Chapter - VIII

The Power Interpretation of History

Every political theory, either implicitly or explicitly, is a theory of the nature of man and society. C. Wright Mills writes that "a political philosophy contains theories of man, society, and history, or at least assumptions about how society is made up and how it works; about what are held to be its most important elements and how these elements are typically related; ... It suggests the methods of study appropriate to its theories." Bussell's political philosophy is based upon his profound belief that it is power that man always seeks. Wealth, he believes, is important because it is sought by man as a means to power. To quote him: "Men desire power quite as much as they desire wealth; indeed power is the source of wealth even more than wealth is the source of power. Wealth, in fact, is one department of power." 1

In his The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism (1920) Russell takes Marx to task for regarding the acquisition of wealth as the most important determinant and regulator of human actions and behaviour. According to him, there are, apart from love of wealth, other very important motives or impulses which regulate and control man's behaviour. They are, in his view, vanity, rivalry, love of glory, power, enjoyment, etc. In his opinion, Marx is too much of a
rationalist to realize the importance of these impulses in human life. That every man should seek his material well-being, as Russell opines, is no doubt a very reasonable conclusion. But he thinks that a man's behaviour cannot always be satisfactorily explained in rationalistic terms. "There is need," writes Russell, "of a treatment of political motives by the methods of psycho-analysis." Of all the impulses that regulate human behaviour, the love of power is regarded by him as the most important. He writes: "Marxians never sufficiently recognize that love of power is quite as strong a motive, and quite as a great source of injustice, as love of money; yet this must be obvious to any unbiased student of politics." Russell concludes that it is love of power, not love of wealth, that is the most important fact in human life and experience.

The theory of Power is first propounded by Russell in his 'A Free Man's Worship'. (1902). Let us give some extracts from this article. "When we have realized," he writes, "that Power is largely bad, that Man, with his knowledge of good and evil, is but a hopeless atom in a world which has no such knowledge, the choice is again presented to us: Shall we worship Force, or shall we worship Goodness? Shall our God exist and be evil, or shall he be recognized as the creation of our own conscience?" "If Power is bad, as it seems to be, let us," he says, "reject it from our hearts. In this lies Man's true freedom: ... In action, in desire, we must submit perpetually to the tyranny of outside forces; but in thought, in aspiration, we are free, free from our fellow men, free from the petty planet on which our bodies impotently crawl, free even, while
we live, from the tyranny of death. Let us learn, then, that energy of faith which enables us to live constantly in the vision of the good; and let us descend, in action, into the world of fact, with that vision always before us.®

Russell very elaborately formulates his theory of Power in one of his most remarkable books, Power : A New Social Analysis (1938).® He writes in the very first chapter of the book: "In the course of this book I shall be concerned to prove that the fundamental concept in social science is Power, in the same sense in which Energy is the fundamental concept in physics." He thinks that when a man is assured of a certain degree of material comfort, he will seek not money, but power. And even if he seeks money, he will seek it, he argues, as a means to power.

According to Russell, every man is possessed of certain desires, such as love of power, glory, enjoyment, etc. These human desires, he thinks, are infinite and can never be fully satisfied. But the desire for wealth, he opines, has its limits and can be satiated. Russell observes: "The orthodox economists, as well as Marx, ..., are mistaken in supposing that economic self-interest could be taken as the fundamental motive in the social sciences. The desire for commodities, when separated from power and glory, is finite, and can be fully satisfied by a moderate competence. The really expensive desires are not dictated by a love of material comfort." In taking the love of profit or wealth as the fundamental motive in the social sciences, Marx and his orthodox followers,
according to him, have made a grave error from the theoretical as well as from the practical standpoint. "The error in orthodox and Marxist economics," Russell writes, "is not merely theoretical, but is of the greatest practical importance, and has caused some of the principal events of recent times to be misunderstood. It is only by realizing that love of power is the cause of activities that are important in social affairs that history, whether ancient or modern, can be rightly interpreted." In his opinion, love of power, in various forms, is almost universal, though in absolute form it is rare. It is, he says, very unevenly distributed, and is limited by various other motives, such as love of ease, love of pleasure and love of approval. "The power impulse," he writes, has two forms: explicit in leaders; and implicit in their followers."

The theory that love of power is the universal and most important factor in human life has been recognized by many modern political theorists and scientists, and there is now a vast output of literature on this subject. Among the most important theorists who have dealt with power in society are Lasswell, Kaplan, Catlin, Tawney, C.E. Merriam, MacIver, Schwarzenberger, Morgenthau and many others. MacIver writes: "All motion, all relationship, all order, and all dissolution across the face of nature are expressions of power." MacIver, in his book, Power Transformed (1964), reviews at length the importance and role of power in society. He classifies power into various categories, namely, (a) the power of the sword, (b) the power of the word, (c) the power of office, (d) the power of wealth, (e) the power of knowledge, and (f) the power of
organization. Behind and at the back of all these forms of power there is, according to him, the power of personality. MacIver thinks that the course of history emphasizes the priority of one form of power to another. "Power is," he writes, "a many-sided thing. In its various forms and multifarious expressions, it is the agent, indeed the very being, of all that happens on earth and over the whole universe." In his *The Web of Government* (1947) MacIver regards power as a hierarchy, and says that every form of society has its characteristic and distinctive hierarchy or pyramid of power. He gives us very interesting graphical pictures of three broadly graded types of power. These three differentiated types of the pyramid of power, according to him, are the caste pyramid, the oligarchical pyramid and the democratic pyramid.

Catlin, a pioneer in "power theory" of politics, writes: "ALL POLITICS IS BY NATURE POWER POLITICS. THIS ANALYSIS IS MORE FUNDAMENTAL THAN THE MARXIST." He thinks that "the subject matter of politics is power." Lasswell and Kaplan, the two other pioneers in this field, are of the view: "Political science, as an empirical discipline, is the study of the shaping and sharing of power." C.E. Merriam in his *Political Power: Its Composition and Incidence* (1934) studies the role of political power in the process of social change. C. Wright Mills thinks: "All politics is a struggle for power; the ultimate kind of power is violence." Prof. Georg Schwarzenberger, in his book, *Power Politics: A Study of International Society* (1941), discusses the importance of "power politics" in international relations, and interprets politics among
nations in power terms. He contends that power provides "a working theory of international relations which fits the facts and main trends of international relations past and present, and which puts the proper emphasis on the real driving forces in the turbulent society." Prof. Hans J. Morgenthau also in his *Politics Among Nations* (1949) interprets international relations in terms of power. He writes: "INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, like all politics, is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim." Morgenthau writes elsewhere: "Politics is a struggle for power over men, and whatever its ultimate aim may be, power is its immediate goal and the modes of acquiring, maintaining, and demonstrating it determine the technique of political action." More recently, Peter H. Odegard regards power as the central theme of politics. To quote him: "The scientific study of politics has as its central core the study of political power." Tawney regards power "as the most obvious characteristic of organised society."

The history of the idea of power is probably as old as human history. "The attempt to study and explain politics by analyzing relations of power is, in a loose sense, ancient." Plato in his *Republic* divides the citizens of an ideal State into three classes, viz., the guardians, the soldiers and the working class, and he opines that the guardians only are to have power. Aristotle, the disciple of Plato, distinguishes between good and bad government by taking into consideration the location of power. He defines democracy as a form of government where power resides with the
people, and regards political or constitutional government as the best government because in it power rests neither with the rich nor with the poor, but with the middle class. Thrasymachus is the first thinker to regard power as might. Medieval scholasticism identifies power with God. Machiavelli, who after Aristotle has brought an empirical approach to the study of politics, makes the pursuit of power the chief end of rulers. Hobbes finds in all men a ruthless desire of power. He writes: "So that in the first place, I put for general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and ruthless desire of Power after power, that ceaseth only in death." Rousseau's conception of human nature is very much akin to that of Hobbes. Power and the urge towards power were very much extolled in the 19th century by such writers as Heinrich von Treitschke and Friedrich Nietzsche. Nietzsche, like Machiavelli, has an ethic which is essentially based upon power. He condemns Christianity as it upholds the morality of love and compassion. Nietzsche preaches the philosophy of the Superman who must always aim at power even by ruthlessness and cruelty. "My theory," he writes, "would be; that the will to power is the primitive force out of which all other motives have been derived." He views life as "essentially a striving after more power." "The State is," as Treitschke writes, "no Academy of Arts, still less is it a Stock Exchange; it is Power, ..." Max Weber also stresses the importance of power in politics. Politics for him "means striving to share power or striving to influence the distribution of power, either among states or among groups within a state." J.S. Mill too recognizes the importance of power and regards it as a practical concept. The concept of power is thus very
ancient. But what is interesting to note is that most political theorists in the past have taken power for granted and considered it as a general terms, and not as a technical concept.

Power in natural sciences is defined "as the rate at which work is done or energy transformed." But power in social sciences is a term which has been variously defined. Many definitions of power are often vague and conflicting. Hobbes defines power as the present means to obtain some future good. *A Dictionary of the Social Sciences* (1964) defines power in its most general sense: "Power in its most general sense denotes (a) the ability (exercised or not) to produce a certain occurrence; or (b) the influence exerted by a man or group, through whatever means, over the conduct of others in intended ways..." Max Weber defines power as "the chance of a man or a number of men to realize their own will in a communal action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action." Catlin criticizes Weber's definition because it identifies power with domination. Domination, according to him, is only one species of power. He defines power not as "a possibility" or "an opportunity," but as "a potentiality of effective action." George Santayana also distinguishes between power and domination. According to him, the distinction between these two terms is moral and not physical. Georg Schwarzenberger regards power as "the mean between influence and force," and distinguishes power from influence and force. Power can be defined, in his view, as "capacity to impose one's will on others by reliance or effective sanctions in case of non-compliance." He
views power both as "a subjective and relative phenomenon." Catlin finds Schwarzenberger's definition defective and unacceptable, as it excludes all species of force and influence from the genus 'power'. Tawney defines power as "the capacity of an individual, or group of individuals, to modify the conduct of other individuals or groups in the manner which he desires, and to prevent his own conduct being modified in the manner in which he does not." By power MacIver means "the capacity to control the behaviour of others either directly by fiat or indirectly by the manipulation of available means." Power is usually defined as the ability to attain goals. This sort of definition goes back to Hobbes. But Kaplan rejects this definition because, first, it is tautological, and second, it gives no independent measure of power.

Russell defines power as "ability to cause people to act as we wish." Thus, according to him, a man has power if he has ability to compel others to act according to his will. It also consists in the ability to prevent others to act against his will. Power has been defined by him as "the production of intended effects." Lasswell and Kaplan have rejected this definition because, according to them, power is defined by Russell not relationally, but as a simple property. In their opinion, power should always be defined relationally. Thus they write: "Bertrand Russell concisely defines power as 'a production of intended effects,' thus making it a property which can belong to a person or a group considered in itself. But power in political science cannot be conceived as the ability to produce intended effects in general, but only such effects as
directly involve other persons; political power is distinguished from power over other men." Power is, therefore, defined by them as "participation in the making of decisions: G has power over H with respect to the values K if G participates in the making of decisions affecting the K-policies of H." "The making of decisions, they further write, "is an interpersonal process." Thus they conclude: "Power as participation in the making of decisions is an interpersonal process." Catlin also emphasizes this point of view and writes: "Power in its exercise is indeed always a matter of human relations." C.Wright Mills, a noted American social thinker, opines that power and authority always involve the making of decisions. "Power has to do with," he writes, "whatever decisions men make about the arrangements under which they live, and about the events which make up the history of their times. ... But in so far as such decisions are made, the problem of who is involved in making them is the basic problem of power."

Russell regards power as a 'genus' or a totality, and thinks that it has various forms, viz., wealth, armaments, civil authority, and influence on opinion. To quote his own words: "It has various forms, according to the kind of influence that is brought to bear. These are most nakedly and simply displayed in our dealings with animals, where disguises and pretences are not thought necessary. When a pig with a rope round its middle is hoisted squealing into a ship, it is subject to direct physical power over its body. On the other hand, when the proverbial donkey follows the proverbial carrot, we induce him to act as we wish by persuading him that it
is to his interest to do so. Intermediate between these two cases is that of performing animals, in whom habits have been formed by rewards and punishments; also, in a different way, that of sheep being induced to embark on a ship, when the leader has to be dragged across the gangway by force, and the rest then follow willingly.

"All these forms of power are exemplified among human beings.

"The case of the pig illustrates military and police power.

"The donkey with the carrot typifies the power of propaganda.

"Performing animals show the power of education.

"The sheep following their unwilling leader are illustrative of party politics, whenever, as is usual, a revered leader is in bondage to a clique or to party bosses." Karl Mannheim distinguishes between three basic forms (or manifestations) of power: free sway, organized destruction, and institutionalized or canalized power.

Russell thinks that in explaining any social or historical change one should take all forms of power into account, as no one form of power in isolation from all other forms can be sufficient to explain it adequately. He does not think that one form of power is basic to all other forms. He regards the Marxian view that economic power is the source and the basis of all other forms of
power as erroneous and a serious practical mistake. He thus comments: "The attempt to treat one form of power, say wealth, in isolation, can only be partially successful, just as the study of one form of energy will be defective at certain points, unless other forms are taken into account. Wealth may result from military power or from influence over opinion, just as either of these may result from wealth. The laws of social dynamics are laws which can only be stated in terms of power, not in terms of this or that form of power."

Russell thus stresses the interdependence of all forms of power and concludes that no one form of power can be fruitfully isolated from all other forms. By maintaining that all forms of power are interdependent, Russell, of course, does not ignore the importance of economic power. MacIver points out that power is "multi-form," and "a many-sided thing," and that no one form of power is absolute. He writes that "economic power cannot be segregated from other forms of social power as though it operated by itself and sought objectives inherent in its own nature. It is true that power of any kind seeks its own increase, that the owners of power strive to extend and solidify their dominance - but they are human beings like the rest, have other goals as well, and are not at one concerning these other goals. As soon as we take these other goals into consideration we see the exaggeration characteristic of the Marxist view." Lasswell and Kaplan also recognize the interdependence of all forms of power and maintain that "none of the forms of power can stand alone; each requires, for its acquisition, as well as maintenance, the simultaneous exercise
of other forms of power as well. And none of the forms of power is basic to all the others. As patterns of valuation in a culture are modified and changes come about in the social order and technology, now one form of power and now another, plays a predominant role."

Tawney regards power as "a large genus," and views economic power as only one species or form of power. Russell thinks that in the modern thermonuclear age economic and political power cannot be fruitfully separated. "The separation of economics and politics, like Montesquieu's separation of legislature, executive, and judiciary, is," he writes, "merely the pleasant fancy of amiable people who value a quiet life more than power. Given a sufficiently strong desire for power, it is inevitable that all the forms of power should come to be concentrated in one organization although the process may involve a longer or shorter period of Civil War. The whole tendency of the modern world towards larger and more efficient organizations is against the separation of economic and political activities. This is more especially the case when war, or the fear of it, plays a large part in the national life; for war is a political act, but is fought, nowadays, mainly with economic weapons."

Russell broadly distinguishes between two methods of acquiring power: force and persuasion. However, he points out that the distinction between them is not always distinctly clear. According to him, the power that a scientist holds over the mind of an individual is the power that is achieved by means of persuasion.
But the power of the State, he thinks, is due to the fact that it has force at its command. Force is defined by Russell as "an influence over the acts of others without altering their desires and beliefs..." Persuasion is also an influence over the acts of others. But it is achieved, he thinks, through altering their desires, beliefs and faiths. Influence, authority, force, coercion, compulsion, persuasion, inducement, etc., are various sources of power and are included under the broad heading 'power'. All these are very technical terms and need very clear and precise definitions. Catlin and Lasswell have tried to define these terms and made subtle distinctions between them. But in Russell we find no such attempt. And he makes no distinction between power and authority, power and influence, and so on.

In The Prospects of Industrial Civilization (1923) Russell refers to three important forms of power, namely, military, economic and mental power. The power that the army or navy wield can be called military power; the power that is exercised by capitalists and industrialists is economic. Economic power has been defined by him as "the ability to influence the conduct of others by increasing or diminishing their income or their means of livelihood." In his view, these two forms of power in the modern world are closely unified and interrelated. But they have not been so in the past. The possession of raw materials and food is nowadays the most important source of power in international relations. Russell thinks that no nation today can become militarily powerful unless it has raw materials in its possession, and that by
military conquest it can get hold of raw materials. C. Wright Mills in his *The Power Elite* (1956) has shown the close interdependence between these two forms of power.

Russell, however, mentions another form of power, namely, mental power. This kind of power, according to him, is exercised by such organizations as the school and the Church. Russell, as we have seen, thinks that from no one form of power all other forms are derived. But in *The Prospects of Industrial Civilization* (1923) he says that mental power is the ultimate source from which all the other forms of power are derivative, and that military and economic power are limited and modified by mental power. In his opinion, all the sources of power are, in the last analysis, psychological. Russell thus holds opposite and contradictory views.

Russell in his *Power : A New Social Analysis* (1933) classifies power into three categories: traditional, naked and revolutionary. He thinks that the distinction between three forms of power is psychological. He defines traditional power as power that is derived from tradition, and regards priestly and kingly power as two well-known examples of traditional power. Tradition is always found to be deeply embedded in religion, and therefore traditional power, according to him, is almost always closely associated with religious practices and beliefs. Russell thinks that the association of religious beliefs with traditional power tends to make opposition to it almost impossible and obedience quite absolute. Its source, in his view, lies in habit and tradition. He points out
that traditional power, for its continuance, depends, to a very large extent, upon popular support. He writes: "Traditional power has on its side the force of habit; it does not have to justify itself at every moment, nor to prove continually that no opposition is strong enough to overthrow it. Moreover, it is almost invariably associated with religious or quasi-religious beliefs purporting to show that resistance is wicked. It can, accordingly, rely upon public opinion to a much greater degree than is possible for revolutionary or usurped power."

Power not based upon tradition or assent is called naked power and has, according to Russell, characteristics which differ greatly from those of traditional power. Russell cites the power of the army as an example of naked power. The instances of naked power, according to him, are: "Slavery and the slave trade, the exploitation of the Congo, the horrors of early industrialism, cruelty to children, judicial torture, the criminal law, prisons, workhouses, religious persecution, the atrocious treatment of the Jews, the merciless frivolities of despots, the unbelievable iniquity of the treatment of political prisoners, in Germany and Russia at the present day - all these are examples of the use of naked power against defenceless victims." It has, in his opinion, two forms: internal tyranny and foreign conquest. "Naked power," writes Russell, "is usually military, and may take the form either of internal tyranny or of foreign conquest." He thinks that traditional power degenerates into naked power as soon as tradition becomes invalid and loses its force and ceases to be widely followed and accepted.
When there is decay of faith in old beliefs, habits and customs, traditional power, he thinks, comes to an end and naked power emerges. Naked power, he opines, is power pure and unalloyed. He argues that power is naked when its subjects respect it solely because it is power, and not for any other reason. Naked power can be defined as "nonauthoritative power openly exercised." "It is power not accepted as authoritative by those over whom it is exercised, but nevertheless submitted to it." Russell is of the view that periods characterized by freedom of thought and criticism are followed by periods of naked power. He cites the examples of Ancient Greece and Renaissance Italy in support of his contention.

Russell makes the following distinction between revolutionary and naked power. "I call power revolutionary," he writes, "when it depends upon a large group united by a new creed, programme or sentiment, such as Protestantism, Communism or desire for national independence. I call power naked when it results merely from the power-loving impulses of individuals or groups, and wins from its subjects only submission through fear, not active co-operation." In his opinion, revolutionary power, in order to be stable and secure, must depend upon an active and willing support of the people. But naked power, he thinks, has no popular support and mainly relies upon force, and usually, though not necessarily, takes the form of violence. The methods of acquiring naked power, he says, are far more ruthless than they are either in the case of revolutionary or traditional power. Russell thinks that the nakedness of power is a matter of degree. For example, the power of the State over its loyal citizens, he points out, is traditional; but its power over rebels
is naked. "It will be seen that the nakedness of power," as Russell writes, "is a matter of degree. In a democratic country, the power of the government is not naked in relation to opposing political parties, but is naked in relation to a convinced anarchist. Similarly, where persecution exists, the power of the Church is naked in relation to heretics, but not in relation to orthodox sinners." He cites four examples of revolutionary power: (1) Early Christianity, (2) The Reformation, (3) The French Revolution and Nationalism, and (4) The Russian Revolution. According to him, revolutionary power is very likely to degenerate into naked power when the revolutionary struggle is severe and prolonged. It tends, in his view, to become traditional when it is secure and established. Russell holds that power as might, that is, naked power, was first propagated by Thrasymachus in his definition of justice as "the interest of the stronger." The periods of naked power, he remarks, are usually brief. They end, he says, when foreign conquest takes place, or when dictatorship becomes stable, or with the rise of a new religion. The part played by naked power in economics, as Russell opines, is very great.

Russell in his *Power : A New Social Analysis* (1938) refers to creed, moral code, opinion and propaganda as many important sources of power. Tawney mentions the following sources of power: religion, military prowess and prestige, strength of professional organizations and exclusive control of certain forms of knowledge and skill such as those of the magician, the medical man and the lawyer. If creed is to be a potent source of power, loyalty to it,
in Russell's view, must be spontaneous and be deeply and genuinely felt by the majority of the people. But when this is not so, obedience to it, he thinks, is enforced by force and persecution, ultimately resulting in boredom and weariness on the part of the people. According to Russell, it is Marx who propounds the thesis that moral code is an expression of economic power. Though he is critical of the Marxian thesis, yet he finds in it a good deal of truth. "The Marxist thesis, that the moral code is an expression of economic power, is," he writes, "even less adequate than the thesis that it is an expression of power in general. Nevertheless, the Marxist thesis is true in a very great many instances." Marx here has been wrongly interpreted by Russell. Marx does not definitely regard wealth or economic power as the only factor determining human life and society. He does not deny the importance of all other factors.

Russell finds that the modern industrial and scientific society is characterized by concentration and uneven distribution of power. He stands against absolute power. Russell regards the inequality of power as the greatest of all evils and problems that afflict the modern society. C. Wright Mills notices in the American society a strong tendency towards an increasing concentration of power in the hands of a fractional minority whom he calls "the power elite." He finds in the modern mass-society certain characteristics which lead to the concentration of power. "The main problem of our time," writes Russell, "is thus not, as formerly, that of freedom, but that of power; how can the power which modern organization gives
to certain individuals be prevented from becoming a tyranny...?"

How to prevent power from becoming tyrannical and oppressive has now become a problem that demands, he thinks, immediate attention and urgent solution from all social and political scientists. The crux of all social and political problems, according to him, is what he calls "the taming of power."

It may be noted that the problem of "taming of power" is a very old one. According to Plato, the solution lies in a government ruled by the philosopher-king. The Confucians advocate a certain degree of ethical and moral training to the holders of power so that they might become benevolent rulers. Russell, like Laski and other Pluralists, finds the solution in a very wide and extensive decentralization of power. Like the Pluralists, Russell is a great lover of individual liberty and is deadly opposed to tyranny in all forms. He fully agrees with the oft-quoted saying of the famous British historian, Lord Acton, that "Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely." And this clearly explains why Russell wholeheartedly supports the Pluralists' policy for wide decentralization of power, territorial and functional. His political philosophy is essentially pluralistic and not monistic. It is interesting to note that Russell mistrusts all power except that which is derived from wisdom and consent. It is natural for him to do so, as he is a thinker who is deeply schooled in the philosophic discipline.

In order to deal with the problem of "taming of power,"
Russell makes a distinction between primary or ultimate power and secondary or derivative power. Power, according to him, is primary when it is used directly by the power holder. "Primary power is the power of a principal; agency (assigned power), of an agent. Authorization is the transfer of primary power to an agent." By secondary power he means power when it is exercised not directly by the power holder, but by his agent.

Russell considers the problem of "taming of power" under democracy because democracy, in his view, is the best device so far known and invented for controlling the holders of power. But democracy, according to him, though a part of the solution, does not provide the complete solution to the problem of concentration of power. Theoretically, in a democracy power resides with the people. In other words, in a democracy the people are the holders of primary or ultimate power. But a modern democratic state is so large in size and so impersonal in character that the people, as Russell points out, are very often without a sense of power and responsibility. He, therefore, concludes that the lack of a sense of responsibility and power on the part of the people can easily make even a democratic government tyrannical and oppressive. Moreover, in a democracy the tyranny of the majority over the minority, in his view, cannot totally be ruled out and always remains a possibility because democracy, from the practical standpoint, is nothing but a government by the majority. According to him, the tyranny of the majority in a democracy is most likely in two cases: first, in the case of those who hold unpopular opinions, and second, in the case of
groups radically different from the groups constituting the government. "But it applies," he writes, "in some degree to everybody, because everybody is in a minority on some point." Democracy is thus beset with certain limitations and dangers. Russell, therefore, thinks that if under democracy the problem of concentration of power is to be satisfactorily solved, certain (I) political, (II) economic, (III) propaganda, and (IV) psychological and educational conditions are to be fulfilled.

Russell strongly pleads for the widest possible decentralization of power and the grant of autonomy to all important groups and organizations, territorial and vocational, in matters that constitute their internal affairs as an essential pre-condition for "the taming of power." This method, he believes, will create in the people a sense of power, importance, and responsibility. With the rapid growth of industrialization, organizations are very rapidly increasing in size and number. The officials of a large organization, as Russell says, are so remote and distant from its members that they can easily become autocratic and oppressive. Industrialization brings in its train the evils of tyranny and oppression of organizations and their officials. In the modern scientific and technological world power, in his opinion, tends to be concentrated in organizations. To tackle this problem of concentration of power, Russell advocates the extension of the democratic method of government to all industries and trades. This means that the workers should be given voice in the management of their industry, and that the officials and the management should remain accountable to the
workers for all their acts of omission and commission. Russell thus advocates industrial democracy or workers' control in industry. "The due distribution of power is to be obtained," he writes, "through democracy tempered by group autonomy. Autonomy for local groups having a separate local sentiment is a recognized principle of federal government. But there is need also of autonomy, in regard to specific purposes, for non-geographical groups to which these purposes are relevant." Here Russell is under the influence of the Pluralists and indirectly acknowledges his debt to Laski.

While laying stress on the importance of functional decentralization of power and federal organization of society, Laski writes: "We are beginning to see that authority should go where it can be most wisely exercised for social purposes. That is to say that there is no natural control inherent in the state. It is to suggest, for example, that it may be wise to put certain avenues of social effort outside the control of the state legislature. It is to argue that, conceivably, industrial enterprise is better settled by those who are engaged in it, than by the representatives of certain geographical areas with no necessary expert knowledge of the problems involved." To place all authority in the State, he thinks, is to breed inefficiency and indifference. Russell even goes so far as to suggest legal recognition of autonomy to non-geographical groups and specialized interests. But he concludes that legal or formal recognition of autonomy is not necessary provided it is followed and respected in practice.
The State, according to Russell, is a geographical organization and gives expression to man's worst passions which are geographical in nature. The State, he opines, exists to promote a man's hatred of foreigners and love of domination or conquest. "The reason why the State gives," writes Russell, "to men's worst passions is that the State controls armaments and conducts war and annexes territories." Russell, therefore, ardently advocates the restriction of State power and the grant of maximum autonomy to non-geographical organizations. The State, he declares, should deal only with those questions, such as tariff, foreign policy and war, which are essentially geographical in nature. But questions of local importance, he maintains, should be left to local bodies and groups. Russell thus sums up: "As regards primary power, therefore, the conclusions to which we have been led are: that power should be lodged in different bodies for different purposes, and not concentrated, as at present, in the geographical State. Some powers are essentially geographical; the most important of these is the power of making war (A civil war which is not geographical cannot be a first-class modern war). Some functions which are essentially geographical demand as large an area as possible, notably tariffs, foreign policy and war. Others are best delegated to smaller areas, especially where any strong local feeling exists. All powers which are not in essence geographical are likely to be better exercised by organizations of those interested."

In a modern representative democracy it is the civil servants who possess secondary or derivative power. In theory, the
officials possess derivative power. But in practice, they exercise, as Russell observes, a good deal of primary power. In the army and navy generals and admirals have secondary power. Under the heading of secondary power he includes the power of civil servants, the power of officials of a large organization, such as railways, the power of trade union officials, the power of school masters, the power of admirals and generals, the power of priests, etc. As power has always a tendency to become tyrannical, adequate safeguards, he urges, are to be made against oppressive use of power by officials of every sort.

To prevent the abuse of power by the officials, Russell suggests that they should be made subject to popular control, especially to the control of those who are most affected by their actions. But he rightly argues that public opinion to which they should be made responsible should not be political opinion, and must not be influenced by party considerations. But this method, he says, should not be followed rigidly and entirely in all cases. Two difficulties of this method are pointed out. First, if the officials are always made amenable to public opinion, it will interfere with their efficiency. Secondly, public opinion may sometimes represent sectional interest; and if the officials are made responsive to such opinion, it will not, in the least, he thinks, do any real good to the people as a whole and may stand in the way of smooth and efficient functioning of the government.

For the just and equitable distribution of power, Russell
proposes the system of vocational constituencies. This system, he believes, will lead to the protection of vocational interests. But Russell is aware of the limitations of this method. In his opinion, vocational constituencies for such questions as railways, electricity, etc., are not possible because they are essentially geographical in nature. To keep the public opinion enlightened and well-informed and to make it efficient and alert, Russell insists on the publication of vocational journals, the function of which should be to provide the reader with reliable and detailed information of an issue that becomes important. The ordinary newspapers, he thinks, cannot be trusted to give correct knowledge and unbiased information.

Trade Unionism and Syndicalism, according to Russell, are not adequate systems to deal with the problem of concentration of power since they seek to promote the interests of the producers at the cost of the consumers. Russell thinks that officials can become dictatorial and oppressive because the interest they represent (producer's interest) is organized, while the interest with which they often come into conflict (consumer's interest) is largely disorganized. He, therefore, opines that the undue power of officials can be held in check by the organization of weaker and unorganized interest of consumers. The State, he says, should not always be trusted to safeguard and protect the interest of the consumers as against the producers. For the purpose of protecting their respective interests, Russell advocates separate organizations both for producers and consumers. The State, he holds, should remain
a neutral spectator and should interfere only in those matters where the two kinds of organization come into conflict with each other. He says that the officials of a large producing organization, such as mines and railways, should be made responsive, in the first place, to the producers of that group. But this, he thinks, is not enough. Russell, therefore, suggests that they should be subjected to expert criticism by the officials of the consumer's group. The actions of the officials of a producing group, as Russell further points out, should be subject to constant review by the officials of the consumer's group. In his view, the State should always be ready to revise the decisions of the officials of a producer's group in those cases where the public are adversely affected. Though this system may appear cumbersome and elaborate, yet it, he argues, is unavoidable in the modern industrial community where producers are well organized and consumers are largely disorganized or ill-organized.

Each and every important interest, in Russell's opinion, should be well-knit and organized to safeguard its liberty. Russell even supports the use of such methods as the strike and the boycott for protecting the interests of both consumers and producers, and he says that there should be no legal bar to the employment of these methods not only by the organization of producers but by the organization of consumers as well, so long as the present capitalist system continues and until a better economic system replaces it. But he points out that these methods should be used only when the methods of arbitration and negotiation fail and prove abortive.
Let us sum up what Russell has said on the organization of interests in his own words: "Undue power arises where one set of interests is better organized than another set with which the first conflicts. Under these circumstances justice and liberty can only be secured by better organization of the weaker interests. This applies to military power in the sphere of international politics; to economic power in the sphere of industry and finance and to the power of the bureaucracy in the State and in big business organizations. Rights will never be respected unless they have power to make themselves respected, but this power can always be won by organization and energy. The result may be for a time a tug of war of rival interests, but in the end people will come to rely upon negotiation, all the more readily when no more favourable result is to be expected from more violent methods, which will be the case when all the interests concerned are duly represented in the negotiations by appropriate organizations. This method may not be ideal, but it seems the best that is possible in our imperfect world."

Russell very rightly maintains the view that democracy in the political sphere provides only a partial solution to the problem of concentration of power, and that nothing short of a combination of political and economic democracy is able to solve the problem. Democracy in the political field, as Russell holds, must be accompanied by democracy in the economic field. In other words, Russell is an upholder of Socialist Democracy. Unjust distribution of power, he opines, cannot be prevented only by the
attainment of political democracy, so long as economic power
remains anarchic and oligarchic. He criticizes both traditional
democracy and the Marxian theory, as the former, he thinks, aims
only at the taming of political power and the latter at the economic
power. Russell thus writes: "Both old-fashioned democracy and
new-fashioned Marxism have aimed at the taming of power. The former
failed because it was only political, the latter because it was
only economic. Without a combination of both, nothing approaching
to a solution of the problem is possible."

State Socialism has sometimes been advocated to stop the
arbitrary exercise of economic power. But Russell very severely
criticizes State Socialism. His main objection to State Socialism
is that it leads to the unification of both economic and political
power, and thereby creates "a terrifying engine of oppression."
Russell, however, thinks that public ownership of land and economic
power cannot altogether be dispensed with in the modern industrial
and scientific world. Due to rapid development of scientific
technique and knowledge, organizations are continually increasing
in size, scope and power. They are becoming so powerful that the
State often finds itself impotent and helpless in the face of their
vast and enormous power. Therefore unless there is public ownership
of land and capital, economic organizations will become increasingly
oligarchical and authoritarian. Moreover, such matters as
electricity, water power, etc., for technical reasons cannot be left
to private control. Russell thus writes: "In one way or another,
wherever modern technique exists, economic and political power must
become unified."
Russell accepts the Marxist thesis that unless the private and capitalist ownership of property is abolished, the tyrannical use of economic power cannot definitely be stopped. But he differs from those who think that irresponsible use of power can be eliminated only through the replacement of the capitalist system by the mere collective ownership of land and capital. In his own words:

"To suppose that irresponsible power, just because it is called Socialist or Communist, will be freed miraculously from the bad qualities of all arbitrary power in the past, is mere childish nursery psychology." Russell argues that unless the State is democratic and elaborate provisions are made against the abuse of power by the officials, public ownership of land and capital will be as much tyrannical and oppressive, nay, even more, as private ownership. Russell praises Marx for his realization of the fact that the State should be democratic. But he takes the followers of Marx to task for their rejection of this part of Marx's teaching. "Those who profess, at the present day, to be Marx's followers, have," he writes, "kept only the half of his doctrine, and have thrown over the demand that the State should be democratic. They have thus concentrated both economic and political power in the hands of an oligarchy, who has become, in consequence, more powerful and more able to exercise tyranny than any oligarchy of former times."

Thus concludes Russell: "While, therefore, public ownership and control of all large-scale industry and finance is a necessary condition for the taming of power, it is far from being a sufficient condition. It needs to be supplemented by a democracy more thorough-going, more carefully safeguarded against official tyranny,
and with more elaborate provision for freedom of propaganda, than any purely political democracy that has ever existed." Russell most passionately advocates freedom of criticism and says that no punishment should accrue to any person for criticizing the actions of government and its officials, provided such criticism is well founded.

Russell lays down certain propaganda conditions for "the taming of power." They are: (a) freedom for ventilation of grievances, (b) freedom of agitation, not involving the breach of law, and (c) impeachment of officials who abuse or misuse or exceed their power. He says that such method as "intimation or falsification of the register of voters" should not be resorted to by any government to secure its permanence. In his opinion, newspapers, printing presses, in a word, all the media of propaganda, should be made available to the public so that they can give vent to their grievances without let or hindrance. In a Socialist State newspapers, according to him, should be free to publish different points of view. Russell opines that there must be, instead of many, only one newspaper, the various pages of which should be devoted to different points of views advocated by different political parties. By this system the people, he thinks, will be able to get themselves acquainted with different points of view and can thereby form unbiased and impartial judgements. If there are many newspapers advocating different and divergent opinions, the people, he believes, will read that paper only with whose opinion they agree.

In addition to these conditions, Russell observes that
certain psychological and educational conditions are necessary for
"the taming of power." According to him, the psychological conditions
are the most difficult, but no less necessary and desirable. Russell
does not hold that love of power is bad in all its forms and
manifestations. But the form that love of power will take, he thinks,
largely depends upon a man's temperament. A man's temperament,
he believes, is largely shaped by his early education and
circumstances. Russell thinks that a man whose early life is
unpleasant and unhappy is most likely to develop such impulses as
hatred, envy, rage, fear and cruelty. These impulses, he says,
create a kind of mass hysteria which produces despotism. "It is
therefore," Russell writes, "important, if democracy is to be
preserved, both to avoid the circumstances that produce general
excitement, and to educate in such a way that the population will be
little prone to moods of this sort." He believes that few men
will be prone to these cruel and destructive impulses if they are
wisely educated and kindly treated in their childhood. "I believe,"
he writes, "that few men are cruel if they have had a wise early
education, have not lived among scenes of violence, and have not
had undue difficulty in finding a career."

According to Russell, it is the actual occurrence or the
possibility of war that provides outlet for man's aggressive impulses.
He thinks that there can be no just and equitable distribution of
power so long as the fear of war persists. To quote him: "War is the
chief promoter of despotism, and the greatest obstacle to the
establishment of a system in which irresponsible power is avoided as
far as possible. The prevention of war is therefore an essential part of our problem - I should say, the most essential." War, he thinks, cannot be totally eliminated without a World Government, having a monopoly of armed force. Russell, therefore, concludes that nothing short of a World Government can permanently and satisfactorily solve the problem of misuse or abuse of power.

In his essay on 'Can Power Be Humanized?' (1939), Russell lays down three important conditions for "the taming of power." "I conclude," he writes, "that the humanizing of power is possible on certain conditions. First: there must not exist, within one governmental unit, such implacable hatreds as are apt to be associated with militant differences of nationality, intolerant religious disagreements, or violent class war. Second: there must be no imminent risk of war; that is to say there must be a federal government of the world, possessed of the sole armed forces beyond such as are genuinely needed for political purposes. Third: economic as well as political power must be democratic, which requires that the main sources of economic power should be controlled by the democratic state."

Russell is a very bitter critic of modern educational system. Education, as it is imparted today, is designed to instil in the young and plastic mind of the child a certain set of beliefs and opinions. It is calculated to stifle the free growth of mind, and the habit of free and independent thought. And as a result, when the child grows up into manhood, he finds himself awfully lacking in the
power of independent thought and judgement. Instead of inhibiting
the free growth of mind, education, according to Russell, should
stimulate in every child the love of free inquiry and the habit of
unbiased thinking. A scientific or an inquisitive bent of mind is
what education, as Russell conceives, should aim to promote and
cultivate. The child, he thinks, should be taught not to accept
anything without inquiry and judgement. In other words, the child,
in his view, should be taught the importance of a certain degree
of rational and sceptical outlook. "Democracy, the only device so
far known for controlling the holders of power, breaks down,"
writes Russell, "when the electorate is unable to resist rhetoric;
if it is to succeed, it requires a kind of popular education which
has hitherto been wholly lacking, an education in critical judgment,
in scepticism, even in something like cynicism." In his opinion,
too much emphasis should not be laid upon discipline in education,
as it will make a child either a rebel or a slave. Education, he
opines, should make a man reverential, sympathetic and tolerant
towards other people's points of view.

"The desire for power," as Russell writes, is part of the
essential mechanism of human nature, and is not to be regarded as
in itself an evil; it only becomes an evil when associated with
certain other desires and impulses. Religious leaders, political
reformers, and men of science, are all actuated by various forms of
the love of power, but are not on this account to be thought ill of.
On the other hand, the power that consists in thwarting people is
bad. Love of power therefore is an evil when it is associated with hatred or contempt, but not otherwise. Whether love of power is good or bad depends entirely upon those other desires for the sake of which power is wanted. Russell, we thus see, does not regard love of power as inherently bad. He thinks that the exercise of power, if it is to prove beneficial to mankind, must fulfil three conditions. First, the love of power must be bound up with some purpose other than power. In other words, power should be desired not as an end in itself, but as a means to an end. Secondly, the purpose for which power is to be sought should be such as not to thwart the desires of others. Thirdly, the purpose for which power is to be wanted should be achieved not through means involving violence and force or anything else which may have bad effects "outweighing the excellence of the end to be achieved." Russell thus does not uphold the thesis that it is the end that justifies the means. No good purpose, he argues, can be achieved through bad means. Power, according to him, should be desired only for the purpose of promoting common good and social co-operation in the entire human race.

Russell refers to Buddha, Christ, Pythagoras and Galileo as four men having greater power than others. These four men influenced mankind most profoundly because they all, as he points out, sought power not for its own sake, but for the sake of securing happiness for the whole human race. Russell includes in his list of men having greatest power only religious men and pure scientists,
and excludes men of action. "For Mr. Russell, as for Schopenhauer, the great men of history are those who attempt to free men's minds. Freedom is mainly subjective." He rejects the power-philosophies of Machiavelli, Nietzsche and Fichte because they all have glorified naked power. Russell regards Bergson's Creative Evolution as a power-philosophy. Pragmatism also appears to him as a power-philosophy. He writes: "Belief in pragmatism, if widespread, leads to the rule of naked force, which is unpleasant; therefore, by its own criterion, belief in pragmatism is false."

Prof. M.J. McGill very severely and rather devastatingly criticizes Russell's theory of Power. He thinks that Russell, following Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, reduces all our instincts to one, namely, the love of power, and seeks to explain "all our successful voluntary actions" in terms of power. Prof. McGill argues that an instinct which explains all of our successful acts, explains none of them. "Instead of accounting for the difference between Buddha and Caligula by two kinds of Power-seeking, one of which sets men free whereas the other enslaves, it seems sensible to analyze the historical conditions and social formations. But when this is done, the Power-drive," he writes, "becomes an unnecessary and supernumerary assumption."

In reply to Prof. McGill's criticisms, it is worthwhile to quote here what Prof. Morgenthau has said against those who have deprecated the importance of power-politics in international
relations. Morgenthau writes: "Though it is true that certain social arrangements and institutions have always existed in the past, it does not necessarily follow that they must always exist in the future. The situation is, however, different when we deal not with social arrangements and institutions created by man, but with those elemental biopsychological drives by which in turn society is created. The drives to life, to propagate, and to dominate are common to all men. Their relative strength is dependent upon social conditions that may favor one drive and tend to repress another, or that may withhold social approval from certain manifestations of these drives while they encourage others. Thus, to take examples only from the sphere of power, most societies condemn killing as a means of attaining power within society, but all societies encourage the killing of enemies in that struggle for power which is called war." Prof. Morgenthau thus observes that "the struggle for power is universal in time, space and is an undeniable fact of experience."

Some recent behaviourists, however, tend to question the emphasis on power. David Easton, a leading behaviourist of our time, writes: "Power is only one of the significant variables. It omits an equally vital aspect of life, its orientation towards goals other than power itself." In the opinion of Herbert Marcuse, "One can dispense with the notion of an innate 'power-drive' in human nature. This is a highly dubious psychological concept and grossly inadequate for the analysis of social developments."

Though Russell recognizes the importance of economic power,
he considers it to be of secondary importance. He thus writes: "Economic power, unlike military power, is not primary, but derivative." During an interview with Woodrow Wyatt in 1959, Russell said in reply to a question about the importance of economic power: "Oh, the importance of economic power is very great indeed, but it's only one form of power; I couldn't say that it was more important than military power or more important than propaganda power." He considers political power more important than economic power. "In place of 'the economic man' of the old-fashioned text-books, we must substitute," writes Russell, "'the political man'. The economic man was supposed to desire only wealth; the political man shall be supposed to desire only power. Both are abstractions, but all sciences work with abstractions, and the political man will give us a better approximation to the existing world than can be obtained from the economic man."

Russell is no doubt correct in thinking that all forms of power are inter-dependent. But he is certainly wrong when he says that economic power is no more important than political power. The experience of modern capitalist society does not certainly lend support to this view. His view is far from being true and consistent with actual facts. J.K. Galbraith, a noted American economist, has shown in his *American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power* (1952) that economic power in America is becoming increasingly concentrated in the hands of a few and fortunate individuals, and that these men, practically and realistically speaking, are controlling and shaping the decisions that are made by the
government. He goes even so far as to say that America in future will be run and governed not by the legislature, but by a few financial oligarchs. In America political and economic power are so unified that in order to check and restrain the abuse of power by big industrialists, Galbraith advocates the strong organization of countervailing power of buyers and consumers. C. Wright Mills in his *The Power Elite* (1956) also points out that in America it is economic power that controls and shapes political power, and even military power. It is mainly due to the possession of economic power that America today, he thinks, is in such a strong military and political position. In short, according to Mills and Galbraith, it is economic power that is gradually, but steadily and surely, asserting its dominance and superiority over all other forms of power. In viewing economic power more important than political power, Marx, therefore, shows a greater foresight of the modern industrial capitalist society than Russell. However, it must not be thought that Marx segregates economic power from political power and ignores the importance of the latter.

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