Chapter III

FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOUR:
CHANGING PATTERNS AND
CONJUNCTURES
Foreign policy behaviour of a state implies the broad pattern of its foreign policies over time. In shaping state behaviour, domestic organisational factors and material power resources assume as much significance as the conditions in external arena. For it is in the external arena that decision-makers operate, and state responses to external situation are in great part, determined by the way policy-makers perceive it. Thus, changes in the external arena notably shifts in regional distribution of power and structural transformation of the international system affect external behaviour, especially of those states located in the geopolitically salient areas.

In the post World War II years the international system rapidly evolved from a “balance of power” structure to “bipolar” structure. In such a structure, as Reymond Aron’s paradigm suggests, policy of neutrality no longer appeared to be the realistic foreign policy choice for a middle-ranking country like Turkey with geographical proximity to an emerging super-power. “Her proximity to the Soviet Union”, according to a Turkish security analyst, “gives her a particular importance in an East-West context and her security cannot be examined apart from superpower rivalry or East-West confrontation.”

In the first part of this chapter, discussion is focussed on the dramatic changes in Turkey’s external environment and its response to cope with the challenges posed

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1 The assumption that decision-makers’ perceptions of their external conditions constitute an important intervening variable in the foreign policy analysis is derived from the neoclassical realist theory of foreign policy. See Gideon Rose, “Neo Classical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy”, World Politics, vol. 5, no.1 (October 1998), pp. 157-165.


by a powerful neighbour. It is argued that Turkey's shift to western alignment in the immediate aftermath of the World War II could be termed as what Rosenau calls "adaptive behaviour". For its decision to join the NATO alliance was meant to deter a "threatening power" from attacking or defeat when it does. The concluding section, however, deals with both internal and external developments during the 1970s in an attempt to explain the extent and nature of change in the basic patterns of Turkish foreign policy behaviour.

From Neutralism to Alliance

Neutralism was the distinctive feature of Turkish foreign policy in the formative years of the Republic. Though never systematically defined, it implied non-involvement in the European affairs, friendly relations with the Soviet Union and commitment to peace and regional security. At the roots of this attitude lay the experience of war of Independence and the compulsions arising from internal reconstruction and reform under Ataturk. While the former had given rise to a brooding suspicion of the Western powers, the latter required quietest foreign policy that excluded alliances and revisionist ventures. Cognizant of the balance-of-power and changes in its external environment, Turkey followed a realistic policy of improving relations with all major powers. However, particular attention was given

5 Jullian Friedman et al, Alliance in International Politics (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1970), Chapter I.
6 For the fundamental principles governing Turkey's national interests during the period, see Turkkaya Ataov, "Turkish Foreign Policy, 1928-1938", Turkish Yearbook of International Relations (Ankara), Vol. 1, (1961), pp. 103-42; Metin
to the need for maintaining warmer relations with the Soviet Union primarily because of the anti-imperialist nature of Leninist foreign policy and Soviet support for the war of Independence.  

Relations with the Soviet Union occupied a special place in Turkish foreign policy in the 1920s under the stewardship of Ataturk. The Treaty of Mutual Friendship of March 1921 was further strengthened by a Treaty of Neutrality and Non-aggression in 1925. Finally the Montreux convention, signed in 1936, came about largely because the Soviet Union wary of its own unprotected southern flank, strongly supported Turkey's request for an international conference on the Straits. It, among others, reversed the demilitarised status of the Bosporus and Dardenelles, reinstated Turkish control over them, and set the rules concerning transit and navigation by foreign vessels. Besides, Turkey also accepted Soviet technical and economic assistance in the 1930s, in marked contrast to her general reluctance to accept foreign assistance from European powers. On the whole, this special relationship was a significant development considering the history of suspicions and war between the Tsarist Russia and Ottoman Empire.

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Tamkoc, The Warrior Diplomats: Guardians of the National Security and Modernization of Turkey (University of Utah; Saltlake City, 1976), pp. 67-123.


8 For the text of the Montreux Convention, see J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record, Vol. II, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1956), pp. 197-203; also see J.C. Hurewitz, "Russia and the Turkish Straits", World Politics (July 1962), pp. 6-5-632.

9 For Russian appreciation of this period of Turco-Russian friendship, see V. Nikiti, "Good Neighbourly and Equal Cooperation" International Affairs (Moscow), vol. 7 (July 1970), pp. 14-29.
Departures from Turkish neutralism occurred in the late 1930s and led to a cooling of Soviet relations. Not only had the success of modernization along Western lines strengthened the power of the political and economic elite who feared Communism and tended to favour a pro-western foreign policy, but the external environment looked more threatening because of the rise of Mussolini and Hitler.\textsuperscript{10} The Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 was a dramatic warning to Turkey as the storm was gathering not far from her borders. Turkey’s self-imposed isolation from European affairs became difficult to sustain in the face of the rising interest of Mussolini in the Mediterranean and Hitler in the Balkans.

Turkey signed the Tripartite Alliance with Great Britain and France, which was ratified in October 1939\textsuperscript{11} after the disclosure of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Treaty of August of that year. Following the Soviet volte-face, the Turkish-Soviet relations went through their coldest stage in twenty years though Turkey managed to remain neutral until the closing days of the World War II. Turkey’s fear of German aggression was counterbalanced by misgivings about Soviet expansionist intentions.

\textsuperscript{10} Altemur Kilic, \textit{Turkey and the World} (Washington, D.C.: 1959), p. 79. According to Selim Deringil, the significance of Italy in Turkish decision-makers’ thinking could not be overlooked. For Turkish dislike of Italy dates back to the war of 1911-12 and the capture of Dodecanese islands and then Ottoman province of Libya. It simmered during the World War I and grew vehement after the Armistice when Italy’s aims were discovered to include a province of Asia Minor. Since Italy was denied of her claim in the Antalya region, the aggressive foreign policy of the Fascist regime in the inter-war period stirred Turkish fear and suspicions, which led to Ankara’s rapprochement with Britain. Selim Deringil, \textit{Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World War: An Active Neutrality} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 7.

\textsuperscript{11} In Conjunction with a British guarantee to Poland and Balkan States, the British joined the Turks in an Anglo-Turkish Declaration of Mutual assistance in May 1939. The French followed the British with an identical declaration in June 1939. Finally, the Tripartite Alliance formalised in October provided for cooperation and assistance
Already during the war, the Soviet invasion of Finland, its participation in the dismemberment of Poland and occupation of the Baltic states had deepened Turkish fear of traditional Russian territorial ambitions. What, however, confirmed the Turks’ worst fear of Soviet design was the secret German-Soviet bargaining over the division of Europe in November 1940. After the defeat of France in the summer, Soviet foreign Minister demanded the inclusion of the area “south of Botum and Baku” in its proposed sphere of influence and guarantee of a base on the Bosporus and the Dardanelles as the price for its signing the Berlin Pact. Although subsequent developments -- the German invasion of Russia and Soviet alliance with the US and UK -- eased pressures on Turkey, they did not “essentially alter Stalin’s determination to achieve the grand design which had been unsuccessfully pursued by the Tsars.”

Towards the end of the World War II the Turkish leadership realised that the greatest problem after the War would be the prospect of facing all alone the powerful Soviet Union. Given the open Soviet hostility prior to the German attack on Russia, Turkey successfully withheld pressures to enter the war so as to pre-empt the Soviet from occupying Turkey either as a member of the Axis or as a “liberator.” After

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14 Deringil, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, pp. 179-185. The formal Turkish declaration of war against Germany came on 23 February 1945 following the Yalta conference, and on February 27 Turkey signed the Declaration by the UN. For at the Yalta Conference Stalin had brought the issue of Turkey’s membership in the UN, distinguishing between nations which had really waged war and suffered from those which had speculated on the winning side. The US President Roosevelt, in response,
the victorious conclusion of the War against Germany, Soviet imperialism already
expanding in Eastern and Central Europe, began to direct its attention towards
Turkey. In March 1945, Moscow notified Turkey of her intention not to extend the
Treaty of Neutrality and Non-Aggression, due to expire in November on the ground
that it needed revision in the light of changes brought about by the war, Moscow
proposed that Turkey grant her bases on the Straits and cede two north-eastern
provinces.15 At Potsdam and Yalta, Stalin coaxed the Western Allies to agree to
change in the status of the Straits through a revision the Montreux Convention.
Throughout the Soviet Union pressed Turkey to agree to joint control and defence of
the Straits.

Terrified by another Soviet note on 7 June 1945 repeating the earlier demands
for Soviet bases on the straits and territorial adjustment in the Soviet-Turkish border,
Ankara tried unsuccessfully to “involve the US in defending Turkey against the
Soviet Union.”16 The great powers of the day, instead, reached a consensus at the
Postdam conference (17 July – 2 August 1945) on the need for revising the Montreux
Convention. Towards the end of 1945, Turkey was again alarmed by the dramatic
warned these nations to declare war by 1 March, or else they would not be represented
at the post-War Conference. See, Henry N. Howard, Turkey, the Straits and the US

15 After the resurrection of the “Eastern Question” began quietly in March 1945,
there were rumours of troop concentrations and movements in Balkans, which
Kremlin denied. However, Soviet support for irredentist demands by Armenians and
Georgian republics as well as press and radio attacks against Turks contributed to
Turkish anxieties. See, Bruce R. Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near
East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece, (New Jersey:

16 George S. Harris, Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical
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claims voiced by two Georgian professors, who demanded Turkey to give up the vast areas along the Black Sea coast as well as along the eastern frontier including Trabzon.17

These demands wrecked the mutual confidence that had grown up between the two countries. "They replaced the non-aggressive and inward-looking image of the youthful Soviet Union with that of an aggressive and expansionist great power."18 Soviet demands were resisted but Turkey felt insecure. For Turkey stood alone to ward off the Soviet pressures without any formal connections with the US. However, by the middle of 1946 when the Soviets presented their proposal over the Straits as authorised at Postdam, calling joint control by Turkey and "other Black Sea powers" (a kind of Turkish-Soviet condominium), the US and UK backed Turkey in its rejection of Soviet demands.19 Although the Soviets repeated their earlier demands in September, they dropped the issue towards the end of October 1946 after another rebuff by Turkey.

Thus, far from isolating Turkey, the Soviet demands and pressures pushed the Turks to draw closer to the West. The Turkish government stepped up its diplomatic efforts to convince the Americans about its strategic saliency in West Asia and the Soviet threat to its territorial integrity. Although the Allied position had hardened by the end of 1946 with regard to Soviet demands on Turkey, it was not until 1947 that

17 Rubenstein, Soviet Policy, p. 10.

18 On the effect, See Harry N. Howard, Turkey, the Straits and US Policy, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), Chapter VII.

19 The US President Truman, for example, favoured the revision of the Montreux Convention, but did not approve of Soviet demand for Turkish-Soviet control. He proposed that straits should be guaranteed by the international community. For details about the discussion at Postdam, see Howard, Turkey and the Straits, pp. 228-260.
US became actively involved.\textsuperscript{20} What prompted the gradual involvement in Northern Tier was a series of developments such as:

a) Communist activities leading to civil war situation in Greece;

b) Britain’s inability to play the role of guarantor of security and its willingness to renounce the responsibilities in the area;

c) the Iranian crisis of 1944 and 1946 following the establishment of the Soviet puppet regimes in Azerbaijan and Mohabab;

d) Soviet pressures on Turkey for control of the Straits and acquisition of the Turkish provinces of Kars and Ardahan.\textsuperscript{21}

The result of these developments was the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine in March 1947, which forged initial bonds between Turkey and the US. The Truman Doctrine brought a remarkable and sudden shift in Moscow’s attitudes as well. The Straits ceased to be the focus of Soviet attention and the Kremlin permitted its territorial claims to lapse. Instead, Moscow turned its main attack against Turkey’s American connection and encouraged nationalist feeling within Turkey against close collaboration with Washington. The Soviet propaganda against Turkey included mainly the accusations that a tiny reactionary ruling class had “sold out” interests of

\textsuperscript{20} The US aid was extended to Turkey through Truman Doctrine much after the Soviets backed down in their claims. However, a pro-US feeling was on the rise inside Turkey since the battleship Missouri anchored at Istanbul on 15 April 1946 carrying the remains of Turkish ambassador. This was followed by the US announcement of its intention to maintain naval presence in the Mediterranean in September. All this was, no doubt, small, scale gestures of support to Turkey at a time when its borders continued to be threatened by the Soviet troops concentrations. See, Harris, \textit{Troubled Alliance}, pp. 19-23.

\textsuperscript{21} For an assessment of these development and their impact on the US Cold-War policy formulation, see Kuniholm, \textit{The Origins of the Cold War}, pp. 376-383.
nation to the "American "imperialists" in order to assure continuation of its political hegemony.\textsuperscript{22}

\textbf{Balancing Behaviour}

Timing was of great importance for this shift in Turkish perceptions. What weighed heavily in Turkey's calculations was the emerging picture of a very different Europe, where a totally new configuration of power was in the making. The Soviet Union, no more the isolated or rejected outcast of world politics, was unchallenged domestically and strong internationally. When it could no longer depend on its own military power for security, Turkey increasingly relied on the balance of power in Europe, just as the Ottomans had sought security by leaning towards one or other of the European countries. But, the new Turkish Republic under Ataturk though continued to view the balance in Europe as essential for security, deliberately pursued a strikingly different foreign policy. It declined military association and overt choice in favour of one European power. But World War II had demonstrated the inadequacy of relying on the great power balance to provide security for small states. Although the proposed UN system held out the promise of a new international order, based on equality and outlawing aggression, the great powers' right of veto in the Security Council weakened this in Turkish eyes\textsuperscript{23}.

Consequently, Turkey looked again at the balance in Europe. As that balance was in the initial stages of construction under the aegis of the US, Turkey turned to America, the only power with the capability to counter the pre-dominant power in


\textsuperscript{23} Sezer, "Turkey's Security Policies", p. 54.
Europe, the Soviet Union. Turkey's alliance policy, according to Walt presents a clearer example of what he calls "balancing behaviour". Confronted by a significant external threat, states either balance or bandwagon. "Balancing is alignment against the threatening power to deter it or to defeat it, it does. Band-wagoning refers to alignment with the dominant power, either to appease it or to profit from its victory."24

In case of post-World War II Turkey, the former tendency is quite evident. By seeking alignment with the US, Turkey sought to balance the Soviet threats emanating from a combination of three essential factors: geographic proximity, the impressive military power of the latter and its apparently aggressive aims.25 In addition to the Soviet threats during the late 1940s, there were other reasons for Turkey to choose an alignment with the West, especially the US.

Ideological considerations certainly played a role in Turkey's choice. Turkey's leaders did have an aversion to communism, but Turkish diplomatic history suggests that the response would have been essentially the same had the threat come from a non-communist Russia. Turkey's foreign policy identification with the West was also a function of the political orientation and legitimation of the Kemalist elite.

24 Stephen M. Walt, "Testing Theories of Alliance Formation: The case of Southwest Asia", International Organisation, vol. 42, no. 2 (Spring 1988), p. 278. Bandwagoning is relatively rare in global politics because it involves unequal exchange, as the vulnerable states have to make asymmetrical concessions to dominant power and accept a subordinate role.

25 Citing Turkey as one of his several case studies, Walt argues that the structural balance-of-power theory fails to explain fully the alliance behaviour of states. For it predicts that states ally in response to imbalances of power defined solely in terms of distribution of capabilities. Had it been so, America's predominant position in terms of power potential after world War II should have led the nations of Western Europe to align with the Soviet Union against the US. Walt, therefore, has formulated the balance-of-threat theory, central concept of which is the distribution of threats and explained alliance behaviour as a response to imbalance of threat. Walt, op. cit., pp. 280-284.
The lure of cooperation with a capitalist giant and the desire to be accepted by the community of Europe must have influenced the decision of the state elite trained in and moulded by western concepts of modernization. Besides, Turkey was also in need of economic assistance for maintaining a large army in view of the Soviet threat.

Ironically, however, while the Turkish government worked hard and resolutely to get the US involved in its security and economy, Washington appeared to be either non-committal or ambivalent until the 1950 Korean War. For the real commitment to contain communism on a global scale “originated in the events surrounding the Korean War, not the crisis in Greece and Turkey. In that year there was a change in American perception not only of the enemy, but of the means available to contain them. Only then was the problem initially posed by the Soviet Union as a regional threat in the Near East perceived as being serious enough to require rearmament.”

In brief, the crisis in the Korean peninsula marked the onset of the Cold War, which, in turn, benefited Turkey in terms of forging close military and economic links with the US.

Until then Turkey’s role was considered peripheral despite President Truman’s recommendation to the US Congress to render economic assistance of $100 million to Turkey. The agreement between the two countries could not be signed before 12 July 1947 partly because of stiff resistance in the Congress and partly, differences arising

26 Frank Tachau, Turkey: The Politics of Authority, Democracy, and Development, (New York: Praeger, 1984), pp. 165-166; also see Ismail Soysal, “The Influence of the concept of Western Civilization on Turkish Foreign Policy”, Dis Politika, vol. 6, no. 304 (June 1977), pp. 3-6.

Likewise, Turkey was not initially considered eligible for the Marshall Plan relief since it had not participated in the war and hence, escaped the ensuing destruction. It was only after demonstrating its strategic saliency because of geographic proximity to the Soviet Union that Turkey was admitted into the Marshall Plan framework.  

Turkey’s entry into the NATO alliance proved to be even more difficult. Its request for membership was turned down by the US on the grounds that the alliance was a regional one comprising mainly the countries of the North Atlantic region. This explanation, however, embarrassed the Turkish government when it was revealed that French Algeria and Italy had been proposed as prospective NATO members. Rather than giving up, the Turkish strategists proposed the creation of a Mediterranean alliance as a continuation of NATO. The formation of a Mediterranean Security Pact fell through because of the British differences with Egypt over the

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28 As aptly put by G. Harris, “The Conclusion is inescapable, therefore, that congressional approval of aid to Turkey was assured primarily because of association with concern over Greece”. Harris, Troubled Alliance, p. 26.


30 Among the allies, it was the British who steadfastly opposed Turkish entry because of the fear of diluting the strength of the organisation through the incorporation of less developed societies. Moreover, Americans themselves appeared to be wary of taking any hasty steps that could provoke the Soviet Union. For details, see Yulug Tekin Kurat, “Turkey's Entry to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation”, Dis Politika, vol. 10, no. 3-4 (1983), pp. 50-77, esp. 66-75. According to an Western analyst, the major objection had come from the US Defense Department which worried about its ability to meet the extended military commitments entailed in Turkey’s participation. Melvyn P. Leffler, “Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945-52”, The Journal of American History, vol. 7, no. 4 (March 1985), pp. 804-807.
Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. After the first multi-party elections, the victorious Democrat party intensified diplomatic efforts for admission into NATO directly.

The North Korean invasion of South Korea provided an opportunity for Turkey’s new government led by prime minister Menderes to demonstrate the country’s solidarity with West by sending a contingent of 5000 troops to Korea. The immediate dividend of this was Turkey’s association with the NATO’s military and strategic planning. After active lobbying in the ensuing year coupled with the oil crisis created by the Mossadeq regime in Iran, the NATO council in its meeting in Ottawa recommended the inclusion of Turkey and Greece as the associated Mediterranean members of the Alliance. With Turkey becoming a full-fledged member of NATO in February 1952, Turkish leaders not only succeeded in their efforts to obtain a formal American commitment to defend Turkey against Soviet Union, also secured acceptance of Turkey into what was then known as a “Western-Christian-Democratic family of European nations”.

From American perspective Turkey’s admission to NATO was essentially a continuation of President Truman’s policy of containment of Russian expansionist tendencies in the Eastern Mediterranean region. In this context, what bolstered Turkey’s strategic functions was its geographic proximity to the Soviet Union. Unable to use air bases in continental Europe in their task of undertaking “forward strategy” against Soviet Union, the American air force comprising medium range bombers required bases close to Soviet border. Moreover, should Turkey remain


neutral in an unfolding East-West conflict, it might ban Allied aircraft from flying over the country en route to Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{33} In the end, it was concluded that “without Turkey’s participation in the Organisation, investments in Turkey would be wasted and their (Americans) hopes for strategic gains unrealised”.\textsuperscript{34}

Finally, the contribution which Turkey could render by adding, on short notice, an army of 500,000 to 750,000 to the alliance was also considered an important factor for extending NATO treaty to the country.\textsuperscript{35} This, however, necessitated a modification of Article 6 which, in its original form, defined the territorial limits of the “North Atlantic area” to be defended by the alliance. Under the protocol of Accession of Greece and Turkey, Article 6 came to read as follows:

“For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the parties is deemed to include an armed attack: i) on the territory of the parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of Turkey, or on the islands under jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer ...”.\textsuperscript{36}

Thus, with Greece and Turkey in NATO, the command structure of the organisation had to be extended into the eastern Mediterranean and to the eastern border of Turkey. The Turkish territory was protected by the European command of NATO headed by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). The

\textsuperscript{33} This was the analysis of an American commentator in the \textit{New York Times}, 2 June 1951, quoted in Sander, \textit{Ibid.}, p. 16.

\textsuperscript{34} Leffler, “Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War”, p. 808.

\textsuperscript{35} George McGhee, “Turkey Joins the West”, \textit{Foreign Affairs} (July 1954), pp. 617-619. He called Turkey “our most reliable ally”, partly because of its strategic location and partly, physical strength.

headquarters of this group was known as Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and has been located in Belgium since 1967. The SHAPE serves as the channel of communication between NATO headquarters and the national Commanders in the respective member countries. In case of Turkey, the national commander is the Chief-of-Staff of the Turkish armed Forces.\textsuperscript{37}

Although Turkey earmarked the equivalent of 15 divisions for assignment to NATO at the time of its entry, all its forces continue to be under national command in time of peace. In other words, integration within NATO was only limited to the highest command level, not to the troop level. Likewise, defence cooperation, despite the NATO links, proceeded largely on bilateral basis between Turkey and the US. In the initial years of Turkey's inclusion into the NATO, cooperation meant American access to Turkish territory for facilities and bases, and improvement of defence capability of the Turkish armed forces with American help. In the mid-1960s West Germany became the second major source of military help to Turkey. The joint US-Turkish Defence Co-operation Agreement signed in July 1969, which constituted the basis of defence cooperation between the two countries until the 1975 US arms embargo on Turkey.\textsuperscript{38} In effect Turkey turned out to be one of those NATO members, which remained heavily reliant on the US military assistance for developing its conventional defence capability.

\textsuperscript{37} Ferenc Vali, \textit{Bridge Across the Bosporus}, pp. 118-120.

\textsuperscript{38} Prior to the 1969 Agreement, the American presence and activities were regulated by the so called "bilateral arrangements". During the period, Ankara had no comprehensive knowledge of and control over American activities. Under public pressures, Turkish government renegotiated the 1969 Agreement, which lost its validity after the US embargo on Turkey. See George Harris, \textit{Troubled Alliance}, pp. 57-59.
However, the large Turkish army became an asset at a time when strategic thinking in Washington assigned a significant deterrent value to the local ground forces. Besides, Turkey following its accession to NATO helped to complete the frontier from Norway to the eastern end of the Mediterranean. As NATO strategy and defence plans evolved to suit new needs and circumstances, Turkey's role also changed. Between 1954 and 1957, for instance, NATO incorporated tactical and theatre nuclear weapons into its strategy in order to prevent Soviet expansion in the area. But with the evidence appearing in the autumn of 1957 that the Soviet Union was advancing towards an ICBM capability, Turkey consented to the deployment of Jupiter missiles on its soil. These IRBM became obsolete in the early 1960s following the deployment of the POLari SLBM and hence, withdrawn in 1963.

By the late 1960s, the Soviet Union attained strategic parity with the US and began to acquire global reach. Consequently, Turkey was outflanked by the Soviets, as the latter established influence in West Asia and a reasonable presence in the Mediterranean. Together, these forward moves enhanced Turkey's strategic saliency in the eyes of its Western allies. According to Sezer's assessment, "The control of the Turkish straits and Turkish airspace have become more critical for the defence of Western interests in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, and they are generally seen as Turkey's major tasks in NATO's defence".

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39 On the basis of March 1959 Agreement of cooperation between Turkey and the US, Turkey agreed to the deployment of Jupiter (SM-78) missiles on its territory. The details of this bilateral agreement were not made public and entered into force in October 1959. However, these nuclear devices were controlled by the so-called double key system of activation used in Germany. They were in the custody of the US, but would be launched by Turkish crews in case of war. Further, the consent of both would be the precondition for its use. For details, see Nur Bilge Criss, "Strategic Nuclear Missiles in Turkey: The Jupiter Affair, 1959-1963", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 20, no. 3 (September 1997), pp. 98-101.

Pro-Western Alignment

Thus, within a decade of its admission to NATO, Turkey became one of the cornerstones of the Atlantic alliance. Its security links with the West was buttressed by membership or ties of association with other European institutions. Having been a recipient of Marshall Plan aid, Turkey became a member of the OEEC; in 1949 it became a member of the European Council, and in 1964 an associate member of the European Economic Community. All this clearly pointed to Turkey’s closer identification with the West by the mid-1960s. So much so that Turkey’s policy-makers considered the NATO more than simply an alliance to enhance its security; it became a framework based on which they shaped their response to international issues, and regional policies.

Turkey, for example, adopted strongly pro-Western stance at the 1955 Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian nations, leading to its alienation from the neutral states of the Third World.\(^{41}\) Likewise, Turkey played an active role in organising the Baghdad Pact, envisaged as the centrepiece of the US Secretary of State Dulles’s “Northern Tier” strategy designed to deter Soviet access to West Asia.\(^{42}\)

\(^{41}\) In the Bandung Conference, Turkey mainly defended the Western alliance vis-à-vis the newly independent Afro-Asian countries. In January 1949, Turkey had refused to participate in the first Asian Conference on the Indonesian question, and also, opposed the Algerian independence movement.

\(^{42}\) After the British idea of a Middle Eastern Command was dropped due to stiff Arab oppositions, the Secretary of State Dulles expounded the Concept of “Northern Tier” in 1953 to organise a security alliance to contain Soviet expansion. But, for the Arab leaders of the period, the possibility of Soviet penetration of the region was not seen as a threat. Instead, their opposition to a regional defence organisations sponsored by the West created inter-Arab tensions. No wonder, Iraq withdrew in 1958 after the monarchical regime was overthrown by a military coup, which led to the formation of Central Treaty Organisation. The CENTO disintegrated in 1979 upon the withdrawal of Iran and Pakistan. The US had Observer status until 1958 when it became an associate member of the CENTO. The absence of full American involvement in the initial stage of its development is generally considered by Western analysts the prime factor for the collapse of the CENTO. See Kemal Karpat,
of the Baghdad Pact in 1955 not only added fuel to Turkish confrontation with the Soviet Union, it also lost its credibility as a regional defence Organisation within a few years of its establishment. Similar Turkish initiative in the creation of Balkan Security grouping in 1954 comprising Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia served only in antagonising the Kremlin. For in less than two years, the Balkan Pact fell into abeyance as Yugoslavia began to reciprocate the Soviets’ friendly overtures.43

Besides, Turkey’s support of the Western powers during the Suez crisis of 1956, its fierce opposition to the 1958 Iraqi coup leading to Iraqi withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact and its threats to intervene in Syria in the heat of US-Syrian Crisis were all indicative of Ankara’s uncritical acceptance of pro-Western orientation as part of general world view. This view in particular involved an extremely close identification with the US – so close that many Turks, especially those in the ruling Democrat party “readily assumed that Turks and Americans were intringically alike and that Turkey could and should become a ‘little America’.”44

The ‘Americanisation’ of Turkish foreign policy,45 as a critic has characterised, was the result of a combination of such factors as the exacerbation of super-power tensions, Turkey’s growing strategic importance, its abding hostility to Soviet communism and willingness to cooperate with the US efforts so as to appear as an indispensable ally. Not surprisingly, the successive Turkish governments from 1952 onwards “equated the US with NATO and NATO with Turkish national

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43 Harris, Troubled Alliance, p. 62.

44 Ibid., p. 45.

It was only in the mid-1960s that the Turks became painfully aware of the fact that an intimately close relation with the US and the West carried a price tag. The price could be exacted in various forms: from loss of autonomy in policy-making to diplomatic alienation from both East and West. In practical terms, however, it was Turkey’s frustrating experience during the June 1964 Cyprus crisis that triggered a wide-ranging re-evaluation its foreign policy orientation.

**Cyprus Question**

While the history of Cyprus and developments in this unhappy island republic fall beyond the scope of this study, an overview of the Cyprus question would help us understand the conflict dynamics and its implications on Turkey’s external policy behaviour since the early 1960s. Cyprus is a bi-communal state made up of a majority Greek Cypriots, who according to the 1960 census comprise 78 per cent of total population, and Turkish Cypriots, who constitute nearly 18 per cent. The former represents the continuing Hellenic cultural history of the land, whereas the latter bears the legacy of the three centuries of the Ottoman rule over the island. Despite the age-old hostility between the World of Islam and Christendom, both the communities lived in relative harmony until the onset of the British colonial rule (1878-1960). Although ‘community’ was the politically operative category in the Ottoman administrative system based on religious *millet*, this was in no way connected with the notion of nationality or nationalism.47

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47 For an in-depth analysis of inter-ethnic co-existence prior to British colonial rule, see Admantia Pollis, “Inter group conflict and British Colonial Policy”, *Comparative Politics*, vol. 5, no. 4 (July 1973), pp. 575-599.
It was under the British rule that the content and nature of their relations changed, partly because of the motherland-influence of Greece and Turkey, and in greater part, the British policy of attributing meaning and significance to the existing religious distinction. Consequently, the process of transposition of the religious division into two antagonistic nationalist ideologies militated against the evolution of a common Cypriot nationality. Greek nationalism was the first to take roots in Cyprus largely because of the centrality of religion in their concept of nationalism. The Greek Cypriots' nationalist struggle for right to self-determination – an euphemism for enosis or union with Greece – owed its genesis to an era of Megali (Great) Idea in the 19th century Greece. In the 1950s, however, the Greek Cypriots' uprising against British colonialism took a violent turn with the growth of an underground terrorist organisation called EOKA, the Nationalist organisation of Cypriot Fighters.

In the face of an increasing militancy on the part of the Greek Cypriots backed by Greece, the British for fear of losing a strategically salient colony resorted to the classic imperialist policy of divide and rule. Under the British patronisation, the Turkish community soon acquired a distinct identity – an identity reinforced further by Turkey's involvement in the negotiations for independence by the Whitehall. The formation of “Cyprus is Turkish” party, and an underground organisation called Volkano provided the common platform that led to the crystallisation of Turkish-

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49 For a critique of the Megali Idea, see Pierre Oberling, The Road To Bellapa’s (New York: Boulder 1982), Chapter I.

50 For a detailed account of dubious British role during the period, see Leontios Ierodiakonou, The Cyprus Question (Stockholm, 1971), Chapters I & II.
Cypriot ethno-nationalism. In response to the Greek-Cypriots' clamour for union with Greece, the Turkish side demanded taksim or partition.

Faced with the irreconcilable demands by two separate antagonist nationalities, the British sought to put in a tenuous alliance at the national level through the Zurich and London agreements of 1959. According to this arrangement, though Cyprus attained independence in August 1960, it remained saddled with an inoperative constitution and qualified sovereignty under the external protection of Turkey and Greece as the guarantor powers. Theoretically, the 1960 Constitution represented a consociational condominium requiring for its operation a coercive external "triad" consisting of UK, Greece and Turkey.51

Internally, the Constitution of Cyprus sought to establish a consociational association of two communities relying on a biocommunal consensus, not on a majoritarian mode of decision-making. Implicit in this constitutional engineering was recognition of the near immutability of the numerical imbalance between two antagonists. Hence, the stress was on equal partnership with a view to balancing a permanent asymmetry characterising two components. For example, the Constitution required separate majorities of Greek and Turkish representatives for the enactment of major legislations involving taxation, municipalities and electoral laws. Likewise the President and Vice-President, elected separately by respective communities, were vested with veto power to forestall any decision relating to foreign affairs, defence and security.

The misplaced application of principles of political equality in a bicomunal configuration rendered Cyprus ungovernable since its inception. The façade of

democracy had no potentiality to hold two components together in the absence of an ideological commitment to an overarching supra-communal Cypriot nation. What inhibited the process was the constitutional sanction accorded to social divisiveness at both the institutional and organisational levels.

Predictably, the ramshackle structure of London and Zurich accords could not survive the future political jolts. Within the restrictive and rigid constitutional framework as the Greek Cypriots tried to alter the power-relationship in their favour, the Turkish side resisted any change in what they termed the existing political balance. Less than four years of the functioning of the constitutional system, when President Archbishop Makarios sought to curtail the legislative powers of Turkish Cypriots through an amendment, communal violence broke out. In 1964, his announcement to unilaterally abrogate the accords of 1959 virtually ripped the fragile thread of consensus so carefully woven into the 1960 Constitution.52

The persistence of inter-communal clashes after December 1963 and failure of both diplomatic attempts and the UN Peacekeeping force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) to resolve the situation led Turkey to contemplate military intervention in 1964. The Ismet Inonu government restrained itself several times despite strong public pressure for exercising military option partly because of the risk of a Greek-Turkish War, and partly, to secure American intervention to restore the status quo on the island-state.53


53 Initially Turkey sincerely sought American intervention to preserve the status quo on the island, though Inonu government repeated its threat of intervention as
Frustrated by America’s and NATO’s neutrality, faced with public outcry at home, and fuelled by the Cypriot parliamentary decision of June 1964 to establish the general conscription for the Greek Cypriot defence forces, Inonu government informed Washington about its decision on unilateral intervention. The American response was the infamous Johnson letter of 1964 which was described by the Prime Minister Inonu in his reply as “disappointing” both “in words and content”.

**Implications of Johnson’s Letter**

Before discussing the implications of the US President Johnson letter on Turkey’s foreign policy orientations, it is important to highlight Turkish interests on the island state of Cyprus. First of all, the size of Cyprus and its proximity to the Turkish mainland (40 miles from the southern cost of Turkey) make it particularly important for Turkish security. The island lies at the entrance of the Gulf of Iskendrun, the innermost corner of the north-eastern Mediterranean, and is large enough for any hostile power to deploy force for amphibious operation against Turkey. Secondly, presence of a large Turkish community on the island serves as a permitted by the Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee if collective action by the guarantor powers fails. But, the US appeared reluctant to impose any solution on the Cyprus for fear of alienating either of its NATO partners. Further, with easing of East-West tensions it was not easy for Washington either to use leverage on them to reach a compromise. Finally, the status of Greece had already been enhanced by its association with the European community, and most importantly, role of the Greek-American Community in influencing American policy negatively vis-à-vis Turkey. For the developments of the period, see A.H. Ulman and R.H. Denkmejian, “Changing Patterns in Turkish Foreign Policy, 1959-1967” Orbis, vol. 11, no. 3, (Fall 1967), pp. 776-777.

54 Both the Johnson’s letter and Inonu’s reply published in The Middle East Journal (Summer 1966), pp. 386-93.

55 Given the historical anomosity between Greece and Turkey, the many Turks naturally fear that if Cyprus passes to Greece or even becomes a Greek-dominated territory, their Aegean and Mediterranean coastlines would be controlled by a nation
psychological bond with the Turkish mainland. Moreover, the Turkish Cypriots look upon Turkey for support for protection against the majority Greek Cypriots, whose demand for enosis threatened their identity in the 1950s.

Thirdly, enosis or union with the motherland Greece was seen by many Turks as a first step for realising the Megali Idea or the re-establishment of the Old Byzantine Empire. The Turkish fear of the Greek millenerian dream made Cyprus a highly emotional issue inside Turkey. Finally, the Cyprus issue is somehow linked to the Greece-Turkish dispute over the Aegean waters. Thus, “Turkey’s interests in the status of Cyprus is, in essence, a response to the situation in the Aegean”.

The Cyprus conflict of 1964 marked the turning point for Turkey’s foreign policy. For the president Johnson’s Letter revealed what Turkish Premier in his reply described, “wide divergence of views between Turkey and the US as to the nature and basic principles of the North Atlantic Alliance”. In other words, the national interests of Turkey were no longer identical with those of the US or Western alliance. Yet another lesson that the Turkish leadership learnt was the reliability of the alliance with the West as the guarantor of the country’s security. Because the Johnson letter sternly reminded Turkey that “a military intervention in Cyprus by Turkey could lead to a direct involvement by the Soviet Union. I hope that you will understand that your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet hostile to them. This explains why Ankara rejected the Greek claim over the island by opposing its union with Greece, and adopted a policy based on supporting the past-independence status quo. Tozun Bahcheli, “Cyprus in the politics of Turkey Since 1955” in Norma Salem (ed.), Cyprus: A Regional Conflict and Resolution (Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, 1992), pp. 62-67.

56 Sezer, “Turkey’s Security Policies”, p. 59. For the Greeco-Turkish conflict over the Aegean Waters and air space, see Jonathan Alford, Greece and Turkey:
intervention without full consent and understanding of its NATO allies” The letter further warned that “the US cannot agree to the use of any US supplied military equipment for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus under present circumstances”.

Doubtless, president Johnson’s warning forestalled Turkish intervention, but in the long-run contributed its share to an increase in anti-American feeling among average Turks. The Johnson letter, according to Gonlubol, “became the most important factor since World War II to affect relations between the two countries unfavourably. This document ... was received with great surprise and created strong repercussions not only in the leftist circles, but in public opinion as a whole”. 57

Not only did this episode undermine Turkish confidence in the Western alliance system, it also brought the country’s very membership in NATO into question. As one Turkish scholar writing in the late 1960s, wondered whether the United States would have come to the rescue of Turkey in the 1946, given its friendship with Soviet Union during the period. “Many in Turkey know”, he adds, “that America was a rendering aid to their country not because of Americans were fond of Turks, but because of Turks were willing to fight for the defense of their country whose boundaries in the north happened to coincide with American national security lines”. 58

On the whole the Johnson letter precipitated the process of estrangement between the two countries already underway since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. During the height of the missile crisis in October 1962, Soviet Premier Kruschev put


forth proposal for withdrawal of Soviet medium range missiles from Cuba in exchange for removal of the Jupiter missiles implanted in Turkey since 1959.\textsuperscript{59} Despite Washington’s denial of any kind of ‘deal’ over the missiles, the missiles were removed in 1963 apparently without consultation with the Turkish government. It was this American action than the trade-off between the Soviet missiles in Cuba and the Jupiters in Turkey that stirred anxiety regarding Turkey’s status as a ‘client’ of Washington whose interests were negotiable.\textsuperscript{60}

Although these intermediate ballistic missiles had become obsolescent by 1962 with the development of the nuclear-powered Polaris submarine, the suddenness of the crisis brought about a basic change in Turkish attitudes. For this experience led an influential section of the Turkish elite to believe that “no amount of pro-western sentiment would suffice to protect Turkish interests in the event of a serious superpower confrontation which might have nothing to do with Turkey at all.”\textsuperscript{61} Equally important in this context was the fear about Turkish defense stimulated by the shift of NATO strategy towards “flexible response”. Unlike the principle of “massive retaliation” previously adopted by the NATO, whereby an attack on an American ally would elicit an automatic nuclear strike against the aggressor, the new strategy entailed no automatic response.\textsuperscript{62}

\textsuperscript{59} For details, see Philip Nash, “Nuisance of Decision Jupiter Missiles and the Cuban Missile Crisis”, \textit{Journal of Strategic Studies}, vol. 14, no. 1 (March 1991), pp. 2-6.


\textsuperscript{61} Tachau, “Turkish Foreign Policy”, p. 24.

\textsuperscript{62} Mehmet Golubol, “NATO and Turkey”, in K. Karpat (ed.), \textit{Turkey’s Foreign Policy in Transition} (Leiden, 1975), pp. 40-42. There was also an impression inside
Not surprisingly, “sentiments in Turkey thereafter began to rise in favour of removing weapons systems which the Soviet considered especially dangerous, in order to decrease the likelihood that the country could be dragged into a conflict against her will.63 At the same time, the entire thrust of Turkey’s pro-western orientation came into question, as the leftist and a sizeable number of liberal intellectuals began to argue that the country’s membership in NATO no longer served Turkey’s national interests if it ever had. Following the trade off, the Turkish left became more vocal in demanding the abrogation of the country’s membership in NATO as it endangered its security. If there was ever a nuclear attack on Turkey, the leftists argued, the NATO allies would not retaliate in kind, but would probably turn the issue into a bargaining chip with the Soviets.64

Together with this painful experience during the Cuban missile crisis and frustrations arising from the impasse over Cyprus, other such issues as American sovereignty over military bases on Turkish soil and the alleged covert activities of the CIA,65 institutionalised for the first time a deep-seated anti-Americanism in Turkey.

Turkey that NATO in case of an attack would differentiate between its Centre and its wings (north and south). Whereas the Centre would be defended at its perimeter (forward strategy), the southeast wing (Turkey) would be defended either in depth—that’s, by sacrificing Turkish real estate or not at all. Vali, Bridge Aeroses Bosporus, p. 121.

63 Harris, Troubled Alliance, p. 94.


65 Turks were always sensitive about the use of American bases in Turkey for purposes other than defence of Turkey or NATO. A major problem arose in 1958, when one of NATO’s main airbases, Incirlik was used to support operations in Lebanon without prior Turkish authorisation. While the Turkish government authorised it after it had take place, the press and opposition created an uproar in the
In an atmosphere of gross disillusionment and anger, Turkey’s decision-making elite began to re-examine the basic fundamentals of the country’s foreign policy, notably its ‘special relations’ with the US.

One of the major outcomes of the re-examination was a considerable scaling down of the US presence in Turkey, involving both civilian (peace corps) and military personnel, and ultimately re-negotiating the conditions underlying the US-Turkish relations (July 1969 Defence Agreement). Beyond these changes in Turkey’s relations with the US and initiative towards normalisation of relations with the Soviet Union, Turkey’s foreign policy behaviour as such showed no significant change either in orientations or in directions until the mid-1970s. As Firoz Ahmad has pointed out, “throughout the sixties ... the intelligentsia was able to inhibit the activities of the government by constant criticism but ... never able to force the government to reformulate the policy.”

Post-1974 Period: Fundamental Foreign Policy Change

It was in the mid-1970s, especially in the aftermath of the 1974 Cyprus crisis that then Turkish Premier Bulent Ecevit undertook the task of re-formulating the country focusing public attention of the privileges granted to the US and its servicemen stationed in the country. In brief, incidents of this nature evoked the memory of 19th century capitulations, under the Ottoman rule. See, Ahmet Evin, “Anti-Americanism in Turkey” in Alvin Z. Rubinstein and Donald Smith (ed.), Anti-Americanism in the Third World (New York: Praeger, 1985), pp. 123-130. See, Ulman/Dekmejian, “Changing Patterns in Turkish Foreign Policy”, pp. 781-782 for the alleged covert prence of the CIA.

66 For details, see Harris, Troubled Alliance, pp. 160-170. It may be noted that peace corps had come to Turkey in 1961 as volunteers to assist the US-sponsored programmes and engage in activities such as English teaching and village development. The influx of these volunteers and their spread to sensitive areas of Kurds inhabited south-eastern Turkey triggered a drumfire of criticism in the mid-1960s.

67 Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment, p. 104.
country's foreign policy in an environment marked by Greek hostility, American unreliability, and global indifference. Based on its "historical and geographical realities" rather than on the global cold war considerations, Turkey, he stated, "would pursue a more independent course". Before we identify the set of factors to explain the nature of change in Turkish external behaviour, we need to address the core theoretical question as to what constitutes fundamental foreign policy change.

Not much attention has been directed to distinguish fundamental foreign policy change from the concept of shift in foreign policy orientation. More often than not, they are used interchangeably leading to analytical mess. For shifts in foreign policy orientations imply simply directional changes in relations between actors. Furthermore, foreign policy shifts may be incremental in nature, occurring over several years. Shifts may occur in response to dramatic internal change or in response to actual or perceived developments in the global environment, as was the case with Turkey in the immediate aftermath of the World War II.

In contrast, fundamental foreign policy change is defined as a case of foreign policy restructuring. "Restructuring", according to Volgy and Schwarz, "involves a major indeed a comprehensive change in the foreign policy orientation of a nation, over a brief period of time, as manifested through major behavioural changes encompassing a broad range of activities in the nation's interactions with other actors in international politics." In short, this definition suggests that three conditions must occur to meet the test of foreign policy restructuring:


1. Multidimensional Change: at least two or three dimensions (i.e. economic, diplomatic, symbolic, military, organisational, socio-cultural or legal/normative) must exhibit a significant amount of change in the same direction;

2. Consistent change: there can be no inconsistency in direction across any of the three dimensions;

3. Fundamental change: to qualify as a significant change on any dimension, the quantity of change must be substantial and even qualitatively different.

Thus, a fundamental foreign policy change is more than simply directional shifts, it involves multidimensional change in foreign policy behaviour over a period of time, in such areas as political/economic, security, and national self-definition or identity. Based on this criteria, we seek to ascertain the extent to which post-1974 Turkey exhibited fundamental change in its foreign policy conduct vis-à-vis its Western allies, it formerly hostile neighbours like USSR and Muslim states of West Asia.

It is, however, imperative to note that foreign policy change does not necessarily have to be ‘fundamental’ in all cases or all occasions. Foreign policy

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70 To understand both qualitative and directional change, these three dimensions may be used as the indicators. Whereas the political/economic dimension may be measured in terms of export-imports and bilateral visits of head of states, security angle is studied through bilateral treaties and official communiques. Finally, national self-definition or identity serves as an index of changes in external behaviour of a state. An assessment of changes in Turkey’s foreign policy orientation may be attempted on the basis of the above criteria as similar studies have already been made in case of Willy Brandt’s policy of Ostpolitik in the early 1970s Germany or De Gaulle’s movement towards greater independence from NATO and friendlier relations with the Soviet Union in the mid-1960s. See Wolfram Hanrieder and Graeme A. Auton, The Foreign policies of West Germany, France, and Great Britain (New Jersey: Englewood Cliffs, 1980).
analysts have developed typologies, consisting of graduated levels of foreign policy change. If, for example, we put together four such levels as suggested by Hermann and Rosati separately, we will have the following typology of foreign policy change:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hermann</th>
<th>Implications</th>
<th>Rosati</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. <strong>Adjustment</strong> Change</td>
<td>Minor changes taking place at the level of efforts to put into a policy</td>
<td>Intensification (small change)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. <strong>Programme</strong> Change</td>
<td>A change in means and methods while the basic goals remain unaltered</td>
<td>Reform (minor change)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. <strong>Problem/Goal</strong> Change</td>
<td>Change in goals and objectives</td>
<td>Reform (Moderate change)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. <strong>International Orientation change</strong></td>
<td>Fundamental change in the state’s entire orientation towards world affairs</td>
<td>Restructuring (major change)</td>
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Of these four types, foreign policy restructuring is the most extreme form of change, which involves “the dramatic, wholesale alteration of nation’s patterns of

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The meaning of restructuring is further specified by a typology of four foreign policy postures: 1) isolation, 2) dependence, 3) self-reliance, 4) diversification. A state pursuing a policy of dependence, for instance, can restructure this in three different ways.

Until 1974, Turkey had a foreign policy disposition that would clearly fit into the category of dependence. There were, no doubt instances in the mid-1960s of Ankara seeking to minimise its dependence on the West through restricting the US military activities, normalising relations with the Soviet Union and mending fences with the Third World countries, especially in the Arab World. All this, however, did not lead to a fundamental change in Turkish foreign policy; these moves were rather illustrative of an “adjustment change” that is adjusting foreign policy to cope with domestic pressures and fluctuating behaviour of the alliance partners:

No wonder, the outcome in terms of ‘actual’ foreign policy conduct was inconsequential, save an improvement in relations with the Soviet Union that too was

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74 In October 1964, Turkey sent two observers to the Cairo Conference of Nonaligned states, which marked the beginning of Turkish diplomatic move towards closer association with the Afro-Asian countries. Likewise, there was an apparent shift in Turkish orientation towards the Arab-Israeli conflict after the Six-Day War of 1967, as it voted for the Yugoslave resolution calling for Israeli withdrawal from the captured Arab territories. However, Turkey decided to abstain on the Soviet resolution that labeled Israel an aggressor in an attempt to balance its interests with the West. Despite Turkey’s rapprochement policy with the Third World countries, it failed to marshal the latter’s support in the UN for its stand on Cyprus. As the 1965 vote showed, majority of Afro-Asian countries (47 for and 6 against with 54 abstentions) disapprove Turkish position. In West Asia as well, the shift in Turkish stance on the Arab-Israeli dispute made no significant impact in terms of changing Arab perceptions of Turkey as a Western proxy. Kemal H. Karpat, “Turkish and Arab-Israeli Relations” in Karpat (ed.), Turkey’s Foreign Policy in Transition, pp. 124-131.
largely confined to economic and cultural spheres. Hence, the so-called Turkish-
Soviet rapprochement of the period failed to cut into the sum and substance of
Ankara’s special relationship with the US.  

1974 Cyprus Crisis: A Catalyst

The nadir of US-Turkish relations came in the mid-1970s, in the wake of the
Turkish military operation on Cyprus. What, in brief, prompted the Turkish military
action was the overthrow of Archbishop Makarios, president of the Republic by the
EOKA extremists on 15 July 1974 under the direction of then Greek Junta. The
Athens – staged coup in Nicosia set off an explosive process to which, the Ecevit
Government in Ankara reciprocated by deploying expeditionary Turkish forces on the

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75 In general, the climate since 1964, when the Turkish foreign minister visited
Moscow, “appeared favourable for a continuing expansion of economic and cultural
relations between Turkey and the USSR”. Harris, “Soviet Union and Turkey”, p. 54. In 1964, trade between them was minimal, totaling less than $20 million. After the
trail-blazing 1967 accord that promised $200 credit to Turkey for the purpose of
seven mega industrial projects, including the Iskenderun Iron and Steel Complex,
Soviet-Turkish economic relations came of age. By the end of the decade, trade more
than quadrupled and Soviet equipment and expertise moved into the centre of
Turkey’s public-sector development. Besides, Turkey became the recipient of more
Soviet economic assistance than any other Third World States. Rubinstein, Soviet
Policy Towards Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan, pp. 26-28.

76 Nothing would better illustrate this dilemma in Turkish foreign policy in the
1960s than the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. It was,
according to Harris, “a blunt reminder that Moscow had not renounced force where its
interests were concerned”. The immediate reaction of the Demirel Government was
its willingness to co-operate in a multinational force to be created in the
Mediterranean under NATO auspices. Earlier, in 1965, Turkey had withdraw its
support for the force presumambly because of Soviet objections. Harris, “Soviet
Union and Turkey”, p. 53.

77 For a chronological description of events leading to the anti-Makerias coup and
installation of an ultra-nationalist regime led by Nikos Sampson, a former EOKA
gunman, see Kyriacos C. Markides, The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic (New
north of the island after having failed to enlist cooperation of the UK as a guarantor power.

Turkey justified its unilateral action as consistent with responsibility of a guarantor power under the 1960 agreement, once Britain had refused to assist in re-establishing the original regime. Whatever the legal merits underlying Turkey’s action, it was clear from the beginning that Turks were intent on more than merely restoration of the pre-coup situation in Cyprus. The Turkish offensive not only shattered the demographic structure of Cyprus as a result of massive shift of population, also brought about an exclusive Turkish Cypriot zone in the north comprising approximately 40 per cent of the territory.

In the aftermath of this dramatic turn of events, the US Congress imposed an embargo on arms supplies to Turkey, and the Turkish government retaliated by shutting down all US bases on the Turkish soil. With the Congressional intervention apparently under pressure from the Greek-American organisations, the process of

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78 According to Turkish sources, Premier Ecevit appeared firm on his position despite American pressures through the under-secretary of State Joseph Sisco who had come to Ankara to dissuade Ecevit from intervening after the coup. Moreover, he was under domestic pressures, especially from coalition partner, the National Salvation party which was opposed to any territorial concession to Greeks Cypriots. Externally, Ecevit considered the Coup as inevitably leading to the annexation of Cyprus by Greece. When the Geneva talks failed in August 1974, Turkish troops fanned out east and West to occupy areas inhabited by Turkish Cypriots so as to create a “geographic basis” for a federal system. See Muntaz Soysal, “Turkish-Greek Relations and the Question of Cyprus” in Erol Manisali (ed.), Turkey and the Balkans (Istanbul, 1990) pp. 55-57. For the reaction of the then Ecevit government, see Mehmet Ali Birand, 30 Sicak Gun (Thirty Hot Days), (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayinlari, 1975), pp. 62-64.

79 Since the early 1960s, Cyprus became a focal point of lobbying for various Greek American Organisations notably the American Hellenic Institute and the American Hellenic Educational Association (AHEPA). In 1964, their concentrated efforts to influence President Johnson brought about a breakthrough with his adoption of the Greek position. Ten years later, Greek-American organisations became a vocal element, shaping the US foreign policy towards Turkey. The imposition of arms embargo was a spectacular coup by the lobby, which became a multipronged
loosening ties between the US and Turkey reached bottom. Incidentally, the US Congress had already approved the Resolution 507, which provided authority to the President to “terminate all assistance to the Government of Turkey” in a sharp reaction to the latter’s decision to revoke the ban on poppy cultivation in Turkey.

In fact, the issue of opium poppies had been a serious bone of contention until the caretaker government after 1971 military intervention announced ban under American pressure on poppy cultivation because of what was officially described as Turkey’s “humanitarian obligation”. Although Washington undertook to provide $35 million over a three-year period so as to compensate the poppy growers and orient them to other crops, the ban became very unpopular after the Turkish leaders learnt that the US had asked India in August 1972 to increase its opium production. Finally, when the new coalition government led by Bulent Ecevit rescinded the ban on poppy production on 1 July 1974, Washington described it as “an act of war”. At a time when the Cyprus crisis was unfolding, the US Congress approved the Resolution 507 on 5 August 1974, which was, however, not implemented because the Congress did not pressure the President. After the second Turkish offensive launched on 14-17 August, which left Turkey occupying more than a third of island’s territory, the congressional opponents of Poppy cultivation chose to support the Greek lobby’s clamour for arms comprehensive embargo on Turkey.


80 For details, see James W. Spain, “The U.S., Turkey and the poppy”, *Middle East Journal*, vol. 29, no. 2 (Summer 1975), pp. 295-309.

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Consequently, a complete military embargo came into force on 5 February 1975 in the form of a US law as adopted by the Congress. While the embargo, as claimed by its proponents, was aimed at bringing about a settlement of the Cyprus imbroglio, the US action provided further ammunition to the prevailing anti-American mood of the Turkish public. The embargo was though lifted in the summer of 1978, the psychological scars remained for years. For “twenty-five years the attachment to the United States was that of the arkadas (Turkish word for friend or ally), affectionate, grateful and ready for sacrifice”. Yet, the eagerness of the US Congress to adopt such coercive measure against a loyal ally was seen in Turkey as an indication of the former’s gross insensitivity towards Turkish national interests. It was, in a sense, a great external shock that shattered the Turkish elite’s bid for cultural identification with the West, and inversely, validated the ideological position of those on left or right of the country’s political spectrum.

Aside from the psychological level, the impact of the American arms embargo on Turkish security was profound. On the one hand, Turkish armed forces according to the assessment of NATO officials lost about half their effectiveness due to the non-availability of spare parts and lack of much needed modernisation of its conventional capabilities. On the other hand, the arms-race with Greece strained Turkey’s economy, partly because of the rudimentary nature of its indigenous industry, and partly, scarcity of foreign exchange and its political isolation that constrained its

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81 Seyfi Tashan, “Turkey’s Relations with the USA and Possible Future Developments”, *Dis Politika*, vol. 8, no. 1-2 (1979), p. 16.

82 Turkey’s inflated defence budgets between 1975-1978 took their toll on the national economy, and demonstrated clearly how its developing economy was adversely affected by the twin problem arising from the US imposed arms embargo. See Eron Manisali, “The Effects of the US Military Embargo on the Turkish Economy”, *Dis Politika*, vol. 5, no. 1 (1975), pp. 95-105.
efforts to procure arms from sources other than NATO. In all, the arms embargo highlighted the extent to which Turkey was dependent on US good-will for maintaining its defence capability, which, in turn, created a strong Turkish desire for reducing the degree of dependence by developing its national defense industry.

In outlining the foreign policy programme of his coalition government, the new Prime Minister Demirel in May 1975 stated, "Nations have to rely above all on their own resources for their defence requirements. It is, therefore, essential that our defence policy should be oriented towards a national arms industry and that we should produce at home a substantial part of the weapons, means and requirements of our Armed Forces." Immediately after the US action, committees were set up in each branch of armed forces to evaluate Turkey's domestic potential for meeting its defense needs. The outcome of this process was the passing of the REMO defense appropriation bill in the Turkish parliament for the purpose of military reorganisation so as to achieve self-sufficiency. In pursuit of this goal, the Demirel government concentrated efforts on the development of a heavy arms industry. The leader of the National Salvation Party, Erbakan who was then in control of the Ministry of Industry and Technology between 1975 and 1977 became the driving force.

The basic thrust on self-sufficiency remained unchanged under the two succeeding coalition governments led by Ecevit after the 1977 general elections. During the election campaign, the programme of Ecevit's Republican Peoples' Party (PPP) envisaged the idea of working out a new national security concept which would refrain from basing Turkey's defense exclusively on external support and on single source. The programme contained the PPP's commitment to "meet the needs of our

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83 "Foreign Policy Programme of the Coalition Government Headed by Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel", *Turkish Foreign Policy Report* (Ankara: Ministry of Foreign Affairs), no. 4, 2 May 1975, p. 31.
defense not only from a single source but from every source, chief among which will be our own sources. We shall attach special importance to developing our national defense industry within the shortest possible time." Consistent with party programme, the Fourth Five Year Plan adopted in 1978, defined the development of a heavy armament industry as a major goal of the Ecevit’s coalition government.

By the time the embargo was finally lifted, Turkey’s policy of reduced dependence upon the US had become far advanced. Not only was it in a position to manufacture a wide range of weapons and antitank missiles, also planned to export modern weaponry to gain badly needed foreign currency.

The Turkish Ostpolitik

As the Turkish Defense Minister Hasan Isk noted, “we are determined to be more independent and more oriented toward our national interests within the alliance. Outside the alliance, we consider it an inseparable factor of the National Security Concept to establish new friendships around us and thereby create security. We believe that being in an alliance is no hindrance to good relations and coherent conduct with countries outside the alliance”. In brief, what the Defense Minister’s statement implied was that the new National Security Concept had two components: a) a new defense concept aimed at achieving self-reliance and reducing what the Premier Ecevit called “over-dependence” on one source for military equipment; b) new orientation in foreign policy which might be termed the Turkish Ostpolitik.


Until the September 1980 military coup, Turkish diplomatic efforts were directed at both expanding cooperation with states outside NATO, mainly with the neighbours, and improving relations with nations hitherto considered as threat to Turkey’s security. “This diplomatic path – a Turkish outpolitik”, Boll remarked “is perceived by Ankara as an intrinsic part of Turkey’s goal of broadening her national security base through activities outside the framework of her NATO commitments”. In consequence, regionalisation of Turkish economic and political relations was the most visible outcome of its post-1974 foreign policy re-evaluation. Whether it was Ankara’s initiative to revitalise the Regional Cooperation Development (RCD) in 1975 for establishing joint defense industry and economic cooperation or attempt to forge multilateral cooperation among Balkan countries or its steps to defuse outstanding disputes with the communist neighbours and expand economic relations with them, notably Bulgaria and Romania, all illustrated an increased regionalisation of Turkey’s foreign policy.

86 Ibid., p. 620.

87 In June 1975, after the US arms embargo, Turkey and Iran signed 5-year economic programme, promising to establish joint defense industry. There was later on a proposal for increased joint production of arms within the RCD framework that would obviously include Pakistan as a member-state.

88 During the period, Ankara undertook steps to improve and stabilise Turkey’s relations with Moscow’s Warsaw Pact allies in the Balkan peninsula. In May 1978, Turkish premier Ecevit during his visit to Bulgaria announced the decision to undertake joint industrial and agricultural ventures. With Romania, Turkey forged much closer relations because both the countries were then attempting to gain freedom of action within their respective alliances. During the Turkish Premier Demirel’s trip to Bucharest in August 1975, both the countries promised to expand political cooperation. After Premier Ecevit’s visit to Romania in 1978 he pointedly referred to their mutual desire for more independence from bloc politics. See, M. Boll, “Turkey Between East and West: The Regional Alternative”, The World Today, vol. 35, no. 9 (September 1979), pp. 366-367; Hamit Batu, “New Developments in Turkish Foreign Policy”, Dis Politika, vol. 5, no. 5 (1975), pp. 5-13.
Besides, in its drive to enhance national security, Turkey focused its efforts on expanding relations with the Soviet Union in almost all spheres including defense matters. Although a beginning in the Soviet-Turkish relations was made in the second half of the 1960s, it was in the mid-1970s that the relations assumed central position in Turkish foreign policy. Improvement in converting past, tenuous efforts into stable interstate relations was the December 1975 visit to Ankara of Prime Minister Kosygin. However, the high-point of Turkish-Soviet relations was the June 1978 Agreement on the principle of good-neighbourly and friendly cooperation. This political document affirmed that future relations between two states would be based on mutual respect for sovereignty and equality. With the expansion of Turkish-Soviet relations during the period, Ankara derived substantial economic benefits in terms of investment, trade and aid. It is worth noting that Turkey by 1978 had become the longest single recipient of Soviet aid within the Third World, aid which exceeded that given by any Western state to Ankara. Commenting on Turkey's

89 The Soviet Premier Kosygin paid an official visit to Turkey in December 1975 to attend the inauguration of the first Iskenderun Iran and Stell complex funded by Moscow in 1967. At the end of his visit, the Joint communiqué announced, "agreement on the preparation of a political document on friendly relations and cooperation" to be signed in the new future. Drafted by the Demirel government, the political document was signed by the Ecevit’s government in June 1978 – an indication of the prevailing consensus for improving relations with the USSR and signaling annoyance to Washington. Foreign Broadcast Information Services (hereafter referred to as FBIS)/USSR, June 13, 1977. Also, Moscow showed “understanding” for Turkish position on the Cyprus conflict. In return, Turkey allowed the Kiev, the latest Soviet aircraft carrier to sail through the Straits to the Mediterranean what was considered in the West as violation of the Montreux convention. See Barry Bukzan, “The Status and Future of the Montreux Convention”, Survival (Nov./Dec. 1976), p. 243.

90 The 1978 Turkish-Soviet agreement suggested a kind of non-aggression pact, as it stated that neither nation would allow the use of its territory “... for the commission of aggression or subversive actions against the other state ...”. This, in a way, amounted to preventing the functioning of the NATO surveillance bases along Turkey’s northern frontiers. Boll “Turkey Between East and West”, p. 366.
rapprochement towards the Soviets, Prime Minister Ecevit in his address to International Institute for Strategic Studies in May 1978 stated, “my government believes that establishing an atmosphere of mutual confidence on our relations with neighbouring countries is at least as protective as, and sometimes more protective, than armaments.”  

From the above discussion of Turkish external relations in the five years since the Cyprus crisis, it becomes clear that the country’s foreign policy orientations underwent a drastic change – a change from exclusive reliance on the US and NATO to independence and self-reliance. The principal objective of this fundamental change was to ensure flexibility in policy-making and autonomy in the country’s foreign affairs. As the programme of the coalition government comprising his Justice Party, ultra nationalist National Action Party (NAP) and Islamist NSP categorically stated in the immediate aftermath of the US arms embargo:

As part of the requirements of a realistic multi-faceted, balanced, and determined foreign policy having a personality of its own, our external relations will be developed, diversified and intensified on the basis of mutual respect to right and interests of nations. We will also endeavour to have these relations acquire a concrete substance thus contributing to international stability and cooperation. While conducting and developing our foreign relations on the basis of the above principles we will continue to contribute in the establishment and development of the atmosphere of détente in the world and especially in our region”.  

The Causal Dynamics of Foreign Policy Change

Doubtless, the Cyprus crisis of 1974 was instrumental in building a national consensus that Turkey ought to diversify its foreign relations and reduce its reliance

\[91\] “Turkey’s Security Policies”, p. 205.

on the West. However, such a fundamental foreign policy change as evident in Turkey's 'actual' external behaviour cannot be adequately explained by single set of factors. A complete explanation of foreign policy restructuring in a relatively over-politicised polity must take into account the full range of factors covering the sources or the basic structural conditions; the role of individual decision-makers, policy-making process or the institutional structures within which decision-makers function.\textsuperscript{93}

In an attempt to construct multicausal explanations based on factors drawn from different levels of analysis, we present a model that illustrates the causal dynamics of foreign policy change in Turkey between 1974 and 1985 (see Figure 3). It may be noted that models are constructed in order to simplify reality. The value of a model has to be assessed on the basis of whether it generates interesting results when applied in empirical studies.

Although the structure of the model looks similar to the previous models developed by Holsti, Hermann, Goldmann and Skidmore\textsuperscript{94} to explain foreign policy change, it differs from them in three different ways. First, it takes into account sources located at international and the domestic level, as well as the need for them to enter and pass through the decision-making process.

In case of Turkey, the environmental conditions such as the changing nature of global political system with the onset of détente and lessening of the Soviet threat are as much important as the internal political dynamics that rendered the polity highly

\textsuperscript{93} See Introduction.

Global Systemic Factors:
1) Cyprus Crisis
2) Detente
3) Polycentrism

Domestic Factors:
1) Over-politicised Polity
2) Islamist Growth
3) Search for new social & Psychological formula
4) Economic Stagnation

FIGURE 3: The Causal Dynamics of Turkey’s Foreign policy Change, 1974-1985

Feed back

Individual Decision-maker

Decision-making Process

Fundamental Foreign Policy Change: self-reliance and diversification

Feed back
politicised and unstable. In fact, the structural changes in the international system, particularly reduction in East-West tensions as in the mid-1970s create greater flexibility, and hence facilitate foreign policy changes.\(^95\)

Second, the model has incorporated a cognitive element that focuses on the mental make-up of decision-makers as recipients of the sources noted above. For structural conditions per se have no independent impact on foreign policy decision-making. As argued in the introduction of this study, it is not the objective reality that counts, but how this is perceived and reacted to by the decision-makers. The model is, therefore, based on the assumption that sources of change need to be perceived by individual decision-makers, and trigger alterations in their beliefs in order to have an impact on foreign policy. In Turkish context, one can identify a number of individuals such as the leaders of the major political parties and some key military figures who during the period under study had the greatest impact on foreign-policy decisions.

Finally, this model emphasises the importance of crisis situations, especially those created by external actors what Hermann calls, "external shock".\(^96\) Whether it is externally-induced or internally-generated, crises are associated with a sense of fear and urgency -- fear because of perceived threat to some established values, and urgency, due to uncertainty over the outcome and a shortage of time.\(^97\)


\(^96\) According to Hermann, external shock is one of four key sources of foreign policy change. Others include leaders, bureaucratic advocacy and domestic restructuring.

Cyprus Crisis: The Catalyst

Logically, therefore, crisis situation calls for extraordinary political action on the part of decision-makers. In this sense, the change in Turkish foreign policy in the mid-1970s was the function of a crisis triggered by the developments in Cyprus. However, this in itself does not diminish the relevance of other factors since crisis situation or external shock does not necessarily always stimulate fundamental foreign policy change. As Boll has pointed out, “it was the shock of the embargo that converted dissidence into state policy”. According to the author, there was already “a growing demand within some Ankara quarters to increase Turkey’s freedom of movement within the NATO alliance”. 98

Super-Power Détente

In fact, a good number of Turkish analysts contend that the Cyprus crisis was the catalyst for change in the country’s foreign policy during the 1970s. Participating in a discussion on the state of US-Turkish relations in 1977, Oral Sander, for example, argued that “the embargo is the manifestation of a deeper problem in Turkish-American relations”. 99 What would rather explain, according to Sander, Turkey’s difficulties with the Alliance and the US in particular were the structural changes in international system as a result of super-power détente in the early 1970s. Historically though the process of détente began as early as the mid-1950s following


the Khruschev-Eisenhower meeting in Geneva, it fructified in 1975 with the signing of Helsinki Final Act, which laid the basis of new Soviet-West relations.  

The détente process defined by peaceful co-existence between states with differing social systems reduced the East-West tensions, which, in turn, allowed room for national interests to exert greater pressure on foreign policy. The East-West divisions or the bipolar structure of the Cold War period ceased to function as a stabilising ‘overlay’ inhibiting fundamental foreign policy changes. Turkey was no exception; it responded positively to these structural incentives evident in its efforts to normalise relations with Moscow since the mid-1960s – a period of limited détente. A steady improvement of bilateral relations in the 1970s not only shook the image of the ‘Soviet threat’ propagated by NATO but also reduced Turkey’s dependence on the West to the point where many questioned the relevance of retaining membership to the alliance.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) marked the culmination of the process of convergence of interests between super-powers in managing their strategic relationship that began in 1963 with the signing of Partial Test Ban Treaty. Some other developments of the 1960s such as the signing of the NPT in 1968, French withdrawal from military structure of NATO, Germany’s Ostpolitik, Sino-Soviet rift and the American withdrawal from Vietnam in early 1970s contributed to the idea of peaceful co-existence.

For détente as a “mode of management of adversarial power”, see Coral Bell, The Diplomacy of Détente (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1977), The quote is from page 1.

According to Sander, the détente process had negative impact on Turkey in terms of reducing its strategic saliency to the NATO, partly due to the Washington’s recognition of strategic parity with the USSR and willingness to settle for the status quo rather than change and partly, the technological developments in the armament industry. Pertaining to the latter, Sander pointed out two important consequences for Turkey: firstly, the transformation of the US nuclear monopoly of the 1950s into “bipolar relationship of mutual deterrence” rendered Turkey vulnerable to Soviet attack since its alliance partners would adhere to a new principle of “flexible response” or “controlled” response that would give both sides a “pause” to calm down; secondly, the American air bases in Turkey lost their importance as striking sites in the defense of vital American interests vis-à-
Polycentrism

Yet, another structural transformation at the level of macro politics during the period was the polycentric nature of the global system. Indicative of this was the growing influence of the Third World, especially the Non-aligned bloc in terms of its impact on the international system as a whole and North-South relations in particular. Although international relations continued to be overshadowed by the two strong poles, the assertiveness of the Third World countries in the early 1970s particularly contributed to a loosening of the rigid bipolar structure. This, in turn, opened space for this group to function independently and re-define economic and political relations with the dominant powers through the “Group of 77”.

At one level, the polycentric character of the international system provided Turkey with greater opportunities to diversify its external relations so as to reduce its dependence on the West the US. At another level, it presented a challenge to its strict adherence to a pro-Western alignment, as it entailed the risk of alienating Turkey from a large, though inchoate, group. The almost total lack of Third World support in the UN for Turkish position on Cyprus and unanimous condemnation of Turkey’s 1974 military action by the Colombo NAM Conference underlined the vis Soviet Union owing to the availability of cruise missiles and long-range, submarine launched missiles. In all, “this force of continuity has felt the grinding effects of technological change”. Sander, “The Present State of Turkish-US Relations”, pp. 60-61. Also, see Yılmaz Altuğ, “The State of International Detente and Turkish Foreign Policy”, Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, vol. xv (1975), pp. 25-36.

103 For details, see Robert A. Mortimer, The Third World Coalition in International Politics, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984).

104 The UN General Assembly vote on a draft resolution on Cyprus in November 1976 showed 94-1 against Turkey, with 27 abstentions. See, M. Gonlubol et al, Olaylarla Türk Dis Politikası (Turkish Foreign Policy with Facts), (Ankara, 1987), p. 57.
urgency of cultivating better relations with the Third World countries so as to neutralise their opposition over the question of Cyprus.

In sum, the above two key changes in Turkey’s external environment reduced the exogenous webs that had otherwise constrained decision-makers in Ankara during the Cold War period to undertake fundamental change in foreign policy. Along with the absence of threatening behaviour by the Soviet Union, the growing interdependence among states regardless of different socio-political systems and the rise of Third World\textsuperscript{105} as an alternative power-centre created conditions favourable to foreign policy shifts.

\textbf{Internal Sources: Over -Politised Polity}

The phenomena of over-politicization is the characteristic feature of many Third World states, particularly those at the transition stage of democratization process. As generally understood, there are basically four traits that distinguish a normal, balanced polity from an over -politised one:\textsuperscript{106}

1) Fluidity of state power and constant insecurity characterising the holders of state power in their relations to social actors;
2) Political participation and competition outside the established institutions;
3) Use of open violence and confrontation in such participation;
4) Lack of compromise over the outcome of political competition.

\textsuperscript{105} The support from the Third World group assumed significance in view of Turkey’s competitive relations with Greece, which in the 1970 became predominant over the East-West tensions. See Ali L. Karaosmanoglu, “Turkey’s Security Policy in the Middle East', \textit{Dis Politika}, vol. 10, no. 1-2 (1982), p. 4.

During the inter-coup period (between 1960 and September 1980), Turkey had similar experience of over politicisation, which was the result of the ultra-liberal features of the Second Turkish republic. For the 1961 constitution failed to strike an effective balance between authoritarianism of the Bayer-Menderes era on the one hand and the extreme form of political participation along the rigid ideological lines. In evaluating its impact, Ataov concluded, “The 1960 revolution was essentially a revolution that shook but did not change Turkey’s political body”.\textsuperscript{107}

It embodied political aspirations of diverse social groups but without adequate safeguards to defend the system against those who rejected its essence. Moreover, the makers of the 1960 coup opted for horizontal process of democracy (enlarging political participation) without tackling the more urgent issues of development including unemployment and urbanisation (vertical dimension of democracy),\textsuperscript{108} which provided the ideal constituency for nourishing radical ideologies, both left and right variety. As Rustow has pointed out, “For better or worse, all Turkish political tendencies, ambitions, frustrations and animosities are out in the open and not as in the Shah’s Iran, suppressed. And one of the genuine virtues of democratic openness is that it provides some guarantee against political surprises or abrupt change”.\textsuperscript{109}


108 The idea of horizontal and vertical dimensions of democracy is adapted from M. Heper, “The Strong State As a Problem For the Consolidation of Democracy: Turkey and Germany compared”, \textit{Comparative Political Studies}, vol. 25, no. 2 (July 1992), pp. 169-194. While the horizontal dimension focuses on responsibility, the vertical dimension is concerned with responsiveness of the state. But, too great an emphasis on responsiveness would lead to a debilitating pluralism, and an undue stress on responsibility would prevent pluralism from developing. Thus, the consolidation of democracy is contingent on the extent to which a balance is track between the two dimensions, ibid., p. 170.

109 D.A. Rustow, “Turkey’s Travents”, \textit{Foreign Affairs}, vol. 58 (Fall 1979), p. 89.
Although the 1961 constitution provided a series of checks and balances to prevent the democratic system from turning into one-party totalitarianism as in the past, the new electoral system made it increasingly difficult for a single party to obtain parliamentary majority. Consequently, major national political parties relied on the fringe groups to form a stable coalition government. This not only enhanced the role of such smaller groups as the leftist, ultra-nationalist and Islamist, also conferred a reasonable degree of state legitimacy on their ideological base and electoral constituency. In addition, the new system also created a plural society by spelling out in the 1961 constitution the ‘fundamental rights’ – freedom of thought and belief, freedom of press, of publication and association including trade unions. All this contributed to diversification of political tendencies and ideological radicalism.

In brief, the process of over-politicisation had two major consequences in so far as the foreign-policy making of the period was concerned. Firstly, the ideological divergence and upsurge of political consciousness led to increasing democratisation of national policy-making. No longer did it remain confined to only the state-elites or political elites; it was subject to diverse pressures from trade unions, intellectual and professional societies. Secondly, the political polarisation at the two ideological extremes precipitated the collapse of a broad consensus, on which Turkish foreign policy had earlier rested.


In this context, the contributions of Turkey’s leftist movement of the 1960s assume significance. “Before the recent military (September 1980),” Ahmet Samin writes, “the spectrum of competing groups on the Turkish left was quite staggering.”\(^{112}\) The forces on the Left was mainly represented by the Turkish Labour party (TLP) or Turkiye isci Partisi (translated literally ‘The Workers Party of Turkey). Founded by some leaders of the Istanbul-based trade unions in February 1961, the TLP entered the electoral fray with reasonable success winning 3 per cent of total votes and 15 seats. As it failed to repeat its performance in the 1969 elections, some groups associated with the party came to believe that they could overthrow the regime by violent means. From among them an extremist urban guerrilla group emerged calling itself Dev Genc, ‘Revolutionary youth’, which began a campaign of murder and bombings since 1968. In the same year, Students of the Leninist, Maoist and anarchist persuasions were engaged in violent confrontation with the right wing elements.

Militancy among left-wing trade unionists was attributed to the steadily expanding labour-force and along with it, their increasing political consciousness, as they became assertive of their rights. The trend was again reflected in the formation of two hundred trade unions and increase in the union-membership from 250,000 in 1959 to 600,000 in 1965. Following the passage of the law in 1963 legalising the workers’ right to strike, working-class movement intensified in the latter half of the 1960s.

As the pro-regime ‘class – Collaboratists’, as the critics term it, confederation of Turkish Trade Union, Turk-Is refused to support militant trade union activities, several unions associated with Turk-Is left and established in 1967 the confederation

of Revolutionary Trade Unions (Devrimci Isci Sendikalari Konfederasyonu or DISK). With the founding of the DISK, workers' militancy increased to a point where massive strikes, demonstrations and even confrontations with police became common occurrences by the end of the 1960s. The TLP played an important role as the vital link among numerous left-wing groups and helped elevate their struggle to a political level.\textsuperscript{113}

Although the left movement failed to attract widespread support among the masses, it provided a common platform against Turkey’s alliance with the West in its campaign against imperialism. Besides, the leftist stirrings, in part, contributed to a basic policy shift within the Republican people’s party (RPP) led by Bulent Ecevit. The party adopted “Left-of-Centre” stance in an apparent attempt to win back the intellectuals from the defunct communist party and to garner support from the working class.\textsuperscript{114} In the course of the RPP’s ideological transformation, “Third Worldism” constituted a part of the party’s global outlook. In contrast to his predecessor Ismet Inonu’s cautious foreign policy vis-à-vis the super-powers, Ecevit argued for disassociating Turkey from the Cold War rhetoric of NATO. He was though not in favour of withdrawing from the alliance, he insisted on independence of the allies within NATO.\textsuperscript{115}

**Economic Stagnation**

Apart from the political and social evolution of Turkey, economic considerations also played an important role in influencing the course of Turkish


\textsuperscript{115} Sezer, “Turkey’s Security policies”, p. 50.
foreign policy during the inter-coup period, especially during the 1970s. Economic planning started with the First Five-year Development in 1963 placed new emphasis on Turkey's requirements for external capital. When the NATO members refused to sponsor an aid consortium, Turkey turned to the organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in order to assure a steady flow of external financing for its development plans. But the OECD support never came up to Turkey's expectations. Nor did its association with the EEC in 1962.  

Turkey's economic difficulties had been exacerbated and complicated in the 1970s partly by its own policies and partly by the recession in Europe followed by World-wide energy crisis. Turkey's balance of trade was adversely affected by these developments leading to severe shortage of hard currency and supply of affordable fuel. In addition, its trade deficit with the EEC, Turkey's main trading partner was rising, and at the same time remittances from Turks in Europe dropped off significantly. The economic situation further deteriorated as a result of the Arabs' oil embargo in 1974 and dramatic rise in military expenditures following the 1974 Cyprus Crisis. At the end of the 1970s, when Turkey was beginning to switch over from its import substitution economy to an export-oriented free-market economy spurrey by the IMF, country's ruling elites turned towards the untapped markets in West Asia and Soviet Union for exports.

American aid reached Turkey through an OECD Consortium in 1963 totaled only $ 66 million. See Harris, Troubled Alliance, p. 101. For Turkey's association with the EEC, see "Turkey and the European Community", Middle East Economic Digest (MEED), Special Report (15 October 1976), pp. 23-35.

See, Subidey Togan, Reports on Development of External Economic Relations of Turkey (Ankara: Foreign Trade Association of Turkey, 1987), pp. 35-43. Also
Growth of Islamist Forces

As discussed in previous chapters (see Chapter I & II), Islam steadily returned to the political arena as an important variable in the competition for power since the early 1970s. With the political space opening up in the Second Turkish Republic, the National Salvation Party (NSP) emerged in the latter half of the 1960s to join in the democratic competition. The NSP led by Prof. Necmettin Erbakan was the first party in many decades to openly espouse an Islamist political philosophy. The first Congress of the party in 1970, echoed with crises of “Allah-u-ekbar”.\textsuperscript{118}

The rise of NSP signaled the return of Islam as a rallying point for socio-economic opposition to the Central authority. The NSP campaigned for revival of Islamic values and traditions that seemed to be vitiated by the penetration of Turkey by Western influences. It was opposed to close ties with the West, including Turkey’s entry into the European community. Instead, Erbakan advocated for closer cooperation among the Muslim countries so as to establish an alternative common market of Muslim states. For the EE, as Erbakan claimed, was a plot by the catholic states, commanded somewhat paradoxically by international Zionism to “melt Muslim Turkey away within a Christian Europe”.\textsuperscript{119}

Although the NSP’s vote share declined from 19 per cent in the 1973 elections to 8.6 per cent in 1977, it remained the third largest party in the Assembly throughout


the 1970s with 50 seats in 1973 and 24 seats in 1977. In a weak multi-partism of the period, both the major parties courted this avowedly Islamist party as a coalition partner in order to remain in power. In 1924 the NSP joined the social democratic Republic People's party to form a coalition government that fell off after the Cyprus Crisis. Between 1975 and 1977, Justice party leader Demirel headed a four party coalition including NSP, which again, became part of the Demirel government after 1977 elections until the 12 September 1980 military intervention.

In sharing power with other centrist parties, NSP acquired the legitimacy of a National party platform. Further, like other minor parties, the NSP despite being a junior partner wielded power and influence disproportionate to its parliamentary strength. In 1974, for instance, the NSP leadership exercised pressures on then Premier Ecevit to present an uncompromising stance vis-à-vis the Greeks over the Cyprus issue. After the US arms embargo, it was Erbakan who became the main driving force behind the “independent industrial development” with a view to reducing dependence on the US for economic development and security.

More significantly, following the Israeli formal enactment of the law declaring “Jerusalem is the united and eternal capital of Israel” in July 1980, the Islamists applied pressure on Prime Minister Demirel to adopt an openly critical stance towards Tel Aviv. The NSP members later on moved a censure motion against the Foreign Minister Hayrettin Erkmen accusing him of being “pro-Israel” and pursuing a “soft” policy towards Greece. In the ensuing debate, the RPP supported the NSP’s motion.

leading to the ouster of the Foreign Minister in September. These two parties not only held compatible views on social and economic matters, but also favoured national independence and friendly relations with the Third World including the Arab countries.

Finally, the NSP propaganda strongly attacked the policies of the US, Soviet Union and Israel, lampooning the first two as the “satans”. As already mentioned (see Chapter I), it was the massive Konya rally organised by the NSP leader on 6 September that provoked military intervention of 1980. According to an account of the booklet published by the ruling junta, the rally was organised as a “Liberation of Jerusalem Day”. Banners in Arabic proclaiming the greatness of Allah, and call for the restoration of the Sharia were carried by the demonstrators, who ended the rally with the burning of the Israeli, American and Soviet flags. In addressing the rally, Erbakan proclaimed the start of a struggle to end the “false Western mentality” that ruled in Turkey.

While the NSP became the organised Islamist expression of popular discontent, an unofficial movement also grew alongside it. It spread through unofficial Quran courses, local associations, charitable organisations and most importantly, various religious brotherhoods (tarikats), notably the Naksibendi, the Suleymanci, the Bektasis and the Nurcular order. Many of these religion-oriented popular movements previously organised outside state control became active in the


years following the development of a new ideology known as “Turkish-Islamic synthesis” adopted by the military leaders after the 1980 coup as the “National culture”. “In essence”, Taprak contends, “the ‘Turkish-Muslim synthesis’ rejects the pagan Turkism of Kemalist ideology and attempts to combine nationalism with Islam”. In the post-1980 coup period, the anti-socialist/communist stance of the generals, and their preference for a historically-rooted, socio-cultural identity based on Türk-Islam sentezi created an atmosphere favourable to growth of the Islamist movement.

National Action Party

This new outlook was originally formulated by a group of intellectuals on the right of Turkey’s political spectrum in a club, which they called “The Intellectuals’ Hearth” (Aydın-ler Ocagi) in the early 1960s. The club came into prominence during the turmoil of the 1970s, when its idea were incorporated into the programme of the ultra-nationalist National Action Party (NAP) founded by Aeparslan Turkes. On his return to Turkey in 1963, Turkes organised an array of right-wing groups, particularly among the youths in the universities of Ankara and Istanbul to fight the “divisive” communist movement. In brief, the NAP became “a reactionary single-

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124 This synthesis, with its emphasis on authoritarian politics and social control through the use of cultural and religious motifs was the perfect ideology for the generals who carried out the 1980 coup. It was used as an instrument both to promote solidarity among Turks and to counteract the divisive appeals from the left. Erkan Akin and Omer Karasapan, “The Turkish Islamic Synthesis”, Middle East Report (July-August 1988), p. 18.

issue movement, its electoral prospects related to its ability to exploit the issue of anti-Communist sentiments among the population”.126

Unlike in the 1960s when NAP supported the secular forces, during the 1970s, Turkes defined Islam as an indispensable part of Turkish culture. This change was, in fact, tactical and instrumental. However, Islam remained one of the three principal elements including Turkish and Western that made up the NAP’s political platform. This combination was clearly reflected in the Party’s programme on foreign policy for the country. While the NAP, unlike the NSP was in favour of close relations with Western European countries and retaining membership to NATO, it was, like the Islamists, opposed to Turkey’s entry into European Common market and against any form of concessions on the Cyprus issues.

Finally, the ultra-nationalists like their Islamist counterparts stressed on a “realistic integration of Islamic countries on the economic front”,127 which would be reinforced by their common past, and religio-cultural ties. The NAP remained on the political margin until 1974 with barely 3 per cent share of the vote. It became an important actor under the two coalition governments, as it doubled its electoral support by mobilising public opinion over the issue of Cyprus. Thus, both the major political parties, the RPP and JP had to adjust their policies to suit these more extreme parties, who in turn, wielded considerable influence in the national policy making.

Motherland Party (ANAP)

The democratic outlet of the Islamists and radical nationalist was not confined to the NSP (later renamed as Welfare/Refah party) or the NAP. In the Third Turkish


127 Ergil, “Turkey”, p. 32.
Republic, the middle and lower-tier cadre of these parties entered the newly established Motherland party by Turgut Ozal to organise within it as a distinct and influential faction.\(^{128}\) For all these parties were outlawed by the coup leaders. As Elie Kedourie has aptly pointed out, “That the Motherland Party may have been perceived as the natural continuation of the Democratic and Justice Parties in going with the grains of Turkish society probably explains its success ...”\(^{129}\) Moreover, one of Ozal’s brother Korkut Ozal once held an important position became a major source of electoral support for the expanding Motherland party in the early 1980s. It may be noted that “much of the Sufi Islam in Turkey is also predominantly political”.\(^{130}\)

Although Ozal was personally an observant Muslim and conservative in matters of morality, his policies, particularly those concerning the economy were largely based on pragmatism. While he had advocated for stronger ties with the Muslim countries, he appeared to be wary of severing ties either with the West or NATO.\(^{131}\) Instead, he set off the evolution of a process that would blend the religious roots of the Turks with the Western values. In other words, he had a vision of transforming Turkey into Japan of West Asia, combining Islamic values with

\(^{128}\) Ozal himself was a parliamentary candidate in the NSP ticket in the 1977 elections and his brother was an influential member of the Party.


\(^{130}\) Feride Acan, “Islam in Turkey” in Canan Balkir and Allian M. Williams (eds.), *Turkey and Europe* (London: Pinto Publishers Ltd., 1993), p. 227. According to the author, major loci of organised Islamist groups are the Sufi Orders. In fact, the largest *tarikat*, the Naksibendi was an important source of electoral support for Ozal’s party in the early 1980s.

rationality and modernity. An Western commentator described Ozal as the statesman “whose brain was in the West, and whose heart was in the Islamic world”.\(^{132}\)

The search for a new identity was inevitably reflected in Turkey’s foreign policy under Ozal’s stewardship. The theme that Turkey could serve as a useful bridge between the West and Islamic world figured prominently in Ozal’s official statements and interviews. Implicit in Ozal’s idea of Turkey as a bridge was his rejection of the country’s role as a “western agent” or “NATO’s arm” in West Asia. The role Ozal envisaged for Turkey was neither a “gigantic bridge-head” nor “a springboard for military operations in the Middle East”. Nor was it to become a “spearhead of an Islamic revival directed against the West”.\(^{133}\) Instead, it was meant to turn Turkey into a “gravity centre of both East and West”.\(^{134}\)

The above discussion brings to the force three central points: 1) factors at the domestic levels carry as much explanatory weight as the changes in the country’s external environment; 2) the Cyprus crisis of 1974 was only the catalyst that forced Turkish decision-makers to re-examine the country’s foreign policy in the light of the changes taking place at global/regional level; 3) the outcome of the intense re-evaluation of the foreign policy was not the directional shift in terms of changing side

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in a bipolar world, nor was it meant to become non-aligned.\textsuperscript{135} It was, in brief, a change in orientations from dependence on and close identification with the West to self-reliance and diversification, encapsulated in official description as “multi-faceted foreign policy”.\textsuperscript{136}

Finally, among Turkey’s decision-making elites – both state as well as political elites – there was hardly any point of disagreement (with the exception of the Islamists) as regards Turkey’s security link with the US and NATO. On the contrary, there existed a broad consensus among policy-makers and critics on the preservation of a NATO-based security policy. No wonder then the US-Turkish relations improved markedly with the removal of arms embargo in 1978, which was followed by the signing of a Defence and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) in March 1980. In the following chapter, Turkey’s policy of constructive engagement towards the Arab Gulf States is discussed in the backdrop of the country’s fundamental foreign policy change since 1974.

\textsuperscript{135} For an interesting discussion of foreign policy options before Turkey after the US embargo, see Esat Cam, “Foreign Policy Preferences of Turkey”, \textit{Dis Politika}, vol. 7, no. 3-4 (1978), pp. 83-110.

\textsuperscript{136} “Multi Faceted Foreign Policy: As a New Approach”, \textit{Dis Politika}, vol. 6, no. 3-4 (June 1977), pp. 7-15.