Chapter IV

Major Advaitins in 14th to 18th Centuries, A.D.

(i) Vidyāranya

As has already been seen, the development of Advaita in various ways reached its pinnacle in the last period and there was nothing special to be added. As a matter of fact, Gauḍapāda and Ś. established the goal of Advaita and the general outline and only minor problems like the precise relation between the so-called Jīva and Brahman and Avidyā or Māyā were dealt with by the immediate followers. After this the inactive period started - inactive in the sense that no further activity in the line of classification was available and the only activity was to defend Advaita from the opponents like Dwaitins and Naiyāyikas.

The notable figures of the early days of this period are Vidyāranya and his guru Saṅkarānanda who, with the help of the Vijayānagara empire revived the
Vedic Dharma and also Advaita. Mādhava alias Vidyāraṇya, the minister of Vijayānagara emperor Bukka I (1355-77), is a big authority in Advaita and he composed many works to elucidate the difficult problems thereof.

There has already been a lot of discussion with regard to his date and his identity to Bhāratītirtha, and the controversy is still not closed. Some books are ascribed to Vidyāraṇya, while some to Bhāratītirtha and others to both. Tradition is not unanimous on the point. But Rāmakṛṣṇa a commentator of many of the books distinguishes between Vidyāraṇya and Bhāratītirtha when he salutes both of them as his Gurus.

Vidyāraṇya was a pupil of both Sāṅkarānanda and Vidyātīrtha, as is clear from the works going in his name. In some works like Anubhūtiprakāśa he reveres only Vidyātīrtha while in Vivaranaprameyasamgraha, the opening slokas extol Sāṅkarānanda and the closing verse offers the work to Vidyātīrtha.

2. Introduction to the Philosophy of Advaita by T. M. P. Mahadevan.
3. "Introduction to Vivekananda" by D. V. Josy.

Andhra University, Sastri, 1947.
The Jīvanmuktiviveka both at the beginning and end glorifies Vidyātīrthamahēśvara and the colophon presents him to be the pupil of Bhāratītīrtha. Vidyātīrtha might be same as Bhāratītīrtha according to the maxim 'आज्ञानम् गुरुवर्णितम् — तत् गुरुवर्णितम्.'

Vidyāraṇya alias Mādhavācārya is known the son of Māyāna and the brother of Bhoganātha and Sāyaṇa, the commentator of Vedas. Bhoganātha is also said to have taken to asceticism and was named Bhāratītīrtha. Vidyāraṇya put an end to his mortal life in 1137 A.D. after enjoying the pontificate of Śrīneri Pīṭha.

Works.—The following works go in his name:—


1. Cf. His Sāṅkara-digvijaya:

* Cf. Catalogue of Adyar Library, Mss.
Anubhūtivratkāsa.- It discusses the purport of Upaniṣads. It is divided into fifteen Adhyāyas out of which the first considers the Aitareya, the second, the Tattiriya, the third, fourth and fifth, the Chāndogya, the sixth and seventh the Mundaka, the eighth and ninth Kausitaki, tenth - Maitri, eleventh Katha, the twelfth Śvetāsvatara, and the rest Brhadāraṇyaka. The work is throughout in ṛgveda.

Jīvanmukti Viveka.- It is an independent work and considers everything about Jīvanmukti, taking the authority of Yogavāsiṣṭha. It discusses whether a woman is entitled to Sannyāsa and on the strength of precursors like Vācaknāvi, Sulabhā, Vidyāraṇya gives his decision in affirmative. He alludes to his commentary on Parāśara-Smṛti. He quotes from Gaudapāda, Ś. Suresvara, and Viśvarūpa, Seṣa, Padmapāda, Ānandabodha and number of Smṛtis. He alludes to Ś. as Bhagavatpāda and to Suresvara as Vārttikakāra. It is not clear whether he identifies Suresvara with Viśvarūpa.

1. Cf. छेकों तु समावासा: 'तेजस्व: प्राणातस्मृत'।
   वार्तिकमेव समाधिसाधयेत 'परेको विविधायले' Jīvanmuktiviveka 1. 2. 3.
The work is divided in five Adhyāyas and is very useful and interesting from the practical side of Advaita.

Pañcadasī. - It is ascribed to two authors, Vidyāraṇya and Bhāratītīrtha. As the title shows there are fifteen chapters which discuss all the salient problems in Advaita. The work is popular and even read every day by some.

Vivarana-Prameya-Sāmgraha. - According to the title it explains lucidly the questions dealt with in the Vīvarana of Prakāśātman whose follower Vidyāraṇya is. It is not a regular gloss nor a summary of Vīvarana but an independent elaboration and discussion of the same. According to the original it is divided in nine Varṇakas.

Dṛgdrṣṭya-Viveka. - Some ascribe it to Ś., but others to Vidyāraṇya and even Appayya agrees with them.

Śaṅkaradīgviṣaya. - It is a poem of the nature of Mahākāvyya running over into twenty Sargas and depicting the life of Ś. It is valued as the
earliest reliable tradition regarding the Life-history of Śī.

The language is lucid and forcible and the poet in Vidyāranya is displayed at every step.

Sarvadarsāna-Samgraha.- The work presents all the then philosophical systems (Darsānas), orthodox as well as heterodox (Cārvāka, Baudhā and Jain). The noteworthy feature of the work is the inclusion of Rāmānuja (Viṣistadvaita) and Pūrṇaprajña (Dvaita) Darsānas. It takes up the systems one by one, represents the views honestly and then refutes these. Ultimately it is shown how only Advaita position is true.

The colophon describes the work as Śāyaṇa-Mādhavīya and the work at the outset pays obeissance to Sarvajña Viṣṇu and notes that the Sarvadarsāna-samgraha is composed by Mādhavārya who is born of Śāyaṇa. It might belong to Mādhava son of Śāyaṇa and not to Vidyāranya.

It refers to Kalpatarukāra, Khandana, Citsukha,
Narendragiri, Pañcapādikā, Vivarana, Bhāmatīkāra, Sarvajñāviṣṇu (and his work Vivarana-Vivaranaṁ). Parāṣāramādhasīva.- It is the commentary on Parāṣārasmṛti.

Adhikaranaṇaratnamālā.- It is also styled as Vaiyāsikanyāyamālā and is a summary in verse of each Adhikarana of B.S. The work is attributed to Bhāratītīrtha.

Vidyāranya's Pratibimbavāda.- In all his works his views on Advaita are expressed clearly and he is a Pratibimbavādin, being a follower of Prakāśātman on whose Vivarana he has based his work Vivaranaprameyasaṁgraha. A cursory glance at Anubhūtipraṅgāsa also would reveal his Pratibimbavāda. A tinge of Sarvajñātman's view also is mingled with it. His opinion about the main problems might be formulated as follows :-

The pure consciousness or Brahman gets reflected into Māyā which can effect anything (अध्यात्मिकत्वातः मत्तत्वातः)

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when the Ātman is reflected in the pellucid Īśvara

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Māyā he is styled as Īśā who was there alone prior to the creation. The solitude became, as time

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1. Cf. सत्यायत्नं द्वितीयकोपायं आचार्यं प्रतिनिधिनि।

प्रदूषनिः द्वितीयकोपायं मृते: प्रामेयं एव सः || Anubhūtipraṅgāsa. ॥ ॥
rolled on, boresome and like a sovereign he longed for some pastime. Soon he discovered it and this was the game of creation. Seeing no other material he thought of becoming many and produced various bodies and entered in them as their breath. Though he is really ऊँचक र परमाकालेश्वर, he appears as an enjoyer due to the outer garb of मयाः.

This मयाः has served the last straw in the argument. It is the successful retreat which is named 

अभिमुख्य मयाः 

thus. It is the root of the activity and passion. It is indescribable and capable of putting forth anything. It is not over and above the आत्मा. It is as if the ornament (महिमा) of Him and his power.

The world is phenomenal (प्राक्तिक). विद्यारथ्या refers to the द्रष्टिष्ठितवाद for he writes: द्रष्टिष्ठितवादमें जगतम्

अनुभवने कथं मात्रैः स्वाधिनोज्जातसंसारसङ्गले निशयसे स्वाधिनथर:।

The entangled Brahman is the cause as also the अधिकार of the world.

अभिमुख्य इस्वरः कारकं जीवाः जीवा तद्यथा विद्वान यद्याभिमुख्याःकारकं जीव तद्यथा विद्वान। इदम् र्वासो विद्वान जीवाः तथा। इदम् र्वासो विद्वान जीवाः तथा। इदम् र्वासो विद्वान जीवाः तथा।

While इस्वरा has the cause as its adjunct जीवा ह is the effect, viz., बुद्धि as its adjunct. The activity of the जीवा is due to the

1. शुभाच्छान्ति श्रीराम पशुकारिकाय दायन्ता। मनोद्भवाणि संसाराणी भुजाय इव सरस्वती।। इदम् के वर्गः। 2. यद्याभिमुखायां मात्रेन भविष्यत:। तद्याभिमुखायां मात्रेन भविष्यत:। इदम् के वर्गः। 3. आयुः श्रीकृष्णनाथ तृतीयः महिमाधिस्तमितः। इदम् र्वासो विद्वान जीवाः तद्यथा। 4. श्रुतिर्ममोहिनेऽजीन: कार्योपाधिकारीकर:। इदम् र्वासो विद्वान जीवाः तद्यथा।
gordian knot of the Ego (Ahaṅkāragranthi) fastened by Māyā. Due to this Ego the Jīva gets engrossed into many faults and is tied with four meshes—bhava māyāṅkanātāḥ—bhārata-kaṭa. To get rid of these should be the prime goal for it cannot be effected in other births except manhood. For while the Pitṛs have no independence, the mind in Gandharvaloka is very fickle and though in Brahmaloaka one can get salvation still each and everybody cannot get a passport to it! So one should strive in this very birth.

Jīvanmukti can be had. It can be defined as:

It is the removal of the tie in the form of evil tendencies of the mind which is dragged here and there by both pleasure and pain. The means to it is only Jhāna and nothing else. A Jīvanmukta should lead a chaste life in order to avoid nuisance to others for if he indulges in evil deeds his šaṅderers would have to go to the hell though there is no fault accruing to him.

1 Jīvanmukti Viveka 1.102 (Ananda Śramaṇa edition)
The women are also entitled to Sannyāsa without which Brahmasākṣātkāra cannot be had. Gārgī, Maitreyī, Vācaknavī, Sulabhā and others did indulge in Brahmavidyā which proves it.

This, in brief, is the opinion of Vidyārāṇya which is clothed in many works. The style is simple and attractive, and one place in Vivaraṇaprameyasamgraha he summarises the things usually discussed in any Advaita book which are: Is detachment alone necessary for the Adhikārin of Brahmavidyā or anything else, what is the proof for that, whether Vedāntas are already dealt with by Dharmamāṁśa, how should they be interpreted, what is the reality about Ātman and why and by what Pramāṇa is it known and further is this Pramāṇa contradictory to some other Pramāṇa, is Jñānakarmaśuccaya helpful, what is salvation and why, etc.

Vidyārāṇya discusses and clarifies the authoritative views on these problems in the light of Pratibimbaśvadā.

1. Ibid p. 17.
2. Vide Vivaraṇaprameyasamgraha pp. 6-7.
(ii) Nrśimhāśrama

From Vidyāraṇya to Nrśimhāśrama is a big gap indeed, in time as well as in historical circumstances. Vidyāraṇya flourished in a time when the Sanātana Vaiḍīka Dharma was impeded by the foreign onslaught of the Khilji rule and hence a revival of Hindu Kingdom and with its help of the religion and philosophy also took place. When the western, middle and Deccan India was thus disturbed the eastern coast was enjoying independence in spite of the change of local royal families. In this solemn atmosphere, Nrśimhāśrama composed his Advaita works in Jagannātha-Purī in the middle of the sixteenth century. He gives Saṁvat 1604 (A.D. 1546) as the year of the composition of his Vedānta-tattva-viveka, a very rare and accidental phenomenon indeed, in the history of Sanskrit literature.

No biographical information is available except that he spent his Sannyāsa days at Purī most probably
as a Pontiff there. He is known to be the pupil of Gīrvāṇendra Sarasvatī and Jagannāthāśrama and had five great Advaitins for his disciples, as is clear from Dharmarājādhvarīndra's reference in Vedānta paribhāṣā. These five pupils were Nārāyaṇāśrama (the commentator of his works), Dharmarājādhvarin, Bhaṭṭoṭī Dīṅtī, Pettā Dīṅtī, and Umā Mahesvara. A tradition cites that once Nṛsimhāśrama went to a village on the bank of Narmadā, and as he did not get any alms he burnt it, when Appayya intuitively received him and wrote Kalpataru Parimala through his behest. He was reputed among his contemporaries and calls himself Vedāntasārābhijñā.

He was a devotee of Nṛsimha, situated on Nīla mountain.

His works:

A long list of books is given against his name but all of them do not seem to belong to his pen. Usually the following works go in his name:

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1. Cf. अर्द्धलोकस्यान्तरमेव जयसम्बन्धां

2. Vide Appayathīkāśendravijaya by K.V. Subrahmanya Ayyar. Saoli
Advaitadīpikā, Advaita-pañcaratna, Advaita-
bodhadīpikā, Advaitavāda, Bhedadhikkāra, Vācaraṁbhanaṁ,
Vedāntatattvaviveka, Tattvabodhini, Pañcapādikāvivarana-
prakāśikā, Advaitaratnakosa, Vedāntaratnakosa,
Vaidikasiddhāntasaṅgraha, Bhāvajñānaprakāśanam,
Nṛsimhāvijñāpanam, Madhumaṅjarī, Advaitabrahmānusandhānam.

Out of these Advaitadīpikā (incomplete),
Bhedadhikkāra, Vedāntatattvaviveka and Nṛsimhāvijñāpanam
are available in print. The Advaitadīpikā is a voluminous
work divided into four chapters and deals with all the
salient problems of Advaita on the dialectical basis.
Bhedad-hikkāra is a refutation of Bheda or distinction and
Dvaita, and incidentally establishing Advaita. The work
is translated by S.s. Suryanarayana Shastri. Vedānta-
tattva-Viveka as is clear from the title, discusses all
the features of Advaita in brief and in simple style.
It is divided into two chapters, the first containing
discussion about 'Thou' describing Adhyāsa, Mithyātva,
the Self as Saṁvīt, the

1. Advaitadīpikā, Bhedadhikkāra, Tattvaviveka are printed in
   'The Pundita' and separate reprints are available. Only three
   volumes of Advaitadīpikā are printed but still incom-
   Nṛsimhāvijñāpanam is printed in the Pomeo of Welsh Seri
   (No.52).
individual soul and the different theories while the second chapter deals with 'That.' *Nṛsiṃhaviṣṇūpanam* is a Stotra addressed to Nṛsiṃha running over two hundred and forty-six verses, and describing the Advaita doctrine. In V. 243 he mentions that the work is composed by one Nṛsiṃhayati for the sake of one Rāmacandra, son of Nṛsiṃhaṇaśa.

His Advaita-bodhāṇiṇī and Advaita-śāstra appear to be small independent works on Advaita while *Advaitatāpadīpikā* most probably, might be the same as *Advaitatāpadīpikā*. *Tattvabodhinī* is a commentary on the *Saṅkṣepasārīraka* of Saṃvajñātman and *Pañcapādīkā*-vīvaranapraṇaśikkā which is also known as *Bhāvaprakāśikā*, is a gloss on *Vivarana* of Prakāśātman. Only one *Varnaka* is amongst *Advaitaratnakosā* same as *Vedāntaratnakosā* (?) also styled *Tattvavivekadiṭpana* is a commentary written by him on his *Vedāntatattvaviveka*. *Bhāvajñānapraṇaśanam* is wrongly attributed to him there in the Adyar Library Mss. Catalogue. It belongs to Śivarāma, one of his pupils, the son of one Kṛṣṇaśāstri.  

1. Vide the opening stanzas in Adyar Mss. no. 69836

Cf. *Vidyāprāpañche*  वस्त्रे  सहव  सुनि-हित-मनत  कालिनाम।* <br>लोकशेषोऽदर्शनं  तीर्थात्मनु-काव्यैरिगम।*<br>तिर्थज्ञवर्धम  कृपायेन  भक्त एवं जयं विषयस।*<br>अति-तिर्थिकपयते गुणादात्मकोऽस्यते  कृपि।*<br>वनोऽविवेकं  चतुर्वत्तेऽधिकीडः अस्तगुणरक्षास्यस्म।*<br>--- कृपाे---
Närāyaṇāśrama, prominent among his pupils has commented upon Advaitadīpikā and Bhedadhikāra.

Nṛsiṃhāśrama's Synthesis of Advaita:—

That Nṛsiṃhāśrama mainly defended Advaita from the attacks of other Darsānas and mainly Naiyāyikas is clear from the allusion of his pupils. Dharmarāja says: "एवं रूपांकाल्यात् प्रीतिः एवं रूपांकाल्यात्। तोमो नारायणा!" This shows that the disciples also, had a lot of share in facing the brunt of the attack. As the author of Bhāvājñānaprakāśanam remarks, Nṛsiṃhāśrama was as though born just to refute Tārkikas and others sailing in the same boat. Thus refutation of Nyāya authorities was the main problem to be met with in the age. As the tradition gives Nṛsiṃhāśrama had to beat a retreat in dealing with a big Naiyāyika, Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇa. That this mission of controverting the Bhedavādins or Naiyāyikas was accepted by him, is clear from the independent work Bhedadhikkāra.

As has been already shown above the tendency
of the age was to synthesise the various theories in Advaita. Nṛsiṁhāsrama is not an exception वे ना। Of course he is not a blind follower. He accepts and defends Vācaspati's views only if they are sound, and shows his partiality towards Vivarana view. While dealing with Adhyāśa he defines it as "वाचस्पतिक न है। पूर्णकालिकः. This being the definition of illusive superimposition (ग्राहरणकालिकः) there is no fault of narrowness (Avyāpti) on a jar etc. The true definition of all superimposition is (परम परानासा) 'imposition on another.' According to some 'Smṛti-rūpa' implies the cause as association (संवदन), impression (संस्मरण) and fault (शेष) which would mean that the definition points out to only कुलविधास. Here Nṛsiṁhāsrama quotes Vācaspatimisra ¹ who takes Smṛti-rūpa to refer to non-proximity, which is explained by Amalānanda as 'absence in reality in the substrate'. He also remarks that this last view is correct on the strength of the word 'परान' in S.'s definition.

¹. लक्ष्यातु श्रुतिरूप-पदोन्नतसंस्मरणमिलतः विनिर्देशकमपरानासाः सङ्गीतः परपरानासाः इत्यादि। अतः निर्देशात्तुमिलतः न द्वितीयोत्पत्तिः तत्त्वमिलतः न केवलानासाः सः।

V.V. p.22 (The Pavement Vol.22)
Nrsimhāśrama resorts to Pratibimba view which can support both Nāṇājīvavāda and Ekajīvavāda. The individual souls are different and this distinction is not real but is effected due to the adjuncts in the form of the Antahkaraṇa. Hence the experience of pain and pleasure is distinct. To account for this plurality of Jīvas he accepts the plurality of Ajñāna also, for Sruti also supports the view of Ajñānaṭva in उदयेन सामायिकः पुरुषं इस्ते। The passage अन्नमेवं कोड्यं भण्डपुः भुवेन refers to the basic ignorance (Mūlajñāna). One man cannot enjoy the same Avidyā which another man rejects; thus every man has his own Avidyā.

After first giving this view of Nāṇājīvavādins, he records other views. Some opine that there is only one Avidyā in which the Ātman is reflected and hence there is not any difference in the various souls even though the minds are distinct, giving rise to distinct doers (आत्मसौर्स्यम्). The ego is responsible for the distinction. That Avidyā is only one should be proved by passages like 'माया उपग्रहितम्' which should be accepted as it contains brevity (कारणम्).

1. Vide ibid p. 32.

2. अथ अतात्मसौर्स्यमेव। अन्नमेवः, अविवेच्यन्ति वनमार्गोलोकनिष्ठे! न उदयेन सामायिकः पुरुषं इस्ते। अन्नमेवं कोड्यं भण्डपुः भुवेन। अविवेच्यन्ति वनमार्गोलोकनिष्ठे! विवेच्यन्ति वनमार्गोलोकनिष्ठे। अविवेच्यन्ति वनमार्गोलोकनिष्ठे। अविवेच्यन्ति वनमार्गोलोकनिष्ठे। विवेच्यन्ति वनमार्गोलोकनिष्ठे। अविवेच्यन्ति वनमार्गोलोकनिष्ठे। अविवेच्यन्ति वनमार्गोलोकनिष्ठे। अविवेच्यन्ति वनमार्गोलोकनिष्ठे। अविवेच्यन्ति वनमार्गोलोकनिष्ठे। अविवेच्यन्ति वनमार्गोलोकनिष्ठे। अविवेच्यन्ति वनमार्गोलोकनिष्ठे। अविवेच्यन्ति वनमार्गोलोकनिष्ठे। अविवेच्यन्ति वनमार्गोलोकनिष्ठे। अविवेच्यन्ति वनमार्गोलोकनिष्ठे। अविवेच्यन्ति वनमार्गोलोकनिष्ठे। अविवेच्यन्ति वनमार्गोलोकनिष्ठे। अविवेच्यन्ति वनमार्गोलोकनिष्ठे। अविवेच्यन्ति वनमार्गोलोकनिष्ठे। अविवेच्यन्ति वनमार्गोलोकनिष्ठे। अविवेच्यन्ति वनमार्गोलोकनिष्ठे। अविवेच्यन्ति वनमार्गोलोकनिष्ठे। अविवेच्यन्ति वनमार्गोलोकनिष्ठे। अविवेच्यन्ति वनमार्गोलोकनिष्ठे। अविवेच्यन्ति वनमार्गोलोकनिष्ठे। अविवेच्यन्ति वनमार्गोलोकनिष्ठे। अविवेच्यन्ति वनमार्गोलोकनिष्ठे। अविवेच्यन्ति वनमार्गोलोकनिष्ठे। अविवेच्यन्ति वनमार्गोलोकनिष्ठे।
So Jīva is One (Eka). The Karmakāṇḍa presupposes distinction in the actor (Pramātā) and not the Jīva. Ekajīvavāda does not find any difficulty of the lack of devotees for salvation; as nobody can guess whether one has attained it and hence everybody goes after it. Further the salvation of a sage does not effect the salvation of a fool as the fruit can be enjoyed only by the doer of that act. The salvation of Śūka is not the highest one according to some but only Krama-mukti as he goes by the Arcirādi path, according to the Purāṇas; while others think that he is a Jīvanmukta on the basis that salvation means the cessation of the Antaḥkaraṇa. Only Śūka’s Antaḥkaraṇa is merged while others persist in fact. Some of the Advaitins think that the Mukti of one Jīva effects that of all, as there is complete removal of all distinction. Śūka’s salvation is not a fact but only a laudatory statement (त्र्यम्बकम्) to goad others. This one soul is Hiranya-garbha. It does not mean that there is no hope of salvation as nobody has obtained it until now; for if a blind man can not see beauty does it mean that others should not desire to witness the same?

1 Ibid p.37

3. अनुमान-न प्रभावित रूपम्: सृजनारीक्ष्यते न अनेन्। इbid p.60
Thus Jīva is only one. Nṛsimhāśrama argues out both the views without taking sides. But still this phenomenal distinction between the various Pramātras is based upon Pratibhāma doctrine and not the Avaccheda. Firstly because the Śrutis "अर्मिग्रहां चित्तं विवेदितं " supports it and secondly because omnipresence of Brahman which is the Avacchedaka (pervador) cannot be accounted for. In case of Bhāma, it is seen to be connected with the whole, while the Avaccheda occupies only parts. It cannot be objected that the reflection is distinct from the prototype, and on the same imagery Jīva also would be distinct from Brahman, for we are convinced of the unity of the reflection with the Bhāma.

Thus even though the order of the day was to synthesise all the views, still Nṛsimhāśrama many a time dissends from some of them though for the most part he summarises all the doctrines without showing any partiality. The Jīva is the reflection of the Ātman in Ajñāna which can be
defined as अनन्तने्न तथा सति आत्मनित्यले। That which, being the beginningless material, is removable by realisation. No fault of आत्मन्न्यप्ति can arise as the whole universe is included in it. Likewise there is no atiyङ्गप्ति either on the आत्मन who is endless and hence not removable; otherwise the 'absolute absence' (अन्तर्देश) of the नायायिकास also would be liable to the same fault.

The proof of आत्मन is inference: संधिरहस्यं प्रदेश प्रश्न | ज्ञानवान्वितत्र ज्ञानवान्वितात्मनः। As we see all effects to have come out of insentient object, the world also must have some insentient positive entity for its cause. It is also proved by presumption (अर्थपाप्ति) in the impossibility of explaining otherwise of the superimposition.

It resides in the consciousness which is its object also. Some attribute this आत्मन to जीव who is also beginningless. But आत्मन should be regarded as belonging to आत्मन. 

The cause of the universe is ब्राह्मण. This
causality implies both material and instrumental cause. For Brahman alone can be regarded as the material cause in as much as no other entity can possibly claim this. Atoms being not joined cannot be the cause, and Prakṛti being insentient cannot produce the world. The causality of Brahman can be defined as 'भूतोऽभावं न च स्थितं कथ्यते'. The word 'तत्र' (elements) wards off potter etc. while 'तत्र' (actor) denies Māyā. This does not mean that Māyā is not the cause. It is there only as material and not the instrument. Some take that Brahman is material and Māyā being its power makes the causality effective.

As to the relation between the Jīva and Paramātman, some regard it as natural and real, while according to some it is extraneous and real. These are the opinions of other Dārśanikas. But the followers of S. regard it as conditional and indescribable. The Bhedavādins cannot argue that Bheda is proved by Sruti in 'द्वितीय सुपर्णि स्मुर्गा ...'

1. स्त्राभिषेकः प्रेम: पारमानिशः इति केवल। दैविकम्: पारमानिशः हृदि आद्यः

Oḍa-oḍa निर्मल-सन्तीम्: इति भूम्पआदायः परम्परायिनाः। Saivānlao dipikā Vol. II 101
for it is Sruti that declares ... and further Bheda though referred to cannot nullify the identity, as it is denied later on. Further Bheda as such cannot be proved at all. Even though we perceive it, it serves the purpose to show different objects and thus create valid knowledge of objects; but still it has no reality (मता). Direct perception deals with distinction which is only phenomenal and Sruti proclaims the final word in this respect. In direct perception the eyes do not grasp the distinction nor the mind which is not reliable. It cannot also be proved by inference as all Bheda pertains only to Jīva and not Brahman and hence the inference’ like सहिष्णु मनोरूपमेवादधिकारिणी | प्रश्नितानि प्रत्ययति। Would become स्विदुर्गहनः. Sruti also does not support it. It cannot be the essence of the object and if we do not accept it as indescribable, the Vyavahāra cannot be proved at all.

The Prapancha or Jagat or the world is only imagined as the Sruti denying Bheda proves its absence in reality for all the time in

1. Vide Bhadadikāra for detailed discussion of Bheda and its refuta
Brahman. That the Jagat is a fiction is proved on the strength of the Sruti passages dealing with creation and its subsequent denial. The inference also proves this. It can be put as follows: -अज्ञानाज्ञाताः प्रेमात्रां संस्कृत, द्विगतानं, पुराणांकानां। The world which has been created only out of Avidyā and is insentient must be unreal being included under Drṣya (to be perceived, i.e. object).

Nṛśimhāsrama deals with all the problems of Advaita on dialectical basis but mainly he bases his arguments on Sruti, which is the last resort of Advaitins. In his Advaitadīpikā he explains some Sruti passages, e.g. (i) ज्ञातो संस्कृतेऽविवेकः संस्कृतेऽविवेक — It refers to Jīva and Isvara who are the reflection and prototype respectively, exist in the body. Out of these, one, viz. the Jīva who is a reflection in the intellect, enjoys the fruit resorting to the pride of superimposition and the other viz. Isvara, who is bereft of the idea of identity with the intellect, looks on in His real blissful state.

1. Vide Tattvaviveka p.58.

(ii) असत्य इ-र-अये. Asat here means the world. The śruti means to say, that, it was there before creation unmanifest into Brahman. Otherwise there will be contradiction with the next sentence 'तनो वे अवासयते'.

(iii) कथाने तुस्ते तुर्मणे निवंधः... The Puruṣa or individual soul is merged into the same body (= tree) which is the resort of Jīva and Isvāra both. He experiences misery due to his ignorance of the identity. अन्योग्य means ignorance and not 'absence of God'.

(iv) शास्त्रणे असानि कामानि अहा अन्योग्यः... Here 'काम' does not point to distinction for there cannot be any association with Brahman. Not like पुरौऽऽ सहान्: येता for it would involve the enjoyment of Brahman also. It is not also like instrumental in पुरौऽऽ सहान्नमवाहेल for, if Brahman is supposed to bestow permission every-now and then in all the actions, why should it be mentioned in particular in the case of salvation alone? Hence the instrumental is not in the sense of 'with (सहादयेऽ)' but to state the fact (इति वाले). And
the ultimate meaning is: अभिन्नात्मकत्वायुक्तं मुक्तः सदृ युग्मत्
परमानन्दमुरुभनलि।

These passages have been interpreted by him to show that the शुद्ध even though containing apparent distinction does not intend it.

This refutation of Bheda occurs in all of his works besides Bhedadhikkāra. Even in Nṛsiṁha vijaṇāpanam he allots more than twenty stanzas for it. Thus the remark of his pupils that his main aim was to attack 'Bheda' is justifed.

Nṛsiṁḥādrama, at heart, is a devotee of Nṛsiṁha and a tinge of Bhakti is mixed with his Advaita though it is not so prominent as that in Madhusūdana's works. In his Ṭat Tvaviveka, as well as in his Bheda-dhikkāra, he refers to the God dwelling on Nila mountain (the same is alluded to by Madhusūdana in his VedāntaṅGaliṭa). The salutation in Dhikkāra goes - शेषानन्दस्य श्रीमान्य निवेदित्याग्निशाम्य।

In this last, the commentator mentions Tāpanīyadvipa. This might show that Nṛsiṁḥādrama
was the author of the Dīpikās on the twenty-eight Ātharvāṇa Upanisads.

Though there is not much original contribution to Advaita from his pen, he undoubtedly influenced it to a great extent and the trend of arguments is found in Appayya and even in Madhusūdana. Further investigation will show the exact extent of his influence. That Govindānanda, in his Ratnaprabhā, just in next century, refers to him with honorific title as 'महं कृतार्था विद्याधर' is sufficient to show the authority he held in the circle of Advaitins. In fact, the 16th century Advaitins got inspiration from his Guru Gīrvāṇendra in the earlier half, while he wielded the rod of Advaita in the latter half. He had many pupils who prepared their own pupils and thus spread his fame in the then world of scholars.

1. vide below p. 6150
(iii) Prakāśānanda:—

After Nṛsiṃhāśrama we come to Prakāśānanda, author of Siddhānta Muktāvalī (S.M.), who can be included among the authoritative Advaitins, in as much as, he professes an altogether distinct Vāda, viz., Dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭivāda, a sort of idealism.

Date etc.—He is known to be the pupil of Jñānānanda and Guru of Nānā Dīkṣita, who has written Siddhāntadīpikā on S.M. Nānā Dīkṣita mentions Rāghavendra and Prakāśānanda as the Gurus. Rāghavendra is the Guru of Advaitānanda, who himself is the preceptor of Svayāmprakāśa. Hence some identify Prakāśānanda with Svayāmprakāśa. But this does not appear possible as Prakāśānanda mentions only Jñānānanda which name does not occur in the names of the preceptors of Svayām-prakāśa. The problem of their identity is still open.

Prakāśānanda is alluded to by Appayya in his S.L. and hence might be assigned to the latter half of the 16th cen. A.D.

He is also called Mallikārjuna Yatīndra. Even though he was an Advaitin in doctrine, he was inclined

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1. Published at Benares as a reprint from "The Pandita".

2. Cf. आचार्यांना सत्काशात्तिरंग परं भुक्तो श्रीनूर्ध्वशिल्म।
   अनवे नि कस्लिंगठने श्रमरमार्गेन शाखलेन्द्रे शशीनूत्तम।
towards Tantra forms of workshop in practice, as is clear from his other works.


His S.M. is a small yet valuable work on Advaita, summarising some of the prevailing views on the important problems. It consists of Kārikās explained lucidly at great length. The discussion is carried on quite lively and the effect is enhanced by the idiomatic style.

**Prakāśānanda's Drśtisrṣṭivāda.** - According to Dr. Dasgupta, Prakāśānanda is the only Advaitin who tried to explain Vedānta from purely sansationalistic viewpoint of idealism. He propounds Drśtisrṣṭivāda, which holds that the world exists only for the time occupied by its perception. It does not exist when we do not see it, say in sleep, and what is seen after the sleep etc. is something anew.

While discussing whether Ātman is real or not,

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1. This is explained as:  

- वैसा यद्य शत्रु अयथा: मनसः. अस्बा: या नुसा: प्रयुक्तिः अद्विते।
Prakasāṇanda comes to the above conclusion. Ātman is Nitya, as āt is beginningless and as Śruti, which is the only proof for it, proclaims. For the worldly Pramāṇas cannot prove Ātman who is beyond their reach. If the Veda is said to be the proof, then, what is the precise nature of this proof should be clearly stated. It cannot mean that Ātman is to be illumined (आत्मज्ञान) by the knowledge from Veda, for, in that case Ātman will be insentient. If it means that Ātman is the object of ignorance, which is to be removed by the knowledge from Veda, still Ātman would be object of ignorance, which is well nigh impossible, as it is self-luminant.

Here some opine that ignorance belongs to the Jīva and is with respect to Brahman. The Ātman who is the substrate of Ajñāna is the Jīva; and there are many such Jīvas each possessing his own Ajñāna. Otherwise, the world will stop by one's Mukti. Hence many Jīvas and many Ajñānas should be accepted. The objector asks whether it will not be better to accept Dvaita as
real instead of imagining many Ajñānas. The Advaitin throws the suggestion overboard, on the ground that there would be Anavasthā if we accept validity from other agency (परतः समानतः) and faulty cognition if every perception is self-valid (प्रत्ययः समानतः).

Others importune — whether the words Jīva and Brahman convey one and the same entity or separate? If Jīva shows Ātman, Ātman does become the object of ignorance. But still he is experienced due to the consciousness. And though this Ātman is self-luminant and consisting of Bliss; he imagines false distinction and thus becomes the object of Ajñāna.

Thus Avidyā belongs to the Ātman and has the same for its object. This Avidyā or Ajñāna is only one. And it is neither proved by Veda which aims at Brahman nor by worldly Pramāṇas, as in that case, no debate would have arisen. So the alternative left is to suppose that Ajñāna is imagined and, further, for the sake of brevity it should be one, which is capable of producing plurality as in dream.

1. तत्सारं ज्ञातिं बलस्मिनं ज्ञातिं भक्तिः। तमेव विषयं अनुभोवासी। इत्यादि

विषयं अनुभोवासी: तस्मिनं गृहस्थां ॥ ६८॥ ॥
The distinction of the tie and salvation etc. can be explained on the analogy of the dream. Hence (S.M. p.18). The question of fixing that one Jīva does not arise at all; for, in raising it, one presupposes the identity of the Ātman and body. To explain: Are different bodies named as gods, Gandharvas etc. imagined in dream or are many Jīvas with one chief, are posted? The former would not hold good as there would be no contradiction, even if we imagine many bodies; nor the latter as the distinction cannot be grasped by the Jīvas who are limited by ignorance. To speak the truth the process is as follows:— The one Ātman resorting to Ajñāna turns into Jīva and imagines different bodies and names it as man, god, Viṣṇu, Rudra, etc. These are endowed with power according to their adjuncts. This is as regards the waking state. Similarly, in the dream, he imagines another Prapañca and again winding up that state, attains to either sleep or waking. Thus one and the same Ātman becomes known (Abhidheya) as Jīva and Samsārī. And
the same after having removed sin and achieving detachment, becomes Mukta through the favour of the preceptor.

The old Advaitins accepting the existence of unknown objects propound that existence is of three types — real, phenomenal and apparent. They should be asked:

"Is the Dvaita real or unreal? Of course it cannot be real as you resort to Advaita. If unreal, how can it be three-fold? Is the Dvaita unknown or indescribable? If latter, how to prove it? If by the serpent-on-the-rope, then why not suppose that the sky etc. also is apparent, exactly like the serpent?"

Thus existence according to Prakāsānanda is only two-fold. Prātītika or apparent and real or Pāramārthika. Brahman or Ātman is real and all else is apparent. The Vyavahāra takes place due to common illusion of all; as ten men simultaneously see the serpent-on-rope; likewise all Jīvas who are imagined imagine the Prapañcā also alike. Having experienced the Prapañcā in the waking state, he goes to sleep and when he gets up he experiences another Prapañcā and not the same.

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1. ज्ञानमेरे ज्ञातं को ज्ञातं सत्यशिष्यं कुर्थि न तयारं चुम्पितं अर्चितं यद्यपि न तस्माद् इति \[\text{Sibid p.24}\].

2. एवं आद्यन्तरस्यं श्रवणं प्रणवभुवनं मुदत्रेऽविंशाय गुर्जरं न विशुद्धिकालं बोध्यं प्रणवभुवनं \[\text{Sibid p.20}\].
It cannot be argued that the experience of the Prapañcika is distinct from the illusion. For, the sense-organisms are not the cause of Prapañcika. They cannot validate it as they can have unreal things as their object. If you say, that they are Pramāṇa in as much as they make us grasp unknown objects, it boils down to saying that the substrate alone is the object, as Prapañcika being insentient cannot possess unknowability. Further, the substrate is the same as Ātman and it is well-known that the sense-organa cannot proceed towards it (cf. पुष्पाधिका रामाधिका आकृतिलुक्तमयं). Thus the sense-organisms are not capable of effecting any special distinction in the Vyavahāra and thus only Avidyā remains to be accepted as the cause. Thus it comes to that all effects are Avidyaka and hence apparent. As has been said by Vasiṣṭha: अतिप्रभृतियो विशेषाय सत्याय न हुः हृद । श्रवणविधाय अपादितां श्रवणविधा श्रवणोद्धारूः क्रृद्धम्।

The existence of the world thus lasts only for the time of perception. Prakāśānanda remarks: अतोदिताविशेषाय अतोदिताविशेषाय अतोदिताविशेषाय सत्याय न हुः हृद । (5.40)

1. तथापि अतोदिताविशेषाय अतोदिताविशेषाय अतोदिताविशेषाय अतोदिताविशेषाय अतोदिताविशेषाय अतोदिताविशेषाय अतोदिताविशेषाय अतोदिताविशेषाय अतोदिताविशेषाय अतोदिताविशेषाय अतोदिताविशेषाय अतोदिताविशेषाय अतोदिताविशेषाय अतोदिताविशेषाय अतोदिताविशेषाय अतोदिताविशेषाय अतोदिताविशेषाय अतोदिताविशेषाय अतोदिताविशेषाय अतोदिताविशेषाय अतोदिताविशेषाय अतोदिताविशेषाय अतोदिताविशेषाय अतोदिताविशेषाय अतोदिताविशेषाय अतोदिताविशेषाय अतोदिताविशेषाय अतो�िताविशेषाय अतोदिताविशेषाय अतोदिताविशेषाय अतोदिताविशेषाय अतोदिताविशेषाय अतोदिताविशेषाय अतोदिताविशेषाय अतोदिताविशेषाय अतो�िताविशेषाय अतोदिताविशेषाय अतोदिताविशेषाय अतोदिताविशेषाय अतोदिताविशेषाय अतोदिताविशेषाय अतोदिताविशेषाय अतोदिताविशेषाय अतोदिताविशेषाय अतोदिताविशेषाय अतोदिताविशेषाय अतोदिताविशेषाय अतोदिताविशेषाय अतोदिताविशेषाय अतोदिताविशेषाय अतोदिताविशेषाय अतोदिताविशेषाय अतोदिताविशेषाय अतोदिताविशेषाय अतोदिताविशेषाय अतो�ि
As the illustrations cited for Vivarta should be interpreted so as to satisfy the reasoning, the world should be accepted to exist as long as the experience (Pratīti) exists. This is the Drṣṭi-srṣṭivāda.

The world thus is created anew in each perception and exists only in imagination. Does this mean that experience itself is existence or the world is something over and above the experience? Prakāśānanda holds that there is no difference between the cognition and its object as no Pramāṇa can prove any distinction as such. As in the case of a dream, the knowledge itself appears with the difference of cognition and object; likewise in waking also, the whole universe appears on the experience. Lasting for some time, it vanishes and is seen again like the reflection.

This does not mean that Ātman who belies all proof, does not exist. As the Sruti tells, Ātman is self-luminant; and hence no other agency is

\[1. \text{प्रक्रियाप्रत्यक्षम भूमि: अध्यात्मिकम् कुलं।}\\ \text{सत्त्वसाध्वमेतत् शिव अयोध्यमं।} \text{Ibid 8.11.}\]

\[2. \text{प्रतिभासिनांश्च:} \text{शिखरं अकोलस्यं।} \text{Ibid 9.51.}\]
required to know him. Further, he being one, who will know him? (निराकारं त्रिश्र निराकारन्त्वम्). Really speaking Ātman, who is Svapراكāsa should not be the object of Ajñāna; but do not the owls think that the noon-time sun is veiled by darkness? The self-luminosity consists in its not being object of any cognition. The experience 'I know' pertains to the Ātman limited by adjuncts; while that in 'I do not know' refers to the pure Ātman.

This idealism is distinct from that of the Buddhists who regard everything as unreal; while according to Prakāśānanda only the universe is unreal (Tuccha) while Ātman, which is the base, is the Reality. As Vasiṣṭha remarks, people forget Brahman, which is real, while Avidyā, which is unreal, is regarded as the all-in-all.

Thus the Drṣṭisṛṣṭivāda is propounded by Prakāśānanda basing his arguments chiefly on Śruti and Yoga-Vāśistha. He tries to embellish his work with figures of speech like Rūpaka, Anuprāsa etc. The last can be illustrated in the following :

1. तत्त्वावश्यकम: कुछले कुञ्जराबलेके श्रेष्ठं का।

2. अति: कुछले कुञ्जराबले अक्षर तथिकोरणं नुः।

The last can be illustrated in the following :
(iv) Appayya Diksita

Appayya is credited with more than hundred works dealing with all the branches of lore of that time. Even though he has not contributed anything original to Advaita, and displays a distinct departure from it, in many of his works, he has undoubtedly helped the spread of Advaita, in as much as, he has written independent works like Rāmānujamatakhaṇḍana and Madhvamukhabhaṅga etc. to refute the other systems of Vedānta. In fact, no notice of Rāmānuja's criticism against was directly taken of by any other Advaitin before Appayya.

Date and biographical data.— Mr. K.V. Subramania Sastriar of Madura, tenth in descent from Appayya, has composed Appayyadiksitendraviṣṭaya. Appayya, in his works gives some information about his grandfather, father and himself. His grandson Nīlakanṭha also alludes to him. From all these sources the following information is available.

Near Kāṇcī, in Aḍayappala, there lived a
renowned brahmin of Bharadvāja family, Ācārya Dikṣita, who was also called Vakṣasthatācārya. His son was Raṅgarājādīhvarin who was the father of Appayya, who alludes to him as Advaitavidyācārya. He had performed Viṣvajit sacrifice. After his forty, he got two sons and one daughter through the favour of Naṭarāja. Raṅgarāja himself was their Guru, as Nyāvaraksāmanī and Sīvārakamāṇidīpikā and S.L. mention. Appayya grew up into a great scholar and was honoured by king Cinna Bomma and also by Śrīkālāhastiveṅkaṭa, chief of Kārveṭi. He married the daughter of Śrīnivasādūvarin Ratnakheṭadīkṣita. He also performed Jyotistoma and Vājapeya. He had three sons - Umēmaheśvara, Nilakaṇṭha and Candrāvataṁsa.

A great Māmāka, Appayya was a devotee of Śiva and was carried away by the devotion to a personal God, even though his father taught him Advaita. Mṛṣimhāśrama is known to have brought him
back to the Advaita, which was traditional
(कुशल-निदान) in his family. Appayya, after
this awakening\(^1\), wrote a commentary on the Kalpataru
of Amalānanda. He also composed S.L. to purify his
intellect.

There is an inscription at Aḍayappalam dated
Saka 1504 (A.D. 1582) which was engraved on the
occasion of raising the temple of Kali-kāntheśa by
Appayya\(^2\), who is praised in it with the mention of the
gold-ablution received by him from Cinnabomma. It
also mentions some of his works, viz., Śrīkantha-
bhāsa, Śivārkanāṇṭi-piṭā, Nyāyakāśāñā, Kalpataruparimala, etc. On the strength of this inscription
Mahāṅgāstrastrin proves that Appayya must have
flourished between 1520 A.D. and 1592, as he lived
for seventy-two years according to Nīlkanṭha, his
grandson. But Yogindra in his commentary on Ātmārpana-
stava, records Appayya's birth-date as Kali year 4554
i.e. A.D. 1554. Hence some regard his date as 1554 to

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\(^1\) cf. also Reference in Parimala:—
शेषमिथुपरिणाममित्र
किमहस्त-समि तन्मोहिनि चाकोटि:?
नरसम प्रियसमीमित्वम् अभासस्वम् आन्यस्य वेञ्चम् कृत्यसम्बु

\(^2\) वेन नीर्जनोमतिशिष्यस्मितिरः क्रीरीमित्र्वाला: 
वेन नीर्जनोमतिशिष्यस्मि ते परमस्यवस्तुपरस्ता
दुःशाश्वताबराधिनाः प्रेमात्मकोऽविद्याभिषेकोऽ
आय नीर्जनोमतिशिष्यस्मि ते परमस्यवस्तुपरस्ताः

\(^3\) vide Indian Antiquary Vol. II
1626 A.D. Cinna Bomma's inscriptions date between A.D. 1566 and 1575. When Appayya was honoured by him, he had written many works and must have been, most probably an aged one, so as to court such honour; further, if the tradition regarding his meeting with Nṛsiṁhāsrama is to be accepted, the date about 1520 to 1592 A.D. appears proper.

The famous grammarian Bhaṭṭojī with Dharma-rājādhvaram was his pupil. Appayya visited Pāṇḍya country, on the invitation of King Tirumalai Nāyak, to settle the disputes between Saivas and Vaiṣṇavas.

His Works.— He is known to have composed one hundred and four (१०८) works, which deal with various branches of Sanskrit literature. He wrote Sīvārācanasamuccandrika at the request of Cinna Bomma. The work gives the secret of Bhakti and proves that worship can be done in any form; it is not material or method, but the spirit, that matters. His Sīvārka-manidīpika is a com. on Śrīkanthabhāṣya. This also

1. Dr. Daoupltza. Indian Philosophy Vol. II pp. 218-220.
2. See the detailed note, wrote an introduction to Madhavatarkanamukha.
3. श्रीकृष्णराजवर्धन अभिव्यक्ति अभिप्रेत श्रीकृष्णराज ध्रुविकारी।
   अभिप्रेत श्रीपुष्पमनाविन्दकान्तिः इत्यं स्मारकं विद्धात्त्वं वर्चायते।
was composed for Cinna Bomma. At the completion of this work he received the Kanakābhiṣeka, which is referred to in his Nalacaritanātaka. His chief works, which concern the proper Advaita, are Siddhānta-
leśa, Parimala (on Kalpataru), Brahmatarkastava,
Madhvanukhaṇḍa and Rāmānujamātakaḥandana; on
Pūrvarūpa - Mīmāṁśādhikaranamālā, Upakramaparākrama;
on Nyāya - Nyāyaraksāmani, Nyāyadrśaksaṅkarālikā; on
Grammar - Vyākaranavādanaksatramālā; on Kāvyā -
Kuvalayānanda, Citramāṁśā, Yādavabhuyudayatīkā, etc.
He has written works like Rāmāyana - Tatparya-
nirnaya, Rāmāyanasarasāsāgraha etc. on Rāmāyana and
and Hariyānaśārācarita on Mbh. But his important works are those which glorify Śiva as the highest
God or Brahman. Besides Candraśīkā and Dīpikā,
he has composed Ānandalaharī, Śivakarmānta, Śiva-
tatttvaviveka, Śivakalpadruma, etc.

As has been said, he is a good compiler of
Advaita. In his S.L. he takes up important topics

1. Vide History of Indian Philosophy Vol. II pp. 218-220.
and records different views prevailing in Advaita, under them. The work is divided in four chapters. The first deals with the following subjects: Nature of Vidhi in hearing (Sravana - श्रवणम् - śravāna), definition of Brahman, its causality, nature of Īsvara and Jīva, the doer; omniscience of Brahman the psychosis (Vṛttiḥ), Bliss, Adhyāsa. The second contains discussion about the purport of Vedāntas, the various Pramāṇas, the Jīva as reflection and its relation to the Bīmba, the dream, Drṣṭisṛṣṭivāda, number of Jīvas, the measure of Ātman etc. The third discusses the means to salvation, the qualification of Karma, the Adhikārin for Brahnavidyā, Saṁhyāsa, instrument of Sākṣātkāra etc. and the fourth deals with the phala or Mukti.

Appayya summarises the different views systematically. He quotes from Vivaraṇa and Bhāratī-tīrtha profusely. Many a time he refers to the views of his father. Mostly the following works and authors are referred to: Vivaraṇa, Saṁksepa,
Vārttika, Vācaspati, Kauumudī, Padarthaatattvaniṁṇāva, S.M., P.V., V.V., Kalpataru, Pañcadasī, Bhāratītīrtha, Tattvasuddhi, Nyāyacandrikā, Tattvadīpana, Nyāyasudhā, Vivaranavārttika, Nyāyaratnamāla, Advaitavidyā (mukura) S. D., Citsukha, Rāmādvaya, Advaitadīpikā. He appears to have tried to reconcile between Vivarana and Kalpataru.

He discusses the problems in an easy and interesting manner without taking sides. He explains the distinction between Pariṇāma and Vivarta as follows: Pariṇāma or transformation is change in a thing pertaining to the same type of existence (परिनामं न भावों नसीनम्...परिनाम), and Vivarta is the change in the ken of other type of existence (विवर्तमानं न भाविका चिन्तिते...)[P.10]

He cites two types of Drśtisrṣṭivāda. Some hold that the creation exists for the time taken by its perception i.e. as long as perception lasts; while others, and Prakāśananda is included hereunder, say that the creation is nothing but perception itself. But all others prefer Srṣṭidrṣṭivāda where the creation is presupposed by the perception.

1. अवकथितं द्वितीयमुक्तं द्वितीयविकारं अन्त श्रेष्ठ द्वितीये
किं द्वितीयत्: द्वितीयं द्वितीये: अन्ततथातः...स.ल.प.72.
Appayya thus compiles only other's views without showing his own opinion. This is consistent with the tendency for synthesis of the day. To speak the truth, he is not so much interested in propounding Advaita, as he is engrossed in defending it; and secondly he is a devotee par excellence of Śiva whom he equates with Brahmaṇa. He is said to have held two different religious tendencies—Śaiva and Advaita, at two different times in his life. But this does not appear probable, as he was never a blind follower of either of these. In his Śaiva works a tendency towards monism is visible; nay he proclaims that he is not against Viśṇu. For may it be Viśṇu or Śiva, the Śrutī aims at only Advaita. That he was appointed a judge to preside over the debate of Śaivas and Vaiṣṇavas attests how he was not blindly partial to any of the two.

According to his Śivaṇkamanidīpika, the Advaita aimed at by Śrutī, Smṛti and Sūtras, can be achieved only through the favour of Śiva. cf.

1. शिरशुणी श्लोकः या शुल्कश्वरजीवनसमस्ततत्त्वेष्यभूतः
   नामाकर्षेन तथा आरा जारति शिरशुणी स्वप्नमयेन भवानामाः।
   श्रीशंखशुणीशालकानुवाचिनिताद्वितीयो द्विष्ठोति:
   स्वस्त्व अर्थे समानं काहे स्थलं नलो शिरशुणी केषानि।
He states his own view in his *Ānandalaharī* as:

> आसन तर तैत्तिरिण्यकर्मारुपं अन्तर्गतानि।
> श्रीरन्द्र नायाया; स्वेतिकर्म विश्वारस्तादियोऽसि।।
> तस्मान्वश्चाचार्यांः; क्षणि दिर्पश्च विध्ये नान्तिवा नान्ततिव।।
> निधि स्वध्यायादिस्तादि इति युद्धिनित्योऽदिकेषु भूवित।।

He has produced a mountain of works, which are pleasant to be read and which bespeaks of his high and subtle intellect. He was a Mīmāṃsaka, Advaitin and a devotee in one, with all trends blended together.
(v) Madhusūdana Srāsvatī

Due to his Advaitasiddhi, which can be considered as the last important work in the history of Advaita, Madhusūdana occupies one of the front seats among the great Advaitins. With his dialectics and versatile genius, he defeated all the critics of Advaita and established it on firm foundation, devoting his long life of one hundred and five years for the purpose.

Date, biography etc.- Most of his works have been published and the introductions to various works furnish the available information regarding his life. According to the Kulapaṇjikā of Koṭalipura, he is known to have been a native of Bengal, which fact is regarded to be also proved by his partiality to Balabhaṃdra Bhāṭṭācārya, his Bengali Śiṣya. His father's name was Pramadapurandarācārya, who had four sons - Sṛṅātha Cudāmaṇi, Yādavānanda Nyāyācārya, Kamalajanayana and Vagīśa Gosvāmin. Kamalajanayana took the Daṇḍa Sānnyāsa and went to

1. Vide for detailed information the introduction to Siddhāntāvatā in Gaekwad series.
Benares. His Sannyāsa name was Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. He spent his life at Benares, where the Hindi poet Tulsīdāsa, author of Rāmacaritamānasa (A.D. 1584) was his contemporary. King Akbar is said to have invited Madhusūdana for a discourse with the scholars at his court. Madhusūdana accepted the invitation and got an encomium from them as: 

नेति चारे सत्सनायाः मधुसूदनसरस्वती तिः।

मधुसूदनसरस्वते चारे नेति सरस्वती।

From all these considerations the date is tentatively fixed as 1540 A.D. - 1645 A.D. One Nārāyaṇabhaṭṭa, who wrote his Vṛttaratnākaraṭikā in A.D. 1545 is known to have defeated Madhusūdana. This incident might have taken place at the close of 16th cen. A.D. He was a contemporary of Gadādharabhaṭṭa also.

He gives himself to be the disciple of three preceptors. In His Gudhārthadīpikā, he states:


2. Cf. Śrīśri śāmśīṣṭamahābhāṣyānāṁ प्रणाम वादापुनुपन्याः पर्वसूरणि।

3. Cf. "Gudhārthadīpikā" श्रीश्रीसामस्मिरिधारिण स्वाधीन: विभाषिण: विराज्ज्ञानाय भेज्या।
Thus Śrīrāma, Viśvaśvarasarasvatī and Mādhavasarasvatī were his Gurus. Viśvaśvarasarasvatī initiated him in Sannyāsa. Viśveda and Pratyagviṣṇu were his grand-preceptors. One Śrīpāda is also mentioned as his guru.

A ms. of his Mahimnatīkā at Ujjain, was copied in Sāṃvat 1650 or A.D. 1593. In this work Siddhāntabindu and V.L. are referred to. Hence these three works were composed before that date.

He has Balabhadra, Puruṣottama Sarasvatī and Seśa Govinda (author of Sarvasiddhāntarahasyavivarana) for his pupils.

Works.—He is credited with a number of works which deal with either Advaita or Bhakti. His Advaita is mixed with devotion to Viṣṇu; but this does not interfere with the highest position of Nirguṇa Brahman in Advaita. The following works are attributed to him:

1. Advaitasiddhi — It is a dialectical, voluminous work and is his magnum opus. It is

The following works are attributed to him:

1. Advaitasiddhi: It is a dialectical, voluminous work and is his magnum opus. It is written to refute the Nyāyāmṛta of Vyāsarājasvāmin (a Dvaitin) [of A.D.1446-1539]. Advaitasiddhi is refuted by Vanamāti Misra in his Advaitasiddhikhandana (which is also styled Nyāyāmṛtasamgrahya), which tries to prove the reality of the universe (॥५॥३॥३॥), which was denied by Madhusūdana, and thus establishes that the Saguṇa Brahman is the reality. Brahmanandarasavatī in his Advaitacandrikā, gives a reply to the arguments of Vanamāti and again proves the final reality of Nirguṇa Brahman, commenting on Advaitasiddhi.

2. Advaitaratmaraksana: It is a criticism of Bhedaratna (A.D.1529) of Saṅkaramisra and refutation of Nyāya. He refers to his Advaitasiddhi and V.L. in this work.

3. Prasthānabheda: (Vāṇi Vilāsa Press) - It is the same as the com. on seventh sloka of Mahimna stotra.
But it is culled out from the work and read as a pamphlet of all Darsanas. It appears to have been composed at Benares as the colophon to B.O.R.I. ms. No. 330 states.

4. Gūḍhārṇhāpyika: It is a com. on B.G. following Sāṅkarabhāṣya. He promises to explain each and every work of B.G. At the end, after offering the work to his preceptors, he remarks, that whatever is contrary to the views of S. should be discarded. But there too, in the com. of S. some views are inconsistent, which Madhusūdana has tried to reconcile. It is for the readers to judge as they like.

5. Vedāntakalpatuṣṭa: All available mss. of the work (as well as the printed work) contain only one stabaka. It is not known, whether the work had more than one chapters. The available composition appears to be self-sufficient. The work refutes the doctrines of other Darsanas and proves the salvation and the means

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1. Ārya Śāṅkaraśamkaraśāntiśāṅkaraśānti: प्रसंस्करितं: समा श्चिमक्षमतं काश्चात्।
2. Bhāvanāādhyāśāntaḥमायेन्या/कालविन्यासमानवतम। प्रति: प्रसंस्करितं। कृपया-विरियतुक्षियतुः।
3. शास्त्राकारसिद्धः संस्कृतम्! हरिभज्येष्वम्! एकाधिकारुणिकान्तिकालविन्यासीयते।
   वा शास्त्राकारसिद्धां संस्कृताँ स्वरूपमा। एकाधिकारुणिकान्तिकालविन्यासीयते।
4. Princess of Wales Texts No. 3.
to it according to Advaita. Thus the author states at the outset, that he is going to purify the Advaita of Śaṅkara, having refuted the views of Jaimini, Patañjali, Gautama, Kaññada, Kapila and Saivas, in brief and discuss the nature of Mokṣa. After having dealt with all the views, he comes to the conclusion that he has established Advaitavāda as the only tenable view. There is no reference to any other chapter, as there is reference to second Ullāṣa in his Bhaktirasāyana. The V.L. appears to be his favourite work, to which he alludes to in his Advaitasiddhi, Siddhāntabindu, Mahimmatkā, Advaitaraksana etc.

6. Samkṣepaśārīrakāti? It is a com. on Samkṣepa of Sarvajñātman and is written with the help of the com. of Viśvaveda and Pratyagviṣṇu on it. It contains a detailed discussion of Pratibimbavāda. Wherever Sarvajñātman refers to Viṣṇu, Madhusūdana identifies him with the Antaryāmin, consisting of the consciousness, reflected in the sattva part of Māyā.

The work refers to the com. on B.G. viṣṇu.

Gūḍhārthadīpikā.

2. Ībid p. 93.
7. Siddhānta-tattva-bindu: It is a gloss on Śrī's Daśaslokī. In discussing the meaning of the ślokas, Madhusūdana presents a short Prakaraṇa Grantha of Advaita, which collects the main views (Prasthānas) viz. Ābhāsa, Pratibimbā, Avaccheda and Drītisrṣṭi. It describes all the salient features of Advaita in brief and is popular among the Advaitins.

He alludes to his V.L. twice in this work, which is also referred to in V.L.

8. Bhagavadbhaktirasāyana: This work is devoted to the discussion of Bhakti, which he discusses at great length. The work is the same as Bhaktīsāmānyanirūpāna as the mss. of both the works show. He takes into consideration the prevailing definitions of Bhakti, as given by Nārada or Śāṇḍilya. It is possible, according to Madhusūdana, even in case of Nirguṇa Tattva, Brahman.

He refers to his V.L. and Bhaktirasāyana in this work referred to in Gūḍhārthadīpikā and Paramahamsapriyā.

9. Paramahamsapriyā: It is a com. on the first verse of Bhāgavata Purāṇa. It runs smooth and vies with the style of Śrī in its classical simplicity and depth
of meaning. The various interpretations are ingenious. The work speaks of the author's versatile scholarship. He is not only well-versed in philosophy but also in poetics and cites Bharata, besides many other authors. It refers to Bhaktirasayana, for detailed elucidation of Bhakti. Herein the style is revealed at its best and the work, besides being dear to Paramahamsas, would be loved by all. Madhusūdana here seems clearly to believe in the identity of Bādarāyana and Kṛṣṇadvaipāyana Vyāsa.

He summarises the interpretations of Vedāntins, Sātvatas and Kevala devotees.

10. Haritīśāritaṭṭha: It is a lucid com. on Haritīśārita of Vopadeva who flourished under Hemādri, minister of Rāmadevarc Yādava of Devagiri of 12th century A.D. The work gives the contents of Bhāgavata. Madhusūdana explains it supplying and amplifying details, even culling authority from Vedāntins like Gauḍapāda; law-givers like Manu and Kātyāyana and others. As usual, in 1-10, he refers to his work Paramahamsapriyā, com. on Bhāgavata, the Pāramahamsa Sāṁhitā according to him. Thus there is no doubt

1. cf. तथा य चासंकृतस्य सम्बन्धम् नेद्यान्तिवाचकासायणप्रार्थितवासान्तोपुरुषः -

2. Printed in Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series No. 411 along with Paramahamsapriyā.
as regards the authenticity of the work.

Other works :-

A com. on S.L. is attributed to him; but it is not certain, as the relation between Madhusūdana and Appayya is not yet decided. Most probably the latter was earlier if we accept his date as 1520-1592 A.D. Madhusūdana has written com. on Ātmabodha, on the first three verses of Bhāgavata, on Puspadantas Mahimnastotra, on Vedastuti and on Sāndilyasūtras. Ānandamandākinī, Kṛsnakutūhalanātaka and Rājñām Pratibodha are also ascribed to him.

Siddhāntas according to Madhusūdana:-

In his Siddhāntabindu and V.L., he collects all the main doctrines of Advaita and elucidates them with two or three authoritative views. Thus he discusses the meaning of the passage 'That thou art' (तत् तत्तस्वात्) and accordingly the connotations of the two words 'That' and 'Thou'. He gives various views about Jīva, held by other systems and according to Advaitins, he notes the different Vādas. Ātman who is formless, gets reflected into insentient Ajñāna and takes the form of Jīva. This reflection is real according to the Vivaraṇa view, while unreal, according
to Vārttikakāra. This Ajñāna is positive and beginningless. The reflection into Ajñāna is Īśvara and that into the intellect is Jīva and Brahman is the Bimba according to Saṁskṛta, while Brahman, entangled with Ajñāna, is Īśvara whose reflection into Antakālana is Jīva, according to Viśvāna; while Suresvara holds that Ātman identified with its appearance on Ajñāna is Īśvara and identified with the appearance on intellect is Jīva. Vācaspati accepts Avacchedavāda and Jīvanātva. The Drstisrṣṭivādins hold that Jīva itself produces the world. Thus Madhusūdana collates all the prevailing views.

He divides Drk into three, according to the adjuncts. Thus one Drk becomes Īśvara, Sākṣin and Jīva and further, states that Īśvara is threefold - Viṣṇu, Brahma and Rudra. Jīva also is three-fold - Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña according to his being the experiencer of the three states waking, dream and sleep. The Drśya is the universe, the effect of Avidyā and can be classified into Avyākṛta or unmanifest, Mūrta or corporeal and Amūrta or incorporeal.

In his V.I. also he proves the Mokṣa according
to Advaita and quotes many views. He seems to accept the fifth type (पञचमांकार) Mukti there, as is held by Istasiddhi. In this way Madhusūdana summarises Advaita for the sake of his pupils and also refutes all other views, as is done in V.L. His fame rests in the dialectics, he contributes to Advaita, chiefly in his Advaitasiddhi, where he takes up all the possible definitions of Mithyātva, Anirvacanīyatva etc., and by the way shown by Khandana, he refutes the Dvaitins.

The only remarkable feature of his synthesis is the tinge of devotion added to it. He is a devotee of Mukunda or Kṛṣṇa as is well-known from his verse  "कक्ष-रात्रिनं दया कितने सन्ताने विभिन्न अवमंत्रे। अपने पुरुषे सखानां कैसे मुक्ति॥..." But this devotion does not interfere with his Advaita, for his Kṛṣṇa does not vie with Brahman, but is content with being the Īśvara, a step to Brahman. Accordingly, when he discusses the Mukti of the Advaitins he states: "आकल्यानुष्ठानं निरन्तरेन्द्रियालोकशेषात्। अन्यायान्तर्विषयकं निष्कृतसुपरलक्षितो-मोक्षं द्वारा कर्तवे॥ (V.L. p.6). The Advaitins grasp the correct idea of Mukti, because they are favoured by the Lord on Nila mountain!

That this devotion to personal God is not contradictory with Advaita is shown by him in his Bhakti works, as well as Gūḍhārthadīpikā and also com. on
**Saṁkṣepa.** Explaining the word 'Praṇaya' in Saṁkṣepa
he writes :

Thus Bhakti or devotion is the most ardent love towards Paramātman and is nothing but the continuous psychosis of mind experiencing the highest bliss.

There was, really speaking, nothing left which could have been added to Advaita by him. Only thing was to revert the attacks of the Dvaitins and other Dārsānikas, and taking his stand upon the views held authoritative in Advaita circle, he does the required feat quite dexterously.