CHAPTER-III

CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CONTENT
By about the first century BCE, about 200 to 300 years after the death of the Buddha, (E.P. = Era of Parinirvāṇa) the community of his followers had changed significantly. From a loose grouping of itinerant mendicants, practicing largely as individuals, there emerged communities with a settled life of scholarly study and religious discipline. In this more organized setting, Buddhist monks began to reexamine the received teaching, to extend it to new areas, and to elaborate and refine techniques designed to ensure its preservation. Eventually, this new scholastic enterprise became not only the medium for transmitting and understanding the traditional teaching but also tradition in its own right and, for the various schools that were soon to emerge, the source of multiple, even rival traditions.

Whilst the Buddha himself categorically rejected all authority except experience, his followers in the course of time tended more and more to regard his statements, as handed down among them, as authoritative. In a desire to maintain his teaching faithfully, many of them seem to have adopted an attitude which could be described as flatly contradictory to his own. In any case the early Buddhists during the first centuries after the time of the Buddha attempted to systematize his doctrines in a consistent and orderly manner. Besides the records they preserved of dialogues between the Buddha and others, in which he set forth his views discursively, varying according to the exigencies of the occasion, they had some sets of brief notes or headings (mātrkā) summarising the doctrine in a more regular, but highly condensed, form intended for ease of memorising.

These notes served as a basis for the elaboration of systematic texts, known as Abhidharma, which began by selecting relevant explanations in the dialogues to attach to the headings and continued by annotating these with new analysis, definitions and discussions. The aim was precise formulation and the
working out of a system in which all the terms are defined and arranged in their mutual relations. During the first two centuries after the parinirvāṇa of the Buddha there appears to have come into existence an Abhidharma in three main sections: (1) analysis and definitions of the topics and phenomena propounded by the Buddha; (2) classification of the phenomena in various ways and listings of those phenomena which can occur in conjunction; (3) a study of conditionality and causality, the different types of condition or causal relation found in the sequence of conditioned origination. This Abhidharma does not survive, because during the second century and afterwards the Buddhists divided into several schools which disagreed especially over this systematic extension of their doctrine and consequently produced their own separate versions of it. As approximate idea of it can be obtained by comparing the extant Abhidharmas of the Buddhist schools. In this regard the Kathavatthu serves an important role in ascertaining the nature of the Doctrine and its development.

In this chapter while critically analyzing the text we shall see how the debates arose concerning certain subjects of discourse. These subjects are classified in the Points of Controversy where a list of such controverted doctrinal issues, is given. I have followed that list in preparing the summary of doctrines available from the Kathavatthu on certain subjects of discourse. Nyanatilika Mahathera, was one of the earliest scholars from the West to present a detailed study of the Pali abhidhamma. His "Guide through the Abhidhamma Pitaka" (1938) has helped many who did not have the patience to traverse the arid desert of Abhidhamma terminology, analysis, and categories. The summary of the Kathavatthu done by him as well as that of James P. Medermott given in the Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophy Volume VII are very helpful for beginners like us.

Also there will be discussions on major issues like Nibbāna and Kamma, which are intricately and indirectly discussed within the framework of the debates but are not clearly specified as such in the book. Other major doctrinal aspects,
relating to the dissentient schools or sects, that really turned the course of Buddhism forever, will be discussed in the later chapter.

There will also be a discussion in this chapter on the development of Logic as evident in the Kathāvatthu.

**POINTS OF CONTROVERSY GROUPED ACCORDING TO THE SUBJECT OF DISCOURSE**

The following portion will show how several topics were discussed in the Kathāvatthu. This will bring forth the major philosophical issues that were discussed and will also show the trivial issues based on not-so-philosophical grounds. The figures in the list show the chapter number in Roman numerals and the point of controversy or the particular section of the text in Arabic numerals.

**Of the Buddha**

**Buddha’s everyday Usage, II.10.**

II.10. Was the Buddha’s worldly speech supramundane?

(1) The opponent holds the affirmative. The rejoinder denies the Buddha’s ordinary speech was supramundane on the grounds that it was heard by the mundane ears of ordinary people.

(2) The opponent is asked whether the Buddha’s terminology was supramundane—the implication being that he used mundane terminology to speak of spiritual matters.

(3) Since the supramundane is no apprehended by the physical senses, no one could have heard the Buddha’s everyday speech if the opponent’s thesis were true.

(4-7) His listeners were affected by his everyday speech in ways incompatible with the supramundane nature

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(8) The Sakavādi holds that whether the Buddha’s spoke of worldly or supramundane matters he used the same worldly speech.

(9-11) The opponent now affirms the Buddha’s speech is mundane or supramundane depending on its content.

Buddha’s Powers, III, 1, 2.

III.1. Whether all the powers of the Buddha are also possessed by his leading disciples.

(1-2) The opponent holds the powers of the Buddha are also possessed by his disciples. This should wrongly imply that they are all-knowing as he is.

(3-11) The Sakavādi holds only some of the Buddha’s powers are held in common with his disciples. The knowledge of the Buddha concerning causal matters and the like is without limit that of the disciples limited.

(12-16) That all can share knowledge of the extinction of the intoxicants is taken to confirm the opponent’s proposition. But in rejoinder it is noted that not all share knowledge of the development of the faculties.

III.2 That of the ten powers of knowledge, all are to be considered noble.

(1) The opponent affirms the power to discern causes is noble.

(2-3) This is rejected on the grounds that emptiness (i.e. the suññatā of nibbāna), the signals and what cannot be desired are not the object of this power.

(4-7) Since the opponent denies that liberation, etc., are objects of the power of a Buddha, it is argued that that power cannot be noble.

(8-12) Repeats the argument with regard to the Buddha’s power to see the death and rebirth of beings.

(14-16) The point of 13 is expressed in negative terms and the argument of 13-14 repeated substituting “knowledge of the three signs as object is noble”.

Enlightened through Enlightenment? IV.6

IV.6. That one becomes (the) Buddha through enlightenment.
(1-10) The debate hinges on an ambiguity in Pali, the opponent taking the position that one becomes enlightened through enlightenment, the rejoinder assuming this to be a claim that one becomes the Buddha through enlightenment.

**Buddha’s marks, IV.7**

IV.7. That one gifted with the characteristic marks is destined for enlightenment.

(1-6) The opponent holds that one possessed of the 32 characteristic marks is a *bodhisatta*. This is based on an interpretation of *Digha* III.145 where it is stated that “two careers are open” to the individual thus endowed. The rejoinder points out that this interpretation wrongly identifies the universal king as a *bodhisatta*, and seems to imply that one possessed of some of the characteristic marks is a partial *bodhisatta*.

**Gifts to the Buddha brought Blessing, XVII. 10**

XVII.10. That it ought no be said that what is given to the Buddha has great fruit.

(1-3) The opponent holds that what is given to the Buddha is not really helpful, as he is beyond earthly enjoyment. The objection is that since he is the supreme field of merit, gifts to the Buddha do bear great fruit.

**Did the Buddha visit earth by proxy only? XVIII.1**

XVIII.1 Concerning the world of men.

(1-4) The opponent holds it ought not be said that the Buddha lived in the world of men. The thesis is based on the sutra that says the Buddha was not defiled by the world (*Samyutta* III.140).

**Did the Buddha teach by proxy only? XVIII.2.**

XVIII.2. Concerning exposition of the dharma.
The opponent holds it ought not be said that the Buddha himself taught the dharma, but that it was taught by his magical creation.

**Did the Buddha feel pity? XVII.3**

**XVIII. 3. Concerning compassion**

(1-5) The opponent holds that the Buddha felt no compassion, since he had conquered his attachment. The objection is that the thesis implies the Buddha was ruthless.

**Was everything of the Buddha fragrant? XVIII.4**

**XVIII.4. Concerning odors**

(1-2) The opponent holds that the fragrance of even the Buddha’s excrement surpassed that of all other things. The rejoinder holds that had this been true, some would have used the Buddha’s excrement for perfume.

**Could he work wonders against nature? XXI.4**

**XXI. 4. Concerning supernatural power**

(1-5) The opponent holds that either a Buddha or his disciple had the power to do what he wills. The case of *Pilindavaccha* is cited as evidence. The rejoinder points to numerous wishes which such powers could not fulfill, a wish for perpetual moonlight to give but one example.

**How to Buddhas mutually differ? XXI.5**

**XXI. 5. Concerning Buddha**

The opponent holds that there are differences among Buddhas. The *Sakavādi* objects that in essential matters such as enlightenment there is no
difference. The only differences are in such accidental characteristics as age and physical appearance.

Do they pervade the firmament? XXI.6

XXI.6. Concerning all directions

(1-2) The opponent holds that the Buddhas abide in all directions. The objection is that Sākyamuni, the historical Buddha, does not persist in all directions, nor can a separate Buddha be identified for each direction.

Do Bodhisattvas decree their own suffering? XXIII.3

XXIII.3. Concerning one who governs himself according to his own inclination. (The Nalanda edition numbers this as XXIII.3-6.)

The opponent holds that a bodhisattva of his own free will can (a) enter a hellish state, (b) enter a womb, (c) perform difficult tasks and (d) perform acts of penance. In each case the Sakavādi denies what the opponent says.

Are Bodhisattvas assured prior to their last birth? IV.8; XIII.4

IV.8 On entering fixedness on the path.

(1-6) The opponent holds that the Bodhisatta actually entered the path of fixedness (i.e. the path of the stream-winner, etc.) when the Buddha Kasyapa assured him of his future enlightenment. The rejoinder sees the Buddha Kasyapa’s fixedness merely as a prophecy concerning the future.

XIII.4. Concerning the way of assurance.

(1-2) The opponent holds that he who is fixed enters the way of assurance. The objection is that one can be equally fixed in assurance of immediate retribution.
Can the Arahant fall away? 1.2

1.2. The debate in this section centers on whether a perfected being can fall away.

(1-8) The opponent asserts a perfected being can fall away from perfection. This is taken to imply any perfected being can fall away anywhere, at any time, not only from perfection, but also from the stages of never-returned, once-returned, and stream-enterer. If this is so, those on the lower stages must also be able to fall away.

(9-13) This the opponent denies.

(14-20) It is replied that you cannot consistently deny that a perfected being who excels all others in cultivation of 37 matters pertaining to enlightenment (the eight fold path, applications of mindfulness, etc.) can fall away while at the same time denying that those who have cultivated these to a lesser degree can equally fall away.

(21-32) A similar argument is made substituting realization of the four noble truths for cultivation of matters pertaining to enlightenment.

(33-44) To be consistent it must either be maintained (a) that at whatever stage one is at, one must be capable of falling away or (b) that one cannot fall away regardless of one’s stage of development.

48) The opponent modifies his statement to maintain that only the perfected being who now and then reaches liberation can fall away, not the perfected being who has permanently achieved this state.

(49-54) In rejoinder it is maintained that this qualification does not affect the argument.

(55) The opponent is asked for examples of perfected beings who have fallen away, but can give none.
Proof-texts are cited by both sides, *Anguttara* III. 173 in support of the view that the perfected being can fall away; and *Suttanipāta* 714, *Anguttara* III. 378 etc. against the view.

It is claimed a perfected being is led to fall because of delight in business, talk, sleep and the like or because he is assailed by greed, hatred or delusion. But this would imply that he is bound by earthly desires or latent dispositions. However, since this in turn is denied, the original claim is seen to be refuted.

**Can Māras defile an Arahant? II. 1**

II.1. A debate concerning seminal emission on the part of perfected beings.

1-2) The opponent maintains a perfected being can have impure seminal emissions, but denies there is any passion remaining in the perfected being. This is taken to negate the original proposition.

3) The opponent holds this impurity is imparted by the *Māra*-gods, yet admits they themselves have no such impurity. Lacking such themselves, how could they impart it to others?

4) Such impurity is not imparted from the bodies of these gods, from the perfected beings themselves, nor from others—the only possibilities.

5-6) It is not imparted through the pores of the body. The opponent holds it is imparted to the perfected being in order to cause doubt as to his achievement. If the perfected being is free from doubt, this argument fails. If not, he must be capable of doubt as to the principles of faith as well, which is absurd.

7-8) The impurity cannot be due to eating or dinking.

9-13) The *Sakavādi* argues that if perfected being(s) were capable of impure seminal emissions, it would imply sexual interest and activity on their part. But this cannot be for, as the opponent admits, the perfected being has cut off all desires at their roots, cultivated the factors of enlightenment and realized the final goal.
(14-20) The opponent now limits his claim that perfected beings can have impure seminal emissions. He now holds this is so only for perfected beings who are skillful in their dharma but not for those skillful in (an) other dharma(s).

(21) The *Sakavādi* cites *Vinaya* 1.295 in rejoinder.

(22) The opponent argues that since the requisites for monastic life (e.g., robes, alms) can be imparted to a perfected being, the same should also be true of the impurity of seminal emission.

(23) In response it is noted that the argument is flawed since no everything can be imparted to a perfected being.

**An Arahant's knowledge; its limits, II. 2; IV. 10; XXII. 1.**

II.2. A controversy over the knowledge possessed by a perfected being.

(1-4) The opponent holds a perfected being may be lacking in knowledge. The *Sakavādi* takes this as equivalent to the claim that a perfected being may be ignorant. This the opponent denies, although and ordinary man may be both lacking in knowledge and ignorant. The ignorance of an ordinary man may lead him to evil deed, but the lack of knowledge on the part of a perfected being cannot do the same, maintains the opponent.

(5-10) The opponent holds that although the perfected being may lack knowledge, it is not knowledge of spiritual import (e.g., dharma, ethics, causes) that is lacking although such knowledge may be lacking in the case of the ordinary individual.

(11-16) The opponent’s claim that a perfected being may be lacking is limited to the perfected being who is good in his own dharma, and does not apply to the perfected being good at (an) other dharma(s).

(17-21) In opposition to the view that a perfected being may be lacking in knowledge, *Samyutta* II.29, V.434 and IV.1.7, *Suttanipata* 231, and *Vinaya* 1.97, *Samyutta* IV.47, etc., are cited.

(22) The opponent holds a perfected being can lack knowledge of ordinary things like names or directions.
(23) But since it cannot be said he lacks knowledge of the path, the Sakavadi argues he cannot be said to lack knowledge.

IV.10. That putting off all the fetters is tantamount to perfection.

(1-5) The opponent holds that perfection is the putting off of all fetters. His point is merely that all fetters have been put off by the perfected being. The rejoinder, however, takes him to mean that they are put off simultaneously with the achievement of perfection, which to be denied.

XXII.1. Concerning final liberation

The opponent holds that final liberation can be obtained without eliminating a certain fetter.

Can an Arahant doubt? II.3.

II.3. Controversy over whether a perfected being can have doubts.

(1-19) Repeats the argument of II.2 substituting “doubt” for “lack of knowledge” and “perplexity” for “ignorance”.

(20) In rejecting the view that a perfected being can experience doubt, Vinaya I.18, Udana 7, and Dighanikāya II.275 are quoted.

Can others excel him? II.4

II.4. Controversy over whether a perfected being can be excelled by others

(1-19) The argument is similar to that in II.2 and II.3, the opponent holding the affirmative.

(20) In opposition Suttanipata 1064 is quoted.

Arahant and Layman, IV.1.

IV.1. Concerning whether a layman can be a perfected being.

(1-6) The opponent holds that a layman can become a perfected being. His point is that one living in secular circumstances can attain perfection. The
rejoinder assumes that the term “layman” applies not just to the external circumstances of the lay life, but more especially to the fetters binding a layman. Surely one so bound cannot attain perfection.

**Can one inherit Arahantship? IV.2; XXII.5.**

**IV.2.** Concerning whether one can become a perfected being at the moment of rebirth.

(1-2) The opponent so affirms, but not that one can become a stream-enter, once-returner or non-returner at that moment.

(3-4) On questioning he is unequal to provide examples.

(5-6) The rejoinder holds that since rebirth occurs as a result of desire the proposition cannot be valid.

**XXII.5.** Three similar arguments (The Nalanda edition numbers these separately.)

The opponent holds that an embryo is capable of realizing the dharma. The objection is that a perfected being is incapable of hearing and paying attention to the doctrine. This argument is repeated with reference to: (a) attainment of perfection by an embryo, (b) realization of the truth by a dreamer and (c) attainment of perfection by a dreamer.

**An Arahant’s Common Humanity, IV 3**

**IV.3** Concerning the absence of intoxicants (in the case of the perfected being).

(1) The opponent holds that everything about the perfected being or belonging to him is free from the intoxicants. In rejoinder it is noted that only the paths, the fruits of liberation and the factors of enlightenment are free of intoxicants.

(2-8) The perfected being’s body and possessions are not.

(9) In response the opponent argues that since the perfected being is free from the intoxicants, so must be everything connected with him.
Indifference to Sensations, IV.5.

IV.5. Concerning endowment with equanimity.

(1-4) The opponent holds the perfected being is endowed with six-fold equanimity. The rejoinder understands this to imply he experiences six states of equanimity simultaneously, which is not the opponent’s point.

His Attainment as a Final Step, IV.10.

IV.10. That putting off all the fetters is tantamount to perfection.

(1-5) The opponent holds that perfection is the putting off of all fetters. His point is merely that all fetters have been put off by the perfected being. The rejoinder, however, takes him to mean that they are put off simultaneously with the achievement of perfection, which to be denied.

As Adept, V.2.

V.2. Concerning the insight of the adept, i.e. one beyond learning.

(1-4) The opponent holds a disciple (or learner) has knowledge of an adept. The point is that a disciple is supposed to recognize what makes one an adept. The rejoinder, however, takes the proposition to imply the disciple has the same insight as the adept, which of course is to be denied.

Does Karma affect an Arahant? VIII, 11.

VIII.11. Concerning karma as cause.

(1-3) The opponent holds that a perfected being can fall away from perfection as a result of karma, specifically as a result of making malicious accusations against a perfected being in a previous life. The orthodox position considers this idea absurd.
No more Accumulating Merit, XVII.1.

XVII. 1. Concerning a perfected being accumulating merit.

(1-4) The opponent holds that a perfected being can accumulate merit, that is that he can perform merit accumulating acts. The objection is that this thesis wrongly implies a perfected being can build up further karma.

No Untimely Dying, XVII.2.

XVII.2. Whether a perfected being can suffer an untimely death.

(1-5) The opponent holds that since a perfected being must experience the results of all his past karma before death, he cannot die an untimely death. The rejoinder notes the possibility that a perfected being can be murdered, and considers that this would be an untimely death.

His Consciousness at Death, XXII, 2, 3.

XXII. 2. Concerning good awareness

(1-3) The opponent holds that there is good awareness in a perfected being when he attains final release. The objection is that good awareness inevitably involves karmic consequences.

XXII. 3. Concerning unchangeableness

(1-4) The opponent holds that a perfected being is in a state of unchangeableness when he attains final release. The objection is that the perfected being’s final awareness is an ordinary though karmically inoperative consciousness.

Bogus Arahants, XXIII.2.

XXIII.2. Concerning apparent perfected beings
The opponent holds that nonhuman beings with the appearance of perfected beings may engage in sexual intercourse. The objection is that the thesis appears to limit their possible offences to this one from among many.

Is an Arahant’s Emancipation complete? XXI.3; XXII.1.

XXI.3. Concerning fetters

(1-3) The opponent holds that there is attainment of perfected being without eliminating a certain fetter, namely ignorance. His point is that the perfected being lacks the complete knowledge of the Buddha. The objection is based on a different listing of fetters not including lack of total knowledge.

XXII.1. Concerning final liberation

The opponent holds that final liberation can be obtained without eliminating a certain fetter. The dialogue is as at XVI. 3.

Those in the Lower Path-Stages:

The Eighth Man. III.5, 6

III.5. Of becoming liberated.

(1) The opponent’s view is that doubt and wrong views are put behind by an individual on entering the eighth and lowest stage of the path. This is not a claim that from the moment he has entered this stage he is a stream-enterer.

(2-6) The rejoinder holds the proposition implies such an individual has put away the latent bus of doubt and wrong views. This cannot be since such a person has yet to engage in the actual practice of the path he is entering.

(7-11) Though denying the initial proposition, the Sakavādi holds the view that outbursts of doubt and wrong views will no longer occur for one who has entered the eighth stage of the path. The opponent holds the latter claim tantamount to the former.

III.6. Of the faculties of the individual at the eighth or lowest stage of the path.
(1-13) The opponent holds the faculties to be absent in the individual as he enters the path. The rejoinder holds that this is to deny such an individual the faith necessary for him to have entered the path. *Samyutta* V.202 is further cited in opposition to the thesis. In contrast, the point of the opponent's proposition is that these faculties are not yet fully developed as one first enters the path.

**Can Learner discern an Adept? V. 2**

V.2. Concerning the insight of the adept, i.e. one beyond learning.

(1-4) The opponent holds a disciple (or learner) has knowledge of an adept. The point is that a disciple is supposed to recognize what makes one an adept. The rejoinder, however, takes the proposition to imply the disciple has the same insight as the adept, which of course is to be denied.

**The Seven Rebirths' Limit XII. 5, 9.**

XII.5. Concerning (rebirth) seven times at the most.

(1-6) The opponent holds that an individual who is said to be liable to seven more rebirths at the most becomes subjectively assured of final liberation only at the culmination of the seven. The objection is that such a person may achieve the goal in less than the maximum.

XII.9. Concerning the individual who has reached the seventh rebirth.

The argument is as at XII.8. The opponent holds that for an individual accomplished in views the possibility of woeful destiny is eliminated although he may experience desire for objects or creatures in such courses of existence. The *Sakavādi* to the contrary holds that one at the stage of accomplishment in views is still subject to sense desires of a sort which may lead to rebirth in a woeful course.

*Of the Ariyan Nature and Path:*

*Ariva, III.2.*
III.2 That of the ten powers of knowledge, all are to be considered noble.

(1) The opponent affirms the power to discern causes is noble.

(2-3) This is rejected on the grounds that emptiness (i.e. the suññatā of nibbāna), the signals and what cannot be desired are not the object of this power.

(4-7) Since the opponent denies that liberation, etc., are objects of the power of a Buddha, it is argued that that power cannot be noble.

(8-12) Repeats the argument with regard to the Buddha’s power to see the death and rebirth of beings.

(14-16) The point of 13 is expressed in negative terms and the argument of 13-14 repeated substituting “knowledge of the three signs as object is noble”.

The Arivan Mind, VII.9.

VII. 9. Concerning whether the factors of the noble or spiritual adept have maturations.

(1-6) The opponent holds that the factors of the noble have no positive results, for they do not lead to further rebirth. The opposing view stresses in rejoinder that the career of the noble person produces great rewards, namely the fruits of the path as its maturation.

The Outward Life, X.2, 3; XIV. 4.

X. 2. Whether the path is material.

(1-8) The opponent holds that the (eight-) limbed path is a path with physical form, that is that right speech, right action and right livelihood are material and, hence, that the body of one practicing the path is included in the path. The rejoinder denies that the three aspects of the path mentioned are material, hence rejecting the thesis.

X.3. Concerning the path and fivefold consciousness.
The opponent holds that one can be practicing the path while enjoying the five types of sense-consciousness is worldly.

XIV.4. Of noble matter.

(1-3) The opponent holds that the noble forms of speech and action, as material qualities, are derived from the primary material elements. Objection is that such speech and action are moral, rather than amoral as are the primary material elements.

Ill and the Path, XVII. 5.

XVII.5. On the omission of the noble path.

(1-4) The opponent holds that with the exception of the noble path all remaining conditionings are frustrating. The noble path is excepted as leading to the cessation of frustration. The objection is that the thesis leads to the conclusion that the origin of frustration (i.e., the first noble truth), thus reducing the noble truths to three in number.

The word ‘Sorrow’ and the Path, II. 5, 6; XI. 4.

II.5. The controversy concerns whether a person who is in the first meditational state utters the word “frustration” on attaining the stage of the stream-enterer.

(1) The opponent affirms this. But since such an utterance is not universal in such cases, his view is rejected.

(2-3) It is further argued that this position cannot be maintained as there is no corresponding bodily expression.

(4-5) Since he says “frustration” having understood frustration, why should he not equally utter names of the other three noble truths which he has also come to understand? That he does so is denied by the opponent.

(6-7) The opponent holds the object of one’s insight to be the truth of frustration, and the object of his hearing to be the sound “frustration”. For this to
be so and the sound articulate would imply a combination of two simultaneous perceptions or moments of awareness- an impossibility.

(8-11) Although affirming the thesis, the opponent denies that one who has meditated on the devices or who practices meditation for mundane reasons can utter an articulate sound. The *Sakavādi* does not consider these claims reasonable.

(12-13) It is unclear why the possibility is claimed only for one who has attained the first meditational state and not for those in higher meditational states.

(14) The opponent cites the Buddha to the effect that sustained mental application leads to speech. Such application is characteristic of the first meditational state.

(15) This seems to contradict 8-11, as concentration on the devices involves sustained application of mind.

(16) But speech is also caused by identification. But since identification is also present in the higher meditational states, this contradicts 12-13.

(17-19) *Samyutta* IV.217 is cited against the opponent’s proposition.

(20-22) The opponent cites *Anguttara* V.133 in his favor, but this is shown not to apply. He then cites *Anguttara* I.227 and *Samyutta* I.157.

II.6. Controversy over whether repeating “frustration” plays a role in inducing insight.

The opponent claims it dies, and thus is part of the path. This is rejected on the grounds that it wrongly implies that anyone saying the word is following the path.

XI.4. Of the utterance “This is frustrating”.

(1-7) The opponent holds that knowledge of the nature of frustration arises at the same time in the individual who at the moment of entering the path utters the phrases: “This is frustrating.” He is found inconsistent is not admitting the development of knowledge in one who utters the other truths under such circumstances.

*Of a one-staged Path, XVIII. 5.*
XVIII.5. Concerning the one path

(1-5) The opponent holds that the four fruits of the religious life are realized by pursuit of a single path. The objection considers the paths of stream-enterer, once-returner, non-returner and perfected being separate and distinct.

XX.5. Concerning the path

(1-6) The opponent holds that the noble path is fivefold only. Right speech, action and livelihood are not counted as limbs of the path because they are not states of awareness, as are the other limbs, and on the basis of a proof-text which suggests that one who is already pure in action, speech and livelihood can go on to pursue the path. Objection is based on numerous scriptural references to the path as eightfold.

The Assured Order of the two Paths, IV. 8; V. 4; VI. 1; XIX.7.

IV.8 On entering fixedness on the path.

(1-6) The opponent holds that the Bodhisatta actually entered the path of fixedness (i.e. the path of the stream-winner, etc.) when the Buddha Kāśyapa (Kassapa) assured him of his future enlightenment. The rejoinder sees the Buddha Kāśyapa's fixedness merely as a prophecy concerning the future.

(7-8) He cites Vinaya I.91 = Majjhima I.171 = Therigatha 129.15 and Samyutta V.422 in the rejoinder.

V.4. Concerning fixedness.

(1-7) The opponent holds that in one not yet possessed of fixedness on the path, there is knowledge requisite for going on to fixedness. The rejoinder takes this as a claim that only the ordinary individual not yet engaged on the path is capable of developing knowledge necessary to assure achievement of the goal.
The point of the thesis, rather, is that even in one not yet fixed in his pursuit of the path the possibility of developing the knowledge necessary for success may nonetheless exist.

VI.1. Concerning whether fixedness is unconditioned.

(1-6) The opponent holds fixedness on the path to be unconditioned. The intent is to maintain that once one is fixed on the path so as to assure its fruition, the nature of this fixedness is such that it cannot cease. The objection is that to use the term "unconditioned" to refer to fixedness in this way wrongly makes fixedness equivalent to liberation.

XIX. 7. Concerning final fixedness

(1-8) The opponent holds that the ordinary person can possess final fixedness. The objection notes that an ordinary person can commit heinous crimes, harbor doubts or adopt annihilationist views, none of which is possible for one possessed of final fixedness.

The 'Un-included', XIV. 9.

XIV.9. Concerning the un-included.

(1-2) The opponent holds that speculation is to be found in the un-included. The objection is that the term "un-included" is limited to the experiences appropriate to the path and to liberation.

*Of the Average Man or Worldling*

Does the average man renounce lust and ill-will? I. 5.

I.5 The controversy concerns whether an ordinary person who achieves higher states renounces his desires while still a man of the world.

(1-6) The opponent maintains that the ordinary person who achieves the higher stages of the path does renounce sensuous desires and attachment as an
ordinary person. The Sakavādi maintains this is the same as saying these desires are thoroughly arrested. The opponent disagrees.

(7-10) The opponent holds the ordinary person renounces these desires by means of a path belonging to the material realm. In rejoinder, it is noted that such a path does not lead to enlightenment and freedom from the fetters and intoxicants which lead to grasping and defilement; whereas the path leading to the stage of never-returner does lead to such results.

(11-13) The opponent says the ordinary person who has overcome his desires achieves the status of never-returner as soon as he has comprehended the truth. Why not say he becomes a perfected being? To say he achieves the status of non-returner must wrongly imply he achieves the lower stages beginning with that of stream-enterer at the same time.

(14-15) In defense the opponent cites Anguttara III.373, while Anguttara IV. 104ff. is quoted in rejoinder.

**May the average man (as such) possess final assurance? XIX. 7.**

XIX. 7. Concerning final fixedness

(1-8) The opponent holds that the ordinary person can possess final fixedness. The objection notes that an ordinary person can commit heinous crimes, harbor doubts or adopt annihilationist views, none of which is possible for one possessed of final fixedness.

**Has the average man insight? XX.2.**

XX.2. Concerning knowledge

(1-3) The opponent holds that there can be no knowledge in the case of an ordinary person. The debate results from the opponent's failure to distinguish between "knowledge" in the sense of "worldly knowledge" and in the sense of "spiritual insight". The thesis denies knowledge in the latter sense to the ordinary individual. The objection allows knowledge in the former sense to such a person.
Can the average man have more than average experience? XXI. 2.

XXI.2. Concerning one who is not separated

(1-3) The opponent holds that an ordinary person is not separated from factors of the three worlds. The point is that since he cannot tell which world his actions will lead to, he cannot be held incapable of actions leading to any of the three worlds. The objection is that the thesis implies an ordinary person can experience factors in all three worlds simultaneously.

Of Devas

Do the Devas lead the ‘higher life’? I. 3

I.3. The claim that there is no observance of the religious life (brahmacarya) among the gods is debated.

(1-2) The opponent denies there is observance of the religious life among the gods, yet-inconsistently—also denies they are physically, mentally or morally defective.

(3) The Sakavādi maintains there is such observance, but denies that gods observe the monastic discipline and that Buddhas become enlightened among them. How then, he is asked, can they be said to observe the religious life?

(4-7) In rejoinder he notes that laymen do not follow the monastic discipline, yet may nonetheless lead a religious life.

(8-10) He further notes that the religious life is led in cities can countries other than where the Buddha became enlightened. Thus the absence of enlightened ones in the world of the gods does not make the opponent’s case.

(11-14) The Sakavādi claims the religious life is observed by some gods, but not by all. The opponent considers this inconsistent. However, it is pointed out the even among men only some observe the religious life.
Since the never-returner overcomes the upper five fetters and realizes final liberation in the pure heavenly abodes, observance of the religious life must be possible among the gods of those spheres.

(19) To claim otherwise is as much as to hold that the perfected being is capable of rebirth.

Do they practice self-control? III.10


(1-8) The opponent holds there is restraint among certain gods. In rejoinder this is taken to imply its absence among some gods, since for them to refrain from a vice implies they are otherwise capable of such a vice. The opponent responds that if they lack moral restraint, this must mean they are evildoers.

Can Unconscious Devas be conscious? III.11.

III.11. Concerning (the sphere of) identification.

(1-7) The opponent holds there is identification among beings in the sphere where there is no identification at precisely the moment of death from that sphere or rebirth into it. This is not a claim that such beings identify things during their life in this sphere as the rejoinder suggests. The opponents cited a Dighanikaya sutta [iii.p.33].

Of the Order

As Abstract Notion, it cannot accept gifts, XVII. 6.

XVII.6. That it ought not be said the monastic order accepts gifts.

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(1-5) The opponent holds that it ought not be said that the monastic order accepts gifts. The thesis is based on the assumption that the term *sangha* refers to the paths and their function.

**Or purify the same, XVII. 7.**

XVII.7. That it ought no be said the monastic order sanctifies gifts.

(1-4) The argument is as at XVII.6. The opponent holds that it ought not be said that the monastic order purifies or sanctifies gifts. The thesis is based on the assumption that the term *sangha* refers to the paths and their function.

**Or share in daily life, XVII. 8.**

XVII.8. That it ought not be said that the monastic order enjoys (lit."eats", *bhuñjati*).

(1-4) The argument is as at XVII.6. The opponent holds that it should not be said that the monastic order 'enjoys' 'eats' or 'drinks'. The thesis is based on the assumption that the term *sangha* refers to the paths and their function.

**Or confer great merit, XVII. 9.**

XVII.9. That it ought not be said that what is given to the monastic order has great fruit.

(1-4) The argument is similar to XVII.6. The opponent holds that it should not be said that the monastic order can confer great merit to the giver. That is, a thing given to the order brings great reward. The thesis is based on the assumption that the term *sangha* refers to the paths and their function. It is refuted by citing from the *Majjhimanikaya* [iii,p.258] and *Samyuttanikaya* [i,p.233].

*Of the Religion or 'Church' (Sāsana)*

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XXI.1. Concerning the teaching

(1-3) The opponent holds that the teaching has been made new, that is, reformed. The objection is that this implies it was possible to improve upon the Buddha’s message.

**Of the Individual**

**Of a permanent entity or soul, I.1**

I.1. Concerning the existence of a person (*pudgala*).

I.1.1. The eight refutations.

(1-5) The opponent stated that the person is known as a real and ultimate fact, but is unwilling to admit that it is known in the same way as a real and ultimate fact is known. This is refuted as inconsistent.

(2-5) Using the same reasoning, the opponent argues that if this were true, it would also be inconsistent to maintain the person is not known as a real and ultimate fact while maintaining, as the *Sakavādi* would, that it is unknown in the same way as a real and ultimate fact is known. Since the *Sakavādi* does not admit this as inconsistent, the original refutation must be faulty.

(6-10) The opposite position is then argued beginning with the *Sakavādi*’s assertion that the person is not known in the sense of real and ultimate fact. By repeating both steps of the above argument it is thus shown that the opponent’s rejoinder to the *Sakavādi*’s original refutation in I.1.1.2-5 must be faulty.

(11-13) It is then shown that the person cannot be known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, since the opponent is unwilling to admit that it (I.1.1.11) is known everywhere in that sense; (I.1.1.12) is always
known in that sense; and (1.1.1.13) is known in everything in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.

In each case the opponent attempts to demonstrate the refutation faulty, as in I.1.1.2-5.

(14-16) The opponent's rejoinder in I.1.1.11-13 is then rejected through the opposing argument as at I.1.1.6-10

I.1.2. Comparison of the hypothetical person with other realities.

(17) The opponent maintains that both the person and matter are known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, yet that they are not distinct from one another. The Sakavādi rejects such an opinion as inconsistent.

(18-21) The same argument is then repeated, substituting for matter the other aggregates,

(22-23) the twelve sense-bases,
(34-51) the eighteen elements
(52-73) and the twenty-two faculties.

(74-129) The opponent's rejoinder and Sakavādi's response repeat the pattern of argument from I.1.1. for each of the aggregates, bases, elements and faculties in turn.

(130-134) Since his opponent both maintains that each of the aggregates are known as real and ultimate facts and that they each are separate and distinct from one another the Sakavādi argues by analogy that to be consistent he must also maintain that the person is separate and distinct from the various aggregates, as he also considers it a real and ultimate fact. This the opponent does not do.

(135) The argument by analogy is repeated for each of the bases, elements and faculties in a similar manner.

(136) The rejoinder and response once again repeat the pattern of argument from I.1.1.

(138) Since the opponent does not consider the person distinct from these, logically he should consider it identical with them. This he does not do.
(139) The opponent is further shown to be illogical in that he is not willing to admit (a) a person as matter, (b) a person as apart from matter or (c) matter as being in the person.

(140-145) The argument is repeated as in 139 for the remaining aggregates, the bases, elements and faculties. Again the pattern of rejoinder and response echo those in I.1.1.

(146) The opponent questioned whether he considers the person (a) relative or absolute, (b) conditioned or unconditioned, (c) eternal or temporal, (d) to have external features or not. When he denies that any of these options can be truly predicated about the person the Sakavādi calls the logic of this into question.

(148-152) The opponent clarifies his concept of the person by indicating that while it is known, and is a reality which exists, the converse is not true. Not all that is known, is real, or exists is the person.

(154-155) The opponent defines a person as one who has material qualities in the sphere of matter, and no material qualities in the immaterial sphere.

(156) He is refuted for admitting (a) the identity between physical frame and body, (b) the identity of person and self (jīva), and (c) the difference between the physical frame and the person, while at the same time denying the difference between body and self.

(158-170) The opponent maintains that the person passes from one world to another (i.e. transmigrates). However, he denies that the person who is reborn is (a) identical with, (b) different from, (c) both identical and different, (d) neither identical nor different from the being who passed on. This is refuted. The opponent is inconsistent, as he had earlier claimed that it was, indeed, the identical person which transmigrates from one course to another. The Sakavādi presses his point by getting his opponent to admit: a god may be reborn as a human or a brahman or as a noble. Further inconsistencies are noted to exist in his view of the relation between the transmigrating person and the five aggregates.
I.1.3 (171-179) The concept of the person is said to derive from each of the aggregates in turn, yet not to have the characteristics of these aggregates. This is refuted as inconsistent.

(181-182) It is affirmed that a person with wrong views is derived from wrong views, but denied that when wrong views cease the person derived from them also ceases to exist. This is rejected as inconsistent. Similar claims and rejoinders are made for the other elements of the eightfold path.

(183-188) The opponent maintains the opponent of a person may be derived from the aggregates, bases, elements and faculties in turn. However, this is rejected because of the absence of multiple persons corresponding to these sources in one individual's life-continuum.

(189-192) It is argued that the concept of the person is derived from material qualities just as a shadow is derived from a tree. The validity of this analogy is rejected since the shadow is impermanent like its source, whereas the same cannot be said about the person. Other analogies used to derive the concept of the person are rejected in the same way.

I.1.4 (193) It is maintained that there is a notion of a person for each moment of consciousness, yet denied that the person changes, dies and is reborn with each such moment. This is rejected as inconsistent.

I.1.5 (196-199) It is taken to indicate the reality of the person when the Buddha says he is able to see beings (here equated with person) being reborn according to their karma. The proponent of this view is caught in an inconsistency when he then refuses to admit that this implies that the person is a visible object cognizable by sight and possessing color.

I.1.6 (200) The opponent asks whether both the person who does an action and the person who causes him to do it are known to exist. Since the question involves the person rather than merely the action and its cause, the Sakavadi denies this. The opponent disagrees. The Sakavadi argues that logically this should imply that he who makes the doer should
also exist, which the opponent cannot admit since it implies the existence of God. Thus he is caught in a contradiction.

(201) If by acting a person produces or causes a person who experiences the results, as the opponent at first maintains, each person would inevitably produce a successor, thus negating the possibility of final liberation-something untenable.

(202-203) Although the effects of good and bad karma are known to exist, this does not imply the existence of a person which experiences these effects.

(204-211) The argument of 202-203 is repeated using celestial satisfaction, human satisfaction, the misery of the realms of suffering and the agony of hell as examples effects of karma.

(212) The Sakavadi asks his opponent in turn (a) whether he who does an act is the same as he who experiences its effect, (b) whether they are two different persons, (c) whether they are at once the same and different persons, (d) whether they are neither the same not different persons. At first the opponent answers each negatively, but on questioning reverses his opinion to avoid contradicting the sutras. Then he is asked in succession whether (a) satisfaction and frustration are self-caused, (b) produced by another, (c) both self-caused and produced by another, but of spontaneous origin. Each of these possibilities he denies.

(213-216) Unlike his opponent, the Sakavadi will admit karma and its effect, but not that there is a person who performs the act and experiences its fruit.

I.1.7 (217-218) The opponent argues that the fact that there are those with supernatural powers demonstrates the existence of the person as a real and ultimate fact.

I.1.8 (219-220) The opponent argues that granting the reality of mothers, fathers, brothers sisters, nobles, Brahmins, gods, etc., implies the existence of the person as a real and ultimate fact. The Sakavadi denies this as
someone who is not a mother or the like can become one and vice versa, whereas the concept of the person implies permanence.

(221-223) A similar argument is made with respect to those on the various stages of the path (e.g., stream-enterers, once-returners).

(224) Since the stage of the path ends with the achievement of final liberation, the opponent’s argument should imply the person is annihilated with the achievement of final nirvana. This contradicts the sutras.

(225) The controversy concerns what is implied when the opponents claims the person is real and ultimate. He holds the person is neither conditioned nor unconditioned. Since this implies a third alternative, it contradicts the sutra where the Buddha lists the conditioned and the unconditioned as the only irreducible categories.

(226) The opponent holds the person is neither conditioned nor unconditioned, yet that the conditioned, the unconditioned and the person are not three different things. The aggregates and liberation are used as examples of the conditioned and the unconditioned respectively.

(227) The opponent admits the genesis, passing away and duration of the personal entity, but is caught in an untenable position since these are characteristics of the conditioned. On the other hand, he cannot admit these characteristics are not apparent in the person for, to be true to scripture, that would imply the person is unconditioned.

(228) The opponent affirms the person who has attained nirvana exists there in. This wrongly implies eternality of the person. Yet one cannot say he does not exist there in for that implies annihilation. He similarly affirms the person depends on (coming into) existence. Since the state of coming into existence is impermanent, contrary to his intent this implies the person is impermanent and unconditioned.

(229-230) The opponent argues that the fact of self-awareness proves the existence of the person as real and ultimate fact. But if a person is known to be such because of such self-awareness that must wrongly mean that the person who lacks such awareness does not exist.
(231) The opponent argues that denying there is such a thing as a person with self-awareness implies there can be no one with self-awareness. This the Sakavadi denies, thus leading his opponent to the conclusion that the person exists.

(232-233) The argument of 229-231 is repeated substituting one who carries out the applications of mindfulness for one who is self-aware.

(234) Suttanipata 1119, which rejects the “world’s opinion” as to self, is cited against belief in the person.

(236-243) Both parties to the controversy cite further passages from the sutras in defense of their views, the opponent’s citations using the term “person” in what the Sakavadi takes to be but a conventional sense, while the Sakavadi’s proof-texts deny such concepts as the self, being and the like.

Of permanent sentient existence, I. 6-8; IX.12

I.6. The controverter point concerns whether everything exists.

(1) The opponent maintains everything exists. But this would imply that the nonexister exists.

(2) It is argued that past, present and future exist. How can this be since the future has not yet happened and the past is something that has ceased?

(3-4) The argument is made concerning the existence of past material qualities and future material qualities, then repeated for each of the other aggregates.

(5-6) On questioning the opponent admits the phrases “present material aggregate” and “material present aggregate” to be equivalent. A rejoinder is presented based on consistent parallel use of the adjectives “present” and “material”. If the aggregate gives up its status as present when it ceases, it must also give up its materiality. If it cannot give up its materiality, it cannot give up its presence.
If the material aggregate cannot lose its materiality, it must be permanent and not subject to change. But the opposite is true.

To say past, present and future all exist implies analogies between them that are not valid.

Since it is admitted that liberation exists, to say past, present and future exists implies analogies between them and liberation that are not valid.

A similar argument is made concerning the existence of past, present and future aggregates.

An argument similar to that in 5-6 of I.1.6 is made using the phrases "non-past exists" and "past nonsexist".

The opponent is caught in an inconsistency of logic in a rejoinder based on a word play when he admits that the future becomes present, but what has not been (i.e. future) does not become present. A similar argument is made substituting present and past.

If the opponent affirms all conditions of an act of perception exist when past, it also should be admitted that one perceives the past object with senses that are past. The same point is made concerning conditions of a future act of perception.

If he denies one perceives past objects with past senses since they too exist, he must also deny one perceives present objects with present senses. Similarly with respect to future objects and acts of perception.

Rejoinder based on the question of whether past and future awareness exist. If so, their existence must be analogous to the existence of the present processes of awareness.

The opponent is asked whether the past defilements of a perfected being exist, and replies that they do. It then the perfected being still attached as a result of his past but still existent attachment? Logically it would seem so, but it cannot be. The argument is repeated for nine other past defilements.

The argument is again repeated with respect to the past fetters, defilements and desires of the non-returner, once-returner and stream-enterer.
Insofar as the past defilements or fetters exist, the average man must be said to be subject to them at present. This wrongly implies that the perfected being, never-returner, etc., should also be subject to his past but nonetheless existent fetters, etc.

If it is impossible for a perfected being, etc., to be subject to defilements that exist for him as past, this should imply the same for the ordinary person.

Do past bodies, their parts and elements exist? If so, they must still be capable of acting and being acted upon.

Do past, present and future aggregates exist? If so, there must be fifteen aggregates rather than the five listed by the Buddha. Similarly an excessive number of organs and objects of sense, elements and faculties are implied.

Similar logic implies three wheel-turning kings must exist simultaneously. This cannot be. The same holds for multiple Buddhas existing simultaneously.

Having affirmed the past exists, the opponent is asked whether the existent is then past. He responds it may be past and not past. But since the existent is past, substituting terms considered equivalent, this implies the past may be past and not past, a logical fallacy. Similar logic is used with respect to the existence of the future and of nirvana.

Majjhima III.16ff. = Samyutta III.47 is quoted in defense of the view that past and future exist.

Samyutta III.71 and IV.52 and Anguttara I.197 are cited in opposition.

Samyutta II.101 is then cited in support.

The immediately following passage is taken in opposition.

I.7. Debate over whether one's past consists of aggregates, bases, elements or all three.

The opponent argues that to admit that one's past and future consist of aggregates, bases or the like implies the past and future exist. The Sakavaadi admits such is their character, but not that they exist.
The opponent argues that to admit the present exists and consists of aggregates, etc., implies that the past and future which are similarly constituted also exist.

Again if a past or future consisting of aggregates, etc., which does not exist is admitted, it must also be concluded that the present no longer exists.

The same argument is repeated substituting numerous specifics.

The Sakavadi cites Samyutta III.71, his opponent Samyutta III.47 in support of their respective views.

I.8. Controversy over the claim that some of the past and future exists and some does not.

The opponent admits that past things, the effects of which have not yet matured, exist. If their effects have matured, past things do not exist. But since the opponent admits that even the former may have ceased, he is refuted as inconsistent.

The opponent argues that since the immature effects of past things will mature, these things may be said to exist. This logic could lead to the conclusion that present things that will perish are non-existent.

The argument is similar to that of 1-5, but is based on the claim that inevitably determined future things exist, while those not inevitably determined do not.

IX.12. Concerning past, future and present.

The opponent argues that past and future experiences can be possessed in the present by one who can induce the meditative states. This contradicts the orthodox understanding of the past as come to an end and the future as not yet come into being.

Modes of Sentient Existence, I. 10

I.10. The debated point is the claim that things exist one way and not another.

The opponent asserts that things exist exclusively as past, present or future at one time. They thus exist one way and not the other. This implies that
each of these temporal modes both exists and does not exist, which the opponent has already denied.

(8-12) A similar line of reasoning is followed with respect to the existence of the aggregates.

Consciousness: Duration of Consciousness, II. 7; IX. 6, 7, 12; X.1; XV 3, 4; XVI. 4; XXII.8

II.7. Controversy concerning the duration of an awareness.

(1) The opponent holds a single awareness can last a day or longer. This is rejected as implying its constituent moments of arising and cessation can each last half a day or longer.

(2-3) *Anguttara* I.10 and *Samyutta* II.95 are cited to suggest how quickly awarenesses arise and pass away.

(4) Since the content of an awareness does not endure for a day, the state itself should not be said to do so.

(5) Since apprehension of sounds, smells, sights, etc., involves separate awarenesses, the opponent’s view is refuted.

(6) Since movement leads to separate awarenesses, the controverted point is again refuted.

(7-10) The opponent’s inconsistency in admitting a single awareness lasts the entire aeons-long lifetime of gods of the sphere of unbounded space, but does not last an entire lifetime for other beings is noted.

IX. 6-7. Of past and future mental objects.

(1-5) The opponent holds that awareness of past or future ideas lacks a mental object. The rejoinder finds this view self-contradictory.

IX.12. Concerning past, future and present.

(1-7) The opponent argues that past and future experiences can be possessed in the present by one who can induce the meditative states. This contradicts the orthodox understanding of the past as come to an end and the future as not yet come into being.
X.1. Concerning cessation.

(1-4) The opponent maintains that before one congeries of five aggregates ceases, five karmically functional aggregates arise. This is rejected as implying the existence of ten aggregates simultaneously rather than the five posited by the Buddha.

XV.3. Concerning duration.

(1-6) The opponent holds that duration is predetermined, which the Sakavadi denies.

XV.4. Concerning moments, instants and seconds.

The opponent holds that moments, instants and seconds are predetermined. The Sakavadi denies it.

XVI.4. Concerning excelling attention.

(1-5) The opponent holds that we can attend to all things at once. The reference is to such generalizations as: “All things are impermanent”. The objection is that we attend to things in any given moment as exclusively past, present or future, and not all at once. Moreover, we aren’t attentive to the process of attention at the moment of that attention.

XXII.8. Concerning what is momentary

The opponent holds that all dharmas persist for but a single moment of awareness. The point is to stress their mutability and impermanence. The rejoinder notes the existence of such concrete things as mountains and trees that persist for longer than a single unit of awareness.

Sense, Perception, Ideation, V. 3; VI. 8; VIII. 4, 5, 7; IX 9; X. 5; XII. 4; XIV. 3

V.3. Concerning perverted awareness in meditation.

(1-8) The opponent holds that awareness is perverted in the case of one who has attained a meditative state through use of a symbolic device. His point is that he sees one thing (the actual device) and becomes conscious of another (an
idea). The rejoinder holds this is not really a perversion of awareness. For there to be such would require that permanence be seen where there is none.

VI.8-10. Concerning the four elements, the five sense faculties, and bodily action.

(1-9) The opponent holds each of these to be visible. The argument parallels that of VI.7.

VIII.4. Concerning sense-desire.

(1-3) The opponent holds the term कामा refers only to the five constituents of sensuality. The Sakavādi, to the contrary, holds these are not to be termed कामा, but the term कामा refers to the subjective experience of desire.

VIII.5. Concerning the realm of matter.

(1-2) The opponent holds the term रूपधातु (realm of matter) to refer to material qualities only. He is criticized for limiting the meaning of the term too far, for the term should refer to every aspect of the material realm.

VIII.7. Concerning the sense bases in the material sphere.

(1-14) The opponent asserts that beings in the material sphere have all six senses. This is rejected as implying the existence of objects to stimulate these senses in this sphere.

IX.9. Of sound as the diffusion of initial thought.

(1-2) The opponent holds that sound is the diffusion of initial thought. His point is that thought produces speech. If sound were merely the diffusion of thought, argues the rejoinder, each mental process would produce its own characteristic sound.

X.5. Concerning double morality.

(1-7) The opponent holds that an individual engaged in pursuit of the path is practicing at once a worldly and an other-worldly morality. The rejoinder is based on the understanding that this would wrongly imply the simultaneous existence of two sets of mental processes.

XII.4. Concerning the sense-organs.

(1-4) The opponent holds that the sense-organs are the result of karma. The argument is as at XII.3. The opponent holds that sound is a result of karma. The thesis is based on scriptural passages indicating that the quality of a person’s
voice is a karmic reward. The objection is that the term “maturation” refers to psychological states only.

XIV.3. Concerning proximity condition.

(1-5) The opponent holds that one sensation follows another in immediate proximity. The rejoinder is similar to XIV.1. The objection is that this implies good awareness can follow upon bad and conversely without an intervening change of mind.

Mental Properties and Functions, VII. 1-3; IX. 8; XVII. 4; XVIII. 9; XIX. 2

VII.1. Concerning the grouped.

(1-8) The opponent holds that factors cannot be grouped together by means of ideas. The point is that the factors are brought together in the physical sense. In rejecting this thesis, the rejoinder uses the terms “group” in the sense of “classify”.

VII.2. Concerning whether factors are connected with one another.

(1-2) The opponent holds that factors are not connected with one another, by which he means that they do not literally pervade one another. The rejoinder holds they are connected with one another, by which he means that they can be associated with one another.

VII.3. Concerning properties of awareness.

(1-5) The opponent holds that properties of awareness do not exist as things. The position of the rejoinder is that the term cetasika refers to mental properties or states of mind, which may properly be said to exist.

IX.8. On what is affected by initial though.

(1-4) The opponent holds that all awareness is affected by initial thought. The point is that any awareness can be an object of initial thought. In the rejoinder it is argued that some awarenesses arise independent of prior thought, and thus that the thesis is to be rejected.

XVII.4. On being bound up with the faculties.
The opponent holds that rustration is bound up with the faculties. The objection is that this implies that only what is bound up with sentience is impermanent, and thus that some frustration is not bound up with the other faculties.

**XVIII.9.** Concerning whether one sees matter with the eye

(1-5) The opponent holds that one sees matter with the eye. The objection is that one sees with visual consciousness, rather than with the material eye.

**XIX. 2.** Concerning voidness

(1-5) The opponent holds that voidness is included in the aggregate of conditionings. For the fourth aggregate to involve the void, goes the objection, would be to deny its impermanence. Moreover, it would lead to the inclusion of the voidness of the other aggregates under the fourth aggregate.

Knowledge, V.6, 9, 10; IX. 6-8; XVI. 4

**V.6.** Concerning conventional knowledge.

(1-3) The opponent holds the object of conventional knowledge to be truth. The rejoinder, wishing to distinguish between (conventional) truth and (ultimate) truth, rejects the thesis for failing to avoid the implication—which the opponent rejects—that the (ultimate) truth is the sole object of conventional knowledge.

**V.9.** Concerning present knowledge.

(1-2) The opponent holds possible knowledge of the present as a whole. The rejoinder considers this impossible for it would involve an endless regression in which present knowledge of the present becomes the object of present knowledge in the present and so forth.

**V.10.** Concerning knowledge of fruition.

(1-5) The opponent holds a disciple can have knowledge of the attainment of spiritual fruition by another. The point is that he can teach that a particular person has attained such spiritual fruits. The rejoinder rejects the thesis as a claim the disciple actually understands that person's knowledge.

**IX. 6-7.** Of past and future mental objects.
(1-5) The opponent holds that awareness of past or future ideas lacks a mental object. The rejoinder finds this view self-contradictory.

**IX.8.** On what is affected by initial thought.

(1-4) The opponent holds that all awareness is affected by initial thought. The point is that any awareness can be an object of initial thought. In the rejoinder it is argued that some awarenesses arise independent of prior thought, and thus that the thesis is to be rejected.

**XVI.4.** Concerning excelling attention.

(1-5) The opponent holds that we can attend to all things at once. The reference is to such generalizations as: “All things are impermanent”. The objection is that we attend to things in any given moment as exclusively past, present or future, and not all at once. Moreover, we aren’t attentive to the process of attention at the moment of that attention.

**Insight. III. 9; V. 5, 8, 10; IX. 5; XI.2, 3; XX. 2, 6**

**III.9.** Concerning knowledge of destiny (as determined) by karma.

(1-4) The opponent holds that divine vision amounts to knowledge of the passing of beings from one mode of existence to another in accordance with their karma. The point is that inherent in the vision of beings being reborn in accordance with their karma is the explanation of their destiny. In rejoinder this is taken either to imply that such vision involves judgment of such beings, or that what is in fact a single act of consciousness is sequential.

**V.5.** Concerning discrimination.

(1-3) The opponent asserts that in the case of the spiritual adept all knowledge is discrimination. The debate turns on an ambiguity of terminology. While the opponent intends the term nana to mean “(transcendental) knowledge”, the rejoinder takes the thesis as a more general claim concerning all awareness. In this latter interpretation the thesis would imply that even conventional knowledge is transcendental.

**V.8.** Concerning knowledge of the future.
(1-4) The opponent holds that knowledge of the future is possible. This is a claim that certain future events can be seen, not as the rejoinder understands it, that every element in the chain of future events can be known.

V.10. Concerning knowledge of fruition.

(1-5) The opponent holds a disciple can have knowledge of the attainment of spiritual fruition by another. The point is that he can teach that a particular person has attained such spiritual fruits. The rejoinder rejects the thesis as a claim the disciple actually understands that person's knowledge.

IX.5. Whether knowledge is objectless.

(1-5) The opponent maintains that the knowledge belonging to the perfected being may lack a mental object. When his senses are occupied with a visual object, for example, his knowledge is objectless. The rejoinder largely follows that of IX.4.

XI.2. Of knowledge.

(1-3) The opponent holds that an individual who has overcome spiritual ignorance cannot be said to have knowledge at the same time as he has mundane thoughts. The rejoinder is based on the understanding that to overcome ignorance means to have knowledge.

XI.3. Whether knowledge is conjoined with mundane consciousness.

(1-5) The opponent holds that knowledge is not conjoined with mundane consciousness. If this were true, goes the rejoinder, knowledge would be identifiable with liberation, matter, sense-organs, sense objects, or the like.

XX.2. Concerning knowledge.

(1-3) The opponent holds that there can be no knowledge in the case of an ordinary person. The debate results from the opponent's failure to distinguish between "knowledge" in the sense of "worldly knowledge" and in the sense of "spiritual insight". The thesis denies knowledge in the latter sense to the ordinary individual. The objection allows knowledge in the former sense to such a person.

XX.6. Concerning insight knowledge.
(1-2) The opponent holds that higher-worldly knowledge has a twelve-fold base. Vinaya I.96ff. is cited as evidence. The objection is that this wrongly implies that each of the paths and fruits is also twelve-fold.

**Desire, VIII.4; XIII. 8-10; XIV.7; XVI. 10**

**VIII.4.** Concerning sense-desire.

(1-3) The opponent holds the term *kāma* refers only to the five constituents of sensuality. The *Sakavādi*, to the contrary, holds these are not to be termed *kāma*, but the term *kāma* refers to the subjective experience of desire.

**XIII.8.** Of attachment to the disagreeable.

(1-3) The opponent holds that one can experience attachment for what is disagreeable, basing this view on an interpretation of Majjhima.1.266. The objection finds the thesis self-contradictory.

**XIII.9.** That craving for factors is morally neutral.

(1-5) That opponent holds that craving for objects of the mind is morally indeterminate. The objection is that there is no basis for distinguishing between this and other craving which is immoral.

**XIII.10.** That craving for dharmas is not a cause of frustration.

(1-5) The argument is as at XIII.9.

**XIV.7.** Concerning what is included.

(1-5) The opponent holds that desires for the material and the immaterial realms crop up and are included in those realms. The argument is based on an analogy to the sensual realm. The *Sakavādi*, however, holds: that such desires are limited to the sensual realm.

**XVI.10.** Concerning what is included in the material and immaterial elements.

(1-7) The opponent holds that attachment to matter in the sensuous realm is included among the elements of this realm. The argument is similar to XVI.9.

**Voluntary Action, III.10; VI.8; IX. 8.11; XII. 1, 2; XVI. 1-3**

(1-8) The opponent holds there is restraint among certain gods. In rejoinder this is taken to imply its absence among some gods, since for them to refrain from a vice implies they are otherwise capable of such a vice. The opponent responds that if they lack moral restraint, this must mean they are evildoers.

VI.8. Concerning the bodily action.

(1-9) The opponent holds each of bodily action to be visible. The argument parallels that of VI.7. The rejoinder is based on the view that visibility implies an object which is visible.

IX.8. On what is affected by initial though.

(1-4) The opponent holds that all awareness is affected by initial thought. The point is that any awareness can be an object of initial thought. In the rejoinder it is argued that some awarenesses arise independent of prior thought, and thus that the thesis is to be rejected.

IX.11. That action does not conform to awareness.

(1-5) The debate is as in IX.10. The opponent maintains that action does not conform to awareness, that is that one can act without thinking or talk about something other than is on one's mind. This is rejected as wrongly implying there is no connection possible between action and awareness.

XII.1. Whether restraint is karma (i.e. morally effective action).

(1-3) The opponent holds that both mental self-restraint and the lack there of are karmic ally efficacious. The objection is that the opponent's refusal to apply the thesis to the other senses is inconsistent. The rejoinder stresses that karma is will.

XII.2. Concerning action.

(1-3) The opponent holds that all action has maturation. In support he cites Anguttara V.292ff. The objection is that the thesis is unqualified, implying that both inoperative and neutral volitions produce karmic effects.

XVI.1. Concerning influencing awareness.
(1-4) The opponent holds that one who has power and authority can influence the awareness of another. The objection is that this implies the possibility of external control of one’s attitudes, emotions, will or the like. The rejoinder cites Dhammapada 164.

XVI.2. Concerning operating another’s awareness.

The opponent holds that one can operate the mind of another. The argument is as at XVI.1. The objection is that this implies the possibility of external control of one’s attitudes, emotions, will or the like. The rejoinder cites Dhammapada 164.

XVI.3. Concerning giving another satisfaction.

(1-3) The opponent holds that an individual can give satisfaction to another. He cites Majjhima 1.447. The objection is that one doesn’t give away happiness in the same sense as a gift is given.

Supernormal Gifts. III. 7-9; V. 7; XI. 5; XVII. 2; XXI. 4

III.7. Of the higher or divine vision.

(1-4) The opponent holds that fleshly vision becomes the higher or divine vision when it is the medium of a spiritual idea. The rejoinder takes this as equating this fleshly with divine vision, and denying a third type of vision which the Sakavadi calls the vision or eye of wisdom. The Sakavadi cites I.61.

III.8. Of the higher or divine ear.

(1-3) The argument corresponds to III.7.

III.9. Concerning knowledge of destiny (as determined) by karma.

(1-4) The opponent holds that divine vision amounts to knowledge of the passing of beings from one mode of existence to another in accordance with their karma. The point is that inherent in the vision of beings being reborn in accordance with their karma is the explanation of their destiny. In rejoinder this is taken either to imply that such vision involves judgment of such beings, or that what is in fact a single act of consciousness is sequential.

V.7. Concerning knowledge of the awareness of others.
The opponent holds that knowledge of the consciousness of another—one of the six higher powers—has no object beyond (that) awareness. His point is that the only object of such insight is the state of consciousness of the other, that is, what is in his mind. The thesis is rejected as a claim that what is known is the psychological complex we know as awareness.

XI.5. Of the force of supernatural power.

(1-7) The opponent holds that one possessed of supernatural power can live an entire kalpa. The rejoinder argues that such power can only avert an untimely death, not prolong one’s life-span unnaturally.

XVII.2. Whether a perfected being can suffer an untimely death.

(1-5) The opponent holds that since a perfected being must experience the results of all his past karma before death, he cannot die an untimely death. The rejoinder notes the possibility that a perfected being can be murdered, and considers that this would be an untimely death.

XXI. 4. Concerning supernatural power

(1-5) The opponent holds that either a Buddha or his disciple had the power to do what he wills. The case of Pilindavaccha is cited as evidence. The rejoinder points to numerous wishes which such powers could not fulfill, a wish for perpetual moonlight to give but one example.

Growth (physical). XIV. 2; XXII.4, 5

XIV.2. Of the origin of the sense-organs.

(1-3) The opponent holds that the ix sense-organs originate at the moment of conception. The Sakavadi maintains, to the contrary, that only the mind and the organ of touch originate at the moment of conception, the others developing over time.

XXII.4. Concerning realization of the dharma

(1-3) The opponent holds that an embryo is capable of realizing the dharma. The objection is that a perfected being is incapable of hearing and paying attention to the doctrine.
XXII.5. Three similar arguments (The Nalanda edition numbers these separately.)

The argument of XXII.4 is repeated with reference to: (a) attainment of perfection by an embryo, (b) realization of the truth by a dreamer and (c) attainment of perfection by a dreamer.

Growth (ethical) I.4; II.9; III. 4; IV. 4, 9; VII. 5; X. 9; XIV.2

I.4. The controverters point concerns whether the defilements are given up piecemeal.

(1-12) The opponent affirms that when those on the path attain higher vision, the defilements are put away piecemeal. But if this is so, it should be admitted that part of an individual can become a stream-enterer, or once-returner, etc., while the remainder still has not achieved such a stage.

(13-16) That part can be perfected being, while the remainder is not.

(17) The opponent cites Dhammapada 239 in his support.

(18) In rejoinder Suttanipata 231 and Vinaya 1.97 = Samyutta IV.47, etc. cited.

II.9. A debate over whether penetration of the path is made in ordered segments.

(1-4) The opponent holds that penetration is achieved gradually, but not that the stages of stream-enterer, once-returner, etc., are each gradually developed.

(5-9) He holds the defilements are given up piecemeal, but not that one can become a partial stream-enterer, etc. The Sakavadi by contrast considers the views that the defilements can be given up piecemeal and that one can become a partial stream-enterer, etc., equivalent.

(10-13) The opponent considers one who is coming to see a stage of the path as practicing it. When he has seen it, he is considered experienced in its fruit. While the opponent admits this of the stages of the path, he will not admit it of the realization of the four truths. The Sakavadi considers this inconsistent.
(14-15) The Sakavadi admits that once the first truth is realized, the others are also realized. Nonetheless, he rejects the charge that this is equivalent to holding the first truth amounts to the four truths collectively.

(16) He holds the opponent's original proposition wrongly implies multiple fruits corresponding in number to the portions into which the process of spiritual advancement is divided.

(17-18) The opponent supports his thesis by citing Vinaya III.303 and Dhammapada 239.

(19-20) Samyutta V.436, Suttanipata 231 and Vinaya I.97 = Samyutta IV.47, etc., are quoted rejoinder.

III.4. Of becoming liberated.

(1-8) The opponent holds becoming liberated is a process. The rejoinder considers this tantamount to a claim that liberation occurs step by step.


(1-24) The opponent holds that past spiritual achievements are retained permanently, that is that they are carried on as one rises to higher spiritual states. The rejoinder is that they are transcended, as nothing is permanent.


(1-24) The opponent holds that a person striving to attain perfection permanently holds the three fruitions as acquired qualities. The argument largely repeats that of IV.7.

VII.5. Concerning whether merit increases with enjoyment.

(1-7) The opponent holds that merit increases with enjoyment, that is, that the merit accruing from a gift increases with its use. The rejoinder rejects this view for it could imply that one continues to gain merit for an act of which one is no longer conscious, or for an act performed with unwholesome thoughts. In rejecting the thesis, Anguttara II.50 is cited, while Samyutta I.33 is quoted in its defense.

X.9. Concerning attitude as cause.

(1-4) The opponent holds that virtuous attitude is the cause of virtue. The argument is as at VII.5.
XIV.2. Of the origin of the sense-organs.

(1-3) The opponent holds that the ix sense-organs originate at the moment of conception. The Sakavadi maintains, to the contrary, that only the mind and the organ of touch originate at the moment of conception, the others developing over time.

**Vital Power, VIII.10**

VIII.10. Concerning vitality.

(1-11) The opponent holds that there is nothing material in vitality, that vitality is a wholly psychological phenomenon. The rejoinder holds that this implies the impossibility of life in organic phenomena, for these are material.

**The Embryo, XIV. 2; XXII.4, 5**

XIV.2. Of the origin of the sense-organs.

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XXII.4. Concerning realization of the dharma

(1-3) The opponent holds that an embryo is capable of realizing the dharma. The objection is that a perfected being is incapable of hearing and paying attention to the doctrine.

XXII.5. Three similar arguments concerning realization of the dharma (The Nalanda edition numbers these separately.)

The argument of XXII.4 is repeated with reference to: (a) attainment of perfection by an embryo, (b) realization of the truth by a dreamer and (c) attainment of perfection by a dreamer.

**Dreaming, XXII. 5, 6**
XXII.5. Three similar arguments concerning realization of the dharma (The Nalanda edition numbers these separately.)

The argument of XXII.4 is repeated with reference to: (a) attainment of perfection by an embryo, (b) realization of the truth by a dreamer and (c) attainment of perfection by a dreamer.

XXII.6. Concerning the karmically neutral

(1-2) The opponent holds that all states of dream-awareness are karmically neutral. The objection is that in his dreams an individual can commit serious offences.

Counterfeit Consciousness, XXIII. 4

XXIII.4. Concerning what is fitting?

The opponent holds that there can be the appearance of attachment, hate, delusion or the defilements without these actually existing. The Sakavādi denies this.

Speech, II. 5, 6; IX. 9, 10

II.5. The controversy concerns whether a person who is in the first meditational state utters the word “frustration” on attaining the stage of the stream-enterer.

(1) The opponent affirms this. But since such an utterance is not universal in such cases, his view is rejected.

(2-3) It is further argued that this position cannot be maintained as there is no corresponding bodily expression.

(4-5) Since he says “frustration” having understood frustration, why should he not equally utter names of the other three noble truths which he has also come to understand? That he does so is denied by the opponent.

(6-7) The opponent holds the object of one’s insight to be the truth of frustration, and the object of his hearing to be the sound “frustration”. For this to
be so and the sound articulate would imply a combination of two simultaneous perceptions or moments of awareness—an impossibility.

(8-11) Although affirming the thesis, the opponent denies that one who has meditated on the devices or who practices meditation for mundane reasons can utter an articulate sound. The *Sakavadi* does not consider these claims reasonable.

(12-13) It is unclear why the possibility is claimed only for one who has attained the first meditational state and not for those in higher meditational states.

(14) The opponent cites the Buddha to the effect that sustained mental application leads to speech. Such application is characteristic of the first meditational state.

(15) This seems to contradict 8-11, as concentration on the devices involves sustained application of mind.

(16) But speech is also caused by identification. But since identification is also present in the higher meditational states, this contradicts 12-13.

(17-19) *Samyutta* IV.217 is cited against the opponent’s proposition.

(20-22) The opponent cites *Anguttara* V.133 in his favor, but this is shown not to apply. He then cites *Anguttara* I.227 and *Samyutta* I.157.

II.6. Controversy over whether repeating “frustration” plays a role in inducing insight.

The opponent claims it dies, and thus is part of the path. This is rejected on the grounds that it wrongly implies that anyone saying the word is following the path.

IX.9. Of sound as the diffusion of initial thought.

(1-2) The opponent holds that sound is the diffusion of initial thought. His point is that thought produces speech. If sound were merely the diffusion of thought, argues the rejoinder, each mental process would produce its own characteristic sound.

IX.10. That speech does not conform to awareness.

(1-5) The opponent maintains that speech does not conform to awareness, that is that one can speak without thinking or talk about something other than is
on one’s mind. This is rejected as wrongly implying there is no connection possible between speech and awareness.

**Trance. VI.5; X.1; XV. 7-10**

**VI.5.** Concerning the attainment of cessation.

(1-5) The opponent holds the attainment of cessation to be unconditioned. In part the rejoinder follows VI.1. The objection further holds the fact one can enter and emerge from the state of cessation precludes its being considered unconditioned.

**X.1.** Concerning cessation.

(1-4) The opponent maintains that before one congeries of five aggregates ceases, five karmically functional aggregates arise. This is rejected as implying the existence of ten aggregates simultaneously rather than the five posited by the Buddha.

**XV.7-8.** Concerning the experience of identification.

The opponent holds that to attain cessation of the experience of identification is higher-worldly. The reply is that it is mundane. The argument is as at XV.5. and 6.

**XV.9.** A third argument concerning the experience of identification.

(1-5) The opponent holds that having entered the state of the cessation of the experience of identification one may die. The objection is that the mental symptoms of death and its accompanying states are absent in such a state, and that the causes of violent death cannot afford the body of an individual therein.

**XV.10.** Concerning attaining rebirth in the sphere of unconscious being

(1-4) The opponent holds that attainment of the cessation of the experience of identification leads to rebirth in the sphere of unconscious being. The objection is that one can experience the cessation of identification without attaining the moral conditions necessary for rebirth in the sphere of unconscious being.
II.5. The controversy concerns whether a person who is in the first meditational state utters the word “frustration” on attaining the stage of the stream-enterer.

(1) The opponent affirms this. But since such an utterance is not universal in such cases, his view is rejected.

(2-3) It is further argued that this position cannot be maintained as there is no corresponding bodily expression.

(4-5) Since he says “frustration” having understood frustration, why should he not equally utter names of the other three noble truths which he has also come to understand? That he does so is denied by the opponent.

(6-7) The opponent holds the object of one’s insight to be the truth of frustration, and the object of his hearing to be the sound “frustration”. For this to be so and the sound articulate would imply a combination of two simultaneous perceptions or moments of awareness—an impossibility.

(8-11) Although affirming the thesis, the opponent denies that one who has meditated on the devices or who practices meditation for mundane reasons can utter an articulate sound. The Sakavadi does not consider these claims reasonable.

(12-13) It is unclear why the possibility is claimed only for one who has attained the first meditational state and not for those in higher meditational states.

(14) The opponent cites the Buddha to the effect that sustained mental application leads to speech. Such application is characteristic of the first meditational state.

(15) This seems to contradict 8-11, as concentration on the devices involves sustained application of mind.

(16) But speech is also caused by identification. But since identification is also present in the higher meditational states, this contradicts 12-13.

(17-19) Samyutta IV.217 is cited against the opponent’s proposition.

(20-22) The opponent cites Anguttara V.133 in his favor, but this is shown not to apply. He then cites Anguttara I.227 and Samyutta I.157.
II.6. Controversy over whether repeating “frustration” plays a role in inducing insight.

The opponent claims it dies, and thus is part of the path. This is rejected on the grounds that it wrongly implies that anyone saying the word is following the path.

V.3. Concerning perverted awareness in meditation.

(1-8) The opponent holds that awareness is perverted in the case of one who has attained a meditative state through use of a symbolic device. His point is that he sees one thing (the actual device) and becomes conscious of another (an idea). The rejoinder holds this is not really a perversion of awareness. For there to be such would require that permanence be seen where there is none.

VI.5. Concerning the attainment of cessation.

(1-5) The opponent holds the attainment of cessation to be unconditioned. In part the rejoinder follows VI.1. The objection further holds the fact one can enter and emerge from the state of cessation precludes its being considered unconditioned.

XI.6. Concerning concentration.

(1-4) The opponents hold that continuity in the flow of awareness constitutes concentration. The rejoinder considers concentration to be confined to a momentary unit of awareness.

XIII.7. Whether having attained a meditative state one enjoys it.

(1-3) The opponent holds that one who has attained a meditative state enjoys it. The objection is that this implies that the meditative state is an end in itself, rather then merely a means to the goal.

XVIII.6. Concerning passing over from one state of meditation to another.

(1-8) The opponent holds that the passage from one state of meditation to another is immediate. The objection is that the thesis seems to deny that any additional mental process is necessary of lead to the second state of meditation from the first.

XVIII.7. Concerning the interval between meditative states
(1-9) The opponent holds that concentration accompanied by sustained thought without initial thought constitutes an intermediate stage between the first and second meditative states. The objection considers it inconsistent to posit any intermediate state of awareness between only the first two states of absorption. Further, as but one of three types of concentration spoken of by the Buddha, concentration accompanied by sustained thought without initial thought should not be singled out from the others as the thesis does.

**XVIII. 8. Concerning whether one hears sound**

(1-3) The opponent holds that one who has attained meditation continues to hear sound, because the Buddha said that sound is a thorn for the first meditative state. The objection is that the opponent is inconsistent in not allowing the other senses to operate in the first meditative state, and in failing to deal analogously with the "thorns" of the other meditative states.

**Emancipation. III. 3, 4; IV. 10; V. 1; XII. 6**

**III. 3. Concerning liberation.**

(1-3) The opponent affirms liberation occurs for mental states associated with attachment. In rejoinder this is taken to mean it is the attached awareness which is emancipated. The opponent's point is, rather, that there is no need for emancipation in the case of the pure awareness.

(4-10) The same point is repeated substituting "hatred" and "delusion" for "attachment".

**III. 4. Of becoming liberated.**

(1-8) The opponent holds becoming liberated is a process. The rejoinder considers this tantamount to a claim that liberation occurs step by step.

**IV. 10. That putting off all the fetters is tantamount to perfection.**

(1-5) The opponent holds that perfection is the putting off of all fetters. His point is merely that all fetters have been put off by the perfected being. The rejoinder, however, takes him to mean that they are put off simultaneously with the achievement of perfection, which to be denied.
V.1. Concerning liberation.

(1-4) The opponent holds knowledge of liberation to have the quality of liberation. The rejoinder considers this statement too general as only knowledge of deliverance as the fruit of tranquilization has this quality.

XIII.6. Of one who is face to face.

The opponent holds that a fetter is cast off by one who is face to face with it.

*Of Cosmology (A):*

**Modes of Existence, I. 6-8; III.11; III.12; IX.12.**

I.6. The controverter point concerns whether everything exists.

(1) The opponent maintains everything exists. But this would imply that the nonexister exists.

(2) It is argued that past, present and future exist. How can this be since the future has not yet happened and the past is something that has ceased?

(3-4) The argument is made concerning the existence of past material qualities and future material qualities, then repeated for each of the other aggregates.

(5-6) On questioning the opponent admits the phrases “present material aggregate” and “material present aggregate” to be equivalent. A rejoinder is presented based on consistent parallel use of the adjectives “present” and “material”. If the aggregate gives up its status as present when it ceases, it must also give up its materiality. If it cannot give up its materially, it cannot give up its presence.

(7-8) If the material aggregate cannot lose its materiality, it must be permanent and not subject to change. But the opposite is true.

(9-10) To say past, present and future all exist implies analogies between them that are not valid.
Since it is admitted that liberation exists, to say past, present and future exists implies analogies between them and liberation that are not valid.

A similar argument is made concerning the existence of past, present and future aggregates.

An argument similar to that in 5-6 of I.1.6 is made using the phrases "non-past exists" and "past nonexist".

The opponent is caught in an inconsistency of logic in a rejoinder based on a word play when he admits that the future becomes present, but what has not been (i.e. future) does not become present. A similar argument is made substituting present and past.

If the opponent affirms all conditions of an act of perception exist when past, it also should be admitted that one perceives the past object with senses that are past. The same point is made concerning conditions of a future act of perception.

If he denies one perceives past objects with past senses since they too exist, he must also deny one perceives present objects with present senses. Similarly with respect to future objects and acts of perception.

Rejoinder based on the question of 'whether past and future awarenesses exist?'. If so, their existence must be analogous to the existence of the present processes of awareness.

The opponent is asked whether the past defilements of a perfected being exist, and replies that they do. Is then the perfected being still attached as a result of his past but still existent attachment? Logically it would seem so, but it cannot be. The argument is repeated for nine other past defilements.

The argument is again repeated with respect to the past fetters, defilements and desires of the non-returner, once-returner and stream-enterer.

Insofar as the past defilements or fetters exist, the average man must be said to be subject to them at present. This wrongly implies that the perfected being, never-returner, etc., should also be subject to his past but nonetheless existent fetters, etc.
(43-46) If it is impossible for a perfected being, etc., to be subject to defilements that exist for him as past, this should imply the same for the ordinary person.

(47-49) Do past bodies, their parts and elements exist? If so, they must still be capable of acting and being acted upon.

(50-53) Do past, present and future aggregates exist? If so, then there must be fifteen aggregates rather than the five listed by the Buddha. Similarly an excessive number of organs and objects of sense, elements and faculties are implied.

(54) Similar logic implies three wheel-turning kings must exist simultaneously. This cannot be. The same holds for multiple Buddhas existing simultaneously.

(55-58) Having affirmed the past exists, the opponent is asked whether the existent is then past. He responds it may be past and not past. But since the existent is past, substituting terms considered equivalent, this implies the past may be past and not past, a logical fallacy. Similar logic is used with respect to the existence of the future and of nirvana.

(59) Majjhima III.16ff. = Samyutta III.47 is quoted in defense of the view that past and future exist.

(60-62) Samyutta III71 and IV.52 and Anguttara I.197 are cited in opposition.

(63) Samyutta II.101 is then cited in support.

(64) The immediately following passage is taken in opposition.

I.7. Debate over whether one’s past consists of aggregates, bases, elements or all three.

(1-2) The opponent argues that to admit that one’s past and future consist of aggregates, bases or the like implies the past and future exist. The Sakavadi admits such is their character, but not that they exist.

(3-4) The opponent argues that to admit the present exists and consists of aggregates, etc., implies that the past and future which are similarly constituted also exist.
(5-6) Again if a past or future consisting of aggregates, etc., which does not exist is admitted, it must also be concluded that the present no longer exists.

(7-18) The same argument is repeated substituting numerous specifics.

(19-20) The Sakavadi cites Samyutta III.71, his opponent Samyutta III.47 in support of their respective views.

I.8. Controversy over the claim that some of the past and future exists and some does not.

(1-4) The opponent admits that past things, the effects of which have not yet matured, exist. If their effects have matured, past things do not exist. But since the opponent admits that even the former may have ceased, he is refuted as inconsistent.

(5) The opponent argues that since the immature effects of past things will mature, these things may be said to exist. This logic could lead to the conclusion that present things that will perish are non-existent.

(6-10) The argument is similar to that of 1-5, but is based on the claim that inevitably determined future things exist, while those not inevitably determined do not.

III.11. Concerning (the sphere of) identification.

(1-7) The opponent holds there is identification among beings in the sphere where there is no identification at precisely the moment of death from that sphere or rebirth into it. This is not a claim that such beings identify things during their life in this sphere as the rejoinder suggests.

III.12. Concerning (the sphere of) neither identification nor its reverse.

(1-12) The opponent holds it wrong to say there is identification among beings in the sphere of neither identification nor its reverse. In refutation it is argued that the opponent would not be willing to consider this realm to be comprised only of the material aggregate and to lack the four mental aggregates. In refutation it is further asked how it can be consistently maintained that there is identification in the realm where there is no identification by not in the realm where there is neither identification nor its opposite.

IX.12. Concerning past, future and present.
The opponent argues that past and future experiences can be possessed in the present by one who can induce the meditative states. This contradicts the orthodox understanding of the past as come to an end and the future as not yet come into being.

**Spheres of Existence, VII. 1,2; XV. 10**

**VIII.1.** Concerning courses of existence.

(1-5) The opponent holds that there are six courses of existence or possible realms of rebirth, the sixth being birth in the realm of demons. The Sakavadi recognizes only five courses of existence: godly, human, animal, ghost and hellish.

**VIII.2.** Whether there is an intermediate state of existence.

(1-13) The opponent posits an intermediate state of existence during the interim between the death of an individual and his rebirth in the succeeding life. This is to allow for time for the requisite conditions for conception to arise. The rejoinder notes that the Buddha allowed for the existence of only three states of becoming—the realm of desire, the realm of matter, and the immaterial realm—thus excluding the possibility of an intermediate state. Moreover, the existence of cases of immediate retribution is taken as evidence against the intermediate state.

**XVI.10.** Concerning what is included in the material and immaterial elements.

(1-7) The opponent holds that attachment to matter in the sensuous realm is included among the elements of this realm. The argument is similar to XVI.9. The objection sees the thesis as a claim that there is matter in these two realms.

**Kāmaloka, I.3, 5; VIII. 3:**

I.3. The claim that there is no observance of the religious life (brahmacarya) among the gods is debated.
(1-2) The opponent denies there is observance of the religious life among the gods, yet-inconsistently—also denies they are physically, mentally or morally defective.

(3) The *Sakavadi* maintains there is such observance, but denies that gods observe the monastic discipline and that Buddhas become enlightened among them. How then, he is asked, can they be said to observe the religious life?

(4-7) In rejoinder he notes that laymen do not follow the monastic discipline, yet may nonetheless lead a religious life.

(8-10) He further notes that the religious life is led in cities can countries other than where the Buddha became enlightened. Thus the absence of enlightened ones in the world of the gods does not make the opponent’s case.

(11-14) The *Sakavadi* claims the religious life is observed by some gods, but not by all. The opponent considers this inconsistent. However, it is pointed out the even among men only some observe the religious life.

(15-18) Since the never-returner overcomes the upper five fetters and realizes final liberation in the pure heavenly abodes, observance of the religious life must be possible among the gods of those spheres.

(19) To claim otherwise is as much as to hold that the perfected being is capable of rebirth.

1.5 The controversy concerns whether an ordinary person who achieves higher states renounces his desires while still a man of the world.

(1-6) The opponent maintains that the ordinary person who achieves the higher stages of the path does renounce sensuous desires and attachment as an ordinary person. The *Sakavadi* maintains this is the same as saying these desires are thoroughly arrested. The opponent disagrees.

(7-10) The opponent holds the ordinary person renounces these desires by means of a path belonging to the material realm. In rejoinder, it is noted that such a path does not lead to enlightenment and freedom from the fetters and intoxicants which lead to grasping and defilement; whereas the path leading to the stage of never-returner does lead to such results.
The opponent says the ordinary person who has overcome his desires achieves the status of never-returner as soon as he has comprehended the truth. Why not say he becomes a perfected being? To say he achieves the status of non-returner must wrongly imply he achieves the lower stages beginning with that of stream-enterer at the same time.

In defense the opponent cites *Anguttara* III.373, while *Anguttara* IV. 104ff. is quoted in rejoinder.

**VIII.3. Concerning the constituents of sensuality.**

(1-5) The opponent holds the term कर्मधातु ("sensuous world") refers only to the five constituents of sensuality. The rejoinder notes that the sensuous world also involves mind and external organs of sense. Further the term refers to a realm of beings to which action leads.

**Rūpaloka, Arūpaloka, I. 3-5; III.11,12; VI. 4; VIII. 5-8; XVI. 10.**

1.3. The claim that there is no observance of the religious life (brahmācarya) among the gods is debated.

(1-2) The opponent denies there is observance of the religious life among the gods, yet—inconsistently—also denies they are physically, mentally or morally defective.

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(19) To claim otherwise is as much as to hold that the perfected being is capable of rebirth.

I.4. The controverter point concerns whether the defilements are given up piecemeal.

(1-12) The opponent affirms that when those on the path attain higher vision, the defilements are put away piecemeal. But if this is so, it should be admitted that part of an individual can become a stream-enterer, or once returner, etc., while the remainder still has not achieved such a stage.

(13-16) That part can be perfected being, while the remainder is not

(17) The opponent cites Dhammapada 239 in his support.

(18) In rejoinder Suttanipata 231 and Vinaya 1.97 = Samyutta IV.47, etc.

cited.

I.5 The controversy concerns whether an ordinary person who achieves higher states renounces his desires while still a man of the world.

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**III.12. Concerning (the sphere of) neither identification nor its reverse.**

(1-12) The opponent holds it wrong to say there is identification among beings in the sphere of neither identification nor its reverse. In refutation it is argued that the opponent would not be willing to consider this realm to be comprised only of the material aggregate and to lack the four mental aggregates. In refutation it is further asked how it can be consistently maintained that there is identification in the realm where there is no identification by not in the realm where there is neither identification nor its opposite.

**VI.4. Concerning the immaterial.**

(1-4) Citing *Anguttara* II.184, the opponent holds the sphere of infinite space to be unconditioned. The rejoinder is as in VI.1. The objection is that to use the term “unconditioned” to refer to sphere of infinite space in this way wrongly makes sphere of infinite space equivalent to liberation.

**VIII.5. Concerning the realm of matter.**

(1-2) The opponent holds the term *rūpādhatu* (realm of matter) to refer to material qualities only. He is criticized for limiting the meaning of the term too far, for the term should refer to every aspect of the material realm.

**VIII.6. Concerning the immaterial realm.**

(1-2) The opponent holds the term *arūpadhātu* (immaterial sphere) to refer to the immaterial sphere as a realm of existence only. The objection to this is that this overly limits the meaning so as not to include such mental aspects of this sphere as feeling.

**VIII.7. Concerning the sense bases in the material sphere.
The opponent asserts that beings in the material sphere have all six senses. This is rejected as implying the existence of objects to stimulate these senses in this sphere.

VIII.8. concerning matter in the immaterial sphere.

(1-5) The opponent holds that there is matter even in the immaterial sphere. Although the reference is to a subtle, refined matter, this is rejected as a logical contradiction.

XVI.10. Concerning what is included in the material and immaterial elements.

(1-7) The opponent holds that attachment to matter in the sensuous realm is included among the elements of this realm. The argument is similar to XVI.9. The objection sees the thesis as a claim that there is matter in these two realms.

Purgatory, XIII. 1; XX. 3.

XIII.1. Of staying there for an aeon (kalpa).

(1-3) The opponent holds that an individual doomed to aeon-long retribution must endure it for an entire aeon. The Sakavadi holds such retribution to last only for the duration of the current aeon.

XX.3. Concerning guardians in hell

(1-5) The opponent holds that there are no guardians to inflict punishment in hell. The objection is that since there is punishment in hell, a class of punishers is necessary.

Space, VI. 6, 7.

VI.6. Concerning space.

(1-5) The opponent holds space to be unconditioned. The rejoinder begins as in CI.1. Evidence against the thesis includes the fact that one can make space where there has been none, that movement through space is possible, and that space can be enclosed.

VI.7. Concerning whether space is visible.
(1-3) The opponent holds space is visible, as the interval between two objects can be “seen”. The rejoinder is based on the view that visibility implies an object which is visible.

**Time, IX. 6,7; XV. 3, 4; XXII. 8.**

**IX. 6-7.** Of past and future mental objects.

(1-5) The opponent holds that awareness of past or future ideas lacks a mental object. The rejoinder finds this view self-contradictory.

**XV.3.** Concerning duration.

(1-6) The opponent holds that duration is predetermined, which the Sakavadi denies.

**XV.4.** Concerning moments, instants and seconds.

The opponent holds that moments, instants and seconds are predetermined. The Sakavadi denies it.

**XXII.8.** Concerning what is momentary

The opponent holds that all dharmas persist for but a single moment of awareness. The point is to stress their mutability and impermanence. The rejoinder notes the existence of such concrete things as mountains and trees that persist for longer than a single unit of awareness.

**Matter, VI. 8; VIII. 5-10; IX. 3; XVI. 5-9.**

**VI.8.** Concerning the four elements, the five sense faculties, and bodily action.

(1-9) The opponent holds each of these to be visible. The argument parallels that of VI.7. The rejoinder is based on the view that visibility implies an object which is visible.

**VIII.5.** Concerning the realm of matter.
The opponent holds the term *rupādhātu* (realm of matter) to refer to material qualities only. He is criticized for limiting the meaning of the term too far, for the term should refer to every aspect of the material realm.

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(1-2) The opponent holds the term *arūpādhātu* (immaterial sphere) to refer to the immaterial sphere as a realm of existence only. The objection to this is that this overly limits the meaning so as not to include such mental aspects of this sphere as feeling.

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(1-14) The opponent asserts that beings in the material sphere have all six senses. This is rejected as implying the existence of objects to stimulate these senses in this sphere.

**VIII.8.** Concerning matter in the immaterial sphere.

(1-5) The opponent holds that there is matter even in the immaterial sphere. Although the reference is to a subtle, refined matter, this is rejected as a logical contradiction.

**VIII.9.** Concerning whether matter is action.

(1-39) The opponent holds that matter is karma, that the matter involved in physical and vocal action is of ethical import. Two points are involved: (a) bodily and vocal actions are material, and (b) matter may be said to be good or bad. The rejoinder is to stress that karma is defined as will. The physical involvement of body and voice only follows upon the act of having willed. *Anguttara II.157ff.* = *Samyutta II.39ff.*, *Majjhima II.209*, etc., are cited in support of the rejoinder.

**VIII.10.** Concerning vitality.

(1-11) The opponent holds that there is nothing material in vitality, that vitality is a wholly psychological phenomenon. The rejoinder holds that this implies the impossibility of life in organic phenomena, for these are material.

**IX.3.** Whether matter is considered a "co-supporting object".
(1-4) The opponent holds that matter should be considered a co-condition for the working of the mind. The objection holds this wrongly would imply that matter has mental features.

XVI.5. Concerning matter as cause.

(1-4) The opponent holds that material qualities can be causes, that is that the four primary material qualities condition secondary qualities. The objection takes the term "cause" (hetu) in its special sense as a reference to one of the causes of moral or immoral conduct.

XVI.6. Concerning matter and concomitant cause.

(1-4) The opponent holds that material qualities are accompanied by a cause. The argument is as at XVI.5.

XVI.7. Concerning matter as good or bad.

(1-7) The opponent holds that matter is morally good or bad. His point is that the physical motions involved in action are moral or immoral. The objection is that unlike the moral conditions, matter does not have a mental aspect.

XVI.8. Concerning matter as maturation.

(1-3) The opponent holds that matter is a maturation of action. The rejoinder insists on maintaining the subjective or psychological nature of the results of action.

XVI.9. Concerning matter in the material and the immaterial realms.

(1-3) The opponent holds that there is matter of the realm of matter and matter of the immaterial realm, that is matter which is due to actions done in these two spheres. The objection sees the thesis as a claim that there is matter in these two realms.

Sound. II.5; IX. 9, 10; XII. 3

II.5. The controversy concerns whether a person who is in the first meditational state utters the word "frustration" on attaining the stage of the stream-enterer.

(1) The opponent affirms this. But since such an utterance is not universal in such cases, his view is rejected.
It is further argued that this position cannot be maintained as there is no corresponding bodily expression.

Since he says “frustration” having understood frustration, why should he not equally utter names of the other three noble truths which he has also come to understand? That he does so is denied by the opponent.

The opponent holds the object of one’s insight to be the truth of frustration, and the object of his hearing to be the sound “frustration”. For this to be so and the sound articulate would imply a combination of two simultaneous perceptions or moments of awareness—an impossibility.

Although affirming the thesis, the opponent denies that one who has meditated on the devices or who practices meditation for mundane reasons can utter an articulate sound. The Sakavadi does not consider these claims reasonable.

It is unclear why the possibility is claimed only for one who has attained the first meditational state and not for those in higher meditational states.

The opponent cites the Buddha to the effect that sustained mental application leads to speech. Such application is characteristic of the first meditational state.

This seems to contradict 8-11, as concentration on the devices involves sustained application of mind.

But speech is also caused by identification. But since identification is also present in the higher meditational states, this contradicts 12-13.

Samyutta IV.217 is cited against the opponent’s proposition.

The opponent cites Anguttara V.133 in his favor, but this is shown not to apply. He then cites Anguttara I.227 and Samyutta I.157.

IX.9. Of sound as the diffusion of initial thought.

IX.10. That speech does not conform to awareness.
(1-5) The opponent maintains that speech does not conform to awareness, that is, one can speak without thinking or talk about something other than is on one's mind. This is rejected as wrongly implying there is no connection possible between speech and awareness.

XII.3. Whether sound is a karmic maturation.

(1-3) The opponent holds that sound is a result of karma. The thesis is based on scriptural passages indicating that the quality of a person's voice is a karmic reward. The objection is that the term "maturation" refers to psychological states only.

Are Natural Kinds fixed? XXI. 7

XXI.7. Concerning factors.

(1-4) The opponent holds that all dharmas are fixed in their fundamental nature. The rejoinder takes the thesis as a claim that all factors are to be classed among things resulting in assured fixed retribution.

Are Animals reborn in Heaven? XX.4

XX.4. Concerning animals

(1-3) The opponent holds that beings can be born in the heavens as animals. The case of Erāvana, the elephant, is cited as proof. The objection is that the thesis wrongly confuses the animal and heavenly realms.

Of Cosmology (B)

Subject and Object, I. 9; IX. 3.

I.9. Controversy over whether the factors are all applications of mindfulness.

(1-9) The debate arises from an ambiguity in the use of the term "application of mindfulness" which can have both a subjective and objective
sense. The opponent confuses the two senses of the term and thus maintains that all factors are applications of mindfulness. In rejoinder it is shown that this confusion results in logical inconsistency.

IX.3. Whether matter is considered a “co-supporting object”.

(1-4) The opponent holds that matter should be considered a co-condition for the working of the mind. The objection holds this wrongly would imply that matter has mental features.

Relation, XV. 1, 2; XXII.7.

XV.1. Of causal condition hood

(1-8) The opponent holds that only one kind of causal relation can exist between two phenomena. Thus, a phenomenon related to another as moral cause or as its object cannot be related to it through contiguity or immediate succession. The rejoinder gives counter-examples of multiple relationships of other sorts.

XV.2. Of reciprocal relation.

(1-4) The opponent holds that a reciprocal causal relationship does not exist between ignorance and action. The objection is that since action and ignorance can coexist, the relationship between them is reciprocal.

XXII.7. Concerning repetition as condition

The opponent holds there is no condition by way of repetition. The rejoinder cites Anguttara IV.247 and Samyutta V.54.

Impermanence, XI. 8; XV.6.

XI.8. Concerning impermanence.

(1-5) The opponent holds that impermanence is predetermined. The objection is again that this would result in an endless regression.


The opponent holds that the decay and death of higher-worldly factors is itself higher-worldly. The objection is that there are but nine higher-worldly
factors (i.e. four paths, four fruits and liberation), and higher-worldly per se is not one of the

**Sentient Existence and Misery, II.8.**

II.8. Controversy over whether all conditioned things are no more than an ash-heap.

(1-2) Basing his claim on the Buddha’s fire sermon (Vinaya I.134) and the doctrine that all conditioned things involve frustration; the opponent holds that without exception they are no better than an ash-heap. In opposition various types of satisfaction are noted.

(3-8) Samyutta IV.126 and Anguttara I.286 are cited in support of the affirmative, Majjhima I.85 and 92, Samyutta IV.126, and Udana II.1 in opposition.

**III. Sentience, and the Truths, II. 11; VI.3; XI.4; XVII. 4.**

II.11. Concerning Cessation

(1-5) The opponent affirms two kinds of liberation. The rejoinder is that this wrongly implies the duality of the four noble truths and that there are two different liberations. The two kinds of cessation affirmed are the cessation of composite things upon and without calculation. The Sakavadi holds cessation to be one, not two.

VI.3. Concerning the four noble truths.

(1-6) The opponent, citing Samyutta V.430, holds the four noble truths to be unconditioned. The rejoinder is as in VI.1. The objection is that to use the term “unconditioned” to refer to the four noble truths in this way wrongly makes the four noble truths equivalent to liberation.

XI.4. Of the utterance “This is frustrating”.

(1-7) The opponent holds that knowledge of the nature of frustration arises at the same time in the individual who at the moment of entering the path utters
the phrases: “This is frustrating.” He is found inconsistent is not admitting the development of knowledge in one who utters the other truths under such circumstances.

**XVII.4. On being bound up with the faculties.**

(1-4) The opponent holds that frustration is bound up with the faculties. The objection is that this implies that only what is bound up with sentience is impermanent, and thus that some frustration is not bound up with the other faculties.

**Causality, VI. 2; XI. 7; XV. 1.2; XXIII, 5.**

**VI.2. Concerning dependent origination.**

(1-7) The opponent holds the causal links in the chain of dependent origination to be unconditioned, citing S II.25 in his support. The rejoinder is as in VI.1. The objection is that to use the term “unconditioned?” to refer to the causal links in the chain of dependent origination in this way wrongly makes the causal links in the chain of dependent origination equivalent to liberation.

**XI.7. Concerning the establishing of causes and effects.**

(1-2) The opponents holds that the establishment of causes and effects is predetermined. The objection is that this would result in an endless chain of causes rendering the attainment of liberation impossible.

**XV.1. Of causal condition h**

(1-8) The opponent holds that only one kind of causal relation can exist between two phenomena. Thus, a phenomenon related to another as moral cause or as its object cannot be related to it through contiguity or immediate succession. The rejoinder gives counter-examples of multiple relationships of other sorts.

**XV.2. Of reciprocal relation.**

(1-4) The opponent holds that a reciprocal causal relationship does not exist between ignorance and action. The objection is that since action and ignorance can coexist, the relationship between them is reciprocal.

**XXIII.5. Concerning what is not predetermined.**
The opponent holds that the aggregates, elements, faculties—all save frustration—are not predetermined. The objection is that all these are impermanent and, as such, characterized by frustration.

**Karma: Is Matter a Result of Karma? VII, 7; XVI, 8.**

**VII.7.** Concerning the earth and the maturation of karma.

(1-7) The opponent holds that the earth is a result of action. The point is that some obtain dominion or ownership over land as a result of their action. In rejecting the thesis, the point of the rejoinder is to maintain the maturations of actions take the form of subjective experiences. Further, the earth is experienced in common with others, while the same could not be said of the results of an individual’s karma.

**XVI.8.** Concerning matter as maturation.

(1-3) The opponent holds that matter is a maturation of action. The rejoinder insists on maintaining the subjective or psychological nature of the results of action.

**Are Decay and Death a Result of Karma? VII, 8.**

**VII.8.** Whether decay and death are the result of karma.

(1-6) The opponent holds old age and death to be maturations of karma. The argument is largely as in VII.7. the point of the rejoinder again being that the term “maturation” refers only to the subjective experiences resulting from action.

**Do Results of karma entail other Results? VII, 10.**

**VII.10.** Whether a maturation is a factor resulting in factors.

(1-5) The opponent holds that a maturation is a factor resulting in further factors, that is that a maturation in turn is the cause of further maturation. The rejoinder considers this view to lead to an endless cycle of maturation entailing...
maturation with in turn would rule out the possibility of ending existence and attaining liberation.

**Can Karma make an Arahant fall? VIII.11.**

**VIII.11.** Concerning karma as cause.

(1-3) The opponent holds that a perfected being can fall away from perfection as a result of karma, specifically as a result of making malicious accusations against a perfected being in a previous life. The orthodox position considers this idea absurd.

**Is all Action moral? XII, 2.**

**XII.2.** Concerning action.

(1-3) The opponent holds that all action has maturation. In support he cites Anguttara V.292ff. The objection is that the thesis is unqualified, implying that both inoperative and neutral volitions produce karmic effects.

**Is Sound a Result of Karma? XII, 3.**

**XII.3.** Whether sound is a karmic maturation.

(1-3) The opponent holds that sound is a result of karma. The thesis is based on scriptural passages indicating that the quality of a person’s voice is a karmic reward. The objection is that the term “maturation” refers to psychological states only.

**Are all Sense-organs Results of Karma? XII, 4.**

**XII.4.** Concerning the sense-organs.
(1-4) The opponent holds that the sense-organs are the result of karma. The argument is as at XII.3. The objection is that the term “maturation” refers to psychological states only.

**Karma and the Embryo, XIV, 2.**

XIV. 2. Of the origin of the sense-organs.

(1-3) The opponent holds that the ix sense-organs originate at the moment of conception. The Sakavadi maintains, to the contrary, that only the mind and the organ of touch originate at the moment of conception, the others developing over time.

**Karma distinct from its Mechanical Accumulation, XV, 11.**

XV.11. Of action and its accumulation.

(1-6) The opponent holds that karma is one thing and it’s a accumulation another. The objection is that karma and its accumulation are conjoined, as are feeling, identification, mindfulness, etc., and their respective accumulation. Where there is karma, its accumulation begins; where it stops, its accumulation ceases.

**Is Everything due to Karma? XVII, 3.**

XVII.3. That all this is from karma.

(1-4) On the basis of Suttanipata 654 the opponent holds that all this is due to karma. The objection is that this implies karma itself is a karmic result and hence that one can commit crimes as a result of previous karma.

**Are Karmas mutually fixed? XXI.8**

XXI.8. Concerning karma
The opponent holds that all karma is fixed, that is fixed, that is that one type of karma cannot be converted into another. The objection is as in XXI.7. The rejoinder takes the thesis as a claim that all factors are to be classed among things resulting in assured fixed retribution.

**Fixity and Assurance, IV.8; V.4; VI.1; XII.7, 8; XIII. 4; XIX. 7; XX.1**

**IV.8** On entering fixedness on the path.

(1-6) The opponent holds that the Bodhisatta actually entered the path of fixedness (i.e. the path of the stream-winner, etc.) when the Buddha Kasyapa assured him of his future enlightenment. The rejoinder sees the Buddha Kasyapa’s fixedness merely as a prophecy concerning the future.

(7-8) He cites Vinaya 1.91 = Majjhim 1.171 = Therigatha 129.15 and Samyutta V.422 in the rejoinder.

**V.4.** Concerning fixedness.

(1-7) The opponent holds that in one not yet possessed of fixedness on the path, there is knowledge requisite for going on to fixedness. The rejoinder takes this as a claim that only the ordinary individual not yet engaged on the path is capable of developing knowledge necessary to assure achievement of the goal. The point of the thesis, rather, is that even in one not yet fixed in his pursuit of the path the possibility of developing the knowledge necessary for success may nonetheless exist.

**VI.1.** Concerning whether fixedness is unconditioned.

(1-6) The opponent holds fixedness on the path to be unconditioned. The intent is to maintain that once one is fixed on the path so as to assure its fruition, the nature of this fixedness is such that it cannot cease. The objection is that to use the term “unconditioned” to refer to fixedness in this way wrongly makes fixedness equivalent to liberation.

**XII.7.** Of deprivation of life.
The opponent holds that an individual possessed of accomplishment in views can deprive a creature intentionally of life. The objection is that the thesis implies such an individual is capable of matricide, patricide, arhaticide, etc.

XII. 8. Concerning woeful destiny.

The opponent holds that for an individual accomplished in views the possibility of woeful destiny is eliminated although he may experience desire for objects or creatures in such courses of existence. The Sakavadi to the contrary holds that one at the stage of accomplishment in views is still subject to sense desires of a sort which may lead to rebirth in a woeful course.

XIII. 4. Concerning the way of assurance.

The opponent holds that he who is fixed enters the way of assurance. The objection is that one can be equally fixed in assurance of immediate retribution.

XIX. 7. Concerning final fixedness

The opponent holds that the ordinary person can possess final fixedness. The objection notes that an ordinary person can commit heinous crimes, harbor doubts or adopt annihilationist views, none of which is possible for one possessed of final fixedness.

XX. 1. Concerning what is unintentional.

The opponent holds that the five gravest transgressions (matricide, patricide, etc.) involve immediate retribution even when committed unintentionally. This thesis aims at stressing the seriousness of such acts even if unintentional. The rejoinder notes the lack of scriptural warrant and the inconsistency in denying that unintentionally is a mitigating circumstance only in the case of these five offences.

Thusness, Suchness, XIX. 5

XIX. 5. Concerning suchness

The opponent holds that the suchness of all factors is unconditioned. The argument is similar to VI.1, XIX.6. The objection is that to use the term
“unconditioned”’ to refer to suchness in this way wrongly makes suchness equivalent to liberation.

**Of the Unconditioned**

**Are the Four Truths is ‘Infinite Space,’ ‘Cessation,’ Space unconditioned?**

**VI. 3-6**

VI.3. Concerning the four noble truths.

(1-6) The opponent, citing SamyuttaV.430, holds the four noble truths to be unconditioned. The rejoinder is as in VI.1. The objection is that to use the term “unconditioned” to refer to the four noble truths in this way wrongly makes the four noble truths equivalent to liberation.

VI.4. Concerning the immaterial.

(1-4) Citing Anguttara II.184, the opponent holds the sphere of infinite space to be unconditioned. The rejoinder is as in VI.1. The objection is that to use the term “unconditioned” to refer to sphere of infinite space in this way wrongly makes sphere of infinite space equivalent to liberation.

VI.5. Concerning the attainment of cessation.

(1-5) The opponent holds the attainment of cessation to be unconditioned. In part the rejoinder follows VI.1. The objection further holds the fact one can enter and emerge from the state of cessation precludes its being considered unconditioned.

VI.6. Concerning space.

(1-5) The opponent holds space to be unconditioned. The rejoinder begins as in VI.1. Evidence against the thesis includes the fact that one can make space where there has been none, that movement through space is possible, and that space can be enclosed.

**Nibbana: is it a ‘Fetter’? IX.2**
IX.2. Concerning the deathless as a supporting object.

(1-7) The opponent holds that the deathless state as an object of thought is a fetter. The objection is that the deathless state is in fact accompanied not by the fetters, but by their opposites.

Nibbana: is it a moral 'good'? XIX.6

XIX.6. Concerning the morally good.

The opponent holds that the sphere or element of Liberation is good (i.e. faultless). The objection is that unlike liberation morally good states have mental objects and produce karmic results.

The Void, XIX. 2

XIX. 2. Concerning voidness

(1-5) The opponent holds that voidness is included in the aggregate of conditionings. For the fourth aggregate to involve the void, goes the objection, would be to deny its impermanence. Moreover, it would lead to the inclusion of the voidness of the other aggregates under the fourth aggregate.

Some Ethical Points

What is Giving? VII. 4

VII.4. Concerning giving of a gift.

(1-7) the opponent holds that terms dana refers not to the material gift but to the will to surrender it. That is, he considers giving a mental state. In contrast, the rejoinder recognizes the use of the term in both a mental and a material sense.

Is Utility the measure of Merit? VII.5
VII.5. Concerning whether merit increases with enjoyment.

(1-7) The opponent holds that merit increases with enjoyment, that is, that the merit accruing from a gift increases with its use. The rejoinder rejects this view for it could imply that one continues to gain merit for an act of which one is no longer conscious, or for an act performed with unwholesome thoughts. In rejecting the thesis, Anguttara II.50 is cited, while Samyutta I.33 is quoted in its defense.

Effect of Giving, VII. 6; XVII.11

VII.6. Concerning what is given here.

(1-4) The opponent holds that what is given here (i.e. in this life) sustains elsewhere (i.e. in the afterworld of the hungry ghosts). This is rejected as implying the actual gifts are enjoyed in the afterlife, or that what is experienced by one individual is caused by another. The opponent’s point is, rather, that when an individual does an act in one life, he may experience its fruits in a future rebirth. Khuddakapatha 6 and Anguttara III. 43 are cited in support of the thesis.

XVII.11. Concerning the sanctification of a gift.

(1-4) The opponent holds a gift is sanctified by the donor but not by the recipient. The objection is that since there is greater merit in giving a gift to a more worth field of merit, the recipient must also be a factor in the sanctification of the gift.

On Ethical growth, see supra, Of the Individual, 12

I.4. The controverter point concerns whether the defilements are given up piecemeal.

(1-12) The opponent affirms that when those on the path attain higher vision, the defilements are put away piecemeal. But if this is so, it should be admitted that part of an individual can become a stream-enterer, or once returner, etc., while the remainder still has not achieved such a stage.
II.9. A debate over whether penetration of the path is made in ordered segments.

(1-4) The opponent holds that penetration is achieved gradually, but not that the stages of stream-enterer, once-returner, etc., are each gradually developed.

(5-9) He holds the defilements are given up piecemeal, but not that one can become a partial stream-enterer, etc. The Sakavadi by contrast considers the views that the defilements can be given up piecemeal and that one can become a partial stream-enterer, etc., equivalent.

(10-13) The opponent considers one who is coming to see a stage of the path as practicing it. When he has seen it, he is considered experienced in its fruit. While the opponent admits this of the stages of the path, he will not admit it of the realization of the four truths. The Sakavadi considers this inconsistent.

(14-15) The Sakavadi admits that once the first truth is realized, the others are also realized. Nonetheless, he rejects the charge that this is equivalent to holding the first truth amounts to the four truths collectively.

(16) He holds the opponent’s original proposition wrongly implies multiple fruits corresponding in number to the portions into which the process of spiritual advancement is divided.

(17-18) The opponent supports his thesis by citing Vinaya III.303 and Dhammapada 239.

(19-20) SamyuttaV.436, Suttanipata 231 and Vinaya 1.97 = Samyutta IV.47, etc., are quoted rejoinder.

III.4. Of becoming liberated.

(1-8) The opponent holds becoming liberated is a process. The rejoinder considers this tantamount to a claim that liberation occurs step by step.

The opponent holds that past spiritual achievements are retained permanently, that is that they are carried on as one rises to higher spiritual states. The rejoinder is that they are transcended, as nothing is permanent.


The opponent holds that a person striving to attain perfection permanently holds the three fruitions as acquired qualities. The argument largely repeats that of IV.7.

VII.5. Concerning whether merit increases with enjoyment.

The opponent holds that merit increases with enjoyment, that is, that the merit accruing from a gift increases with its use. The rejoinder rejects this view for it could imply that one continues to gain merit for an act of which one is no longer conscious, or for an act performed with unwholesome thoughts. In rejecting the thesis, Anguttara II.50 is cited, while Samyutta I.33 is quoted in its defense.

X.9. Concerning attitude as cause.

The opponent holds that virtuous attitude is the cause of virtue. The argument is as at VII.5.

XIV.2. Of the origin of the sense-organs.

The opponent holds that the ix sense-organs originate at the moment of conception. The Sakavadi maintains, to the contrary, that only the mind and the organ of touch originate at the moment of conception, the others developing over time.

Evil behind and good ahead, IX. 1; XI. 4

IX.1 On seeing what is commendable.

The opponent holds the fetters are put off only by one who discerns liberation as commendable. The rejoinder notes that the fetters are also put off by those who discern the unsatisfactoriness and impermanence of the conditioned world.

XI.4. Of the utterance "This is frustrating".
(1-7) The opponent holds that knowledge of the nature of frustration arises at the same time in the individual who at the moment of entering the path utters the phrases: "This is frustrating." He is found inconsistent is not admitting the development of knowledge in one who utters the other truths under such circumstances.

**Can an Ariyan have a double Moral Code? X. 6**

X.6. Concerning double morality.

(1-7) The opponent holds that an individual engaged in pursuit of the path is practicing at once a worldly and an other-worldly morality. The rejoinder is based on the understanding that this would wrongly imply the simultaneous existence of two sets of mental processes.

**Is Sense Ethical? X. 4**

X.4. Whether the fivefold consciousness is good or bad.

(1-4) The opponent holds that the five kinds of sense-consciousness are morally good or bad. The argument follows that of X.3. This cannot be, goes the rejoinder, because sense-consciousness is worldly.

**Is Virtue Automatic? X. 7, 8**

X.7. Whether morality is not a property of awareness.

(1-11) The opponent holds that morality is not a property of awareness. The point is to affirm that the virtue of an act continues to exist after it has passed from mind. The rejoinder argues that to hold this thesis wrongly implies morality is either material, liberation a sense organ, or a sense object. The argument parallels that of VII.4.

X.8. That morality is not connected with awareness.
The argument is as in X.7. The rejoinder argues that to hold this thesis wrongly implies morality is either material, liberation a sense organ, or a sense object.

Is Self-expression Ethical? X. 10

X.10. Whether what makes itself manifest is moral.
(1-2) The opponent holds that acts of manifestation are moral, that is that they have a moral quality. The rejoinder argues that manifestation is physical and morality is not, thus contradicting the opponent’s thesis.

Are Acts not Self-expressive Immoral? X. 11

X.11. Whether no manifestation is immoral.
(1-4) The opponent holds that acts which do not intimate a moral thought behind themselves are immoral. The rejoinder notes that immoral acts themselves are manifest.

Is Latent bias immoral? IX. 4; XI. 1; XIV. 5

IX.4. Whether intoxicants are without supporting objects.
(1-10) The opponent maintains that intoxicants lack a corresponding mental object. For example, a latent bias to evil may exist even in one thinking moral thoughts. If this were so, it would mean that all manifestations of sensual desire would be without mental objects. Moreover, the relationship of the intoxicants to the mental aggregates further suggests the invalidity of the opponent’s thesis, for the mental aggregates are not without mental objects.

XI.1. Three points about intoxicants.
(1-20) The opponent holds that intoxicants are morally neutral, without root conditions, and independent of awareness. The rejoinder notes that the intoxicants cannot be identified with any of the morally neutral ultimates. Further
it cannot be shown that these intoxicants are different from the corresponding fetters which are immoral. The argument continues as in IX.4.

XIV.5. Of contaminant as other.

(1-8) The opponent holds that a being afflicted by a contaminant is different from actually being possessed by the contaminant; that is, that the bias is different from the actual manifestation. The objection is that this wrongly implies that an actual but unmanifest contaminant is also different in kind from the open manifestation of that contaminant.

Is Self-restraint Positive Moral Action? XII. 1

XII.1 Whether restraint is karma (i.e. morally effective action).

(1-3) The opponent holds that both mental self-restraint and the lack there of are karmic ally efficacious. The objection is that the opponent’s refusal to apply the thesis to the other senses is inconsistent. The rejoinder stresses that karma is will.

Can one doomed to Purgatory be virtuous? XII. 2

XII.2. Concerning action.

(1-3) The opponent holds that all action has maturation. In support he cites Anguttara V.292ff. The objection is that the thesis is unqualified, implying that both inoperative and neutral volitions produce karmic effects.

Abettors of crime, XII. 3

XII.3. Whether sound is a karmic maturation.

(1-3) The opponent holds that sound is a result of karma. The thesis is based on scriptural passages indicating that the quality of a person’s voice is a karmic reward. The objection is that the term “maturation” refers to psychological states only.
Good, Evil and Immediate Sequence, XIV. 1

XIV. 1. Concerning the relining of the good and bad.

(1-7) The opponent holds that the root of good awareness can link directly to the root of bad awareness, and conversely. For example, good and bad thoughts can occur consecutively. The objection is that this implies good awareness can follow upon bad and conversely without an intervening change of mind.

Can there be unconscious eruption of vice? XIV. 6

XIV. 6. Whether outbursts are unconscious.

The opponent holds that passionate outbursts are not associated with awareness. The objection holds that this wrongly classes them as nonmental.

Is a vice not vicious? XV. 5

XV. 5. Concerning the intoxicants.

The opponent holds that four intoxicants are free from intoxicants. The objection is that the intoxicants per se are not included in the category of no intoxicants.

Is Error Unmoral? XIV. 8

XIV. 8. Concerning what is neutral.

(1-5) The opponent holds that speculation is neutral. By this he means that speculation concerning matters upon which the Buddha did not pass judgment is morally neutral. The thesis is rejected as a claim that speculation is morally neutral.

Can Matter be Moral Motive? XVI. 5-7
XVI.5. Concerning matter as cause.

(1-4) The opponent holds that material qualities can be causes, that is that the four primary material qualities condition secondary qualities. The objection takes the term “cause” (hetu) in its special sense as a reference to one of the causes of moral or immoral conduct.

XVI.6. Concerning matter and concomitant cause.

(1-4) The opponent holds that material qualities are accompanied by a cause. The argument is as at XVI.5. The objection takes the term “cause” (hetu) in its special sense as a reference to one of the causes of moral or immoral conduct.

XVI.7. Concerning matter as good or bad.

(1-7) The opponent holds that matter is morally good or bad. His point is that the physical motions involved in action are moral or immoral. The objection is that unlike the moral conditions, matter does not have a mental aspect.

Can Matter be Result of Karma? XVI.8

XVI.8. Concerning matter as maturation.

(1-3) The opponent holds that matter is a maturation of action. The rejoinder insists on maintaining the subjective or psychological nature of the results of action.

Moral Reform and Time, XIX.1

XIX.1. On leaving behind the defilements

(1-4) The opponent holds that one can leave behind past, present and future defilements. The objection is that the thesis implies that we can dismiss both what has already ceased and what has not yet come to be.

Is Nibbana Good? XIX.6

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XIX.6. Concerning the morally good.

The opponent holds that the sphere or element of Liberation is good (i.e. faultless). The objection is that unlike liberation morally good states have mental objects and produce karmic results.

The Moral Controlling Powers are Supra-mundane only. XIX, 8

XIX.8. Concerning the faculties

(1-7) The opponent holds that the five spiritual faculties are not worldly. The objection is that there can be faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration and wisdom (i.e. the five spiritual faculties) with reference to worldly matters. Further the thesis is inconsistent in not treating the sixth mental sense analogously.

Of Unintentional Crimes, XX.1

XX.1. Concerning what is unintentional.

(1-9) The opponent holds that the five gravest transgressions (matricide, patricide, etc.) involve immediate retribution even when committed unintentionally. This thesis aims at stressing the seriousness of such acts even if unintentional. The rejoinder notes the lack of scriptural warrant and the inconsistency in denying that unintentionally is a mitigating circumstance only in the case of these five offences.

Can Dreams be morally effective? XXII. 6

XXII.6. Concerning the karmically neutral

(1-2) The opponent holds that all states of dream-awareness are karmically neutral. The objection is that in his dreams an individual can commit serious offences.

Is United Resolve a Virtue for All? XXIII.1
XXIII. 1. Concerning that sexual relations may be entered upon with a united resolve

The opponent holds that sexual intercourse can be entered into with single intention. The objection is that the thesis does not discriminate between appropriate and inappropriate circumstances.

From the above discussions we can surmise the following points:

- Questions on 123 types of subjects were discussed.
- 14 questions on Buddha and Bodhisatta.
- 17 on arahats, 3 on those in the lower path stages and 9 on the ariyan nature and Path. Only 3 points on Devas.
- 4 on average man or worldling and belong to the fringe of the book indicating later origin.
- 4 on the Order and most strikingly these questions are placed in a cluster indicating some kind of homogeneity.
- Sasana is discussed only once that too in the later part of the book.
- The most debated topic is Puggal and as many as 20 groups of controversies arose on this topic. 110 points in total were discussed on matters relating to Puggala.
- $9 + 19 = 28$ topics were debated on Cosmology.
- 26 topics of ethical subjects were debated.
- Most important point is that only 3 questions were related to the Four Truths, 2 on Nibbana, and only 1 on Sunnata.

Thus it is evident that the in general Kathavatthu discusses on minor topics and very few major controversies arose or were presented in the text.

**INDIRECTLY DISCUSSED MAJOR ISSUES THAT SHOW THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE IN GENERAL**

In the Kathavatthu we find some major issues were discussed indirectly while discussing some other points. Such references that indicate the subtle
development of the Doctrine can be found about nibbana, Kamma and the Noble Truths. But here we shall discuss on the Nibbana to give an idea of these developments. We can have similar discussions on Kamma and niyama from the writings of James P. Mcdermott mentioned earlier.

Nibbana

We may well examine the few remarks scattered here and there in the Kathavatthu regarding the conception of Nibbana. While discussing the existence of puggala, the Kathavatthu makes a remark showing that it conceives Nibbana as a real and eternal state. It says that if puggala (soul) be taken as not disintegrating with the disintegration of Khandhas, this will entail Sassatavāda, for the soul becomes eternally existent like Nibbana.2 Buddhaghosa in commenting upon this say:

_Yatha hi nibbānam na uppajjati na bhijjati evam hi puggalo_3

'Just as Nibbana does neither originate nor decay, so would be the soul.'

Thus we see that the Kathavatthu, supported by Buddhaghosa, takes Nibbana as an eternal state without origination and decay, and does not consider a parinibbuta puggala as sassata.4 In other connections too, the Kathavatthu remarks that Nibbana is eternal and unchangeable _nibbānam dhuvam sassatam aviparināmadhammam_.5

It also says that Nibbana unlike _ñāṇa_ (knowledge) exists by itself like _rūpa_ or _cakkhu_ and does not require any _ārammana_ (basis) to arise.

_Rūpaṁ ca nibbānāṁ ca anārammanā_.6

Unlike _sīla_ (morality), _phassa_ (contact) and _vedanā_ (feeling), it is _acetasika_ (not a property of the mind)7 and is unconnected with mind ( _citta-vipayutta_).8 It is

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2 Kvu. I. i.170 (p.34): _Khandhesu bhījjanamesu no ce bhijjati puggalo, puggalo sassato hoti nibbāno-samasamo._

3 Kvu.A., p.25.

4 Kvu., p.61 Ibid., p.60. cf Dh. S. 1416: Nibbanam na vattabbam uppananti pi anuppaan ti; see also 1534, 1535.

5 Kvu. I. 6 (p.121); see also the note of the commentator in the point of the controversy, p. 63 fn.

6 Kvu., IX. 5; cf. Dh. S. 1408, 1415, 1418: Rupan ca nibbanan ca anārammanā.

7 Kvu. IX. 7; DhammaSangani 1513: _katame dhamma acetasika? Cittanca rupanca nibbananca._

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asankhata (unconstituted)\(^9\) because it possesses the three signs, viz., no origination (\textit{uppāda}), no destruction (\textit{vayo}) and no change (na \textit{thitānam aṁnahathattam paṁñāyati}).\(^{10}\) The \textit{Kathavatthu} thus conceives \textit{Nibbāna} as existing eternally without origin, decay and change and is beyond all description.

**DEVELOPMENT OF LOGIC**

The divisions among the Buddhists which led to the formation of the separate schools were naturally accompanied by much controversy, including public debates. Public debating was in fact an ancient custom in India, reflected in the \textit{Upaniṣads} and in the earliest Buddhist texts. It had then been relatively undisciplined and rhetorical, as far as one can see from those texts. When, however, the Buddhists became divided over various philosophical questions they sought more rigorous methods of argument which might clarify their difficulties. This happened just at the time when in the \textit{Abhidharma} they were elaborating entire texts containing only precisely formulated, in other words logical, discourse, with strictly controlled deductions from accepted premises. The \textit{Abhidharmas} of the schools include texts which record what purport to be actual debates with other schools, carried on in regular form and against checks supplied by logical method. The most important of these is the \textit{Kathavatthu} (in Pali, of the \textit{Sthaviravāda} school), a collection of more than two hundred debates supposed to have been compiled in the 3\textsuperscript{rd} century B.C. but undoubtedly added to after that date (a parallel text of another school is found in the \textit{Vijñānakāya} of the \textit{Sarvāstivāda}, extant in a Chinese translation). These debates are refutations in strict logical form of propositions maintained by other schools of Buddhism. They generally turn on the question of the consistency of these disputed propositions

\(^8\) Kvu. XIV.6; cf. DhammaSangani 1515: \textit{Katame dhamma citta vippayutta? Rupanca nibbananca}...

\(^9\) DhammaSangani. 1439

\(^{10}\) Kvu.I.1.227 (p.61); cf DhammaSangani 1416: \textit{Nibbanam na vattabbam uppananti pi anuppaan ti}; see also 1534, 1535.
with those accepted statements which all schools admitted to have been enunciated by the Buddha.

The use of logical reasoning is a significant characteristic of the teaching of the Buddha. The development of systematic logic in India owes much to Buddhist logicians. The contribution of Buddhist logic in shaping the nature of Indian logic in general has been widely acknowledged. It seems that, by the time of the Buddha logical reasoning had become an accepted mode of rational thinking. Literary evidence belonging to the early Buddhist tradition shows that not only logical reasoning was known and practiced but also that people were mature enough even to bring it under criticism. The discourses have reference to many *sramanas* and *brahmanas* who went on arguing with each other in order to establish the supremacy and efficacy of their own view only and that the views of others were false as they held mutually contradictory views. *Aññam’aññassa uju vipaccanika vādā.*

K.N. Jayatilleke\(^1\) has noticed that almost all the arguments used in the discourses against the holders of different views is of the form of *modus tollens* which is to demonstrate that the opponent’s view results in a proposition which is obviously false. In the *Culadukkhandhasutta* of the *Majjhimanikāya*\(^13\) the Buddha shows to *Niganthas* that if their practice of undergoing suffering in order to destroy the past karmas is meaningful, those who have entered religious life under Jaina must be those who were born as human beings due to their bad past karmas

\[ \text{evam sante āvuso niganṭhā ye loke luddhā lohitapāñino kurūrakammantā manussesu paccājāta te niganṭhesu pabbaṇantti.}\]

The implication is that since all those who enter religious life in Jainism cannot be of that character, the practice must be misguided.

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\(^{11}\) Majjhima Nikāya I.p.402


\(^{13}\) Majjhimanikāya I. pp.91-95

\(^{14}\) ibid. p.93
The Buddhist discourses refer to instances of ‘two pronged question’ (ubhatokotikam panham) put forth to the Buddha. One such instance occurs in the Abhayarajakumara sutta. Abhayaraja’s question is as follows: Would the Tathagata make statements which are displeasing and unpleasant to others (=p)? If yes, then how is he different from the ordinary individual who makes similar statements (=q)? If the Tathagata would not make statements which are displeasing and unpleasant to others (r), then why has he pronounced about Devadatta that he is doomed to hell (=s)? It is clear that the intention of the questioner is to commit the Buddha either to q (that he is not different from an ordinary person) or to r (which is equal to accepting that he is a liar). The Buddha escapes from the dilemma by admitting p (that he uses unpleasant words) in a qualified sense. The example is illuminating not only for the awareness of a complex logical rule betrays, but also for the Buddha’s refusal to yield to the rigidity of linguistic concepts and the rules of logic themselves.

The above example shows that the early Buddhist tradition did not take logical rules based on strict true-false dichotomy as inviolable and sacrosanct. Nevertheless, the rational thinking which is characterized by clear demonstration of advantages and disadvantages in a given situation has always been upheld. In the Apannakasutta the Buddha compares the advantages and the disadvantages of accepting and rejecting survival of life and moral responsibility and demonstrates that is always more advantageous to accept the two views rather than rejecting them.

The instances of use of logical reasoning in the Abhidhamma seem to be more technical than those in the discourses. According to some interpreters, the Kathavatthu, one of the treatises belonging to the Abhidhamma Pitaka contains even more advanced forms of logical reasoning. The entire book has been presented as a dialogue between the Theravadin and those who held views.

15 Ibid, pp.392-6
16 Majjhima Nikaya, I. pp. 400-413
different from him, namely, those who belonged to Buddhist sects other than the Theravada. The language used contains certain technical terms used in the professional debates in which logical reasoning was employed. For instance 'Niggaha' refutation, 'patikamma rejoinders are two such terms that occur frequently. More importantly, scholars like KN Jayatilleke17 have shown that, if the statements in the Kathavatthu are interpreted as dealing with propositions and not with terms, the author of the book shows that he knew the two theorems of propositional calculus namely, the rule of implication \((p \rightarrow q = \neg(p \land \neg q))\) and contraposition \((p \rightarrow q = \neg q \rightarrow \neg p\)). More recent scholars like D.J. Kalupahana18 have argued that this way of interpretation is wrong and have suggested that the relevant statements have to be understood as efforts to clarify the relationship between the two key concepts ‘sacchikattha’ and ‘paramattha’ (truth and reality).

Ancillary to the debates proper the Kathāvatthu shows us a variety of logical methods for dealing with new propositions, or new terms, presented for discussion. These are:

1. Checking against all the accepted terms in the system to see how it fits in this gives us a tetrad scheme of:

   - I, is the new term identical in meaning (though not in name) with any of the accepted terms? (This leads further into an ‘examination of concepts’ and a study of synonyms);
   - II, is it different from all the accepted terms?
   - III, is it part of any of the terms? and
   - IV, is one of the terms part of it? (this ‘scheme’ is to be applied for all the accepted terms, with reference to the new one).

2. Considering the logical ‘quantity’: does the proposition cover all instances of a given term or only some?

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17 Jayatilleke, K.N., op. cit., p.415
18 Kalupahana, D.J., A History of Buddhist Philosophy: Continuities and Discontinuities, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1992, p. 135
(3) Discussing the possible classification of a new term under the classes of the system, its definition or description, the conditions under which the phenomenon in question occurs.

(4) Any special discussions which may be relevant.

(5) Adducing statements from the accepted texts (Tripitaka) to confirm or controvert a proposition.

The method of the debate proper is based on placing two propositions side by side, one of which is the disputed one and the other related to it in such a way that one must either affirm both or deny both. The second proposition is itself either taken directly from the accepted texts or so clearly implied by them that all Buddhists must admit the implication (consequently that the proposition must be affirmed or must be denied, as the case may be). If the disputed proposition is inconsistent with the system (and therefore with the accepted texts), it will be found that the 'opponent' (representative of the other school) in the debate affirms one of the two related propositions but denies the other: the protagonist of the Sthaviravāda then asserts the relationship between them (adding further analysis where necessary to establish the relationship) and calls upon the opponent to admit the refutation. The actual form of the debate in the Kathavatthu is much longer than would seem necessary to set out the refutation, and presumably represents some conventional procedure in public debating which laboriously established the positions of the two parties and reiterated the argument until no one could escape seeing the conclusion. It contains forty two steps in argument, besides the initial statements of the two related proposition, in which the opponent first sophistically refutes the Sthaviravādin (e.g. by equivocation, which has eventually to be exposed by an ancillary method) in a twenty one step argument, maintaining his proposition (cf. the Arthaśāstra's purvapakṣa, opponent's view), after which the Sthaviravādin gains the initiative (uttarapakṣa,
own view) in a second twenty one step ‘refutation’ and (properly, this time) refutes it.

Apart from the rigid formalisation of discourse, the relationships between the two propositions around which the debate turns is logically important. In effect the opponent's proposition (statement to which he assents, *pratijñā*; whether affirmative or negative) is analysed by substituting for it one of which it is a potential or a biconditional (i.e. which implies it), but which the opponent must deny (on grounds of the agreed texts or of experience). Where necessary the relationship will then be proved. Alternative methods of analysis of the disputed proposition include substituting a synonym for one of its terms or bringing out its implications by showing that one of its terms belongs to some class or is causally related to some other term. All these procedures bridge the gap between the disputed proposition and accepted doctrinal statements and so establish a deduction from accepted doctrine of the untenability of the disputed proposition. The form of the debate may be summarized as follows:

1. The opponent is asked whether he assents to his (disputed) proposition, and does so (*p*).

2. The opponent is asked whether he assents to another proposition (which clearly is contrary to the accepted doctrine), but he denies it (*¬q*).

3. The *Śṭhāvīravādin* asserts that if you accept *p* then you must accept *q* (*p→q*).

4. The *Śṭhāvīravādin* shows why *p→q*, by analysing *p*, concluding that if *¬q* then *¬p*.
Examples of the pairs of propositions (the first is the disputed one, the second that clearly related to accepted doctrine):

(a)  (1) There is that which is unknown to a ‘perfected one’ (arhant).
     (2) There is ignorance in a perfected one.

(b)  (1) The discourse of the Buddha is ‘transcendental’.
     (2) The discourse of the Buddha is audible only to transcendental
       ears, not to worldly ones.

(c)  (1) There are two ‘cessations’ (leading to nirodha
     (2) There are two cessations of unhappiness (this would duplicate
       one of the Four Truths, which is untenable ).

(d)  (1) The ‘person’ (soul) exists in the real, ultimate sense.
     (2) The person exists in the real, ultimate sense in the same way as
       those (agreed) things which are real and ultimate (i.e. as the groups matter,
       sensation, etc., and other elements; the opponent cannot maintain the
       person in the same way because it lacks any characteristics to identify it
       and can be argued for only indirectly as neither the same as the groups nor
       different from them, and so forth).

In each case the opponent assents to (1) but denies (2).

The *Kathāvatthu* represents a very advanced and developed art of debate in which the basic canons of logic which are universally accepted are seen to be emerging. Some modern critics have been hesitant to believe that these ancient Indian debaters possessed knowledge of sophisticated logical principles. As K.N. Jayatilleke\(^\text{19}\) observes, in a situation such as “one has to rely on the factual evidence...........and not on hypothetical possibilities of what can or cannot exist”

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