Chapter IX
TOWARDS ESTABLISHING AN EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL ORDER

It has been truly said that the aim in living is not perfection as a final goal, but the ever-enduring process of perfecting, maturing and refining. In realising this aim, our trust must after all be in thought and not in instinct. Indeed it is difficult to see how instinct can at all adjust us to the increasingly artificial environment which industry has built around us and the maze of intricate problems in which we are enmeshed.

There has indeed been a strange disparity between the sciences of inert matter and those of life. Physical science has for the time being far outrun psychical. We have mastered the physical mechanism sufficiently to turn out possible goods; we have not gained a knowledge of the conditions through which possible values become actual in life. It seems that at times we are caught in a contradiction. With tremendous increase in our control of nature, in our ability to utilise nature for human use and satisfaction, we find the actual realisation of ends growing unassured and precarious.

It is in this field, in this application of human knowledge to our social antagonisms, that the work of
philosophy should lie. Indeed, philosophy is in flight to-day and is left alone like the forsaken mother with the vitals gone from her and almost all her cupboards empty. What is in urgent need to-day is that philosophy must be made to shake off her timidity and face the contemporary difficulties and social antagonisms so as to be able to clarify our ideas as to the social and moral strifes of our own day and become an organ for dealing with these conflicts as far as is humanly possible.

Although the world to-day is submerged in an inflation of words and meaningless symbols, the need for a constructive theory to interpret the meaning of need for a constructive theory events to the community and to the world at large can hardly be exaggerated. The hatred of theory is discredited if at the same time we see the admission of cranks with their pet theories. If a social system does not admit theory in its proper place, the latter is bound to slip in through the back door. Those who are reluctant to discuss the basic issues of our national and international life are mostly not doing so because it is too early for such discussion as they pretend, but because they are afraid of touching upon anything that calls for creative imagination and constructive thought.
We have now entered one of the most critical epochs in history where we shall have to re-define the fundamental postulates of our national and international life. The traditional habits of the past are breaking down before our eyes and with their breakdown there comes an inescapable challenge to the social foundation upon which they were anchored. It is hardly possible for contemporary mankind to meet this challenge by mystic rituals of semantics and statesmanship which are as relevant to the problem as are the incantations of preliterate sorcerers to the cause and cure of the disease.

From our survey we have seen that the notion of sovereignty is in the throes of a grave crisis and it requires a restatement and re-interpretation for our present generation in the light of the amazing developments and enormous changes effected in the very fabric of our social and economic life.

It may be a long and arduous task to make the revelation decisive. All institutions whose past has been a majestic one contain, even in their decline, the power to delay the coming of their successors. They are, by our habituation to them, a sort of prison made intimate, and even dear, by the associations of an age — long history.
Dwelling therein, to many of us, the prospect without seems vague and doubtful and hard. We weigh uneasily the price of escape from its confines; and the courage to attempt it is rare. But it is only as we make the effort that we can go forward with hope. For in no other fashion can we now add creative dignity to the human adventure.

No doubt even in the infancy of human society, before we could live together in a family or in a tribe, the need for the imposition of some restraint upon our natural impulses was keenly felt for community life. But human nature is such that man does not accept rules unless they are imposed upon him by constituted authority.

Hence in its earliest form, as we have seen the idea of authority appears as belief in a divinely ordained or divinely dictated body of rules as in the laws of Manu dictated to the sages by Manu's son in Manu's presence and by his direction or in Hammurabi's Code, handed him by the Sun-God. Here then we have the first sovereign authority - a supernatural symbol.

Later on during the long period of history, kings and emperors, to justify and maintain their authority had to
link themselves as closely as possible with religion and proclaimed that they derived their authority from God. Thus the monarch ruling by divine right came to be known as sovereigns.

Between the Renaissance and the eighteenth century, a great revolutionary idea was gradually taking shape and ultimately gave birth to the cognate ideals of national sovereignty and national independence, which became a great liberating force and served a strong incentive to democratic movements all over the world. Under the impact of this new ideal, people came to be regarded as the ultimate sovereign law-giving authority and it was thought that "sovereignty resides in the community." The ideal reached its apotheosis at the peace settlement of 1919 when more nations became sovereign and independent.

But this eighteenth century ideal of "national sovereignty" which could be fitted well in a world of self-sufficient and self-supporting units, when industrial revolution had not yet started its full course, was in flat contradiction to the spirit and temper of our times, to the deep and profound changes brought about by industrialism which seeks to embrace the whole globe within its orbit of activity.
Indeed the new economic force of Industrialism like the sister political force of industrialism and democracy — their implications in global terms democracy is intrinsically universal in its operation. Just as the essence of Democracy is a spirit of fraternity which embraces all mankind, similarly Industrialism as a co-operative system of work demanded the unification of all the habitable lands and navigable seas on the face of this planet as a common home for the entire humanity.

Industrialism, thus, since its inception, has been working to re-shape the economic structure of the world in two ways, both leading in the direction of world unity. It has been trying to make the local economic units fewer and bigger; and at the same time it has been trying to lower the barriers between them.

The truth seems to be that in both Democracy and Industrialism, the impetus towards universality is so strong that these forces can hardly be confined within the prison-house of the parochial institution of sovereign state which was originally established under quite different social conditions in order to meet different human needs.

That is why we are witnessing how Industrialism, caught in the trammels of state sovereignty, is struggling to save
itself from ruin by striving to achieve its global character instead of being perverted into economic nationalism.

In fact the twin forces of nationalism and industrialism are in constant conflict with each other; conflict between industrialism and nationalism while industrialism seeks to expand its market all over the globe, even beyond the national frontiers, nationalism has the tendency to segregate the human race into smaller and smaller groups.

So long as there were enough unexplored regions in the world for industrialism to develop, the two could pull together without severe strain.

Thus with the beginning of this century, the sovereign state served as an effective instrument for fostering the growth of industrially productive forces. But with the advent of the twentieth century, the crisis in the theory of nation-state became acute. Capitalist competition, developing by its inner logic, broke through and across national frontiers. Concentrated economic power within the nations developed into cartels, into international and world-wide monopolies. These bred greater conflicts among the different nations.
Thus with the beginning of our present epoch, this conflict between the forces of industrialism and nationalism has become acute and pronounced. In fact it is this collision between our political life and our economic and technological life that has been the principal cause of the crisis of our time with which we have been struggling as helpless guinea pigs.

This new world which the twin forces of Democracy and Industrialism have called into existence presents us with the inescapable choice between overhauling economic nationalism or allowing it to wreck our civilisation through the enhanced and misdirected "drives" which find their ugly manifestations in Political and Economic Nationalism.

Perhaps we are coming to this realisation late in the day, when Nationalism that has been generated by a perversion of Democracy and Industrialism, has already made great headway. The prospect of solving the problem by peaceful adjustment would have been more promising if the task with which we are grappling now could be taken in hand a century back.
In this new world, if the Sovereign State has any pretension to survive without any surrender of its traditional claim, it has to take the form of the survival of "Totalitarian State" which manifests itself in a Communist Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, a Fascist Italy and in a National Socialist Germany. A plurality of totalitarian States will ultimately give place to a single totalitarian State through the delivery of a "Knock-out-blow" as Dr. Toynbee has pointed out, in a totalitarian war of series of "totalitarian wars".

Thus with the growing interdependence among the various units of the world and the deadliness of our present weapons, it is perhaps an inescapable conclusion that the world is in any event going to be unified in two alternative ways of unification politically in the near future. But the really formidable political issue to-day is not whether the world is soon going to be unified politically but in which of two alternative possible ways this rapid unification is going to come about and what will be the pattern of the unified world-society.

The two alternative possible ways of such unification are suggested. One is by continual rounds of wars ending in the survival of only one great power which would succeed in
knocking out its last remaining competitor and would impose 'peace' on the world by conquest. The other is by finding a co-operative way out of the present-day troubles: The present political pioneering enterprises of substituting the humane device of constitutional government for the blind play of the physical force in the conduct of international relations give rise to this hope.

There is yet suggested a third possibility which however is not one of unification of the world but of continuous designed conflict. The suggestion is that the number of great powers will dwindle to three and these three powers will succeed in holding their respective people under permanent serfdom keeping them in continuous terror of war.

It may be pertinent here to point out that the character of modern war has changed and there are many who think that the present trend in warfare is entering upon the Orwellian phase as analysed and described by George Orwell. According to Orwell, war hysteria will in "Nineteen Eighty Four" be continuous: the prevailing moods, he declares, will be, "fear, hatred, adulation and orgiastic triumph."

"The splitting up of the world into three great super-states was an event which could be and indeed was foreseen before the
middle of the twentieth century. With the absorption of Europe by Russia and of the British Empire Orwellian analysis by the United States, two of the three existing powers, Eurasia and Oceania, were already effectively in being. The third, Eastasia, only emerged as a distinct unit after another decade of confused fighting. The frontiers between the three super-states are in some places arbitrary and in others they fluctuate according to the fortunes of war but in general they follow geographical lines. 4

"In one combination or another, these three super-states are permanently at war and have been so for the past twenty-five years. War, however, is no longer the desperate, annihilating struggle that it was in the early decades of the twentieth century. It is a warfare of limited aims between combatants who are unable to destroy one another, have no material cause for fighting and are not divided by any genuine ideological difference.

"In fact the distinction between war and peace in such a state of society is gradually fading away. Already it has become hard to say whether certain states are at peace or at war with each other. On the one hand their armed forces are not in conflict. On the other hand, they have adopted a war economy, all their resources are mobilised to
resist an attack and no secret is made by them of the identity of the enemy whose attack is feared — on the contrary this "enemy" is persistently reviled and traduced. Thus Prof. John J. Nef observes, "Before 1939 representatives of nations had begun to talk to each other during a period of nominal peace in words and in a tone which earlier Western Statesmen would hardly have rentured to use even in time of war."

All the characteristics of the social system outlined by Orwell are certainly foreshadowed by tendencies, some painfully obvious and some latent in modern society.

Orwell thinks that the form of society which he predicts became inevitable from the time when the invention of machinery and its adoption by industry in the late nineteenth century, followed by rapid scientific and technical progress in the twentieth century, made it apparent that "the need for human drudgery and therefore to a great extent for human inequality, had disappeared." Throughout history, he claims, the ruling classes have relied upon the unequal distribution of wealth to maintain their positions.

The Orwellian basic contention is contained in the following passage:

"The problem was how to keep the wheels of industry turning without increasing the real wealth of the world."
Goods must be produced, but they must not be distributed. And in practice the only way of achieving this was by continuous warfare.

We need not for our purpose consider whether Orwell's explanation must be accepted that the underlying purpose of the existing trend towards the establishment of a permanent war economy and a state of continuous cold or phony warfare is due to a conscious desire "to deprive the masses of the fruits of an ever-expanding technology". Whatever the explanation may be, there can be little dispute that this trend exists.

The real lesson to be drawn from all this is that if we wish to escape from either the tyranny, intimidation and austerity of a "Nineteen Eighty Four" regime we must repudiate the cold-war strategum and imposture of "perpetual war for perpetual peace" and return to a truly pacific internationalism.

It can be hardly denied that the two world wars and their aftermath have inspired in the great mass of mankind a revulsion against war far greater than existed ever before. The "fresh terrors and undreamed of fears" engendered by the annihilating mechanisms of modern war have brought about
a situation in which even the most unreflecting can no longer contemplate the coming of war without dismay. It is now increasingly felt that war between major Powers threatens human existence itself. We are on the threshold of an era in which the mad race for armaments and successive inventions of diabolical engines of destruction may make the continuance of life on earth an impossibility. In the altered perspective of to-day what is demanded now is a new orientation of man towards the conception of state sovereignty, a conception which has proved to be tragically incongruous with the changed conditions of human life.

We have seen that the society that has given us the kind of history we have been surviving for the past forty years is a mortally sick society. It is a society in convulsion, caught in a whirl-pool of cause and circumstance that leads us to an end which nobody wants. It seems we are living in an age when every "reasonable" approach halts before a stone-wall of unreasonable fact. We are living as if were in a mad house where delusions govern amid hopeless and needless sufferings, where myopia and fear obscure the most elementary demands of our true self-interest.

This dementia of our time is largely the result of a gross contradiction between our existing socio-political institutions and the productive capacities and
potentialities offered by our technical civilisation, of a lack of correlation between progress in technique and progress in civilisation.

The problem has acquired new and terrifying urgency because of our growing realisation that our civilisation is undone if we cannot overcome the crisis in the theory of nation anarchy in which the sovereign states live. The crisis in the theory of national sovereignty of state is nothing but an expression of the new need to enlarge the new economic units of the world. In fact, the triumphant voyages of Vasco de Gama and Columbus seem to be carrying us now into seas than run so high that Leviathan himself can scarcely breast the waves. In the new and altered conditions of our time, the world itself has become the minimum unit of necessary change.

Standing at the cross-road of world history, it is perhaps incumbent upon us to realise that the economic interdependence of the world places us under the obligation, and gives us the possibility, of enlarging the human community so that the principle of order and justice will govern the international as well as the national community.
The new and compelling task of our present generation is to build up an effective international order which will bring the present chaos and anarchy in international relations to an end. We are driven to this task by the lash of fear as well as by the incitement of hope.

It is perhaps profitable for us to realise that if these titanic energies released by the newer forces are caught in the toils of State Sovereignty, they will eventually burst their bonds by destroying the institution that is cramping them. We must consider taking active and timely steps to adjust the old institution to the working of the new forces in such a way as to give these a peaceful entry into the world-wide field of operation which they demand.

Viewed in this sense, sovereignty is nothing else than the quality of being a subject of the law of nations. A state is not a subject of the law of nations because it is sovereign, but it is sovereign because it is a subject of the law of nations. Hence the concept of state sovereignty is to be developed, not out of natural law speculation independent of the law of nations, but precisely out of the law of nations. Thus we shall have to modify the theory and practice of state sovereignty to whatever extent it
may be necessary in order to build the sovereign states into some kind of world order.

If we fail to achieve this in the near future by the method of pacific adjustment, it is likely to be achieved by the alternative method of 'the knock-out blow' in which a war - or a series of wars - of attrition will end in the decisive and definitive victory of one single Power through the annihilation of all the rest. The best analogy for our present world situation is to be found in Greece. The Greek city states never achieved the imperial unity of the oriental empires. The threat of Persia did finally prompt the organisation of the Delian League; but the rivalry of Sparta and Athens for the hegemony in the League resulted in its disintegration.

The unity of Greece was finally achieved under Philip and Alexander of Macedon.

The analogy in present global terms would be the final unification of the world through the preponderant power of either America or Russia, whichever proved herself victorious in a final global struggle. The destiny of mankind depends upon which of these two alternatives we in our generation choose.
Thus the problem before us is not simply one of "controlling" atom bombs or other weapons of war, but of rooting out the causes of war. It is not a matter of smoothing out the jagged edges of self-expanding spheres of influence but of abolishing spheres altogether. It is not a matter of adjusting boundaries or economic barriers but of levelling them. It is in short a matter of the whole context of society. It is a matter of transforming the world and the way we all live in it.

No doubt the best that we could produce out of the cataclysm of the war was the United Nations Organisation. If the United Nations Charter were a crude expedient today to be scrapped and the effort to be made to bring about a general international agreement upon a world government, humanity would secure neither world government nor anything other than chaos. Yet doubts are not infrequently felt as to whether the United Nations, like the League of Nations before it, is really based upon the acknowledgement that the world must function on a unified basis or not at all. It is a crude expedient resting primarily on the old ideas and premises. It is often considered as "at best a mild check on rapacity, at worst a thin cloak for it. It is a mirror
of our world, not an instrument for changing it."

We are told that each time a veto is used, it means a failure: but it is not the U.N. machinery that is at fault nor perhaps can we do away with the trouble simply by abolishing the veto. The clanging of a fire bell also indicates failure somewhere down the line; but abolishing the alarm would not put an end to carelessness or arson. The veto is such an alarm bell; when its harsh tones jar us, we should do well to find out where the fire is and how it was caused.

Ideally, no doubt, the introduction of any new dynamic forces or creative movements into the life of a society ought to be accomplished by a reconstruction of the whole existing set of institutions if a healthy social harmony is to be preserved.

At the time we cannot be blind to the realities that sheer "vis inertiae" tends at all times to keep most parts of the social structure as they are, in spite of their frequent incongruity with the new social forces that are constantly being brought into action by the creative energies of the growing society as its growth proceeds.

In such cases, these new forces may perform creative work by finding vent either in new institutions which they
have established for themselves or in old institutions which they have successfully adapted to serve their purpose.

The truth is that the main source of disharmony has been the result of the introduction into the life of our society of new social forces which the existing set of institutions was not designed to carry.

The destructive effect of this incongruous juxtaposition of "things new and old" has been pointed out in one of the most famous of the sayings that are attributed to Jesus:

"No man putteth a piece of new cloth unto an old garment, for that which is put in to fill it up taketh from the garment, and the rent is made worse. Neither do men put new wine into old bottles - else the bottles break and the wine runneth out and the bottles perish; but they put new wine into new bottles, and both are preserved."

We need not examine for our present purpose the eternal philosophic question which has accompanied speculation since the days of the Greeks namely, which is older, the fact or the idea. "In the beginning was the Deed" (Am Anfang war die that), we are informed by the poet Goethe. "In the beginning was the Word", we are told by the theologian.
However closely a new fact of high significance may be related to a pre-existing cluster of ideas, it nevertheless runs like a sword into the old web of ideas. At first it must be considered in terms of those ideas, their logical form and phraseology. It may excite wonder and surprise, produce ejaculations of amazement and incredulity, but when its implications are considered, the nature and purpose of control over it (if any) must be geared up to the inherited stock of opinions, morals, creeds, laws and sayings. Gradually the new fact is worked into the old body of thought, effecting changes in it, making some of it obsolete, giving novel direction to the remainder, and suggesting idea patterns which at least have the appearance of novelty. This operation of readjusting facts and ideas requires time; hence there is always a lag between the appearance of an important fact and the formulation of systematic thought about it.

Thus in the altered conditions of the world of do-day, the conception of sovereignty, if it has any chance to survive, must have to accommodate itself to this new perspective. In the eighteenth century, the nation-state was regarded as the broadest imaginable basis of sovereignty, to-day it is far too a narrow one. As industrialism expands, the entire universe becomes a unit and hence requires an
ever-broader basis for sovereignty to fulfill its purpose.

Thus although we sneer at the suggestion of a worldwide legal order as an Utopia, we hardly realize that the present nation-state, by the logic of its own existence, has become a super-state. The absolutely unregulated sovereign nation-states can function successfully so long as they live in a condition of complete isolation. But when they come in contact with each other, their interests conflict and clash with one another. This strengthens the centralised power of the sovereign state to make �aloch-like demands upon individual liberty. "It is this nation-state which to-day is making serfs of its citizens. It is this state which, to protect its particular vested interests, takes away the earnings of the people and wastes them on munitions in the constant fear of being attacked and destroyed by some other nation-state. It is this state which, by forcing passports and Visas upon us, does not allow us to move freely. It is this state, wherever it exists, which by keeping prices high through artificial regulations and tariffs, believing that every state must be economically self-supporting, does not permit its citizens to enjoy the fruits of modern science and technology."
As the world is organised to-day, the original democratic conception of sovereignty hardly exists. Sovereignty does not to-day reside in the people, but is exercised in an absolute form by groups of individuals we call nations.

We forget that the conception of sovereignty is not an end, but a means to an end. It is a convenient means necessary to create law and order in the relations of men. Sovereignty finds expression in institutions, but in itself is not and can never be identified with the institution itself.

To identify sovereign institutions with sovereignty itself, to assume that sovereign rights identified with sovereign institutions must eternally reside in any specific institution (viz. the nation-state) is like identifying the graven images of God with God Himself in the Christian religion. This is a novel form of idolatry which finds its expression in the intellectually and morally purblind worship of the part instead of the whole, of the creature instead of the creator, of Time instead of the creator, of Time instead of eternity and this abuse of our faculties and misdirection of our potent energies have a disastrous and fatal effect upon the very object we seek to idolize.
To avoid the existing anarchy in international relations we shall have to re-instate the people, the ultimate repository of sovereign power. Democratic sovereignty of the people can be correctly expressed and effectively instituted only if there is a separation of sovereign power, only if local affairs are handled by local government, national affairs by national government and world affairs, by world Government.

The more far-reaching and manifold the activities of Government, the more necessary does it become to decentralise. The more far-reaching and manifold the activities of Government, the more necessary does it become to decentralise.

decentralisation — its utility control in the interests of efficient administration. It is in this interplay between centralisation and devolution, in this recognition that some human affairs require to be handled by larger, and others by smaller, groups than at present that we must seek a solution to the baffling problem of our national and international life.

The rational solution of the problem of international organisation will be possible if we realise that the problem of sovereignty cannot be solved simply by the immediate total disappearance of the international personality of states. What we require is the gradual limitation of rights of sovereignty within an association
of states based on the continued recognition of the distinct international personality of States without going to the length of claiming that they represent an enduring and indispensable form of political organisation. There is no contradiction between the notion of sovereignty conceived as independence in relation to other States of the international society and the gradual approximation to the much-coveted Federation of the world.

The recent Asian-African Conference at Bandung enunciated certain principles which were regarded as essential for the promotion of international peace and security.

These are:

1. Respect for fundamental human rights and for the purposes and principles of the Charter of the U.N.

2. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations.

3. Recognition of the equality of all races and of equality of all nations large and small.

4. Abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country.

5. Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively in conformity with the Charter of the U.N.
6. (a) Abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve the particular interests of any of the Big Powers.

6. (b) Abstention by any country from exerting pressure on other countries.

7. Refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country.

8. Settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement as well as other peaceful means of the parties' own choice in conformity with the Charter of the U.N.

9. Promotion of mutual interests and co-operation.

10. Respect for justice and international obligations.

It should be borne in mind that the Conference was called not from any sense of exclusiveness or rivalry with other groups of nations and other civilizations and cultures, but in an atmosphere of confidence and goodwill towards each other.
nations, born out of a genuine desire to practise tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours. Emphasis was laid more upon the equality of all nations and their territorial integrity than upon any dogmatic assertion of absolute sovereignty of states. The Conference expressed in no ambiguous term that freedom and peace are interdependent. All nations should have the right to choose their own political and economic systems and their own way of life in conformity with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter.

Prof. Northrop, while discussing philosophical foundations for world sovereignty, points out that a world government or a federal government is as much a self-government as is a village government or a government of an individual by himself alone, since the factors which are the same in all men are as much a part of the self as are the factors which distinguish that self from other persons or things. According to him, the philosophy of the state needed to solve the national and international problems of our time must provide for both local and world sovereignties if the full freedom and integrity of the individual is to be a source of any creative advance in civilisation.

Such an approach does not necessarily require the abolition of nations or national boundaries. We are told
that this would imply surrender of sovereignty. Such a conception is illusory and misleading. A democratic state is not an absolutely sovereign state, but is sovereign only to the extent to which sovereignty is delegated to it by the people, the real source of such sovereignty. In fact there can be surrender of the sovereignty of the people only if the sovereign power to create law has been surrendered to any arbitrary or lawless power.

To transfer certain aspects of our sovereign rights for the regulation of human relationships in the international field is not in reality the "surrender" but the acquisition of the sovereignty of the people in a domain hitherto unregulated by law. "It is an exchange of a phantom asset, the product of unfulfilled and unfulfillable promises, for a real and tangible asset."

But whatever may be the way, the obstacles to the establishment of an effective international order cannot be exaggerated.

We need not, for our present purpose, discuss the views entertained by some sociologists that when higher cultural and political development has put an end to the
perennial threat of war, a period of political devolution will follow which will allow governmental units to assume a size that harmonizes best with geographical regions or unified districts of habitation and with administrative convenience and an alert public interest in political affairs.

The truth is that we do not yet have a world community - only a halting and hesitant beginning towards one. The tragic fact still remains that even after the several demonstrations of the atomic bomb, the statesmen of the great nations appear often not to realise the necessities imposed upon them by the growth of a world civilization. So long the world community does not possess this potent elements of "togetherness" which is the characteristic feature of national communities, the principle of national sovereignty remains the legal symbol for social realities, the legal expression of the fact that national communities regard themselves as legally and politically autonomous.

Arguments for world government rest upon the simple pre-supposition that the desirability of world order proves the attainability of world government.

Such arguments are based upon the assumption that nations need merely follow the alleged example of the individuals of another age who are supposed to have achieved
community by codifying their agreements into law and by providing an agency of some kind for law enforcement. Such theorists talk of calling a world constitutional convention which would set up the machinery of a global constitutional order and would then call-upon the nations to abrogate or abridge their sovereignty in order that this newly created universal sovereignty could have unchallenged sway. It may however be pointed out that no such explicit abnegation has ever taken place in the history of the world. Indeed the notion that world government is a fairly simple possibility is the final and most absurd form of the "social contract" conception of government which has confused modern political thought since Hobbes. No group of individuals has ever created either government or community out of whole cloth.

Indeed most advocates of world government ignore the historic fact that the mutual respect for each other's rights in particular communities is older than any code of law and that the machinery for the enforcement of law can be efficacious only when a community as a whole obeys its laws implicitly, so that coercive enforcement may be limited to a recalcitrant minority.

The fallacy of world government can be stated broadly in two propositions; firstly that governments are not created by fiat, secondly governments have only limited efficacy in
integrating a community. In fact a more cohesive world community than now exists must precede the establishment of world government.

The fact cannot be ignored that there are countries who are unwilling to submit their sovereignty to a more highly integrated constitutional order. Perhaps we cannot meet the problem by simply framing a constitution for a super-national authority, so long as there is possible reluctance of nations to take this step. We should not forget that constitutions cannot insure the mutual trust upon which a community rests. A constitution is not workable if there is not enough common ground between majority and minority to assure that a majority will not take advantage of a minority or that the minority will not suspect the majority of injustice even though without cause.

The ambiguities in the Charter of the United Nations which so outrage the advocates of world government are in fact the consequence of seeking to guarantee two, rather than one objectives. The one objective is to preserve the unity of one world, even though it be seriously divided and to provide a bridge of a sort between the segments of a divided world. The other is to preserve the integrity of our "way of life" against a tyrannical system which we abhor. Each of us hopes ultimately to create a world order upon the
basis of our conception of justice." Neither of us is ready, at the moment, to submit our fate to a world authority without reservation, so long as the possibility remains that such an authority could annul a system of law and justice to which we are deeply committed.

In fact the fallacy in world government theories is to be found in their conception of the relation of government to community. Governments cannot create communities for the simple reason that the authority of government is not primarily the authority of law nor the authority of force, but the authority of the community itself. Hence the community cannot be coerced into a basic order unless it exists in fact; the basic order must come from its innate cohesion.

Thus we shall have to face the delicate task of creatively stabilizing an inchoate community of nations in a civilisation which can achieve stability in global terms.

Prof. Quincy Wright, of the Chicago University, has in his recently published volume, dealt with the "general problem of stability and progress in international relations." The learned Professor points out that although from the material point of view, i.e. in terms of economic interdependence, of effective and abundant communication and of
vulnerability of each people to influences military, economic and propagandist from the most remote quarters, it may indeed be said that one world exists, but from the point of view of symbolic loyalties and institutional effectiveness, it is far from true that we have one world. Hence, international peace and security require a centralisation of institutions of information, education, regulation and control at a rate proportional to the development of economic and cultural interdependence among nations and of vulnerability of each to destructive attack by others.

Those who think that an imposed world government supported by some kind of international police will be able to maintain an adequate world organisation are under a misconception as to the essence of law and force in particular and of social organisation in general. Indeed the proposition that simply by the imposition of such a legal order, the present anarchy in our international life can be brought to an end perhaps takes a limited view of the problem. Such theorists forget that the harmony of communities is not simply attained by the authority of law. Nomos does not coerce the vitalities of life into order. We must look beyond legal enactments to the whole structure and organisation of the community. The social harmony of our international life can be
achieved by an interaction between the normative conceptions of morality and law and the existing and developing forces and vitalities of the international community.

It is perhaps a common and most grievous error in modern interpretations of our social life as the too simple conception of historical progress. We should rather conceive of our social life dynamically.

dynamic character of social life

Indeed our understanding of the indeterminate possibilities of our individual and collective existence may give us an insight into the reformulation of the problem of our life in the international community. If we too naively hope for an ever-increasing dominance of "form" and "order" over all historical vitalities and refuse to acknowledge that our social life cannot move forward toward increasing cosmos without developing possibilities of chaos by the very potencies which have enhanced cosmos, we may be wrong in conceiving the dynamic aspects of our collective life too simply.

It will be profitable for us if we do not forget that the international community which we have in our mind cannot be a simple construction of conscience or reason. No doubt the legal order reflects the conscience of the community seeking to subdue the potential anarchy of forces and
international interests into a tolerable harmony. On the other hand it is also an explicit formulation of given tensions and equilibria of life and power, as worked out by the unconscious interactions of social life. In fact all communities are more or less stable or precarious harmonies of human vital capacities. The two elements of communal life – the central organising principle and power and the equilibrium of power are essential perennial aspects of community organisation. No moral or social advance can perhaps redeem society from its dependence upon these two principles.

We are told that perhaps it is too early to ask all men to think "universally", to consider themselves as elements of humanity as a whole. No doubt many need for world - consciousness attempts have been made to arouse "world-consciousness". But to materialise the idea into a constructive effort, we are told that it must correspond to the present psychological resources of the people. This universal psychology depends in a great measure on the environment and on the degree of advancement in every realm.

If the caveman had been asked to think "nationally" he would not have understood. His ancestors thought in terms
of family. To-day we live in a big park which grows smaller every day. Time is no longer respected, neither are the works it has helped to create, because it has been beaten in the race. Man will at last be able to think universally. He has gained centuries by eliminating space and time which separated him from his fellow-beings and erected isolating barriers all around him. His horizon has become closer, his vision has been enlarged.

Doubts are frequently expressed as to whether international society can ever develop into one or whether the state must remain the largest community. Such questions often miss the point that there is nothing final about the present pattern of nation-states. All of these represent amalgamations of smaller communities that were once more independent than they are to-day. This evolution of the state indicates that the size of communities is variable and that there are no inherent limits to further expansion.

We must not forget that the expansibility of communities does not automatically bring about their expansion whenever that becomes desirable, as in the world to-day. On the other hand their enlargement to adequate dimensions,
being a psychological process, may be often slow and painful because human beings are more ready to adjust to technical innovations than they are to change their attitudes.

Moreover, sociologists point out that the vital factor in a small community is that every human being is a member of one small enough for him to experience personally and practically the various facets and the reality of community. But the larger community is mostly an abstract one, existing essentially in the minds of men. Hence community is not constituted by like interests but by "like interests" become common through recognition and establishment. In fact the two basic prerequisites of successful world organisation are, on the objective side, a sufficient intensity and permanence of contact between nations and on the subjective, a co-operative attitude among the members of the organisation. What is required, therefore, is a conviction among the peoples of the world that those interests served by war or by the state could better be served by a world organisation constructed to preserve peace.

But although extreme nationalism has been the chief obstacle to the further advance of internationalism, we cannot minimize or ignore the services it has rendered in past. We have seen
how the spirit of nationalism has been a potent influence in the break-up of feudalism and in the making of modern territorial states and thus has helped to broaden the community basis of the state.

We have also seen that the epoch of the modern nation-state as an instrument of national economy came into being after a long period of wars and dislocations. For nearly three hundred years it served as a more or less reasonably sufficient instrument for fostering the growth of industrially productive process. It created a power-economy that transformed the face of the earth and yoked all of more backward Asia and Africa to the West.

But the wave of nationalism in Asia and Africa has now demanded a drastic revision of the political map instead of being content to leave the map as it stands within an existing political framework.

It has served to arouse people to rid themselves of foreign oppressors. It has used their sentiments and emotions by concentrating these upon the uniqueness of their group, for the purpose of singling this group out against all others, especially the oppressing one. Partly for this entirely acceptable reason it is frequently approved even by those
who are interested in an effective world organization.

In fact, nationalism, as it penetrated the East, had been accompanied by the same changes that Europe had experienced in modern times. All the nationalism in the East romanticism, cultural and sentimental, that had attended European nationalist movements, blossomed forth in the East as well. Ancient economic systems are falling into decay, modern industrialism, wholesale trade, and finance capital are beginning to penetrate everywhere. The old ruling caste of landed nobility, warriors, and priests is being slowly ousted by a rising class of merchants, lawyers, and men of letters.

But the evolution of the East is subject to a peculiar influence in that the first symptoms of the new epoch dawning upon the European fellowship are making an impression upon the East as well. Thus the demand for national liberation is accompanied by demands for social liberation. The two demands are constantly interwoven and intermingled and each movement seeks to make use of the other as an ally in its struggle.

In fact Asia is in revolution and its ferment of ideas and aspirations for a better and fuller life is one of the immense facts that dominate the mid-twentieth century. Its
people are hungry, poor, sensitive and proud. Nationalism is rampant. 18

"Every major conflict in Asia to-day is either a struggle for independence or a struggle to improve conditions of life which have become outmoded and intolerable." These words of Mr. Carlos Romulo, President of the General Assembly of the U.N. at its fourth session, are a true revelation of the forces shaping the events of Asia in our present times.

Thus these recent developments have confronted statesmen with a choice between two alternatives. They may either make a voluntary adjustment of the political map to satisfy the nationalist urges or they may bend all their efforts to defy the seething waves of nationalism that are beating upon their frontiers from outside or from within. In the latter event, if old institutions obstruct the action of new social forces, the new-Nationalism might take a revolutionary way by shattering the recalcitrant state.

The greatest problem of modern statesmanship is how to conserve the values of the state, alike the devotions which it inspires and the services which it renders while nevertheless finding a way to safeguard that international order without which our whole civilisation is imperilled.
The damaging effects of nationalism upon international relations and even upon the nation it damaging effects of nationalism glorifies have been demonstrated abundantly in these recent years. Nations think and feel in terms of national loyalties; they pride themselves on the uniqueness of their own institutions and achievements and not at all on those of the world at large. It is still the tribal instinct, though immensely expanded, which makes nations aware first of all of the differences between their own group and outsiders rather than to have regard to what they have in common with others. Accordingly, they react to these emotional valuations by erecting national and spiritual frontiers which are expected, consciously or unconsciously, to enhance the feeling of "togetherness" and security. But these narrow loyalties, restricted to a rigidly circumscribed area, have a disintegrating effect as regards world unity, however valuable they may be in their own sphere. In fact it has been a lesson from the political history of our recent times that nationalism as a political force never stops when the original goal of political freedom is reached. Instead it continues to drive people apart and contributes greatly to international friction. Its incompatibility with a world community is evident from its techniques, which basically consist in
overstressing national differences, real or apparent, then
in elevating the nation above all others on the grounds of
these differences, and finally in stimulating exclusive and
indiscriminate devotion to the nation, at the expense of
any other national or international consideration.

Thus nationalism becomes dangerous when it denies the
common interest that binds nation to nation, thereby defeating
the true national interest itself. It then degenerates into
'chauvinism' which is intolerant and boastful or 'imperialism'
which seeks economic or political domination over others.
Nationality renders a distinct service so long as it serves
as a basis for the pursuit of common interests, and serves
as a necessary condition for the growth of internationalism.
But when it insists on the line of demarcation cutting off
the interests of one nation from those of another, it
becomes an evil whose course "will be marked by material and
moral ruin, in order that a new invention may prevail over....
the interests of mankind." 19

But the architects of a world organisation should not
forget that simply by the "abolition
basic problem
of the
necessity of coercive power
of national sovereignty" the problem
can be satisfactorily solved.

Sovereignty is not a fact, nor is it
really any actual power of the state; it is a convenient
legal theory concerning the authority of the state in the
field of law. Even if the legal concept of sovereignty could
be parted with, the basic problem of the necessity of coercive
power in social organisation cannot be easily dispensed with.

Perhaps it may be a peurile oversimplification if we
think that all our social conflicts can be resolved in a
purely rational and moral way. A sensitive conscience may
be revolted by the tragic and brutal realities of man’s
social life and decide to disavow all power. It may be well to
explore all methods of achieving justice and maintaining
peace, short of violent conflict. But non-violent resistance
as a moral or political absolute is perhaps a source of
moral and political confusion.

The perennial importance of power in social organization
is based upon two characteristics of human nature. The one is the unity
of vitality and reason, and the other
is perhaps the tendency to regard
ourselves as more important than any one else and to view
a common problem from the standpoint of our own interest.
Legal authority may be more sufficing; but there is no legal
authority which does not imply sanctions or the threat of
coercive action against the recalcitrant. Hence social
restraints upon these anti-social purposes must be equally armed with all available resources.

No doubt, disputes may be composed and conflicts arbitrated without recourse to all such resources. Conscience may appeal to conscience and reason to reason. Most of our conflicts are composed without an overt appeal to force or without the actual use of force. History reveals adjustments of interest without the interposition of superior coercive force to be possible within wide limits.

Yet the importance of the threat of force as a potent instrument in all communal relations can hardly be exaggerated. It may not be frequently used in a stable and well-ordered community, but if the government explicitly disavows any resource at its disposal, it would upset whatever equilibrium of social forces existed at that moment.

This dynamic interpretation of our social process presents men of every age and more particularly the age of technics with the problem of relating their lives to a larger number of their fellowmen. The task of creating community and avoiding anarchy is constantly pitched on broader and broader levels.

In such a process, the various interests of man's communal life, are able, in their variety of types of power unity and interrelation, to create an
endless variety of types and combinations of power, from that of pure reason to that of pure physical force. But pure physical force is always a last resort in communal relations. It is determinative in these relations only on primitive levels. All civilized relations are governed more by spiritual, than by physical, facets of power.

No doubt the forms of power which are developed in our social life display an even wider variety of types. On the whole, social power rests upon differentiations of social function. In a sense all historic forms of social organisations are determined to a great extent by the given equilibrium or disproportion within each type of power and by the balance of various types of power in a given community.

But political power, it should be noted, deserves to be placed in a special category, because it rests upon the ability to use and manipulate other forms of social power for the particular purpose of organising and dominating the community.

Human society indeed requires a conscious control and manipulation of the various equilibria which exist in it. There must be an organising centre within a given field of
social vitalities. This centre must arbitrate conflicts from a more impartial perspective; it must manage and manipulate the processes of mutual support so that the tensions inherent in them will not erupt into conflict; it must coerce submission to the social process by superior power whenever the instruments of arbitrating and composing conflict do not suffice, and finally it must seek to redress the disproportions of power by conscious shifts of the balances whenever they make for injustice.

Perhaps it is incorrect to present law and power politics as irreconcilable alternatives. Political power is always present, whether within law and power politics - whether irreconcilable or lacking a system of law and government. It is, like fire, an energy which can be dangerous or can be helpful. It must be brought under control and this is done through the establishment of law and governmental institutions.

Thus it would be an over-simplification of the problem if we assume that as soon as political preponderant military power - how far a solution units lose their sovereignty, wars would automatically be brought to an end, as a mechanical consequence of their being merged
Nor can the problem be avoided by introducing legislation prohibiting war, and placing the "collective might of the world community" or "preponderant military power" behind its enforcement.

Prof Briggs of Cornell University thinks that such "collective might" or "preponderant military power" must have a geographical location and this collective might appears, to him, on examination to be Russian or American or other national groups. According to the learned Professor, so long as men hold deeply entrenched views on nationalism, politics and economics, the so-called automatic application of the collective might of the world community turns out to be a matter of power-politics.

Whatever justification the apprehensions of Prof. Briggs might have from the patterns of political behaviour of the sovereign state, it must be admitted that, we can not envisage any such international order if we deny the perennial problems of the political order. Impatient idealists think that world government is possible without an implied hegemony of the stronger powers. But this hegemony in some form will always be there and so there is the peril of a new imperialism which is inherent in it. The peril can best be overcome by arming all nations great and small with constitutional power.
to resist the exactions of the dominant power. Thus we shall have to face all the old problems of political organisation on the new level of a potential international community.

The sanity of a mature individual incorporates psychic complexities and tensions into a tolerable unity, richer and finer than the simple unity of childhood. But it is also subject to aberrations from which children are immune. The political cohesion of a national community has a breadth and extent beyond that of a primitive tribe. But it embodies social complexities of which tribal unity is innocent. Thus every political order is filled with tensions which may become overt conflicts if not carefully managed. The community is like a political artifact. It lacks the security of nature and are exposed to the perils of human errors and the aberrations of human freedom. Hence no conceivable historical growth can perhaps make a possible world government as stable and secure as the order of a national community must as no national community is as immune from disorder as the family or the tribe.

No doubt the extension of all forms of knowledge, the contradictions of social life elaboration of mechanical and social techniques, the corresponding
development of human powers and historical potencies and the consequent increase of the extent and complexity of the human community have indubitably proved that life is subject to growth in its collective and total, as well as in its individual, forms. We have or ought to have, learnt, yet perhaps particularly from the tragedies of our contemporary experience, that although each new development of life, whether in individual or social terms, presents us with new possibilities of realising the good in our social life, we also face new hazards on each new level and that the new level of historic achievement offers us no emancipation from contradictions and ambiguities to which all our social life is subject.

Apart from all this we cannot ignore the fact that the opening up of the new and deeper gulf between different legal systems according to the political principles underlying them has been responsible for new developments in international life since the First World War. No doubt during this period the world witnessed increased international collaborations centering around the work of the League of Nations, the International Labour Office, the Permanent Court of International Justice and the like. Numerous bilateral and multilateral treaties purporting to secure such collaboration came into being during this period. These resulted in
vastly increased legal contacts between different groups of legal systems. But the basis of this international collaboration became very much shaken when the political and social revolution of Russia produced a radical change in the many fundamental principles of social life hitherto obtaining in the national societies. Since then the problem of co-ordination of different social systems in one international order has been a fundamental problem of the present day international life.

It has been a problem whether international law should be regarded as essentially bound to certain general principles of internal order which are characteristic of the majority of states, or whether it should be interpreted as 'system neutral' so that there may be a place within its framework for any social structure known at the present time.²¹

International planning however need not concern itself with the alleged superiority of either system. Then again "It is surely impossible, whatever may be our views as to the relative merits of socialist and individualist doctrines, to assert that modern civilization requires all states to accept so undeservedly the theories of one side or the other in the great economic dispute"²² and "it would surely be rash to erect any one set of those views into an international
law which is to limit the national freedom of the members of the international society." This broad minded approach of Sir Fisher Williams, if generally followed by either side, would go a great way towards establishing an international peace-order.

Prior to the First World War international law was not so much concerned with questions of Municipal Law. It was essentially a system of inter-state relations, and its rules confined to legal forms of a kind which are possible between states regardless of their internal social and legal structure. Recent developments have, however, revealed a much greater connection between internal and international law, for a twofold reason: In the first place, international law was based partly expressly, partly tacitly, upon a community of fundamental legal values, the disappearance of which has made the continuous functioning of international law largely impossible. In the second place, the steady increase of state control over formerly private matters produced a corresponding growth of public at the expense of private law, and thus a parallel problem in the international sphere.

The most disappointing feature of the post-war world is the failure of the United Nations Organization to promote cooperation among its members in solving urgent international problems. Still more deplorable is the absence
of a will to cooperation among the members to resolve outstanding international problems. This failure is certainly ascribable to a great extent to a want of agreement on some basic concepts which are essential for the normal functioning of the organization.

The basic concepts which are not only essential for the understanding and observance of the purposes and principles of the organization, but also of importance in determining mutual relations among the member states themselves are those of state, law and sovereignty, of which we had occasions to observe earlier. Unfortunately there has been fundamental disagreement on each one of these concepts among the members of the Organization.

Philosophers have suggested "the way of harmoniously uniting Soviet Russia and the traditional democracies", so that the one supplements and reinforces, rather than fights and destroys the other. No doubt before this can happen both sides must be prepared to drop certain unjustified portion of their respective philosophies and behaviours. Philosophers have suggested the way; but the politicians and statesmen have hitherto failed to act accordingly.

In spite of this, world peace should not be an impossibility. No doubt the preservation of peace in a changing and dynamic world
cannot be the result of establishing an immutable international order. It involves a perpetual adjustment of constantly new conditions.

In the present state of our international life, any world organisation composed of sovereign nation states can have the chance of preserving peace so long as the purposes of war could be served by peaceful methods. Hence any effective world organisation should involve procedure for pacific adjustments and changes in international society, for the pacific settlement of disputes and lastly, for compulsory use of the first two procedures and the enforcement of their results.

If any world organisation has any chance of survival in this dynamic age it must have to meet the dilemma between the need of order and stability on the one hand and the need of adaptation to new conditions on the other, between the need to uphold and enforce the existing order as well as to reconsider and revise it. Peaceful change involves the solution of problems of adjustment in a progressing society, the easing of stresses and strains caused by the dynamics of existence. Social institutions become outworn when they are too inflexible to integrate the social processes.
Peaceful society is the continual uneasy equilibria between many different forces which must be constantly adjusted by adequate institutions. \(^{26}\) Within nations, people have long since accepted a common, superior authority as the best guarantee of the survival of the individual and the peaceful solution of social problems. But the absence of these factors in the relations of individuals belonging to different nations is the crux of the discrepancy between the integrated social life of the state and the hazardous existence of international society.

Indeed this fractional state of the present-day world is the inevitable result of the fractional fabric of its substructure. So far as there is thinking in universal terms at all, it is mainly restricted to economic problems. It leaves out social problems largely and fails completely in the political field. The world thus is in a broken state; but it cannot be denied that it is also in a state of expectancy. The undercurrents are gradually coming to the surface. It is the strength of these undercurrents which will drive us towards a deeper understanding of the problems which mankind must inevitably face. This confrontation has been expressed by a great philosopher in the words. "Irresistibly, slowly, terrifyingly, like destiny, the great problem and question is
approaching: how can the world be administered as a whole?"

The growth of international organisations in various spheres no doubt, may provide a frame-role of international organisations work for social action and increase the potential for social harmony. It integrates the unit into the whole and orders the functions of human interrelations. It permits specialisation and co-operation. Through organized effort, the end product of united action grows quantitatively and qualitatively far beyond the sumtotal of independent, individual action by each unit.

Despite the divisive forces of an essentially state-centered world that continue to assert themselves within international organisations, these bodies have been able to take collective action that expresses an international will greater than the composite will of the members. These organisations have served as media for harmonising of national interests formulating and symbolizing standards of world behaviour; and they have facilitated the harmonizing of national interests in accordance with these standards. No doubt the capacity of all organisations to yield genuinely international results is highly responsive to the ebb and flow of general international
tension. Yet recent experiences demonstrate how these international bodies at all points on the political scale have acquired through the years varying degrees of immunity to the influence of such tensions.

We need not think these international organizations as a substitute for the "balance of power" process among nations. Perhaps the process of so essence of all balancing and harmonizing forces and interests that none will establish an intolerable domination over all, and each will co-exist with the others in rough parity, is of the essence of all politics, at least where power is shared among equals. Viewed in this sense, a dynamic balance is the presupposition of all civic order and stable government. 23

We need not also consider for our present purpose the problem of co-ordination 29 of these international non-governmental organizations in international community based on rule of law. All that is necessary for our purpose is to consider that these developments clearly demonstrate that technological progress and a worldwide ideology for higher living standards and economic and social development are leading us to a unifying world. These international organizations have therefore a firm basis in the real necessities of the present-day world. While the impact of these international organizations upon the character of the international
community is slow and imperceptible, this impact may have the way even for a structural change in the law of nations in no distant future.

Regional associations also can play a vital part in widening the exclusively national horizon, in economic planning, cultural relations and political role of regional associations allegiance. But such associations are, however, capable of being developed for different ends. In a sense the development of various regional organisations may seem a paradox in the light of the present interdependencies of the world community and its increasing common interests. A regional organisation, however extensive and efficient it may be, can hardly meet and resolve global problems, such as control of atomic energy and subserve the best interests of the world community as a whole.

But inspite of such limitations, regional organisations may further the security interests of the world community, provided they be placed under the exclusive authority of the world organisation which is powerful enough to assert its supremacy. The world authority would not only determine the existence of a situation justifying an action by a regional organisation, but would also authorise and terminate it. Thus regional organisations would represent centres of power
delegated by a world organisation. However such a decentralisation could operate to the benefit of the world community only if there would be a considerable differentiation between the power of the world organisation on the one side and of the regional organisations on the other.

We are told that the regional organisations though no ideal solution may beneficially affect the entire world community and its political structure, if they while strengthening the defence power, at the same time aim at long term economic and social objectives. The more primary needs are satisfied peacefully, the more psychological tension subside, anxiety over food and security will diminish, and people will be less inclined to power politics. ....... This venture in creating order and security for a long period to come and over a widespread area would diminish aggression, even were superpowers to undertake it for the usual reasons of mere expediency. 32

Thus conceived politically, these regional associations form an important and, probably, an indispensable stage in the redressing of the balance between big states and smaller states. Economically, they will make possible the development of energies and resources which lie unused, to the detriment of the people. But if they are conceived as the final and exclusive step in international integration, they will just
represent a counter-move in the unending game of power politics, without, ultimately, removing either fear or want from mankind. If, on the other hand, regional groups are developed as more closely knit units, within a wider international organisation, they can do much more than offset the preponderance of Big Powers.

Although at the present moment, vertical frontiers between states largely determine their mutual intercourse, community of interests on a world-wide scale may be developed, if free intercourse between individuals across political frontiers is possible under more liberal conditions. In fact the more they are allowed to ignore the existence of vertical barriers, the more their initiative may lead to the formation of horizontal and supra-national strata. Thus while sovereign powers all over the world are vertically separated from each other, individuals under favourable conditions can engage in horizontal world-community building.

In the Middle Ages, Christians all over Europe, in spite of the existence of a network of sovereign or semi-sovereign states, formed one horizontal community with one creed and outlook which found its expression in the spiritual pre-eminence of Rome. Thus the fact that horizontal community
relations in the international field have existed in the past shows that much can be done in this sphere under newer conditions and circumstances. This constructive international co-operation across vertical barriers can take place only by the promotion of common functional interests of primary importance on a world-wide scale.

The edifice of the international structure which we are going to build up will be sound and useful if its height is proportionate to the strength of the materials from which it is constructed. No doubt we should not be prisoners of historical destiny and shall have to strive our utmost to perfect instruments of peace and justice if we succeed in creating some communal foundation upon which international order can rest. We shall be profited in our task if we have knowledge of the limits of the will in creating government and of the limits of government in creating community. We may have pity upon but can have no sympathy with, those who flee to the illusory security of the impossible from the insecurities and ambiguities of the possible.

But perhaps the supreme task of our generation is to bring about a drastic radical change of the whole structure of our society. We cannot meet the problem of our time by
half-solutions and expedients. Our old ideas and premises, our old practices and beliefs have to be given up, if we do not wish to drive social institutions the world into another epoch of endless chaos and interminable war. Seldom do we realise the gravity of our task and allow our reason to remain untainted and unalloyed by the taint of passion and so-called self-interest. We often forget the contingent and finite character of our institutions and interests and in ignorance of our ignorance claim finality for the contingent.

It cannot be denied that the problem engendered by this new cycle of civilisation ushered in by science and technology has presented us with an unprecedented challenge involving a terrifying problem of adjustment; the velocity of life has entered into such a new, unforeseen and unimaginable phase that any effort to establish a social structure to contain that velocity involves super-human energy. The adjustment we are seeking for must not be a mere compromise but a real response which can settle the tasks presented by the situation. It must not be mere mechanical in which only one response is possible to a given stimulus. It must be so that the adjusted organism relates its inner and overt behaviour to the requirements of the surroundings. These demands are certainly
too severe and exhausting; in facing them civilisation is perhaps consumed by anxiety and fear. Man to-day is called upon to organise beyond his moral and emotional means. This may be the reason why the process of establishing any international society is proving to be prolonged, bloody and exhausting and perhaps there may be no premature escape from the guilt of history.

But however overwhelming this challenge might be, that should not bring any cause for despair. Man in this moment of his history has emerged in greater supremacy over the forces of nature than has ever been dreamed of before. There lies before him, if he wishes, a golden age of peace and progress. In our attempt to tear the old skin of mankind and to give it a new one, we may, for some time, display only the flayed body of the new generation. But human nature certainly is not so hopeless as to render impossible any organisation of the world more rationally, pooling its resources and its needs, federating its races, nations and culture and thus building up a new world structure.

The new international community shall be built neither by the pessimists, who believe it impossible to go beyond the balance of power in the relation of nations to each other, nor by the cynics who are inclined to organise by the imposition of imperial authority without regard to the
Injustices which flow inevitably from arbitrary and irresponsible power, nor yet by the idealists who cherish the fond illusion that a new level of historic development will emancipate history from these vexing problems.