First of all, we will discuss the problem concerning the first person-use of 'know that'. J. L. Austin has pointed out that the expression 'I know' is not descriptive as it has been commonly thought of but is performative in character. The present chapter will contain a critical review of Austin's performative analysis of knowing. His theory of performative utterances has been developed in two stages. In his earlier theory, he criticizes the descriptive interpretation of the utterance 'I know that P' and compares it with 'I promise'. This comparison, according to Austin, justifies the assumption that the utterance 'I know that P' must be regarded as a performative utterance, i.e., as an action rather than a description. In his later theory, he re-examines the whole doctrine of performatives and softens the distinction between performatives and other types of utterances.

SECTION I: AUSTIN'S EARLIER THEORY

Austin's earlier theory is found in his famous essay "other Minds". He distinguishes between knowing and believing to differentiate the following two forms of challenge:
"How do you know?" and "why do you believe?". In ordinary conversation we never seem to ask 'why do you know?' or 'How do you believe?' but always 'How do you know?' and 'why do you believe?' The expressions 'be sure' and 'be certain' follow the example of believe but not that of 'know'. The challenge 'How do you know?' suggests that perhaps you don't know at all, whereas 'why do you believe?' suggests that you ought not to believe it.

He points out that in case of belief, the "existence" of one's alleged belief is not challenged but in case of knowledge, the "existence" of one's alleged knowledge is challenged. 'I believe' like 'I am sure' and 'I am certain' are descriptions of subjective mental states or attitudes. But the expression 'I know' functions differently in speech. It is more than a description of my mental state. He says:

"If I know, I can't be wrong. You can always show I don't know by showing I am wrong, or may be wrong, or that I didn't know by showing that I might have been wrong. That's the way in which knowing differs even from being as certain as can be."²

Knowing, then, according to Austin, is not equivalent, in talking, to being certain. And the phrase: 'I know' is
different not only from 'I am certain', but also from all other 'psychologically descriptive' phrases, on the certainty scale. The question is, what is it that differentiates 'I know' from all other descriptive mental states? Is it, for instance, that 'I know that S is P' entails both 'I am certain that S is P' and 'S is in fact P'? This would square with the formula 'If you know, you cannot be wrong'. But Austin does not adopt this solution although he does not deny that the formula makes sense; and his actual answer is as follows:—

"Saying 'I know' is taking a new plunge. But it is not saying 'I have performed a specially striking feat of cognition, superior, in the same scale as believing and being sure, even to being merely quite sure': for there is nothing in that scale superior to being quite sure........... When I say 'I know' I give others my word: I give others my authority for saying that 'S is P'."

On Austin's view, then, it is the authority - pleading character of 'know' - statements which differentiates them from statements expressing belief or certainty.
Unlike 'I believe' or 'I am certain', the phrase 'I know' is not used to describe any mental state. The utterance 'I know' is, on the other hand, performative. It implies some action. He explains this by presenting an analogy between 'I know' and 'I promise'. From Austin's analysis, we get the following points of similarity between the two.

In the first place, both the expressions 'I know' and 'I promise' in the first person, singular, present indicative tense, cannot be used to describe a special mental state but can be used only in the sense to do something. So both are 'performative', not descriptive. Both 'I know that X' and 'I promise to do Y' are performances rather than descriptions.

Secondly, just as in the case of 'I promise', I give others my authority or my word that I will do X; similarly in the case of 'I know', I take a new plunge, I give others my word for saying that 'S is P'.

Thirdly, the statement 'I know that P' authorises others to rely on it in the same way as a promise authorises others to act on it. According to Austin, the right to say
'I know' is transmissible because if someone has said to me 'I know', I am entitled to say I know too, at second hand. In the same way, if someone has promised me to do A, then I am entitled to rely on it, and can myself make promises on the strength of it.

Fourthly, the same type of challenge may be made in both cases of knowing and promising used in first person present tense. If one says, 'I know', it may be challenged by asking "Are you in a position to know?" That is, one must show not merely that one is sure of it, but that it is within his cognizance. In case of promising also, fully intending is not enough. One must show that he is in a position to promise, that it is within his power. So a promise can be given only if the person giving it is in a position to fulfil what he promises; if someone doubts the fact that he is in a position to do this, then this doubt, according to Austin, is comparable to the critical consideration as to whether someone has the knowledge required to justify his claim that he knows that P. Because of such doubts, some philosophers hold that "I should never, or practically never say 'I know' anything except what I am sensing at this moment". Similarly some others hold that I should never or practically never, say 'I promise' anything except what is actually within my power at this moment.
Fifthly, another point of similarity between, 'I know' and 'I promise' follows from the above. "In both cases, there is an obsession: if I know I can't be wrong, so I can't have the right to say 'I know', and if I promise I can't fail, so I can't have the right to say 'I promise'." Austin points out that the traditional interpretation of 'if I know, I can't be wrong' is inadequate since we are often right to say we know even in cases where we turn out subsequently to have been mistaken, and we seem always or practically always, liable to be mistaken. He then attempts to provide an alternative account of the sentence "If I know, I can't be wrong". He compares the sentence 'I know it is so, but I may be wrong' with 'I promise I will, but I may fail'. Just as it is often reasonable to say 'I promise' even though circumstances may cause me to fail, so it is often reasonable to say, 'I know' although events may prove me wrong. The fact that it is always possible that I may be mistaken or break my word by itself is no bar against using the expression 'I know' and 'I promise', as we do in fact use them. Austin takes these as typical Moorean absurdities which are to be explained by the fact that I have no strong reason to suppose that I am wrong just as when I say 'I Promise' I imply that I have no reason to
suppose that I will fail. Thus on Austin's view, 'if I know, I can't be wrong' reflects the moral truth that one ought not to say one knows if one has some concrete reason to suppose that one may be mistaken. Thus one opens oneself to possible censure. 'If I know, I can't be wrong', is more like 'if I say I know, I should not have any reason to suppose I may be mistaken.' But Austin adds that it is not demanded that I do more than believe about the future.

Sixthly, the difference between knowing and believing corresponds to the difference that can be shown to exist between promising and intending. According to him, the situation in which I say 'I know that P' and the situation in which I say 'I believe that P' differ in exactly the same way as the situation in which I say "I promise that...." differs from the situation in which I say 'I intend.......

Knowing is not super-certainty any more than promising is super-intention. To say 'I know' is not to be more than absolutely certain, for there is no certainty superior to absolute certainty. To say 'I promise' is not to intend something more than saying 'I fully intend' for there is
no intention superior to full intention. 'I promise' differs from 'I fully intend' in that when I say 'I promise' I take a plunge, bind myself by reputation. 'I know' differs from 'I am absolutely certain' in that when I say 'I know' I give others my word. So it is not merely difference in degree.

Lastly, "Swear", "guarantee", "give my word", "promise", all these are similar words to cover cases both of 'knowing' and of 'promising', thus suggesting that the two are analogous. Austin admits that there are subtle differences between them. For example, know and promise are in a certain sense "unlimited" expressions, while when I swear, I swear upon something, and when I guarantee, I guarantee that, upon some adverse and more or less expected circumstance arising, I will take some more or less definite action to nullify it.

This analogy between knowing and promising - usually formulated by saying that 'knowing' is a performative word has come to be thought of as a major contribution to philosophy. Knowing, it had commonly been presumed, is the name of a special mental state and to assert that 'I know that S is P', therefore, is to assert that I am in that mental state in relation to S is P. This doctrine, Austin argues, rests on "the descriptive fallacy", the supposition
that words are used only to describe. In discussing whether we can set out any necessary conditions for the truth of 'X knows that P', it has been assumed that in saying 'X knows that P', we are describing some situation or state of affairs, and we have been trying to find out what this situation or state of affairs must be if what we say is true. In the light of these difficulties, and indeed for other reasons, it may held that 'X knows that P' should not be regarded as primarily a description of anything at all, and that to do so is to commit the 'descriptive fallacy'.

W. H. F. Barnes\textsuperscript{5} arranges the parallel drawn by Austin in the following way:

1) When I say
   \begin{itemize}
   \item I fully intend
   \item I am sure
   \end{itemize}

   I do so for my part, you can take it or leave it, act on it or not, as you see fit.

2) If I say
   \begin{itemize}
   \item I promise
   \item I know
   \end{itemize}
I do not merely announce my intention, say I have performed a specially striking feat of cognition. By saying it I take a new plunge. I announce my intention, say I have performed a specially striking feat of cognition. That is, I bind myself, that is, I give others my word for saying that S is P.

3) If (Someone has promised me to) do A (Someone has said to me 'I know')
   I am entitled to rely on it and can make promise on the strength of it, 'I know', too, at second hand.

4) If (You promise) You can be (You say you know) challenged to show
that you are in a position to promise,
that you are in a position to know;
that is, it is within your power,
that is, it is within your cognizance.

5) I may be perfectly justified in saying I know although things turn but badly.

6) There is a mistaken obsession that if I promise, I cannot fail,
I know, I cannot be wrong.

Austin himself, however, raises an objection to saying 'I know' performs the same sort of function as 'I promise'. He points out an important difference between 'I know' and 'I promise'. For example, someone who promised to do one thing have failed to perform it, although he did promise. But he who says that he knows something, when he is proved wrong, cannot be said to know that thing. Austin says that this difference is more apparent than real. The sense in which you "did promise"
is that you did say you promised (did say 'I promise') : and you did say you knew. He says that there is another sense of promise in which he who says 'I promise', but does not perform what he promised, or promised what was not within his power, did not promise.

In this sense of promise, promising and knowing are similar. The essential factors, according to Austin, are :

"(a) you said you knew : you said you promised, (b) you were mistaken : you did not perform". Here Austin makes knowing and promising appear more similar than they are, for he seems to suppose that 'you said you promised' parallels 'you said you know' and 'you cannot warn someone of something that is not going to happen' parallels-- 'you cannot know what is not true'.

Austin's earlier theory of knowing has been severely criticized by many subsequent writers. Their criticisms focus on different aspects of Austin's view. Now I will discuss some of them.

In the first place, Austin's notion of 'descriptive fallacy' has been subjected to criticism.
Jonathan Harrison says that it is not clear what Austin intended to mean by the phrase. If by 'descriptive fallacy' he meant the fallacy of supposing that 'I know she will be late', like 'She is habitually unpunctual' or 'twice two are four' etc. describes something then he would certainly be right. But Harrison thinks that this is an irrelevant and unimportant contention. On the other hand, if Austin meant by 'descriptive fallacy', the fallacy of supposing that the function of certain words is to make a statement expressing some truth or falsehood when they have some other functions, then Austin was wrong and Harrison tries to prove it by some counter-arguments that words like 'I know......' do express a statement. According to him, 'descriptive fallacy' lies in supposing that putting 'I know' in front of any sentence does not alter the truth-value of what is said, much as putting 'I warn you that', in front of 'The bull is going to charge' does not alter the truth-value of what is being said. If Austin thought that the function of 'I know' was like the function of 'I warn', he was mistaken. Harrison thinks that though 'I warn you that the bull is going to charge' does not have a different truth-value from 'the bull is going to charge,
"I know the bull is going to charge* does have a different truth value from 'the bull is going to charge'.

Harrison admits that it is an important discovery that language has other uses than to state facts, describe things or communicate informations, but this view is sometimes over-estimated and mistaken. It is true that someone saying 'I promise' or 'I do' or 'I warn' etc. was not making a statement about himself to the effect that he was in some special state or undertaking some special performance, but actually, by saying these words, engaging himself in the performance. But the assimilation of the more philosophically important words 'I know', however tentative or partial, to this class of words is just a mistake. He says: -

"Our predecessors, so far from committing the 'descriptive fallacy' with regard to 'I know' had the better of us in that they did not make this mistake."

Harrison rightly points out Austin's mistake in applying the notion of 'descriptive fallacy' to the case of 'I know'. But he has not explicitly stated the reasons why our predecessors who committed the 'descriptive fallacy' are better than those who mistakenly apply this fallacy to
saying "I know" is a descriptive phrase. Perhaps he meant that the mistake committed by the latter is a more serious mistake than committing the 'descriptive fallacy.'

P.T. Geach\textsuperscript{8} advances a vigorous criticism of the notion of descriptive fallacy and its application to knowledge. He starts with what he calls the 'Frege point' about assertion that the propositional content of a proposition remains the same whether its truth is being asserted or not. To say a proposition is true is not to describe it but to confirm and concede it. To say 'I know that P' is not a statement about my own mental capacities, but is an act of warranting my hearer that P and so on. He points out that in cases where the sentence or the proposition is a hypothetical one, starting with an 'if' clause, the anti-descriptive theories will not apply. He presents some examples to prove it. "Thus in saying 'If what the policeman said is true, then........', one is not confirming or agreeing with what the policeman said; in saying, 'If he hit her, then........', one is not ascribing the act to him, and still less giving some moral or legal verdict about him; and again in saying, "If that looks red, then.....' one is not even tentatively asserting that the thing is red."

Geach assumes a possible reply of the anti-descriptive theorists, namely, that their theory was not meant
to cover such cases - that the same form of words, after all, may have different uses on different occasions. He holds that this possibility of varying use, however, cannot be applied to cases where an ostensibly assertoric utterance 'P' and 'If P, then C' can be teamed up as premises for a modus ponens. Here the two occurrences of 'P', by itself and in the 'if' clause, must have the same sense if the modus ponens is not to be vitiated by equivocation; and if any theorist alleges that at its ostensibly assertoric occurrence, 'P' is really no proposition at all. It is up to him to give an account of the role of 'P' that will allow of its standing as a premise.

Now Geach examines whether Austin's theory, which is anti-descriptive theory of knowledge, has performed this task. Austin would maintain that if I say assertorically, 'I know Smith's Vermeer is a forgery', this is not an asserted proposition about me, but an act of warranting my hearers that the picture is a forgery. Austin never observed that this alleged non-proposition could function as a premise obeying ordinary rules, in inferences like this:

"I know Smith's Vermeer is a forgery."
I am no expert.

If I know Smith's Vermeer is a forgery, and I am no art expert, then Smith's Vermeer is a very clumsy forgery.

Ergo, Smith's Vermeer is a very clumsy forgery."

But Austin had not explained how a non-proposition could be a premise. But without such an explanation, Austin's account of 'I know' is valueless. Geach also discusses the errors involved in other types of anti-descriptive theory and concludes that all those philosophers fail to see the Frege point, the reason is that they have in general little regard for formal logic as a philosophical instrument. So Geach concludes that unless we are not clear about the logical construction of a proposition, our theories cannot give successful results.

Patrick Wilson says that though one may grant that language is very often used for purposes other than conveying information, one need not necessarily think that a given phrase should always be ritualistic. He admits that the phrase 'I know' is sometimes used as a purely social, ceremonial noise. But even when it is so used, it may still have meaning, the circumstances in which a phrase is used, the tone, expression and attitude of the speaker, the attitude of the listener, the effects of the phrase on the listener
and so on, is not to exhaust the relevant semantic facts; there is, or may be, also a meaning, a sense. Austin treats the phrase 'I know' as purely 'performatory', yet he holds that if I say 'figs don't grow on thistles', I imply I know they don't though I certainly don't imply merely that I say 'I know......'. On Austin's account, the sentence 'He knows' seems to mean "He says, 'I know'", but this surely is not right. Again, to say. "I knew......" must mean more than to say merely "I said 'I know'", but on Austin's account there is no way to express this something more in the present tense. It would be hard to escape from this tangle without abandoning the notion that some phrases are purely 'performatory'.

Thus according to Wilson's thesis, the phrase 'I know' is not purely performatory. Even when it is used as a purely social, ceremonial noise, it is still descriptive. So those who say that 'I know' is a descriptive phrase are quite right and do not involve the 'descriptive fallacy'.

A. C. Danto also holds that Austin's charge against those who describe knowledge as a special state of mind is not absolutely valid. He says: "If 'I know' can
be emptied of its descriptive implications, and appreciated solely as a performative expression, the quest for philosophers from Plato to Prichard to find out what it describes, what condition of the individual is correctly reported with 'I know' will have been demonstrably ... a pointless search for a phantom state, a state of grammar missed as a state of being." This would have been similar discovery of Austin's had he been right, but Danto shows that he was mistaken.

Danto thinks that Austin might have misled to argue that not only is 'I know' not descriptive due to the fact that there is no special subjective condition of a subject which it describes, it is not descriptive also due to the fact that there is no such thing as knowledge. If this be the case, then no one could make a knowledge claim and say 'I know'. If Austin really supposes that 'I am right that S' has the same transitive force as 'I know that S', then he certainly believes that 'I am right that S' or 'S is true' is descriptive and then 'I know that S' or 'I believe that S' must be at least partly descriptive or what may be called "quasi-performative" (in Austin's own terms).

Danto is of opinion that the phrase 'I know' may be performative as well as descriptive. What 'I know'
describes is at the least a relationship between him who asserts it and someone else outside him. That is to say, there must be a subject who knows and an object of knowledge. Without access to an object, we are never justified in claiming to know. It is also performative in the sense that the concept of knowledge has no value without its practical use. But it is not clear what Danto means by 'practical use' of knowing. It is also questionable how a know-statement which describes something to be true or false, can at the same time be a performative utterance.

Chisholm distinguishes between a strict sense and the extended sense of the word "performative" in order to criticise Austin's view of "descriptive fallacy." According to him, performative in the strict sense means an utterance containing words which a speaker commonly uses to designate an act. For example, the standard way of making a request, among English people, is to make an utterance beginning with 'I request.' But according to Chisholm, the phrase, 'I know' is not performative in the strict sense of the term, for knowing is not an act that can be performed by saying 'I know'. 'I know' is performative in an extended sense of the term, for it is often used to accomplish what one may
accomplish by the strict performative "I guarantee" or "I give you my word." But 'I know' is not always a substitute for 'I guarantee'. I may tell you that I know some of the things that you also know, and on an occasion when you neither need nor want my guarantee.

Having thus distinguished the strict and extended use of the term "performative", Chisholm remarks that Austin mistakenly assumed that 'I know' is performative in the strict sense and not merely in the extended sense. But the utterance 'I know' may serve both to say something about me and provide you guarantees. Chisholm says: "To Suppose that the performance of the non-descriptive function is inconsistent with a simultaneous performance of a descriptive function might be called, therefore, an example of the "performative fallacy." There is a state, after all, that may be described or reported by means of the word 'know.' It is by committing the "performative fallacy" that one is led to suppose that there is not.

Keith Lehrer supports Chisholm's opinion by saying that Austin is guilty of the "Performative fallacy." Even if he is correct in declaring that when I say 'I know that
S is P', I give others my authority for saying that S is P, the performance of this act is perfectly consistent with describing oneself as believing with complete justification that S is P. In fact, I give my authority by affirming my belief and complete justification for believing that S is P.

J. O. Urmson, however, agrees with Austin regarding the view that 'know' is not a descriptive verb. But instead of calling it performative he calls it a 'parenthetical verb.' He defines a 'parenthetical verb' as follows: "A verb which, in the first person, present, can be used........followed by 'that' and an indicative clause or else can be inserted at the middle or end of the indicative sentence, is a parenthetical verb. 'There are so many parenthetical verbs such as 'I suppose', 'I know,' 'I believe,' 'I assume,' 'I guess' etc. and Urmson thinks that there is no essential difference between them. According to Urmson, both parenthetical and performatory verbs have much in common as against ordinary descriptive verbs. He regards the parenthetical as basic in the case of 'believe' and some other standard uses as related to it. If the point of 'I know' is, roughly, to signal complete trustworthiness for a statement made in the best evidential conditions, then the point of other uses of the
verb may be said with reasonable accuracy to be the assertion that somebody else, or oneself at another time, was in a position in which he was entitled to say 'I know.'

But Urmson's argument does not seem to be sound. According to him, not only 'I know' but also 'I believe', 'I assume' etc. are non-descriptive, for 'believe', 'assume' etc. like 'know' are parenthetical verbs as opposed to descriptive verbs. This is absurd. 'Believing', 'assuming' etc. are descriptions of one's mental states.

Austin himself never says that 'I believe', 'I assume' etc. are non-descriptive. Moreover, Urmson makes no distinction between knowing and believing but puts them under one head. But it is an important distinction which is admitted by almost all epistemologists.

Our examination of the notion of 'descriptive fallacy' shows that though this fallacy can be said to be committed by those who take 'I Promise' to be an utterance which describes my mental state, it is a mistake to assimilate it to the phrase 'I know.' For when I say 'I know that S is P', I make a statement which can be true or false. It is a
descriptive statement and not a performative utterance, for a descriptive statement can only be said to be true or false. But we can never say that a performative utterance is true or false. It consists only in doing something. When I say 'I promise', 'I warn', I do not claim anything about the truth or falsity of the statement. But when I say 'I know', I may make a truth claim. So the charge of 'descriptive fallacy' is not applicable to the phrase 'I know', for it is really a descriptive phrase. Austin's view is thus proved to be wrong. Danto, Wilson, Chisholm and Lehrer hold that the descriptive use of the word 'Know' is perfectly compatible with its performative use. Whether this view is correct or not is to be decided after examining Austin's later theory of performative utterances.

The criticism against Austin's notion of descriptive fallacy is the most important objection against his view on knowing. But there are other objections. The criticism against the view that both the expressions 'I know' and 'I promise' must be used only in the first person, present tense, can be regarded as the second objection. Barnes shows that the present perfect of 'know' is used not only in the first person but also in the second person and third person,
while the present perfect of 'promise' is used only in the first person. Promise differs from know also in that while the former has a normal continuous present, the latter has no such tense. Although I can say 'I am promising' at this moment, I cannot say 'I am knowing' at this moment. The reason is that promising is an activity, is doing something. The verb 'to promise' has the full range of continuous tenses, just as the verbs 'to roll' and 'to run.' Instead of using the word 'performative', Barnes speaks of the 'practical' use of the verb 'promise' in the first person, present perfect singular. But 'know' is not a verb which has a practical use in the very special sense in which Barnes uses the term, i.e., in the first person singular present perfect. By this, he does not mean that it has not a performatory use, because it may be that something different is meant by 'performatory' from the rather limited feature he has specified and labelled 'practical.'

Barnes is quite justified in pointing out the above difference between the expressions 'I know' and 'I promise'. But it is not clear what is the exact line of demarcation between the performative and the practical use.

Thirdly, Austin suggests that if someone supposes
that the difference between 'I fully intend' and
'I promise' on the one hand and 'I believe' and 'I know'
on the other, is only a difference in degree, one would be
mistaken. Harrison says that there may be two different
interpretations of Austin's suggestion. If Austin means
that someone who knows is not more certain of what he
knows than someone who is absolutely certain, he is right.
For it is a fact that there is nothing more certain than
being absolutely certain. But if he means that just as
someone would be mistaken who supposed that 'I promise'
was a different and 'more extreme' statement about the
speaker than 'I fully intend', so someone who supposed
that 'I know' made a different and 'more extreme'
statement about the speaker than 'I am quite sure' would
also be mistaken, then he is wrong. For although to adopt
the first course is a mistake and a bad one, to adopt the
second course is not to make a mistake. Harrison has not
explicitly stated the reason why to adopt the first course is
a mistake and to adopt the second one is not so. Whatever,
it may be, this objection does not hold good of Austin's
suggestion. For this is an objection to the second inter­
pretation of Austin's argument. As he did not mean it,
Harrison's objection is useless. We have to accept Harrison's
First interpretation of Austin's argument and Harrison himself says that according to this interpretation, Austin's view is surely right.

Fourthly, Austin's explanation of transmissibility of knowledge which is based on a comparison of the utterance 'I promise' is criticized by Jaakko Hintikka. He is not sure that Austin is right about the transmissibility of the right to make promises, and in any case it seems to him that the analogy in question is rather vague. He gives a different explanation of the transmissibility of the right to say 'I know' which makes no use of Austin's comparison.

Hintikka says that there are other ways in which knowledge may be transmitted, in addition to saying 'I know.' For instance, he supposes that you say to me aprops of Dr. N. N. "He now knows that he will get the job he has been considered for"; and also supposes that a third person subsequently asks me: "Do you happen to know whether Dr. N. N. will get the job he has been considered for?" According to Hintikka, "if I trust you intellectually and morally, I shall naturally answer that I do know." So "if I know that you know that P is true, I virtually know myself that P is
true. He proves the notion of transmissibility of knowledge by showing that "Kakp ⊃ Kap" is self-sustaining. This case cannot be covered by an explanation which is based on the authorizing character of 'I know.'

"Kakp ⊃ Kap" can be proved by Hintikka's rule of "The self-sustenance of Implications" and "Reductive arguments as abortive constructions of counter-examples. According to him, a material implication "P ⊃ Q" is self-sustaining if and only if the set (P, ¬Q) is indefensible. Every proof of the indefensibility of a statement "P ⊃ q" is an abortive attempt to describe consistently a state of affairs (with alternatives) in which P would be true but q false. The reductive arguments start from the assumption that a certain set of sentences is defensible that is imbeddable in a member of a model system, and proceed to deduce a contradiction from this assumption. This contradiction completes the reductive proof and thus it is proved that the original set was in reality indefensible. Hintikka proves the self-sustaintion of "Kakp ⊃ Kap" by this type of reductive proof.

Before stating the 'reductive argument' we have
to explain some concepts and symbols used by Hintikka.
The following symbolic notations at the left hand side mean the following sentences at the right hand side.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SYMBOLIC NOTATION</th>
<th>SENTENCES</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) &quot;Kakbp&quot;</td>
<td>1) &quot;a knows that b knows that P&quot;.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) &quot;Kap&quot;</td>
<td>2) &quot;a knows that P.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) &quot;Kakbp \supset Kap&quot;</td>
<td>3) &quot;If a knows that b knows that P, then a knows that P&quot;.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4) &quot;\sim Kap&quot;</td>
<td>4) &quot;a does not know that P.&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>5) &quot;Pa\sim p&quot;</td>
<td>5) &quot;It is possible, for all that a knows that not-P.&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>6) &quot;\sim p&quot;</td>
<td>6) &quot;It is not the case that P.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) &quot;Kbp&quot;</td>
<td>7) &quot;b knows that P.&quot;</td>
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Hintikka uses the terms 'defensible' and 'indefensible' instead of 'consistent' and 'inconsistent' respectively and instead of valid sentences, he speaks of self-sustaining sentences. Whenever an implication "P \supset Q" is self-sustaining, he says that P virtually implies Q.
"Defensibility" of a set is defined "as a capacity of being imbedded in a member of a model system". A model system, according to Hintikka, "is a set of sets between some of which there obtains a dyadic (two-place) relation, called the relation of alternativeness." This definition needs further explanation.

A set \( \mu \) can be called a model set (of propositional logic) if it satisfies the following conditions. (These conditions and some other additional conditions are collectively referred to by Hintikka as (C) conditions.)

\[\text{(C. } \sim \text{) If } P \in \mu \text{ then not "} \sim P \text{" } \in \mu,\]
\[\text{(C. } \& \text{) If } "P \& q" \in \mu \text{ then } P \in \mu \text{ and } q \in \mu,\]
\[\text{(C. } \lor \text{) If } "P \lor q" \in \mu \text{ then } P \in \mu \text{ or } q \in \mu \text{ (or both).}\]
\[\text{(C. } \sim \sim \text{) If } "\sim \sim P" \in \mu \text{ then } P \in \mu,\]
\[\text{(C. } \sim \& \text{) If } "(P \& q)" \in \mu \text{ then } "\sim P" \in \mu \text{ or } "\sim q" \in \mu \text{ (or both).}\]
\[\text{(C. } \sim \lor \text{) If } "\sim (P \lor q)" \in \mu \text{ then } "\sim P" \in \mu \text{ and } "\sim q" \in \mu.\]

Hintikka, however, says that in order to study the properties of sentences which contain the notion of
knowledge, it does not suffice to consider a single model set at a time. This is apparent from the following paragraph.

"Let us suppose that $\kappa$ is a description of a possible state of affairs; and let us suppose that $\text{"Pap" } \in \kappa$. In more intimitive terms, let us consider a state of affairs in which it is true to say that it is possible, for all that the person referred to by the term a knows, that P. Clearly the content of this statement cannot be adequately expressed by speaking of only one state of affairs. The statement in question can be true only if there is a possible state of affairs in which P would be true: but this state of affairs need not be identical with the one in which the statement was made. A description of such a state of affairs will be called an alternative to $\kappa$ with respect to a. (Sometimes the state of affairs will itself be said to be alternative to the state of affairs described by $\kappa$).

Hence, in order to show that a given set of sentences is defensible, he considers a set of model sets which is named by him a Model System. The following condition is added to the previous conditions:
"(C. P\#) If "Pap" \(\in\) \(\mu\) and if \(\mu\) belongs to a model system \(\Omega\), then there is in \(\Omega\) at least one alternative \(\mu^*\) to \(\mu\) (with respect to \(a\)) such that \(P \in \mu^*\)."

The condition \((C. P\#)\) makes it evident that it is possible that \(P\). But this is not enough. It is also required that "it is possible, for all that the person referred to by the term \(a\) knows, that \(P\)." So everything he knows in the state of affairs described by \(\mu\), he also has to know in the alternative state of affairs described by \(\mu^*\). This is expressed by the condition stated below:

"(C. K\#) If "Ka\#q" \(\in\) \(\mu\) and if \(\mu^*\) is an alternative to \(\mu\) (with respect to \(a\)) in some model system, then "Ka\#q" \(\in\) \(\mu^*\)."

One more condition seems to be obvious to Hintikka.

"(C. K-) If "Kap" \(\in\) \(\mu\), then \(P \in \mu\)."

Finally, the following pair of conditions are needed:

"(C. \(\sim\) k ) If " \(\sim\) Kap" \(\in\) \(\mu\) then "Pa\(\sim\) p" \(\in\) \(\mu\)."

"(C. \(\sim\) p) If " \(\sim\) Pap" \(\in\) \(\mu\) then "Ka\(\sim\) p" \(\in\) \(\mu\)."
The above conditions must be satisfied by every member of a model system except the starred conditions (C.P*) and (C.KK*). The relation of alternativeness has to be such that (C.P*) and (C.KK*) are satisfied.

Now if the conditions (C.KK*) and (C.Kc) are satisfied, the following condition must be satisfied too.

"(C.K*) If "Kap" ∈ µ and if P* is an alternative to µ (with respect to a) in some model system, then P ∈ µ*.

If we use (C.K*) we can replace (C.K) by the following conditions:

"(C.refl) the relation of alternativeness is reflective."

From (C.refl) it follows that"(C.min.) In every model system each model set has at least one alternative."

From (C.min) and (C.K*) it is obvious that the following condition is satisfied.

"(C.K*) If "Kap" ∈ µ and if µ belongs to a model system Ω, then there is in Ω at least one alternative µ"
to $\mu$ (with respect to $a$) such that $P \in \mu^*$.

Hintikka proves that the relation of alternativeness is not symmetric but transitive. This is shown by the following condition.

"(C. trans) If $\mu_2$ is an alternative to $\mu_1$ and $\mu_3$ to $\mu_2$ both with respect to one and the same $a$, then $\mu_3$ is an alternative to $\mu_1$ with respect to $a$." 

This completes Hintikka's list of conditions for a model system by which we can explain the sentences containing the notion of knowledge. There are other conditions for sentences containing the notion of belief and also for sentences containing the notion of knowledge and belief taken together. However, our concern here is to show how Hintikka proves the self-sustainance of "$K_aK_bP \supset K_aP$" with the help of a reductive argument and so the conditions of a model system which explain the sentences containing the notion of knowledge discussed above are adequate for us to understand the reductive argument.

The reductive argument is the following:
We assure that for some model system and for some \( \mu \in \Omega \) we have:

\[
\begin{align*}
(21) \quad "& KaKbP" \in \mu \\
& \text{and} \\
(22) \quad "& \sim KaP" \in \mu \\
\end{align*}
\]

and we proceed to deduce consequences from this assumption. The deduction may have the following look:

\[
\begin{align*}
(23) \quad " & Pa \sim P" \in \mu \text{ from (22) by (C. } \sim k ); \\
(24) \quad " & \sim P" \in \mu^* \text{ from (23) by (C. } P^* ); \\

\text{here } \mu^* \text{ is an alternative to } \mu \text{ with respect to } a \text{ in } \Omega; \\
(25) \quad " & KbP" \in \mu^* \text{ from (21) by (C. } K^* ); \\
(26) \quad P \in \mu^* \text{ from (25) by (C. } K ).
\end{align*}
\]

We find that (C. \( \sim \)) is contradicted by (24) and (26) and thus it is proved that "KaKbP \( \Rightarrow \) Kap" is self-sustaining. And as "KaKbP \( \Rightarrow \) Kap" self-sustaining, knowledge is transmissible.
Fifthly, Austin claims that by saying 'I know', I give others my word, my authority that S is P. This authority-pledging character of knowing has been questioned by some commentators.

John Hartland-Swann says that Austin is quite right in claiming that when I say 'I know', I give others my authority and pledge my word, which I do not when I believe. But according to Swann, I do so only because I have taken a dominant decision that so and so is the case. By 'dominant decision', Swann means that our knowledge must be "well-grounded." Every case of 'knowing that' - whether affirmative, negative, or interrogative, whether referring to past, present or future must be well-grounded, that is, must involve, when analysed, some dominant decision, or the acceptance of some dominant decision. Philosophers, according to Swann, are not in a position to lay down rigid and strict rules for the proper use of 'know' in ordinary conversation; although they can usually develop the nature and cogency of the grounds or evidence on which decisions, issuing 'know' statements are made.

Swann's definition of dominant decision, however, is circular. For by 'dominant decision' he means that which
is well-grounded and the phrase 'well-grounded' implies that it must involve some dominant decision or acceptance of some dominant decision. Whether Swann's theory of dominant decision can justify 'know' statements will be discussed later.

Harrison points out that there may be cases where one who says 'I know P' does not give others his word. He shows the following example. "When the amateur investigator says to the detective-inspector 'I know that there is circumstantial evidence against him, but......', it would be odd to describe what he is doing in the way Austin does." In general, when X says to Y, 'I know that P', when he believes Y to be already aware of P, he is not doing this so much to assure Y of P, as to communicate to Y the fact that he also knows P. In such cases, to describe X as giving his word to Y that P is true would be thoroughly implausible.

Harrison admits that when X says to Y 'I know that P' but Y himself is not aware of the fact that P, we could describe X as giving the word to Y that P. He then assumes a situation in which X says to both Y and Z, 'I know the gun is unloaded.' He supposes that Y is already aware of the fact but Z is not. So here X may be giving his word that the
gun is unloaded to Z, but at the same time not doing so when he says the same thing to Y who already knows this. Harrison says that since X is saying the same thing to Y and Z, and he is making a statement to Y, it follows that he is also making a statement to Z. So even if it is correct to describe X as giving his word to Z, he is also making a statement about himself and these two are not incompatible with each other. But then Harrison again questions whether saying 'I know that P' can ever be described as giving my word that P. If one says, 'I give my word that the gun is unloaded' or 'I swear that the gun is unloaded', he can be described as giving his word, but someone who simply says 'I know it isn't loaded' cannot be described so. This is because 'I know the gun/unloaded' entails the statement 'the gun is unloaded' which may be what the hearer wants to know. But perhaps he already knows this, and wants to know whether the speaker knows this too. In this case 'I swear the gun is unloaded' would not do for giving the hearer the information he needs.

Barnes also says that sometimes when I say 'I know', I give others my word, that is it has the force of assurance. But they cover a limited number of cases. The words 'I know' can be used in contexts where its significance has nothing
to do with assurance. He points out that there are some intermediary cases between 'I promise' and 'I know' such as 'I give you my word that.......', 'I swear that m' etc. Both of them can be used instead of 'I promise.' But I may accept your word, not in any way doubt your sincerity and yet still ask 'But do you know?' If the answer is, 'Of course, I know,' you insist not now on your sincerity, but on your justification for committing yourself. Here your insistence has the force of an assurance not merely to whom it is addressed but to anyone who hears it.

Broyles is of opinion that we simply cannot say that when one says 'I know', one gives one's authority, binds oneself etc. because even though it is very often true, still sometimes it is not, depending upon what one is doing in saying this. The expression 'I promise' differs from 'I know' chiefly in that it is used almost exhaustively in the speech act of which it is an integral part, namely, promising. But there is no speech act called knowing because knowing and other epistemological concepts, e.g., believing, doubting etc. are not action concepts at all. When one utters the words 'I promise' in the proper circumstances, he is not describing the action but is rather doing it. The utterance of the words 'I know' does not always mean so.
A. C. Danto admits that perhaps the words 'I know' have the force, as Austin suggests, of giving my word. But while in the case of promising, 'giving my word' is enough to assure my performance, in the case of knowing, I have to report an additional fact, namely, that 'I know'. Danto, like Harrison, Barnes and Broyles shows some cases where by saying 'I know', I do not give others my word. He gives the following example. "A says, 'I no longer love you' to B and B replies, 'I know you do not'. Here B is only acknowledging A's statement and is not giving his word to A. So here 'I know' is not used in the performative sense, but in the descriptive sense.

Thus it follows that saying 'I know' is not always giving my authority to others. It may also be used in situations where the hearer already has this information and is only interested in making a statement and does not give the hearer his assurance.

Sixthly, some commentators have shown that saying something is not essential in the case of 'I know'.

Harrison says that there is an enormous difference between our worry concerning whether someone did warn, or
order, or promise, and our worry concerning whether one knew. While in the former case, the worry is concerning whether one having said 'I warn', 'I order', 'I promise', said these in the appropriate circumstances, in the latter case the worry is never concerning whether one, having said 'I know so and so', said this in the appropriate circumstances. One can perfectly know without saying anything at all.

Broyles makes the same type of argument. Like Harrison, he also says that promising is intimately connected with saying something in a way that knowing is not. He points out that promising is an inter-social concept. We make promises to other people. But my 'knowing' need not be conveyed to other people.

Danto's view is also not very different from Broyles. He also holds that one can say that I have promised unless it is true that I have performed a promissary action. But someone can very well say 'I know' without my having ever performed any ritual action and without my ever having said the words 'I know.' Moreover, Danto holds that this does not mean that other people are not aware of my knowledge but in
some cases I myself is also excluded from knowing that I know. I am also aware of my knowledge and when I describe the fact that I know, I use the words 'I know' to express it.

The above objection does not seem to me to be absolutely valid. For in the case of promise also, one can promise to do something in one's mind without expressing it in language. It is true that my knowing need not always be communicated to other people. In the same way, there are mute promises which need not be conveyed to other people, but the person who makes this promise can act in accordance with it. But Austin has clearly stated that he is making comparison between saying 'I know' and saying 'I promise.' So this objection is not quite appropriate to his analogy. Danto's view concerning 'knowing that one knows' is interesting but has nothing to do in the present case.

Seventhly, According to Austin's thesis, one is prohibited from saying 'I know, but I may be wrong' and one is prohibited from saying 'I promise, but I may fail'—so if one thinks one may be wrong, he "ought" not to say 'I know' and if one thinks one may fail, one ought not to say 'I promise'. Danto points out that this comparison is restored
by the crucial consideration of Austin himself that I often say 'I know' when I ought to say so for there is a chance of its turning out to be false and also say 'I promise', when I may not be able to keep it and so the promise is unjustified. Thus it seems clear to him that the analogy is not a perfect one.

But Austin says that the analogy still holds, for the obsession is doubly mistaken. Barnes holds that to speak of a mistaken obsession as characterizing both knowing and promising is misleading. According to him, it is a mere tautology to say that 'If I know I can't be wrong, for one can never say 'I know' when there is a possibility of being wrong. But one can very well say 'I promise' even if he fails to keep it. But I do not think that Barnes is right in saying that 'If I know, I cannot be wrong' is a mere tautology, for my knowledge may turn out to be wrong.

Broyles agrees with Austin that one should not claim to know something if one has some concrete reason to suppose that one might be mistaken. But he points out at the same time that Austin himself warns us that the mere fact of human fallibility should not in itself be taken to be such a reason. He notes that Austin's remark tends to focus only
on the negative side of the matter. But the positive side should not be overlooked. Reason for thinking I may be mistaken will also include the circumstances which bear on my ability to correctly assess the situation.

Broyles says that whether I am justified in saying 'I know' is not dependent upon my attitude or my personal assessment of the situation. It depends on whether it is reasonable for me to believe that I cannot be wrong. If so, then it is reasonable for me to believe that I know, since it is the same issue in both cases. But no one can preclude the possibility of his being mistaken in this absolute sense. One does not see any possibility that one is wrong, but one can be mistaken even about the possibility that one is mistaken. According to him, mistakes in thinking that we know are, like other mistakes, the exception. He says that it is this empirical fact that makes our concept of knowledge possible. When we do not see how we can be wrong, we rarely are wrong. In these favourable circumstances, being mistaken is incomparably less probable than being mistaken in other circumstances. This is what justifies our treating these as a special class of cases in which we say we know. We see that on Broyles's interpretation of the possibility of being mistaken in our knowing something, we can never claim to
know anything at all. We can at least reasonably believe something to be true where the possibility of being mistaken is less probable. So this position is not better than Austin's in this respect.

Wilson points out that Austin's interpretation of this fact is clearly not the only possible one. We could construe "If you know, you can't be wrong" to mean "Necessarily, if you know, you are not wrong." Wilson says that people might generally agree that one can only be said to know when what one believes is true. It would indeed be curious for a person to say continually "I know, but I may be wrong", but it is not nonsense. In easily imaginable circumstances it would be perfectly appropriate. But this will not do for Austin; for him, to say 'I know' is a performance, a ritual act, not a description of a mental state.

Austin, however, says that though there is a chance of being mistaken, we are often 'justified' in saying that we know of the past and the present. But he adds that we can only believe about the future. Swann says that Austin's theory is unsatisfactory regarding future statements. He shows this with the help of two examples.

1) "A lady, Mrs. Smith, tells me, 'I know that my
daughter will marry you.'

2) "A reputed chemist says, 'I know that gold will dissolve in aqua regia.'"

Swann starts with the case of Mrs. Smith. "Imagine the following situation. I am courting Angela, the daughter of Mrs. Smith. I am uncertain about my prospects, and too nervous to put a direct question as yet to Angela herself. So I say to Mrs. Smith: 'Do you think Angela will marry me?' — to which Mrs. Smith replies: 'I know she will.' I am still not altogether convinced and ripostle: 'But how do you know?" Did Angela say she would?" 'No', replies Mrs. Smith, 'but all the same I know she will.' Swann also supposes that her decision, after all, is proved to be right. The question is, whether Mrs. Smith is here justified in saying 'I know' on the basis of Austin's analysis that the reply to the challenge 'Are you in a position to know?' involves showing that whatever you claim to know is 'within your cognizance.' By saying 'within your cognizance' Austin seems
to mean that we have to be in a position to assemble evidence or have access to, evidence directly relevant to what we claim to know. Now, is Mrs. Smith's assertion that her daughter will marry me the sort of assertion for which she can assemble evidence? On the following quotation of Austin, Mrs. Smith seems entitled to use 'know' even though it refers to the future. "We may be perfectly justified in saying we know.......in spite of the fact that things may turn out badly, and it's a more or less serious matter for us if they do." Moreover, the correctness of this interpretation is reinforced by Austin's coupling knowing with promising since 'I promise' normally refers to a future action. But Austin's remark that things 'may turn out badly' here refers to the process of verifying some 'know'-statement about the present or the past such as 'I know that S is (or was) P'; but it does not refer to the non-occurrence of some predicated event, such as Angela not agreeing to marry me when her mother had said she would. It is noticeable that Austin also says, 'it is not demanded that I do more than believe about the future.' But here whatever may be the alleged implication of Mrs. Smith's statement, she was talking, rightly or wrongly, in quite a different frame of mind from the one she would talk in if she were merely expressing
belief. She was, in Swann's opinion, talking in an authority-pledging frame of mind which for Austin is a 'know' frame of mind. Swann, however, admits that strictly speaking, Mrs. Smith should not have said 'I know'; she should have used some other expression on the certainty scale. Even the fact that she was right after all does not alter the situation. For when she said 'I know' she implied, as Swann's analysis of "able to state correctly" shows, that her predicate assertion would be a dominant decision. But the general appraisal of human behaviour (according to Swann, human behaviour is relatively unstable, and particularly female human behaviour) makes it clear that it would not be a dominant decision. But this criticism does not apply to the chemist and his predicative assertion 'I know that gold will dissolve in aqua regia'. The chemist has definitely decided, and would pledge his professional reputation, that gold will always and inevitably dissolve in aqua regia, and he expresses this by using the phrase 'I know'. Austin's remark that 'It is not demanded' that he do more than believe about the future cannot prevent him from knowing, for this does not make it clear that he has broken any specific rule by saying he knows. However, Austin might claim that he does not wish to persuade either the chemist or Mrs. Smith or anyone else to change his
or her usual terminology; he is only concerned with analysis.

But Swann comments that he has complicated his position by not distinguishing between analysing and rule-making. Since the analysis of how 'know' functions is very complicated and disputable, it is best, initially at least, to keep the two questions apart. From this he concludes that in either ordinary or scientific discourse, the proper use of 'know' in respect of future depends, not on some philosophical rule, but on the nature of the case and the kind of 'material' about which predication is being made. But the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the prediction is not determined by any special criterion. Our 'past experience, intelligently interpreted, furnishes the ground for regarding some decisions as well founded, e.g., I know that gold will dissolve in aqua regia, and other decisions, even if things turn out favourably, as ill-founded, e.g., I know that Xenophen will win the 3.30.'

It seems to me that Swann's theory of dominant decision cannot justify 'know'-statements either. His opinion that both in ordinary and scientific matters, our knowledge of the future depends on the nature of the case and the
'material' about which one predicts is quite plausible. But then we are no better than in the older position that we can only believe about the future. The nature and material of the case only determines our positions in the certainty scale. In the ground of the intelligent interpretation of our past experiences, our belief may be justified in some cases but not so in some other cases. Now whether justified belief can be called knowledge is a very important problem in the analytical philosophy of knowledge. I will discuss this problem in details in subsequent chapters.

Eighthly, Austin claims that the parallelism between knowing and promising consists of the following essential factors: "(a) you said you know: you said you promised (b) you were mistaken, you did not perform." Harrison, however, shows that the suggestion is wrong the reason being that 'you said you knew' is an indirect speech for "you said 'I know'," but 'you said you promised' is not an indirect speech for "you said 'I promised'." Though you did not know what turned out to be false, you did promise what you did not perform. One can very well say, 'I promise', and fail to keep it but much more is required to know than simply to say 'I know'. Thus what Austin claims to be the essential
factors of the parallelism between knowing and promising are proved to be wrong by Harrison by making the difference between the two even within the essential factors constituting this analogy.

Barnes also shows that in the case of 'I promise', the report could be made in oratio recta — "He said, 'I promise!'"— but instead of the corresponding oratio obliqua form which does not exist, we have simply "He promised." On the other hand, the normal oratio oblique report of 'I know' is "He said he knew", and we may say, "He said he knew but he didn't". This consideration strongly suggests that 'I know' does in fact assert something which can be true or false. There is nothing absurd, if someone says, 'I know', to say 'you don't. But it would be simply absurd if someone says 'I promise', I were to say 'you don't.' But there is no form 'He knew' that can the used to report his saying 'I know'. This fact, together with others, proves that the analogy between 'know' and 'promise' is not so close as Austin thought it to be.

Ninethly, some comments have also been made on the difference between, 'I know' and 'I promise' as pointed out by Austin himself. Urmson says that Austin points out
important differences between 'I know' and 'I promise' (or 'I guarantee'). But Maxwell Wright criticizes him by saying that Austin nowhere points out such differences. Wright says:

"He concedes one difference between 'know' and 'promise', but immediately argues that the 'contrast is more apparent than real.' Harrison says that Austin uses the phrase, 'I promise', in two senses. Austin himself holds that in one of the senses of 'I promise', there is an important difference between 'I know' and 'I promise'. But in another sense of promise, promising and knowing are similar. But Harrison shows that there is only one sense of 'promise.' He rejects the unexplained difference between the two senses of promise. According to him, there is no sense in which he who says, 'I promise', but does not do what he promised, does not promise. On the other hand, someone who claims to know something that is in fact false, does not in any sense know it. So knowing and promising have no similarity in the so-called second sense. Thus Austin's attempt to remove the apparent difference between knowing and promising simply fails.

Lastly, another important difference between knowing and promising has been pointed out by Harrison and modified by
According to Harrison, someone saying 'I promise' in the appropriate circumstances is promising, not claiming to promise, but someone saying 'I know' is simply claiming to know, not knowing. Wolfgang Carl and Rolf P. Horstman admit this fact but hold that it does not follow from the fact that there is a difference in this respect that the use of 'I know that P' can always be understood as making a claim. For by saying 'I know that P' I might also be making a concession, revealing or admitting something to someone. Now what is characteristic of the use of 'I know that P' which is understood as making a claim, can be determined by looking at the situation in which claims are made. In this connection, they criticize the view of Woolzley and White on the claims to knowledge.

Now, Carl's and Horstman's opinion is that the appeal to reasons justifies the claim that is made when someone says 'I know that P', and it founds the judging of this claim. The idea of justification implies the assumption that what is being adduced as a justification can just as well serve as a justification to the other i.e., as a foundation of a positive judging of a claim. The intersubjectivity of the justification implies an intersubjectivity of the reasons. There is, in this sense, no such thing as 'private reasons' for my knowing. Reasons have, therefore, the same function
Again reasons, if understood as those propositions that determine a verification of propositions for which they are reasons, can only exist for true propositions. A justification always relates to the problem whether the truth of a given proposition can be linked up with the truth of other propositions in such a way that we have an acknowledged procedure for the discovery of the truth of propositions. This problem does not arise at all if the proposition that is to be verified in this way is false. The non-sensicality of the statement 'I know that P but \( \neg P \) is false,' therefore consists in that a claim is made and at the same time negated, that this claim can be treated as a claim which it is impossible to justify or judge. Such a claim is simultaneously made and cancelled. Thus Carl and Horstman rightly concludes that the utterances 'I know that P' is not an action in the same sense in which Austin thought of it as an action. The utterance is, on the other hand, the making of a claim whose justification consists in the giving of reasons for the truth of P.
The points analysed so far show that Austin's view on knowing is not sound. The above analysis makes it clear that he fails to justify the analogy between saying 'I know' and saying 'I promise. And with it the charge of 'descriptive fallacy' which he brings against those who use 'I know' as a descriptive phrase is also proved to be wrong.

SECTION-II. Austin's Later Theory.

The above criticisms on Austin are based on his theory of knowing as it is found in his "Other Minds". But later on, he modifies his theory of performatives in 'How to do things with words'. There he modifies the distinction between performative utterances and utterances that are either true or false (utterances which Austin calls constatives). We have now to see whether these criticisms against him still persist even after the modification of his theory of performatives.

In 'How to do things with words' Austin restates his 'performative/constative' distinction in a clear way. He now prefers the word 'constative' to 'descriptive'. In 'How to talk' he shows that the term descriptive has a very limited use. He says:

"...... It has come to be seen that many specially perplexing words embedded in apparently descriptive
statements do not serve to indicate some specially odd additional feature in the reality reported, but to indicate (not to report) the circumstances in which the statement is made, or reservations to which it is to be taken and the like. To overlook these possibilities in the way once common is called the 'descriptive fallacy;' but perhaps this is not a good name, as 'descriptive' itself is special. Not all true or false statements are descriptions, and for this reason I prefer to use the word constative.\textsuperscript{25}

Austin analyses the term 'performative' in the following way.

"The name is derived, of course, from 'perform,' the usual verb with the noun 'action': it indicates that the issuing of the utterance is the performing of an action—it is not normally thought of as just saying something." The immediate question is, what are the classes of action covered by the word 'performative.' It is very difficult to state the exact cases of utterances. What is always necessary in such cases is that the circumstances in which the words are uttered should be in some way or ways appropriate, and it is also very commonly necessary that the speaker himself or other persons should also perform certain other actions, whether 'physical' or 'mental' actions or even acts of uttering further words. 'I promise
to '.....', for example, is not merely a matter of uttering words. It is an inward performance which obliges me, puts in record my spiritual assumption of spiritual shackles.

In the case of promising, as with many other performatives, it is appropriate that the person uttering the promise should have a certain intention, viz. to keep his word. But when such intention is absent, we do not say that he misdescribes or misrepresents his intention. For promising is a sort of action. He does promise. The promise here is not void but it is given in bad faith. His utterance is perhaps misleading, probably deceitful and doubtless wrong, but it is not a lie or misstatement.

Performative utterances are always made in first person singular number and they, unlike descriptive or constative ones, cannot be true or false. They can only be said to be happy or unhappy, felicitous or infelicitous. The various ways in which a performative utterance may be unsatisfactory Austin calls by the name infelicities; and an infelicity arises — that is to say, the utterance is unhappy — if certain simple rules are broken. He provides the following six rules which are necessary for the smooth or 'happy' functioning of a performative.
"(A.1) there must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances, and further, (A.2) The particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure involved.
(B.1) The procedure must be executed by all participants both correctly and (B.2) completely.

(T.1) Where, as often, the procedure is designed for use by persons having certain thoughts or feelings, or for the imagination of certain consequential conduct on the part of any participant, then a person participating in and so involving the procedure must in fact have those thoughts or feelings, and the participants much intend so th conduct themselves, and further,

(T.2) must actually so conduct themselves subsequently.

If we do not follow any one (or more) of these six rules, our performative utterance will be (in one way or another) unhappy."26
Austin makes a general distinction between all the four rules A and B taken together (A.I-B.2) and the two rules of T. If we offend against any of the former four rules, that is, if we utter the formula incorrectly or if we are not in a position to do the act, then the act in question is not successfully performed at all, it is void or without effect. This is called Misfires. On the other hand, in T cases, we speak of our infelicitous act as 'professed' or 'hollow' rather than 'purported' or 'empty', and as not implemented, or not consummated, rather than as void or without effect. This is called Abuses. If we sin against T.I, it is called insincerity, but Austin has not given any name for T.2.

Austin makes further distinctions between A cases and B cases, i.e., among Misfires. In both cases labelled A, there is Misinvocation of a procedure either because there is, speaking vaguely, no such procedure, or because the procedure in question cannot be made to apply in the way attempted. Hence, infelicities of the kind A is called Misinvocations. Among them, the second sort (A.2) - where the procedure does very well exist but cannot be applied as purported - is called Misapplications. Austin, however, has not succeeded in finding a good name for
the other class (A.I). By contrast with the A cases, the
notion of the B cases is rather that the procedure is all
right, and it is applied all right, but we miff the
execution of the ritual with more or less dire consequences:
so B cases are called Misexecutions as opposed to Mis invo-
cations: the purported act is vitiated by a flaw or hitch
in the conduct of the ceremony. The class B.1 is that of
Flaws, the class B.2 that of Hitches. Austin admits that this
list is certainly not complete and they are neither mutually
exclusive.

Austin now says that when we come to look more
closely at happiness, we see that it always involves some-
thing's being true, e.g., that the formula is in fact the
correct one, that the person using it has in fact the right
to use it, that the circumstances in which it is being
employed are in fact right circumstances. This problem may be
thought to be solved by saying that even although the
happiness of the performative utterance presupposes the truth
of certain statements, the performative utterance in itself
is neither true nor false. But the same interplay of truth
and happiness, Austin remarks, applies to statements—for
example, to the statement: 'John's children are bald.' It
is not then false, but unhappy, improperly uttered. On the
other hand, such a performative like 'I warn you that the bull is about to charge' is severely open to criticism on the ground that it is false that the bull is about to charge. So it is not so easy, as it at first seemed to be, to distinguish between statements and performatives by contrasting what is true or false with what is happy or unhappy.

Then, performatives must be distinguished from constatives on some other grounds. A suggestion may be given that the two types of expressions are different in respect of grammatical grounds since performatives are often expressed in a special sort of first person indicative: 'I warn you', 'I name you' etc. But Austin points out that they do not always have this grammatical shape. 'I state that........' also has the first person grammatical form, and that, surely, is a constative. A very common and important type of indubitable performative has the verb in the second or third person (singular or plural) and in the passive voice; so person and voice, anyway, are not essential. Some examples of this type are:

1) "You are hereby authorised to pay."

2) "Passengers are warned to cross the track by the bridge only."
Indeed the verb may be 'impersonal' in such cases with the passive voice, for example:

3) "Notice is hereby given the trespassers will be prosecuted."

Thus if we turn away from the highly formalised and explicit performative utterences, we have to recognise that mood, voice and tense break down as absolute criteria.

We must make it clear by the way, what Austin does mean by explicit performative. He contrasts explicit performatives with implicit performatives. Explicit performatives begin with or include some highly significant and unambiguous expression such as 'I let', 'I promise', 'I bequeath' - an expression very commonly also used in namely the act which, in making such an utterance, I am performing—for example, betting, promising, bequathing, & c. But when we say, "There is a bull in the field", it may or may not be a warning, for I might just be describing the scenery and 'I shall be there' may or may not be a promise. Here we have primitive or implicit as distinct from explicit performatives; and there may be nothing in the circumstances by which we can decide whether or not the utterance is performative at all.
Again we might test a performative utterance by means of vocabulary as distinct from grammar. Such words might be 'of - side', 'authorised', 'promise', 'dangerous', &c. But this will not do, for:

1) We may get the performative without the operative words. For example, in place of "you are ordered to.......", we may have 'you will,' and in place of 'I promise to......', we may have 'I shall.'

2) We may get the operative word without the utterance being performative. For example, in such locutions as 'you promised', 'your authorize' etc., the word occurs in a non-performative use.

This proves that any single simple criterion of grammar or vocabulary is not sufficient. Even a complex criterion involving both grammar and vocabulary is not an adequate criterion because various difficulties may arise in this process. Austin holds therefore that there is no absolute criterion of this kind and it is not also possible to lay down a list of all possible criteria. Moreover, they certainly would not distinguish performatives from constatives, as very commonly the same sentence is used on
different occasions of utterance in both ways, performative and constative. Therefore, he looks forward for a different mode of distinguishing utterances in terms of the kind of act they perform.

He introduces a new set of distinctions in the nature of what he calls speech - acts. He makes a tripple classification of the ways in which to say something is to do something. To utter a certain sentence with a certain sense and reference is to perform a locutionary act, as when somebody tells us that George is coming. To use this utterance with a certain 'force', such as informing, warning, ordering etc., is to perform an illocutionary act, as when somebody warns us that George has come. To achieve by uttering this sentence a certain effect like convincing, deterring etc., is to perform perlocutionary act, as when somebody without actually telling us that George is coming, succeeds in warning us that he is on the way. Any single utterance combines, Austin came to think, locutionary and illocutionary functions. On the face of it, locutionary acts correspond to constatives and illocutionary acts to performatives. Austin says: "In general and for all utterances that we have considered (except perhaps for swearing), we have found:
1) Happiness / unhappiness dimension,
1a) An illocutionary force,
2) Truth - falsehood dimension,
2A) A locutionary meaning (sense and reference).

The doctrine of the performative/constative distinction stands to the doctrine of locutionary and illocutionary acts in the total speech act as the *special* theory to the general theory."

Austin said earlier that he needed a list of explicit performative verbs; but in the light of the more general theory he now sees that what we need is a list of illocutionary forces of an utterance. The old distinction between primary and explicit performatives will survive sea-change from the performative/constative distinction to the theory of speech acts quite successfully. But Austin has rejected the view that a particular utterance can be classified as a pure performative or a pure constative. To state, as much as to warn, is, he says, to do something, and my action, in stating is subject to various kinds of 'infelicity'; statements cannot only be true or false, they can be fair, precise, rightly or wrongly uttered and so on. On the other side, considerations of truth and falsity apply directly to such
performative acts as a judge's finding a man guilty, or a watchless traveller estimating that it is half-past two. So the distinction between performatives and constatives must be abandoned - except as a first approximation. He says that the "dichotomy of performatives and constatives" has to be abandoned in favour of more general families of related and overlapping speech acts.

Using then the simple test of the first person singular present indicative active from, and going through the dichotomy in a liberal spirit, we get a list of verbs. In this connection, Austin distinguishes five more general classes:

1. Verdictives, 2. Exercitives, 3. Commissives,

The Verdictive is an exercise of judgement. For example, 'acquit', 'grade' etc. where some appraisal is given. The Exercitive is an assertion of influence or exercising of power. Examples are 'appointing', 'warning', 'ordering', 'urging' etc. Here some power, right, or influence is exercised. The Commissive
is an assumption of an obligation or declaring of an intention. Examples are promising, intending etc. whereby one commits oneself to do something. The Behavitive is the adapting of an attitude. Examples are 'apologizing', 'congratulating', 'commanding' etc. which have to do with attitudes and social behaviour. The Expositive is the clarifying of reasons, arguments and communications. Examples are 'I reply', 'I argue', 'I concede', 'I assume' etc. which make plain how our utterances fit into the course of an argument or conversation. The five types of actions are not totally separate, there are relationships and interconnections among them. And commanding, promising, grading all are isolated specimens of illocutionary acts. Stating and describing are, simply two illocutionary acts, devoid of the special significance with which philosophy has commonly endowed them. Except by an artificial abstraction which may be desirable for certain special purposes, 'truth' and 'falsify' are not names for relations or qualities; they refer to a dimension of assessment of the satisfactoriness of the words used in statements in relation to the facts to which they refer. From this it follows that the standard philosophical distinction between 'factual' and normative' must go the way of many other philosophical discussions.
The above analysis shows that although the notion of performative utterance, was propounded and patiently developed by Austin, finally it has been shown by him to be unsatisfactory.

Chisholm\textsuperscript{27} and Black\textsuperscript{28} hold that Austin bungled the job with performatives: that he 'despaired' of the notion too readily. Consequently they put forth an amended definition of performatives which intended to avoid the difficulties Austin encountered and which led him to abandon the doctrine altogether in favour of a more throughgoing analysis of the 'forces of utterances'.

Chisholm distinguishes between two senses of performatives:

1) Strict performatives and
2) Performatives in the extended sense. He gives the following definition of strict performatives:

"There are acts (e.g., requesting) which have the following characteristics: when the circumstances are right, then to perform the act it is enough to make a certain utterance (e.g., 'I request......') containing an expression which the speaker commonly uses to designate such an act...."
Let us say, of anyone who performs an act in this way, that his utterance is a performative utterance—in the strict sense of this term."

Chisholm says that there are utterances such as 'I want', 'I know' etc. which are not performative in the strict sense but can be performative in another, i.e., the extended sense of the term. He characterises it as follows:

"The utterance of an expression (e.g., 'I want m) is performative in an extended sense of the term, if it is made in order to accomplish that act in virtue of which the utterances of some other expression (e.g., 'I request....8) can be performative in the strict sense defined."

Thus 'I know', according to Chisholm's analysis, is performative only in the extended sense. For example, 'I know that he put the arsenic in the soup' is performative in the extended sense, for I could just as well have said, and accomplish the same act by saying, 'I guarantee that he puts the arsenic in the soup.'

Max Black also offers two distinct definitions of performatives. But his distinction is drawn along different lines. The two types of performatives are called by him
performative A' and 'performative B.' He says,

"An utterance is said to be performative A, when used in specified circumstances, if and only if it's being so used counts as a case of the speaker's doing something other than, or something more than, saying something true or false."

On the other hand, "an utterance of the form 'I X (such and such)' is said to be performative B, when used in specified circumstances, if and only if its being used counts as a case of the speaker's thereby X-ing."

Black holds that it is Austin's failure to distinguish these two senses in which an utterance can be performative that leads him into difficulties in the case of 'I state......', 'I maintain........,' and the like. For although to say 'I state that, such and such' is to state that such-and-such, it is not to do anything 'other than, saying something true or false.

F. W. Ferguson suggests that neither Chisholm's nor Black's amendment in any way avoids the difficulties Austin foresaw, and that both of these attempts to amend
Austin's analysis, are based upon a fundamental misunderstanding of his reasons for abandoning it. He thinks that the main reason why Austin gave up his notion of performatives seems to be that he could not find a satisfactory answer to his own question: "How can we be sure, how can we tell, whether any utterance is to be classed as performative or not?" That is to say, what criterion can be found which will enable us to distinguish all and only those utterances which are genuinely performative?

The most promising criterion—the grammatical criterion that any genuine performative either is or can be reduced to an explicit performative: an utterance in which the performative verb occurs in the first person singular present indicative active—breaks down because, in addition to such obvious performatives as 'I promise...', and 'I let you.....', that the straightforward assertive 'I state that.......', also neatly fills the bill. But the whole point in talking about performatives in the first place was to distinguish them as a class of utterance from straightforward assertive statement.
Ferguson criticizes Chisholm's opinion. First of all, Chisholm's class of strict performatives appears to be no more than what Austin meant by 'explicit' performative utterances which is open to the same main objection for which Austin despaired of performatives. Furthermore, Chisholm's definition of strict performatives excludes certain utterances which Austin considered to be paradigm examples of performative utterances. For example, 'I will' as uttered in a marriage ceremony is neither a strict performative utterance, nor a performative utterance in the extended sense as defined by Chisholm. The expression 'I will' does not contain a word commonly used by the speaker to designate the act of marrying. So it is not a strict performative utterance. Again, the utterance of the words 'I will' cannot be accomplished by means of some other expression, the uttering of which in the appropriate circumstances would be the performance of marrying in the strict sense of the term.

Ferguson says that unless 'I state that.....' and similar expressions can be effectively excluded from the class, the explanatory and classificatory power of the notion of performative utterances will be practically nil. But Austin realised and Ferguson agrees with him that
there seems to be no non-arbitrary way to exclude these expressions.

As regards Black's theory, Forguson states that Black's distinction avoids some of the problems that worried Chisholm with respect to expressions such as 'I state that......'. Black is inclined to think that some such notion as that of 'performative A' will serve the purposes of Austin and all the philosophers who have had high hopes of the notion, and that many, if not all the difficulties that Austin encountered, will be overcome by this choice. But Forguson, on the contrary, shows that none of the difficulties Austin encountered will be overcome by this choice. It is the function of every utterance, even those which are either true or false, to do something more than merely say that something is true or false. If this were not the case, there would be very little point in ever issuing any utterance. But the 'performative - constative' distinction, being a distinction between two separate classes of utterance, obscures this feature of utterances entirely. And it is above all the reason why Austin rejected the distinction and turned to a consideration of the forces of utterances.
Forguson argues that Black's notion of 'performatives' and Chisholm's 'strict', and 'extended' notions of performative utterances still draw a basic distinction between one class of utterances (performatives) and all other utterances. The important point that Austin saw but Chisholm and Black seem to have missed is that there really is no good reason to distinguish between performative and other sorts of utterances at all. What is really needed is a new dimension of classification altogether. Forguson thinks that it was precisely this discovery which led Austin to consider again 'from the group up' the many senses in which saying something can be doing something, the many different ways in which things are done with words.

Thus we see that in Austin's earlier theory, the emphasis is squarely on the performative use of knowing in the first person. By making the analogy between saying 'I know' and saying 'I promise' he perhaps overshoots the mark. For there are a great number of differences between the two as have been pointed out by the commentators and discussed above. But in the light of his later theory, to say 'I know' is no longer a performative utterance but has only a performative or illocutionary force and still
can be held to be true or false. So though the arguments raised by the critics against Austin's earlier theory are quite plausible, those criticisms are not tenable in respect of his later theory. Now there is no hard and fast distinction between performatives and other types of utterances. We can very well admit that the utterance 'I know that P' has a performative force, while, at the same time, it must be either true or false.

Austin in his later theory of performatives holds that there is no strict rules that performatives can only be used in the first person, present, indicative, active. It follows that though the phrase 'to know' has a performative force, it should not be restricted to its first person-use. In fact, when the phrase is used in the third person which takes the form 'X knows that P', we have to face more crucial problems. So our next task is to discuss the conditions of 'knowing that' in its third person-use and the problems raised therein.
NOTES

1. Austin contributes this paper to a symposium of the Aristotelian society held in 1946. It was published in Aristotelian Society Supplementary volume XX (1946) and also in Austin’s Philosophical Papers (1961). Here he takes up John Wisdom’s question of how we can ever know that another person is having a certain emotion, and discusses elaborately the different ways in which we use the word ‘know’.


3. Ibid, P.99

4. The characteristics of performative utterances can be explained as follows. Many verbs are used to describe or to report something. Verbs such as "to write", "to walk", "to eat", and "to look" can be, and almost always are, used to describe or to report that somebody is writing, walking, eating, or looking. Now if a person hurts another person unintentionally, he may say ‘I apologize’. In this
situation, the sentence 'I apologize' is not used to describe or to report that he is apologizing; instead, it is used not to describe the performance of an act but to perform an act. So it is a performative utterance.

Performative utterances are used in the first person present tense. The sentences 'I apologized' and 'He is swearing' are not performative utterances. In most contexts the use of the sentence 'I apologized' is to report that the person using the sentence apologized, and in most contexts, the use of the sentence 'he is swearing' is to report that the person talking about is swearing. As reports they are neither true nor false. But performative utterances are neither true nor false. The person who in the appropriate situation says 'I apologize' is not asserting anything; he is not, therefore, saying anything that could be either true or false. Although a performative utterance can be neither true nor false, it may be what Austin calls an infelicity or a misfire. It is surely not always the case that the use of performative sentences has the intended result, that is, results in the performance of an act. In order that a performative utterance should not be an infelicity or a misfire, the circumstances must be appropriate. But this does not mean
that it is possible to specify a set of necessary and sufficient conditions that must be fulfilled in order that the circumstances can be counted appropriate.


6. J. L. Austin; Philosophical papers, P.103.


10. A. C. Danto: Analytical Philosophy of knowledge, Chapter I.


15. Ibid, pp. 40 - 41

16. Ibid, p. 42

17. Ibid, p. 61


20. An Analysis of knowing, p. 15.


22. An Analysis of knowing, p. 45.


J. L. Austin: How to do things with words, p. 3


