Chapter - III

On Democracy

As an individualist, Russell cannot but regard democracy as ideally the best form of government. But 'democracy' is a very much controverted term or "a rather tricky word", as one modern writer very aptly and tersely observes. Carl L. Becker describes democracy as "a kind of Gladstone bag which, with a little manipulation, can be made to accommodate almost any collection of social facts we may wish to carry about in it." The term 'democracy' has been interpreted in various ways. The literature on the subject is so vast and varied that it is difficult to say what democracy really means. Russell, however, defines democracy as a system of government where all people have an equal share of political power. "By democracy", Russell writes, "I do not necessarily mean a parliamentary regime; the Soviet system, as originally conceived, would have been quite compatible with democracy. What I mean by democracy is a system under which all ordinary men and women participate equally in fundamental political power, though exceptional people may be excluded for special reasons, such as endeavouring to upset by force the government directed by the majority." DEMOCRACY MAY BE DEFINED AS THE EQUAL DISTRIBUTION OF ultimate power. According to him, democracy in practice implies a government by the majority.

Democracy, thus defined, appears to him to be the most
natural form of government of every advanced industrial community except in times of special stresses as revolution or war. Democracy, as conceived by Russell, implies an even or equal distribution of political power among all men and women. But democracy in this sense is an ideal and can never be fully realized. And this leads Russell to give us a workable and practicable definition of democracy in his *Power: A New Social Analysis* (1938). He observes: "A government is usually called 'democratic' if a fairly large percentage of the population has a share of political power." In his opinion, a government becomes more and more democratic as the number of people possessed of political power increases. Thus, according to Russell, democracy is a matter of degree, and its essence lies in an approach to equality of power.

Russell, as we have seen, defines democracy as essentially a political system or a form of government where the ultimate political power rests with the people. It must be noted that Russell does not give us any new definition of democracy. On the contrary, he completely adheres to the definition given by J.S. Mill and Lord Bryce. J.S. Mill regards democracy as ideally the best form of government where "the sovereignty or supreme controlling power is vested in the entire aggregate of the community." Lord Bryce defines democracy as a form of government where the ruling power of a State is legally vested in the members of the community as a whole. Like Russell, many modern political theorists regard democracy primarily as a form of government or a political system. For instance, MacIver writes that "democracy must be understood in
the first instance as a political system. However, Plato and
Aristotle are the first among political philosophers to view
democracy as a political system. Sir Henry Maine also looks upon
democracy as essentially a form of government.

Democracy has many critics. Plato regards democracy as a
system of government where everyone has the absolute liberty to
do whatever he likes. He thinks that since democracy lays too
much stress upon liberty, it very frequently opens the floodgates
of tyranny. To quote his words: "... tyranny arises from no other
constitution than democracy, severest and most cruel slavery
following, I fancy, the extreme of liberty." Aristotle considers
democracy to be a perverted form of government. Rousseau says
that men are not fit for so perfect a government as democracy.
Nietzsche criticizes democracy because it, he argues, is the means
by which cattle become masters. Sir Henry Maine in his Popular
Government (1890), and Lecky in his Democracy and Liberty (1896),
subject democracy to very rude and harsh criticisms.

In modern times, Mosca and Michels are two of the most
well-known and influential critics of democracy. Mosca writes:
"Among the constant facts and tendencies that are to be found in
all political organisms, one is so obvious that it is apparent to
the most casual eye. In all societies - from societies that are
very meagerly developed and have barely attained the dawnings of
civilization, down to the most advanced and powerful societies - two
classes of people appear - a class that rules and a class that is
ruled. The first class, always the less numerous, performs all
political functions, monopolizes power and enjoys the advantages that power brings, whereas the second, the more numerous class, is directed and controlled by the first, in a manner that is now more or less legal, now more or less arbitrary and violent..."

In his opinion, in all human societies political power is always exercised by an organized minority. "Democracy leads", as Michels writes, "to oligarchy, and necessarily contains an oligarchical nucleus." Democracy, he further writes, "has an inherent preference for the authoritarian solution of important questions."

According to him, democracy cannot be a successful form of government because "the number of those who have a lively interest in public affairs is insignificant."

Among the modern critics of democracy, H.G. Wells and George Bernard Shaw stand out most prominently. H.G. Wells condemns democracy because he thinks that it subordinates all individuals to the ignorant mass. He regards democracy not as "a permanent form of political and social life", but as "a phase of immense dissolution." Bernard Shaw considers democracy to be a dangerous and treacherous system, and defines it as "a big balloon, filled with gas or hot air, and sent up so that you shall be kept looking up at the sky whilst other people are picking your pockets."

Both Wells and Shaw contend that democracy cannot prove to be a good and an ideal system of government because of ignorance and indifference of the common man to public affairs.

But unlike Wells and Shaw, and like J.S. Mill, Russell accepts democracy as the best possible form of government. According
to him, it is extremely dangerous to think that there are better systems than democracy. "Democracy ... is a product," writes Russell, "of the West, very imperfect as yet, very limited in scope both within and without the nominally democratic nations. But no man with a sense of justice can doubt that it represents an advance upon previous modes of government, and that it ought not to be allowed to perish because of the vices of those who inadequately practise it." It may be noted here that Russell's views on democracy are largely influenced, nay, moulded by John Stuart Mill who, in his *Considerations on Representative Government* (1860), argues most fervently and passionately in favour of democracy. But Russell, like J.S. Mill, has not written any comprehensive treatise on Democracy.

Russell in his brochure 'What is Democracy?' (1935) points out several advantages of democracy. According to him, the merits of democracy are negative. To quote him: "The merits of democracy are negative: it does not insure good government, but it prevents certain evils." In his opinion, all forms of government except democracy suffer from the defect that they are very often indifferent to the welfare of the people. In his well-known book, *Power: A New Social Analysis* (1938), Russell discusses in some detail the merits and demerits of monarchy and oligarchy, and holds the view that they are all unstable forms of government. He writes: "The principal demerit of both is that sooner or later, the government becomes so indifferent to the desires of ordinary men that there is revolution." But democracy, as Russell says, is a safety-valve against this kind of instability. Democracy has,
no doubt, many faults; but it has, in his opinion, the great merit that the people generally accept it as "a substitute for civil war in political disputes." Russell thinks that democracy is the only form of government which, by insisting upon the accountability of the government to the people, achieves very largely, though not absolutely, the identity of interests between the rulers and the ruled. In his own words: democracy "has the merit of making governments pay some attention to the welfare of their subjects— not, perhaps, as much as might be wished, but very much more than is shown by absolute monarchies, oligarchies, or dictatorships." MacIver regards democracy as the most flexible form of government because it adjusts itself rather easily to changing conditions and needs. He is of the view that by granting fundamental rights to all men democracy liberates them from the most deadly frustration which arises from the denial of the freedom of thought, expression and belief. In his unpublished essay, 'The Advantages and Disadvantages of Party Government, and the conditions necessary for its Success' (1889), Russell says that democracy is the most suitable government to secure the improvement of the condition of the people and the settling of social problems.

Democracy has been very often described as a government by discussion and compromise. "Democracy is the process of discussion," as Barker observes. It is, as Santayana says, based upon "the Ethics of Compromise." Not by using force, but through the methods of discussion, persuasion and compromise democracy seeks to resolve all difficulties and disagreements. In a democracy public issues cannot thus become so acute as to lead to civil war. "One of the
most important purposes of government", writes Russell, "should be to prevent issues from becoming so acute as to lead to civil war; and from this point of view democracy, where it is habitual, is probably preferable to any other known form of government." Tocqueville more than a century ago has said that democracy favours equality and thereby tends to make wars and revolutions "more rare, less frequent and protracted." But Rousseau argues that no government is so subject to civil wars and agitations as democratic or popular government.

Nobody will probably dispute the fact that dictatorship is tyrannical and oppressive. In a dictatorship no opposition is tolerated, and all criticisms of public policy are ruthlessly suppressed and persecuted. "To suppress public discussion of opposing views of public policy and to prevent criticism of established authority", in the words of Burns, "is essential to dictatorship." In a dictatorship no freedom of thought is allowed, because the dictatorship simply tries to promote uniformity of thought and action. "In a modern totalitarian State", as Russell says, "matters are worse than they were in the times of Socrates, or in the time of the Gospels. In a totalitarian State an innovator whose ideas are disliked by the government is not merely put to death, which is a matter to which a brave man may remain indifferent, but is totally prevented from causing his doctrine to be known." But democracy, in his opinion, prevents all such atrocities. "This is", according to him, "its first and greatest merit." Russell regards democracy as the best device so far invented to prevent the
abuse of power. He thinks that democracy can prevent all large-scale persecutions and atrocities, because it makes "men's tenure of power temporary and dependent upon popular approval." Laski argues that a democratic government cannot be oppressive, because it "lives always in the shadow of coming defeat."

Russell's view that democracy is the best system so far invented to prevent the abuse of power receives strong support from many modern writers on Democracy. "Democracy in origin and action", MacIver observes, "is a system devised to break the primal source of all tyranny, which is the coercive power of group over group, or of the few over the many." "Democracy seeks", writes Karl Mannheim, "to control power, whatever its forms."

Russell thinks that the value of democracy in the modern scientific age is mainly educational and intellectual. To quote him: "What are the advantages of scientific democracy over dogmatic dictatorship? At the basis of all other advantages is the purely intellectual one that in a scientific community doctrines are accepted because, as a result of untramelled discussion, they have emerged as the most likely to be true, whereas under a dictatorship doctrines are accepted either because they are traditional or because they are convenient for the holders of power." In his opinion, dictatorship always tends to promote stereotyped opinion, and thereby puts a brake upon intellectual and technical progress. A dictatorship, as Joad says, through a system of centralized education, always seeks to develop in citizens "a definite cast of mind." Thus the evils of dictatorship,
as both Russell and Joad argue, are essentially psychological. Russell agrees with all the protagonists of democracy that it is the only system which allows for freedom of thought and discussion. To him, democracy is the best device so far invented for diminishing as much as possible the interference of government with individual liberty. Russell believes that by permitting what he calls "untrammelled discussion", democracy helps to stimulate the growth of mind and intellect.

The view that dictatorship stunts intellectual progress has long ago been pointed out by J.S. Mill. "All intellectual superiority", he observes, "is the fruit of active effort." In a dictatorship the people are not called upon to play an active part in the processes of administration, and are kept ignorant of all public affairs. A dictator, for the sake of his own interest, always tries to promote a docile and inert public opinion. Mill thus concludes that in a dictatorship the people suffer intellectually. He goes a step further and says that in a dictatorship not only intellectual but also moral qualities of the people are stunted and stifled. Mill recognizes the intellectual value of democracy when he says that by requiring active and intelligent participation of the people in civic functions, democracy promotes intellectual growth and brings about "a better and higher form of national character." Lipson also focusses on the educative value of democracy when he points out that by providing a continuous civic education "it helps humanity in becoming more civilized."

Another great merit of democracy, according to Russell, is
that it is less prone to war. "Although it cannot be said," he writes, "in any absolute way that democracies are against war, I do think it can be said that they are less apt to be war-like than autocracies are." He is of the view that a democratic government is more inclined to peace; and this, he thinks, is a great advantage which a popular government possesses over all other forms of government. Russell thinks that the First World War was mainly due to three great Empires, namely, Austria, Russia and Germany. He makes Hitler's Germany, "the very reverse of democracy," responsible for the World War II. And he wrote in the fifties that the World War III, if it ever happens, will be due mainly to "the unfriendliness and aggressiveness of Russian policy since 1945." Russell, however, modifies his view in the closing years of his life and regards America, not Russia, as the greatest enemy of peace.

Russell rejects the charge against democracy that it is a weak government. "Democracy, as a form of government, has," he writes, "the advantage of making everybody a participant in war. I think it may be doubted (and I see that Goebbels agrees with me in this) whether a country under an undemocratic regime would be as unmoved in disaster as England was in 1940. This is one of the strongest reasons for expecting democracy to survive." Russell does not think that an authoritarian government is superior to democracy for purposes of war. In his article entitled 'The Future of Democracy' (1937) he writes that in a totalitarian régime "the absence of free criticism soon produces bureaucratic conservatism}
which is fatal to success in war." That wars since the beginning of the 18th century were won by democracies, he points out, is an adequate testimony of the strength which a democratic government possesses in times of stress and strain. But in his unpublished essay, 'The Advantages and Disadvantages of Party Government, and the conditions necessary for its Success' (1889), Russell says that democracy "is very ill suited for a resolute foreign policy, for conducting great wars or forming firm alliances." It is generally thought that an authoritarian government is better than a democracy for rapid economic changes. But Russell writes: "The ultimate power of the majority is very important to minimize the harshness inevitably involved in great changes, and to prevent a rapidity of transformation which causes a revulsion of feeling."

Tocqueville writes that it is the nature of democracy to promote peace and to renounce war. Delisle Burns maintains that democracy makes war less probable. He goes so far as to regard democracy and war as "irreconcilable opposities." Joad thinks that it is dictatorship that logically leads to war. He observes that dictators, even when they do not go to war, "keep the possibility of war even before the people."

Like J.S. Mill, Russell believes in the relativity of all forms of government. Mill writes in his Autobiography that "all questions of political institutions are relative, not absolute", and that "different stages of human society not only will have, but ought to have different institutions." Being an empiricist, Russell
thinks that democracy cannot be indiscriminately and successfully applied to every society. Like Mill, he is aware of the fact that though theoretically democracy is the most ideal form of government, it is not, on the practical plane, always and everywhere the best form of government. "I do not think", writes Russell, "it can be said that democracy, always and everywhere, is the best form of government. I do not think that it can be successfully practised among totally uncivilized people. I do not think it is workable where there is a population of mixed groups which fundamentally hate each other. I do not think that it can be introduced quite suddenly in countries that have no experience of the give and take that goes with freedom in government."

Russell thinks that democracy cannot function successfully in a country where the people lack self-restraint and toleration. He points out that before introducing a democracy in a country the political instinct of the people should be taken into account. In his opinion, the success of democracy "demands a readiness for compromise. The beaten party must not consider that a principle is involved of such importance as to make it pusillanimous to yield; on the other hand, the majority must not press the advantage to the point at which it provokes a revolt." This, he thinks, requires a general respect for law and the habit of believing in opinion other than one's own. Russell observes that democracy is not possible where men live in a state of acute fear, and are not free from hatred and destructiveness. He thinks that when men live in a state of acute fear, they "look for a leader and submit to
them when found, with the result that he probably becomes a dictator." According to him, the success of democracy depends upon the widespread diffusion of two qualities: (a) a certain degree of self-reliance, and (b) a certain degree of willingness to back one's own judgement. Russell concludes that democracy can be a stable form of government only where it is traditional, that is to say, where it is deeply rooted in the political genius of the people. "The chief conditions for the success of democracy", he writes, "appear to be three: first, an educated population; second, a considerable degree of cultural homogeneity; third, a greater interest in home affairs than in relations with foreign countries." Cultural homogeneity, according to him, is "a matter of sentiment", and is generated partly by history as it is taught in schools and partly by similarity in national customs, manners, food, games and so on. Where there is no cultural homogeneity, democracy, if it is to be successful, must, according to him, be federal in character. In Russell's opinion, the success of democracy depends upon the fulfilment of certain (a) political, (b) economic, (c) propaganda, and (d) psychological and educational conditions.

John Stuart Mill has pointed out certain conditions where a democratic government is not possible. He thinks that a democratic government is unsuitable to a people who have yet to learn the lessons of obedience. It is, he argues, unfit for a people who are extremely passive and readily submit to tyranny. Mill further observes that a democratic government is equally unsuitable to a people with an inveterate spirit of locality. In
his view, a people who are ignorant, hold strong prejudices and obstinate adherence to old habits cannot make the best use of a democratic government.

Along with Mill and Russell, many modern writers have adopted a relativist approach to democracy. MacIver holds the view that a democratic government cannot be suddenly introduced in a country by a sudden change of attitude. He thinks that democracy is unworkable in a country where the people are illiterate, politically inactive and unconscious of their unity. He further adds that it is difficult to introduce a democratic system where economic standards are low and the means of communication are not developed. Aristotle is, of course, the first political thinker to emphasize the relativity of forms of government. Rousseau also thinks that all forms of government do not suit all countries.

From what has been said above, it can be concluded that Mill and Russell have laid emphasis upon the psychological basis of democracy. Among modern writers, Durbin and Leonard Woolf very strongly plead for a psychological approach to the study of democracy. Durbin writes: "... that the immediate cause of the growth of democratic political institutions in any society is the appearance in that society of certain widely distributed emotional characteristics; and that the establishment and maintenance of democracy is a sign of growing psychological health in any people." "Democracy is", in the words of Woolf, "not a branch of science or metaphysics: it is primarily psychological, an attitude of mind
towards human government, a conviction as to the just and the reasonable method for determining the social position and political rights of individual in human communities." By treating democracy as "a way of life," John Dewey emphasizes the psychological roots of democracy.

Russell is not a dogmatist to regard democracy as a government without any defect or limitation. On the contrary, he says that democracy is subject to certain limitations. The limitations of democracy, in his view, arise from two sources. First, democracy often requires speedy actions and quick decisions. This is particularly true, as Russell says, when the possibility or threat of war is imminent. That democracy sometimes requires speedy decisions and quick actions vests excessive power in the executive, and gives it opportunity to become autocratic and tyrannical. Secondly, there are some matters, for example, war and finance, which require expert knowledge. The electorate cannot be expected to possess expert knowledge in these matters. Hence these matters, as Russell argues, should be left to the government by the electorate.

Russell admits that these limitations of democracy are to some extent ineradicable. And he, therefore, concludes that some unwarranted interference with individual liberty by the government cannot altogether be ruled out. But he thinks that these limitations can be largely overcome if the government is made responsive to public opinion. In his words: "Democracy is successful in so far as the Government is obliged to respect public opinion."
War and the threat of war, according to him, are the two most serious threats to democracy at the present time. In war times, he thinks, the sense of national solidarity reaches such a high pitch that the leader who personifies the nation can easily arrogate to himself dictatorial power. Russell holds that if the fear of war is eliminated, the above limitations of democracy can be removed to a considerable extent. "The great powers vested in the executive", he writes, "of a modern State are chiefly due to the frequent need of rapid decisions, especially as regards foreign affairs. If the danger of war were practically eliminated, more cumbrous but less autocratic methods would be possible, and the Legislature might recover many of the powers which the executive has usurped."

Russell observes that through newspapers and broadcasting the people in a modern scientific age can easily get themselves acquainted with what happens inside the legislature. He further says that through newspapers and platforms they can also make their opinions and grievances known to the government. In fact, there are now more frequent personal contacts (psychological and mental) between those who rule and the people. This has resulted, in Russell's opinion, in diminishing the importance of the representative and increasing that of the leader. Parliaments, as he thinks, are no longer regarded as "effective intermediaries between voters and governments."

According to Russell, it is a fatal defect of democracy
that it gives all the people an equal voice in the settlement of an issue whether it affects only a small fraction of the people, or whether they have no interest in the issue concerned. He thinks that the people are invariably swayed by irrelevant considerations when they have no direct interest in an issue. Russell, therefore, argues that it is dangerous to allow all the people to have an equal voice in the settlement of issues which concern only a small fraction of the population, whether geographical or vocational.

In the opinion of Russell, a modern democracy is exposed to certain dangers which did not exist in the past. These dangers, he thinks, arise from (a) the police, (b) important pressure groups, (c) an intolerant public opinion, and (d) such collective prejudices as nationalism, racial and religious bigotry. He agrees with J.S. Mill that liberty is often interfered with not only by government alone, but also by public opinion. Like Mill, Russell points out that in a democracy there can be no liberty without toleration of all opinions, not involving an incitement to the breach of law. He writes that "where public opinion is intolerant a man may be gravely damaged by the publication of something which is in no way to his real discredit." Mill in his Essay on Liberty (1859) states the case for freedom of thought and opinion in the most convincing terms. Russell thinks that the dangers to democracy that arise from intolerant public opinion and collective prejudices can be removed, or at least can be largely mitigated by a proper and right system of liberal education.

Like J.S. Mill, Russell, as we have seen, finds a close
relationship between democracy and education. In his article entitled 'Education for Democracy' (1939), Russell writes: "It is quite clear that education has a very large part to play in making democracy a workable system. To start at the extreme point, you certainly cannot work a democracy when your population is illiterate; if they cannot read or write, all the machinery which is required for democracy does not work. You need a fair amount of education before democracy becomes at all possible." Russell very strongly advocates the idea of democracy in education. He thinks that true democracy is not possible unless there is democracy in education. He thus writes in his unpublished essay entitled 'The Prospects of Democracy' (1933): "Political democracy, it has been found, is little better than a sham unless it is accompanied by economic democracy and democracy in education. At present those whose parents are well-to-do receive, as a rule, much more instruction than those whose parents are very poor. The result is that the children of the well-to-do tend to occupy all the key positions of power and to have a monopoly of propagandist skill. So long as this remains the case, true democracy is impossible."

The close relationship between democracy and education has been extensively treated by John Dewey in his *Democracy and Education* (1916). Lord Bryce also stresses a close relationship between democracy and education. But, in his opinion, public spirit and honesty are even more necessary than knowledge in a democracy. The proper aim of education in democracy, according to Russell, should be to produce open-mindedness and a willingness
to listen to all sorts of arguments other than one's own. He says that "the business of education in relation to democracy is to try to produce the type of character which is willing to advance its own opinion as vigorously as may be, but also willing to submit to the majority when it finds the majority going against it."

Russell reminds us that the Army often poses a serious threat to democracy. In the past democracies in many countries of the world were overthrown by their armies. It is often found that in a democracy the Army takes control of the government and rules the country. Sir Henry Maine points out that in a popular government it is very difficult to keep the army from meddling with politics. He goes so far as to regard an army and a democratically governed nation as two quite opposite and incompatible organizations. A.D. Lindsay echoes almost the same opinion when he writes: "How to control an efficient and strong army has always been a puzzle for democracy. An army itself cannot be democratically governed." Tocqueville also notices the danger that arises to democracy from the Army.

Russell agrees with Laski and others that there can be no liberty without democracy. But he, like J.S. Mill, thinks that there is no necessary correlation between the two, because in a democracy the majority might tyrannize the minority. Ivor Brown sees no good reason why liberty and democracy should be treated as "inseparable companions." Like Tocqueville and J.S. Mill, Russell is conscious of the fact that in a democracy the majority might abuse power and
Lord Action also points out the possibility of "the tyranny of the majority" in a democracy. He writes: "The only prevailing evil of democracy is the tyranny of the majority, or rather that of party, not always the majority, that succeeds, by force or fraud, in carrying elections."

But to obviate this danger, Russell, like John Stuart Mill, has not advocated the Hare scheme of proportional representation. Russell does not advocate such schemes as plural voting based on educational qualifications, direct or open voting and short tenure of Parliament, which Mill has propounded and propagated. Hearnshaw rejects the scheme of proportional representation as a remedy for "the tyranny of the majority," and insists upon "the rousing of public spirit," "the education of public conscience," and "the development of the sense of public responsibility." But Lord Acton thinks that it is through the system of proportional representation that "the tyranny of the majority" can be minimized. "Fifty years ago," as Action writes, "it was pointed out that the remedy is proportional representation. It is profoundly democratic; for it increases the influence of thousands who would be otherwise have no voice in government; ..."

Russell lays down certain conditions, the fulfilment of which, he thinks, will minimize "the tyranny of the majority." First, the majority, in his opinion, should not be so intransigent as to think that they are always in the right and not liable to error. John Stuart Mill writes: "The power of the majority is salutary so far as it is used defensively, not offensively - as
its exertion is tempered by respect for the personality of the individual, and deference to superiority of cultivated intelligence."

Secondly, the majority, as Russell says, should not impose its will upon the minority in those matters in which uniform or common decisions are not absolutely necessary. He opines that liberty of the minority should not be curtailed so long as there exists no technical reasons for a common decision. He argues that the minority should be left free in matters like religion, education and military service. Thirdly, on the part of the majority there should be, he says, toleration of all propaganda, not involving the breach of law. Russell is very cautious to point out that in a democracy the minority should not breach law and resort to force even when the government is oppressive, because the reign of law is always better than the reign of terror which might be unleashed by force. "Where there is democracy, attempts of a minority," he writes, "to seize power by force, and incitements to such attempts, may reasonably be forbidden, on the ground that a law-abiding majority has a right to a quiet life if it can secure it."

Democracy thus, in the opinion of Russell, requires a rather difficult combination of individual liberty with submission to the majority.

Russell notes that democracy today does not inspire the same zeal and respect as it used to do in the olden days. The main reason, according to him, lies in the size of the modern State. Joad observes that the growing size and complexity of the modern State is preeminent among the circumstances that militate against democratic government. As Barker points out, it is 'size' that
constitutes one of the great difficulties of a democratic government. Ivor Brown argues: "The fact is that the more a democracy grows in size the less democratic it becomes." Democracy in ancient Greece was more democratic in the sense that the people there could actively participate in the processes of government. Democracy now implies a representative form of government. People no longer have the opportunity to participate directly in the administration of government and law-making. A modern State, as Russell thinks, is so large in size and so remote from the life of the people that they feel no interest whatsoever in the affairs of the State. The largeness and remoteness of a modern democratic State, in his opinion, tends to create in the people a sense of impotence and callousness to public affairs. Lord Bryce observes that in a modern State a large residue of the citizens remains apathetic and indifferent to public affairs, reading little and thinking less about them.

Moreover, in the modern industrial and scientific society issues are mostly complicated and require technical and expert knowledge for their comprehension and solution. The common run of men cannot be expected to understand them in all their implications and complications. In the modern State it is the officials who take decisions on almost all important questions, because they alone can command expert and requisite technical knowledge. Russell, therefore, observes that in a modern democratic State it is the officials, and not the people, who possess all power and initiative. In short, he argues that in every modern State bureaucracy thrives under the cloak of industrial development.
Russell agrees with Laski that the officials are by nature conservative and opposed to every kind of new and progressive ideas.

Russell, however, admits that the growth of bureaucracy cannot altogether be arrested in the modern industrial age. But he opines that the evils of bureaucracy are to be removed if democracy is to be worth its name. To check its evils, Russell pleads for the subjection of officials to popular control. Joad argues that the officials should provide only guidance and advice, and that the determination of policy should be left to the ordinary citizens and not to the officials. Russell thinks that education in a modern society should be so oriented as to create in those who would be officials a broad mental outlook to help them understand properly the problems of society, and regard all other knowledge except their own as not unimportant and inferior.

Russell refers to "two opposite forces" which, in his opinion, make people lose their respect for democracy. He writes: "Two opposite forces have caused, in our time, an undue diminution in the respect which people feel for democracy. On the so-called Left, there are admirers of Russia who think that, since dictatorship is adopted by Russian Communists, democracy must be in some way reactionary. On the Right, there are those who fear Socialism and who wish to preserve ancient privileges."

Like almost all writers on Democracy, Russell says that Democracy without Party Government is inconceivable. Like Laski,
Russell holds that the two-party system is the best condition for the working of democracy. In his own words: "Worship of Government is the modern form of idolatry and is exceedingly dangerous. For the most effective antidote is the two-party system." Russell's unpublished essay, "The Advantages and Disadvantages of Party Government, and the conditions necessary for its Success" (1889), shows that he is not unaware of the evils of Party Government. But the evils, he says in the essay, "can be remedied by a modification of the system, without necessitating any radical change." Here he writes: "It (Party Government) would be much improved by being lessened in rigidity; if men were encouraged to think for themselves, to choose their party after due reflection, and not to consider themselves bound thoughtlessly to accept the policy of their party, except where a resistance to party on a minor point would entail graver consequences whose avoidance is of more importance than any minor question." Elections, he points out, should be fought on principles, and not simply on the basis of party affiliations.

Russell observes that the psychological sense of impotence and indifference which afflicts the individual in the modern State must be removed if democracy is to be made a reality in feeling and action. He opines that this cannot be made possible so long as democratic control is remote and administration remains centralized. With John Stuart Mill and others Russell thinks that the success of democracy always depends upon an active and intelligent participation of the people in civic functions. In his opinion, the role of the intellectual in a democracy must be mainly advisory.
In his unpublished essay, 'The Role of Intellectuals in a Democracy' (1941-42), Russell writes: "The function of the expert is not to decide what should be the purposes of political action - that is a question to be decided democratically, and will be wisely decided if the democracy has a certain degree of intelligence and knowledge. The expert's function is to give advice as to what can best be done to realize the purposes of democracy." Like J.S. Mill, Russell has thus adopted what may be termed a theory of "participatory democracy." However, many well-known writers on Democracy in recent times, namely, B.R. Berelson, R.A. Dahl, H. Eckstein and G. Sartori, have expressed themselves against the active participation of the people in political affairs in a democracy, because it would lead to totalitarianism, mediocrity and would be dangerous to the stability of the democratic system. According to them, the fact of apathy is a basic datum; and they have all constructed what may be called "the elitist theory of democracy," or "the theory of democratic elitism." G. Sartori writes: "In short, democracy is terribly difficult. It is so difficult that only expert and accountable elites can save it from the excesses of perfectionism, from the vortex of demagogy, and from the degeneration of *lex majoris partis.*" Russell develops his theory of "participatory democracy" through the scheme of the widest possible decentralization of power. "The essential theory of democracy," he writes, "is the diffusion of power among the whole people, so that the evils produced by one man's possession of power shall be obviated." Almost all the progressive thinkers of the West advocate decentralization of power
to make democracy a reality. Ivor Brown says that through decentralization of power "can democracy be made a living reality in our modern mechanised world." Lord Bryce recognizes its importance in the working of democracy when he writes: "The habit of local self-government is the best training for democratic government in a nation. Practice is needed to vivify knowledge." Laski also supports decentralization of power and says that "it can hardly be too earnestly insisted that to place the real centre of political responsibility outside the sphere in which its consequences are to operate is to breed not only inefficiency but indifference." Aldous Huxley writes: "The political road to a better society is, I repeat, the road of decentralization." Joao observes that "if man's faith in social action is to be revivified, the State must be cut up and its functions distributed." Prof. Adams thinks that in order to get rid of the drawbacks of modern representative government we "must go to the root of the trouble and pursue a bold policy of devolution - of decentralization."

Russell thinks that decentralization of power is necessary not only to instil in the people a sense of pride and civic responsibility, but also to prevent the majority from oppressing the minority. "Government by majorities," observes Russell, "can be made less oppressive by devolution, by placing the decision of questions primarily affecting only a section of the community in the hands of that section, rather than of a Central Chamber. In this way, men are no longer forced to submit to decisions made in a hurry by people mostly ignorant of the matter in hand and not personally interested."
Russell rejects the view that the end of democracy is the rule of the majority because it appears to him "too mechanical a view," and leaves out of account two important questions, namely, "(1) What should be the group of which the majority is to prevail? (2) What are the matters with which the majority has a right to interfere?" In his view, democracy, when it is well established, becomes as jealous of power as any other form of government. "It is, therefore, necessary, if subordinate groups," as Russell argues, "are to obtain their rights, that they shall have means of bringing pressure to bear upon the Government." He finds it difficult to accept the Benthamite theory that each man's interest will be equally protected if each voter looks after his own interest. Human nature, according to Russell, is neither so rational nor so self-centred as Bentham thinks. Russell concludes that "the theory of democracy demands a good deal more than the mere mechanical supremacy of the majority. It demands (1) division of the community into more or less autonomous group; (2) delimitation of the powers of the autonomous groups by determining which of their concerns are so much more important to themselves than to others that others had better have no say in them."

Russell pleads for self-government and the grant of autonomy to every important group in affairs that affect the members of the group more profoundly that outsiders. He maintains the view that each politically important group should be autonomous in internal matters, in matters that do not directly affect the outside world. He thinks that the government has the right to
interfere only when the activities of a group intimately affect people outside the group. Russell thus distinguishes between the self-regarding and other-regarding activities of a group. He opines that in a democracy the government should control only the other-regarding activities of a group and leave it free in self-regarding activities. He, of course, admits that it might sometimes be difficult to apply this formula in practice. He, however, points out that there must be a limit of size below which a group should not be granted self-government. But he wants us to bear in mind the point that the question of the approximate limit of size cannot be determined in the abstract.

Russell subscribes to the view of John Stuart Mill that each State should contain one nation. Mill writes: "Where the sentiment of nationality exists in any force, there is a prima facie case for uniting all the members of the nationality under the same government, and a government to themselves apart." Russell observes that in a State consisting of more than one nation, self-government should be granted to each nation in its internal affairs, in affairs that do not affect outsiders. He writes: "The popularly elected legislature, if it is to be genuinely democratic, must represent one nation; or, if more are to be represented, it must be by a federal arrangement which safeguards the smaller units."

According to Russell, many issues are not local, but national. Hence they, in his opinion, should be left to the State
and not to various groups. Russell pleads for the organization of various interests of citizens and their representation in the legislature. By this method, he thinks, the legislature can be made aware of the different and multitudinous interests and grievances of various groups of citizens.

In his opinion, democracy presents a difficult problem when a minority group feels that its legitimate interests are being neglected, or when an important and large minority group is disgruntled and "basically out of sympathy with the rest of the citizens of the State." Russell thinks that democracy in such a situation cannot work except by the use of force. But the use of force, he says, will always produce great dissatisfaction in subordinate groups and a harsh temper in the dominant group. According to him, the problem can be solved by devolution of power provided the minority group is geographically located. But devolution of power, Russell argues, is difficult when a group, instead of being geographically concentrated, is spread out and scattered throughout the country. He thinks that Mohammedans in India, Hindus in Pakistan and Negroes in America present such cases. Russell maintains that the success of democracy in all such cases depends upon "a diffused sense of toleration."

Russell describes himself as a believer in Democratic Socialism. According to him, economic power in modern democratic countries remains oligarchic. In his essay on 'Democracy and Economics' (1939), he, therefore, writes: "If democracy is to
preserve any reality, it must achieve the conquest of economic power.” In other words, Russell thinks that Democracy is meaningless unless it is accompanied by Socialism. In his essay on 'Hopes and Fears as Regards America,' published in The New Republic in 1922, he writes: "... economic power is now at least as important as political power, owing to the growth of vast industrial organizations; therefore democracy must be extended to economics, which can only be done by socialism." The view that Democracy must be followed by Socialism has been propounded by many modern writers. H.G.Wells writes: "Modern democracy is not legalism and equalitarianism, it is socialism." Durbin regards Democracy and Socialism as "necessary parts of a complex whole." Erich Fromm thinks: "Democratic, decentralizing socialism is the realization of those conditions which are necessary to make the unfolding of all man's power the ultimate purpose."

Russell recognizes the importance of public ownership of private property to secure economic justice. But by Socialism he does not merely mean public or collective ownership of private property. He identifies Socialism with Economic or Industrial Democracy. He expresses the belief that the battle for political democracy being won, the struggle for economic democracy would dominate politics for many years to come. By Economic or Industrial Democracy Russell means self-government in industry and the democratic management of economic life, or the active participation of workers in the management of their industry. This type of Socialism Erich Fromm calls "Communitarian Socialism."
In Russell's opinion, the internal management of an industry should be left in the hands of those men actually engaged in the work of the industry. According to him, all questions relating to wages, hours of labour, and business management should be decided by the workers themselves. To quote his words: "In an ideal democracy, industries, or group of industries, would be self-governing except the price and quantity of their product, and their self-government would be democratic." Price and quantity of product, according to him, are matters of interest to society and should, not, therefore, be decided by the workers. The workers, in his view, should elect their general manager and a board of directors, if necessary. But the board of directors and the general manager, he opines, should remain responsible to the workers for all their decisions. Russell does not support the Syndicalists' idea of the abolition of the State. The State, he thinks, will be necessary for resolving conflicts and adjusting relations between different trades and industries. In his unpublished essay, 'Democracy and a Planned Economy' (1942/43), Russell writes:

"Democracy, hitherto, has been entirely regional in its organization, but if it is to be effective in the economic sphere there will have to be also an occupational democracy, in which a constituency is composed of employers in a certain industry throughout some region. It is obvious that industrial unionism must form the basis for this form of democracy.

"If trade unions are to afford an adequate balance against
the weight of capitalists, bureaucrats and managers, they must fulfil certain conditions. It is, of course, obvious that they must be industrial, not craft, unions. They must be internally democratic; their members must be able to control their elected officials. Public opinion in the unions must be such as to prevent their officials from making an alliance with the bureaucrats and managers, and becoming, in effect, a part of the State. The right to strike must be preserved, but everything possible should be done to make the exercise of the right unnecessary."

Though Russell thinks that direct action, when abused, may lead to tyranny and cause great hardship to society, he in his article entitled 'Democracy and Direct Action' (1919) strongly advocates its use to secure democracy in the economic or industrial field. "Direct action," he writes, "has its dangers, but so has every vigorous form of activity. And in our recent realisation of the importance of law we must not forget that the greatest of all dangers to a civilisation is to become stereotyped and stagnant. From this danger, at least, industrial unrest is likely to save us." But Russell is very guarded in his approach. No section, in his opinion, should resort to force or direct action if there is the possibility that public opinion will ultimately be on the side of the Government. Direct action, he says, should always be used as a means of educating public opinion. This, according to him, can be done by making facts known to the people which would otherwise remain unknown.

But Russell thinks that the use of direct action for
general political purposes raises, in most cases, very difficult problems. He argues that whether it would be legitimate under any circumstances to use this weapon to oppose a war which a considerable part of the population considers unjust or to prevent the enactment or continuance of conscription or in any other matter which essentially concerns the nation as a whole rather than any section of it, is a question which cannot be judged without examining the whole basis of democracy. There are, however, some political uses of direct action which are, according to him, in accordance with democratic principles. "The most obvious case," he writes, "is a strike for the establishment of democracy where it does not yet exist. On the same grounds it might be justifiable to force a General Election when Parliament is obviously opposed to the present majority of the nation. The same might be said where there has been infringement of some important right, such as free speech." He concludes that except in cases like these, the use of direct action in other matters should be regarded as "a somewhat dubious expedient."

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Russell's concept of industrial democracy is largely influenced by Syndicalism and Guild Socialism. Besides Russell, Harold Laski, H.G.Wells, Ivor Brown, to name a few, have recognized the importance of industrial democracy. "Socialism is," writes Wells, "the attempt to democratise economic life as political life has already been democratized." Carl L. Becker writes that industry should be emancipated from the hampering restraints of petty governmental regulations. "The survival of political
democracy," as Laski observes, "today is, all over the world, definitely impossible unless it can conquer the central citadel of economic power. There cannot, in a word, be democracy unless there is socialism." Erich Fromm very earnestly supports the case for industrial democracy.

In Russell’s theory of democracy, industrial democracy occupies a very important place. His notion of industrial democracy is bound up with his concept of freedom. According to Carl L. Becker, the problem of democracy is intrinsically an economic one. Laski in his Democracy in Crisis (1933) also holds that the crisis of democracy is mainly economic. But, in the opinion of Russell, the crisis of democracy is primarily psychological. According to him, it is the lack of freedom and self-respect, and not the lack of economic security, that poses the most serious threat to democracy in the modern scientific world. The modern capitalist organization of society, he thinks, enslaves man to the machine, deprives him of freedom and initiative, and reduces work to a dull, painful, wearisome and monotonous affair. Industrial democracy, he argues, will remove the stultifying and crippling effects of Capitalism, and will make men aware of their importance in society by involving them directly in the management of industry and in the process of decision-making. It will, he thinks, provide "opportunity for initiative" and make work pleasant and wholesome, instead of irksome and laborious. In short, industrial democracy, according to Russell, is a very vital step towards emancipating man from dehumanization which accompanies modern civilization.
Ivor Brown very forcefully and cogently argues: "The key to industrial democracy is not neither higher wages nor security of tenure: it is the distribution of power, so that every worker in the trade or craft feels that he is a human being and not a tool, a workman and not a machine, a self-governing individual and not the bondman of an overseer, a responsible public servant and not the implement of a profiteer."

Ken Coates and Tony Topham, two of the most well-known advocates of industrial democracy or workers' control in industry in modern times, write: "The quest for self-government is the quest for humane, socially conscious control over technological development. While emphasizing the importance of workers' control in industry, Ernest Mandel writes that workers' control 'is a first step in the liberation of the individual worker from a long habit of economic passivity, submission and obedience. It is a first step in the removal of the burden of the various 'authorities' which crush him in daily life. It is thus the first step in a process of dis-alienation, of emancipation in the true sense. The worker is starting to change from being a creature ruled by the social and economy system, by Capital, the 'laws of the market', the machines, foremen, and a whole lot of other supposed 'facts of life', into a man who can rule himself.' But Mandel thinks that workers' control will remain a myth and a fiasco unless the working class overthrows the power of the bourgeois State and controls State power. Like G.D.H.Cole, Russell, however, does not formulate any detailed programme of how industrial democracy might be
organized or brought into being. Nor do we find in him any
discussion of the problems involved in establishing a system
of industrial democracy, such as that of securing the
accountability of management to the workers and the maximum
participation of the workers in the management of an industry. It
is often argued that to take part in the management of a large-scale
industry requires a high degree of expert and technical knowledge
which the workers cannot be expected to possess.

The age in which we live is an age of science and
technology. Russell thinks that vast and spectacular improvements
in scientific technique have given the modern democratic State
so much hold over men's minds and thoughts that individual liberty
has been reduced to a minimum. Broadcasting, newspapers and all
other media of propaganda, he says, are regulated and controlled
by the State to such a degree as to paralyze free thinking and
to promote uniformity of thought. Russell argues that science,
by making society more and more organic, increasingly reduces
the individual to a cog in the machine and thereby diminishes the
scope for individual freedom and initiative.

According to Russell, an individual can be viewed from
three standpoints, from the standpoint of a common man, a hero
and a cog in the machine. He thinks that science increases the
extent to which a man is a cog and diminishes the proportion to
which he is a hero and a common man. He concludes that if democracy
is to get back its former prestige, there must be a proper
reconciliation of scientific technique with these three views of regarding an individual.

Almost every modern democratic State is deeply committed to the philosophy of welfare, and seeks to guarantee to its citizens security against unemployment, poverty, sickness and old age. In other words, social welfare legislation is the supreme important task to which a modern State devotes itself. Russell finds nothing wrong with social welfare legislations. On the contrary, he thinks along with Laski and others that without a certain degree of economic security and planning, democracy will be redundant and chimerical. Russell very clearly points out that in a good society there must be security against undeserved misfortune. But what pains him is that a modern democratic State, by laying too much stress upon security and efficiency, seeks to promote uniformity and affords little opportunity for personal freedom and initiative. He laments the fact that in a modern State greater emphasis is laid upon equality or justice rather than upon liberty. By securing justice or equality at the cost of liberty a modern democratic State, he thinks, delimits opportunity and freedom for the full and unhindered growth of the individual. Russell writes: "A modern democratic society, by enacting service and conferring security, forbids or prevents much personal initiative which is possible in a less well-regulated world." Tocqueville has long ago pointed out that in democratic nations the love of equality is more ardent and enduring than the love of liberty. Lord Bryce observes: "Nearly a century ago Tocqueville remarked that the love of Equality was stronger than
the love of Liberty, so that he could imagine a nation which had enjoyed both parting less reluctantly with the latter than with the former. Nothing has happened since his day to contradict, and some things to support, this view."

Russell believes that if freedom is to be preserved in a modern equalitarian State, justice should mean nothing more than the absence of discrimination between one man and another in political matters. With Laski he says that the State should seek only to eliminate unjust privileges and to guarantee to all citizens a basic minimum of necessities. In his opinion, justice is important in regard to material goods but not in respect to mental goods. According to him, what is most important in regard to mental goods is not justice but freedom and opportunity. He, therefore, urges that the individual in a popular government should be given freedom and "opportunity for initiative" in the sphere of mental goods, and that the State should not interfere in that domain. It is the uniformity of thought and opinion against which, he says, a democratic government must always be on its guard. Like J.S. Mill, Russell very frequently warns us against the growing pressure for conformity and standardization of thought in a modern democratic State. As a convinced individualist, Russell deplores the growing tendency on the part of a democratic government to impose its own standards of thought and conduct upon those who are endowed with exceptional merit and creative genius. In a democracy men of extraordinary merit, he holds, must have freedom to pursue their works and should not be persecuted for
their opinions. Russell thus writes that "democracy is good when it implies self-respect and bad when it implies persecution of exceptional individuals."

We are now in a position to conclude that Russell's views on democracy are not original. They are essentially derived, as we have already noted, from John Stuart Mill. But it must be said to the credit of Russell that he draws our attention to the dangers and difficulties that beset a democratic State in the present-day world. Secondly, a very noteworthy feature of Russell's political thought is the emphasis which it puts on the importance of maintaining and preserving liberty in a modern democratic and egalitarian State. In fact, Russell's entire political thought proceeds from one dominant value, viz., individual liberty and is tempered constantly by his passionate love of liberty. It is upon the conception of liberal democracy that, from first to last, Russell, as an individualist, takes his stand. But his concept of liberal democracy may be criticized as being aristocratic. The aristocratic element in his thought is evident in the fact that he, like J.S.Mill, is very much eager to secure liberty or "opportunity for initiative" for "men of great creative power" and originality. "If a community is to make progress it needs," Russell opines, "exceptional individuals whose activities, though useful, are not of a sort that ought to be general."

"No society," he says, "can be progressive without a leaven of rebels, and modern technique makes it more and more difficult to be a rebel." Russell's argument here is really for a kind of
intellectual aristocracy. Russell's aristocratic outlook will be further evident from his Platonic conception of the future society which he outlines in *The Scientific Outlook* (1931). The society which he envisages for the future is a "society of experts" which, being an oligarchy, will control propaganda and education. It is a society which will teach submissiveness to the great bulk of the population, and will confine initiative and the habit of command to its own members. Peter Fryer, we think, is not, therefore, wrong when he charges Russell with "bourgeois morality." He writes: "Throughout, he (Russell) makes tremendous efforts to cloak his outlook in humanitarianism. But he cannot disguise his fundamentally reactionary outlook, his individualistic disdain for and fear and hatred of the common people."