Chapter II

THE FOREIGN POLICY

DECISION-MAKING:

STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES
As discussed in the preceding Chapter, the study of decision-making is the central part of foreign policy analysis (FPA). This is a process through which inputs are converted into foreign-policy output. The concept of orientation is one of the three major components of foreign-policy output; the other two components are decisions and actions. Orientation refers to the way a state's foreign-policy elite perceives the world and its country's role in it.\(^1\) Orientations of a country's foreign policy are not necessarily rigid; they may change due to a radical alteration either in regional balance of power or global system or in the domestic political structure.

The political structure denotes not merely the "political institutions and constitutional matrix in which authoritative decisions are made", also it refers to "various traits of the political system that may influence the decision process in foreign policy".\(^2\) The number and relative influence of the participants in the decision-making process, for instance, vary depending on the type of political regime, e.g., authoritarian or consensual. The following analysis will focus on the individuals, groups and institutions that make up Turkey's decision-making elite, and examine their influence in the light of the country's changing political structure (See table 2.1).

---

1 Karl Holsti defines orientation as a state's "general attitudes and commitments toward the external environment, its fundamental strategy for accomplishing its domestic and external objectives and aspirations and for coping with persisting threats". Based on the degree of involvement in internal politics, he has identified three basic types of orientation: isolation, nonalignment and coalition-building or alliance construction. K.J. Holsti, *International Politics* (Englewood Cliff, N.J.: Princeton Hall, 1977) p. 109. Apparently Turkey opted for alliance construction after the World War II, which was in contrast to the Kemalist policy of neutralism or non-alignment during the war years.

During the Republic’s formative years, decision making was a one-man affair. This phenomenon of “principal decision-maker” was predominant in Turkey until the transition to competitive politics in 1946. In other words, the institutionalised structure as it related to foreign policy domain was dominated by a strong and central figure during the single-party years. Both under Ataturk and his successor Ismet Inonu, the locus of policy formulation remained in the executive rather than the legislative branch.

Although the 1924 Constitution gave the National Assembly some important responsibilities in the determination of foreign policy, it in practice functioned only as a forum for discussing the day-to-day events. The state establishment dominated by a powerful presidency rested on three institutional pillars; the Republican People’s Party, bureaucracy and military. The leaders of these institutions made up a state elite that the president led and consulted in the decision-making process. During the Kemalist period, the RPP wielded a more influence in broad policy matters than the other two. In fact, the RPP continued even after Ataturk’s death in 1938 to formulate policies before sending them to the National Assembly for ratification.

---

3 This term has been adopted from A.I. Dawisha, “The Middle East” in Christopher Clapham (ed.), Foreign-Policy Making in Developing States: A Comparative Approach (London: Saxon House, 1977), p. 62. He has prepared three main subcategories of decision-making elites in a scale of descending importance in terms of the power and influence they possess and frequency with which they exercise this influence. These three subcategories are: the principal decision makers, the ruling elite and the political elite.

With the transition to competitive politics in 1946-1950, however, the decision-making structure in Turkey was altered drastically. As compared to the mono-party system characterised by the predominance of 'principal decision-maker', the multi-party system allowed political parties and National Assembly greater scope in influencing foreign policy. The range of foreign policy-makers widened in the period of democratisation, with the rise of political elite led by the Democratic Party (DP). The cabinet and parliament, both representing the political elite, began to wield far more influence in foreign policy-making than the state-elite. 

While the centrality of the RPP in the decision-making process was in the decline following its electoral defeat in 1950, the bureaucratic elite, the 'guardian of national interest' felt increasingly marginalised in policy formulation. Although the latter managed to restore its primacy subsequently with the help of the military, the RPP under the leadership of Bulent Ecevit lost its characteristics of being a statist party after 1968. In brief, there appeared to be a significant shift since 1950 of responsibility concerning the country's foreign-policy making from the politically non-accountable bureaucratic and military elites to politically accountable elites. This was, doubtless, the result of the 1946 systemic transformation in Turkey's political life, which, however, replaced a state-centred polity by only a party-centred polity.

During the Democrats era, for example, the new political elite abandoned the Kemalist policy of neutralism and aloofness towards the West Asia. Instead, they opted for more pro-active and less sensitive policies, which included the formation of Baghdad Pact in 1955, attempt to subvent the Syrian regime in 1957 and threat to intervene in Iraq following the overthow of the Hashemite monarchy in 1958. For more see, Philip Robins, Turkey and the Middle East (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1991), p. 27.
In a party-centred polity, the political parties are considered the only channels both for articulating and aggregating interests, demands and beliefs. The interest associations though proliferate, they are heavily controlled and regulated by the state. Hence, such associational interest groups as trade unions, civil groups and business organisations rarely play any role in a foreign policy system. In such a polity, the political parties become the vehicle for mobilising political support, and thus, remain a means of elite conflict.⁶

During 1960-1979, Turkey experienced a proliferation of association interest groups, but this was not accompanied by a formal and institutionalised incorporation of such associations into the decision-making process. As one study on this critical aspect of Turkish polity between 1965-1975 period indicates, the linkages between political parties and social groups in Turkey were either weak or did not exist at all.⁷ Regulation from above, in the absence of systematically obtained information from the interest groups continued to be an important feature of policy-making in the Third Turkish Republic as well.

In an attempt to de-politicise the polity, the 1980 military intervenors prohibited the associational interest groups from pursuing political goals and engaging in “political activities” or developing links with political parties. The constitutional and legal

---


Restructuring after 1980 "obliged all interest group associations to act as 'interest' rather than 'pressure' groups".\(^8\) In other words, they were prevented from articulating their views on matters not immediately related to their concerns. On the contrary, the political parties were supposed to assume "charged with the articulation of all interests, which as a critic has pointed out assumes a level of organisational capacity which the current Turkish political parties do not possess".\(^9\)

Whatever may have been the intention of the authors of the new constitution, the developments outlined above underlines the party-based nature of Turkey’s democratic regime. The Turkish case thus clearly shows that the participation of the organised interest groups in its foreign policy system has been marginal, though the role of non-associational groups in influencing country’s foreign policy decision process cannot be brushed aside. The non-associational elements include, among others. Commentators, academicians, specialists and journalists of the mass media.\(^{10}\) Not only do they

---

8 Metin Heper, “The state, political Party and Societies in Post-1983 Turkey” op. cit., p. 331. Some voluntary associations such as the Association of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen, known by the Turkish acronym TUSIAD have acquired relative autonomy by maintaining distance from all political parties. They, however, represent their sectoral interests only; they are not allowed legally to concern themselves with the larger issues facing the country. Such restrictions are naturally a reaction to what was seen as over-fragmentation and polarisation of the political system in Turkey in the previous decades. Ibid., pp. 332.


10. Almond and Powell, Who first suggested the classification of interest groups considered s the commentators as part of communication network, not as non-associational, interest groups because their function was to ‘communicate’ information not to ‘articulate’. However, it is argued that in a foreign policy system, ‘advocacy’ rather than ‘articulation’ is more precise to describe the function performed by interest groups. In this sense, the “advocacy” of specific policies by the journalists and columnists becomes significant for decision-making. G.A. Almond and G. Powell,
communicate information about the environment to the decision-making elite but also advocate specific foreign policy goals. In brief, it is their interpretation of information, which forms the “attitudional prism”, and so contribute to the process of decision-making.¹¹

**Communication and Public Opinion**

As in other late-modernising countries, the role of public opinion in Turkey is narrower than in Western societies. Although contemporary, Turkey has made impressive progress in developing communication networks (See table 2.2), the interest of average Turks on foreign-policy matters remains skin-deep, except in times of war or other forms of regional and internal crisis. Thus, while examining public opinion on issues of foreign policy, one has to give attention to those whose voice has real bearing on the conduct of external affairs.

Inside Turkey, the academics and specialists commentators in the press – for example Fahir Armaoglu, Mehmet Ali Briand, Haluk Ulman and Mehmet Okay – engage in discussion and debate, “which seems to be based on broad like-mindedness on national interests”.¹² They represent, what an observer has described the “unofficial elite”, whose opinions are indicative of the way in which public opinion in the country

---


is likely to react. In a sense, they are the ‘opinion leaders’ and hence, more important than others in the transmission of influence.

However, under the single-party regime, they had a circumscribed political space. As the Turkish media was strictly controlled through a number of laws and press regulations, their role boiled down to simply defending the policies of the government. During the World War II the entire press for instance, was united in its support of Inonu Government’s policy of neutrality. Responding to German papers’ criticism that Turkish press was controlled by the state, Tan a leading daily of the period proclaimed, “if the papers are united in defending the country’s interests, that is because they are acting as the interpreters of Turkish public opinion”.13 This was, in a way representative of the general tone of editorial comments during the war years, much of which seemed to be directed towards the outside world.

Although eminent journalists of the period like Ahmet Sukru Esmer of ulus, Nadir Nadi of Cumhuriyet, Necmettin Sadak of Aksam and Huseyin Cahit Yalcin of Yeni Sabha carried on discussion in the press informing public opinion, there was no opposition press as such in Turkey then. It was only with the expansion of liberal democratic institutions in the post-war period that the official foreign policy began to be scrutinized outside the parliament by academics and commentators in the press. Indeed, a critical evaluation of the country’s foreign policy orientation took place after 1960 when the Cyprus Crisis had first mobilised anti-American sentiments. “For the first time in post-war history”, an analyst notes, “ties with the US and NATO came under

vigorous attack in public, neutralism and non-alignment were proposed instead, and memories of the Ataturk-Lenin period were revived".14

The great foreign policy debate of the mid-1960s eventually produced a more flexible foreign policy though the official policy-line did not deviate essentially from the earlier course. Nevertheless, the bipartisan approach towards Turkey's foreign policy suffered since the electoral campaign of 1969 because of the growing ideological intransigence between the leftist and rightist groups. Consequently, heated attacks on governmental attitudes in international affairs intensified, while the public opinion particularly in the aftermath of the 1974 Cyprus Crisis remained highly sensitive to special relationship with the US.

In a public opinion poll conducted in two major cities of Ankara and Istanbul in 1965, over 70 per cent of respondents did not consider the US as "our best friend". As many as 52 per cent found the US attitude towards Turkey negative, though an overwhelming 78 per cent approved of Turkey's membership in NATO.15 Doubtless, a certain anti-Americanism was found in the mid-1960s, which continued to dominate the subsequent public opinion polls.16


15. This public opinion was carried out for a Istanbul-based Market studies and Research or PEVA Company which was published in the Omnibus Study: Turkey (Ankara, 1965).

16. In another public opinion poll in February 1990, over 30 per cent of respondents named the US as a country unfriendly to Turkey, whereas, 28.3 per cent respondents in the same poll named Pakistan as the country most friendly towards Turkey and next came the TRNC of Northern Cyprus. Turkish Daily News (Ankara) 15 February 1990.
As a Turkish watcher has observed, "the role of public opinion in foreign policy is obstrusive, with press coverage of many topics being noisy and emotional and acting as a major constraint on the government." It has been, however, less effective in influencing broad policy matters as is the case with pluralist societies. The effectiveness of public opinion in foreign policy decision-making has varied from time to time depending on the pluralist thrust of Turkish politics. Moreover, foreign affairs in Turkey have always been treated as national rather than party-political matters. Hence, the basic continuity of foreign policy is primarily the responsibility of the military and bureaucratic elites who see themselves as the guardians of the raison d'etre.

Dominant Decision-Making Elites: Civilian Bureaucracy and Military

As already noted, the civilian bureaucracy and military constitute the two crucial components of Turkey's decision-making elite. The centrality of the military in the decision making process results from its "guardianship of national interests", while the civilian bureaucrats owe their privileged position to their self-defined modernising mission. Together with the Turkish army, the civilian bureaucrats historically built the Republic, and subsequently modernised it along a Western path. "As their raison d'etre was closely linked to the nation state, they became the natural transmitters of the Kemalist ideology of progress."18

17. David Barchard, op. cit., p. 42.
18. Nilofer Gole, "Secularism and Islamism in Turkey: The Making of Elites and Counter Elites", Middle East Journal, vol. 50, no.1 (Winter 1997), p. 50. It is worth mentioning that the military and civilian bureaucracy were the groups with strong socialisation into state traditions; they were in fact the pillars on which the authority of the state rested since the Ottoman time. All three military interventions since 1960 have had identical aims of restoring the state as a binding locus of the society.
Also, crucial to the weight in the decision making is the ‘cultural capital’\(^{19}\) comprising mainly the non-traditional knowledge and familiarity with the West. All this is acquired through modern, secular education, which even today remains the foundation for bureaucratic elitism in Turkey. During the single party years of the Republican Turkey, most of the higher civil servants were products of the prestigious Political Science Faculty of Ankara University. Subsequently, however, the institutions of higher learning that future bureaucrats attended became diversified.\(^{20}\)

As early as 1970s, the Middle East Technical University (METU) and later, the Bogazici University began competing with the Ankara University in producing the future diplomats. Since English is the medium of instruction in these universities, the bureaucrats graduating from there appear to be more familiar with the literature originating in the US and UK.

As products of the Republic’s elite academics, the civilian bureaucrats, including the foreign ministry cadres share a highly developed sense of identity and

---

19. This concept is adopted from French Social Scientist Pierre Bourdieu, who distinguishes economic capital (convertible into money) from cultural capital (conferred by educational credentials and institutions), and Social Capital (achieved social connection and group membership) from Symbolic capital (Source of prestige). The aspects of ‘symbolic capital’ of Turkey’s traditional elites have been highlighted by Gole, op. cit., pp. 46-48.

outlook. During the single party years of the Republic they assumed unto themselves the responsibility of carrying the positivist-progressive ideals of the revolution for a rational reconstruction of Turkish society. In fact, the Kemalist period was not only one of undisputed domination of the bureaucratic elite, also a bureaucratic outlook had permeated the entire state apparatus.21

With the transition to pluralism, the bureaucratisation of the political decision-making came to an end, though civilian bureaucracy was never rendered subservient to the political elites. The non-bureaucratic governments of the DP and JP failed in their attempts to replace the bureaucratic elitism by a new orientation conducive to a liberal-democratic state. Instead, the reaction of the civil bureaucracy seemed to be what Heper describes “negative politics”22 — using bureaucratism as an effective weapon, they sought to undermine the policies of the government.


22. See Metin Heper, “Negative Bureaucratic Politics in a Modernising Context: The Turkish Case”, Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies (vol. 1, 1977), pp. 65-84. Heper tries to argue that the Civil bureaucracy maintained its integrity and autonomy from political elites bent on breaking its influence, especially during the JP rule. Because, the 1961 constitution clearly defined the locus of the state, and its position above political competition by giving commensurate powers, albeit inadequate, to the institutions like civil bureaucracy in the face of political interference. For instance, it could resist a particular government decision through appeal to the council of state, which had authority to over-rule such constitutional provisions meant to maintain separation of powers was utilised negatively, “serving to deepen the cleavage between the institutions the state and realm of political decision-making”. More so, it helped perpetuate the hostility between civil
At any rate, the civil bureaucracy in Turkey despite a relative loss of occupational prestige and income retained its hold on the implementation and formulation of public policies until the mid-1970s. The diplomats, for instance, saw themselves as the "stewards" of Ataturk's foreign policy, "just as the armed forces viewed themselves as the guardian of his domestic order."\(^{23}\) During the 1950s, the traditional mandarins in Turkey's external affairs ministry increasingly felt marginalised because the Democrats seized the initiative of building a collective defence network to ward off threats from Soviet proxy states to the country's South. Following the conclusion of the 1955 Baghdad pact, the DP Government adopted an active foreign policy towards the West Asia, which the bureaucratic elites considered a dangerous deviation from Ataturk's policy of aloofness.

The 1960 military coup that toppled the country's civilian government was a reaction of the bureaucratic elites against the diminution of their status. No wonder, the aftermath of the coup saw restoration of their pre-eminence in the Turkish polity, as the 1961 constitution subordinated the parliament to some bureaucratic agencies limiting thereby the powers of political elites. Likewise, the indirect military intervention in March 1971 once again brought the civilian bureaucracy to the forefront. It continued to function as what Heper calls, "guardian bureaucracy"\(^{24}\) with an in-built tendency to


24. Heper described the Turkish bureaucratic elite as a "guardian bureaucracy" in the sense that they were to serve the physical representation of the approved ideology and as its devoted instruments too. M. Heper, "The Recalcitrance of the Turkish
reject political constraints as inputs in policy-making. With the installation of the JP-led coalition government in 1975, however, the bureaucratic ruling tradition was progressively weakened, partly because of the periodic reshuffling of the civil servants and partly the fragmentation and politicisation of civil bureaucratic agencies. Finally, in the post-1980 period, the economic liberalisation and de-bureaucratisation measures attempted by Turgut Özal led to the induction of Western-educated technocrats and specialists who effectively undercut the influence of the old bureaucratic elites in the formulation of public policies.

Public Bureaucracy to ‘Bourgeois Politics: A Multi-Factor Political Stratification Analysis”, *Middle East journal* (Autumn, 1976), p. 494. The political orientation of the bureaucratic elites hardly comprised responsiveness to the demands of the emerging economic groups. Thus, their attitudes towards both the political elites representing the particularistic demands of the periphery as well as the on-going socio-economic differentiation remained almost static. See for details, M. Heper, “Political Modernisation as Reflected in Bureaucratic Change: The Turkish Bureaucracy and a Historical Bureaucratic Empire Tradition”, *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, (October 1976), pp. 507-52.

25. “It was not until the 1970s”, Ahmet Evin writes, “that political polarisation and fragmentation seriously damaged the civil service”. In the wake of constantly changing coalition governments, government patronage to reward party supporters through civil service appointments became a widespread practice. Moreover, as the political parties of the radical fringe tried to exploit this mechanism to secure control of certain agencies, the civil bureaucracy gradually lost its status as a solidarity group, and its total subjugation to the political whims of competing groups. After the 1980 coup, the junta undertook the massive cleaning operation by removing political partisans, reportedly upto 18,000 in number. And to prevent the recurrence of this phenomenon, the new constitution gave the President power to appoint members of the council of state, top regulatory body for bureaucracy. Finally, as Turkey began the economic liberalisation in the 1980s, a new type a managerial elite in the civil bureaucracy appeared – a trend that subsequently weakened the bureaucratic culture as a socialising force. See, Ahmet Evin, *op. cit.*, p. 207, and M. Heper, “Bureaucrats: Persistent Elites” in Heper, Aysen Oncu and Heinz Kramer, *Turkey and the West: Changing Political and Cultural Identities* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1993), pp. 63-67.
The Military

By contrast, the military in Turkey has retained its internal unity throughout the period, though some signs of factionalism were observed within its ranks in the 1960s and 1970s. The relative insulation of the military from political polarisation is attributed to an extraordinarily strong socialising influence within it. As Mehmet Ali Birand's study on such socialising mechanisms and the resulting 'military mind' suggests, the young officers at the Military academy are not only "taught discipline with everything", also inculcated with the idea that they are superior to their civilian counterparts.26 In brief, the political culture of the Turkish military discourages the cadets to get involved in partisan politics, but the intervention of the army in case the state or Kemalist principles are threatened is considered its legitimate duty. Because, Turkey owes its existence and independence to Ataturk and his revolution to the protection of which the armed forces remain firmly committed.27

26. Mehmet Ali Birand, Shirts of Steel: An Anatomy of the Turkish Armed Forces, trans. Saliha Paker and Ruth Christie (London: I.B. Tauris, 1991), pp. 39-41. To comprehend this peculiar socialisation process, it is useful to discuss briefly the military education system in Turkey. This includes military high-schools (askeri liseler) which educate boys aged roughly between 14 to 19, followed by military college (harp okullari), which recruits both from military high schools and the equivalent civilian institutions, though about two-thirds of the entrants are from the former. Apparently, most officers enter the army in their early teens and undergo the training designed to instill professional elites like discipline, and also to inculcate them with the values of Kemalism. Besides, they learn their duties as protectors of the Kemalist nation-state, the functions that separate them from the society at large. See, James Brown, "The Military and Society: The Turkish Case", Middle Eastern Studies (vol. 25, 1989), pp. 392-395.

27. The guardian role of military is deeply embedded in Turkey’s past dating back to the 17th – 18th century when Janissary selected from the Christian population served as the praetorian guards, though they formed weak link with the society. Despite their destruction in 1826, the army never ceased to be a crucial actor in the Ottoman political developments. Whether it was during the introduction of the first constitution in 1876 and its restoration in 1908 or in the period of Young-Turk rule, the army played prominent part. What is more, the military activism was not
Thus, the ultimate justification for military's political predominance rests on its complete identification with the state and the status quo. But, "its sentry role as an ideological task force prescribed by Kemalism, the official ideology of the state", has placed the military at a distance from the society. The social autonomy of the Turkish armed forces is reinforced by the general recruitment patterns, and more so, by the military education system, which goes back to the Ottoman days. In all, "traces of the Ottoman Kapikulu, in which soldiers were torn away from society and ideologically trained to identify fully with the state, are still in effect".

challenged by any other socio-political groups because the local bourgeoisie and the rural pre-capitalist dominant classes were "unable to alter their "subservient status before the state". Ahmet Kemal, "Military Rule and the Future of Democracy in Turkey", MERIP Reports (March/April 1989, p. 13.

In the Ottoman days, the civilian and military arms of the state were not distinguished. Their legacy did not lose its force with the proclamation of the Republic. In fact, officers were the heart of the committee of Union and Progress. Their shared political involvement with civilian leaders was vital in nourishing the notion that they were responsible for the destiny of the state. Subsequently, Ataturk though tried to take away the political role they were allowed during the liberation movement, complete civilian supremacy was not established. On the contrary, his attempt to forbid the serving officers from playing any part in the legislature was meant only to prevent the military's growth as a rival source of power. His recognition of the military's role as vanguard of his revolution rather legitimised the military claim as, what Evren after the 1980 coup declared, "master of the country" In short, Ataturk legacy, which is often invoked by the intervenors is "an ambiguous one" See W. Hale, "Transition to civilian Government in Turkey" in Heper and Ahmet (ed.), State, Democracy and Military, p. 174. Also see George Harris, "The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics" Middle East Journal (Winter-Spring, 1965), pp. 55-56.


An examination of officer corps recruitment patterns will provide useful insights into the social origins of the Turkish military, which according to Janowitz, "is a powerful key to understanding of its political logic". Data on the social origins of Cadets and serving officers gathered by James Brown in the 1970s and early 1980s reveal that sons of lower-middle and middle classes accounted for the vast majority. Whereas, only a small minority around 5 per cent – had parents who could be considered well-off, and 10 to 15 per cent who were 'farmers'. What is, however, particularly striking in Brown’s finding is that military and civil servants produced the largest percentage of officers (around 40 per cent) in Turkish armed forces (table). In short, “a major aspect of social origin is through familial recruitment”, which helps the “guardians of the flame of Kemalism” to perpetuate the revolution.30

While the military education and self-recruitment pattern suggest as to why the Turkish army is politically engaged, its strategic position within the political realm explains the type and degree of its involvement. Certainly, it is not praetorian, like its counterparts in the region, nor does it intend to usurp civilian authority to establish a ‘ruler-type’ regime.31 The Turkish officer corps, on the contrary, has shown the


31. The ‘ruler regime’ is one of three types of military regimes broadly recognised in the theoretical literature available since the 1960s on the “military in politics” in the Third World countries. These types are differentiated by their aims or how they legitimise themselves, duration and degree of penetration and control over political and social structures. In case of ruler regimes, there is a far greater degree of political control for a far longer period. The leaders of such regimes resort to radical ideologies (i.e. Islam or socialism) to consolidate the regime. They also try to achieve not just the control of the government, but complete regime dominance including a high-degree of penetration and mobilisation of society from above. In contrast, moderators/veto regimes exercise veto power over governmental decisions but without direct involvement. Moderator regimes are conservative, and they may sometimes carry out what Nordlinger calls a “displacement coup”. Eric A. Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Government (Eaglewood Cliff:
characteristics of an "arbitrator army" despite three military interventions in the country's post-war politics. In fact, under the single-party rule, the army was relegated to a secondary position behind the RPP. After the transition to pluralism, the civilian government acquired full constitutional powers over the armed forces, though the latter retained considerable institutional autonomy, mainly concerning its core professional functions.  

Princeton Hall, 1979), pp. 22-23. The 12 March 1971 Military coup through memorandum resulted in the regime of the above category. But, in 1960 and 1980, the coup leaders established a regime of the guardian type, in which the military takes over political power without intending to exercise it indefinitely. Guardian regimes are moderately conservative like the "Moderator type" since they wish to preserve the status quo but return power to the civilians after constitutional and political changes so as to prevent another relapse into the pre-coup crisis. For further analysis, see Morris Janowitz, Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), pp. 73-84; Christopher Clapham and George Philip, "The Political Dilemmas of Military Regimes" in C. Clapham and G. Philip (eds.), The Political Dilemmas of Military Regimes (London: Croom Helm, 1985), pp. 7-10. Based on these works, William Hale has brought out some civil, military and external variables to explain why the Turkish army's role in the politics is largely of an arbitrator and guardian rather than a ruler-type. They are i) unity of the military command structure or the degree to which armies adhere to the official chain of command (i.e. larger the military in power, greater the risk of counter-coup) ii) this problem is complicated by size and complexity of the Turkish armed forces, iii) The differentiation of the military from civil society – to the extent the military has its own political culture; iv) level of autonomous political organisations and other institutions, v) foreign pressures because of its long-established western linkages, especially with the NATO, EU and Council of Europe act as disincentive to army take-over and also early return to democratic government. William Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military (London: Routledge: 1994), pp. 304-328. Also see, Ihsan D. Dagi, “Democratic Transition in Turkey, 1980-1983: The Impact of European Diplomacy” Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 32, No.2, April, 1996, pp. 124-139.

32. Institutional autonomy refers to structural properties such as guarding its core professional functions against unwanted interference by outsiders. But the political autonomy involves both an ideological and a behavioural dimension; it is an offensive strategy transcending institutional boundaries and representing “the military’s aversion toward or even defiance of civilian control”. David Pian – Berlin, “Military Autonomy and Emerging Democracies in South America”, Comparative Politics, vol. 25(October, 1992), pp. 83-102. The best illustration of Turkish military's institutional autonomy is the function of the General Chief of Staff, who takes all major decisions affecting the armed forces unfettered by the
Ironically, it is this institutional autonomy that the Turkish armed forces were allowed to enjoy on the ground of its guardianship role and physical defence of national territory, which in subsequent years rendered the civilian supremacy unsustainable. As Turkey's nascent democratic experiment gave rise to political forces incompatible with and even opposed to the Kemalist consensus, the military assumed a role of *deux machina*, interpreting the national will and laying down legitimate boundaries of adversarial politics. The 1961 constitution, the most liberal constitution for example, banned communist and religious parties and propaganda activities that were considered foreign-directed and divisive and hence, dangerous to territorial integrity of the state. In similar way, the 1982 constitution defined these boundaries more clearly and narrowly.

Thus, the military in Turkey became politically powerful from the 1960s largely because the countervailing civilian forces (political elites) were weak, and incapable of building a broadly based national dialogue in which the rules for the democratic order could be set. Apart from the defiance of civilian control, what precisely facilitated the increasing military influence in decision-making process was the impact of Cold War, especially Turkey's close alignment with the US. Both the military build-up by the US and its training to officers from allied states improved professionalism of the Turkish civilian control. See "Special issue: Defense and Economics in Turkey", *NATO's 16 Nations*, vol. 31, 1986, pp. 65-69.

33. Samuel Huntington argues that armies in the European states developed a tradition of non-involvement because of high degree of professionalism — that is expertise, responsibility and corporateness — which characterised their institutional autonomy. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Practice of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), pp. 71-74. But, other specialists like S.E. Finer has challenged this assumption by pointing out that highly professional officer corps, such as those of Germany and Japan intervened in Politics. What is more, under the Cold-War conditions military's increasing
military, which, in turn, increased its influence in the process of decision-making concerning not only purely defence matters also external relations. Entrusted to contain Soviet expansionism – to which was also linked domestic subversion – the armed forces were able to enter political arena as a powerful actor, though they handed over power to the civilians after each intervention.

Institutional Channels

Among the institutional channels through which military has extended its authority, the most important is the National Security Council or NSC. Established following the 1960 coup, the NSC is essentially a mechanism designed to legalise a more prominent role for senior commanders in the decision-making process of the civilian authority. Initially, it was meant to serve as a platform for the military to voice its opinions on matters related to national security. With the 1973 amendments, its function was extended to making recommendations to the government. Finally, the position of the NSC was enhanced by the 1982 constitution, which stipulated that the

---

professionalism in the Third World has paved the way for its political role. In an incisive analysis, Aijaz Ahmad Contends, “none of these armies (in the periphery/Third World states) would be what they are without the means of mass destruction they receive from the metropolitan exporters of weaponry. It is in this sense that imperialism is the constitutive element and stabilising factor in the whole global structure of military violence”. Aijaz Ahmad, Linkages of the Present: Political Essays, (New Delhi: Atulika, 1996), pp. 62. Also see, S.E. Finer, The Man on the Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics 2nd edn. (Penguin, 1976), pp. 180-184.

34. The lengthy constitutional amendment enacted in September 1971 was essentially an attempt by the army generals to ‘fine-tune’ the existing system by correcting defects. At the same time some of these amendments like powers assigned to the NSC to submit recommendations to the cabinet increased possibility of civilians being tried in military courts, removal of review of military impersonal actions from civilian courts and adjusting power of the minister of defense bolstered the position of the armed forces. See George Harris, “The Role of Military in Turkey in the 1980s: Guardians or Decision-Makers?” in Heper and Evin (eds.), op. cit. P. 188.
council of ministers had to give top priority to the NSC recommendations. Assessing the extensive power of the NSC, an analyst writes, "a close survey of the range and substance of decisions discussed or shaped in the NSC establishes beyond doubt that in the last two decades it has been the most decisive leg of a dual system of executive decision making."\(^3\)

In the new arrangement, the NSC has claimed further areas of executive power through the enhanced powers of the presidency. Although nowhere was it stated that the president should be drawn from military, there did exist an unwritten agreement according to which if the civilians were elected, they would not be permitted to override the military. Among the powers assigned to the President, the most crucial was the appointment of the Chief of General Staff whose “duties and powers shall be regulated by law” (Article 17). That his position is above the Minister of Defense is confirmed by the duties assigned to the Chief of General Staff\(^3\) who, for instance, can exercise duties of Commander-in-chief on behalf of the President in time of War (see Table 2.4). To sum up, the absence of civilian-controlled defense ministry and along with it, the nature

\(^{35}\) Umit Cizre Sakallioglu, op. cit., p. 158.

\(^{36}\) The position of the Turkish General Chief of Staff has gone through three stages. In 1924, it was subjected to the Prime Minister; in 1949 it was placed under the control of the minister of defense; under the 1961 constitution it once again became the responsibility of the Prime Minister. After the 1980 coup, he is appointed by the President, and according to the 1982 constitution, he is responsible to the prime Minister in the exercise of his duties and powers (Article 117). Although the Social Democrat Populist Party has proposed this relationship to be altered by subjecting the General Staff to the Defence Ministry, the army is steadfastly opposed to this on the ground that the Ministry would be reduced to a ‘supply office’ for the army rather than the determinant of defence policy. See William Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military, p. 294.
of its institutional link with the head of state has given Turkish army a high degree of autonomy in decision-making even under the civilian governments.

In the final analysis, one can argue that the military has replaced the civilian bureaucracy as a senior partner in the alliance since the inauguration of the Second Republic. As the post-1980 pattern shows, there has been a considerable shift in the military’s influence on almost all issues, especially those involving security and strategic interests. Faced with serious centrifugal challenge mainly represented by the Kurdish insurgency, the military has strengthened its intelligence operation units, including the civilian-based intelligence unit, the National Intelligence Agency of Turkey (NIA). Although Turkish army hardly interferes in the day-to-day conduct of foreign policy, since much of this is the responsibility of professional diplomats, it does

37. In the post-1980 Turkey, the military, unlike in the past, has remained the only homogenous group without natural allies. In 1960, the bureaucratic state party, the RPP and state-centered intellectuals supported it. But, the military’s political allies narrowed in 1971 as it depended solely on the civilian bureaucracy, which was in fact, part of the group behind the military action called as Zinde Kuvvetler (living forces). See, Kemal H. Karpat, “Social Groups and Political system after 1960”, in his Social Change and Politics in Turkey (Leiden, 1973), p. 254. But when the military intervened in 1980, the bureaucracy had been fragmented, intellectuals divided along ideological lines, and more importantly, the RPP had distanced itself from the military. Thus, in the early 1980s, the Turkish military acted as the sole repository of Kemalist ideals, and the only institution identified with the state. The 1982 constitution was naturally designed to establish the military authority over the state rather than restoring the authority of the state. See, Ahmet Evin, “Changing Patterns of cleavages Before and After 1980” in Heper and Amin, State, Democracy and the Military, p. 210-211. Interestingly, some scholars have interpreted the 1982 constitution more optimistically as a division of responsibility with civilians to develop a more harmonious cooperation that existed before 1980. While George S. Harris calls it a “shared decision-making in security matters”; Kemal H. Karpat describes it the true essence of democracy that is based on “distribution of power” between the state and government (political elites). Harris, “The Role of Military in Turkey in the 1980s” and Karpat, “Military Intervention: Army-civilian Relations Before and After 1980” in Heper and Ahmet, State, Democracy and Military, p. 158 and 199.
wield influence on issues particularly concerning territorial integrity and national unity. In fact, foreign policy was one of the areas of government over which President Evren retained most direct influence in the early 1980s.38

**Historical Legacy**

After having identified Turkey’s principal decision-making elites, we may now analyse the general psychological framework for decision-making. As discussed in the previous Chapter, decision-makers in foreign policy operate within a context of psychological predispositions, which comprise: a) cumulative historical legacy, b) ideology. Together they constitute what Brecher has described, “the screen or prism” through which elite perceptions of the external environment are filtered. Because, “decision-makers act in accordance with their perceptions of reality, not in response to reality itself.”39 In this context, a set of images the decision-makers may possess are of prime importance since they condition their behaviour on foreign policy issues.

Commenting on this vital link between elite image and foreign policy decision-making, Prof. Kenneth Boulding writes; “we must recognise that the people whose decisions determine the policies and actions of nations do not respond to the objective facts of the situation whatever that may mean, but to their ‘image’ of the situation. It is what we think the world is like, not what it is really like, that determines our behaviour .... It is one nation’s image of hostility of another, not the ‘real’ hostility, which

---

38. David Barchand, *op. cit.*, p. 41. According to Barchard, it was fairly clear in November 1983 that the “officials in the relevant department of the Foreign Ministry were by no means the first to learn about the impending declaration of unilateral independence by the Turkish Cypriots”. Ibid., p. 42.

determines its reaction. The 'image' then, must be thought of as the total cognitive, affective, and evaluative structure of the behaviour unit, or its internal view of itself and its universe.”

The discrepancy between image and reality is partly the result of historical legacy or the memories of the past. For, nations tend to live in their memories. The weight of history-real or imagined - tends to shape attitudes of hostility or friendship, trust or distrust, and fear or confidence towards other nations. In case of Turkey, the official approach to international relations, particularly foreign policy conduct vis-a-vis the countries in her vicinity is determined more by the perceived lessons of history or historical legacies than ideological considerations. As an analyst, discussing Turkeys’ soured relations with the Soviet union after the World War II. “Turkey’s leaders did have an aversion to communism, but Turkish diplomatic history suggests that the response would have been essentially the same had the threat come from a non-communist Russia”. Indeed, relation with Russia/Soviet union has been underpinned by a brooding suspicion and animosity, the roots of which lie in the 250-year-long


41. Memory plays an important role in the Foreign Policy Decision-making because this element is closely related to Cognition, which refers to what a subject knows. In broader terms, Cognition refers to the content as well as the structure of subject’s information processing system. As subcomponent of cognition, memory deals with how “past experiences constrain policy and choice?”. Steve Chan and Donald A. Sylvan, “Foreign Policy Decision Making: An Overview” in D.A. Sylvan and S. Chan (eds.), Foreign Policy Decision-Making, (New York: Praeger, 1984), pp. 5-6.

struggle between the empire of Tsars and the Ottoman Empire since the time of Peter the Great. No wonder, conscripts in the army are taught that Russia – rather than any other country – is Turkey’s ‘ancestral’ enemy.

Likewise, memories of bloody historic struggles have sustained the Turco-Greek feud. Both share what an observer describes “a heritage of hate”, but Turkish leaders are particularly worried about the Greek territorial ambitions in the Western Anatolia. They attribute to Greece the Megali Idea, 19th century dream to resurrect the former Byzantine-Greek state, which stirs fears of territorial shrinkage, especially the loss of Istanbul. So is the case with Armenian territorial claim in eastern Anatolia, which remains yet another source of security concern for Turkish decision-makers. Finally, the most enduring legacy of Turkey’s War of Independence period is the dismay at the Arab uprising in 1916, which Turkish people tend to regard as a monumental act of treason. For the Turks, “it was, indeed, extremely disappointing to see the Arabs – their fellow subjects and co-religionists – siding with the enemy, leaders of the Christian West.” The episode provides an unhappy memory engendering a negative image of the Arabs (untrustworthy, for example) in the eyes of average Turks.

---


44 For an exhaustive account of the Tukrco-American conflict, especially the latter’s alleged massacre by the Turks in 1915, see Ronald Grigor Suny, Looking Toward Ararat: America in Modern History, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), Chapter I.

45 Omer Kurscuoglu, “Arab and Turkish Public Opinion Attitudes Towards Questions of the two Nations”, DIS Politika (vol. XII, nos. 1-2, June 1985), p. 27.
On the whole, such salient negative historical precedents as Russia’s expansionist design, Greek irredentist dream, Western powers’ occupation of Anatolia, secession of Arabic-speaking provinces, Iraq’s successful claim to Masul and Syrian campaign demanding the return of Hatay province have all shaped the perceptions of Turkey’s decision-making elites considerably. So much so that they appear to be concerned primarily with the “physical security”46 of the modern Turkish state more than 70 years after its creation. This is in a sense a typical paranoid reaction of the nation that visualises itself as encircled by hostile neighbours. In fact, explaining the phenomenon further, an observer concludes that Turkey’s decision-makers suffer from what he calls “Serves-phobia – the conviction that the external world conspiring to weaken and divide Turkey.”47

**Ideology**

Ideology, is the second most important component of the “attitudinal prism”, which is part of the psychological environment within which policy processes take

---

46 “Physical security’ here refers to the security of a population and its associated territory, which according to Barry Buzan, “comprise the physical foundation of a state”. It is worth mentioning that Buzan’s definition of national security is predicated on a simple descriptive model underlining three essential attributes of statehood.

(1) The idea of State

| (1) The Physical base of the state | (2) The Institutional expression of state |


place. Ideology affects the 'images',\textsuperscript{48} which the decision-making elites form of reality and upon which they act. "The images which are important in international system are those which a nation has of itself and of those other bodies in the system which constitute its international environment."\textsuperscript{49} In the formation of both the national image of the Turks and their image of the world around them (the operational environment), Kemalism\textsuperscript{50} the ideas of Mustafa Kemal embodied in the 'six arrows' – has played a central role. Not only does it define the values and norms of the Turkish state, also constitutes the very basis of the identity of the Turkish population of Anatolia.

\textsuperscript{48} The notion of 'image' is defined as the "Organised representation of an object or a situation in an actor's cognitive system", in the sense that this system of images serves as a kind of mental and emotional filter, which mediates and orders incoming messages. Besides, it "determines the actor's focus of attention ... as well as his interpretation and ... affects the author's perception of events and alternatives open to him". Christer Jonsson, Soviet Bargaining Behaviour: The Nuclear Test Ban Case (New York, 1979), p. 11.

\textsuperscript{49} Kenneth E. Boulding, op. cit., p. 392.

\textsuperscript{50} Whether the ideas of Mustafa Kemal should be collectively termed as ideology is still debatable. Critics argue that Kemalism was not an ideology since it was neither universally applicable nor rigid. See, for instance, Mahmut Bali Aykan, "Ideology and National Interest in Turkish Foreign Policy toward the Muslim World, 1960-87. (unpublished doctoral thesis, university of Virginia, 1987), p. 20, quoted in Philip Robins, Turkey and the Middle East (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1991), p. 118. Interestingly, the concept of ideology itself "lacks agreement regarding its basic properties. Broadly, it is defined as a tightly-knit body of beliefs organised around a few central values. Moreover, its simple definition is given by a translation of the German Word, Weltanschauung, which would render ideology as a 'world view'or the overall perception one has of what world, especially the social world consists of and how it works. See, Nicholas Abercrambie and others (eds.) Dictionary of Sociology, 2\textsuperscript{nd} edition (Penguin, 1984), p. 118, and David Robertson, Dictionary of Politics (Penguin, 1985), p. 152.

In this sense, Kemalist ideas may be termed as ideology because the 'six-arrows' of Kemal Ataturk centres on specific set of values, and more importantly, it presents the weltanschauung of Anatolia-based Turkish people. Indeed, Kemalism serves as what Barry Buzan calls, the idea of the state and it is so deeply ingrained as an organising ideology into the state that "change would have transformational, or perhaps fatal, implications". B. Buzan, op. cit., pp. 50-51.
Kemalism, thus, remains the "organising ideology" of the Turkish state, though the original principles have undergone changes due to the side-effects of the political process, especially since the revolution of 1960. In Turkish foreign policy system, this official ideology of the state plays at least three major functions: 1) cognitive function, providing the "attitudinal prism" for the core group of decision-makers through which intentions or behaviour of others are evaluated; 2) goal-oriented function, projecting the ambition to reach the level of muasir medeniyet (contemporary civilization); 3) normative function, serving as a justification, rationalisation, and a guide for specific foreign policy actions.\(^{51}\)

Before we make a critical evaluation of these functions, we need to examine those basic concepts which have direct or implicit bearing on Turkey's external behaviour. On the basis of their relative salience to the foreign policy-making, we can identify three main areas: 1) the secular character of the state; 2) meaning of democracy; and 3) the nature of Turkish nationalism. The first explains Turkey's Western-oriented policies, the second reveals the external linkage to the survival of a liberal political order, and the last highlights the complex issue of identity, which impinges on Turkey's national security.

Secular Character

Secularism in Turkey does not mean simply taking religion out of the public sphere or its subservience to the state. It also implies the wholesale rejection of the Ottoman-Islamic past, and more importantly, adaption of the western model of change as a basis for the rational reconstruction of the society. In fact, much of the Kemalist reforms aimed at “destroying the symbols of Ottoman-Islamic civilization, and substituting them with their Western counterparts.” The secularisation programme was central to the Kemalist project of modernization based on a rational mode of thinking. In all, secularisation in Turkey is considered to be the pre-requisite of westernisation, and the west as such “continues to be an important ‘mirror’ through which the Turkish elites see themselves, their polity, and society”.

As an important component of the Kemalist ideology, the vision of a Westernised Turkish nation has considerably influenced the foreign policy formulation. Apart from promoting western ideal in the cognitive map of the decision-makers, it sets the goal of becoming a part of the European world and serves as a justification or rationalisation for specific foreign policy actions. If the decision to apply for membership in the European union is justified in terms of achieving psychological parity with the west, the policy of aloofness from the Arab world is rationalised on the ground that the Arabs are the “enemies of secularism”. “The Arabs”, as the author of

Northedge comments, “a nation does not exactly perish, but it can hardly know what to approve and disapprove”, Ibid., p. 13.


the book, *Arap Milliyetçiliği* writes, “under the guise of religious brethen ... actively work to erase the Turks from the surface of the earth”. The book concludes with the warning of “grave danger” in case Turkey cultivates close relations with the Arab states.\(^\text{54}\)

In the past few years, however, the ideological foundations of Turkey’s foreign policy have come under an unprecedented range of criticism, particularly from the religious sector of the society. In fact, recent diplomatic efforts to improve fraternal bonds with Arabs are a pointer to the revived Muslim consciousness in the Turkish society being promoted by the National Salvation Party (NSP), the forerunner of Refah in the 1980s. The NSP appeared on the Turkish political scene in the early 1970s “as a neo-Islamic party on a platform of retraditionalisation in sociocultural life along Islamic principles”.\(^\text{55}\) Raising the slogan of “a great Turkey” the NSP promised to build a highly industrialised nation through economic cooperation with the Muslim world.

In short, the NSP led the “nationalist-sacredist” (Milliyetçi-Mukaddesscatci) faction, while the second group known as the “Turkish-Islamic synthesizers”\(^\text{56}\) stressed the importance of religious values in the fabric of Turkish nationalism. In a way, the latter called for restoration of Islam as a core value of Anatolian nationalism like their

---


Arab counterparts. Whereas, the NSP advocated for the return to Islam as a basis of social organisation, which it considered the precondition for Turkey's world-leadership. Besides, there was also a third group of radical fundamentalists who viewed Islam as a revolutionary anti-imperialist force within a Third World paradigm. The Islamists of all hues, however, concurred on substituting an indigenous framework of values for the secularised model of development. On the whole, Islamism in Turkey "became the political expression of a conflictual link between an Islamic-Turkish identity and a secular-Western modernity".57

Doubtless, the exponential growth of Muslim sentiment since the mid-1960s has had impact upon policy-making in Turkey, as reflected in the changes mainly concerning the educational system and the religious establishment. All this, however, does not mean the erosion of the Kemalist legacy or what a Turkish watcher maintains, "secularism in Turkey is clearly receding before the tide of re-Islamisation".58 Instead, such changes are a part of the process, long and tedious though, towards formulating what Peyami Safa, a 20th century Turkish philosopher describes "cultural synthesis".59

56. Turkish-Islamic synthesizers view Islam as one of the tenets of Turkish nationalism like the Arab nationalists who emphasise on the seminal connection between Arabism and Islam. They consider Turkish nationalism as "an Islamic thesis, and consider those political and economic recipes from the West as its anti-thesis". Such nationalism rejects all external influences including the western alliances, and stresses on "independent action based upon our country's own sources". E. Ervedi, D. Ozer and A. Debbagoglu, Turk Milliyetciligi ve Batililasma 2nd edition, (Istanbul, 1979), p. 173-74 quoted in Oke, op. cit., p. 59. The trend of "Turkish-Islamic synthesis" was represented by Mehmet Kececiler in Ozal's Motherland party, the group was opposed to the secular-nationalist bloc led by former foreign minister Mesut Yilmaz, see, Jeremy Salt, "Nationalism and Rise of Muslim Sentiment in Turkey", Middle Eastern Studies, (Jan., 1995), vol. 31, No.1, pp. 13-17.

57. Gole, op. cit., p. 53.

58. P. Robins, Turkey and the Middle East, p. 45. He discusses the changes since the transition to multi-party system in almost all spheres of public life, which he attributes to the return of religion to the "political domain as an important variable
In other words, they are indicative of Turkey's recent attempts to produce a working societal compromise between the demand for a secular state and the spiritual needs of the people.

The approach towards this new balance was as much reflected in Turkey's domestic politics as in her foreign policy directions, especially in the 1970s when policy-makers projected Turkey as a "bridge" between East and West connecting two continents in cultural and ideological sense. Despite the apparent confusion and even wide-spread fear of "Islamic threat", the framework of East-West synthesis was reconstructed in the post-1980 Turkey to obtain a societal consensus in her political life.

Highlighting this characteristic of a new political order, Metin Heper observes, "the present interpretation by the state elites of such themes (and programmes) as modernism and secularism is more conciliatory than it was in the past". The "secularism of the present day state elites", he adds "no longer borders on agnosticism. Instead, a search for a new historically-rooted, socio-cultural Turkish identity is tolerated." In fact, the original Kemalism was modified, which in the years following the 1980 coup became officially known as Ataturkism. "The approach of the new state elite resembles the original 'Kemalism' of Ataturk rather than the 'Ataturkism' of the post-Ataturk intellectual-bureaucratic elite". All told, what seems still quizzical is in the competition of power". According to Robins, "a tide of re-Islamization since the late 1940s has been "edging back up the secular shore" Ibid., p. 39. For an opposite view, see Umit Cizre, Sakallioglu, "Parameters and Strategies of Islam - State Interaction in Republican Turkeyi", IMES, vol. 28, 1996, pp. 231-249. He criticises the conventional description of Islam and Kemalism as polar opposite. Instead, he examines the contingent relationship between the two, which makes up a complex interaction between Islam and the state.


whether Turkey, given the enormity of challenges ahead will succeed in achieving the hoped-for-synthesis, upon which depends her future role in the region (whether as a bridge, a balancer, an agent or a hegemon).

Democracy

Unlike secularism, democracy never figured so prominently in the Kemalist thought. In fact, democracy is not one of the ‘six arrows’ of the Republican People’s Party, which, as noted earlier, continues to be the core of Turkey’s official ideology. In the recent years, however, the progress of democratisation in Turkey has been seen as an index of her ‘Europeanness. The potential for Turkey’s ‘co-habitation’ with the European community (EC) countries is judged essentially in terms of her ability to

61. M. Heper, “State and Society in Turkish Political Experience” in Heper & Evin (ed.), State, Democracy and the Military, p. 9. Heper argues that the post-1980 state elite, unlike the post-Ataturk intellectual-bureaucratic elite, treated Ataturkian thought not as a political manifesto, nor did they presume that they were “inherently superior group in the possession of truth”. Instead, Ataturkian thought was taken as a ‘technique’ concerning public politics. Inherent in the new ideology is the belief that Turks have the capacity to “catch up and even surpass the contemporary civilization”. Supporting Heper’s contention, Ahmet Evin observes that the military has modified Ataturkism in a way so as to make it relevant in a polity of cultural pluralism. Evin, “State and Democracy: Changing patterns of cleavages Before and After 2980”, Ibid., p. 212.

62. Comenting on Turkey’s efforts to achieve a new balance between the materiality of the west and spirituality of the East, Bernard Lewis writes, “This is a vain hope – the clash of civilization in history does not usually culminate in a promiscuous cahabitation of good, bad and indifferent alike.” Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, p. 418. Also see a similar analysis by Ayse Kadioglu, “The Paradox of Turkish Nationalism and the Construction of Official Identity”, M.E. Studies, vol. 32, No.2, (April 1996), pp. 177-193. In contrast, those who sound optimistic about Turkey resolving the paradox of her nationalism argue “There is .... a specific Turkish national, political, cultural, and religious tradition coming together to form a Turkish national identity quite separate from that of the Arabs to the South and the Persians to the east”. Andrew Mango, “Turkey’s Vocation” in Erol Manisali (ed.), Turkey’s place in Europe: Economic, Political and Cultural Dimensions (Istanbul: Logos, 1988), pp. 10-11.
function within an orderly democratic environment under the rule of law.'"63 To the
degree the Turks have a cultural pattern that reflects the notion of liberal democratic
state, "to that extent", says Metin Heper, "they would better fit politically into the
EC."64

Democracy is as much an important domestic variable in Turkey’s foreign
policy-making today as it was in the post-World War II period when a radically
changed international political conjuncture induced Turkey to join the democratic club.
The decision to end the party state autocracy, which had continued almost uninterrupted
for more than twenty-five years, was at least partly prompted by foreign-policy
motivations.65 Because of her vacillating war-time policy, Turkey faced the prospect of
virtual isolation of which her powerful neighbour and traditional rival, Soviet union was
seeking to take advantage to establish domination in the Eastern Mediterranean:

63. Udo Steinbach, “Turkey-EEC Relations: The Cultural Dimension” in Manisali,
Ibid., p. 22.

64. Metin Heper, “Political Culture as a Dimension of Compatibility” in Turkey and the
West pp. 17. In the article Heper mainly focuses on the deficit of the ability not the
political responsibility of political actors to strike a balance between the views and
interests of particular groups and long-term interests of the community. What
Turkey is required to strive for is the ‘organic solidarity’ through consensus which
is dynamic as opposed to ‘mechanical solidarity’ which is static because it is
achieved through the fiat of state isolated from civil societal groups. In brief,
Turkey to co-habit within a Western context will have to reorient its political culture
compatible with the West. Ibid., pp. 14-17.

65 The foreign policy reasons for becoming democratic were only one of many
motivations. Many argue that the transition to competitive politics was in continuation
of Ataturk’s Europeanisation/Westernisation drive, and more so, it evolved from
Ataturk’s idea of populism, which refers to the sovereignty of the people. In fact,
President Ismet Inonu in an interview with Rustow categorically denied that foreign
policy considerations had influenced his decision. “All that slander spread about me, as
if I had been swimming with the stream”, Inonu said. Later, with a shrewd smile, he
added, “suppose I had been swimming with the stream, that, too, is a virtue”. D.
In this adversial regional security environment, “The only shield against Soviet ambitions seemed to be United States protection.” Consequently, the traditional Turkish Russophobia was on the rise, while the image of U.S. among the Turks had been greatly enhanced by its performance in the war. But, what was really impressive for average Turks was the proven American military prowess, especially the explosion of the atomic bomb, which, in the words of an Western analyst “imparted to the United States an aura of invincibility that would not be questioned in Turkey for many years to come.”

The image of Turks in the U.S. was, however, not favourable, partly because of low-level of diplomatic contact and partly, the general American sympathy for Armenians in eastern Turkey. All the same, the Turkish elites in their efforts to secure American pledges of support apparently pursued a two-pronged policy: 1) dramatising the Soviet menace and convincing Washington of Turkey’s geopolitical salience in the region; 2) transforming gradually the domestic political order so as to demonstrate

Rustow, “Transition to Democracy: Turkey’s Experience in Historical and Comparative Perspective” in Heper and Evin (ed.), *State, Democracy and Military*, pp. 245.


68 American trade with Turkey in the inter-war period was a fraction of one per cent of total American trade. Moreover, the disparaging American attitude towards the Turks like treating them as Central Asian barbarians was the product of a generation of denigration by missionary forces. Topping them all, the Roosevelt administration had no political ambitions in the West Asia, which continued to be recognised as Britain’s traditional sphere of influence during World War II. Consequently, the U.S. never exerted pressure on Turkey to give up its neutral position in support of the Allied powers, unlike the British and the Soviets who criticised Turkey for its supposed pro-Axis orientation. For the stereotyped image of the Turk held by Americans, see Howard Sachar, *The Emergence of the Middle East, 1914-1924* (New York, 1969), pp. 337-347.
Turkey’s commitment to “ideals cherished by America.” The second is as important as the first because promotion of such ‘ideals’ as democracy became one of the key foreign-policy goals of the U.S. after the Second World War. During this period, “American leaders were moved by a vision of what the global order should be like that was derived from American values and the American experiences – Lockean liberalism and a nonrevolutionary, democratic, prosperous historical evolution.”

Of all, American belief in the promotion of democracy world-wide mirrored in the rhetoric of the Atlantic Charter, and in the language of the UN Charter. In fact, domestic demands for the change-over to competitive politics grew stronger when the UN Charter, which Turkey signed in 1945, came before the Assembly for ratification. A group of deputies belonging to the RPP started arguing publicly that “Turkey by signing the charter had definitely engaged to practice genuine democracy”.

Following the expulsion of these dissidents led by Adnan Menderes and Fuad Koprulu,
other prominent leaders like former Prime Minister and compatriot of Ataturk, Celal Bayer resigned in support of their demand for political liberalization.

After a period of acute tension that arose from public schism within the party, President Ismet Inonu announced sweeping changes in the body-politic. Some of those important policy-decisions that eventually contributed to the systemic transformation included the provision for the formation of legal opposition political party, introduction of direct election and repealing of the laws restricting the freedom of expression and association. In short, Inonu’s November 1945 announcement in the Assembly set Turkey on the high road to liberal parliamentary democracy. By the time the next general election was held in July 1946, Turkey had a new opposition party, the Democratic Party led by the four RPP rebels. The transition process was, however, completed with the 14 May 1950 multi-party elections, in which over 88 per cent of one million eligible voters exercised their franchise, and more significantly, the opposition DP won overwhelmingly to rule the country for the next ten years.

In retrospect, one can find how the process of democratic transition in Turkey was linked to her post-World War II foreign policy adjustment, leading to a close alignment with the West. In the national-international linkage paradigm of Prof. Rosenau, the Turkish experience can fit into the category of what he calls the “emulative linkage process”, in which the “emulated behaviour is ordinarily undertaken independently of those who emulate it”. A similar indirect linkage

---

72 The process of political liberalisation initially conduced to the publication of leftist periodicals and dailies like Tan and Yeni Dunya. Besides, attempts were also made to launch left-wing parties like the Socialist workers’ and Peasants’ Party of Turkey. But in the face of growing Soviet hostility to Turkey, the suppression of Communist activities and propaganda by the government enjoyed popular support. Indeed, Turkey had its own version of McCarthyism at least months before the Republican senator Joseph McCarthy began his mission of cleansing American society of the Communist sympathisers.
process becomes evident in the years following the 12 September, 1980 military coup. Turkey’s ideological, political, economic and institutional linkage with the West, and its need and resolve to maintain those linkages made the military sensitive to the European pressures and influences.

The increasing political isolation of Turkey from individual member-state of the EC after suspension of its member-ship in the Parliamentary Assembly in 1980, even the threat of expulsion of Turkey from the Council of Europe and the pressures from European public opinion on the EC to withhold the release of economic aid linking it to the return of democracy – all acted as an “external stimulant of Turkey’s transition to a civilian regime in 1983.” This, indeed, presents a case of “positive linkage” between the actors (Western states and institutions) who initiate, and the polity (Turkish state), which experiences the change. For Turkey, this linkage has been particularly a crucial factor in determining the political attitude of the army.

---

73 James N. Rosenau, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press, 1971), p. 320. Rosenau in his study on foreign policy has used a ‘linkage’ as basic unit of analysis, defining it as any recurrent sequence of behaviour that originates in one system and is reacted to in another. He explains how an individual polity (state) influences and also gets influenced by its external environment (the international system) especially in the post-World War II global system in which “politics are increasingly dependent on their environments and interdependent with each other”. The ‘emulative type of linkage process’ is one of the three types – the other two are penetrative and reactive process – in which there is only an indirect link between the two. It corresponds to the so-called ‘diffusion’ or ‘demonstration’ effect whereby political activities in one country are emulated in another. Ibid., pp. 317-324.

74 Ihsan D. Dagi, “Democratic Transition in Turkey; 1980-83: The Impact of European Diplomacy”, in Middle East Studies, vol. 32, No. 2, April 1996, pp. 124. For further discussion, also see the Chapter IV.

75 According to Rosenau’s classification, Turkey’s post-1980 political experience can be described as a ‘reactive linkage process’. Rosenau; The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy, pp. 320.

76 William Hale, Turkish Politics and Military, p. 323 Refuting the thesis of global dependency, which argues that military in Third World generally acts as the Western/American powers’ instrument, Hale tries to project the Turkish case by ‘turning on its head’. There are still, many Turkish scholars who consider the linkage
As the norm of democratic participation becomes progressively embedded in Turkish political life, foreign policy of the country no longer remains the exclusive preserve of a narrow clique of Generals. On the contrary, an elite-led foreign policy has become subject to popular demands, and responsive to public opinion. According to Graham Fuller, "... it is quite possible that sobriety that has long characterised Turkish foreign policy will be increasingly affected by other domestic interests and emotions ... popular opinion now plays a greater role in the republic's foreign policy than ever before".77

Nature of Turkish Nationalism

While pluralist democracy and secular character of the state function as the means to achieve Turkey's long-term foreign policy goal of catching up with the developed Europe, Turkish nationalism or Turkism aims at providing the state with a strong identity in the international arena. It legitimises the actions of governments in defence of the 'national' interests (normative functions). "But in articulating national identity through foreign policy, the state is at the same time forming national identity".78 For national identity has no fixed essence, no stable core; it is constantly subject to revision, negotiation and interpretation. In short, construction of national identity is a continual project of which foreign policy constitutes an integral part.

---


Furthermore, “the concept of national security implies strongly that the object of security is the nation, and this raises questions about the links between nation and state.” If, for instance, there is a poor correspondence between the state and national identity, the state becomes vulnerable to challenges from within and without. Unlike in such primal nation-states as Japan, where nation precedes the state, bonds between the two are either weakly developed or poorly established in many state-nations. In the latter, state plays an instrumental role in creating nation, which, in turn requires the subordination of ethnic or other sub-national identities. Naturally, therefore, such states remain vulnerable to instability and internal conflict in ways not experienced by the natural nations.

Modern Turkey is perhaps the strongest example of state-nation model. For the unique Turkish national identity was not just manufactured by the post-imperial Kemalist state, also imposed upon the diverse Anatolian population as the primordial political identity. At the end of Turkey’s war of independence, Ataturk turned his back on the extra-territorial ethnic pan-Turkism, and opted for a territorial-citizen

79 Buzan, People, State and Fear, p. 45.

80 The state-nation model is top-down rather than bottom-up. This model has been successful in the U.S. Australia and many Latin American countries where populations were largely transplanted from elsewhere to fill an empty or weakly-held territory. But, in the countries with a multitude of nationalities and ethnic or tribal groups, the model has spawned domestic insecurity and external interferences. For a fuller discussion, see Mustafa Rejai and C.H. Enloc, “States and State-nations”, in Michael Smith et al (eds.), Perspectives on World Politics (London: Croom Helm, 1981), pp. 28-39.

81 Pan-Turkism, Pan-Turanianism and Turkism (Turkish nationalism) are not the same phenomenon, although they were used as one and the same thing from time to time. In terms of origins, aim and duration, there were differences between the three. For example, Pan-Turanianism has its origins in Hungary against Pan-salvism by seeking to unify the ‘Turanian race’ which includes Magyars and Finns in addition to the Turks. Pan-Turkism, on the other hand, originally grew up at the beginning of 20th century in Russia among the Volga Tatars and Azeris in opposition to the Czarist rule. It aims at the unification of all Turkic peoples (the Turkish race) namely the Turks of Central Asia, Azerbaijan, China, Turkey, Iraq, Western Thrace, Bulgaria, Iran and Cyprus.
nationalism with pre-Islamic memories. Accordingly, the Anatolian heartland became the new focus of loyalty, whereas the term 'Turk' used derogatorily under the Ottomans was re-invested with positive ethnic potential and harmonised with the Western concept of a territorial nation.

The historians, for instance, under the direct patronage of Ataturk created the common myth of belonging to a distant but special land-Central Asia - which was the cradle of all civilizations of the World including that of the Turks. The purpose of

There are, according to an estimate, more than 120 million Turkish speaking peoples scattered in this vast territories stretching from Adriatic sea to the borders of China. According to Ziya Gokalp, a leading Pan-Turkist theorist and literary precursor of modern Turkish nationalism, the union of all Turkic peoples (Ulus) will form what he called Turan, the land of Turks. Heyd Uriel, Foundations of Turkish Nationalism (London, 1950), pp. 126-130; also see Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (Montreal: McGill Union Press, 1964), pp. 337-365. Turkism, unlike the other two, advocates cultural nationalism rather than racial nationalism. It is not irredentist and thus does not seek political unification of all Turkic peoples. However, in Turkish language, the very word Turkcu refers both to Turkist and pan-Turkist.

By the WW I, the irredentist Turkism of Russian emigres was adopted as a guiding principle of state policy by a section of young Turks. But the same war brought discredit to the irredentist ambitions following the defeat of Ottoman Empire. However, hopes of a Pan-Turkish Empire of the Turkish and Tatar peoples flared up in the wake of Russia's Bolshevik Revolution. The minister of War- Enver Pasha, who subscribed to Pan-Turkist ideal led a revolt in Turkestan against Soviet Government for the liberation of Russian Turks and died in the battle in August 1922. For details, see Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 352-356; Jacob Landau, Panturkism: A Study of Turkish Irredentism (Connecticut: The Sheo String Press, 1981), pp. 44-76.


In decreeing that the borders of state and nation should coincide Ataturk sought to bind the identity of the state (physical base) and nation (idea of the state) to one another. Thus, territoriality forms an inherent part of Turkish nationalist ideology. The proof of this is the articulation of the concept called National Pact (Misak-i-Milli), which defined the borders of Anatolia as the official borders of modern Turkey.
inventing a collective myth pertaining to the Central Asian origins of the Turks was to provide the Anatolian Turkish population with ethnicity, historicity, and a "sense of territorial rootedness". For the myth of descent is needed for arousing the feeling of attachment to a historic homeland. "It is the attachment and association", writes Anthony Smith, "rather than residence or possession of the land that matters for ethnic identification". Likewise, the famous Sun Language Theory claiming Turkish to be the mother of all languages was meant to elevate the status of the vernacular spoken by the common Turkish people.

In all, 'Turkishness' or the notion of Turkism was an artificial politico-ideological construct imposed upon the disparate people of Anatolia to forge cohesion so as to create a modern nation-state on European model. In fact, the Turkish system is modelled on the concept of French nation-state wherein citizenship is based on the rights of the individual rather than on ethnic or religious identity. In brief, it implies

84 Anthony Smith, *Ethnic Origins*, p. 148. In case of the Turks of Anatolia, piece of territory as defined by the national Pact did not appear historic at the beginning. Therefore, the task of writing the national history was regarded as a political mission during the initial years of the Republic. For instance, the official historical doctrine as it developed in the 1930s pointed to the early roots of the Turkish people of Anatolia including such peoples as Hittitiss of antiquity. For details, see Busra Ersanhi Behar, *Iktidar va Tarih: Turkiye 'de Resmi Tarih Tezninin Olusumu (1929-1937)* (Istanbul: April 1992)


86 In the French concept of nation-state, 'nation' is understood as a territorial-civic community. It has its roots in the French Revolution's idea of Patrie (Fatherland) and in the writings of Rousseau, Diderot and other Encyclopedists. The nation is a community based on laws and lawful institutions with duties and rights regardless of ethnicity. In contrast, German Romantics, Herder and Fichte describe nation as a natural phenomenon with its roots in language and culture. The assumption here is
that citizenship and nationhood are one; there is no legal barrier or structural
discrimination on the basis of ethnicity in so far as the social mobility of citizens are
concerned. Also, as a Turkish scholar has pointed out, it seeks to liberate the individual
by repressing the collective/communal identities. 87

The emphasis on Turkish identity, regardless of ethnic background, proved to be
extremely valuable in the initial years of the Republic particularly in aborting the
Armenian and Kurdish aspirations for statehood, which would have destroyed the
spatial cohesion of Anatolia. Comparing Reza Shah's Iranian nationalist ideology with
that of Atatürk's Turkish one, Nikki Keddie has argued that the former was ultimately
less successful among the people than Atatürk's "artificial" ideology mainly because
Iran was more backward and less integrated than Turkey and because Reza Shah lacked
Atatürk's past as a national hero. 88

All the same, the dogma of homogeneity imposed by Atatürk did carry with it
the risk of alienating the national minorities, especially the Kurds who constitute a
sizeable proportion of Turkish population. In fact, it was during the Kemalist period
that the seeds of a stronger Kurdish national identity were sown as a reaction to the

made of the existence of nation outside of state-formation, and people are tied together
through ethnic identity, Giestines Volk. However, all nations bear the impress of both
territorial and ethnic principles and components and represent an uneasy confluence of
more recent 'civic' and a more ancient 'genealogical' model of social and cultural
organisations.” Anthony Smith, Ethnic Origins, p. 149. For further discussion of
country-formation in Western Europe, see Homi K. Bhabha (ed.) Nation and Narration
(London: Routledge, 1990), esp. Introduction Chapter: (Walker Connor, Ethno-
nationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton: Princeton University press,
1994).

87 Ayse Gunes - Ayata and Sencer Ayata, “Ethnicity and Security Problems in
Turkey” in Lenore G. Martin, (ed.), New Frontiers in Middle East Security (London:

88 Nikki R. Keddie, Iran and the Muslim World: Resistance and Revolution (London:
forcible imposition of the Turkish one. Despite attempts at their forced assimilation and incorporation by the successive governments, many Kurds have refused to identify themselves with Ataturk’s famous maxim, “Happy is the one who calls himself a Turk”. For “the Kurds”, according to an analyst, “are a multi-lingual, multi-religious, multi-racial nation, but with a unified independent and identifiable national history and culture.”

Rather than integrating its Kurdish population, Turkey’s official denial of the Kurds as a distinct ethnic category has over the years contributed to a progressive radicalisation of the Kurdish nationalism (Kurdayeti). If, the PKK has emerged as the focal point of nationalist Kurdish resistance to Turkish rule, it is not due to its Marxist-Leninist ideology, which remains alien to local mentality. Nor is it because the majority Kurds share the PKK’s ultimate goal of establishing an independent state.

---

89 Henri J. Barkey and Graham E. Fuller, “Turkey’s Kurdish Question: Critical Turning points and Missed Opportunities”, Middle East Journal, vol. 51, no.1 (Winter, 1997), p. 64. The authors further add, “Kemalists inadvertently succeeded in creating two distinct nationalities: a Turkish and a Kurdish one, even if the latter would need another generation to blossom fully. Ibid., p. 64.


91 The Turkish authorities do not acknowledge that the Kurds exist. They are generally categorised as the “mountain Turks” or the “eastern compatriots”, and their language is portrayed as a “rotten branch of Turkish”. Besides, the 1961 constitution of the Republic, which envisaged that every citizen of the Turkish state was a ‘Turk’. So does the 1982 constitution. While Article 2 of the Constitution proscribes any thoughts or opinions “Contrary to Turkish National interests, the principle of the existence of Turkey as an indivisible entity with its state and territory”, Article 14 prohibits any kind of regional autonomy arrangement for distinctive ethnic population like Kurds and Article 28 warns of legal actions against those who advocate cultural rights for non-Turkish (i.e. Kurds). Likewise, Article 89 of the Turkish law concerning political parties forbids political parties wedded to diffusion of any non-Turkish language or culture to create minorities. See, Hurst Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty and Self Determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990), pp. 188-189; Paul J. Magnarella, “Turkey” in Paul J. Magnarella (ed.), Middle East and North Africa: Governance, Democratisation, Human Rights (Aldershot; Ashgate, 1999), pp. 148-150.
Instead, it is the strong mono-ethnic tendency on the part of the state elites combined with an almost psychotic fear of the loss of ‘national unity’, which has strengthened the symbolic value of the PKK, the only surviving organisation that upholds the concept of Kurdish identity.

As long as the authorities in Ankara pursue an exclusively military solution notwithstanding the recent capture of the PKK leader, Abdullah (Apo) Ocalan, foreign policy of Turkey will remain hostage to domestic insecurity arising from the Kurdish struggle for autonomy. It has already created societal polarisation along ethnic lines, posing a dire threat to the cohesion of the Jacobin national state forged by its founder. In the past decade, the growth of Kurdish insurgency has offered Turkey’s hostile neighbours an alternative way of exerting leverage over Ankara. Even as the PKK-led movement begins to peter out in the aftermath of Apo’s expulsion from Syria, Turkey’s regional rivals; notably Iran and Russia, continue to dobble with the PKK factions with a view to deflecting Ankara from an activist foreign policy in the ‘Greater West Asia’.

While Syria no longer represents a serious security challenge to Turkey, northern Iraq has become its constant source of worry. For the absence of strong state authority in the area since Iraq’s Gulf crisis defeat in 1991 has benefited the PKK partisans particularly in consolidating their forward bases close to Turkey’s border.

92 For the Developments leading to the capture of Apo in Kenya by the Turkish security forces in February 1999, see Alistair Bell, “Chronology of the Ocalan Affair”, Reuters on-line, 16 February 1999; Michael Jansen, “The capture of Ocalan: Turkey’s Gain, Europe’s Shame”, Middle East International, 26 February 1999, pp. 4-6.

93 The ‘Greater West Asia’ includes the newly independent Central Asian states apart from those originally belong to the region. The term “Greater Middle East” was first used in the immediate aftermath of the break-down of the USSR by some scholars in the West. See, P. Robins, “The Middle East And Central Asia” in Peter Ferdinand
region. In all “the Kurdish issue is both an internal and foreign policy issue for Turkey: the Kurdish issue in the internal domain affects foreign policy, and vice versa”.94

That the Kurdish issue has remained a critical variable in Turkey’s foreign policy-making becomes evident in its increasingly strained relations with the Western world, especially the European Union.95 Much of the Western criticism about Turkey’s poor human rights record and democratic standards stems from its treatment of the Kurdish minority population. In fact, Ankara’s failure to provide for a non-military, political solution to the Kurdish conflict96 is considered by many EU members the ground for Turkey’s non-inclusion in the enlargement process of the

---


95 In the December 1997 Luxembourg summit, European Council decided not to include in its enlargement process even though Turkey had applied for full membership way back in 1987. The decision was based on the EU’s concern about the human rights violation in Turkey. Already the Council had adopted a set of Criteria for EU membership in its Copenhagen summit in June 1993. The criteria included, among others, stable institutions governing democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and the minorities. In brief, the European Union has a clear position on membership; democracy is a must. Furthermore, in the post-cold-war period, the mainstream European approach to the issue of minorities varies substantially from the Turkish state doctrine of the indivisibility of the nation that denies the existence of ethnic minorities such as the Kurds. For details, see Meltem Muftuler-Bac, “The Never-ending Story: Turkey and the European Union” in Sylvia Kedourie (ed.) Turkey Before and After Atatürk (London: French Cass, 1999), pp. 240-258; Philip Robins, “Turkey: Europe in the Middle East, or Middle East in Europe” in B.A. Roberson (ed.), The Middle East and Europe: The Power Deficit (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 162-164.

96 As an alternative to Turkey’s current military approach to the Kurdish issue, political solution suggested by its Western partners involves a dialogue with the PKK, greater devolution of power to strengthen local participation in political process and a measure of cultural and administrative autonomy based on the Basque Model. Besides, Turkey will have to dismantle the institutions it has employed to repress the Kurds, such as the village groups and emergency laws, and end such practices as the deportation of the villages in the south-eastern provinces. See Henri J. Barkey, “Turkey’s Kurdish Dilemma”, Survival, vol. 35, no.4 (winter 1993), pp. 66-67.
Organisation in the years 2000. In other words, Turkish government's handling of its Kurdish problem is used as the yardstick by which the state of democracy in the country is judged. Thus, if the issue of Kurds were allowed to fester, European pressures on Turkey are certain to grow, blighting its already slim chances of full membership in the EU.

Internally, the Kurdish ethnic activism has served to fuel radical Turkish nationalism represented by the late Alparslan Turkes' National Movement Party (MHP). Once on the political margin, the MHP today constitutes a formidable force winning over 18 per cent of popular votes in the last municipal and legislative elections. Ideologically though the movement is wedded to the ideal of Pan-Turkic unity, the party programme suggests it to be "the product of a defensive obsession with the preservation of the Turkish state". Since the mid-1980s, the PKK has been identified as the principal enemy of the Turkish nation, which it believes has to be challenged and destroyed. With such a pro-fascist party becoming a partner in the governing

---

97 The PKK terror campaign particularly in the 1990s triggered off counter ethnic chauvinism inside Turkey. For example, funerals of the soldiers who were killed in the clashes with terrorists often turned into political rallies against the PKK. Even the ordinary football matches were turned into demonstrations against the separatists, widening the gap between the Kurds and Turks. Through mobilising anti-PKK sentiments, the MHP gradually gained popularity, and improved its electoral prospects. See A. Adnain Akcay, "Southeastern Question and same Unintentional but Inevitable Effects on Turkish Society", *Orient*, vol. 38, no.2 (1997), pp. 277-285; "All about MHP", *Turkish Daily News*, 27 April 1999.


99 The founder of the MHP once threatened the Kurds with "a final solution" of the kind that had been adopted by the unionist Government towards the Armenians in 1915. "If the Kurds" Turkes warned, "run after the illusion of creating a state, their destiny
coalition of the day, prospects of a political or civilian solution to Turkey’s Kurdish tangle appear bleak. But, longer the conflict drags on, greater are the pressures on the country’s foreign policy establishment, especially at a time when Ankara seeks for itself the role of a regional power. 

Finally, the latest surge of ethnic chauvinism inside Turkey is attributed to the catalytic developments in the former Soviet Union resulting in the ‘liberation’ of the Turkic populations in the southern Soviet republics. Further, the heated public reaction to the reports of near-geocidal experiences of Turkic peoples in Bosnia, Chechnya and Azerbaijan has created an atmosphere in which the distinction between the ethnonym Turk and a citizen of the Republic of Turkey is getting blurred. This trend has been complemented by the official tolerance for greater ethnic expression, including political expression by Turkey’s large immigrant communities (see table 2.5). Though absorbed into the “children of the country” (memleket Cocuklari), they have always remained acutely sensitive to Turkic separatism or the Pan-Turkic cause. “These ethnic elements”, to quote Graham Fuller, “represent a new public pressure group in the

will be wiped off the face of the earth”, quoted in Hamit Bozarslan, “Political Aspects of the Kurdish Problem in Contemporary Turkey” in Philip and Sperl, The Kurds, p. 104. Also, the MHP leadership is currently opposed to any amnesty being granted to the PKK supremo Ocalan, who is already given death penalty by the State security court, and continues to resist the “repentance law” meant to entice the PKK combatants who lay down arms. See, Nicole Pope, “Turkey: The Political Aftershocks”, Middle East International, 3 September 1999, p. 4-5.


formulation of Turkish foreign policy – a process that is increasingly less the sole preserve of an elitist Foreign Ministry". 102

Assessment

As the preceding analysis shows, role of ideology in Turkish foreign policy system is limited to providing an intellectual framework through which policy-makers observe reality and organise their vision of political development. Although its Western/secular component of "official ideology" lays down long-term goal of becoming a "part of Europe", Turkey does not claim to have a purely ideological foreign policy – one that "seeks transformation of international society". 103 Not unnaturally, therefore, Turkey faces no dichotomy or conflict between ideology and national interests, which is not so unusual in case of the revolutionary regimes like the former Soviet Union, China or Iran. All the same, the nationalist component of the state ideology has brought to the fore the apparent contradictions between the notion of Turkism and the long-term foreign policy goal of elevating Turkey to the level of "contemporary civilization".


103 R.W. Cottam, Foreign Policy Motivation (Pittsburgh, 1977), P. 41. According to Cottam, the ideological goals of foreign policy differ from country to country depending on the nature of the regime. The foreign policy behaviour of the revolutionary Iran, for instance, "has been much more influenced by certain Islamic aspirations, at times at great national costs". S.T. Hunter, Iran and the World: Continuity in a Revolutionary Decade (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), p. 13. For a discussion of the consequences of Marxism-Leninism as an ideology in Soviet foreign policy, see Holsti, International Politics, pp. 159-165.
PRINCIPLES OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

The basic principles of Turkish foreign policy were largely defined by the founding father of the Republic, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Some Turkish foreign policy analysts even argue that “the seeds of today’s foreign policy can be found in the National Pact’ (Misak-i Milli) of January 28, 1920.”104 “Friendship with every nation”, “peace at home, peace abroad”, “Turkey has no perpetual enemy” are some of the primordial tenets of Kemalist foreign policy. In the words of Ataturk,

The state should pursue an exclusively national policy and .... this policy should be in perfect agreement with over national organisation and based on it. When I speak of national policy, I mean it in this sense: To work within our national boundaries for the real happiness of our nation and the country by, above all, relying on our own strength to retain our existence.105

In brief, Kemalist foreign policy was to be based on national interests, self-reliance, non-expansionism and preservation of territorial integrity of Anatolia. Indeed, security of the Anatolian Turks continues to be an irreducible tenet of Turkish foreign policy strategy. The policies that have flowed from this core have all been subsidiary and designed to serve this objective in the light of changing historical circumstances. Until recently, the subsidiary goals – Modernisation and Westernisation – have been relatively constant and without contradictions inter se.106


105 These statements are from A speech Delivered by Ghazi Mustafa Kemal, October 1927 (Leipzig: K.F. Koehlen, 1929) pp. 378-379, and 657.

106 This aspect is comprehensively dealt in the Chapter IV.
The second most important component of the Kemalist foreign policy traditions is the nature of relations with its neighbours, notably the former Soviet Union, Iran and Arab states. The Soviet Union was the first country to sign a treaty of friendship with the emergent Turkish republic. Although it remained an unflinching ideological opponent against communism at home, Kemalist Turkey disengaged from the intra-Soviet politics of the region. Likewise, Turkey's foreign policy in West Asia under Ataturk was guided by the basic principles of avoiding entanglements in intra-regional disputes and developing friendly relations with all regardless of the nature of the regimes prevailing then. Ideologically, however, Ataturk had been opposed to colonialism and imperialism in the Arab provinces of the former Ottoman Empire. In fact, Ataturk considered the Turkish War of liberation as a war of the oppressed against the oppressors. ¹⁰⁷

Officially, Turkish foreign policy is described as unchanging, consistent, credible and based on a national consensus. ¹⁰⁸ The fundamental goals of national policy, as determined under Ataturk, have not really changed much; they have become better defined and updated to meet the more exacting requirements of the world today. In this context, the strategy that Turkey forged with the onset of the Cold War in the 1950s has to be seen as an attempt at adaptation to the global political changes that the end of World War II had brought about.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERIOD</th>
<th>REGIME</th>
<th>DOMINANT FACTIONS IN ORDER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1924-1946</td>
<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td>President as Principal Decision Maker, RPP, Bureaucracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946-1960</td>
<td>Multi-Party Democratic</td>
<td>Political Elites: Prime Minister and his cabinet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-1961</td>
<td>Guardian-type Praetorian</td>
<td>State Elites: Military and Bureaucracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-1971</td>
<td>Multi-Party Democratic</td>
<td>Political Elites: Political Parties, Civil society associations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-1973</td>
<td>Moderator/veto Type Praetorian</td>
<td>Military, Non-partisan political elite, Bureaucracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-1980</td>
<td>Multi-Party Democratic (Coalition Governments)</td>
<td>Political Elites: Parties, associations and personalities (i.e. Premier Ecevit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-1983</td>
<td>Guardia type Praetorian</td>
<td>Military, technocratic elite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983 onwards</td>
<td>Transitional Democracy</td>
<td>Mixed: Military, Political elites and technocratic elites</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2.2  
TURKISH MASS MEDIA: A PROFILE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>News papers Foreign</th>
<th>Leading Commentators/ columnists on Foreign Affairs</th>
<th>Coverage of Affairs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cumhuriyet</td>
<td>Oktay Akbal, Mehmed Kemal, Erguın Balci</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gunaydin</td>
<td>Ardan Zenturk</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gunes</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hurriyet</td>
<td>Haluk Ulman and Sevik Adali</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milliyet</td>
<td>M. Ali Birand, Metin Toker And Mumtaz Sosyal</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tecuman</td>
<td>Mrs. Zazli Ilicak</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dunya</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabah</td>
<td>Gungor Mengi, and Kenan Martan</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkiye</td>
<td>Mehmet Okay</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaman</td>
<td>Fehmi Koru</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Turkish Daily News (English)</td>
<td>Ilur Cevik, M. Ali Birand</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: There are well over 1,000 newspapers, weeklies and periodicals. Many of these are local newspapers with limited circulation and little real news. Some of the important News Magazines are Tempo, Nokta and 2000 Dorgu. The leading news agency of the Country is Anadolu Ajansi (The Anatolian News Agency), which was established by Ataturk in 1922.

* Turkish Daily News (TND) is the only English daily based in Ankara whereas, all other major Turkish-language dailies have their headquarters and editorial staff in Istanbul, which continues to be the centre of the country’s press activity.
Table 2.3

OCCUPATIONS OF CADET OFFICERS' FATHERS, 1982-84

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ARMY</th>
<th>NAVY</th>
<th>AIR FORCE</th>
<th>TOTAL POPULATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military and Gendarmerie</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>1.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Servants</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>29.04</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labourers</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>21.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traders/Merchants</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>57.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.4
COMMAND STRUCTURE OF TURKISH ARMED FORCES

CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF

HO Staff  Staff College

Land Forces Commander

Air Force Commander  Navy Commander  Gendarmerie Commander

1st Tactical A.F. (Fachkohir)  2nd Tactical A.F. (Kasımpaşa)

1st Army Command

2nd Army Command

3rd Army Command

4th Army Command

Army Corps Commands

Army Corps Commands

Army Corps Command

Army Corps Command

### Table 2.5

**Turkey’s Immigrant Communities And Their Political Activities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUPS</th>
<th>SIZE</th>
<th>PERIOD OF MIGRATION</th>
<th>ORGANISED ACTIVITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crimean Tatars</td>
<td>5 million</td>
<td>Annexation of Crimea by Catherine the Great in 1783; After Russo-Turkish War, 1877-78</td>
<td>Kirim Turkler Yardımlasma Cemiyeti (KTYC – Aid Society of Crimean Turks) founded in 1954; its journal known as Emel (aspiration).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azeris</td>
<td>3 to 4 million</td>
<td>Sovietization of the Republic of Azerbaijan in 1920; those displaced in Armenian SSR during the period</td>
<td>Azerbaycan Milli Merkezi – AMNI (National Centre of Azerbayzan) set up in 1924 in Istanbul, currently in Ankara; Azerbaycan Kuklur Dernegi AKD (Azerbaijan Cultural Association) established in 1949; Azerbaycan Turkleri Kultur ve Danis Dernegi – ATKDD (Culture and Information Association of the Turks of Azerbaijan) founded in 1990 in Istanbul - it has a Newspaper called Hazar (Caspian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Caucasians (Circassians, and Abhaz)</td>
<td>2 million</td>
<td>Between 1859 and 1914; during the WW II those supportive of Germany in migrated in 1865</td>
<td>Kuzey Kafkasya Yardımlasma Dernegi (North Caucasus Aid Association) established in 1953 in Istanbul; Ankara Kuzey Kafkasya Kultur Dernegi (Ankara North Caucasian Cultural Association); monthly Journal Kaddagi (name of the mythical mountain to which prometheus was chained);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chechens</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>The Cardak Dernegi (Cardak Association) – an association of the Chechens in Istanbul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnians</td>
<td>2 to 3 million</td>
<td>During the inter-war period; post WW II, especially in the mid-1950s and 1960s; disintegration of former Yugoslavia</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkestanis</td>
<td>About 50,000</td>
<td>After WW II as independent immigrants</td>
<td>Turkistani Milli Birliği TMB (Turkistan National Union) founded in 1924; Turkistan Turkler Gençler Birliği, TTGB (Turkistani Turk Youth Union)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Afghans of Turkic stock | N.A. | After Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 | N.A. |
| Mesketian Turks | 150,000 | After WW II from the former USSR | N.A. |
| Turcomans/ Turkmen | N.A. | -do- | N.A. |

Notes:

1. Jordan, not Turkey, has the largest Chechen diaspora community settled there when it was an Ottoman province in the 19th century. See, Anthony Hymen, “In the Shadow of the Chechen War; the Caucasus and Central Asia Take Stock”, *Middle East International*, 22 September 1995, pp. 16-17.

2. By 1980s, Turkish official records show 303,000 refugees from Yugoslavia in addition to 488,000 from Bulgaria. By 1989, another 300,000 Turks had come from Bulgaria alone. After the breakdown of Yugoslavia, nearly 25,000 Bosnians found refuge in Turkey. For the latest figure of Bosnian republics, see Morton Abramowitz, “Dateline Ankara: Turkey After Ozal”, *Foreign Policy*, No. 91, (Summer 1993), pp. 168-170.

3. Turkistanis mainly include those from Western China, known as Uygurs from Xinjiang province. Their language belongs to the East Turkic Karluk group; they are related to Uzbek and found largely in Kazakhstan.

4. After the closure of TTGB in 1940, the post WW II period saw the creation of Turkistanlilar Kultur Dernegi (Turkish cultural Association) in 1952 by a renowned Turanist Mustafa Chokay. His followers established in Ankara the Turkistanlilar Yardimlasma Dernegi (Turkistani Aid Association) in 1953. Besides, Turkistanis from the former USSR founded in Istanbul the Turkistanlilar Kultur ve Sosyal Yardimlasna Dernegi (Turkish Cultural Aid Association) – TKSYD. It publishes a journal called Turkistan which is being sent to Central Asian states. The Turkistan Arastirmaları Vakfı (Turkistan Research Foundation) was established in August 1990 in Istanbul. It organises yearly Kurultay or congress since then with participants from the Turkic states of Central Asia.

5. Turcomans are largely found in northern Iraqi towns of Mosul and Kirkuk which host more than 25,000 of them according to the official Iraqi statistics. But Turkish press gives larger estimate upto 1.5 million Turcomans in the region. It may be noted that Turkey’s leading educationist and founder of Hecettepe University in Ankara, Prof. İhsan Dogramaci’s family belongs to the Turcoman community.