Chapter I

DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENT:
HISTORICAL LEGACIES AND
POWER RESOURCES
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND:

"Among the nations that have flourished and decayed, ruled and been conquered, the Turkish nation stands out by reason of its formative and recuperative power. Founders, rulers, heirs and losers of one of the great empires, a power mighty in three continents, the Turks have experienced all the vicissitudes a people can undergo".  

The long history of the Turks— from their advent into Asia Minor as the pastoral nomads, consolidated by the victory at Manzikert to the foundation of the Ottoman Empire, and its ultimate collapse to the emergence of the modern nation-state—has probably no parallel in the world. The origins of the Turks who established an empire that at one time stretched from the gates of Vienna to the straits of Bab al-Mandib, and from the Caucasus to the Atlantic ocean remain wrapped up in legend and obscurity.

The westward movement of the Turkish tribes continued in the years between 800 to 1000 A.D. when the Arabs first came in contact with them in Turkestan. The second Abbasid Caliph, Al-Mansur had a small corps of Turkish warriors. It was during the reign of the Caliph. Al-Muatasim that Turkish tribesmen were recruited as the regular body-guards. In fact, this marked the beginning of the Turkish era of the Abbasid Caliphate, if not of Turkish rule of Dar-al-Islam (the Domian of Islam).  

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1 Phillip Pareth, Turkey: Decadence and Rebirth (London, 19430, p. 9.

2 At the famous battle of Manzikert, the Turkish-Seljuk Sultan Alp Arslan defeated the Byzantine Emperor Romanos IV. Thereafter, most of Asia Minor (the Greeks called Anatolia) passed under the control of the Seljuk-Turks who had already established an independent principality on the decadence of the Arab-Caliphate in the Eastern abode of Dar-al-Islam. For details see, P. Wittek, The Rise of the Ottoman Empire (London, 1938).

The Osmanli group of Turks or the Ottomans as they came to be known by Europeans were not one of those original Turkish people who were involved in the political affairs of the Caliphs of Baghdad. Their movement into the region began much later, stimulated in part by the rise of the Mongol Empire in Asia during the 13th and 14th centuries.

As the Mongol power began to decline, the Turkish groups who were settled in the Islamic Byzantium borderland, known as the “defenders of the faith” (Ghazis) rose into prominence. The Osmanli group was from one of those Turkish principalities (beyliks) on the frontiers of the Islamic world. And, “it was destined within a century to unite Anatolia and the Balkans under its sovereignty, and to develop into an Islamic Empire”.

At the turn of the 14th century, the small state of Osman continued to expand, first towards the west but led towards the east till the Turks crossed the Dardanelles and entered the European parts of the decaying Byzantine Empire. Simultaneously,

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4 The Osmanli or Ottoman Turks were so called after the founder of the dynasty, Osman or Ottoman (1259-1326). Osman was the leader of a small clan of the Kayi – this tribal nucleus, however, played a negligible part in the formation of a state which did not have a tribal character even at its inception.

5 The immediate result of the Mongol invasion of the Near East from the 1220 was the westward migration of the Turcomans, the powerful nomadic Turkish tribes. They had arrived first from Central Asia in Iran and eastern Anatolia, and after Mongols’ invasion moved westwards, concentrating on the frontier between Byzantium (East Roman Empire) and the Seljuk Sultanate, in the mountainous regions of western Anatolia. On the ‘marches’, or war frontiers between them special military organisations had emerged on both the Byzantium and the Turkish sides. The Byzantium ‘march’ warriors were called the Akritoi; the Turkish host was made up of Ghazis who came from distant parts of the world. Interestingly, these frontiers forces were an eclectic mixture of nationalities and languages, forming a distinct population. For details see, Paul Wittek, The Rise of the Ottoman Empire, pp. 33-34, and Halil Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire (London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1978).

Ottoman Sultanate expanded across Asia Minor gradually absorbing all of Seljuk Turk principalities in that region. After a temporary halt in the expansion of the Ottoman Sultanate in 1401 because of the Mongolian invasion of Timur Lenk (Tamerlane), Sultan Mehmet II conquered Constantinople, the capital city of the long-moribund East Roman Empire in 1453. The imperial capital of the Ottoman Empire was set up there what became known as the Muslim city, Istanbul (Islambul) the city where “Islam bounds”. The Ottoman state soon emerged as the invincible world power after the conquest of the Arab-speaking lands in West Asia by Selim I (1512-20) and Suleyman the Magnificent (1520-66).

The Ottoman conquests continued until 1715, though the highwater mark of the Empire as a subjugating force was reached in the late 16th and early 17th centuries. For, the Ottoman territory at this point embraced the whole of Southeastern Empire to the Danube river. It included Tatar provinces in the Crimea as the Ottoman Empire stretched around the entire circumference of the Black Sea. It also encompassed most of the West Asia except Iran and North Africa with Morocco alone escaping its grasp. In addition, Ottoman control over the holy cities of Mecca and Medina gave it legitimacy as the Islamic Empire. Henceforth the Sultans adopted the title of Caliph of Islam. 8

Prior to this, Bursa (Brussa), captured by Orhan, the son of Osman was the Osmanli capital. However, it was Mehmet II, the conqueror, who was the true founder of the Ottoman Empire. “He established an empire in Europe and Asia with its capital at Istanbul which was to remain the nucleus of the Ottoman Empire for four centuries. He used the title of ‘Sovereign of the Two Lands’ – Rumelia and Anatolia – and of ‘the Two Seas’ – the Mediterranean and Black Sea”, Halil Inalcik, op. cit., p. 29.

Earlier on, the Ottoman Sultans had a common title called the Padishah. In the mid-16th century, they assumed the rank of a Caliph, the successor of the ‘prophet’ and “Shadow of God on Earth”. Ever since the Mongol invasion had brought to an end the nominal existence of the Caliphate in the 13th century “there was a natural tendency for the Sultans of the Islamic world to seek to elevate their status by debasing the Caliphat title: it thus became normal for any Islamic ruler of any significance to omake some
The Ottoman Administration

Within 100 years, the Osmanli Turks from an organisation of ghazis created a colossal military and political power that territorially replaced the Roman Empire of the East. Unlike its Roman predecessor, the Ottoman Empire, spread over three continents became increasingly heterogeneous. “This multi-ethnic and multi-religious Ottoman state achieved internal cohesion through a socio-ethnic balance whose durability was enhanced by lack of national ideology at state and government level.”

Second important characteristic of the Osmanli state was the three distinct mainstreams of influence that contributed to the formation of the Ottoman organizational patterns. They were local (Mongol, Byzantine and Balkan), Turkish, and Islamic (both Arab and Persian). “Byzantium provided little more than a site and the Turks little
gesture in the direction of Caliphate status and the Ottomans were no exception to the general scramble”. M.A. Cook, “Introduction”, op. cit., p. 4.  


10 Bernard Lewis has distinguished these three main elements of the Turkish culture. According to him, the first is a “composite one that for want of better name, we may call local”. Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London: OUP, 1961), p. 3. It is debatable to determine which one of these elements was predominant in the Ottoman polity. Some leading historians such as A.J. Toynbee and S.N. Fisher seem to believe in predominance of the pre-Islamic Turkish traditions. Similarly, Halide Edib confirming this, argues that the Turkish nomadic tradition was the best part of the Ottoman organisation pattern. Because it was a combination of discipline and responsibility which made the Turk “a democrat and an autocrat at the same time”. See A.J. Toynbee, A Study of History, vol. III (London, OUP, 1954); S.N. Fisher, Social Forces in the Middle East (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1955); Halide Edib, Turkey Faces West (New Haven: Yale University, 1930), p. 45. Finally, Islam had a constitutive role in both the origin of the Ottoman state as well as in shaping its polity subsequently. Whether it was in the realm of Ottoman law (based on Seriat) or the institutional structure (such as Kadi or chief Mufti) there was, complete identification of the Ottoman Turks with Islam. The Islamic element is evidently pre-dominant. For details see, Bernard Lewis, op. cit., p. 36.
more than a language, it was Islam which gave the venture its meaning". The
Ottoman state in real sense of the term, was not Turkish, it was rather known as
Memalik-I Osmaniye or, more recently Osmanlı İmparatorluğu (Ottoman Empire).

Another characteristic of the Ottoman polity, no less significant, was the ethnic
balance primarily through religious tolerance. This was effected by the strict segregation
of other communities from the Muslims. The non-Islamic religious groups enjoyed self-
government in matters of culture, religion and private relations under the Millet
system. It was not until the dawn of 19th century when the national minorities began
to rebel against Ottoman authority, the millet system was ever considered to be a source
of weakness or point of centrifugal political forces.

Despite this fragmentation, the ottoman administration remained highly
centralised. The supremacy of the central government, that is, the political authority of
the Sultan prevailed over all-personal, cultural and religious spheres. This was, in
essence a statist system, the durability and strength of which rested on three major
pillars of support: I) the loyalty to the Sultan – state, ii) the central army, notably the
Janissaries, iii) the central bureaucracy consisted of the kul (servant-slave of the

11 M.A. Cook, op. cit., p. 3.

12 Only the foreigners called the Empire "Turkish" and even 'Turk' was synonymous
with Islam. A Western convert to Islam was called a Turk. Moreover the word
'Turk' was insulting to subjects of the Sultan for, it was “reserved and used, often
in contempt, for the simple peasants of Anatolia.” Lewis V. Thomas, “The National
and International Relations of Turkey”, T. Cuyuler Young (ed.) Near Eastern

13 Millet is an Arabic-Turkish word meaning 'people' that came to be applied in the
Ottoman Empire to the organised or legally organised religious communities such
as the Greek Christians, Armenian Christians and the Jews. There was no Turkish
or Arab or Kurdish Millet – they were rather parts of a larger body called umet.

14 The Sultan-state was properly defined both by the Law of Succession as well as
Sultan who were usually converts). In addition, it was a feudal state based on the timar\textsuperscript{16} land system that proved to be the most effective means of maintaining the social order and steady base for revenue to the state.

**Decline of the Ottoman Empire**

The Ottoman Empire, once evolved from a principality of march-warriors on the frontier between Islam and Byzantine christendom, reached the limits of its expansion by the sixteenth century. The classical period of Ottoman expansion came to a halt at this point beyond which it could not advance, from which it could only retreat. (see table 1.1)

The stages in the decline of the Ottoman Empire are marked by its military reverses and international treaties. If the 17\textsuperscript{th} century began with a concession of equality reflected in the treaty of Sitvatorok in 1606, it ended with a clear admission of

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by suitable interpretation concerning the origin of the Osmanli dynasty which was linked to great Muslim rulers of the past. It was a unique phenomenon that precluded the crisis over succession prevailed in Europe at that time.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{15} Janissaries constituted the nucleus of the ottoman military force through which the authority of the central government could retain effective control over the provinces. Like the guardians of Plato's Republic, they were made highly professional soldiers and given best possible training. They were selected from among the 'captives of war' and also from the devshirme (the collection of levy of boys from the Christian subjects, particularly the Slav and Albanian) children. On the role of the Janissaries, see H.A.R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West*, vol. I (London: Oxford University Press, 1951), p. 56 ff. Also see, Ahmed Emin, *Turkey in the World War* (New Haven: Yale University, 1930), pp. 5-8, and Sir Harry Luke, *The Making of Modern Turkey* (Macmillan, London, 1936), pp. 26-29.

\textsuperscript{16} The timar land system had its roots in the Seljuk Empires. In the Ottoman state it emerged as a well-organised socio-economic system integrated into the state structure. The timar was based on the principle that the title (rakaba) to miri lands (conquered lands) belonged to state, but its cultivation right was granted to the tenant. The Sipahis (the fief-holders serving as cavalrymen) received the administration of the timar as a payment. This was the regular source of revenue, and ensured the supply of soldiers in case of war. For details, see K.H. Karpat, "The Stages of Ottoman History, A Structural Comparative Analysis" in his *The Ottoman State and Its Place in World History*, pp. 88-89.
defeat before the walls of Vienna in 1683. This was followed by the peace treaties of Carlowitz and Passarovitz signed in 1699 and 1718 respectively. In real terms, however, it was the treaty of Kucuk Kayanarca of 1774\(^\text{17}\) that marked the end of the epoch, the Ottoman hegemonism and the beginning of another, the European mastery over the oriental.

It is too difficult to determine the causality between the internal decay of the Ottoman state and its loss of power and grandeur abroad. It is nonetheless true that the loss of territory or military defeats are the symptoms of the internal weaknesses of the Empire. This was the result of a combination of factors contributing towards the process of the Ottoman decline that began much earlier than its external territorial shrinkage. They can be broadly categorised as socio-economic, political and cultural.

The fundamental cause of Ottoman decline is the internal, tributary nature of the state, wherein "the military-bureaucratic ruling class was based on no specific socio-economic foundations like the ruling class in pre-industrial Europe whose power was rested on land-ownership."\(^\text{18}\) It appropriated surplus in the form of revenue from all sectors of the economy: land and trade. In such a social order, territorial expansion was necessary in order to provide revenue to the state and to sustain the Sipahi.

As the external accumulations began to shrink, revenue was raised by an increased resort to tax farming. This in turn led to growing pressures on the peasants, especially among the peasantry.

\(^{17}\) Toynbee considered the Russian-Turkish Treaty of Kuchuk-Kayanarja as the beginning of Ottoman decline. Because, this treaty gave an insulting blow to the Empire by conceding Russia the right of protection over its own orthodox Christian subjects and ceding Crimea to Russia. The loss of territories by the Ottoman Empire continued till 1878 when it lost Bosnia Herzegovina to Austria and Batum and Kars to Russia.

and discouraged agricultural or industrial progress. Besides, what precipitated the
economic stagnation was the progressive decline in the Ottoman maritime trade.¹⁹

The shrinking economy of the Empire adversely affected the social cohesion,
particularly the bureaucracy and the military organisation.²⁰ Politically, the main threat
to the unity and integrity of the Empire came from within. The authority of the Porte
was challenged by the particularist ambitions of the millets, the provincial rulers; the
pashas in Egypt and Syria, the derebeys (valley-lords) in Anatolia, the ayans²¹ (the
newly emerging notables) in Rumelia and the Wahhabi tribes in Arabia. Added to all
this, the creation of extra-territorial foreign colonies by the capitulation had the
disruptive effects on the empire.

Finally, the technological backwardness of the Ottoman Empire at all levels – in
agriculture, trade and transport, industry and their armed forces – failed the Empire to
face the greater challenge of the 17th and 18th century Europe. The Ottoman
backwardness compared to its European counterpart is largely attributed to the lack of
receptivity. The Ottoman failure to respond to new changes and inventions in the West
can be partly explained by the inward-looking character of the classical Islamic
civilization,²² which the Ottomans had inherited. To conclude, “The Ottoman Empire

¹⁹ Bernard Lewis, op. cit., p. 27.

²⁰ The timar system lost its military importance, as the introduction of small firearms
rendered the Cavalry (Sipahis) rather obsolescent. Besides, a long series of defeats
primarily because of the lack of the technical and logistic developments in the
armies, and loss of naval supremacy in the Mediterranean, the Ottoman armies
cessated to be the armies of the Ghazi days. Ibid., pp. 25-26.

²¹ The ayan-I Memleket are the country-notables who acquired the de facto control
over the rural areas replacing the Sipahis, the agents of central authority. In the
mid-18th century when the Porte became weak as a result of series of wars, the
ayans pressed for local autonomy. See, Karpat, Stages of Ottoman History, p. 93.
in 1774”, an authority on the Eastern Question has noted, “was still stagnant and archaic. Its chances of survival now seemed to many observers very small”.\textsuperscript{23}

Reforms and Attempts at Rejuvenation of the Empire

In the face of the danger of partition and growing internal instability, the enlightened Ottoman leadership made reformist attempts to rejuvenate the antiquated Ottoman system. The widespread changes carried out by Selim III (1789-1807)\textsuperscript{24} and Mehmud II (1808-34) had one fundamental purpose, namely, to strengthen the authority of the central government through establishment of a modern army and an effective bureaucracy. In fact, both Selim III and Mehmud II forged new paths that led to the more radical mid-19\textsuperscript{th} century Tanzimat in which the old institutions were replaced by the new ones imported from the West. In the century and half that had

\textsuperscript{22} The classical Islamic civilization was profoundly convinced of its immeasurable and immutable superiority and self-sufficiency. “Frankish Europe was an outer darkness of barbarism and unbelief, from which the sunlit world of Islam had nothing to learn and little to fear. This view, though becoming out dated towards the end of the Middle Ages, was transmitted by the medieval Muslims to their Ottoman heirs, and was reinforced by the crushing victories of Ottoman arms over their European opponents. Ibid., pp. 34-35. This dangerous but comfortable illusion not only had adverse effect on the intellectual life, also the economy and military. It discouraged industry and trade for the stigma of infidel being attached to these profession. Similarly, this made the Ottoman Muslim apathetic towards new ideas and innovations of European origin. See, Abdulhak Adnan-Adivar, “Interaction of Islamic and Western Thought in Turkey”, in T. Cuyler Young, \textit{Near Eastern Culture and Society}, op. cit. pp. 118-119.


\textsuperscript{24} In response to the external dangers, particularly the expanding Russian power, Selim III undertook the modernization of the armed forces and revival of the naval power of the Empire. Commenting on the impact of Selim’s reforms, S.J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw write, “they were at best partially successful, but they were opening wedges and essential guides for the efforts of his successors ... the iron curtain protecting the “Ottoman way” erected in an age of greatness and maintained in times of decay was pierced on a large-scale for the first time, although it still was not destroyed ...”. S.J. Shaw and E.K. Shaw, \textit{History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey} (London: Cambridge University Press, 1977), vol. I, p. 180.
elapsed since the Nepoleonic episode in the Levant, many major changes were introduced in all areas of Ottoman state and society. Finally, what emerged in the mid-19th century was a new ruling stratum, that is, the “bureaucratic-intelligentsia” (the new ruling class) and a corresponding ideology, called Ottomanism. In a sense, the Empire embarked on the road to Westernisation during the Tanzimat period (1839-79) — an attempt at blind imitation of the West through the super-imposition of an alien culture without changing the basic social-structures of the land.

Although the Tanzimat reforms failed to serve the purposes they were meant for, the changes “did lay the new foundation without which there could have been nation-state”. The policies of these “westerners” (memurs) created modern institutions, but they had disastrous effect on the society and economy leading to the rise of the reactionary forces opposed to the process of emulation of the West. As a result, the Sultan became the symbol of opposition to the West, and the long forty years of domination of bureaucrat-intelligentsia was supplanted by an era of autocracy of Sultan Abdul Hamid (1876-1909).

From Despotism to Revolution (1876-1908)

While the Tanzimmat was characterised by the domination of the porte over the palace, established by Rasid Pasha and reinforced by Mehmet Ali Pasha and Faut

25 Tanzimat (reorganization), in the words sof Kemal H. Karpat, the legal and political recognition of the structural and political changes which had occurred since Selim III”. K.H. Karpat, op. cit., p. 95. Tanzimat began with the imperial Edict of Gulhane (1839) and was followed by the Hatti-I Humayun (illustrations rescript) in 1856. The latter was to oimplement the principles announced in 1839. The reigns of Mahmud’s sons Abdulmecid I (1839-1861) and Abdulaziz (1861-76) “encompassed the entire period and who provided the context in which Tanzimat bureaucrats could and did proceed their work”. Shaw and Shaw, vol. II, p. 55.
Pasha, Hamidian regime was described as the “palace system”. The latent unavoidable conflict between the despotistic Sultan and the new governing elite, ‘the young Ottomans’\(^\text{27}\), was brought into the open by the suspension of the Midhat Pasha’s constitution in 1878. Alarmed by the gradual western penetration, Sultan Abdul Hamid posed as the champion of the traditional order and waged an ideological battle called popularly Pan-Islamism.\(^\text{28}\) Although the movement had an Islamic character, it was by no means reactionary. It was essentially an anti-imperialist struggle that aimed at uniting the Muslims against the Western domination in the Islamic world.

Despite the powerful pan-Islamic propaganda and commitment to reforms, Abdul Hamid’s personal rule degenerated into an oriental despotism that created internal unrest and widespread resentment. Finally, the revolution of the Young Turks\(^\text{29}\)


\(^{27}\) For the detailed account of Young Ottoman movement, see Ahmed Bedevi Kuran, *Osmanlı İmparatorlughunda İnkılap Hareketleri ve Milli Mücadele* (Ankara, 1956), p. 57; Geoffrey Lewis, *Turkey* (London, 1955), p. 36 and B. Lewis, *op. cit.*, pp. 156-168. The Young Ottomans strongly believed that the decaying Empire could be saved by joining the West rather than resisting it. That was the logic behind Rasid Pasha signing the Treaty of Balti Liman in 1838—the agreement to establish free trade throughout the Empire. This move towards westernisation was no less motivated by the political ambitions of the Young Ottomans to strengthen their position vis-à-vis an autocratic Sultan. On the contrary, Sultan who was the symbol of the conservative sections tried to revive the traditional order based on Islam to face the western cultural challenge and their advocates.

\(^{28}\) Hamid’s appeal of pan-Islamism was remarkably successful for three main reasons: a) the political as well as cultural colonialism of the Arab lands by the western powers, b) the cessation of political rapprochement between Turkey and the West, c) the failure of the constitutional experiment coincided with the collapse of the Ottoman economy leading to virtual bankruptcy. “Pan-Islamic ideas”, Niyazi Berkes writes, “were the culmination in Turkey of a reaction against the Tanzimat doctrine of fusing Muslim and non-Muslims into an Ottoman nation”, Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (Montreal, 1964), p. 267.

\(^{29}\) The Young Turk revolution started with the limited goal of restoring the 1876
started in Macedonia by a section of the Ottoman army stationed there in 1908 swept away the Sultan and replaced the old order by a constitutional regime in 1909. Although the dominant faction of the Young Turks, the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) professed Ottomanism to rejuvenate the Empire, the Islamic contents of the ideology were soon substituted by Turkish nationalism. Moreover, their renewed modernisation attempts were thwarted by the rapid succession of events.\footnote{The Unionists (Ittihatciler) failed miserably in their modernisation pursuit for they were caught up amidst a series of unprecedented political developments, both internal and external. Internally the nationalist risings of the non-Turkish ethnic minorities such as Macedonians, the Albanian revolt from 1910-1912 and the Arab stirrings in the crescent posed serious threat to the survival of the Empire. Added to this, new regime lost more territory than Abdul Hamid had been forced to give up since 1882. Austria annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina, Greece occupied Crete, Bulgaria proclaimed its independence, and Italy captured Tripoli and Bengazi from the Empire in 1911. The Tripolitanian war was followed by a new wave of attacks in the Balkans that proved disastrous as the Ottomans “lost 83 per cent of their land and 69 per cent of their population in Europe as well as much of the revenue and food that had come into Istanbul each year”. S.J. Shaw and E.K. Shaw, \textit{op. cit.}, P. 296.} The disastrous Balkan wars effected a sweeping change in the overall policy of the CUP. It marked a remarkable drift towards the Turkification of the Sultan’s subjects of varied nationalities through a rigid centralisation under a dictatorial triumvirate of Enver, Jemal and Talat Pasha. In a nutshell, this was the state of affairs in the summer of 1914 when at the outbreak of World War I, Turkey cast her lot with the long-time ally, Germany.\footnote{The Unionists (Ittihatciler) failed miserably in their modernisation pursuit for they were caught up amidst a series of unprecedented political developments, both internal and external. Internally the nationalist risings of the non-Turkish ethnic minorities such as Macedonians, the Albanian revolt from 1910-1912 and the Arab stirrings in the crescent posed serious threat to the survival of the Empire. Added to this, new regime lost more territory than Abdul Hamid had been forced to give up since 1882. Austria annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina, Greece occupied Crete, Bulgaria proclaimed its independence, and Italy captured Tripoli and Bengazi from the Empire in 1911. The Tripolitanian war was followed by a new wave of attacks in the Balkans that proved disastrous as the Ottomans “lost 83 per cent of their land and 69 per cent of their population in Europe as well as much of the revenue and food that had come into Istanbul each year”. S.J. Shaw and E.K. Shaw, \textit{op. cit.}, P. 296.}
The reason why the Young Turks entered the war on the side of Germany was three-fold: I) The anti-Turkish bias of Europe as reflected during the Balkan wars, and non-acceptance of Turkish offer of friendship at least four times in case of Great Britain and once by Russia, ii) the economic interference of the Entente powers by resisting the Unionists’ move to abolish the capitulations that gave rise to frustrations among the nationalists, and iii) the domination of the Germanophiles like Sevket Pasha and the Minister of War, Enver Pasha and many other German-trained senior army officers who consistently pressed for a treaty of alliance with Germany.

Besides, the immediate factor for Turkey concluding alliance with Germany on 2 August 1914 was the serious implications of the Austro-Serbian war and the Allied blockade of the Straits on the economy as well as the general psyche of the Turks. The CUP leadership seized the opportunity to rid the Empire of external strings by abolishing the capitulations in September 1914, and tried to regain their pride and self-respect.

World War I and the Emergence of Modern Turkish Republic

As the war progressed, the CUP leadership was faced with an insurmountable task of maintaining the integrity of the Empire and unity of the Muslim-subjects

31. By 1914 the German-Turkish relations were quite old. The German card was first played by Abdul Hamid to counter the Russian threat. Germany’s increasing strength and ambition as a world power ideologically suited Hamid’s pan-Islamism. The link was strengthened in the 1890s by the economic concessions granted to Germany like the Berlin-Baghdad railway. That way, “Abdul Hamid was successful in making the Eastern Question more complex through German participation”, Feroz Ahmad, The Late Ottoman Empire, op. cit., p. 12. For details on German-Turkish relation till the end of World War I, see, Ulrich Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 1914-1918 (Princeton, N.J., 1968); on British policy towards the CUP regime, see Mariam Kent, “Constantinople and Asiatic Turkey, 1905-1914” in F.H. Hinsley (ed.), British Foreign Policy Under Sir Edward
because of the incipient tendency towards local autonomy that had already assumed the character of uprising in the Arab-speaking provinces. In their efforts to rally the Muslims' support, Sultan Mehmed V in his capacity as Caliph, declared a Jihad (Holy War). This, however, failed to impress either Muslim soldiers fighting in the ranks of Allied powers or the Arab nationalists revolting against their Turkish masters. After the strong repulsion of British-French combined attack in the Dordanellas and Gallipoli Peninsula, Turkish resistance began to wear off and finally collapsed in 1918. With the signing of the armistice at Mudros on October 30 of the same year, the partition of the Empire among Britain, France and Italy appeared inevitable.\(^{32}\)

After a century and a half of struggle for rejuvenation and survival, the Ottoman Empire at last lay prostrate: its Arab provinces had seceded; its capital was in the hands of the occupying forces and the heartland of Turkism, Anatolia was threatened with dismemberment. After the draft of the Paris Peace Conference was submitted to the Sultan, it seemed as though once the Sick Man of Europe finally had passed away. When the Treaty of Serves was signed on August 10, 1920,\(^{33}\) most of the Young Turk

\(^{32}\) The Mudros armistice was meant to legalise the de-facto domination of the Allied powers in Turkey. The armistice line followed roughly the northern borders of Syria and Mesopotamia, but the Allies were also allowed to occupy "any strategic points in the event of a situation arising which threatens the security of the Allies". For the text of the Armistice Treaty at Mudros, see J.C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record*, vol. II, (Princeton, N.J., 1956), pp. 36-37.

\(^{33}\) The Treaty of Serves was dictated by the ambitions of the victorious Allies to distribute the spoils among themselves. They had entered into a number of mutual agreement for the partition of the Empire. Britain and France had reversed their century old policy and agreed to the incorporation of Constantinople and the Straits into Russian Empire. Under the so called Sykes-Picot Agreement, Russia was further promised the eastern Anatolia while the British were to receive Palestine and Mesopotamia, and French to have Syria and Cilicia. Under another Agreement Italy was promised to have her share of the Ottoman Empire: the Dodecanese islands, and the administration of Izmir (Smyrna) and Mersin. Similarly, Greece was to
leaders disappeared leaving the fate of Turkey to the occupying forces. It was but for Mustafa Kemal Pasha, who was a General at that time, that the impending division of Turkish territories by the Entente powers was averted. In fact, “the Turks were the only one of the central powers able to overturn immediately the vindictive settlements imposed by the Allies following World War I”.

Rise of Mustafa Kemal Pasha

Throughout the war, Mustafa Kemal Pasha was sharply critical of the ruling Young Turks, particularly the strategy of Enver Pasha, and Turkey’s alliance with Germany. His arrival at Samsun on the Black sea coast of Anatolia after a couple of days of the Greek landing at Izmir in May 1919 marked the beginning of the struggle for liberation of the Turkish ‘Fatherland’. During the summer of 1919, he with the assistance of his compatriots and associates held several Congresses, organized the
Union for the Defense of Rights (Mudafai Hukuk) of Anatolia and Rumelia, and encouraged resistance against the occupying forces in the western and southern Anatolia. Under the pressures of the nationalists, the Sultan’s government held elections on November 7, 1919. The new Parliament, consisting mostly of the nationalist deputies adopted the National Pact (Milli Misak) on January 28, 1920. Its programme, among other things, envisaged the complete independence and the territorial integrity inside the armistice line inhabited by the Ottoman-Muslim majority.

After the Allies formally occupied Constantinople, and the Sultan at their insistence dissolved the Parliament, Kemal convoked the Grand National Assembly (Buyuk Millet Meclisi) in Ankara, composed of partly the Parliamentary deputies and partly the representatives from all other sections of Turkey. In April 23, 1920, the Assembly passed a resolution establishing its own government. The Constitution of January 1921 declared that “sovereignty belongs without reserve to the nation” and the Turkish state “is administered by the Grand National Assembly and its Government”.

The country was no longer called the Ottoman Empire, and officially, for the first time,

Rauf, Colonel Rebet and General Kazim Karbekir Pasha. They all were the signatories to the Amasya protocol which was the first call for an organised national movement against the occupation. See, Sabahaddin Sefek, Milli Mucadele Anadolu Ihtilali (The National Struggle Revolt in Anatolia), 2 vols. (Ankara, 1963-68).

37 According to a recent study, even the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) played a dominant role in the organisation of the national resistance movement from 1919 onward. The CUP, aware of its impending defeat established a secret underground network called Karakol, and resistance organisations in Anatolia. See, Erik Jan Zurcher, The Unionist Factor: The Role of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish Nationalist Movement, 1905-1926 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1984).

it was named Turkaya (Turkey). What followed next was the Greco-Turkish war that ended in October 1922 with the defeat of Greeks by the Kemalist national forces. The Peace Conference of Laussane, opened on November 20, 1922 concluded on July 24, 1923 with the signing of the treaty that fulfilled most of the demands set by the National Pact. In short, the Treaty of Lausanne “certified and legalised the victory won by the Turkish War of Independence”.  

Kemalistic Reforms

Historically it would be no exaggeration to hold that Turkish participation in the World War I was the final nail in the coffin of the Ottoman Empire. For, “without participating in the War” Feroz Ahmad writes, “it would not have been possible for the

39 The Greek-Turkish War of 1919-22 is known to the Turks as their War of Independence. This has an unprecedented historical significance for the Turkish victory in the war ensured the defence against the further imperialist advance, and restored their self-respect through a negotiated rather than an imposed peace.

40 Shaw and Shaw, op. cit., p. 368. In August 1922 the Turkish forces under the personal command of Mustafa Kemal won a decisive victory by expelling the Greeks from Anatolia territory. After the collapse of Greek army as the Turkish nationalists advanced into Smyrna and the Straits, Britain nearly confronted them at Chanak on the Dardanelles in September, 1922. Finally, the British withdrew from Dardanelles by conceding to Kemal’s demands in the Armistice of Mudanya on 11th October, 1922. The Soviet had already signed an agreement with the Kemalists by fixing the frontier in March, 1921. In October, the same year, the Franco-Turkish treaty was signed drawing up a new Turco-Syrian boarder. The Italians soon withdrew from Southern Anatolia, except retaining the Dodecanese islands. All these agreements and withdrawal paved the way for the Lausanne Conference which recognised the demands formulated in the Turkish National Pact. Further, Turkey recovered all the territory previously awarded to the Greeks up to the River Maritza while Armenia was not detached from Turkey. In the words of W. Churchill, “the treaty of Lausanne is a surprising contrast to the Treaty of Serves”, Marian Kent, op. cit., p. 193. Similarly, Lloyd George was bitter about the Treaty when he wrote “from Serves to Mudania was a retreat. From Mudania to Lausanne was a route”, quoted in Prof. Mim Kemal Oke, “The Lausanne Conference (1922-23): Themes and Sources in the Archives of Great Britain”, Ataturk Turkiye Sinde (1923-83) (Bildiriler: Bogazici Univ. Press, 1984), p. 91.
unionists to carry out the transformation so necessary for laying the foundation of the new state and society that were to result in the Turkish Republic”. 41

In other words, the victory of the Entente signaled the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, but aftermath of the war witnessed the historic emergence of the modern Turkish Republic based on a completely new framework. In the words of Nuri Eren, “the Kemalist Revolution was the end of the Turkish quest for a new identity in the contemporary world. Ottomanism and Islamism were submission to history”. 42 Firstly, it was a revolution to “preserve independence, not to establish it a new”. 43 In a sense, the Turkish War of Independence was the first successful struggle against the imperialist exploitation of the Western powers which was to be followed by other new nations.

Second, the Kemalist Revolution resolved the dichotomy that had kept Turkey divided for a long time between the East and West. It was a radical and organic

41 Feroz Ahmad, op. cit., p. 18. According to the author, even if the Turks had opted for neutrality, the partition of Empire would not have been averted in view of its multinational character being affected by the Wilsonian principle of self-determination and its strategic importance subjecting it to subversion and occupation like Greece and Persia.


44 The imperialist exploitation in the Ottoman Empire was two-fold: economic and politico-cultural. On the economic plane, the exploitation was carried out through the free trade practice in 1838, the capitulations and foreign loans that caused the progressive decline in the revenue as compared to high expenditures and erosion of the political authority of the Ottoman state. Politically, it was more explicit. There was a de facto partition of the Empire into spheres of influences tacitly accepted by the Porte. For a comprehensive analysis on the peripheralisation of the Ottoman Empire in the Capitalist world economy based on Wallerstein’s World system theory, see Huri Islamoglu – Inan (ed.), The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
revolution that rejected compromise between the old and the new, the East and the
West, secularism and religion. From a fight for freedom against the foreign occupation,
Turkish Revolution developed into a struggle for the creation of a new nation, a new
state, a new mentality, a new way of life.

In the months following the victorious termination of the War of Independence
and recognition of the newly proclaimed Republic, Mustafa Kemal, the Ataturk\textsuperscript{45} of the
nation embarked on the peaceful reconstruction of Turkey. Most of the Kemalist
reforms during the early years of the Republic were directed towards creating a new
nationalist ideology and a national identity, and establishing the paramountcy of the
state authority by dissolving into it all other primordial loyalties. The major objectives
of the Nationalist Movement are unambiguously underlined by the six principles of
Kemalism: \textsuperscript{46} Republicanism (cumhuriyetcilik), Nationalism (Milliyetcilik), Populism
(Halkcilik), Revolutionist (Inkelalpcilik), Secularism (Leyiklik) and Statism (Etatism).

"The first four principles reflected the ideological basis of the new political

\textsuperscript{45} Ataturk or Father-Turk was the new name of Mustafa Kemal after a law for the
compulsory adoption of surnames was passed in 1934. Accordingly, the President
renounced his old titles of Gazi and Pasha. For his biographical details see, Lord
Kinross, \textit{Ataturk: A Biography of Mustafa Kemal, Father of Modern Turkey} (New

\textsuperscript{46} The term ‘Kemalism’ was first used by Western authors which was later referred in
Turkish as Ataturk uluk. Kemalism named after leader of the Turkish revolution,
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, contained his basic ideas and policies developed in hundreds
of speeches and programmes from the early days of the War of Independence till his
death in 1938. These were partly included in the 1924 Constitution, and partly in the
political programmes of the RPP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi). The triad ‘republicanism,
nationalism and secularism’ symbolises the rejection by the Turkish revolution of the
Ottoman dynasty, the Caliphate and ummet ideology. The triad ‘republicanism,
populism and etatism’ presents the social ideal of the Turkish state. Republicanism and
revolutionism, particularly revolutionism, frees Kemalist principles from becoming
static. Enver Ziya Karal, ‘The Principles of Kemalism” in Kazancigil and Ozbudun,
Ataturk, p. 28.
restructuring, and the last two expressed the policies that were to provide a philosophical framework for reforms".47

Kemal Ataturk “created a set of institutions that built originally upon the legacies of the past, responded effectively to the contingencies of the present, and equipped his people for the challenges of an uncertain future”.48 Some of the institutions that have survived the subsequent political jolts and jerks are the Grand National Assembly, the People’s Party (later Republican People’s Party or RPP), the enactment of the Law on the Unification of Instruction (Tevhid-I Tedrisat Kanunu) and, above all the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey founded on the universal suffrage and all attributes of popular sovereignty.

The new institutions proved durable in part because “they had been prepared and tested both for their support at home and their recognition abroad, before they were irrevocably announced”.49 In this context, most striking is the absence of any movement for restoration of the Sultanate or Caliphate abolished on 1st November 1922 and 3 March 1924 respectively.50 The Caliphate as an Islamic institution represented a

47 Shaw and Shaw, op. cit., p. 375.
48 Rustow, Ataturk as an Institution-builder, op. cit., p. 57.
49 Ibid., p. 72.
50 The decree of 1922 (Heyeti Umumiye Karari) passed by the Grand National Assembly of the future Turkish Republic separated the Sultanate from Caliphate, and abolished the former to end the personal autocracy of the Sultan and to establish that “Sovereignty Belongs to the Nation” (Hakimiyet Milletindir). This decree also stipulated the election of the new Caliph by the GNA. As the new Caliph Abdulmecid gained recognition from Muslims all over, particularly from the Indian Muslims who were then leading the Khalifat movement, Mustafa Kemal decided to abolish the Caliphate in 924, four months after the proclamation of Republic. The abolition of Caliphate removed the link of the Turkish people with the Islamic and imperial past, and the potential conservative threat to the secular Turkey. See, Niyazi Berkes, op. cit., pp. 443 to 459; Also see Halide Edib, Turkey Faces West (London, 1930), and Prof. M. Sadiq, “The Turkish Revolution and the Abolition of the Caliphate” International Studies, 28, 1 (New Delhi, 1991), pp. 25-40 for an indepth analysis of the religious justification provided for the abolition of the Caliphate by the Kemalists.
supra national concept of solidarity of all Muslims which was inimical to the development of the nation-state based on the concept of national identity. Likewise, the office of the Seyhu-I-Islam and the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Pious Foundation (Seriye ve Evkat Vekaleti)\textsuperscript{51} were also abolished. Since they provided an institutional base for the 
\textit{din u devlet} concept, their continued existence was incompatible with the political authority derived its legitimacy from the concept of national sovereignty. Moreover, the continuation of these religious institutions were perceived as a threat to Republicanism and national independence to the extent that it would lead to duality in Turkey’s domestic and foreign policy.

**Kemalist Revolution: An Assessment**

The cultural and social dimensions of the Kemalist Revolution outstripped its political depth. Its goal was to establish a modern state as defined by “the quasi-ideology of the revolution namely westernisation.”\textsuperscript{52} The reforms were primarily designed to bring about a change in the basic value-structure of the Turkish society rather than the structural change per se. This meant more than simply a ‘break’ in the continuity of the Ottoman Islamic past; “it involved the difficult and traumatic task of destroying a culture that had existed for centuries and putting in its place a totally new culture imported from another civilization.”\textsuperscript{53}

\textsuperscript{51} In 1928 the deletion of the Article 2 of the constitution which had recognised Islam as the state religion was yet another example of de-Islamisation of Turkey. For the English translation of the 1924 constitution, see Appendix E. in Elaine D. Smith, \textit{Turkey: Origins of the Kemalist Movement and the Government of the Grand National Assembly (1919-23)} (Washington, D.C.: Judd and Detmeiber, 1959).


\textsuperscript{53} Samuel P. Huntington, \textit{The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World}
Kemalism understood westernisation not just as a question of acquiring technology, but as something that could not be absorbed without wholesale importation of the cultural practices of the West. In short, Kemalism represents what the famous philosopher of history Toynbee has characterised, 'Herodian'\(^{54}\) response to the western cultural advancement.

Within the Kemalist programme of westernisation, some changes were only symbolic: the Latinisation of the alphabet,\(^{55}\) exchange of the Fez for hat, Sunday rather than Friday as weekly day of rest, adoption of the Gregorian calendar and of European numerals. These symbolic changes, however, were reinforced by functional secularisation as well as by a legal framework. If the former included a single comprehensive system of schooling,\(^{56}\) in case of the latter, the religiously sanctioned

\(^{54}\) Toynbee's concept of "Zealots-Herodians" provides an analytical framework to study the relationship of the Islamic world with the West. Inspired by the internal conflict which arose in the Hebrew world subject to the influence of Hellenism, Toynbee records that when faced with a powerful civilization across their borders, zealots tend to embrace their traditional values and views the outside world with contempt and fear. Herodians, in contrast, attempt to imitate the alien civilization. See, Arnold J. Toynbee, *Study of History*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), vol. VIII, p. 152-53.


\(^{56}\) According to F. Frey, "the history of "westernisation" or 'modernisation' in Turkey was in essence the history of secular education there. The new educational system became master determinant of both political mobilisation as well as over-all secularisation of the society. See F. Frey, "Education: Turkey" in D.A. Rustow and R.E. Ward (eds), *Political Modernisation in Japan and Turkey* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 205-235.
provisions of civil, commercial and criminal laws were replaced by a series of civil code, Italian criminal code and German commercial code respectively.

On the whole, Kemalist movement brought about changes into Turkish polity and society, which by any standard look revolutionary. "The Turkish Revolution, stands in a class by itself in the annals of Revolution". Unlike the French and Bolshevik Revolutions, it has universal message especially for these people "still groaning under colonial rule and who aspired for a place in the Sun."

All the same, many critics, particularly those belonging to the school of historical sociology, deny the revolutionary character of the Kemalist experience. The ground for their denial is two-fold: absence of insurrections in the cities or rural areas and the continuity of the state-bureaucratic elites. Since there was no real landed-class in Turkey for the Kemalist project to dispossess, it "represented more of a transformation by coup under war-conditions than a revolutionary break with the ancien regime."

Certainly, the Turkish Revolution represents neither a bourgeoisie revolution nor a socialist revolution, though communist sources claim that Kemalist regime and all its reforms were inspired by the Bolshevik Revolution in the Soviet Union. It was an archetype of 'Revolution from above', in which ordinary Anatolian Turks participated as soldiers rather than revolutionaries. Regarding the 'Political' nature of

58 Ibid., pp. 3-4.
the Turkish Revolution, "it must be emphasised that its revolutionary character derived from its re-definition of the bases of political legitimation and the boundaries of the political community."  

However, what seems peculiar to Turkey's experience is the continued domination of the state elites. "Its political institutions were extensively recast (1919-25) when the composition of the elite remained essentially unchanged". Kemalism was a continuum with the Tanzimat and young Turks, in so far as its major concern was the state, viewed as "the principal agency of social transformation". Unlike,


63 Aijaz Ahmad, "Class, Nation and State: Intermediate classes in Peripheral Societies" in Dale L. Johnson, (ed.), Middle Classes in Dependent Countries (London: Sage Publications, 1985), p. 45. According to the author, Kemalists belong to what he calls "broad spectrum of intermediate classes" who not only play a key role in the revolution, also in organising a new type of state in the peripheral societies/dependent countries. Because, the peripheral state arose prior to the formation of bourgeoisie as a politically dominant class. Thus, the elements drawn from the intermediate classes seek to establish their dominance over civil society mainly through the agency of the state. In fact, there was no significant landed class with independent bases of power in the Ottoman provinces. A substantial majority of peasants, nearly 87 per cent according to 1913 figures, owned small land. However, the absence of such social formations is attributed to the patrimonial/tributary nature of the Ottoman state where "political power was divorced from economically defined class-relations" Ozbudun, "State Elites and Democratic Political culture in Turkey" in Larry Diamond (ed.), Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publications, 1993), p. 248. Since the Ottoman state was founded by military rulers who placed primary emphasis on "political" goals of regime consolidation and territorial expansion, the economic-cultural considerations mostly remained unimportant. See, Resat Kasuba, "A
however, the Ottoman reformers, the Kemalists were successful in one strategic aspect of state-building. They narrowed the gap between the political centre and periphery by forging alliances between state elites (the military-bureaucracy) and such economically active social groups as the country notables, land-owners and intellectuals. As a result, the notable became the essential link between the Centre and periphery helping the process of “integration from the top to the bottom”.

**Turkish Polity**

The inter-war experience of Turkey set the theme and gave them meaning in the construction of the Turkish polity. The quest for independence and national sovereignty led Ataturk and his compatriots to establish a strong, centralised polity – a polity in which the state was placed at the centre-stage. For Kemalists who constituted

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64 This alliance was, however, not the one what Barrington Moore describes the “reactionary coalition” defined as an alliance between the landed upper class and the emerging commercial and industrial bourgeoisie. This coalition is maintained by a powerful state apparatus comprised of the army and civilian bureaucracy. On the contrary, the ruling coalition in Turkey was dominated by the military-bureaucratic elements. The landed and commercial interests were rather secondary. The study by Frey on the composition of the single-party Assemblies of the Republic (1920-1950) clearly shows the political ascendancy of the former. Frederick W. Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1965) pp. 181-190. (See table No. 2). Also see, B. Moore, *The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1966).

65 “Integration from the top to the bottom by imposing regulations had been a general approach behind Ottoman social engineering. The characteristic features of Kemalism show that this view of society was still pre-eminent”. Prof. Serif Mardin, “Centre-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics” in E. Akarli and G. Ben-Dar (eds.), *Political Participation in Turkey* (Istanbul: Bogazici University, 1975), p. 24. According to Mardin, the periphery includes the primordial groups that are distinguished by “an attitude ... that spelled localism, particularism and heterodoxy:” Ibid., p. 13.
what Marx and Engels refer to “the governing caste”, state was more than simply a source of legitimacy in the society. It was the principal agency, through which Ataturk and his lieutenants sought to build a modern nation, a cohesive citizenry and a strong industrial economy. Indeed “Ataturk was a practitioner of nation-building, a term that was to come into vogue in Westernisation and modernisation literature long after Ataturk’s death.”

**Centre-Periphery Polarity: Domination of Official Elites**

The political guarantor of the nation’s integration was to be the Republican People’s Party (RPP), a cadre-based party dominated by a small westernised elites and some local notables. Of the two, the former included the military officers and civilian officials who came to constitute the core of the ‘official elites’ or ‘state-elite’s. Although Ataturk’s nationalist rebellion did not enjoy undiluted support among the bureaucrats, consolidation of the Kemalist regime led to the bureaucracy becoming one of the mainstays of its power. During the single-party years, the officials made up nearly half of all members of the Parliament, which under the new constitutional structure had unfaltered concentration of power.

Evidently, there existed a close alignment between the regime and civil bureaucracy which “grew accustomed to almost unchallenged power and to the social prestige. The Republican People’s Party was bureaucratised; bureaucratic and political

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67 Officially founded on 9 September 1923, the RPP was based on the amalgamation of various pre-existing local resistance groups. Dominated by small westernised elites, particularly those with successful bureaucratic career and those involved in nationalist movement, the RPP leadership made no serious attempt to broaden party’s popular base. In this sense the RPP was not really a mass mobilisation party. Elie Kedourie, *Politics in the Middle East* (Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 109-110.
power was largely fused to create an apparatus to impose the official’s will on the public.\textsuperscript{68} Naturally, the official elites came to see themselves as the guardians of public interests, and legislated what they considered to be the desirable ends of the society.

In its essentials, the Kemalist republic was a continuation of the “bureaucratic ruling tradition” from the Ottoman times.\textsuperscript{69} As in the past, the bureaucracy became a part of the political centre supported by the military, the ardent defender of the “spirit” of Ataturk’s revolution, it controlled the periphery more effectively. Although the inter-elite conflict at the centre was contained under Ataturk’s leadership, restrictive nature of the regime (i.e. limited political liberties, and coercion of incipient opposition) led to a virtual exclusion of the masses from political participation.\textsuperscript{70}

In short, the centre-periphery bipolarity that characterised the new polity created a ‘strong’, paternal state as evidenced by popular expression of devlet baba or father-state. There was, however, a fundamental shift in the policy priorities of the official/state elites that became increasingly evident since the 1930s. If their primary concern in the past was “how to save the state (bu devlet nasıl kurtarılabilir), in the single-party years, the nagging question for them was “how can the state be developed

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\textsuperscript{69} E. Ozbudun, “State Elites and Democratic Political culture in Turkey”, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 252. Ozbudun attributes the officials’ domination to an exceedingly elitist outlook that permeated the entire state apparatus since the Ottoman period.

(bu devlet nasil kalkindirlabidir).\textsuperscript{71} Indicative of the change was the adoption of etatism\textsuperscript{72} as one of the “six fundamental and unchanging principles” which enlarged the economic activities of the state. So much so that the state became the producer, investor and a business entrepreneur at the same time. In fact, the founding entrepreneurs in more than 70 per cent of all firms established between 1930 and 1940 were bureaucrats.

\textbf{Era of Democrats}

In all, the ascendancy of the ‘official elite’ and along-with the Ottoman legacy of a strong centre that made up what Metin Heper has described the ‘monocentrist system’\textsuperscript{73} This system persisted in Turkey until recently, despite the switch-over to pluralism since the 1940s. It was, however, in the 1950 that the introduction of


\textsuperscript{72} Etatism and state socialism are “two species of the same genre” of the statist mode of production. The former represents the combination of growth and welfarism; it is control-based. Socialism, on the other hand, is meant to achieve self-reliant industrialisation without chronic indebtedness. In the process, the state-directed economic activities (etatism) gives rise to the two classes typical of a capitalist system: proletariat and an incohate bourgeoisie. Both classes grow in strength with the expansion of the industrial sector of the economy. In case of Turkey, however, etatism was adopted basically as a pragmatic response to the effects of the Great crash of 1929. For a comparative analysis in the West Asia, see Nazih N. Ayubi, \textit{Over-stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East} (London: I.B. Tauris, 1995), pp. 196-220.

\textsuperscript{73} Turkey represents a rare case of indigenous and continuous transition from monopoly to competition. This change has, however, never “amounted to a transition from Monocentrist system (where only a modification of the same political system is possible) to a ‘free polity’ in which there are no constraints on change”. A transition of the latter-type would require a different system based on different principles and mechanism. For further elaboration on Turkey’s changing monocentrist system, see M. Heper, “Recent Instability in Turkish Politics: End of a Monocentrist policy?”, \textit{International Journal of Turkish Studies} (Wisconsin), vol. 1, No. 1, Winter, 1979-80, pp. 103-104.
competitive politics led to the resurgence of the periphery. It should be noted that the term periphery is used here quite differently from its more conventional ecological meaning. The periphery is equated with those social strata, comprising such diverse groups as the commercial class, the emergent urban working class, free professionals and peasants that were excluded from political power.

The victory of the Democrat Party (DP) in the first multi-party elections, and its popular appeal throughout the 1950s can be interpreted as a strong reaction to the authoritarian domination of the bureaucratic centre represented by the RPP. The social

74 For a fuller elaboration of the theme on Centre-Periphery cleavage in Turkey, see Ergun Ozbudun, Social Change and Political Participation in Turkey, (Princeton: N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976). Serif Mardin was the first to analyse Turkish Politics in this configuration. See his “Centre-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics” Daedalus (Winter, 1973), pp. 169-190. Yet, another Turkish political sociologist in explaining the rise of the DP argues that the gradual penetration of the state, rather than the gap between the centre and periphery, led to a “democratic” resurgence of the periphery. Finally, with the introduction of competitive politics leading to “ruralising elections,” Turkish society experienced what Huntington calls the “Green uprising” or mobilisation of rural masses into political system. See, Ayse Gunes – Ayata, “Roots and Trends of Clientelism in Turkey” in Luis Roniger and Ayse Gunes – Ayata (eds.), Democracy, Clientelism and Civil Society (London: Boulder, 1994), p. 52.

75 Founded in 1946 by four erstwhile RPP members - Adnan Menderes, Mehmet Fuad Koprup Celal Bayer and Refik Koraltan – the resultant Democrat Partisi won 62 of the 465 parliamentary seats in the 1946 general elections, to be followed by a landslide victory with 408 seats in 1950. With Adnan Menderes becoming the country’s new Prime Minister, Turkey underwent peaceful switch-over to a complex party-system or pluralism. The Democrats’ victory marked the beginning of mass political participation, which logically led to the broadening of the political elite in terms of social background and of access to elite status. The Democrats sought to curve out an alternative constituency by concentrating on the peasantry hitherto alienated by the official elites. While the D.P. created what Sabri Sayari calls “a real rural political machine”, the ballot provided the peasants the means of bargaining with the candidate and parties about the services to be exchanged for votes. This pattern gave a new legitimation to the process of patron-client relationship. See, Sabri Sayri, “The Turkish Party System in Transition”, Government and Opposition (Winter, 1978), pp. 39-57, and E. Ozbudun, “Turkey: The Politics of Clientelism” in S.N. Eisenstadt and R. Lamarchand, Political Clientalism, Patronage and Development (London: Sage Publication, 1981), pp. 249-270.
base of the DP was diverse mainly comprising modern entrepreneurs, middle class artisans, small merchants and the rural migrants to the urban centres. Predictably, the new coalition of forces challenged the residual national elite with strong ideological and emotional ties with the RPP. Thus, the immediate outcome of Turkey’s systemic transition to pluralism was the ‘resurrection of severe intraelite conflict’ the conflict between the ‘old’ state elite and the emergent political elite.

The former was oriented towards the tutelary development of the country under a strong central surveillance without any dilution in the Kemalist legacy of secularism. Conversely, the latter represented by the DP called for local initiative, free enterprise and relaxation of religious restrictions. In other words, the DP government sought to “debureaucratise” the society, and advocated the notion of ‘populist’ democracy based on “national will” (milli irade). The military and bureaucratic elites, on the other hand claimed to represent the “state’s will” in order to preserve their weighty role in the government. The upshot of this irreconcilable conflict of ‘interests’ was that both sides became distrust – full of each other until the government of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes was overthrown by military coup on May 27, 1960.

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76 Frey, The Turkish Political Elite, p. 39. The intra-elite conflict revolved around the core issue of “what the basis of the state really is?”. According to Kemalism, it is the principles of Ataturk, above all secularism, but according to democracy, it is the will of the people. “The people were represented by Parliament, and in practice by the majority in Parliament. But what happens if this same majority representing the people acts against Kemalist principles? It means one legitimacy conflicts directly with the other.” David Hotham, The Turks (London, John Murray, 1972), p. 63.

77 ‘Populist democracy’ was not, of course, popular democracy, for the focus on national interests led to a stress on collective rather than individual or group interests. In contrast, the political elites wedded to the notion of ‘rationalist democracy’ based their claims on general rather than sectional interests. In essence, this implied “what was best for the country was a more important than the reconciliation of interest groups.” See Metin Heper, “State, Party and Society in Post-1983 Turkey”, Government and Opposition (vol. 35, 1990), p. 322.
Second Turkish Republic

That the coup was successfully carried out by a small group of a relatively junior officers revealed the intensity of intra-elite conflict, particularly the extent of negative feelings of civilian bureaucracy towards the political elite.\textsuperscript{78} Despite being downgraded during the DP regime, the elitist pretensions of the bureaucratic intelligentsia did not disappear. Following the 1960 coup, they received a great boost since the task of drafting a new and democratic constitution was entrusted to those intellectuals subscribing to the basic values and political interests of the state-elites.\textsuperscript{79}

Indeed, the 1961 constitution framed under the supervision of the National Unity Committee (NUC) created a titular democracy, in which the parliament was placed under the virtual tutelage of the bureaucratically staffed institutions. Not only did it introduce bureaucratic limitations upon the power of elected assemblies, it also proscribed the advocacy of such ideas as religions, sectarian and ethnic. Besides, the NUC in an effort to reinstitute the Kemalist state established the State Planning Organisation (SPO) and in conjunction with it, promulgated the first five year

\textsuperscript{78} The “Democrat Decade” saw the emergence of new social force disinclined to acquiesce in the paternalistic government of the old ruling groups. Contrarily, the DP-led union of large land-owners, small-town notables known as local elites posed an alternative to the national/official elite represented by the RPP. For further details see, C.H. Dodd, \textit{Politics and Government in Turkey} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), pp. 52-53.

\textsuperscript{79} The 1960 coup found widespread and enthusiastic support among the intellectuals and civilian bureaucracy. In fact, the constituent Assembly set up by the NUC in January, 1961 was composed partly by members elected indirectly and partly by representatives of various institutions including the political parties (mainly the RPP), Judiciary, universities, bar-associations and chamber of conference. Apparently, it was dominated by the members and sympathisers of the RPP, the party representing the values and interests of the state-elites, whereas, the DP supporters were virtually excluded from the constitution-making process. See, Feroz Ahmad, \textit{The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-75} (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1977).
Development Plan. The SPO of supposedly non-partisan technocrats, however, became the instrument of state-elites control of all economic activities.

The rationale behind this new system of checks and balances was to render the elected representatives into a secondary position vis-à-vis those who exercised administrative power without popular mandate. Nowhere was this more evident than in the article 4 of the 1961 constitution which reads as follows; “The Nation exercises its sovereignty through the authorised agencies in accordance with the principles laid down in the constitution”. Such agencies as the National Security Council (NSC), the constitutional court and the Council of State (the Turkish version of France’s Council d’Etat) were designated as the watchdogs of the democracy in the Second Turkish Republic. In addition, the universities and the Turkish Radio and Television were granted substantial autonomy in the hope that would enlighten public opinion so as to ensure the evolution of a genuinely pluralistic society. Similarly, the new electoral law introduced a system of proportional representation, which aimed at preventing political parties from obtaining parliamentary majority.

Given the hostility of the two sets of elites towards each other, it was but natural for the political elites to resent the limitations on their prerogatives. Consequently, Suleyman Demirel, leader of the Justice party, often complained as Prime Minister that the country could not be governed under the 1961 constitution. If Turkey faced the

80 In contrast to the 1961 Constitution, the 1924 constitution had stipulated that the nation should exercise its sovereignty through its representatives in Parliament. In the second Turkish Republic, the ‘authorised agencies’, particularly the higher tribunals were assigned to test the legal validity and even desirability of the administrative decisions and parliament acts. These tribunals sympathetic to the views of the state-elites, however, rarely made decisions in an impartial manner. For an insightful analysis see, C. H. Dodd, The Crisis of Turkish Democracy, (Walkington, U.K.: The Eothen Press, 1983), pp. 25-28.

legitimation crisis in the succeeding years, it was precisely because of the fundamental disagreement over what should be the proper and accepted division of authority in the Turkish polity. 82

Despite some fundamental changes in the rules of the political game in Turkey, the new constitution of 1961 produced stagnation and instability that it was designed to avoid. In the following four years, Turkey was ruled by a series of three fragile constitutions headed by Ismet Inonu, leader of the RPP, the party identified with the state-elites. In the 1965 parliamentary elections, however, the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi) won 53 per cent of popular vote under the leadership of Suleyman Demirel who had succeeded to the party presidency in November 1964. 83 No single party since that time has been able to win an absolute victory in the polls (see table 1.1). The JP repeated its performance in 1969 when it secured an absolute majority of the National Assembly seats with a somewhat reduced percentage of popular votes.


83 The Justice Party (JP) was one of eleven parties registered in January 1961 when the ban on political activity was formally lifted. Its founder was General Gumuspala, who had been appointed chief of the General staff after the revolution but was compulsorily retired in August 1960. His avowed purpose was to rehabilitate the DP deputies condemned to various sentence by a court set up by the military. This policy defined as “revengist” was promoted by the JP leaders under the Chairmanship of Gumusupalas successor, Sadettin Bilgic, who was beaten by Suleyman Demirel at the party convention held in November 1964. The new leader of JP was an engineer by profession who sought to avoid confrontation with the military. Instead, he was prepared for accommodation with the state elites, and at the same time he used the DP badge, ‘grey horse” to establish itself as the heir of then outlawed DP. In the first post-coup elections however, two other parties, the New Turkish Party (NTP) and Republican Peasant Nation Party (RPMP) competed with the JP for winning the former DP supporters. Due to the fragmentation of DP voters, no single party received an absolute majority in 1961.
As the centre-right re-established its electoral predominance, despite frequent manipulations in the electoral system, the radical elements in the armed forces sought to establish a longer-term military regime. The “coup by Communiqué” on 12 March 1971, which forced Demirel to resign was a political move by the top military commanders to forestall a direct seizure of power by a group of radical officers.\footnote{In the days following the military pronunciamento most of the radical officers were summarily retired or dismissed, thereby strengthening the position of the more conservative leadership of the military. The radical elements always saw the 1960 coup as the triumph of what they termed neo-Kemalism. After the restoration of the civilian government, they were convinced that Kemalism and the will of the majority were in conflict. The failure of the RPP to muster majority of seats required to form a stable government defending neo-Kemalism disappointed many of its proponents. What provoked them further was the campaign of the Democrats to ‘avenge’ the downfall of the DP. Hence, the two coup attempts in 1962 and 1963 led by colonel Talat Aydemir, the Commandent of the Ankara War College, which were narrowly averted, thanks to Ismet Inonu’s presence at the head of the government. For details, see Geoffrey Lewis, “Political Change in Turkey since 1960” in William M. Hale (ed.), \textit{Aspects of Modern Turkey} (London: Bounker, 1976), p. 16 and Feroz Ahmad, \textit{The Turkish Experiment}, pp. 161-172.}

Officially, the intervention was justified on grounds that “the government had plunged our country into anarchy, fratricidal strife and social and economic disorder.”\footnote{Quoted by Suleyman Demirel, 197 \textit{Buhrani ve Aydînîga Dorgu} (Ankara: Dagu Matbaasi, 1973), pp. 1-2, reproduced in G. Lewis, \textit{Ibid.}, p. 8.}

The army chiefs did not go far as dissolving the parliament or assuming power directly. Instead, they installed a “above party” coalition under Nihat Erim, a former academician from the conservative faction of the RPP, who resigned from the party on assuming premiership. The military remained closely involved in politics, as it imposed a series of constitutional amendments designed to strengthen the executive authority and restrict certain civil liberties that were seen as responsible for the upsurge of political extremism particularly from the left.\footnote{On the left and Labour movement, see Chapter IV.} Indeed much of the political participation in the period 1960-71 bore the marks of increasing radicalisation which
stirred fears among the democratic nationalist officers about the possibility of a leftist take-over. Although the top generals adopted neutral attitude towards all political parties regardless of their ideological commitments, their wrath fell mainly on the leftist groups and intellectuals since they were more active than the right-wing elements. The military decided to act alone because it could not rely on its natural allies like the RPP already heading for split as the leading faction headed by Bulent Ecevit denounced the intervention. On balance, the makers of the 1971 coup undertook partial revamping of the system by strengthening the executive, closing down the TLP and Milli Nizam Partisi of Erbakan, and above all, trying to enforce the social and economic reforms decreed by the NUC through a non-partisan Prime Minister.

Although the officers called for a “strong government” to address the range of issues that had raged prior to the coup, the country experienced four week coalitions in the span of 36 months. As such, the military intervention of 1971 produced no lasting effect partly because it was not supported by a political party as in the 1960s, and in greater part, both of Erim’s cabinet and that of Ferit Melen failed to hammer out public consensus on the proposed reform-package. In fact, before any compromise was

87 Unlike the 1960, “the intervention of 12 March 1971 had been a preventive coup d’etat, designed to end the activities of radicals who wanted to overthrow the government and implement reforms”. Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment, op. cit., p. 292. The democratic nationalist officers led by Faruk Gurel, the chiefs of Staff, suspected those radicals from the political left; They suspected a specific group headed by General Cemal Madanoglu who had been receiving advice of some leftist intellectuals. See, Karpat, Turkish Democracy at Impasse, op. cit., p. 14.

88 The military, as well as many liberal-minded intellectuals attributed the leftist upsurge since 1965 to the failure of Demirel government, despite winning comfortable majority to introduce social and economic reforms. Besides, the civilian government was blamed for the political turmoil in Turkey, which began first in the universities and then spilled over into society in general. Thus, the unabated extremist violence revealed the inability and lack of determination on the part of the civilian government to cope with the acts of violence. For details see, Karpat, “Turkish Democracy at Impasse”. op. cit., pp. 14-15.
reached among the conservatives and reform-minded parliamentarians, the 'semi-military regime' faced the crucial test of electing new president as incumbent Cevdet Sunay's seven-year term was due to end in March 1973. In the protracted balloting which followed, the two major political parties were united to defeat the military-backed candidate General Faruk Gurler, who had led the 1971 intervention in favour of a retired admiral Fahri Koruturk. Instead of outright take-over as it had done in 1960, the army decided to withdraw into barracks after speeding up plans for elections, and a return to civilian party politics in October, 1973.89

Period of Coalition Governments

Between 1973 and 1979, Turkey lived through a period of unstable and precarious coalition governments, numbering at least thirteen. These governments were led alternately by the conservative JP and social democratic RPP based on alliance with an assortment of right-wing parties, mainly the National Salvation Party of Erbakan and the Democratic Party (DP) formed by the break-away Bozbeyli faction of the JP.

Following the 1973 elections, the RPP led by Bulent Ecevit emerged as the single largest party, securing 33.3 per cent of the votes, but fell short of an overall majority.90 In January 1974, however, Ecevit managed to form a coalition government

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89 The high-voltage political drama that triggered off a serious crisis in 1973 had begun with the resignation of General Faruk Gurler from his post of Chief of the General Staff to become a presidentially appointed senator so as to fulfill the eligibility criteria for the presidency. Election to presidency started on 13 March and ended in the fifteenth ballot on 6 April with the election of retired Admiral Fahri Koruturk. For a detailed description see, Roger P. Nye, "Civil-military confrontation in Turkey: 1973 Presidential Elections", International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 28, April 1977, pp. 212-226.

90 The elections of 1973 showed an increase of about 6 per cent in the votes received by the RPP as compared to its crushing defeat in 1969 when the party secured lowest percentage since 1950. The new Chairman of the RPP, Ecevit interpreted the success as a positive response to the populist-socialist orientation of the party
with the support of the NSP, which lasted until September of that year. Next scolalition
government known as the Nationalist Front was formed by the right-wing parties – the
JP, NSP, National Action Party or NAP (an ultra-rightist Party) and a splinter group of
the RPP, the Republican Reliance Party – under the premiership of Demirel. This
shaky combination survived relatively longer period until the June 1977 elections. But,
the voters in 1977 favoured the RPP, as its vote-share rose to 41.4 per cent the highest
since 1950. Despite his large bloc of deputies, Ecevit failed to win a vote of
confidence, which paved the way for the second Nationalist Front (Milli Cephe).

The ruling right-wing formation suffered temporary reversal in January 1978,
when a number of deputies from the JP resigned in protest against the rightist
radicalisation of the Party. They, together with some independents anxious to end the
dangerous slide to extreme right combined in a coalition government under Ecevit’s
leadership In November 1979 Ecevit resigned after having failed to secure five
parliamentary seats in the October by-elections – all lost to Demrel’s Party. Once again
Demirel formed a minority government backed by his traditional allies, NSP and NAP.

Emboldened by his Party’s impressive electoral performance (JP’s vote rose
from 36.9 in 1977 to 54 per cent in 1979), Demirel concentrated on restoring Public

assiduously promoted by his group within the RPP since 1965. In fact, the RPP
under Ecevit since his election to the party Chairmanship in extraordinary party
convention in May 1972 became a social democratic party. However, it would be
an exaggeration to conclude that under Ecevit, the RPP had converted itself into a
strictly socialist party. The party speakers and programme ignored the terms
‘socialist’ or ‘social democrat’, preferring to describe party’s stance as that of
‘democratic left’. This was according to its critics part of an attempt by the party
to divest itself of its old image as the representative of a bureaucratic ruling class,
and to encourage small-scale grass-roots industrial democracy with worker-
controlled factories in the public sector and cooperative development in
agricultural sector. See, William Hale, The Political and Economic Development
confidence in the authority of the government. He took stern measures to curb extremists, both leftists and rightists; initiated far-reaching economic reforms long advocated by the World Bank as precondition for the granting to Turkey of much-needed hard currency credits. The economic package announced by the Demirel government in January 1980 represented a radical departure from the past practices and policies. It was, in brief, a replacement of an inward-oriented strategy based on import-substitution with an export-oriented strategy in the direction of a free-market system.

Predictably, the new economic experiment provoked bitter opposition from the left, and more so, misgivings among the statist-minded entrepreneurs who had thrived on state protectionism. The Revolutionary Workers Trade Union (DISK), for example, launched an open campaign of strikes intended to sabotage Demirel’s economic reforms. Aside from labour unrest, the inflation continued to rise exceeding 100 per cent, and terrorism escalated into a mini civil-war between the leftists, including the Kurdish separatists and ultra-nationalists. On the whole Turkey remained

91 The new package included a major devaluation of the exchange-rate, removal of price controls on state economic enterprises (SEEs), de-regulation of domestic interest-rates and reduction in public sector deficit. The devaluation was one of the major requirements of the stand-by agreement signed by the government with the IMF. A team of high-level technocrats became responsible for implementation of the new strategy. It may be noted that the key figure in the process of policy formulation was Turgut Ozal, who was indeed the architect of the January 1980 programme. Ziya Onis, “Redemocratisation and Economic Liberalisation in Turkey: The limits of State Autonomy”, Studies in Comparative International Development, (Summer, 1992) pp. 9-11.

92 The adoption of a new strategy of an export-driven free-market economy stirred anxiety among many Turks who were unable to forecast its outcome. An “influential section of the country’s intelligentsia criticised the structural adjustment policies of the Demirel government on the ground that they “could result in the oppression of a large section of this society for a long period, and the unprecedented enrichment of a small section” Mehmet Ali Birand, Milliyet, 18 June 1980 quoted in William Hale, The Political and Economic Development, op. cit., p. 259.
in a virtual state of seige, as the authority failed to deal with the reactionary and subversive forces effectively.

September 12, 1980 Coup and Its Aftermath

Amidst the deepening political crisis, worsening economy and growing public pessimism, the reluctant Turkish army finally on September 12, 1980 made the official declaration that "it had a duty to step in". In a way, the third military intervention resembled that of 1971, especially so far as the over-all (socio-economic and political) context was concerned. There were, however, at least three striking differences. First, the 1971 intervention, as Karpat called, was "an incomplete revolution" because it failed to address sufficiently to the core issues, which sustained the competing, even conflicting campaign to re-organise the political centre throughout the 1970s. The ideological struggle in turn, led to the break-down of the consensus among the dominant elites about the future nature of the political regime. Moreover, intense competition among the political parties polarised at the two ideological extremes created governmental immobility, threatening the state (centre) and "its perceived distinctive, traditional role as the anchor of Turkish society".

93 The groups on the left of the political spectrum demanded implementation of the social and economic rights enumerated in the 1961 constitution regardless of the systemic limitations. The RPP in particular changed the ‘left of Centre’ policy (ortanin solu) into an ideology, and indeed, the raison d’etre of the party, whereas, the right of the Centre’ JP reacted to the socialist challenge by labeling the RPP a leftist-Marxist party, and encouraging the formation of nationalist youth groups. The ideological divide between the two major political parties gave moral boost to various extremist formations committed to substitute for democracy nationalistic, socialist or communist totalitarian system. For further analysis, see, Chapter IV.

94 Ustun Erguder and Richard I. Hofferbert, “Restoration of Democracy in Turkey”, pp. 20. Since January 1978 when Ecevit formed an unwieldy coalition, state power was virtually on the verge of extinction. In fact, the country was sliding
Second, in contrast to the 1971, the September coup of 1980 was preceded to by extensive discussion and a more prolonged planning for the post-coup period. While in the aftermath of the 1971 ultimatum, the military leadership preferred to work with a nonpartisan civilian Prime Minister, the makers of the 1980 intervention chose to isolate themselves from all political groups. Instead, they set up the National Security Council (Milli Guvenlik Konseyi) or the NSC, which was consisted of four generals and one admiral. The Council was vested with legal and executive powers, and headed by General Kenan Evren, the leader of the coup. He appointed Admiral Bulent ulusu.

towards civil war, as the terrorist bloodshed continued at an ever-accelerating state. Even imposition of martial law renewed at two-month intervals, especially after the appalling intercommunal massacre in Kahramanmars in December 1978 could not end the violence. There was yet another bloody intercommunal fighting in Chorum in June 1980. While the situation was rapidly passing from bad to worse, the party leaders squandered energy in petty politiking without heeding seriously the suggestions and even warning from the military such as to implement NSC decisions designed to tighten up anti-terrorist campaign (May 1978 complaint to Ecevit by General Evren), and formation of grand coalition between the J.P. and RPP (warning letter by Evren to President Koruturk in December 1979). Although Ecevit had announced his willingness to join such coalition, Demirel turned down the idea and preferred to press for early general elections. Thus, the political confusion dragged on, so much so that the two major parties failed to reach an agreement on a compromise candidate to succeed President Koruturk whose term of office expired on 6 April 1980. The parliament’s failure to elect any permanent successor to Koruturk (speaker of senate served as the acting president) was a bitter reminder of the paralysis of the government. For details see, Feroz Ahmad, “Military Intervention and the Crisis in Turkey”, MERIP Reports, (January, 1981), pp. 2-7; William Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 228-240.

Turkish ambassador in Rome, as the new Prime Minister whose cabinet was consisted of mainly civilian technocrats.

Finally, the generals after the 1980 coup cracked down on both the leftists and extremists on the right, unlike in 1971 when the military concentrated mainly on the left-wing radicals. In fact, the most serious development that arguably forced the army to step in was the massive Islamist rally in Konya organised by the NSP leader Erbakan shortly before the coup.96 Wary of the reactionary forces gaining popular legitimacy, and the rising centrifugal tendency shaking the complex social mosaic, the junta naturally sought restraining the pluralist thrust of recent Turkish politics.

Suspension of political groups active in the pre-coup period was meant to depoliticise an otherwise ‘over-politicised state’.97 Thus, the makers of the 1980 coup sought to establish a framework for an antiseptic type of politics by restructuring the political system so as to prevent the pre-1980 collapse of governmental authority. The new constitution prepared by the NSC-appointed consultative Assembly and completed by the Council itself reflected the concerns and objectives of the military outlined above.

**Third Turkish Republic (The 1982 Constitution)**

The constitution of October 18, 1982, which was submitted to a popular referendum and approved by a 91-per cent majority of the votes seemed to be a reaction

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96 Journalist Kenneth Mackenzie holds that Erbakan’s Konya meeting on 6 September 1980 was “the catalytic factor” in the military leaders’ decision to intervene. Because, on that day Erbakan led a massive demonstration in Konya, a notorious centre of Islamic conservatism. Over one hundred thousand people participated in the political rally, at which open call for the establishment of an Islamic state was made. K. Mackenzie, “Turkey under the Generals”, *Conflict Studies* (London, Institute of Study of Conflict, 1981), No. 126, pp. 12.

to its 1961 predecessor. The new constitution, unlike its predecessor, was less liberal on civil rights, and equally less respectful of the “national will”, elected assembly, political parties and all other civil-society-based associations including trade unions and voluntary organisations.\textsuperscript{98} While such restrictive provisions were a natural reaction against excessive politicisation of the society, several modifications introduced into the structure of the parliament, party system and electoral laws were all designed to establish a fairly rigid set of rules for the political game. Not only were these reforms meant to avoid the pitfalls inherent in the pre-1980 political order such as the disproportionate influence exercised by extremist splinter parties leading to stalemated politics, also to provide a framework conducive to the evolution of consensual conflict management.

However, the overriding, immediate concerns for the 1980 military intervenors was to establish a strong governmental authority. Because, in their eyes, the political elites, especially the old set of politicians were the main culprits whose inability to organise a viable governing coalition undermined public confidence on the central (state) authority. More so, their failure to keep the adversial politics within an orderly framework reduced democracy to a state of anarchy with an intolerably high level of

\textsuperscript{98} The generals were evidently worried about the possibility of encountering violent resistance, particularly from the militant trade unions like the DISK, which was reckoned to have more than 15,000 diehard members. Naturally the unionism was dealt a serious blow in the military government’s trade unions and collective agreements law, with its introduction of cumbersome process of collective bargaining and its many restrictions on the right to strike. Politically motivated strikes, for instance, were not allowed; moreover strikes that are detrimental to the society or damaging national wealth would be banned. Similarly, article 33 guarantees the right to establish association without prior permission, but this right is limited by restrictions like the supervision by ministries of the professional associations. Finally, in its attempt to restructure the political system radically, the junta sought to break links between political parties and interest groups (including labour unions) to be found in wider society. Roger Owen, State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 154-156.
violence. No less were responsible the civilian bureaucratic agencies, which the junta perceived as highly fragmented and vulnerable to radical political ideas, which, in turn, resulted in the erosion of governmental authority.

Thus, “the new document with some overtones of presidentialism emphasised governmental authority as against legislative unruliness – a trait of the 1960s”. In a two-tiered executive established by the new constitution, the role of the president was strengthened vis-à-vis the council of Ministers and Parliament (both representing the political elites). If the president’s power was enhanced and given extensive responsibilities, this was not intended to adopt presidential system of government. Rather, the executive was seriously reinforced with President as the ultimate guardian of the regime. The purpose seems to be, what Kemal Karpat interprets, the imperatives to repose “sufficient power in a supreme and wise authority which might be even a

99 It has been calculated that death from political violence increased every year before 1980 coup. The statistics given by Dodd are as follows: 35 in 1975 increased to 1,500 in 1979 and increased further to 3,500 before the September 1980 Coup. C.H. Dodd, The Crisis of Turkish Democracy, 2nd Edition (Washington: Eothen Press, 1990), p. 27.


101 The 1982 constitution transformed the presidency form a largely symbolic and ceremonial office, as it was under the 1961 constitution into powerful one, with important political and appointive functions. Thus, the President of Turkey has considerable clout as the guardian of the state. Indeed, the office of the presidency was maintained as under the 1961 constitution, “the representative of the Turkish Republic and unity of the Turkish nation” (Article 104). However, the system of government remains essentially parliamentarian because the President is not politically responsible to the legislature. Instead, the Council of Ministers is only responsible; it has primary responsibility of determining and conducting the policies of the country. It can thus be argued that “the 1982 constitution created a ‘mixed’ or ‘hybrid’ system of government, perhaps along the lines of the French constitution of 1958”. Ergun Ozbudun, “The Status of the President of the Republic under the Turkish Constitution of 1982: Presidentialism or Parliamentarism?”, Heper and Evin (ed.), State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s, op. cit., p. 37. Also see, M. Heper and Menderes Cinar, “Parliamentary Government with a Strong President: The Post-1989 Turkish Experience”, Political Science Quarterly, (vol. III, No.3, 1996), pp. 484-493.
single person so long as the person in question exercised authority faithfully for the welfare of the nation and community.\textsuperscript{102}

Evidently, General Kenan Evren was automatically elected president upon the ratification of the constitution by a referendum. Given his apparent popularity, and his role as the leader of the junta under whose auspices the constitution was drafted, it was no surprise that Evren wielded considerable political clout. He was supported by the military-dominated NSC, which, according to a provisional article, was transformed into a presidential council, an advisory body to the president. All this pointed to hard fact that Turkey ultimately had a controlled democracy, in which the members of the junta would remain intimately involved in the conduct of government.

More so, the junta during the transition period to the restoration of civilian rule, which was indeed relatively longer, tried to retain tight control over the political process initially by banning existing political parties and then, restricting the number of new parties that too with limited role.\textsuperscript{103} All the same, the Turkish electorate, which had voted overwhelmingly for the new Constitution, turned around in the November 1983

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\textsuperscript{102} K.H. Karpat, "Military Intervention", op. cit., p. 152.
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\textsuperscript{103} Determined to prevent proliferation of minor parties and the resultant instability, the Constitution-makers imposed serious limitations on their entry. The new electoral law promulgated in June 1983 was a further modification of the proportional representation system adopted in 1961 and considerably modified following the 1971 ultimatum. In order to ensure a bi-party stable political system the new law laid down the minimum 10% of votes to be secured by a political party to be represented in the Assembly. Besides, out of 15 new parties established after the adoption of new political parties law, only three were cleared by the military Directorate to participate in the November 1983 parliamentary election. According to one provisional article, the Directorate proscribed participation and even founding new parties by those who had been prominent in the pre-1980 period. See, Tachau, Turkey, op. cit., pp, 57-59.
\end{flushright}
elections for National Assembly, and voted for the party most likely to disengage the political system from military tutelage. Of the three parties qualified to contest the election, the least closely attached to the generals was the Motherland Party (ANAP) founded by Turgut Ozal, who held high technocratic position in Demirel government before becoming Deputy Prime Minister incharge of economic affairs in the Bulent Ulusu government. The 1983 election conducted under the d'Hondt proportional representation system resulted in an unexpected victory for Ozal and his party winning more than 50 per cent of the Assembly seats and 45 per cent of total valid votes.

If the election outcome was any indication, majority of Turkish voters preferred restoration of civilian government to continuation of military rule, overtly or covertly. As Ozal headed the first civilian government bringing an end to the three-year period of military government, a new phase in Turkey's political life began. Dominated by Ozal and his party for the next ten years, Turkey experienced three politically salient changes: a) liberalisation of the economy giving greater social recognition to the entrepreneurial class; b) de-bureaucratisation\(^\text{104}\) of the political system; c) autonomization of civil society. The developments briefly outlined above according to Metin Heper, were a definitive pointer towards what he calls "a moderate instrumental state" a state in which

\(^{104}\) The attitude of the Motherland Party (MP) government towards the state bureaucracy was more pragmatic than ideological as in the 1970s when civil servants were reshuffled arbitrarily by various coalition governments or in the 1950s when the DP leaders were engaged in virulent anti-state rhetoric. The Ozal government attempted to debureaucratise the political system essentially through indirect methods such as reducing government's involvement in the economy, greater reliance on market forces, privatization of SEEs, tackling the bureaucratic red tape and last but not the least, induction of U.S. educated technocrats-managers (referred to as Ozal's princes) into public economic enterprises. For these changes, see Metin Heper, "The State and Debureaucratisation: The Turkish Case", *International Social Science Journal*, 1990, vol. 126, pp. 605-615.
a dynamic\textsuperscript{105} consensus may evolve through multiple confrontations of civil-societal
groups.

To sum up, the Turkish polity has in the past fifty years or more vacillated
between a bureaucratic and military (state elite) tutelage on the one hand, and a
debilitating pluralism\textsuperscript{106} on the other. "In the polarised Turkish polity", Heper
maintains, "the relations between the statist, that is, the bureaucratic and/or military
elites, and political elites pass through cycles of domination, protest and
redomination".\textsuperscript{107} Unlike in the Latin Christendom, (German and France), Turkish case
shows that it has failed to reconcile increasing pluralism with a 'strong' state tradition.
Consequently, intense conflict between the statist and political elites has destabilised the
polity, imposing thereby serious, constraints on decision-makers. In fact, the political
factionalisation and ideological polarisation during the 1970s adversely affected the
conduct of a purposeful foreign policy. Unlike, however, in the other developing states,
a broad consensus on foreign policy among the state and political elites remain

\textsuperscript{105} An 'instrumental state', is the state that exists for citizens, recognises the diversity
of interests among them, and above all, allows the civil society to mature
autonomous of the state. In contrast, a 'transcendental state' is authoritarian in the
sense that the state is sovereign vis-a-vis civil society. It has moral and legal
precedence over its citizens. Metin Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey
Autonomisation of Politics and Civil Society in Turkey" in M. Heper and Ahmet
Evin (eds.), Politics in the Third Turkish Republic: A Case Study in Transition to

\textsuperscript{106} Deblitating pluralism or extreme instrumentalism is the result of the over-emphasis
on particularistic interests, lack of restraint and lack of consensus to resolve
conflicts among political elites, though the political system is based on effective
consent of the governed.

\textsuperscript{107} M. Heper, "The Strong State As a Problem for the Consolidation of Democracy:
Turkey and Germany Compared" Comparative Political Studies (July, 1992), p.
182.
unbroken. Since the crisis of legitimacy is not the characteristic of Turkish polity, foreign policy is not misused as such for achievement of domestic objectives.

STRUCTURAL ATTRIBUTES: POPULATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

As previously noted, the structural attributes of the units not only determine their ranks or positions in the international system, but also account for variations in their foreign policy behaviour. In his comparative study of foreign policy, Prof. Rosenau has identified three key national attributes of the states 1) size; and 2) economic development; 3) the state of polity. The size attribute refers to both physical (territory) and human resources (population), whereas the economic development refers to the degree to which the country has translated its industrial, agricultural and technological potential into operative capabilities. The state of polity as discussed above refers to the degree to which the decision-makers are exposed, and held accountable by the values and demands of the citizenry. In the ensuing

108 The essence of Rosenau’s theoretical effort is to treat the foreign policy actor – the state or unit – as the centre of concern. These actors are viewed as “national societies” comprising of the structural attributes essential to their survival. Based on these attributes, Rosenau has classified different types of actors (i.e. large, developed and open actor or small, undeveloped/developing, closed one. Then Rosenau goes on to establish the “relative potency” of four sets of source or independent variables – individual (leader), governmental, societal and systemic – in different types of actors. For instance, in a large, developing and open national society or state like India, according to Rosenau’s ranking of the above variables, individual (leaders) tops the list followed by societal, systemic and governmental variables that determine the country’s foreign policy outputs. See Patrick J. McGoman, “Problems in the construction of Positive Foreign Policy Theory: in James N. Rosenau, ed., Comparing Foreign Policies: Theories, Findings and Methods (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1974), pp. 25-41.

109 For a discussion on the three attributes, see J.N. Rosenau and Gary D. Hoggard, “Foreign Policy Behaviour in Dyadic Relationships: Testing a Pre-Theory Extension”, in Rosenau Ibid., pp. 117-125.
discussion the focus is mainly on the size and ethnic composition of Turkey’s population and its state of economy.

Population

The gross population size, according to some foreign policy analysts, is an asset rather than a liability from both economic and military points of view. In fact, states with large population are generally regarded as more powerful than those with relatively small population. However, rapidly growing population can be a disadvantage for its negative fallout on the state of economy and natural resources. What is more, a large but ethnically divided state undermines its capacity to act as an independent actor in world affairs.

Turkey is a fairly large country with a population of over 50 million (according to the 1985 census). Growing at a rate of 2.5 per cent, Turkey’s population is higher than European countries, but lower than most third world states (see table 1.2). Birth rates vary widely, from no more than two children among middle class families in Western cities to as many as 17 in rural families in the south-east. In this part of Turkey largely inhabited by the Kurds, population is growing at 3 and half per cent a year.111

A generally quiescent and largely rural population of nearly 13 million in 1927 has grown more than four fold in the republican era (see table 1.4). Although the rapid internal migration of the 1960s and ‘70s has slowed, once overwhelmingly rural Turkey has become increasingly urban. The urban population rose from 18.6 per cent in 1946 to 44 per cent in 1980 and more than 50 per cent by 1985 (see figure 1.5). Thus, over

half of all Turks live in towns of 5000 or more, and more than one-quarter live in the
five largest cities alone.

Apart from rapid growth in urbanisation, Turkey is one of the few developing
countries, which can claim to have achieved an impressive 70 per cent adult literacy
rate. More than 80 per cent of Turkish male and 60 per cent Turkish women are
literate. These two developments are a pointer towards the progress of modernisation in
Turkey despite an unfavourable economy.

Ethnic Composition

Although Turkey inherited the social composition of a multi-ethnic Ottoman
dominant identity, the national
empire, the framers of the Republic opted for an ‘ethnocratic’ state\textsuperscript{112} – a state in which
the disparate people were to have their previous identities subsumed under that of being
Turkish. Despite the imposition of ‘Turkishness’ as the dominant identity, the national
and linguistic homogeneity of Turkey’s population is not complete. As a recent study
of the country’s ethnic composition shows, there are no fewer than forty seven ethnic
groups living in Turkey today.\textsuperscript{113} Kurds are just one of these ethnic groups, but the
second largest in size.

Kurdish Population

Since there are no government records or statistics indicating the exact size or
geographic distribution of the Kurdish population, estimates of their present number

\textsuperscript{111} “Turkey: A Survey” in \textit{The Economist} (June 18, 1988), pp. 19.

\textsuperscript{112} Ethnocratic state is defined as a state, which “employs the cultural attributes and
\textit{values} of the dominant ethnic segment as the core elements for the elaboration of
the national ideology”. David Brown, \textit{The State and Ethnic Politics in South East

\textsuperscript{113} Peter Alford Andrews, ed., \textit{Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Turkey} (Wiesbaden:
Dr. Luding Reichert Verlag, 1989), pp. 53-178.
vary widely ranging from 7 to 12 million. Based on language as the sole ethnic marker of 'Kurdishness', a Turkish scholar has estimated the number of Kurds to be 7.046 million in 1990, constituting little more than 12 per cent of Turkey's total population.\footnote{114} The ethnically Kurdish population, according to the author, grew by 3.24 per cent per annum between 1965 and 1990 whereas the non-Kurdish component of population increased by 2.19 per cent inclusive of the refugees from Bulgaria during this period (see table 1.6).\footnote{115} Moreover, the massive population movements in the past few decades has geographically redistributed the Kurds. Although majority of the Kurds live in the east and southeastern parts of Turkey, the Kurdish population in the West has increased manifold. Between 1965 and 1990, there was a twelve-fold increase in the Kurds in Marmara, a twenty-fold in the Aegean and nearly four-fold increase in the Mediterranean region. There are as many Kurds in Istanbul and Izmir, Turkey's two big cities, as in the Diyarbakir province, the very heartland of Kurds traditional area of settlement.\footnote{116}


\footnote{116 Place of birth analysis of the 1985 census shows that 22.8 per cent of Istanbul's population was from East and Southeast Turkey - a substantial number, but certainly not all, of whom are Kurds. By 1990, this reached 25 per cent for Istanbul, 24.4 per cent for Izmir, and 12 per cent for Ankara. Furthermore, the three major Mediterranean cities of Adana, Mersin and Antalya have also emerged in the 1990s as major destinations for migrants from eastern provinces. See, The GAP Research Team, Population Movements in Southern Anatolia Project Region (Ankara: METU, Department of Sociology, 1994), pp. 173-77.}
The ethnogenesis of the Kurds has been the subject of several hypotheses, though the Kurdish nationalists claim to be the direct descendants of the ancient Medes, an Indo-European tribe from central Asia that ruled the Iranian plateau until 550 B.C.117 However, the history of the Kurds begins in a more verifiable way with the Arab conquest of the areas in the 7th century. For many centuries before the emergence of modern nation-states in West Asia, the Kurds were frontiersmen, living on the disputed borders between rival Ottoman and Persian empires.118

After the World War I, when new states were carved out of a disintegrating Ottoman empire, the Kurds like the stateless Jews were also regarded as natural candidates for nationhood. The August 1920 Treaty of Servië envisaged interim autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish areas of Turkey. More so, article 64 of the Treaty maintained,

"if within one year from the coming into force of the present Treaty the Kurdish people ... show that a majority of the population of these areas desires independence from Turkey, and if the Government then considers that these

117 The Kurds are an ancient mountain race who have inhabited the mountainous mass encompassing mainly Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Armenian republic over 4000 years. According to some Kurdish nationalist scholars, the history of Kurds began during the third millenium B.C., when a semi-nomadic people who spoke Indo-European language began to migrate from Southern Russia towards Anatolia. They conquered the existing states of Asia minor, formed the Hittite Empire and became the first Iranian speaking Kurds. Around the time when the Hittite empire collapsed (circa 1200 B.C.), another Aryan group from Southern Russia moved into what is known as the Iranian Plateau. These tribes known as Medes are considered among the ancestors of the Kurdish people. The Mede Empire collapsed after the crushing defeat by Alexander. However, the Median takeover of the Zargos mountain already inhabited by Kurd altered the ethnic make-up of Kurdish population. For Kurdish nationalist history, see Omran Yahya Felii and Ariene R. Fromchuck, "The Kurdish Struggle for Independence", Middle East Review, Fall, 1978, p. 47-48; Mordecho Nisan, Minorities in the Middle East: A History of Struggle and Self Expression (Jefferson: McFarland, 1991), pp. 26-29.

people are capable of such independence and recommends that it should be granted to them. Turkey hereby agrees to execute such a recommendation, and to renounce all rights and title over these areas.

The Treaty of Serves became irrelevant, as the reconstructed Turkish army overran Kurdish territories in 1922. While a large chuck of Kurdish population was left within the borders of the new Turkish republic founded by Ataturk, Britain and France indirectly awarded themselves Kurdish areas through their client states, Iraq and Syria. Predictably, failure to implement the provisions of the Treaty set off episodic Kurdish resistance to central control in all three states – Turkey, Iraq and Iran – where Kurds are primarily concentrated. In Kemalist Turkey, for instance, the First rebellion against the state took place in February 1925, and was led by a Kurdish religious leaders, Shaikh Said who occupied one-third of the Kurdish Anatolia. The Shaikh said rebellion was followed by two other significant but less threatening uprisings, the Mount Ararat revolt in 1930 and the uprising in 1937 in the Dersim (later renamed as Tunceli) region under the leadership of Shaikh Sayyid Reza. By the late 1930s, all of these rebellions had been ruthlessly suppressed, and their leaders executed. However, these three major rebellions against the Kemalist state “firmly established the Kurds in

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Turkish minds as the originators of the primary challenge to their independent existence". 122

After these ill-fated rebellions, the government launched a vigorous campaign to stifle the Kurdish ethno-culturalism through forced assimilation and draconian laws banning Kurdish dress, their language, folklore and even the very word 'Kurd'. Also, attempts were made to detribalise the Kurdish society by abrogating all previous recognition of tribes, their chiefs and Sharkhs, and disperse the Kurdish population to the predominantly Turkish-speaking areas. 123 The Menderes Years (1950-60), however, brought a certain measure of liberalisation and relaxation of policy of forced assimilation. During the next two decades, the tribal chieftains (aghas) and religious leaders (Sheikhs and Sayyid) played an active role in the political and economic life of the region, 124 as the government opted for indirect control through these local authorities.

The cooption of the traditional Kurdish elites reinforced, and even consolidated the tribal social structure at the expense of the overall socio-economic development of the southeastern Turkey. As compared to the rapid economic growth and prosperity in


123 In June 1934, a draconian law was enacted to transfer those whose mother tongue was not Turkish to Turkish speaking areas. This law No. 2510 also abrogated all previous recognition of tribes, their aghas and Shaikhs while confiscating their personal property. For details, see Mc Dowall, A Modern History, op. cit, pp. 207-208.

Western Anatolian, the Kurdish areas represent the country’s economic backwater. In 1986, for example, the GDP per capita in the south-east was less than half the national average, and unemployment was estimated to be twice the national average at around 25 per cent.\textsuperscript{125} The economic underdevelopment together with the poor infrastructure of the region forced the Kurdish male population to migrate to near-by towns and cities in the West. Those who remained had to rely on the intermediary stratnon of aghas, for their living since these tribal chiefs owned huge tracts of cultivable land. In 1985, two per cent of land owners possessed 30.5 per cent of the cultivable land.\textsuperscript{126}

The large landowners in Turkey’s south and southeastern provinces, according to William hale, “are often tribal leaders with whom the villagers recognise links of kinships as well as economic dependence. The position of such leaders is perhaps comparable to that of the highland laird in the Scotland of the earlier days – an hereditary chief who often became the owner of his clan’s domain”.\textsuperscript{127} The continuation of the old social patterns, no doubt, served the interests of both the Kurdish notables who successfully resisted the centre’s attempt at restructuring the rural economy and the political parties in Ankara seeking electoral support.\textsuperscript{128} In the long-run, however, this

\textsuperscript{125} Quoted in P. Robins, “The Overlord State”, pp. 663.


\textsuperscript{127} William Hall, “Particularism and Universalism in Turkish Politics”, in W. Hale (ed.), \textit{Aspects of Modern Turkey}, p. 47.

\textsuperscript{128} With the onset of democratic pluralism in the 1950s, political parties including the RPP forged a more extensive accommodation with the aghas and Shaikhs who controlled the rural votes. Pressures of multi-party politics prevented Turkey’s political elites from attempting socio-economic reform in the southeast that would inevitably antagonise the aghamat. The failure of land reform, most recently attempted in 1978, illustrates the lack of political will on the part of the state to undermine the power of the aghas and landlords. Even the South-east Anatolian Project (GAP) launched in the early 1980s is likely to benefit the same strata at the cost of landless peasants in the region. For an interesting discussion on the GAP

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powerful nexus of mutual dependence conduced to the growth in radical politics in the
Kurdish areas, on the back of which emerged the Kurdistan Workers’ Party known as
the PKK by its Turkish initials.129

Founded in November 1978 by a small group of Kurdish students of Ankara
University in Diyarbakir, the PKK represents the strongest centrifugal force in the
country today. Under the youthful leadership of Abdullah Ocalon, popularly known by
his nickname ‘Apo’, the PKK has imbued Kurdish nationalism with the idea of class
war. Unlike the Kurdish groups active in Iraq, which have cultivated a following
through neo-tribal patronage networks, the adherents of Apo are drawn from Turkey’s
growing proletariat. Martin Van Bruinessen has observed, “only in Turkey did the
Kurdish movement in the late 1970s, make significant inroads among the rural and
urban poor. A part of the movement here, notably the Workers’ Party of Kurdistan
turned against aghawat as a class”.130 In fact, PKK’s armed struggle in the southeastern
Turkey has been directed against the Turkish colonialism” as well as the “Kurdish
feudalism” that sustains it.

Despite brutal reprisals by Turkish Security forces, the PKK became the rallying
point for Kurdish collective movement. Although the PKK-led insurgency in the
southeastern provinces has been sufficiently contained, the issue of Kurds will remain

129 On the rise of the PKK, see Michael Gunter, “The Kurdish Insurgency in Turkey”,
Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, vol. XIII, no. 4, Summer, 1990, pp. 57-81; Martin Van Bruinessen, “Between Guerilla War and Political
Murder: The Workers’ Party of Kurdistan”, Middle East Report, no. 153 (July-
August), pp. 42-45.

130 Martin Ven Bruinessen, “Kurdish Society: Ethnicity, Nationalism and Refugee
Problem” in Kreyenbrock and Sperl, op. cit., p. 53.
Turkey’s ‘Achilles heel’. Its foreign policy will remain hostage to the domestic insecurity as long as the Kurdish demand for recognition of separate identity is not accommodated. Given the transnational distribution of Kurds spanning three neighbouring states; Turkey’s power potentials could be adversely affected by the restlessness of the Kurdish minority.

Other Ethnic and Religious Minorities

While the Kurds are by far the most numerous and potentially dangerous ethnic minority, others are no less significant. Turkey contains smaller but important ethnic minorities like the Greeks, Jews, Armenians and Arabs. Of all, them, only the Arabs constitute, according to the 1965 census more than one per cent of the total population. Over 40 per cent of Arabic speakers are located in the province of Hatay near the Syrian border. Other minorities are mainly concentrated within and around Istanbul.


132 The Sarjak of Alexandretta, later called Hatay is claimed by Syria. The area of Hatay continues to be shown as Syrian on postage stamps and official maps produced in Syria. The Sanjak of Alexanderetta was formally incorporated into the Turkish republic on 24 July 1939. According to the Turkish scholars, at the time of its incorporation, “majority of the population were Turks”, and the agreement with French in 1939 called for a plebiscite in which 90 per cent of the population opted for reunion with Turkey. Moreover, Alexanderetta figured in the National Pact as part of the national homeland of the new Turkey. Although the Sanjak was formally attached to the French-ruled Syria at the time of Lausanne negotiations, the French had recognised the region’s Turkish character, and accordingly Turkish language was granted official status, and inhabitants there were given the right to “adopt a special flag containing Turkish flag.” On the basis of these stipulations of the Franco-Turkish Treaty of October 1922, French returned the Sanjak to Turkey in 1939. For the Turkish version, see Ismail Soysal, “Turkish-Arab Diplomatic Relations After the Second World War (1945-1986)” in Studies on Turkish-Arab Relations (Istanbul: Foundation for Studies on Turkish-Arab Relations, 1986), pp. 249-253; Nuri Eren, Turkey Today – And Tomorrow: An Experiment in Westernisation (London: Pall Mall Press, 1963), pp. 238-239. However, the Arabs, particularly the Syrians consider it “annexation” of Arab land.
Although 95 per cent of Turkish population is Muslim, not all of them are Sunnis. An estimated 11.5 to 12 million Turks in central and eastern Anatolia belong to a religious minority known as Alevis. This is a blanket name for various syncretistic, extremist Shi sects, which has in common the deification of Twelfth Imam, Ali and various beliefs of pre-Islamic Turkish and Iranian origins.\(^{133}\)

The religious heterodoxy of the Alevi community clashed with the orthodox Sunni Islam of the Ottoman state, occasionally taking the form of organised revolts aided by the Shii dynasties in Iran. Exclusion and repression during the Ottoman rule by Turkey. According to Syrians, Turkey was the beneficiary of the French perfidy, and return of the Sanjak was a gross abuse of the mandate. Even some Western scholars argue that Turks were never in majority in Hatay. Quoting the French High Commission estimates, Philip Khoury claims that Turks were not more than 39%, while the Arabs formed 46% when Turkish army marched into the Sanjak in 1939. Yet another author holds that Frances distracted by the developments in Europe following the German reoccupation of Rhineland, tried to placate Turkey by allowing it to incorporate the Syrian province before Syria was formally independent. Forty years after, Hatay remains Turkey’s most sensitive province. Apart from being a bone of contention between the two neighbours, Hatay has of late become a major conduit for the PKK infiltration into Turkey. For details, see Philip S. Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987), pp. 495-496; Robins, *Turkey and the Middle East*, op. cit, pp. 23-24; Robert Olson, “Hatay Revisited – Turkey, Syria and the PKK”, *Middle East International*, 20 October, 1998, pp. 17-18.

133 According to some Turkish scholars, the Alevis of Turkey have their origins in the Turcomans who began to migrate from Central Asia to Anatolia in 12\(^{th}\) and 13\(^{th}\) centuries. These nomadic warriors converted to Islam and played leading role in the Turkish conquest of Anatolia. As the expanding Ottoman empire developed alternative source of recruitment for its army, these Turcoman tribes were gradually excluded from the state, and continued their traditional nomadic lifestyle, which, in turn, gave rise to a resistant subculture removed from the mainstream orthodox Islam. Although Alevis are closer to the Shi’is (Ja’fari) and them. They are less orthodox and strict in their beliefs and traditions which were influenced by their nomadic traditions and pre-Islamic Shamanistir religions. Moreover, discriminatory treatment they endured under Ottoman rule made them the staunchest supporters of Kemalist secularism. See Sencer Ayata and Ayse Gunes-Ayata, “Religious communities, Secularism, and Security in Turkey” in Lenore G. Martin (ed.), *New Frontiers in Middle East Security* (London: MacMillan, 1998), pp. 120-121.
forced the Alevis to live in the inaccessible mountain villages isolated from the Sunni neighbours. However, with the establishment of a modern, secular republic by Mustafa Kemal, the Alevis migrated to the metropolitan centres, where they were mostly absorbed in the public sectors and private factories. Naturally, the Working-class politics of the late 1960s and 1970s was dominated by the Alevis who overwhelmingly supported left-wing organisations. In fact, several radical left-wing groups in the 1970s drew their membership exclusively from the Alevi communities.

As the Alevis began to identify themselves more closely either with the secular modernist traditions or leftist ideology, the extreme nationalists and Sunni fundamentalists launched anti-Alevi campaign, calling them as communists and ‘morally-degenerate’. The Sunni reactionary propaganda set off sporadic violent clashes during the 1970s in the smaller towns like Sivas, Corum, Maras, Malatya and Elazig, where Alevis made up a large percentage of newcomers. In post-1980 coup Turkey, communal riots of the same scale did not recur, but the relations between a section of the Sunni population and the Alevi Communities remained tense. In the recent years, what has triggered Alevi radicalism is the rapid erosion of their distinctive identity as a result of “increased Sunnification of the state and rise of political Islam”.134 Indignation and hostility of the majority community have driven particularly the younger Alevis to organise such extremist groups as the Kızıl Yol (Red Path), which based in Germany advocates the founding of Alevistan or a nation of Alevis.135 Although, Kızıl yol does not command popular support in Turkey, assertions of Alevi

134 Ibid., p. 123.

communal identity could create a highly explosive situation threatening the stability of the state.

The overwhelming majority of ethnic Turks – those who declare Turkish to be their mother tongue – are ‘Anatolian Turks’, the memleket cocuklari (children of the country).\textsuperscript{136} Anthropologically, the Anatolian Turks are of mixed descent except a small proportion that stem from the original Seljuks or subsequent Turkic invaders. They largely descend from those people who have inhabited Asia Minor since pre-historic times. The present Turkish population also includes large numbers assimilated people such as the Kurds, Armenians, Greeks and immigrants from all quarters especially during the period of the shrinkage of the Ottoman Empire. Many of these refugees and their descendants moved to the territory of the present Turkish Republic in stages.

The first ever exodus of refugees into the Ottoman dominions took place in the later half of the 18\textsuperscript{th} century, following the annexation of Crimea by Catherine the Great of Russia. The next wave of refugees was set off by the wars with Serbia and Montenegro and then with Russia, between 1876 and 1878. Finally, the Balkan wars (1912-13) and World War I followed by the Turkish war of Independence gave rise to a great wave of migration from Greece, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Armenia. In the post World War II period, Yugoslavia provided Turkey with nearly 40 per cent of its immigrants each year.\textsuperscript{137} For instance, Turkish citizens of Bosnian heritage vary from one to three million including those who found refuge in Turkey since the disintegration of Yugoslavia. However, the largest identifiable and politically articulate

ethnic groups in Turkey today are the Azeri Turks and North Caucasians including 25,000 Chechens.\footnote{For details, see Lowell Bezanis, “Soviet Muslim Emigres in the Republic of Turkey”, \textit{Central Asian Survey}, vol. 13, no.1, 1995, pp. 59-180.}

On the whole, Turkey appears to have achieved remarkable success in homogenising the otherwise diverse population. But with the process of democratisation and economic liberalisation, the ethno-religious cleavages have been further sharpened as evident in the Kurdish particularism and Alevi radicalism. Unless the grievances of these minorities are addressed and their cultural identities accommodated foreign policy of Turkey would remain hostage to domestic insecurity, which could be exploited either by the hostile neighbours or the forces opposed to Turkey emerging as a regional middle-power.

**Economic Development**

The power-potential of a state, as defined by the Realists in material terms, is largely determined by its economic strength. It refers to the rate of growth, availability of natural resources and its productive utilisation, technological base and capital formation. All these make up the overall economic development of the country, which affects its foreign policy objectives and means of implementing them. Besides, military strength of the state is the function of its economic capability. However, in the low and middle-income countries – what is of greater significance is the extent to which they are dependent on the external sources either for financial aid, technological know-how or markets for their primary as well as manufactured products. For in the final analysis it
is their level of dependence or independence, which determines their foreign policy behaviours.\textsuperscript{139}

**Economic Performance of Turkey**

Since the founding of the Republic in 1923, Turkey has evolved into a semi-industrialised, middle-income nation with reasonably high rates of growth averaging 5.7 per cent per annum.\textsuperscript{140} Judged on the basis of its export performance in the 1980s and growth trajectory over longer periods, Turkey would be the most economically advanced countries of West Asia, its oil-importing status notwithstanding. The depth of industrialisation is evident by the presence of a flourishing private sector, which is increasingly involved in investment activities abroad especially in major construction projects. Apart from developing an infrastructural base during the 1980s, the most impressive of which occurred in the communication sector, Turkey is rapidly moving away from the position of a passive recipient of technology and becoming an exporter of technology itself.\textsuperscript{141}

Following the structural reforms in 1980, Turkey experienced a staggering annual average rise in exports of 22 per cent culminating in a balance of payment


surplus of $1.5 bn in 1988, first since 1973. Exports increased enormously from $300 million in 1960 and $2.9 billion in 1980 to $7.13 billion in 1984 and $10.9 billion in 1987 (see table 1.6). Furthermore, Turkish exports represented only 4 per cent of the GNP in 1960 and 6 per cent in 1978, which grew in 1984-85 to 10 per cent and around 19.3 per cent in 1987.\textsuperscript{142} Reflecting the progress in industrialisation is a substantial shift in the composition of Turkish exports. Prior to the economic liberalisation, agricultural products, for instance, made 57.5 per cent of all exports and share of manufactured goods was only 22.4 per cent (1978). In 1984, the proportion of manufactured items was 54 per cent and increased further to 69.8 per cent in 1987. On the whole, Turkey seems to be particularly competitive in certain manufacturing sectors such as textiles and clothing, iron and steel, and ceramics. In addition, Turkey retains comparative advantages in agriculture and livestock.\textsuperscript{143}

In the past thirty-five years, Turkey’s economy has shifted sharply away from agriculture towards industry. In 1960, three out of every four Turks worked in agriculture, which contributed more than 40 per cent of the national income. Towards the end of the 1980s, more than half of the work force was engaged in agriculture and forestry, but contributed only 17 per cent of national income. Industry on the contrary, contributed 34 per cent of national income in 1988-89, but it employed around 18 per cent of all workers.


\textsuperscript{143} For details, see the study by Subeidey Togan, Hasan Olgun and Halis Akder, Report on Developments in External Economic Relations of Turkey, (Istanbul: TURKTADE, Foreign Trade Association of Turkey, 1988), Chapter II, pp. 13-19.
Natural Resources Base

The reason why agriculture remains a key factor in Turkey’s economic life despite a steady industrial growth is because it is favoured with a variety of climatic conditions. The colder Anatolian plateau, for example, has comparative advantage in livestock and, to a lesser extent, wheat and grain. Whereas in the Mediterranean coast cotton, citrus, olive trees and fresh fruit and vegetables vie for rich land, the Black Sea region is favourable to two major crops, tobacco and hazelnuts. Turkey’s resources are so large that “Turkey could be the California of Europe”, as suggested by a Western observer. In fact, the country has large deposits of chrome, copper, coal, iron and a variety of other minerals in addition to its rich land. However, Turkey is dependent on external supply for its energy resources, both oil and gas.

Pattern of Economic Development

The progressive transformation of Turkey from a peripheral or dependent economy to a semi-peripheral, newly industrialised country illustrates the success of its development experience. From the foreign policy point of view, the significance of Turkey’s development pattern lies not merely in its moderate growth performance, but also in the process of restructuring state-society relations. While the former determines the country’s power potentials, the latter explains the internal dynamics of the foreign policy making. The recent transition in Turkey to export-oriented market economy, for instance, has led to a gradual retreat of the state conducing to the rise of the country’s business community as an important new element in the policy-making process. Indeed, in the post-cold war years Turkey’s flourishing private business sector has

144 Quoted in Krueger, op. cit., p. 179.
played a major role in projecting the republic as a pivot of financial and commercial activity in the region.\textsuperscript{145}

Turkey provides a good case to examine the role of the state as an architect of structural transformation and its changing position in different stages of development in the post-1923 Republican era. Based on the “mode of state intervention” in the economic development, Ziya Onis has divided Turkey’s economic history into five policy cycles (see table 1.7).\textsuperscript{146} The policy cycles range between ‘etatist’ and ‘liberal’ phases with the focus shifting from industrialisation to agricultural development, and from import substitution to export promotion. While the Turkish state of the twenties, was exemplary in its non-interventionist stance,\textsuperscript{147} in the 1930s, particularly after the Great Depression the government assumed direct responsibility of economic development. The Statist approach found expression in Turkey’s five-year plans, which provided for the establishment of a number of state-owned economic enterprises (SEEs).

In the post-World War II period, domestic and international forces combined to bring about a shift in the direction of a liberal economic order with an emphasis on agricultural development through mechanisation and commercialisation.\textsuperscript{148} The liberal

\textsuperscript{145} For an analysis, see Aswini K. Mohapatra, “Turkey’s Search for Regional Power Role in Central Asia and Azerbaijan”, \textit{International Studies} vol. 38, No. 1, (January-March, 2001).


\textsuperscript{148} The shift in the focus from industrialisation to agricultural development is generally attributed to external sources notably the aid programme of the Marshall Plan and the report prepared by a commission of American experts under the industrialist Max Thoraburg for the World Bank. The report, for example, recommended the dismantling of etatist manufacturing firms including the
decade of the 1950s came to an end due to the careless expansionist policies of the DP
Government, which culminated in a major macro economic crisis in 1958. As the
economy plunged into a severe recession, Turkey adopted a new strategy involving
controlled and planned industrialisation under the supervision of the newly established
State Planning Organisation (SPO). The economic policies of the 1960s and 1970s
aimed, above all, at the protection of domestic market and industrialisation through
import substitution.

Although Turkey during this period achieved an impressive rate of economic
growth, an average 6.3 per cent per annum, the ISI strategy proved to be inherently
unsustainable partly due to its bias against exports and partly, the unproductive forms of
investments. Transition to a more liberal economic regime became inevitable
following the acute balance of payments crisis in the late 1970s, which forced Turkish
government to negotiate with the World Bank for structural adjustment loans (SALs).
In 1980, Turkey entered the latest policy cycle marked by a radical shift in favour of
liberalisation and export-oriented growth. Parallel to the movement towards a more
liberal trade regime, privatisation has also appeared on the policy agenda since 1984.

Interestingly, however, during the ‘liberal’ decades of both the 1950s and the
1980s, though the state tends to retreat from its leadership position to concentrate on
infrastructural activities directly complementary to the private sector, the overall

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149 For an evaluation of the ISI (inward-oriented) policy, see Bela Balassa, “Outward
Orientation and Exchange Rate Policy in Developing countries: The Turkish

150 For a critique of the structural reforms of the 1980s, see Ziya Onis, “The Evolution
of Privatization in Turkey: The institutional context of Public-Enterprise Reform”,
economic weight of the public sector has not diminished. Thus, Turkey's development efforts, like many other developing countries, continue to be guided by the concept of mixed economy in which the state performs more than a regulatory role.\textsuperscript{151} Despite all its structural deficiencies such as unequal income distribution, pervasive rentseeking tendency, rising inflation and educated unemployment, Turkey has managed to achieve a substantial degree and depth of industrialisation. While Turkey is still trying hard to graduate into the ranks of the advanced industrialised countries, its status as an emerging "trading state"\textsuperscript{152} in the region of greater West Asia (including the Muslim states of Central Asia) is no longer disputed.

**Military Capability**

Power is often equated with those national capabilities that enhance the country's War-making ability. In fact, a nation's military capability, combined with the perception that it is willing to use it has traditionally been "a vital backstop to the various diplomatic, political, economic and other techniques that it might employ in conducting its foreign relations".\textsuperscript{153} Military capability is, however, relative to and conditioned by the strategic environment of a nation. For power capabilities of the states grow at different rates as they attempt to maximise their individual strength


\textsuperscript{152} Adapted from Richard Rosencrance, *Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World* (N.Y.: Basic Books, 1985). The author argues that such states give increased attention to their balance of payment and develop policy instruments to encourage exports and keep manufacturing enterprises competitive.

relative to others. As Nicholas Spykman once pointed out, "There is no real security in being just as strong as a potential enemy; there is security only in being a little stronger."154

Thus, to understand the relative importance of military capacity in Turkey’s foreign-policy making, it is necessary to highlight both the military manpower and military hardware of those states dominating its strategic external environment such as Iran, Syria, Iraq, Israel and Greece. The former USSR (currently the Republic of Russia) through strategically very important to Turkey does not figure in the list because its qualitative and quantitative superiority has to be considered in the global rather than strictly regional context (see Chapter III).

As the Table 1.8 shows, the main feature of Turkey’s armed forces is the numerical strength of its military personnel. With more than 650,000 men under arms, Turkey has the second largest armed forces in NATO,155 and appears to be formidable in comparison to other West Asian countries. The military personnel of Turkey, according to a recent estimate, constitutes more than 0.8 per cent of the total population of the country.156 However, 88 per cent of men under arms are conscripts, for all male Turks, a spell in the armed forces (18 months) as a conscript is an essential prelude to citizenship.


155 Turkey’s armed forces make up roughly 31 per cent of the standing manpower under arms in Europe available to NATO. Turkey defends 27% of the land area of NATO Europe and 37% of the NATO/Warsaw Pact land frontier. Ibrahim Turkgenci, “Towards A Turkish Defense Industry”, NATO’s Sixteen Nations, December 1987 – January 1988, p. 30.

In addition to maintaining a large conscript army (see figure 1. B), Turkey also possesses significant fire power and naval force. Turkish Navy in particular has been further strengthened with the induction of two MEKO-2000 frigates from Germany. Similarly, in the air force Turkey is on a level with France particularly with regard to combat aircraft in numerical terms. All this, however, does not give Turkey an competitive edge over its neighbours particularly in terms of quality and technological life of its weaponry. In comparison to its NATO partners, Turkey’s military capability is manpower-intensive rather than capital intensive.

According to the Turkish analyst, “A significant portion of the arms in the inventory of the Turkish armed forces are of Second World War and Korean War vintage. When compared with weapons in the possession of the countries around Turkey, it would be observed that there are significant vulnerabilities in Turkish defense posture”. While Turkey’s superiority in terms of number of main battle tanks over its neighbours like Syria, Iraq and Iran is marginal, the tanks in the inventory of the Israeli armed forces are the most modern in the region. Furthermore, in terms of air power, although Turkey retains certain comparative advantages with the beginning of production of the F-16 aircrafts since 1990s, the balance may change as Syria and Greece acquire the MIG 29s and Mirage Aircrafts respectively. Besides, Iraq and Iran have an increasing capability in ballistic missiles, which constitute a serious security threat to Turkey.

In all, a comparative study of the military strength of the countries around Turkey (except Russia) reveals Turkey’s inability to meet the requirements of the armed

forces due to economic and technological inadequacies. Despite spending 5 percent of its GDP and 25 per cent of its national budget to ensure a credible defence capability, Turkey’s armed forces rely heavily on aid from US and Germany. 159 Except for the period of the arms embargo imposed by Congress from February 1975 to September 1978, Turkey has generally ranked third behind Israel and Egypt among US military aid recipients worldwide (see Table 1.9).

Over the last decade, however, Turkey has made substantial investment in defence industries, including a $4.5 bn project to co-manufacture F-16 fighter jets in a joint venture between the Turkish Air Force and Lockheed. Other ventures include investments in military electronics, low level defence systems, munitions, armoured personal carriers, tank manufacture and improvement of major fire-power of Turkish land forces. 160 The goal in these investments is to limit Turkey’s dependence on foreign sources and promote self-sufficiency in military production. Turkey is also currently restructuring its forces to make missile defence a high-priority against proliferation of threats from its neighbours. The latest modernisation programme will cost $12 billion, a 20 per cent increase over original estimates. 161

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159 Germany has been giving defence aid (earlier called “military equipment aid”) to Turkey since 1964 in 18-month slices. Slices consist of 80% new defence material of German origin and 20% of refurbished service material. Besides, Germany has provided special defence aid including the delivery of 71 LEOPARD 1A3 MBTs, MILAN anti-tank missiles, modernisation of M-48 MB Tanks. “Military Aid Programme for Turkey”, NATO’s Sixteen Nations (Special Edition), July/August 1990, pp. 34-35.


161 For an overview of Turkey’s latest modernisation programme, see Duygu Buzaglu Sezer, “Turkey’s political and security Interests and Policies in the New
As stated earlier, military capability of a country is the function of its economic strength or its actual pattern of growth. Coincidentally Turkey made rapid strides in developing a local defence industrial base during the mid-1980s – the period when the country had registered unprecedented economic growth and reached the level of industrialisation. In November 1988, for instance, the Ozal government set up the new Defence Development and Support Administration (DIDA) to create economically viable and competitive defence equipments to NATO standards. Based on free and liberal economic principles, the DIDA derives a considerable amount of revenue from official and semi-official state sources.\(^{162}\) The primary task of the DIDA is to encourage new investments, and undertake projects in collaboration with foreign companies or private sectors in order to integrate modern technology into the forces.\(^{163}\)


\(^{162}\) Together with the allocations from the government’s budget, the funds are raised from taxes on alcohol, tobacco, lotteries and other gambling activities, payments in lieu of military service, transfers from military foundations and voluntary contributions. In 1985-86, the fund aimed at raising US $1.5 billion annually for modernisation of the armed forces. Turkey: 1989 Almanac, p. 197. For different projects of DIDA in the 1980s see, “Turkey’s National Defence Industry and Cooperation Projects”, Military Technology (MILTECH), July 1989, pp. 37-47.

\(^{163}\) The extensive participation of the private sector in the defence industry began in 1985, especially after the creation of the DIDA. In the Mid-1980s, Turkey’s large private industrial conglomerates, especially KOC, MANAS and ENKA were licensed to manufacture ground-to-air missiles, Black Hawk helicopters and armoured vehicles. See, “Report of the Month: The Defence Industry And the Development of the Defence Industry in Turkey”, Middle East Business and Banking (Monthly, Ankara), February 1986, pp. 6-12; Omer Karaspan, “Turkey’s Armaments Industries”, MERIP Reports, Jan-Feb., 1987, pp. 27-31.
The foundation not only sets up companies related to defence industry, it is also one of the main shareholders in several companies established for similar purposes. As a result of the extensive armament industries of the mid-1980s, Turkey saw the emergence of what the M.S. President Eisenhower once termed a "military-industrial complex". The complex today occupies a particularly important niche in the country's economy, in part because the military establishment tends to monopolise the transfer and adaptation of high technology. It employs over 40,000 people and has become an important source of foreign exchange estimated to be $400 million in 1985. Besides, the Turkish military enclave has invaded the domestic civilian market, competing directly with private producers and other providers of services.

On the whole, Turkey appears to have developed a fairly advanced defence industry in the past decade, strengthening its overall military capacity substantially. All the same, the relative strength of the countries in the region never remains constant. While Turkey seeks to improve its military hardware qualitatively in view of its sensitive geostrategic location, the neighbouring states, notably Greece, Syria and Iran devote a significant portion of their GDP (in some cases two times more than Turkey's) to the defence sector. Needless to mention, it is this drive for comparative and competitive advantage in power, which has turned West Asia into World's one of the

164 Prior to the creation of the Turkish Armed Forces Foundation, there was the Armed Forces Mutual Assistance Fund (OYAK) set up often 1961 Coup. Robert Bianchi, *Interest Groups, and Political Development in Turkey* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1984), p. 70. OYAK's activities were soon replicated by special funds such as the Foundations for the Air Force, the Navy and Ground Forces. See, "The Turkish Armed Forces Foundation", *NATO's Sixteen Nations* (Special Edition), 1990, p. 39.

highly militarised region. In the long-run, military capacity of a nation does not contribute to peace; instead it exacerbates bilateral tensions neutralising thereby the effectiveness of economic and cultural instruments of diplomacy.

GEOPOLITICAL FACTOR

Broadly speaking, the term geopolitics refers to the study of the influence of geographical factors on state power and its external policy behaviour. Territory, according to the father of geopolitics, Redolf Kjellen, is one of the most fundamental factors in state power.166 Thus, an understanding of the significance of territory which the state occupies necessitates the examination of such features as frontiers, location, size, topography, climate and population. For these physical conditions limit what a polity can achieve at any one time and what a polity actually seeks to achieve.167

The Republic of Turkey that once formed the central chunk of the ci-devant Empire possesses a geopolitical setting reminiscent of its territorial predecessor. In fact, Turkey's historical role and strategic salience rest in large measure on the incomparable geographical location. This importance can be explained by the geographical realities together with the character of the political authority and international influences on the area. The history of the Ottoman Empire and Ataturk's

166 Kjellen defined his new subject as the “Science which conceives of the state as a geographical organism or as a phenomenon in space”. According to Kjellen, the state organism is engaged in a perpetual struggle for life and space, and only those fittest and most adaptable could survive and prosper. See Geoffrey Parker, “Geopolitics” in V. Bogdanar (ed.), The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Institutions (Oxford: Blackwell, 1969), pp. 252-256.

Turkey demonstrate the delicate interplay of political variables and geographical constants.\textsuperscript{168}

The most relevant to Turkey's foreign policy are the straits connecting the Black Sea with the Aegean and the mountain-ringed Anatolia high plateau. Anatolia, formerly called Asia Minor that makes up the major part of Turkey reaches eastward to Kurdistan mountain and Westward to narrow water dividing Europe and Asia. In the West is the nodal area of Istanbul which with the straits makes up a region extremely sensitive to external political stimuli. It should be noted here that the straits are composed of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles connected by the oblong sea of Marmara.

The old strategic axiom that points of strength are simultaneously points of weakness applies to the straits region. As guardian of the straits Turkey can deny passage through these waterways for her safety. But, rival powers, especially Russia were in the past interested in denying Turkey the exclusive control over the straits.\textsuperscript{169} Accordingly, possession of this strategic area carries with it both certain advantages and at the same time risks of attracting potential aggressors. As Napoleon is quoted to have said, "I would rather give up the rule over half of the World than surrender these narrow sea passages to Russia."\textsuperscript{170}


The Anatolian part of Turkey is a highly “Strategic region” from defence point of view and the capture of the straits would only be the beginning of the struggle there. In contrast to European Turkey, its Asia part has natural boundaries as it is surrounded by the Black Sea in the north, by the Aegean Sea in the West and in the south by the Mediterranean. Since her sea frontier is relatively long and much of her land boundaries run along rugged mountainous terrain, Turkey appears to be in advantageous position compared to states in West Asia. Nevertheless, not all parts of the sea frontiers are equally favourable for defense because the offshore islands of the Aegean Sea are mostly Greek controlled.

In a narrow sense, Turkey’s security environment is undoubtedly influenced by history, the political process and lastly its geographical location. “In the border sense, however, it is the salient issue and the rhythm of world and regional politics that spotlight and even over-accentuate her security and therefore her security needs.”

The global bipolar structure, the military and ideological patterns of the super-powers together with its geo-strategic significance as a connecting bridge between Europe and West Asia have placed Turkey in a peculiar position in the global political map.

Turkey’s common borders with the former Soviet Union, immense discrepancy in their power and above all, their respective foreign policy objectives have rendered her security sensitive. This is further enhanced by her proximity to the West Asia, a volatile region in both political as well as economic terms. In the entire new cold war

171 For Turkey’s frontiers, see Lewis V. Thomas and Richard N. Fry, The United States and Turkey and Iran (Cambridge, Mass, 1951), pp. 11-18; and Vali, op. cit., pp. 117-119.


years, Turkey was considered vital for the West as it represented both a potential launching pad as well as a shield so far as the control of the Arab Gulf was concerned. True, Turkish diplomacy during the period was partly directed at maximising the "geo-strategic rents" that is casting in on the country's strategic saliency in the forms of aid and credits especially from U.S.\textsuperscript{174} But, it is also true that Turkey's geostrategic location in the southeastern flank of NATO has given it a traditional unique role in times of peace or crisis regardless of the changes in the nature of threat to the Alliance.

\textsuperscript{174} Turkey received substantial amounts of public funds in the form of military and economic aid in the post war period, beginning with Marshall Plan and continuing with other bilateral funds from the U.S. and NATO assistance. These public capital inflows averaged over $100 million per year, which was more than one-third of the country's export earnings during the 1950s. According to another study, US economic aid in the first twenty-five years amounted to $2.7 billion to Turkey. See, George S. Harris, \textit{Troubled Alliance} (Washington, D.C.: Hoover Institution, 1972), pp. 207.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election year</th>
<th>DP/JP</th>
<th>RPP</th>
<th>NP</th>
<th>FP</th>
<th>NTP</th>
<th>TLP</th>
<th>NAP</th>
<th>UP</th>
<th>RRP</th>
<th>Dem. P.</th>
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<td>(1.8)</td>
<td>(3.3)</td>
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<td>(0.2)</td>
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Table 1.2

POPULATION FIGURES IN TURKEY, 1945-95

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Population in Million</th>
<th>Population Growth (%)</th>
<th>Urban Population Share (%)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>56.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>61.6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>70-80</td>
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### Table 1.3

**RATES OF BIRTH AND DEATH**

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<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Birth Rate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(per 1000)</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>29.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Death Rate</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(per 1000)</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>8.4</td>
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Source: UN World Population Prospects, 1990 (New York, 1992)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Provinces in each Region</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1990</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number (thousand)</td>
<td>% Total Population</td>
<td>Number (thousand)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aegean</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15.77</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Sea</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>28.72</td>
<td>0.51</td>
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<tr>
<td>Central Anatolia</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>262.64</td>
<td>4.13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1,369.65</td>
<td>38.87</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marmara</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>72.65</td>
<td>1.24</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mediterranean</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>190.22</td>
<td>4.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeastern</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1,192.73</td>
<td>64.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>28</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,132.39</strong></td>
<td><strong>9.98</strong></td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number (in 1,000s)</th>
<th>Percent</th>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1,675.0</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>203.5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>201.5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>84.9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>64.2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>70.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,325.0</td>
<td>100</td>
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Table 1.6

INDICATORS OF ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF TURKEY, 1960-84

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Real GNP (1960 = 100)</th>
<th>Per Capita Income (1960 = 100)</th>
<th>Exports ($b)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>102.0</td>
<td>99.4</td>
<td>0.347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>127.05</td>
<td>111.8</td>
<td>0.464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>177.0</td>
<td>137.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>255.9</td>
<td>175.6</td>
<td>1,401</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>290.9</td>
<td>180.0</td>
<td>2,910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>346.7</td>
<td>201.3</td>
<td>7,134</td>
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Table 1.7

POLICY CYCLES IN TURKEY'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

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<tr>
<th>PHASE</th>
<th>PERIOD</th>
<th>POLICY</th>
<th>FOCUS</th>
<th>CHANGES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>1920s</td>
<td>Liberal Trade Regime</td>
<td>Industrialisation</td>
<td>Growth without structural changes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>1930-45</td>
<td>Etatism: State as principal entrepreneur</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>Major structural change: Creation of SEEs and investment of state capital to accelerate industrialisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>1950-59</td>
<td>Liberalisation trade and foreign investment</td>
<td>Agricultural development</td>
<td>Expansion of private industry; growth of agricultural production at some 12% a year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>1960-79</td>
<td>Import substitution Planning</td>
<td>Inward oriented industrialisation with heavy protectionism</td>
<td>Bias against exports, protection of domestic markets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>1980 onwards</td>
<td>Neoliberalism: beginning of state retreat</td>
<td>Export-oriented industrialisation and free trade</td>
<td>Structural changes, export boom, stabilisation of foreign-exchange, restoration of country’s international credit worthiness.</td>
</tr>
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# Table 1.8

**Comparison of Power Resources in West Asia**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>IRAN</th>
<th>IRAQ</th>
<th>SAUDI ARABIA</th>
<th>ISRAEL</th>
<th>TURKEY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Area (Sq. miles)</strong></td>
<td>636,293</td>
<td>168,754</td>
<td>756,981</td>
<td>8,019</td>
<td>301,303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population 1993 (Million)</strong></td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>60.6</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>GDP 1993 (billion, US $)</strong></td>
<td>60</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>125.5</td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td>173.7</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Armed Forces (1,000)</strong></td>
<td>513</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>177.5</td>
<td>503.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Defence Expenditure (1992, billion US $)</strong></td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>6.3</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Combat Aircraft</strong></td>
<td>295</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>628</td>
<td>555</td>
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<td><strong>Submarines</strong></td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Surface combat craft</strong></td>
<td>50</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>66</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>MB Tanks</strong></td>
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<td>2,200</td>
<td>770</td>
<td>3,895</td>
<td>4,919</td>
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</table>

Table 1.9

TOP FIVE RECIPIENTS OF US MILITARY ASSISTANCE, 1946-1985
(US $ Million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total Aid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>20,504.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>South Vietnam</td>
<td>16,623.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>8,623.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>7,857.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>6,824.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: The military assistance is total loans and grants. Turkey in the mid-1980s onwards became the third (after Israel and Egypt) recipient of US military assistance.
ORGANISATION OF TURKEY’S ARMED FORCES

ARMY
1st Army: Deployed in Turkish Thrace, Straits and Kocacli Peninsula
2nd Army: Deployed in South-east Anatolia
3rd Army: Deployed in eastern Anatolia
Aegean Army: Deployed in the Aegean side

AIR FORCE
1st Tactical Air Force
2nd Tactical Air Force
- Air Training Command
- Supply Units and Establishments

NAVY
- Fleet command: located in Golcuk
- Northern Sea Area Command: located in Istanbul
- Southern Sea Area command: located in Izmir
- Naval Training Command: located in Karamursel

Source: Turkey 1989 Almanac (Ankara: Turkish daily) and “Defence in Turkey”, NATO’s Sixteen Nations (Special Edition), July/August 1990, pp. 19.