CHAPTER-V

CONCLUSION
CHAPTER-V: CONCLUSION

In the Theravada Buddhist canonical literature the Kathavatthu is significant both historically and philosophically. Historically it reports the viewpoints of various Buddhist traditions contributing thereby to our understanding of not only the vast and variegated traditions of Buddhism but also the Indian religion in general. Philosophically it contains the arguments adduced by both opponents and proponents for certain very important religious and philosophical positions. In addition to these two aspects, Kathavatthu's value as a basic treatise on Buddhist hermeneutics is immense. It also provides valuable information regarding the development of both the art of debate and logical reasoning in the context of the Indian religion. Probably, it is the best available document featuring the development of logical reasoning and the procedures of debate as evolved from time to time, with respect to Buddhism in particular and Indian religious and philosophical traditions in general.

In our Concluding part we will look at the other aspects of the discussions held on Kathavatthu and its contribution as a source book on the historical development of the Buddhist Doctrine and Sects.

DATE

Modern scholarship, however, questions the accuracy of several points in the account of the compilation of the Abhidhamma literatures in general and Kathavatthu in particular.

According to Luis O.Gomez,1 "The Pali texts as they are preserved today show clear signs of the work of editors and redactors. Although much in them still has the ring of oral transmission, it is a formalized or ritualized oral tradition, far

from the spontaneous preaching of a living teacher. Different strata of language, history, and doctrine can be recognized easily in these texts. There is abundant evidence that already at the stage of oral transmission the tradition was fragmented, different schools of "reciters" (bhānaka) preserving not only different corpuses (the eventual main categories of the canons) but also different recessions of the same corpus of literature. Finally, we have no way of knowing if the canon written down at the time of Vattagāmani was the Tripitaka as we know it today. There is evidence to the contrary, for we are told that the great South Indian scholar Buddhaghosa revised the canon in the fifth century when he also edited the commentaries preserved in Sinhala and translated them into Pāli, which suggests that Pali literature in general had gone through a period of deterioration before his time."

Most scholars, however, accept the tradition that would have the Pali canon belong to a date earlier than the fifth century; even the commentaries must represent an earlier stratum. However late may be its final recension, the Pali canon preserves much from earlier stages in the development of the religion.

**DEVELOPMENT OF THE BUDDHIST DOCTRINE**

As the original community of wandering mendicants settled in monasteries, a new type of religion arose concerned with the preservation of a tradition and the justification of its institutions. Although the "forest dweller" continued as an ideal and a practice- some were still dedicated primarily to a life of solitude and meditation-the dominant figure became that of the monk-scholar. This new type of religious specialist pursued the study of the early tradition and moved its doctrinal systems in new directions. On the one hand, the old doctrines were classified, defined, and expanded. On the other hand, there was a growing awareness of the gap that separated the new developments from the transmitted creeds and codes. A set of basic or "original" teachings had to be defined, and the practice of exegesis had to be formalized. In fact, the fluidity and uncertainty of
the earlier scriptural tradition may be one of the causes for the development of Buddhist scholasticism. By the time the canons were closed the degree of diversity and conflict among the schools was such, and the tradition was overall so fluid, that it was difficult to establish orthodoxy even when there was agreement on the basic content of the canons. In response to these problems Buddhists soon developed complicated scholastic studies.

The discussions as we find in the Kathavatthu can be linked with some extent to the life of Moggaliputta Tissa Thera. As we have seen in the ‘Introduction’ that during the formative period of Moggaliputtatissa he was primarily taught about meditation and then about Abhidhamma before even learning the sutta. This shows the importance given to the interpretation of the doctrine rather than the doctrine in its crude form, i.e. the sutta. It is also stated that Moggaliputta would have obtained arhathood by mere meditation before even learning the Buddhist doctrine. This question also forms a part of the Kathavatthu.

Then when he met King Asoka he had to describe him about the qualities and virtues of dāna. This point is also discussed directly or indirectly in the Kathavatthu. After that came the situation when he had to define Asoka about the result of Karma (kamma vipāka) what according to him was related directly with volition (cetanā). But the claim that he sent missionaries to various parts of the country to proselytize and preach the Theravāda doctrine, which is the original doctrine according to them, needs to be re-examined in the light of recent archaeological evidences. Because the sites in the Northwestern part of India (including Pakistan and Afghanistan) clearly shows the absence of the settlements of the Theravada monks. See adjoining chart.

The following list proves beyond doubt that the traditional account stating that ‘the missionaries sent by Asoka preached Theravāda Buddhism in the Northwestern parts of India’ is not so reliable. Only centres of six Buddhist sects are discovered so far in this region.

---

2 See Kathavatthu, VII. 4, VII. 6, XVII. 11
3 See ibid, VIII.9, XIII.7, XX.1
List of Buddhist Sects in the North Western India as known from Archaeological Data and Literary Source

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sects</th>
<th>Centres</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bahuśrutiya</td>
<td>Pālāṭu Dheri (1/2 a mile from Rajar, modern Peshwar) N.W.F.P., Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dharmaguptaka</td>
<td>Udḍiyāna, (Udyana) Swat Valley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kāśyapiya</td>
<td>Bedadi (12 miles North North-west of Mansehra) N.W.F.P., Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Takṣaśilā (Taxila) modern Shah Dheri, Punjab, Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahāsāṃghika</td>
<td>Andarāb, Kabul, Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Khavada (modern Wardak county) Maydan, Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Udḍiyāna, (Udyana) Swat Valley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mūlasarvāstivāda</td>
<td>Gandhāra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gilgit, Northern Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kāśmira, Kashmir Valley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarvāstivāda</td>
<td>Chinapati</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shāh-ji-ki-Dheri, modern Peshwar, Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tor Dherai, Baluchistan, Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Udḍiyāna, (Udyana) Swat Valley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zeda (near Und, Upper Indus) N.W.F.P., Pakistan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regarding the development of logic as evident from the Kathāvatthu one has to consider the perspective of Buddha’s teaching and the use of logic in propagating the dhamma. A.K. Warder says, “In India the main stimulus to the

---

4 Khettri,Sarita: Buddhism in North-Western India, R.N Bhattacharya, Kolkata, 2006, p.275
development of logic came from the practice of debating, great public debates in which rival philosophical schools engaged in argument under the chairmanship of an umpire and sought to uphold their doctrines and refute their opponents.\textsuperscript{5} The nature of the Buddha's participation in these events has to be understood carefully. On the one hand we have clear evidences in the discourses to show that the Buddha did not wish to take part in debates where participants were simply trying to win over others. On the other hand, there are many instances of the Buddha's getting into situations where he clearly has to prove his point.

In the \textit{Dutthāṭhaka, Pasuṣa, Culavivāha} and \textit{Mahāvivāha} of the \textit{Suttanipāṭa} the central message is that debates arise due to dogmatism in views and therefore, one must give up such tenacious grasp on views which resulting unfriendly debates. The sage has been described as one who does enter into any controversy that has arisen.\textsuperscript{6} The proper attitude has been summarized in the following admonition:\textsuperscript{7}

"These disputes arise among recluses and as a result of them there is elation and depression. Seeing this, [you should] avoid disputation. There is no value in it other than the praise won thereby".

This disapproval of debate where logical reasoning was used in all kind of manner does not necessarily prove that the Buddha did not like logical reasoning itself. The Buddha identifies himself with those who profess the basis of a religion after finding a final and ultimate insight in this life by gaining a higher knowledge personally.\textsuperscript{8} According to this admission the teaching of the Buddha is neither one received through the tradition nor one based on mere logical reasoning. It is significant to note that none of the basic teachings of the Buddha, the four noble truths, the three signata etc., which include his insight into human existence, is found through logical reasoning or metaphysical speculation. Why logical reasoning was not recognized as a means of gaining religious knowledge has been explained in the Sandakasutta of the Majjhimaniyakaya. According to this discourse,

\textsuperscript{6} 'Vādañca jātām muni no upeti', Suttanipāṭa, 780
\textsuperscript{7} Suttanipāṭa, 828
\textsuperscript{8} Sayam abhiśā sacchikatvā
takka or logical reasoning does not necessarily guarantee the truth, for it is possible that one’s view is well-reasoned or ill-reasoned and true or false. According to this characterization the following four situations can be obtained: (1) well-reasoned truth, (2) well-reasoned, (3) ill-reasoned truth, and (4) ill-reasoned falsehood. Because the procedure is liable to error the Buddha has not taken it as a reliable source of religious knowledge. We may connect the well-known epithet ‘atakkāvacara’ to this context. In the Ariyapariyesenasutta (of the Majjhimanikaya) the Buddha has described his teaching (dhamma) as something outside the scope of pure reason. According to the commentary, ‘dhamma’ in this context refers to the four truths, and they are outside the scope of pure reason for they cannot be grasped only by knowledge. What this means is that the realization of the vision of the four noble truths is something that requires more than mere logical reasoning. By ‘nāma’ the commentator must be referring to the ‘insight knowledge’ (vipassana nāma) through which the actual realization of truth occurs. We also find this incidence in the life of Moggaliputta tissa. It was told in the tradition that he was at first taught about Vipassana meditation and then Abhidhamma and the Dhamma.

This rejection of logical reasoning as a reliable source for the ultimate knowledge does not mean that it was totally rejected by the Buddha or by the early Buddhist tradition. The message of the Sandakasutta is that it could be either true of false. In so far as it leads to correct conclusions the Buddha does not seem to have rejected logical reasoning.

The Buddha had not shunned discussion with people who came to argue with him on matters of religious importance. It is generally true to say that the Buddha was more concerned about establishing his own view than disproving those of others. But whenever it was necessary to show the futility of the meaninglessness of the others’ views the Buddha was not hesitant to do so. A good example occurs in the Buddha’s discussion with Upāli, a lay supporter of

\[9\text{atakkavacaroti takkena avacaritabbo ogahtabbo na hoti naneneva avacaritabbo MA.I. p.174}\]
Jaina Mahāvīra. In the course of the discussion Upāli announces that, in Jain’s view, physical act is more important than mental or verbal acts. The Buddha asks a few simple questions for Upāli in answering which he contradicts himself and commits to the position that Buddha says: what you said later does not connect with what you said earlier and vice versa.

“na kho te sandhiyati purimena vā pacchimam pacchimena vā purimam.”

The demonstration of this self-contradictory situation is taken as defeating conclusively the opponent’s argument.

Apart from the logical reasoning of this nature, early Buddhist literature is quite outstanding in its exercises in conceptual clarification and analysis. Conceptual analysis is a very significant aspect in the teaching of the Buddha. K.N. Jayatilleke¹ thinks that the Buddha claimed himself to be an analyst and not one who makes categorical statements. However as Y. Karunadasa² has pointed out, in his analysis Jayatilleke has not noticed a very important limiting term ‘ettha’ which means ‘here’ or ‘in this context’. Thus the statement has to be understood not as the Buddha identifying himself with one who makes analytical statements exclusively but one who makes both kinds of statements depending on the situation. In the same discussion the Buddha admits that he has made both categorical and non-categorical statements. Thus although it is true that the Buddha did not identify himself to be an exclusive analyst, still analysis, clarification and classification of concepts has been key characteristics in the discourses of the Buddha. One can find plenty of examples for this in Saccavibhaṅgasutta where all the key concepts related to the four noble truths have been analyzed and explained.

¹ Upālisutta: Majjhimanikāya I. pp.371-387
² Jayatilleke, op.cit., p.278
³ Karunadasa, Y. Buddhist Analysis of Matter, Colombo, 1967, pp. 4-5
THE FORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF BUDDHIST SECTS

Given the geographical and linguistic diversity of India and the lack of a central authority in the Buddhist community one can safely speculate that Buddhist sects arose early in the history of the religion. Tradition speaks of a first, but major, schism occurring at (or shortly after) the Second Council in Vaisali, one hundred years after the death of the founder. Whether the details are true or not, it is suggestive that this first split was between the Sthaviras and the Mahāsāṃghikas, the prototypes of the two major divisions of Buddhism: “Hinayāna” and “Mahāyāna”.

For at least five centuries, the Buddha’s teaching was actually preserved by oral transmission alone, very probably in different, though related, dialects. This, and the absence of an authoritative ecclesiastical hierarchy in the samgha, constitutes two obvious sources of progressive distortion and alteration of the message left by the Blessed One to his immediate disciples. Furthermore, this message was not entirely clear or convincing to everyone it addressed, leading Buddhist preachers to furnish explanations and interpretations of the teaching. Finally, the teaching given by the Buddha was far from a complete system containing solutions to all the problems that might occur to the minds of people as diverse as those it was destined to reach. Thus, minks and lay disciples, as well as people outside Buddhism but curious and interested in its doctrine-brahman opponents, Jains, and other-easily found numerous flaws, errors, and contradictions in the teaching. These troubled the samgha but pleased those who were determined to refute or discredit it. Although the Buddhist preachers who improvised answers to these varied questions and objections were guided by what they knew and understood of the Buddha’s teaching, their attempts expanded upon the original teaching and at the same time inevitably created new causes for differences and disputes within the heart of the community itself.
The account of the Second Council sees it as the beginning of a major split. In this version the main points of contention were monastic issues—the exact content and interpretation of the code. But doctrinal, ritual, and scholastic issues must have played a major role in the formation of separate schools. Many of the points of controversy centered on the question of: 'the nature of the state of liberation' and 'the status of the liberated person'. Is the liberated human (arhat) free from all moral and karmic taint? Is the state of liberation (nirvana) a condition of being or nonbeing? Can there be at the same time more than one fully awakened person (samyaksambuddha) in one world system? Are persons already on their way to full awakening, the bodhisattvas or future Buddhas, deserving of worship? Do they have the ability to descend to the hells to help other sentient beings? These questions raised against the authority of the Arhats and their fallibility probably justify the historicity of the fact that the arhat theras opposed the amendment of the Vinaya in the line of 'Khuddānukhuddaka sikkhapadāni' and thereby enhanced the schism in the Order. This incident probably sparked the fire among the 'rebellion group' so as to challenge the authority of the arhats as well as the Canon preserved by these arhats.

Among these doctrinal disputes one emerges as emblematic of the most important fissure in the Buddhist community. This was the polemic surrounding the exalted state of the arhat (Pali, arahant). Most of the Buddhist schools believed that only a few human beings could aspire to become fully awakened beings (samyaksambuddha), others had to content themselves with the hope of becoming free from the burden of past karman and attaining liberation in nirvana, without the extraordinary wisdom and virtue of Buddha-hood. But the attainment of liberation was in itself a great achievement, and a person who was assured of an end to rebirth at the end of the present life was considered the most saintly, deserving of the highest respect, a "worthy" (arhat). Some of the schools even attributed to the arhat omniscience and total freedom from moral taint. Objections were raised against those who believed in the faultless wisdom of the arhat, including obvious limitations in their knowledge of everyday, worldly
affairs. Some of these objections were formalized in the “Five Points” of Mahādeva, after its purported proponent. These criticisms can be interpreted either as a challenge to the belief in the superhuman perfection of the arhat or as a plea for the acceptance of their humanity.

After this schism in the second council new subdivision arose, reaching by the beginning of the Common Era a total of approximately thirty different denominations or schools and sub-schools. Tradition refers to this state of sectarian division as the period of the “Eighteen Schools,” since some of the early sources count eighteen groups. Though, these lists of schools differ in different books. Even the list provided by the Kathāvatthu contains the name of only fourteen schools from the traditional list which has been discussed earlier.

Once again in the words of Gomez,13 “The controversies among the Eighteen Schools identified each group doctrinally, but it seems unlikely that in the early stages these differences lead to major rifts in the community, with the exception of the schism between the two trunk schools of the Sīhavira and the Mahāsamghika; and even then, there is evidence that monks of both schools often lived together in a single monastic community. Among the doctrinal differences, however, we can find the seeds of future dissension, especially in the controversies relating to ritual. The Mahisāsakas, for instance, claimed that there is more merit in worshiping and making offerings to the samgha than in worshiping a stupa, as the latter merely contains the remains of a member of the samgha who is no more. The Dharmaguptakas replied that there is more merit in worshiping a stupa, because the Buddha’s path and his present state (in nirvāṇa) are far superior to that of any living monk. Here we have a fundamental difference with both social and religious consequences, for the choice is between two types of communal hierarchies as well as between two types of spiritual orders.”

Bareau has rightly pointed out that, “Certain of these arguments affected, and even impassioned, a large number of schools for long periods, sometimes for centuries, as evidenced by the treatises and commentaries on canonic texts that have come down to us. In these more important controversies the distribution of the sects between the two opposing camps is often independent of their derivational connections. It may be that relations of good neighborliness and, hence, ties based on geographical distribution favored such doctrinal alliances.”

The Sarvāstivādins, the Sammatiyas, and the Purvasailas firmly believed in an ‘intermediate existence’ (antarabhāva) that linked death and rebirth. This concept was rejected by the Theravādins and the Mahāsamghikas. The latter, along with the Andhakas and the Sarvāstivādins, maintained that the bodhisattva may be born in the so-called evil existences (durgati), even in the various hells, to lighten the sufferings of the beings who live in them. The Theravādins denied that this was possible because, in their view, of the automatic retribution consequent upon all actions, a retribution that completely determines the circumstances of rebirths. According to the Vātsiputriyas, the Sammatiyas, the Sarvāstivādins, and the Purvasailas, the arhats could backslide in varying degrees and even lose nirvāṇa, but the Theravādins, Mahāsamghikas, and Sautrāntikas refused to accept this idea. The Theravādins, the Sarvāstivādins, and the Dharmaguptakas agreed that it was possible for the gods to practice the sexual abstinence (brahmacharya) of ascetics, whereas the Sammatiyas and the Mahīśāsakas judged this impossible. For the Theravādins and the Sarvāstivādins, there were only five fates (gātis), namely, those of gods, men, animals, starving ghosts (pretas), and the damned, but the Andhakas and the Vatsputriyas added another, that of the asuras, the superhuman beings who were adversaries of the gods (devas) yet were not devils in the Christian sense.

The Mahāsāṁghikas, the Theravādins, and the Mahīśāsakas taught that the clear understanding (abhisamaya) of the four noble truths (catvāryāryasatyāni) was instantaneous, whereas the Andhakas, the Sarvāstivādins, and the Sammatiyas believed that it happened gradually. So important was this dispute that it was still the central theme of the council of Lhasa (held in the eighth century), where Chinese and Tibetan Buddhist teachers opposed each other in doctrinal debate. The Sarvāstivādins seem to have been along in denying that 'thought' (citta) is inherently pure and contaminated only by accidental impurities, a belief held by the Mahāsāṁghikas, the Theravādins, and the neighboring schools.

The Theravādins, the Vatsiputriyas, and the Sammatiyas recognized only one absolute, or 'unconditioned' (asamskṛta) dharma, namely, nirvana, but the majority of schools also considered empty space (ākāsa) an unconditioned dharma. Several of them taught that “dependent origination” (pratityasamutpāda), the path (mārga) of enlightenment, and sometimes other entities as well, in particular the “suchness” (tathatā) or “permanence” (sthitatā) of things, were equally absolute and unconditioned. Thus the ideas of these schools were quite close to those of the Mahāyāna.

Several important debates centered on the nature of the passion, more specifically, latent passion or tendencies (anusaya) and active passions or obsessions (paryavasthāna). The Mahāsāṁghikas, the Andhakas, and the Mahīśāsakas set up a very precise distinction between them, while the Theravādins and Sarvāstivādins chose to see in them only two aspects of the same passions. For the Theravādins and the Sarvāstivādins, tendencies and obsessions alike were connected, or cofunctioned, with thought (cittasamprayukta), whereas from the Mahāsāṁghikas, the Vatsiputriyas, the Sammatiyas, and Mahīśāsakas, tendencies were unconnected, did not confunction, with thought (cittaviprayukta),
while obsessions were connected with it. As for the Andhakas, they held that obsessions and tendencies were equally separate from thought.

According the Sarvastivadins and the Vatsiputriyas, ascetics of other, non-Buddhist beliefs (tirthika) could, through their efforts, obtain the five lesser supernatural faculties (abhijna) ad thus work various miracle-perceiving the thoughts of others, recollecting their past lives, seeing the rebirths of creatures as conditioned by their past actions, and so forth. The Mahisasakas and the Dharmaguptakas, however, declared that the five supernatural faculties-like the sixth, the cleansing of impurities, that is the attainment of nirvana—could be acquired only by Buddhist ascetics treading the Path of Enlightenment.

The relation between 'matter' (rupa) and the mechanism of the ripening (vipaka) of actions (karman) also gave rise to disagreements. For the Theravādins, matter is independent of the ripening of actions, and it is not the fruit of this ripening. It is morally neither good nor bad but inherently neutral. In contrast, the Sarvāstivādins, Sammitiyas, and Mahisasakas taught that matter can be good or bad when it participates, through the body of man, in a good or bad act. Matter is also the fruit of ripening when it becomes the body-be it handsome or ugly, robust or sickly-received by a person at birth as a consequence of past deeds.

According to the Sarvāstivādins, the five forms of sensory perception are always associated with passionate desires (rāgas). The Mahāsaṅghikas and the Mahisasakas thought that they were sometimes associated and sometimes unassociated with them, while the Vatsiputriyas rejected both these possibilities, declaring that the five forms of sensory perception are morally neutral by nature and thus can never be either good or bad.

The most significant of these divergences of opinion, which are important features in the history of early Buddhist thought, are pointed out so that the
readers can well understand that despite so-called severe schism in the Saṅgha Buddhism in general flourished as a whole, not as a part, for centuries in India. The monks belonging to various schools existed in the same area or Saṅgha with harmony yet differences of opinion survived. This proves the democratic nature of the Order which helped in the development of the variegated interpretations of the Doctrine. Buddhist sites of later periods and Buddhist education centres give ample proof to this harmonious living. Nālanda is probably the best example of that. Also in the Pannasa Jataka, a Southeast Asian Theravāda Buddhist literature composed in the line of Pali Jatakas contains at least two stories, viz. No.30 and 33 that record incidents of animals being taken to heaven. Although the Theravadins denied such a possibility in the Kathavatthu [XX.4] but their opponents- identified by the commentary as the Andhakas-maintained the affirmative, citing Sakka’s divine elephant Eravana as an example. The commentary explains away the Andhaka example by noting that some devas are able to assume animal shapes at will. Thus it is evident that conflicting ideas got amalgamated in the larger Buddhist culture. The Kathāvatthu did not mention about any single school or sect probably believing in the same harmony, because as we have seen in our previous discussions that the text does not even mention about the schism also. Thus the Kathāvatthu becomes one of the most important Buddhist document providing evidences of continuous exchange of dialogues between various groups of Buddhist thinkers.
A chronologically arranged list of the Schismatic schools, to which by the commentary *Kathavatthu Atthakatha* (5th century A. D.) are ascribed the opinions treated in this work. The figures refer to numbers of the discussions in the *Kathavatthu*.

4TH CENTURY B.C.

**Vajjiputta**

1, 2

**Mahimsāsaka**

21, 55, 59, 82, 98, 106, 161, 181, 192, 197

**Mahāsāṃghika**

98-103, 105, 107-09, 112, 116-9, 135, 144-5, 149, 155-6, 184, 201, 204

**Gokulika**

18

**Sabbatthivādi**

2, 6, 7, 19, 113

**Sammitiyas**

1-5, 19, 26, 28, 29, 66, 75, 80, 82-4, 98, 106, 141-2, 154, 161-2, 182.

3RD CENTURY B.C.

**Bhadrayānīka**

19

**Kassapīka**

8

2ND CENTURY B.C.

**Hetuvādin**

148, 150-1, 153, 157, 168-9, 192, 194, 219

1ST CENTURY B.C.

---

**Uttaravathaka** 34-7, 39, 40, 45, 47, 58-9, 74, 87-8, 90-1, 113, 120-1, 123, 126-7, 129-30, 132, 137-8, 159-60, 175, 178-80, 185, 189, 191, 193, 199, 205-6, 209-11, 213, 216, 219

**1ST CENTURY A.D.**


**Pubbaselivaya** 11-6, 55-6, 77-7, 83-4, 86, 93-5, 110, 122, 128, 133-4, 136, 143, 158, 183, 187-8, 198, 214

**Aparaseliyas** 11, 128,

**Siddhatthikas** 64-9, 166-7

**2ND CENTURY A.D.**

**Vetulyakas** 170-4, 176-7, 215

---

**A Diagram Of The Various Sects And Sub-Sects Mentioned In The Kathavatthu**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mahāsaṅghikas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>↓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ekabbohārikas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>↓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gokulikas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>↓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paññattivādins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>↓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bāhulikas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>↓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cetiyaśvādins</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theravādins</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>↓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabbatthivādins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>↓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahimasasakas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>↓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vajjiputtakas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>↓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhadrayānikas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Kassapika

Sankrantiyakas

Suttavādins

Dhammaguttikas

Dhammattariyas

Channāgārikas

Sammitiyas

---

16 Ibid, p. 60