The present work is a modest attempt to tackle certain problems concerning the nature of knowledge. The problem of knowledge is the very cornerstone of all philosophical researches. How we know and what we know are the eternal riddles to which philosophers of all ages have been seeking answers, but the area is still wide open for further enquiries. No theory hitherto formulated is unchallengeable, and there is endless scope for looking at the problems from new angles. The search for the true nature of knowledge is a fascinating yet endless task. Knowledge has myriad sources, facets and implications. It is a hydra-headed monster that defies all attempts at confining it within the narrow bounds of a single definition. As we carry on our investigation of knowledge, we pass through a strange twilight world. Much of it is wrapped in the dark, and yet there are some glimmering half-lights which promise to show a lot more than they have really shown so far. It is the shining darkness that allures the thinking man. A restatement and critical examination of the important theories is absolutely necessary and fresh viewpoints are likely to emerge in the process.

It will be convenient to sketch at the outset a plan of the entire work. It contains a study of some important problems of knowledge which the modern analytic philosophers have tried to solve. An analysis of their theories will, it is hoped, throw light on the issues dealt with. The omission of a great many
philosophers from the scope of my discussion was felt necessary for fear of unnecessary elaboration and a possible blurring of the perspective.

Before examining the analytic theories of knowledge in detail, I have sketched a still earlier background. The first chapter contains a discussion of the traditional conception of knowledge, its limitations, and its basic difference from the modern analytic philosophy based on the linguistic analysis method. Three specific problems of knowledge have been discussed in the subsequent chapters:

1. What is the distinction between 'knowing how' and 'knowing that'? Can the one form of knowing (i.e., knowing how or knowing that) be reduced to the other?

2. Is 'knowing that' in the first person performative in character? Has the new attempt of analysing knowledge produced a satisfactory theory?

3. Are there some necessary and sufficient conditions of knowing that something is the case? If so, what are these conditions and how far can they be proved to be adequate to account for knowledge?

Ryle is anxious to correct the intellectualists' bias to theoretical knowledge and to draw attention to the dispositional nature of knowledge and belief. He tends to suggest that knowing
that is a special, verbal form of knowing how, that it consists in having learned how to answer certain question and now being ready to answer them. D. G. Brown, John Hartland Swann, Robert R. Ammerman, Jane Roland, J. Watling, E. M. Adams, R. B. Scott, among others scrutinize Ryle's theory concerning this distinction and make useful comments on it. The second chapter contains an assessment of the whole problem.

Austin introduced the concept of performative utterances in his famous essay "Other Minds". In this essay Austin compares the use of the sentence 'I know' with the performative utterance 'I promise'. Knowing, it had been commonly presumed, is the name of a special mental state and to assert that 'I know that S is P', therefore, is to assert that I am in that mental state in relation to 'S is P'. This doctrine, Austin argues, rests on "the descriptive fallacy", the supposition that words are used only to describe. To claim to know, according to him, is not to describe my state but to take a plunge—to give others my word, my authority, for saying that S is P, just as to promise is to give others my word that I will do X. Later on, he examines his performative-constative distinction in his William James Lecture on "How to do things with words" and realizes that the distinction between performative and constative must be abandoned—except as a first approximation. However, Austin's analogy between 'I know' and 'I promise' has been criticized by many philosophers, for example, by Urmson, Harrison, Barnes, Maxwell Wright, E. Broyles, Wolfgang Carl and
Rolf P. Horstman, P. T. Geach, Jaakko Hintikka and others. The third chapter is a thorough analysis of this topic.

The traditional necessary and sufficient conditions are known today as the 'Justified True Belief' analysis of knowledge. These conditions are accepted by some recent philosophers, e.g. C. I. Lewis, A. J. Ayer and Roderick Chisholm in different forms. Now, the 'justified true belief' condition of knowledge has been questioned by Gettier in the article 'Is justified True Belief knowledge?' in 1963. He shows with the help of two counter-examples that a man may have justified true belief but yet not knowledge of a particular fact. The implication of Gettier's arguments is that a fourth condition must be added in order to attain the status of knowledge. So after the publication of Gettier's article, the problem of the necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge has turned into the problem of the fourth condition of knowledge. There are varieties of suggestions from a number of commentators regarding this fourth condition. Of them, causal and defeasibility analyses of knowledge are the most renowned theories. The causal theorists hold that if we can show a causal connection between one's being justified in believing that P and P's being the case, we can block the Gettier-type counter-examples. Goldman, Swain, Unger, Armstrong with others are the propounders of the causal theories of knowing.

The Defeasibility theorists, on the other hand, want to prove that to have knowledge one's justification must be
indefeasible. Keith Lehrer, Ernest Sosa, Thomas Paxson, Gilbert Harman, Peter Klein, Risto Hilpinen, Marshall Swain and many other philosophers attempt to construct 'defeasibility analyses' of knowledge. Now, while the Causal and Defeasibility theories have been led to question the necessity of the three conditions in the traditional analysis and thus suggest some additional condition, others have been led to question Gettier's examples themselves and thus defending the traditional analysis. The Gettier - Lehrer objection to the traditional conception of knowledge has been questioned by C. G. New, Fred I. Dretske, Brian Skyrms, Irving Thalberg, Joseph Margolis and Charles Pailthrop. They constitute a defense of justified true belief analysis of knowledge against such objections. The fourth chapter considers the traditional analysis of the necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge and the difficulty of this analysis as pointed out by Gettier. The fifth and sixth chapter cope with the problems of Causal and Defeasibility analyses respectively. The attempts to defend the traditional 'justified true belief' analysis have been proved to be futile by the propounders of Defeasibility theory.

But none of the above theories provide us with a satisfactory explanation of the concept of epistemic justification. The Foundational and Non-foundational theories contain interesting reflections on the nature of epistemic justification. According to the Foundationalists, 'all empirical propositions which are self-warranted for a person at a time ultimately derive their
warrant from a core class of empirical propositions which are self-warranted for the person at the time*. The Non-foundation- lists, on the other hand, hold that 'no empirical propositions are self-warranted for persons, or at least that not all empirical propositions which are warranted for a person at a time "ultimately derive" their warrant from a core class of empirical propositions which are self-warranted for a person at the time.' In chapter seven, I consider a variety of versions of Foundational and Non-foundational theories which represent the main lines of current research on epistemic justification.

The concluding chapter is an endeavour to find out how far these analytic techniques succeeded in clearing up amiguitics in concepts concerning the nature of knowledge. I make no pretensions to have made a comprehensive study of the subject. The area of my work is indeed vast and it is not an easy matter to maintain accuracy and balance in examining so many intricate issues. Yet I hope that, if my work is even moderately successful, it may trigger off fruitful controversies and thus pave the way for further philosophical researches.