Russell regards Power as the most fundamental category in social science, and shares the Anarchists' view that power in its collective form is embodied in the State. To quote his words: "The essence of the State is that it is the repository of the collective force of its citizens." To an empiricist like Russell, the State appears as a power-system. Max Weber has designated the State as a power-system. "Like the political institutions historically preceding it, the state is," Weber writes, "a relation of men dominating men, a relation supported by means of legitimate (i.e. considered to be legitimate) violence. If the state is to exist, the dominated must obey the authority claimed by the powers that be." Russell defines the State as the composition of all the people inhabiting a certain territorial area and using their united and collective force in accordance with the commands of a government. Thus, according to him, the constituent elements of a State are (a) population, (b) territory, (c) force, and (d) government. Russell speaks almost in the Machiavellian and Hobbesian terms that power is the basis and the chief end of the State. "Russell's theory of the State, no less than his conception of individual psychology", as Prof. I.L. Horowitz observes, "rests upon a theory of raw power."

Like the Anarchists, Russell views the State with deep
distrust and suspicion. "The State, no less than the capitalist organization, is," he writes, "in practice a stupid elderly man accustomed to flattery, ossified in his prejudices, and wholly unaware of all that is vital in the thought of his time." He goes even so far as to regard the State as "a wholly evil thing." Russell, in fact, rejects the glorification of the State by Hegel and other Idealists. To him, the State is only a convenience and not a matter of worship. He thinks that to extol the power of the State is to commit "administrator's fallacy." By "administrator's fallacy" Russell means the habit of regarding society as "a systematic whole," "a model of order," and "a planned organism."

"The glorification of the State, and the doctrine that it is every citizen's duty to serve the State, are," he observes, "radically against progress and against liberty." Government and law, in his opinion, are, in their essence, restrictions upon individual freedom. Russell, therefore, argues that every State action must be carefully scrutinized, and that every possibility of restricting its power must be readily welcomed provided it does not unleash a reign of terror.

According to Russell, the chief evil of the modern State is that it promotes "efficiency in war." In his words: "... the chief aim of the State is to possess the greatest possible amount of external force," and "to oppress violence within and to facilitate it without." To achieve this end, the State, as he points out, curtails individual liberty and prohibits anti-militarist propaganda. To him, the State is a conservative force, and is the embodiment of possessive impulses. "The State is
rendered evil," he writes, "by its exclusions, and by the fact that whenever it embarks upon aggressive war, it becomes a combination of men for murder and robbery." Russell thinks that the modern State, through a centralized system of education, promotes narrow and bigoted patriotism and thereby creates hostility between nations. The harmful effects of the modern State, according to him, arise "from the vastness and the resulting sense of individual helplessness." Here Russell, we think, appears as an acute observer of the evils brought about by the State in Western society.

It appears that Russell's attitude to the State is more akin to the English Utilitarians than to the English Idealists. The English Utilitarians, like him, regard the State as a necessary evil and plead for limiting its power. But to T.H. Green, the most well-known representative of the English Idealists, the State has a final moral value and acts as the remover of obstacles that impede the moral development of the individual. The State, in his view, is "the reconciler and sustainer of the rights that arise out of the social relations of men." But Russell, unlike Green, does not attach any moral value to the State nor does he share his somewhat exalted view of the State.

The Anarchists value individual liberty so much so that they think that the retention of the State, even to a smallest degree, is a serious menace to liberty. They even object to the existence of the police and the criminal law. But Russell, though he values liberty as much as the Anarchists, does not stand for
the abolition of the State. To him, the State has some necessity and is the essential prerequisite of certain good things. For Russell, the evil features of the State are, as Prof. I.L. Horowitz observes, "only a partial aspect of its nature."

According to Russell, the necessity of the State arises from the very nature of man. Men by nature, he thinks, are quarrelsome, power-loving and pugnacious. He is of the view that since the love of power and domination is a basic impulse in human life, complete lawlessness and anarchy would prevail in society unless men's actions are restrained by an external authority. Russell, therefore, argues that the State cannot altogether be dispensed with so long as human nature remains what it is. A.N. Whitehead echoes the same view when he writes: "A few men in the whole cast of their character, and most men in some of their actions are anti-social in respect to the peculiar type of any society possible in their time. There can be no evasion of the plain fact that compulsion is necessary."

In his Roads to Freedom: Socialism, Anarchism and Syndicalism (1918), Russell says that the functions like peace and war, regulation of sanitary conditions and the sale of noxious goods and the maintenance of a just system of distribution cannot be undertaken unless there is a central government. According to him, in every society, however perfect, there will be some men and women who will be prone to violence from jealousy or envy or from any other impulse. Though such evil impulses can be largely controlled and restrained by better education and a better
social system, Russell thinks, unlike the Anarchists, that they cannot be totally eliminated from human nature by any means. He thinks that even under an Anarchist régime such acts as prevention of theft, crime and cruelty, and suppression of organizations intended to overthrow the Anarchist régime by force, need to be restrained and forbidden by law. In his opinion, submission to government is necessary to secure order in society; and this, he thinks, cannot be achieved except by the use of force. Russell, therefore, suggests that what is necessary is not to abolish the use of force, but to restrict and limit the 'occasions' for the use of force. He opines that force should be used only against those who do not respect the law in cases where a common decision is necessary, or against those who attempt to use force against others. The use of force by the State, according to him, can be justified only when it is intended "to diminish the total amount of force used in the world."

Russell is not an advocate of absolute individualism. He, therefore, lays stress on the restriction of liberty by law. The greatest amount of liberty, he opines, cannot be secured by anarchy. On the other hand, too much liberty, he thinks, brings chaos. Russell maintains that the most valuable forms of liberty can be enjoyed only within a framework of law. In his opinion, law performs certain services essential for the maintenance of a good society. First, it prevents the use of force or violence and diminishes its scope. Secondly, it helps to establish habits essential to social stability. And lastly, it helps to maintain a certain standard of justice and equality. According to Russell,
law and liberty are both necessary in a good society. Without liberty, he thinks, life would be static and there would be no development of the individual; and without law, he says, there would be widespread chaos and anarchy. "Without civic morality," as Russell writes, "communities perish; without personal morality their survival has no value. Therefore civic and personal morality are equally necessary to a good world." For Russell and for all other liberals, the question is thus not to abolish the State, but to strike a balance between liberty and authority. In Russell's opinion, the need for such a balance arises from the fact that man is partly social and partly individual. But Russell thinks that it is difficult to strike a balance between authority and liberty because man is largely individual than social.

Though Russell realizes the need for striking a balance between authority and liberty, all his fervour is in the direction of limiting State power to secure individual liberty. He argues that a balance between the individual and the State should be struck in such a way as to leave the greatest possible amount of freedom for the free and full development of the individual. In fact, the very basis of Russell's political philosophy is grounded upon his faith in liberalism. Russell is a liberal because he thinks that the end of all State activity should be to help the fullest and highest development of human personality. He thus, like John Stuart Mill and all other liberals, asserts the moral basis of the State. It is, therefore, natural for Russell to argue that the State can achieve and further its end by limiting its functions to what is absolutely necessary.
According to Russell, the functions of the State are partly internal and partly external. The internal functions of the State, he says, include such matters as roads, lighting, education, the police, the law, the post office, and so on. He observes that such functions as the post office and education are undertaken by the State "from motives of convenience." While functions like the law, the police, the Army and the Navy, in his opinion, must essentially belong to the State. Russell thinks that so far as the internal functions of the State are concerned, it deserves our support and loyalty.

The external functions of the State, as Russell points out, consist mainly in the prevention of foreign aggression. He says that defence against foreign aggression, in so far it is genuine, is to be treated as a useful function of the State. But he thinks that the means which are needed to prevent aggression are invariably and generally used to facilitate foreign exploitation. "It is not too much to say," he writes, "that most of the external activities of powerful States in the present day are concerned with the employment, or the threat, of armed forces, for the purpose of taking away from the less powerful wealth which legally belongs to them."

The most important function of the State, according to Russell, consists in the prevention of private violence and in the maintenance of law and order. "The essential merit of the State," he writes, "is that it prevents the internal use of force by private persons." "The State has one purpose," he writes again, "which is on the whole good, namely, the substitution of
law for force in the relations of men." Russell argues that such matters as sanitation, drainage, prevention of infectious diseases, notification of fever, the encouragement of scientific research, the care of children and elementary education must be left to the regulation and control of the State, because these matters constitute "a minimum universal" upon which depends, to a very large degree, the minimum of general welfare.

With J.S. Mill Russell agrees that it should be the duty of the State to see that everybody in the State gets a certain minimum of elementary and primary education. A modern democratic State, both Mill and Russell observe, cannot function efficiently and properly if a considerable percentage of the population remain ignorant and illiterate. J.S. Mill writes: "It is therefore an allowable exercise of the powers of government, to impose on parents the legal obligation of giving elementary instruction to children." But both Mill and Russell are opposed to a State-controlled educational system because it will, they fear, produce a regimentation of thought. They insist that the State itself should not undertake the task of educating children. It is a matter which, they think, should be left to the choice of the parents. Russell is of the view that in the sphere of education State interference should be limited only to inspection and payment.

In his Authority and the Individual (1949) Russell points out that the primary and essential functions of the State should be three in number, namely, security, justice and conservation.
But he adds that none of these functions should be treated as absolute. Security in the form of protection of life and property is recognized by him as one of the main functions of the State. He thinks that the State can secure protection of life and property by preventing private violence through criminal law. Russell says that, apart from 'the due process of law', it is the independence of the judiciary that is necessary for the protection of life and property. With Lord Bryce he wholeheartedly agrees that liberty will always be jeopardized unless the judiciary is kept free from executive control.

According to Russell, there must be State provision for medical care. The State must provide, he says, security against employment, sickness and destitution in old age. In short, the provision of social welfare is reckoned by him as a proper and primary function of the State. Russell thus upholds the idea of the 'Welfare State'. He, however, holds that absolute security should never be the aim of government. Security, as he maintains, by itself is a negative aim and cannot render our life happy, creative and vigorous. Russell argues that the State should control only greedy and predatory impulses, and that all other impulses should be left free from governmental interference.

The provision for economic justice, in Russell's opinion, should be one of the essential and primary functions of the State. To secure economic justice, he, like all Socialists, pleads for the abolition of the private ownership of property and advocates public ownership of landed property. In his words: "Private
property has no justification except historically through power of the sword." Here we can trace the influence of John Stuart Mill upon Russell. Mill does not support absolute property in land and goes so far as to advocate State-acquisition of landed property with compensation. He writes: "The claim of the landowners to the land is altogether subordinate to the general policy of the state. The principle of property gives them no right to the land, but only a right to compensation for whatever portion of their interest in the land it may be the policy of the state to deprive them of." Like J.S. Mill, Russell holds that the State should be the recipient of rent. Russell thus writes: "The economic system we should ultimately wish to see would be one in which the state would be the sole recipient of economic rent, ..."

Russell not only advocates State ownership of private property. He even supports the demand of Socialists for State ownership of key industries, and State control of foreign trade and banking. But Russell observes that "justice by itself is like law, too static to be made a supreme political principle." In his opinion, justice should not be sought at the cost of "destroying the incentive to some form of vigorous action which is on the whole useful to the community." He thinks that intellectual progress would hamper if too much stress is laid upon justice. The art of writing, he says, could never have been invented if there had not been economic injustice in Egypt and Babylon.

Justice in a democracy, as Russell rightly points out,
implies equality. But he is opposed to absolute equality of income. The principle, according to him, should be "to each according to his needs." Inequality, he thinks, can be justified only when there is inequality of service and needs, and when it is found to be socially useful. He writes that "all inequality must be justified by its useful effects, and not by some abstract concept..." Russell is an upholder of justice or equality, because he thinks that injustice generates social instability and unrest. In other words, the chief value of justice, according to him, lies in that it promotes social stability and prevents revolution. Russell hence defines justice "as the arrangement producing least envy."

Russell considers "conservation" as an important function of the State. In his opinion, this function of government is no less important than the other two functions. By "conservation" he means not only the preservation of ancient monuments and places of public utility and interest but also the preservation of the world's natural resources and important raw materials. The modern capitalist system of production, he thinks, involves a huge wastage of important and valuable raw materials. But Russell argues that the wastage of natural resources cannot be totally stopped so long as there is a race for armaments among nations and unless there is a World Government. He points out that the prevailing methods of cultivation exhaust the fertility of soil so much so that unless scientific methods are readily adopted, there will be an acute shortage of food in the immediate future throughout the world. Russell, therefore, concludes that
it should be the most important function of every government, except the prevention of war, to carry out agricultural reforms along scientific lines. MacIver regards conservation and utilization of natural resources as one of the essential functions of the State.

Russell, as we have noted, regards security, justice and "conservation" as the most essential functions of the government. He, however, does not suggest that the government should have no other functions. But he opines that the function of the government "in other spheres should be to encourage non-governmental initiative, and to create opportunities for its exercise in beneficent ways."

Russell thus, like the English Utilitarians, pleads for limiting and restricting the power and functions of the State to the minimum extent. It is his faith in liberalism that propels him in this direction. Maurice Cranston very aptly writes that "English liberalism is the doctrine of the minimal state." Like Kant, he regards the individual as an end in himself and not as a means to an end. In Russell's opinion, all ultimate value and worth belongs to the individual. As such, Russell's end is always the individual and his liberty. "It is the individual," he writes, "in whom all that is good must be realized, and the free growth of the individual must be the supreme end of a political system which is to re-fashion the world." The individual is the beginning and the end of Russell's political philosophy. He thus urges that the proper task of political
philosophy should be to reconcile the highest development of the individual with the minimum of social and political control.

We are sure that Russell would have definitely agreed with Wilhelm von Humboldt that freedom is "the grand and indispensable condition" for "the highest and most harmonious development of his (man's) powers to a complete and consistent whole." To Russell, freedom, though not the highest good, is "the greatest of political goods." He writes that "although liberty does not constitute the total of social goods, it is so necessary for most of them and so liable to be unwisely curtailed that it is scarcely possible to exaggerate its importance."

To Russell, freedom in its most elementary sense appears as "the absence of external control over the acts of individuals or groups." He defines freedom in its most abstract sense as "the absence of external obstacles to the realization of desires." Here Russell, we think, merely echoes the definition of liberty given by Locke and John Stuart Mill. "Russell's conception of liberty," as John Lewis observes, "is the very common one, so convincingly expounded by John Stuart Mill, that liberty means the removal of constraints, of interference, of oppressive legal restrictions, of the social pressures of custom, convention, disapproval and excommunication." For Russell, freedom is thus a negative concept and is nothing in itself except only as a means and "a requisite for many kinds of good things." But in his The Impact of Science on Society (1952) Russell views freedom as a positive concept, and defines it as "opportunity for initiative."
To quote him: "I incline to think that 'liberty', as the word was understood in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, is no longer quite the right concept; I should prefer to substitute 'opportunity for initiative'." He considers "opportunity for initiative" essential and important for man's self-determination and self-direction in the modern scientific age when man is increasingly becoming a robot and an appendage to the machine. Freedom thus, according to Russell, is not a negative concept. It is self-determination. The essence of freedom, in his view, lies not in the negative condition of absence of restraints, but in the positive fact of self-determination. Russell thus, we see, sometimes defines freedom negatively and sometimes positively; and hence he, as John Lewis rightly points out, gives no clear definition of the concept, liberty.

To delimit the sphere of State interference and thereby to protect individual liberty, Humboldt writes that "any State interference in private affairs, not directly implying violence done to individual rights, should be absolutely condemned." Following Humboldt, John Stuart Mill divides the actions of an individual into self-regarding and other-regarding and opines that the State should not interfere with the activities of an individual so long as they do not harm others. Mill thus writes: "The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign."
But Russell argues that Mill's formula is untenable in view of the organic nature of the modern society brought about by industrialization and improvements in scientific technique. He thinks that modern society has become so close-knit and organic that every act of an individual is likely to affect others adversely. "The right of free speech," he maintains, "is nugatory unless it includes the right to say things that may have unpleasant consequences to certain individuals or classes." Russell, therefore, argues that individual freedom is to be justified on a ground stronger than that Mill has suggested. "If we are to justify any particular form of individual liberty," as Russell says, "in the scientific society of the future, we shall have to do it on the ground that that form of liberty is for the good of society as a whole, but not in most cases on the ground that the acts concerned affect nobody but the agent." But it seems that Russell sometimes adheres to Mill's formula. In Political Ideals (1917) he writes that "although individuals and societies should have the utmost freedom as regards their own affairs, they ought not to have complete freedom as regards their dealings with others." He again more explicitly writes: "The liberty of the individual should be respected where his actions do not directly, obviously, and indubitably do harm to other people." Russell, in fact, is often in the habit of making opposite and contradictory statements.

In his Reith Lectures entitled Authority and the Individual (1948), Russell formulates his own principle enunciating the limits of State interference. The formula is first set out in his
Political Ideals (1917) and reiterated in his essay on 'Freedom in Society' in Sceptical Essays (1935). Russell enunciates his principle governing the respective spheres of individual freedom and public control in terms of two different kinds of impulses that make up human nature. The impulses that constitute human nature, according to him, can be divided into two categories, namely, possessive impulses and creative or constructive impulses. The division of human impulses into the creative and the possessive is basic in Russell's social philosophy. In fact, his social philosophy, as John Dewey rightly says, is the elaboration and assertion of this concept. Russell refers to material goods as the illustrations of possessive impulses, and mental or intellectual goods as the examples of creative impulses. According to him, possessive impulses are static qualities and lead an individual to acquire and possess a thing at the cost of others. But creative impulses, he thinks, are dynamic qualities and are "those in which one man's gain is not another's loss." Russell writes: "Material goods are more a matter of possession than goods that are mental. A man who eats a piece of food prevents everyone else from eating it, but a man who writes or enjoys a poem does not prevent another man from writing or enjoying one just as good or better." He, however, points out that this distinction between mental and material goods should not be over-emphasized as there are, he thinks, many border-line cases, for example, the printing of books.

Russell supports and advocates State interference in the
sphere of possessive impulses or material goods because justice in this sphere, according to him, is more important than anything else. He thus writes: "The whole realm of the possessive impulses, and of the use of force to which they give rise, stands in need of control by a public neutral authority, in the interests of liberty no less than of justice."

In his essay on 'Freedom in Society' (1935), Russell points out that the obstacles to freedom are of two kinds, physical and social. With Laski he argues that freedom is the function of realization of certain basic and fundamental desires. Though Russell thinks that a man's desires are not a fixed datum as they are affected by opportunity, education and circumstances, he writes in Sceptical Essays (1935) that such desires as food, drink, health, clothing, sex and parenthood may be taken to be universally common in all men. But Russell writes elsewhere: "The desires that are politically important may be divided into a primary and secondary group. In the primary group come the necessities of life: food and shelter and clothing." These desires, according to him, constitute "the bare minimum of freedom" and are absolutely necessary for biological survival. All other things, he says, are necessary for economic superfluity and may be called comforts or luxuries according to circumstances. Russell, therefore, thinks that without the fulfilment of these minimum desires no man can be really free, and that the State is justified in depriving an individual of his comforts in order to provide another with the necessities of life. Such action on the part of the State, he argues, may not be politically expedient.
and economically justifiable in a given community at a given
time. But Russell observes that "it is not objectionable on
the ground of freedom, because to deprive a man of necessaries
is a greater interference with freedom than to prevent him from
accumulating superfluities." He frankly admits that it is the
government that can help to liberate us from the physical
obstacles to freedom. In his view, governmental control and
regulation of our lives is continually increasing, as it becomes
more and more realized that it is the government that can remove
physical obstacles to freedom. The problem of freedom, according
to him, increases in urgency as human life becomes more civilized
and complex.

Russell, like the traditional liberal thinkers, does not
believe that freedom can be increased by a mere diminution of
governmental control. Wilhelm von Humboldt, a traditional liberal
thinker, says that "the State is to abstain from the positive
welfare of the citizens, and not to proceed a step further than
is necessary for their mutual security and protection against
foreign enemies; for with no other object should it impose
restrictions upon freedom." But Russell does not subscribe to
this point of view, and rejects *laissez-faire* liberalism based
upon the tenet of unregulated business enterprise. To him, the
question is not to do away with the government but to secure
its advantages with the smallest possible degree of interference
with freedom. "This means", according to him, "striking a balance
between social and physical freedom."
In recent times, Ludwig von Mises and Prof. F.A. Hayek advocate economic individualism and vehemently condemn State interference in economic matters. In his books, *The Road to Serfdom* (1944), and *The Constitution of Liberty* (1960), Hayek strongly expresses himself against Socialism, and maintains that Socialism will lead to collectivism and the ultimate extinction of individual liberty. Ludwig von Mises regards private ownership of the means of production as "the foundation of any and every civilization", and as "the basis of social cooperation and association." But with all socialist thinkers Russell argues that a certain degree of public ownership of private property will always be required to make liberty a reality for all. Such English liberal thinkers as John Stuart Mill and Hobhouse also express their sympathy for some sort of Socialism. Russell holds that unless the State intervenes in the sphere of economic possessions, there will be widespread starvation, poverty, and a Hobbesian state of war of all against all. He thus goes so far as to suggest: "In everything that concerns the economic life of the community, as regards both distribution and conditions of production, what is required is more public control, no less..."

But Russell rejects the justification of State interference in the sphere of creative impulses or mental goods because, in his opinion, what is most important and vital in this sphere is not justice, but freedom and "opportunity for initiative." He thus writes: "I cannot admit its right to interfere in matters where what one man possesses is not obtained at the expense of another. I am thinking of such things as opinion and knowledge and art."
Russell thinks that if constructive or creative impulses are subject to governmental control, society will suffer from lack of progress in science, art and culture and the growth of civilization will come to a standstill. He, therefore, says: "The State should not regard itself as the guardian of the Truth in science, metaphysics or morals." In his view, the old liberal conception of freedom as the absence of restraints is more important in regard to mental goods than to material goods. "The old Liberal watchwords", as Russell writes, "were applied in the wrong sphere, that of economics; it is in the mental sphere that they really apply. We want free competition in ideas, not in business."

According to Russell, there are various kinds of freedom, namely, national, group and individual freedom. Apart from these kinds of freedom, the other kinds of freedom he mentions are: political, economic and mental. In the 18th and 19th centuries utmost importance was laid upon national freedom. In the modern world it is freedom for groups and organizations that becomes increasingly more important than freedom for the individual. But Russell opines that it is individual freedom that should be treated as more important and of greater value than either national or group freedom.

Russell, as we have said, does not advocate absolute economic freedom. Economic freedom, in his opinion, does not mean the right of the individual to do whatever he likes in the economic sphere. It means, according to him, that an individual
should not be allowed to starve if he has the willingness to work. He thinks that the problem of economic freedom has nowhere been fully solved. In the opinion of Russell, political freedom has two different elements. On the one hand, it should be the decision of the majority wherever a common decision is necessary; on the other hand, there should be a constant readiness to avoid a common decision whenever such avoidance is possible.

Of all kinds of freedom, viz., political, economic and mental, Russell regards mental freedom as most important and the source of all that is valuable in art, literature and science. In his words: "... the freedom that we can hope to preserve is rather mental and spiritual than economic or material." Without mental freedom, life, he thinks, would be dull and dreary, and "scarcely more interesting than an ant heap." John Stuart Mill in his Essay on Liberty (1859) defends mental or intellectual freedom most forcefully and convincingly when he writes that the proper domain of individual liberty "comprises, first, the inward domain of consciousness; demanding liberty of conscience, in the most comprehensive sense; liberty of thought and feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment or all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or theological."

It is the freedom of thought and opinion, freedom of religion, and freedom of the press that Russell values most. He writes that "there shall be a sphere within which a man's actions are not to be subject to governmental control. The sphere includes free speech, free press and religion." In his opinion,
everything concerned with opinion, such as books, newspapers and political propaganda, should be kept free from governmental control and regulation. "There must be," he writes, "the utmost encouragement to freedom of thought, even when it is inconvenient to bureaucrats." In his essay on 'The Future of Democracy' (1937), Russell observes: "The kinds of freedom that are important are cultural: freedom of religion, of opinion, of art and science." While supporting the freedom of opinion, MacIver writes: "To begin with, the state should not seek to control, no matter what the opinion may be." Russell strongly advocates the freedom of choice and judgement, and disapproves the use of force in the relations of men. In his unpublished essay entitled 'On the Democratic Ideal' (1902), he writes: "It is good that, to the utmost possible extent, every man's actions should proceed from his own judgment and his own choice. It is bad that others should employ an outward compulsion to force a man to do what he considers evil, even if he is mistaken in so considering it. It is bad that others should exert their will to induce a man, voluntarily but against his own judgment, to act as they think right. It is bad that a man should himself resign to others the task of deciding what he ought to do." Russell very warmly supports the freedom of personal morality. He, therefore, writes that "if a man chooses to have two wives or a woman two husbands, it is his affairs and theirs, and no one else ought to feel called upon to take action about it."

According to him, the most elementary condition of the freedom of thought is the absence of legal penalties. But in the
modern world the most important obstacles to the freedom of thought and opinion, he thinks, are (a) economic penalties and (b) distortion of evidence. In his view, "... thought is free when it is exposed to free competition among beliefs, i.e. when all beliefs are able to state their case, and no legal or pecuniary advantages or disadvantages attach to beliefs." He thinks that freedom of thought is not possible unless the government refrains from the suppression of truth and the spread of falsehoods through public agencies.

Economic persecution, according to Russell, constitutes a very potent threat to liberty in the present-day world. He writes that "the habit of considering a man's religious, moral, and political opinions before appointing him to a post or giving him a job is the modern form of persecution." He thinks that it is in Soviet Russia where economic pressure upon freedom of thought exists most severely. In America also, as he points out, freedom of thought is subject to a considerable degree of economic pressure. Russell is of the opinion that economic restraints upon freedom of thought exist in every country "where economic organization has been carried to the point of practical monopoly."

Russell suggests two remedies to cure this evil. First, no man should be deprived of the opportunity to earn his living merely for professing certain opinions. No matter whatever opinion he holds, an individual should be appointed to a job only for the efficiency to do the work. Secondly, a radical change in the aims and method of the prevailing system of education is necessary. Education in
almost all countries of the world is under the control of the State, and is conducted, according to Russell, in such a way as to make the young believe in certain beliefs and faiths and to promote a certain uniformity of thought and outlook. Instead of promoting true knowledge, State education, as Russell observes, promotes the love of the status quo and teaches the young to avoid all fundamental criticism of authority and existing institutions. In short, it aims, in his opinion, to create good citizens rather than good individuals. Russell thinks that this sort of indoctrination and regimentation of thought is to be sedulously avoided if freedom of thought is to be worth its name.

To secure freedom in education, Russell, like J.S. Mill, pleads for the abolition of State control over education. He says, as we have already noted, that in the field of education the State should limit its function only to inspection and payment. Russell argues that without a certain degree of sceptical outlook, freedom of thought and opinion will always be in perpetual danger. According to him, education should aim to create in people those mental habits which will enable them to judge everything for themselves and not to accept anything without evidence. The aim of education, he points out, should be not to create good and docile citizens, but to encourage free outlook and to promote the habit of free inquiry and the independence of mind. To secure the maximum of freedom, Russell pleads for the formation of character of children so that they, when grown up, find their pleasure in activities which are not oppressive.
For the preservation of freedom, Joad also pleads for inculcating a certain healthy and sceptical outlook. He thinks that a sceptical outlook is necessary to create "that temper of mind in the citizens as a whole upon which the liberty to think freely depends."

With Laski Russell thinks that an enlightened, vigorous and vigilant public opinion is the best guarantee and the most effective safety-valve of individual liberty. In his essay on 'Socialism and Education' (1925), Russell writes: "Desirable forms of liberty can be preserved only when average public opinion considers them worth preserving; the ultimate appeal must always be to the man in the street. It is a mistake to suppose, as some socialists do, that the removal of private capitalism will of itself secure every kind of freedom. Nothing will do that, in an industrial society, except organization and vigilance." But the people, he opines, cannot form a strong and sound opinion on any matter unless they have free and uninhibited access to correct and unbiased information. This cannot be possible, according to Russell, unless the press, newspapers, the radio and the other media of mass communication are free from State control and regulation. "The fight for freedom," he says "is not to be won by any mere change in our economic system. It is to be won only by a constant resistance to the tyranny of officials, and a constant realization that mental freedom is the most precious of all goods."

Laski forcefully emphasizes the importance of what he
calls "an honest and straightforward supply of news" as an important safeguard of liberty. In his opinion, "if facts are deliberately perverted, our judgment will be unrelated to the truth. A people without reliable news is, sooner or later, a people without a basis of freedom."

It must not be thought, as we have already pointed out, that Russell is an advocate of absolute individual liberty. He time and again points out that freedom of the individual is not absolute and should be restrained for the sake of good greater than individual good. For example, he observes that the State can interfere with freedom of thought and opinion if it involves threat to the existence and security of the State. Though Russell thinks that religion is a matter of private affair and the State should not interfere in it, he says that no civilized State can and will tolerate a religion demanding human sacrifice.

Like most political theorists, Russell admits the right of resistance to the State. In his opinion, an individual has the right and even the duty to break law when he profoundly and conscientiously believes that to obey law is to commit a sin. The duty to break law, according to him, "covers the case of the conscientious objector. Even if you are quite convinced that he is mistaken, you cannot say that he ought not to act as his conscience dictates. When legislators are wise, they avoid, as far as possible, framing laws in such a way as to compel conscientious men to choose between sin and what is legally crime."

Regarding the question of obedience to the State, he further
writes: "If I have a profound conscientious conviction that I ought to act in a way that is condemned by governmental authority, I ought to follow my conviction. And conversely, society ought to allow me freedom to follow my convictions except when there are very powerful reasons for restraining me."

Russell thus, like his godfather, John Stuart Mill, examines the question of the right to resistance from a moral standpoint. With Laski he regards conscience as the guide to civic action. Laski observes that "it seems to me to leave the individual no option but to follow conviction as the guide to civic function. To do otherwise is to betray freedom."

But Russell is very cautious and careful in his approach. The right of disobedience, he thinks, is to be exercised very rarely because respect for law, according to him, is an essential condition of good and secure life. Revolution, in the opinion of Russell, is always a drastic and, in all probability, a painful method, and may often lead to anarchy and chaos. "Obedience to the law, therefore, though not," Russell thus writes, "an absolute principle, is one to which great weight must be attached, and exceptions should only be admitted in rare cases after mature consideration." Laski also holds the same view and writes that the right of disobedience "is, of course, reasonably to be exercised only at the margins of political conduct."

Russell, like Laski, is a constitutionalist and prefers constitutional methods to revolution or violence to get a bad law
repealed. In his Election Manifesto in 1922, he wrote: "I am strongly opposed to all suggestions of violent revolution, and I am persuaded that only by constitutional methods can a better state of affairs be brought about." Though Russell is a constitutionalist, he thinks that sometimes revolution will be necessary. He thus notes: "Without rebellion, mankind would stagnate, and injustice would be irremediable." But he points out that revolution should be resorted to only when the government is extremely anarchic. "There are causes", writes Russell, "where the legal government is so bad that it is worthwhile to overthrow it by force in spite of the risk of anarchy that is involved."

According to Russell, resistance by an individual to the State can be justified only when he is prompted in his action, not by a purely personal motive, but by the consideration of social good because his desire in this case can be shared by others. "The man who refuses to obey authority," he writes, "has, therefore, in certain circumstances, a legitimate function, provided his disobedience has motives which are social rather than personal." But Russell admits that this is a matter about which it is not possible to lay down rules. Green recognizes the consideration of social good as the only legitimate ground of resistance to the State. But Green does not support the right of an individual to disobey the State unless behind his action there is a majority support. In his words: "It is only a man's consciousness of having an object in common with others, a well-being which is consciously his in being theirs and theirs in being his, - only the fact that they are recognized by him and he
Green, however, recognizes the right of resistance for a minority in the case of worst governments where "the public spirit is most crushed", even "though there is no hope of the resistance finding efficient popular support." Barker suggests the principle of 'weighing' and 'calculation'. He says that before disobeying law the individual should weigh the mischiefs of obedience against the mischiefs of resistance. Needless to point out that the implication of Barker's view is clear enough.

Like Bryce or Holcombe, Russell does not discuss in detail the question of the grounds of political obedience to the State. The reason is that Russell is not a political theorist or a scientist in the sense as Bryce or Holcombe is. He merely refers to certain reasons of man's obedience to the State. Russell writes: "Why do men acquiesce in the power of the State? There are many reasons, some traditional, some very present and pressing." "The traditional reason", he points out, "for obedience to the State is personal loyalty to the sovereign." Tribal feeling, according to him, which mainly accounted for loyalty to the sovereign in the primitive days, exists very strongly even today, and is the chief cause of the power of the modern State. Russell thinks that it is mainly the tribal feeling that guarantees the unity of a modern nation - State. According to him, the other causes of obedience are the fear of crime, disorder and anarchy within, and the fear of aggression from without. Russell does not subscribe to the Hegelian dictum than an individual should obey the State because the State is "the Divine Idea as it
exists on Earth", or "the actually existing, realized moral life." Nor does he agree with Green that we should obey the State because the State removes the obstacles that block the way to our moral growth and thereby contributes to the development of our moral personality, or with Barker who says that "the State is the expression and organ of justice." But, according to Russell, we should obey the State because "the respect for law is an indispensable condition for the existence of any tolerably social order." Russell thus, like Hegel or Green, does not consider the question of political obligation from a spiritual or a moral standpoint. Russell thinks that political obligation should arise from man's rationalistic consideration that there must exist the State to maintain internal law and order, and that to disobey law is to unleash a reign of internal terror and anarchy. However, it must be noted that in the writings of Russell we do not find any distinction whatsoever between political obedience and political obligation.

We find Russell in his political writings very much concerned with the problem of limiting the power of the State in order to protect and safeguard individual liberty. He takes John Stuart Mill to task for his failure to foresee the increasing power of the State. According to him, Mill wishfully thinks that the power of the State in the future would gradually decline. But Mill, as Russell thinks, proves to be a false prophet because the power of the State, instead of declining, has been continually increasing. Russell is of the view that the power of the modern State has increased to such an extent that "it can seize men's
property through taxation, determine the law of marriage and inheritance, punish the expression of opinions which it dislikes, put men to death for wishing the region they inhabit to belong to a different State, and order able-bodied males to risk their lives in battle whenever it considers war desirable." He thinks that the power of the modern State is almost absolute and "only limited internally by the fear of rebellion and externally by the fear of defeat in war."

In *Principles of Social Reconstruction* (1916) Russell outlines several causes that account for an enormous increase in the power of the modern State. These causes, according to him, are tribal feeling, fear of anarchy and violence within, fear of aggression from without, and patriotism. In *Authority and the Individual* (1949) he gives us a brief account of the growth of governmental power. Here he holds that since the discovery of gunpowder in the 15th century the power of the State has been continually increasing. In his *The Impact of Science on Society* (1952) Russell argues that the excessive power of the modern State is due to such scientific and technical discoveries as gunpowder, the mariner's compass, steamships, railways, atomic energy, broadcasting, electricity and telegraph, etc. In his opinion, the discovery of scientific technique has so much increased the power of the modern State that it can easily become oligarchical and tyrannical: "It is possible nowadays for a government," as Russell writes, "to be very much more oppressive than any government could be before there was scientific technique. Propaganda makes
persuasion easier for the government; public ownership of halls and paper makes counter-propaganda more difficult; and the effectiveness of modern armaments makes popular risings impossible."

Joad thinks that the application of scientific technique to human affairs has given rise to certain tendencies which, in their turn, have wrought an enormous increase in the power of the modern State and a consequent decline in individual liberty.

Russell holds that not only the power of the State but also its very size constitutes a very serious menace to liberty. Owing to the largeness of a modern State, the individual very often feels a sense of littleness and remains indifferent. A man in a large modern State can hardly hope to control the intricate policy of his government and to exercise any influence upon its decision-making. His direct contacts with the government are few and far between. And as a result, he becomes apathetic and callous to public affairs. As Russell writes: "the government remains a remote impersonal circumstances," and affords little or no opportunity for private initiative. He thinks that the remoteness of a modern unwieldy large State is more psychological than geographical.

According to Russell, another major threat to liberty arises from the power of officials or from the growth of bureaucracy in a modern State. In his own words: "Kings and priests and capitalists are, on the whole, outmoded bogies. It is officials who represent the modern danger." Russell repeatedly points out that in a modern State it is the officials who exercise
all power and initiative, because the voters who constitute the ultimate source of political control in a democracy are very often callous and very seldom interested in public affairs. The officials have become so much powerful that their power, in his opinion, can be contrasted with the power of monarchs in the 16th century. The growth of officialdom or bureaucracy is, in the words of Max Weber, "precisely characteristic of the modern state." In the opinion of Weber, finance, war and law are the three most important factors that lead to the growth of expert officialdom in every modern advanced State.

Russell argues that in this age of industrialization liberty faces its challenge not from the State alone, but from large organizations also. "Politics and economics," he writes, "are more and more dominated by vast organizations, in face of which the individual is in danger of becoming powerless." Russell points out that an organization by its very nature and for its functioning requires some sacrifice of individual liberty, and he goes on to add that the larger the organization, the greater is the sacrifice of liberty, because the greater is the power of the management. The sacrifice of liberty, according to him, is very great in an organization, the purpose of which is to combat. He regards political party and trade union as the two most important and formidable combatant organizations. These kinds of organizations, he thinks, reduce individual liberty to a minimum and provide little scope for private initiative.

Russell accuses John Stuart Mill for not being able to
apprehend and foresee the danger to liberty that arises from
the growth of vast organizations. "Liberals and Radicals", he
writes, "alike failed to understand the part played by
organization in a world ruled by scientific technique." Laski
observes that English Liberalism suffered eclipse, because it
viewed society as a sum of atomistic and discrete individuals
and could not evolve a philosophy approximate to an industrial
age. Russell thinks that in this scientific and industrial
age the relation between the individual and his group or
organization is assuming greater importance than the relation
between the individual and the State. He, therefore, concludes
that the growth of organizations in the modern scientific and
industrial world requires a fresh examination of the problem of
individual liberty from a standpoint different from 19th century
Liberalism. "The problem which faces the modern world," according
to him, "is the combination of individual initiative with the
increase in the size and scope of organizations." Many modern
writers have noted the growth and immense powers of organizations.
Barker recognizes the immense power of organizations when he
writes: "If we are individualists now, we are corporate
individualists. Our 'individuals' are becoming groups. No longer
do we write The Man versus The State; we write The Group versus
The State." Of late, J.K. Galbraith writes: "It is not to
individuals but to organizations that power in the business
enterprise and power in the society has passed."

According to Russell, the police are everywhere much more
powerful than they were in the past, and constitutes a very serious
threat to liberty in most civilized countries. The modern police force, he thinks, is everywhere employed to obtain and extract confession of a man's guilt by torture and force. To counteract this evil, Russell urges the formation of a second police force, the function of which should be to prove a man's innocence. "I think," he argues, "that the creation of such a police force might enable us to preserve some of our traditional liberties, but I do not think that any lesser measure will do." One critic points out that Russell 'unnecessarily' overemphasizes the threat to liberty that arises from the police. He, however, admits that the police "constitutes a major and continuing affront to the democratic idea of free men in a free society."

To curb the power of the State and its officials and thereby to preserve liberty, Russell pleads for the formation of such strong and voluntary organizations as trade unions, co-operative societies, universities, etc., and the grant of a large measure of autonomy to them. To quote him: "All strong organizations, which embody a sectional public opinion, such as trade unions, co-operative societies, professions, and universities, are to be welcomed as safeguards of liberty and opportunities for initiative." Russell says that citizens having certain specific interests in common should organize themselves into groups, "determined to preserve autonomy as regards their internal affairs, willing to resist interference by strike if necessary, ..." He thinks that by securing power and autonomy for voluntary organizations can liberty and organization be combined. But Russell's faith in Anarchism leads him to argue that such a method cannot be
successful unless there is "absence of submission to government \textsuperscript{151} both in theory and practice," and a diffused sense of respect for liberty. Russell regards organization as constituting a serious menace to liberty. And yet he strongly argues in favour of granting power and autonomy to all such voluntary organizations as trade unions, and goes even so far as to suggest that with the exception of the maintenance of law and order the positive functions of the State should as far as possible be carried out, not by the State itself, but by independent organizations.

More than a century ago Tocqueville has suggested the formation of associations by individuals as a valuable method to protect and preserve individual liberty. In his own words: "An association for political, commercial, or manufacturing purpose, or even for those of science and literature, which cannot be disposed of at pleasure, or oppressed without remonstrance; and which, by defending its own rights against the encroachments of government, saves the common liberties of the country." \textsuperscript{153}

Russell, like the Pluralists, considers the widest possible devolution of power, territorial and functional, to be the most effective method to prevent the concentration of power in the State and to safeguard individual liberty. He writes that "there should be devolution of power of the State to various kinds of bodies - geographical, industrial, cultural, according to their functions." \textsuperscript{154} In Russell's opinion, devolution of power should be not only territorial but also functional or vocational. With the Syndicalists and the Guild Socialists Russell pleads that autonomy
and self-government should be granted not only to all geographical areas, but also to all functional or vocational groups. In fact, he considers functional devolution of power far more important than territorial devolution as an effective safeguard of liberty. According to him, geographical or territorial devolution of power was more important in old days when travel was difficult and slow. Like G.D.H. Cole and other Guild Socialists, Russell thinks that there is a large scope for devolution of power in the sphere of industry.

John Stuart Mill has long ago emphasized the importance of devolution of power as an effective antidote to tyranny and a valuable safeguard of liberty. To quote him: "A democratic constitution, not supported by democratic institutions in detail, but confined to the central government, not only is not political freedom, but often creates a spirit precisely the reverse, carrying down to the lowest grade in society the desire and ambition of political domination." Laski also thinks that there can be no liberty so long as there is a centralization of power in the State. "I hazard the generalization," he writes, "that the more widespread the distribution of power in the State, the more decentralized its character, the more likely men are to be jealous for freedom."

Russell points out that to delimit the power of various bodies and organizations, local and vocational, may after create a difficult problem. But the problem, he thinks, can be solved if the general principle of a federal system of government is followed. In his words: "The general principle should be to leave to smaller
bodies all functions which do not prevent the larger bodies from fulfilling their purpose." Russell says that the affairs of a group or an organization should be divided into home or internal affairs and foreign or external affairs, and he suggests that all groups and organizations should be left free to control and regulate their home or internal affairs. The State, he observes, should control only their external matters and must not intervene in the domestic affairs of an organization or a group, so long as it maintains a certain minimum standard of efficiency and does not seriously threaten law and order. Russell points out that the same principle regarding the devolution of power should be followed in the sphere of industry. In his unpublished essay entitled 'Outline of a Political Philosophy' (1943), he writes: "Consider the organization of industries, and for the sake of definiteness let us take iron and steel. Here, as elsewhere, we must separate what concerns the general public from what concerns those actually engaged in the industry. The general public is concerned about (a) the output, (b) the total remuneration of the industry, and (c) the total number of persons employed in it. These three points, in a socialist régime, would be rightly decided by the State. But everything else should be decided by the industry itself."

Russell regards war as the worst enemy of freedom. He thinks that it is the threat or possibility of war that mainly causes an unusual increase in the power of the modern State. He writes that "until the fear of war is removed it is inevitable that everything should be subject to short-term efficiency." Russell concludes that without a World Government, war cannot be
eliminated and freedom cannot be secure.

Though Russell does not deny the importance of economic justice or equality, he thinks that it is an excessive emphasis upon Socialism, or upon the importance of economic justice that largely brings about an inordinate increase in the power of the modern State and a consequent diminution in individual liberty. Lord Bryce points out that owing to the passion for economic equality and material well-being the respect for liberty has grown cold in the modern world. Tocqueville has long ago noted the tendency towards an increase in the power of government. The power of government, he says, will go on increasing as more and more emphasis is put upon equality. To quote him: "... in Europe everything seems to conduce to the indefinite extension of the prerogatives of government, and to render all that enjoyed the rights of private independence more weak, more subordinate, and more precarious. The democratic nations of Europe have all the general and permanent tendencies which urge the Americans to the centralisation of government, and they are moreover exposed to a number of secondary and incidental causes with which the Americans are unacquainted. It would seem as if every step they make towards equality brings them nearer to despotism." And that is why many modern Socialists, for example, G.D.H. Cole, R.H.Tawney and R.H.S. Crossman, have pointed out that the task of Socialists in the present-day world is not merely to obtain greater and greater economic equality or prosperity, but also to secure more and more freedom for the individual.
Russell has been accused by John Lewis for not realizing the simple truth that there is no necessary antithesis or dichotomy between the individual and the State, between authority and liberty. He says that Russell "fails to learn the lesson of the industrial development in the nineteenth century" which shows that freedom can be increased, not by the absence, but by the presence of governmental control and regulation of economic life. Alan Wood thinks that Russell upholds the individual against the State. He writes that "it is natural enough to find an analytic anti-monist philosopher like Russell upholding the individual against the State, whereas Hegel did the reverse." Prof. Henry Parris argues that "Russell's approach hints at a sort of 'wage fund' theory of freedom, as if the amount of social organization must be inversely proportional to the amount of individual freedom, as if one cannot increase without a compensating fall in the other." Boyd H. Bode thinks that Russell is 'uncompromising' on the question of the relation between the individual and the State. He further points out that Russell brings about a reconciliation of freedom with authority through methods essentially negative, and is "essentially a liberal of the traditional type in the field of political theory."

We think that all these judgements betray a lack of proper understanding of Russell's political philosophy. Russell, we think, does not conceive the State and the individual in antithetical or antagonistic terms. What he does, as our analysis clearly shows, is to lay down a principle in terms of impulses to
determine the sphere where the State should or should not legitimately interfere in the activities of the individual.

Our discussion shows that the State, according to Russell, should restrain the activities of an individual insofar as his possessive impulses are concerned, and that the individual should be given freedom to pursue his creative impulse. In other words, the State and the individual, in his opinion, have their own respective and appointed spheres of function. Russell thus, like Hobhouse, stands for a harmony or a synthesis between social control and individual freedom, between liberty and authority. But A.J. Ayer thinks that Russell has not contributed much towards solving the problem of reconciling individual liberty with stable and efficient government. Ayer, however, admits that this problem can have no general solution.

Russell is, no doubt, very much sensitive to restrictions on freedom. But this does not certainly entitle us to regard him as "a liberal of the traditional type." With the traditional or classical liberals he regards the State as an evil. But it must not be thought that his attitude to the State, like that of the traditional liberals, is entirely negative. The traditional liberals viewed freedom entirely as a negative concept and defined it as absence of governmental restraints. They even advocated absolute freedom of the individual in the economic sphere. But Russell does not consider freedom wholly as a negative concept and in terms of opposition to the State. This, we think, can be seen from the fact that he recognizes the State as a necessary institution for securing economic justice. Russell very severely
criticizes laissez-faire liberalism and he writes that unless the State intervenes in the sphere of material possessions, "the human population of the globe could hardly be a tenth of what it is; it would be kept down by starvation and infant mortality. This would be to substitute a physical slavery far more severe than the worst social slavery to be found in civilized communities in normal times." Russell, therefore, concludes that "the two main purposes of social activity: on the one hand, security and justice require centralized governmental control, which must extend to the creation of a world government if it is to be effective. Progress, on the contrary, requires the utmost scope for personal initiative that is compatible with social order."

In short, Russell, unlike the traditional liberals, admits and emphasizes the importance of governmental control in the economic sphere. In view of his criticism of laissez-faire liberalism and his admission and recognition of the importance of governmental control of economic life, it is difficult to accept the validity of John Lewis's view that Russell "fails to learn the lesson of the industrial revolution in the nineteenth century," or the validity of Bode's view that Russell "is essentially a liberal of the traditional type in the field of political theory" and brings about a reconciliation of liberty with authority through methods essentially negative. Like the classical or traditional liberals, Russell does not espouse the cause of 'economic individualism'; and unlike them, he accepts the idea of Socialism and even welcomes it.
Russell, in fact, seeks to reconcile the claims of individualism and Socialism. But he is driven into inconsistencies by his attempt. In his writings Russell very frequently makes a strong plea for limiting the power of the State. Russell's argument, as we have noted, often appears very much anarchistic or anti-State. But what is misleading and baffling is that he sometimes stands for a strong and authoritarian State. In his earlier works, namely, in Principles of Social Reconstruction (1916), Political Ideals (1917), and Roads to Freedom: Socialism, Anarchism and Syndicalism (1918), Russell voices the demand for limited Socialism. But in his later works he often speaks in favour of extending the power of the State. In Power: A New Social Analysis (1938) Russell advocates public ownership and control of all large-scale industry and finance as a necessary condition for the taming of power. In his essay on 'The Case for Socialism' (1935), he goes so far as to support and advocate State ownership of ultimate economic power which must include, he says, "as a minimum, land and minerals, capital, banking, credit and foreign trade." In Authority and the Individual (1949) he advocates State ownership of key industries and considerable regulation of foreign trade. We thus see that though Russell, as an individualist, is always anxious to limit State power, he often pleads for nationalization on a very extensive scale, leading almost towards centralization of State power. To secure economic justice, he insists on the abolition of private property on the one hand and enjoins the State to protect it on the other. A.J. Ayer draws our attention to this contradiction in Russell's thought.
Prof. Henry Parris, therefore, very rightly concludes that "the whole of Russell's social and political thought rests on two values—freedom and welfare—which he is unable to reconcile with one another."