Chapter III

Advaita in 9th to 12th centuries

(1) Vimuktatman

Up till now we have seen the development of Advaita in the hands of the immediate pupils of Sañkarācārya and Vācaspati just after them. We have also dealt with the three important theories — regarding the relation between the individual soul and the highest soul — viz., Ābhāsavāda, Pratibimbavāda and Avacchedavāda. Hereafter comes the regular traditional picture (Advaita Saṃpradāya) of Advaita in the following period.

Vimuktatman, the author of Īṣṭasiddhi, is taken up first as he is regarded earlier in Vivaśān wherein his opinion is referred to according to the commentator of the latter. Vimuktatman is a big name in Advaita and he is profusely referred to by later writers as Ānandabodha, author of Nyāyakaranda, Cīmitsukha, Sarvajñatman and others.

Date: — Like most of the Sanskrit writers he does not mention his date in his work. It is left to

1 It might be wondered how Sarvajñatman held as direct pupil of Suresvara has not been taken up first. But it has now been established by Dr. T. Chintamanani in his introduction to Pañcaprakriya of Sarvajñatman, that the author is a pupil of Dvēśvāra who is not identical with Suresvara and that he is a later writer as he mentions Īṣṭasiddhi by name.
other means like *terminus ad quo* and *terminus ad quem* based on inner and outer sources. Prof. Hiriyanna in his introduction to *Istasiddhi* discusses this problem and comes to the conclusion that *Vimuktatman* flourished between 850 A.D. and 1050 A.D. on the strength that Bhāskara, a younger contemporary of Saṅkarācārya is refuted by him while he himself is taken up for refutation by Rāmānuja who belonged to the last quarter of the 11th century. Prof. Hiriyanna writes on the authority of *Vedāntadesika* in his *वेदांतदेशिकः* on *भास्करः*

"Thus Rāmānuja is known to have drawn his information chiefly from it in one essential portion of his examination of the Advaita which is designated the Mahāpurvapakṣa and in which are found summarised some of the characteristic features of the doctrine such as the unity, permanence, self-dependence etc. of *Anubhūti* or *Brahman.*" Dr. Dasgupta assigns him to 1200 A.D. on the ground that his work has been commented upon by one Jñānottama who, if identical with Ābeitsukha's preceptor, must have flourished in the first half of the 13th cen. A.D. Mr. E.P. Radhakrishan in one of his

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2 p. xiii G.C.S. No. LXV.

3 cf. अन "आङ्कृतिकृतिः..." ४७३०६४६ उपरीत:।

4 Ibid p. xi

5 Indian Philosophy Vol. II, p.198
articles takes stock of the position and remarks that the lower date as settled by Prof. Hiriyanna can be pushed back as Bhāskara's date is 820 A.D. The problem should further be investigated. No reference to Istośiddhi in Vācaspati's work is yet forthcoming and the date as 850 A.D. to 1050 A.D. might be tentatively accepted for all practical purposes.

Not much biographical data is known about Vimuktātman except that he was a pupil of Avyayātman Bhagavat Pūjyapada. He is also called disciple of Ātmabodha in Tanjore manuscript. He appears to be the preceptor of Ānandaśaboda who refers to him in his Pramāṇamāla as: एवेवेवः युक्तीतः - सामय कर्तव्याकायः न संक्षेपं कृत्व लक्षणे युक्तib.

Works. - Istośiddhi and Pramāṇavṛtiśākhānī

His magnum opus is Istośiddhi a work containing kārikās and commentary called Vivarāṇa by the author on the same. Another of his works is Pramāṇavṛtiśākhānī to which he refers in his Istośiddhi. Only the first is available in print. The other seems to deal with the Pramāṇas or gateways of knowledge.

1. p.4 Chowkhamba Series.

2. प्रावीनयोगे प्रवृत्तिः तुमलोकांते। / Istośiddhi p.37
leading to Brahman.

Istasiddhi

It comprises eight chapters, the first of which discusses the nature of Anubhūti or Dr̥k (experience) which is itself Ātman. Incidentally doctrine of Bheda or distinction and Bhedābheda are refuted. Anubhūti is then identified with Bliss or Ānanda. Then it goes on discussing the nature of the world which has come out of Māyā which is indescribable. This indescribability leads to a discussion and criticism of other khyātis or theories of error, viz., Anyathā, Asat and Akhyāti, Ajñāna or misapprehension is the cause of this Māyā which can be removed by knowledge; it is removed by steps which explain the Jīvanmukti. The nature of the removal of Ajñāna is settled. Incidental refutation of Bhāskara’s view on causality of Brahman is then taken up. Then comes the problem of the resort of Ajñāna which is Ātman itself. These are the contents in general of the first chapter.

I. Two commentaries on Istasiddhi are extant at present according to Prof. Hiriyan. One by Jñānottama, Śūtsukha’s preceptor, another by Anandānubhava, pupil of Nārāyaṇa Jyotīś. He also notes that Maṅkhaka in his Śrikantha-caritra mentions one Ramyadeva, his contemporary, and a commentator of Istasiddhi.
Other chapters take up one or other of these problems and amplify them by adding dialectical wealth. Thus chapters two and three consider Anyathākhyāti in detail while chapter four deals with Akhyāti and Ātmakhyāti. Chapter five again returns to Anyathākhyāti. The sixth chapter takes up the problem of the resort of Āvidyā while the seventh goes into that of āthānubhūtadvaitam. The last or eighth one considers removal of Āvidyā.

Vimuktatma’s treatment of Advaita

With these contents in general of the work we may now look closely into the subject as treated by the author. At the very beginning of the work he describes the Ānubhūti as : अनुब्हूतिः मया अनुभूतिः अनुभूतिः मया अनुभूतिः सन्तोषः सन्तोषः सन्तोषः सन्तोषः (Trans : I bow to that Ānubhūti (intuition) (which is) verily the Canvass for the picture of Māyā (in the form) of the universe consisting of the Mahat etc. (the intuition) which is birthless, unfathomable, endless, the self and comprising Bliss). The self being directly experienced
by everybody is itself the experience. The same is Brahman. It has not been created as there is nothing above or beyond it which can produce it. Passages like एकानेनेवाः नाशकाः prove this. It is Ameya or not known by ordinary sense-organs. As it has no beginning, likewise it has no end, also being eternal. This Ātman further consists of pure Bliss परमेश्वर्य ज्ञान as is described by later writers. But the same supplies the material or substrate for the projection of the variety of the universe which resembles to a drawing. Vimuktātman takes up this verse and the commentary goes on upto thirtyeight pages. From the words Aja and Ananta he begins to discuss प्रा at the very outset.

The objector points out that the Ātman ध्र is realised as 'this' (:this) while the Caitya or Drṣṭya or the object as 'that', i.e., as outside. As the two are diametrically opposed to each other they should

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8 1.0f. अत्यन्त अधिगत । S. 6 ।
8 2.0f. ततो नामः च तेषाकारे च प्रमाणः मन्यते संग।
8 3 of. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's Siddhāntabindu.

8 4. साधनसाधनोपयोगिः सिद्धिगुण, निरामायनः । नोई अहं बिश्रामस्वी । (त) तुहतम । अवधूतार्ह । बिधयाः चोकुरपुर । इति। तस्मातः ततो वर्जये च सर्वे नामस्य नामस्ये। The objector here asks — नते इवनामः अभें चत्वारी भागी आ इति। तु स्वतं अऽव्य तत्त्वत्स्येश्येक्ष्यानि आ इति।
be accepted as distinct for, the object cannot, according to the Advaitin, be either the nature (धनुय) or the attribute (वेद) of the Cit or the subject. Therefore one cannot brush aside distinction. The Siddhāntin replies that he does admit that bheda or distinction is famous or known to all and that it is the cause of the everyday parlance but his point is that it is not absolutely real. To go in detail: The notion of distinction is possible only with reference to two visible things and not with reference to two things one of which is visible while the other is invisible or between two invisible things. The subject or drk is not visible while the object or drṣya is seen. Hence दर्षे में व्यवसित स्वतन्त्रता मूल्य प्रयत्ना।

Further what is this bheda? Is it the essence of the bheda in or the attribute thereof? If essence, then there would be no expectancy for the counterpart (सापेक्षिकता); if still it has that expectancy then it would lead to regresus ad infinitum (अनंतमयता) as that counterpart would expect another one and so on.

1. अन्तःसत्ताते सत्ता प्रासिकितसिः अति एव अखंडसिः किंतु कार्यसिः मूल्य प्रयत्ना। १६१ प. २

2. अभ्यासाता परमपरमात्माभेदाति केंद्रविनं पुनः हस्ताक्षरः अतिक्रमोऽर्थः। १६१ प. ३
Hence भेद अथवा भेदभेद इकानी शेषो शेषिन मयाज्ञान। Now if it is an attribute, it cannot be identical (अभिन्न). So it should be somehow accepted as distinct from the भेद अथवा भेदभेद इकानी like the form or juice etc., to be grasped from some other cognition; i.e., the same cognition cannot grasp both भेद अथवा भेदभेद इकानी and bheda which are distinct from one another. Similar is the plight of mutual absence (अनुपस्मकता) also. For if Bheda and this Abhava are included under द्रṣṭya they cannot obviously be उपरि or attributes of the Drk. If they are not उपरि, i.e., if they are अद्वितीय invisible, they are not proved. Hence both are not either attribute or essence of Drk. If Bheda is urged to be self-illuminating, then it is only a quarrel about name, we name it as Atman and you want the same to be Bheda, that's all. Thus the distinction between द्रष्ट्य and द्रष्ट्यता cannot be pointed out. Now if द्रष्ट्य is said to be abhāva or absence then both become identical and द्रष्ट्य would, in that case, not

1. तत्साधारणम् (विन्दुमा) भाजनम् कथात्मकार्योऽरुपस्तवार्थम्योऽरुपस्तवार्थम् दोहे दोहे तुष्ये अः। 36:3 5-8
2. अथ ब्रह्म: नवं अथोऽहास: सति स्वतः सिद्धिष्ठसि। 36:5 6-4
exist, so also drṣyā would not be there and thus it would lead to nihilism. Further, this void would not shine due to absence of drk. If it is drk alone, then no abhava is shown; hence drk and drṣyā cannot be proved to be द्वन्द्वेत्राभाव। Thus if one wants to argue about Bheda and Abhāva one must accept them as mutually distinct and also from the reality. Therefore अक्षण and द्वन्द्वेत्राभाव are not attributes of drk, far less of the drṣyā. Moreover there is no proof proving them. For if they are self-subsisting, they are not then attributes of drṣyā as they are not grasped by the same cognition which conveys the drṣyā. So the bheda and abhāva which are the counterparts of drk cannot be found in the drṣyā. If they are, what proof is there? Not the senses nor the mind; for drk does not fall in their ken. (न नातेयं तत्त्वविज्ञानं नेन्द्रयानं न स्वरूपसीं नाताँ शक्तिः न नेन्द्रयानं नेन्द्रसंस्कृतं नेन्द्रं) Otherwise all activity (अनंतरां) would come to rest if an object of one thing is known by another thing. It cannot be said that drk itself may be taken as the proof, for even though it illumines itself it

1. अवसाधनं एव तदाद्वाभवन् द्वरणावर्तेन अक्षणी। एत्य एव तदाद्वाभवन् द्वरणावर्तेन अक्षणी। न नेन्द्रानं नेन्द्रसंस्कृतं नेन्द्रं। नेन्द्रानं नेन्द्रसंस्कृतं नेन्द्रं। नेन्द्रानं नेन्द्रसंस्कृतं नेन्द्रं। नेन्द्रानं नेन्द्रसंस्कृतं नेन्द्रं। 

2. तत्साधनं आक्षणीति तत्प्रार्के तत्प्रार्के अस्तुनवर्तेतत्प्रार्के न नेन्द्रसंस्कृतं। 

3. ॥ ॥
cannot exist simultaneously as अनविषेव (a limit) and अनविषेव-अनविषेव (a proof to the limit). Similarly it has no parts for want of proof. Otherwise it would be temporary. And still if they have द्र्क as their proof they cannot have the same as counterpart also. for अविष्कारते - a अविष्कारचं अविष्कारितं अविष्कार - अविष्कारितं अविष्कारितं. Abhāva is known of a thing which is known to have sometime existed (उपत्कस्लक्षण स्त्रयं) and when it is not seen (अनुसंधान). But in case of द्र्क अविष्कारे-उपत्कस्लक्षणिये.

Drk further cannot be a part of any cognition. The objector argues that the Siddhāntin is describing the drk as 'this is so' and 'it is not so'. Thus he has subjected the drk to ignorance of description (विषेषतः- स्त्रयं विषेषतः). No description is really possible in case of a thing which is absolutely non-object. The Siddhāntin replies that the objector also is doing the same, otherwise he would also not have started about it. In the case of the Drgātmika though it is अनविषेविषय still it is experienced being self-illuminant while other things which are अनविषेविषय are not proved. Here its non-objectness itself is stressed

\[\text{1. अ चातुर्गत्यविषये निर्देशन संभवाति। श्री ६ ८.}\]
and not that it is made an object. Thus as bhāda and 
Abhāva are not proved, infinity of ďr̥k, as regards 
place, time and object, is established.

Rebuttal of bhāda does not establish identity 
(अभ्रेत्वा) of ďr̥k and ďr̥ṣya for no proof proves it.
On the contrary, their difference is known to all as 
between darkness and light. Their identity would 
either mean that ďr̥ṣya is equal to ďr̥k or the other way 
round. If ďr̥ṣya is known as ďr̥k, it would be grasped 
with the cognition of ďr̥k and also its insentiently 
would vanish. Let us analyse it a bit closely. Is 
this identity (अभ्रेत्वा) or its knowledge grasped -
(1) when both ďr̥k and ďr̥ṣya are existent and visible 
(विदंतज्ञोऽवरंश्य) or (2) when only one of them is so, or 
(3) when two exist (विदंत) while only one is visible, 
or (4) when only one exists while two are visible?
The first case is not possible as in that case there 
would accrue distinction between the two. In the 
second, knowledge of only one is obtained which is

1 अभ्रेत्वा विदंतज्ञोऽवरंश्य अद्वितीयां विदंतालाभाय। न तत्त्व भविष्यां निः

2 नाहिं घोरैं वत्सलानि भविष्याः विदंतालाभाय। न तत्त्व भविष्यां न

3 नाहिं घोरैं वत्सलानि भविष्याः विदंतालाभाय। न तत्त्व भविष्यां न
contrary to the experience. In the third, the latter though Sat is not seen, so how can we grasp their identity? One thing alone cannot simultaneously be seen and not seen without Avidyā. So virtually it leads to bheda. Their invariable perception (अवेदनः) does not prove their identity as नैतिक्य or together-mention presupposes some distinction. But there is no नैतिक्य at all for the Drk can exist without Drśya though not vice versa.

There is no distinction in the Saṃvid or cognition itself. It cannot be argued that hundred types of cognition take place as cognition of a jar, cognition of cloth and thus they are born and ended because cognition being self-luminant and momentary cannot be object of one another. Therefore it cannot be connected with distinction in any way. Thus the third case also, viz., when both Drk and Drśya exist while only one of them is visible does not hold good. As regards the fourth alternative, no identity or its knowledge is possible as only one thing exists.

1. मनु चार्यांनिधि परिष्विषिति सत्वार्थं शैव विदीर्यते: ता नासंहने अस्थवित्वं चेतो चेततः सत्वार्थं सत्वास्त्रोद्वैतकालिकत्वादिभावमिष्ठानन्तः श्रेयः दुःख: योगितः सन्धि p.14.
After thus vanquishing the Bhadavādin, vimuktātman turns to Bheda-bhadavāda. If it is argued that the knowledge of Bheda and Abheda pertains to only one thing, either the Bheda or the Abheda would be the reality and not both. If still it is urged that the Abheda is not in the form of drk and drṣya but is related to Brahman which is only One, we reply it is not proper as it would necessitate absence of bheda as such. If Brahman which exists alone is identical, Drk and Drṣya which are distinct with it cannot be mutually distinct, otherwise Brahman also would have distinction. It cannot be pointed out that the form which distinct is not the same as identical (अभिन्न) for एक द्वितीय दृष्टि न विभाजनितुष्टा। Hence if Brahman is one it would either be Drk or Drṣya. Experience cannot be shown against this as you cannot cite any illustration for one thing having

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1. The fourth alternative above leads to the view in as much as only one thing appears as one and many.

2 अभिन्नतेष्वं द्वितीयकर्मिणां अभिन्नतेष्वं तस्यां कर्मिणां न हर्षान्तः स अभिन्नतेष्वः तस्यां कर्मिणां

3 अभिन्नतेष्वं द्वितीयकर्मिणां अभिन्नतेष्वं तस्यां कर्मिणां न हर्षान्तः स अभिन्नतेष्वः तस्यां कर्मिणां

1. Ibid p.56, 57, 58
many forms ( स्नेतक्रमण ). Further you will have
to state whether the various forms are 
किन उनक लिये or
विनिर्मित from the one substrate (रूपल) and so on, and thus
it would lead to अनियमतित. तिभिष्ण अवतिरंधनं ग्राणम अनीयमकतितायि तत्संस्कृते जनकु
लो नकम्! स्नात्सूजिते भूतं दूरतिते। Good-bye to all Philosophy!

Thus Drk cannot be associated with birth, etc.
Further, these faults cannot be conceived even in case
of the द्रष्य, not to speak of the Drk. For the द्रष्य
itself cannot be stated whether distinct or otherwise
from the faults and thus no relation of quality and its
substrate exists between them. When no attributes can
be connected, how can the faults do? So also there is
no possibility of bhdas for the fear of अनन्यन्तर.
Reality is one and obviously you would not take it to
be द्रष्य as it has expectancy for the Drk and thus
cannot be अनन्यन्तर ; hence It must be Drk alone as it
is self-luminant.

The same Drk or Anubhūti which is endless (पवित्रम्)
is आत्मन or the Self, the experience. It consists of
Bliss which is its essence. आनंद आनंदत आनत न
synonyms, still they point one and the same thing.
There are some non-synonyms which are अभिन्नत्व as for example सकुट्तार्थम्. सकुट्त here does not mean hot as it is applied to moon also but सकुट्त + अकार्ण are not synonyms as we say सकुट्त + ताल. Sruti which does not endure Bheda proves the same.

Ānanda does not mean absence of misery. It cannot be argued "the primary sense, viz., sensual pleasure should not be adhered to as Sruti describes Ānanda in measures, e.g., ते से तत्तद-—The same cannot be one and hundred simultaneously." For the division of Ānanda is only metaphorical. Due to the association with adjuncts like सुप्रस अतुलक, the Ānanda becomes classified. Further तदाद्वेदेशसःपुलि-etc., proves that Ātman being favourite is Bliss. Some contend that there is absence of pleasure also in शोक्त on the authority of नृधि मे सत्कांयारमक्तः शिवाः प्राप्तिः सार्वतिकः but here the term श्रेय �refers to secondary happiness arising out of senses. The eternal Bliss ( कुट्तान्तुतुर्भु) is primary. Ātman is not meant for anything else while everything exists for Ātman (cf. अत्मस्वत्त्व कामस्व कस्य श्रिय अलस्थि); likewise everything is aimed at Bliss which is not meant for anything else.
Hence Ātman and Bliss are identical.

Jagat—What about the universe then, which is perceived by us at every moment? Is it true or not? If not, then Śruti is futile, so Brahman cannot be real. If yes, it must either be भिन्न or अभिन्न or सिद्धान्त and once you admit these your Brahman also must be modified to suit it.

The answer to the above query is that no fault can apply to Advaita as it accepts the world to have come out of Māyā which is indescribable. It is not real nor unreal, so faults accruing from both these views do not hold good in our case. If you say you don't know anything as indescribable we will make you grasp the same. Where have you seen that direct perception (अव्यय) etc., does not proceed in a thing which is not real? The human horn is not a good answer as the universe is not unreal according to us. If you cite dream, etc., then you yourself know what is indescribable (अवलंब्यसम्प्रेषण) as you illustrate the dream—which is not real nor unreal—giving up the
human horn. You should explain why the dream etc. is not valid. If because of sublation, then sublation itself is the cause of invalidity (अन्यायप्रम) and not indescribability. Even in the waking state all अश्रुः or proceedings take place for all practical purposes like the mirage, cognition of two moons, etc. These even though known as not real are not removed before the realisation of 'reality'. So also the universe continues up to the realisation of Brahman. Things admitted through persistance of duality as true do not remain after their unreality is known but those which appear due to misapprehension do continue till realisation. Hence due to its own Avidyā and Māyā the world is projected on the Anubhūti and thus the Śruti passages relating to the creation etc., can be explained. Māyā is indescribable (अचर्चनीय) and not non-object (अनाधि). The world is compared to a picture in the verse as the picture shows high and low country-parts even on absolutely
smooth wall; even thus, Avidyā generates various illusions of transformations, etc., on One Anubhūti alone. As the picture does not exist independent of the wall so also the world. But it differs from it in one respect — though the picture is not distinct from the wall, still its material is distinct but not so with the world. Its material, viz., Māyā, cannot be stated as either distinct or not distinct from the Anubhūti and hence it is indescribable.

Authority for being आध्यात्मिक — Sruti and Smṛti support our view as in passages like सर्वं व भूतानि विद्वान् ोर वर्तेण भावमि: स भाव हुयेि सर्वं मूलम् (Gītā), etc. Thus the creation and variety on the part of Brahman is through Māyā.

The accusative in आध्यात्मिकं नमांति नाम, is to show that Īśvara as the base of imagined universe becomes the object of our salutation or to show that salutation and devotion to the deity and the preceptor comprises the inner means in attainment of realisation.

31 नया चिन्तनानुसारमेधागार्भं | शिक्षा आदिकार्यानिहत्तो। निरूपिते गृहेऽस्मादशोको विश्वासमानान्तराय तरातुल लूपलाई अनौतीका त्यो शादिकारिकां वन सववित्ति । ग्रि:१३ ३६

4—Kārika 2, p.36.
Khyāti or Error.— The effect of Avidyā is also indescribable and it should not be objected that no such thing can be shown for the silver on shell is known to have the indescribability. Of course, there is no unanimity among the scholars as regards the nature of the silver. Vimuktātman analyses the various Khyātis and deals with them systematically. He broadly states that these can be of three kinds as follows:—

मनस् अन्त यथायथ तत्स्वरूपः परे वसात्। अतोपरिमित्तस्तरस्तः तवाश्रयेऽनं विचारते॥

(Trans.— The silver which appears in the illusion is real according to some; while others regard it as unreal; while some others say that it is indescribable; hence it is investigated herewith). The reasons for these views are furnished as:—

अस्ततः अस्त्तप्रत्येक्षात् अस्त्योगः ॥ अस्ततः, अस्तोपप्रत्येक्षात् अस्त्वच्छिं तपस्या अस्त्येऽक्षेत ॥ कवितां भवः ॥

(Trans.— (1) As an unreal thing cannot be seen (स्त्योगः) it is real (सत्यः). (2) as real cannot be sublated it is unreal (अस्ततः), but (3) due to both these it is indescribable; these (in brief) are the reasons of these theories].

1. Kāraṇa 2 139
(1) The silver should be regarded as real for it is perceived by us; the human horn even though described in words is not seen and hence is not Sat. This is the असत्.

(2) As the silver is later on sublated by the knowledge of shell it cannot be real; a real thing can never be denied. So it is Asat. This is असत्.

(3) The silver is neither Sat being sublated nor Asat being seen and hence it is indescribable. This is अनुदेश्वरचत्यवस्त।

The first of this theory is further subdivided into three as (अनुदेश्वरचत्यवस्त।) (i) अत्मक्षेती, (ii) आक्षेति, (iii) अन्यथाक्षेत्र। These views are discussed in detail and then criticised by logical method. No details are entered into here as it is not the subject of this work. Only the direction is shown in brief:

(1) अत्मक्षेत्र। As is well known this is the view of Yogācāra Bhaudhas. Vimuktātman summarises their argument in the following words:
The silver is not sublated but only its existence outside. It exists only in the intellect due to apparently or impressions of the former birth. In other words, as Prof. Hiriyanne puts it, illusions are psychical facts altogether devoid of objective reference.

This view is refuted by the Māmāśakas who embrace the Akhyāti. Atmekhyāti is untenable due to contradiction with the experience. We do perceive outer objects. Further the argument can be applied to the intellect or cognition itself. As external things appear on non-external so also intellect might appear on non-cognition. It would go to destroy everything. Moreover it would amount to saying that an unreal object, viz., the external one, is perceived. Vimuktatman also refers to the statement व नात्मकवेदिनः गीतिष्कृतर्न नात्मत्वार्थम् । The Yogācāra wants to say that the inner cognition appears as if external and there is nothing outside which is seen; but he should explain what is meant by this 'as if'.
For it is nothing but taking it otherwise, misinterpreting it; it is nothing but maya and hence indescribable (अनिवृत्तार्थिता).

Further if there is only one thing, viz., आत्मात्मा: inner cognition, how can it give forth sublation, etc.? The same cognition which appears as external silver cannot possibly be known by itself. एकर्षत्वा चूके सिरं भूयत्स अथात्मा अत्मात्मात् (One impartite cognition cannot both be subject and object). Further, it cannot be subjected to another cognition, it being momentary. If it can be subjected, then all cognition would lose its self-luminance. Moreover, no illusion can be proved, for it cannot belong like our atman to the cognition. If for the sake of argument you contend that the external form as silver as also the externality is self-proved, then we ask "should this same be taken as the real form of cognition? If yes, and if this is unreal then all cognition becomes unreal. If not, and some other form which is real does exist, then why not take this also to be real as it is a form of cognition? So all cognition

1. कृति: प. 147 2. पुस्तके: प. 178. 3. अन्वेषिका: प. 183.
is either unreal or real. If again, this cognition is self-luminant, then its form cannot be material or non-material. It ultimately leads to accepting one absolute impartible cognition. Thus Ātmakhyāti is not compatible with either illusion or its sublation.

(ii) Akhyāti. - The Mīmāṃsaka after dismissing Ātmakhyāti states his own view as: अतः यदद्विलोक्त्वत् स्वात् सोगतां सहस्त्रिनिर्विशेषयते। नस्तदशुमातिर्भरत्त्वात् अस्मात्मात्मात्मात् स्मानि सर्वमेवं।

इति विरद्वर्तके अवधिः। स्मृतिविवाको स्त्रोत:। द्विपादेऽरुपभावि भूलितक्विनलक्ष्यते॥ ६॥

It cannot be unreal, as it appears and as it will oppose all experience, hence Ātmakhyāti is untenable. Likewise it is not also Ātsamāvatā for the same reason, viz., contradiction with the experience. For, we do perceive silver and not shell and also because it would amount to Ātsamāvatā in as much as shell as silver would be Āsat and still appearing. It can properly be explained as follows: The part 'tār' 'this' in the cognition


... (this is silver) arises out of direct perception of the shell in general, while the part, viz., silver is taken inadvertently from memory and the two are confounded giving rise to the illusive perception of silver. Thus there is no error at all as far as the cognition as such is concerned. For it only connecting two cognitions which themselves are not erroneous. One is directly perceived (अम्लतः) while the other is from memory and through putting them together due to non-perception in detail of the shell that the silver is seen. *Vimuktatman* puts it as: नामानुसारेण विषेषार्थे प्रभवितम् और विषेषार्थे प्रभवितम्।

Thus though the silver is from memory the perceiver here does not know it (अम्लतः) through mistake (प्रभवितम्) and as he does not perceive the particularity (निर्मोभः) of the shell he happens to combine them through non-discrimination and comes to one cognition as दुर्भक्ष्यां; thus even though this combined cognition does not actually take place (अनुस्मर्यः) people...
proceed taking it as actually happened. Thus there is Akhyāti - no error at all in as much as असत्तथा आभासितं तत्तथाभासितं।

The Anyathākhyātivādin takes the Akhyāti view to task and proves its untenability. He asks if the thing is as it appears (असत्तथा आभासितं तत्तथाभासितं), then that cognition cannot be styled as illusion (आभासितं).

It cannot be explained as it is illusion due to erroneous proceeding, for if the cognitions are true, they cannot give rise to असत्तथा - or wrong proceedings. Further non-discrimination of memory and direct perception will not do here, for if the memory is real what is this non-discrimination? It cannot be urged that the non-discrimination is due to mistaken pride of memory for is this pride essence of memory or anything else? If essence, then in its absence all memory would be absent. If it is something else, in its absence no non-discrimination can take place. If it is said, that there is not non-discrimination between two cognitions but it takes place between their objects and this gives rise to असत्तथा, then what is meant by this असत्तथा?
If complete ignorance, then all cognitions would be illusions.¹ If it is argued that activity happens through supposing the cognition of सत्सत्त्वाविद्वार्तण of the two knowledges as taking place even though it is not so, then all the faults shown by you against wrong cognition would fall back upon you like the boomerang. Hence the material of valid cognition and an invalid one is not the same. The cause of illusion is faulty sense-organ while that of valid cognition is a pure potent one. In case of Veda there being no faults it has power to produce valid cognition. Thus Akhyāti going contrary to all experience cannot stand.

Vimuktātman takes objection to the title, viz., Akhyāti. For what is this Akhyāti? Is it khyāti or its absence? It cannot be the absence for the Mīmāṃsaka does not desire it (अभिष्कृतिः). Nor can it be khyāti itself, for in that case all cognition would be illusion. It cannot be said that cognition which is not valid (अभिष्कृतिः) is illusion, for what is this invalidity? Not surely absence of validity as no absence is accepted. If it is validity itself then there is no difference between अभिष्कृतिः and अभिष्कृतिः. If cognition itself is illusion, then what sublates it? Not another cognition. It cannot also be argued that Akhyāti itself does not exist, for it would mean that everybody is omniscient.

¹ मर्यादिः कारणशिल्पज्ञानशब्दांविद्यते। हि सूत्रशिल्पज्ञानशब्दोऽपि सहभाष्यः। सूत्रशिल्पज्ञानशब्दायैव अभिष्कृतिः। अभिष्कृतिः अभिष्कृतिः अभिष्कृतिः।
Anyathākhyāti.- This view is generally ascribed to Naiyāyikas but here it is Bhaṭṭā Mināśaka who summarises his view as: उन्मादनेत्रायं शरणमार्गदेवस्ये स्त्राणेस्थितिः।

The shell itself appears as natural silver. Thus it is Anyathākhyāti as one thing, viz., the shell takes the form of something else, viz., silver. As pointed above either Akhyāti or Asatkhyāti or Ātmakhyāti for the matter of that, does not hold good and so we must take that the shell is real and appears as silver which also is real in the sense that it exists in another place. The fact is, it is not as it appears (अथ भालिं लक्ष्य नासिं), for silver is nothing but absence of shell. For what is absence but some other object? As has been remarked अन्तरात्मकतमानो शनस्य ः उपरयोगिकवल्। Hence it is said that the shell does not exist as silver. But even though both exist the cognition of the shell as shell is valid knowledge while कोण अथात् कोण अष्ठात् शास्त्रात् आहै। Refutation of the first two of these is given above. The third view also is refuted by the Anyathākhyātiśādāna on the ground that it is a third mental cognition to be reckoned as wrong why not the first one? Vide ibid f. 44

1. Vide ibid. Vismuktākṣetana also mentions three types of views on Akhyāti among the Mināśakas: (1) अन्तरात्मकतमानो शनस्य ः उपरयोगिकवल् (२) अनुमाने एकत्रित्तम कामानं भवतु भास्त्रास्य (३) अप्रेयते पुनरियम् प्रात्मसम्प्रेयतो आहै। Refutation of the first two of these is given above. The third view also is refuted by the Anyathākhyātiśādāna on the ground that if it is a third mental cognition to be reckoned as wrong why not the first one? Vide ibid f. 44

2. The commentator takes him to be Udbheda.

3. तुलसिकाः भद्रस्य भद्रस्यं भद्रस्यं भद्रिः।

4. अन्तरात्मकतमानो शनस्य ः उपरयोगिकवल् (२) अप्रेयते पुनरियम् प्रात्मसम्प्रेयतो आहै।
and it is not. A jar as a jar for instance is, but at the same time it is negation of other things. Thus the object in view is shell in positive sense while it is silver in negative sense. In error what is unreal is only its supposed identity with the shell.

Vimuktatman dismisses the theory by pointing out its untenability, positing it in three ways. What appears as another might either be the object or the cognition or it might be neither the object nor the cognition which appears as something else but the latter merely shows the object as different from what it actually is:—

(Trans.- O you of the Aravaddaka, tell us what it means—
is it (i) that cognition which shows a thing as something else, or (ii) does it change the object, or (iii) does it change itself?). Take it in any way but it is not possible thus without Maya. If we hold that it is अनावासायनस्यः cognition showing the thing as it is not, then all knowledge except that of Brahman will be illusion. If you take the अन्वितत्वः, i.e. the change

1. अस्यविह कारोऽधिकृतिः ब्रह्म ज्ञातं प्रचले तु सुपन्नवतं ब्रह्मान्य एवोपेतः। गविः ॥

2. The refutation of this theory engages a bulk of the text and is scattered over the whole work.

3. अविधानम अस्वविष्णुवातीर्थिवर्णस्य प्रक्षुल्पादीः। इति स्वविष्णुवातादृष्टाद्वन्द्वादृष्टादित्यैः। श्रीभगवान अविधानान्। द्वि ॥

4. श्रीभगवान अविधानान्। श्रीभगवान अविधानान्। द्वि ॥
in the object, then this also is not possible, for you must explain how and to what extent it changes. Does the object remain as it is after changing? It cannot, for in that case there is no change. You can't argue that having changed, it reverts to the first state again, as in that case there would be faults of regressus ad infinitum ('अभावात्'तत्) and mutual correspondence ('ततथात्'तत्). To give up the nature is not possible and it would involve the three things: the thrower, the thrown and throwing ('तत्रपि' पि'तत्र'स्तु'). It cannot give up some parts or attributes for in that case it cannot persist. So there is no change ('वर्तमानसः') of an existing or non-existing thing and hence only Māyā. One thing cannot become another without mutual change. This view of change in the object ('परिनेत्रतत्') is the Pariṇāma theory which has also been accepted by Bhāskara. He also gets under this 'अभावात्'तत्'. He argues that the Jīvas, as Śruti ordains, become Brahman which is both distinct and identical.

Vimuktātman itself denies this statement that Brahman

\* Vide II.7 page 214.
is Bhinnabhinnash on the strength of the absence of any proof to the effect. Not direct perception (प्रसब्धत), as Brahman does not fall in its sphere, not scripture which denies distinction. So Bheda is based on Avidyā (अविद्या) and is to be given up. Further, the Bhinnabhinnavadin should state the nature of Brahman and Jīva. Is it Cit or Acīt (non-sentiency) or both? Or one is Cit and the other Acīt? If both are Cit then there is no distinction between the two so they are identical (अभिहत) and not भिन्नभिन्न. If both are Acīt then they lose their nature. If both are simultaneously विविधिश्चिब्रह्म it is inconsistent, for, what is the relation between Cit and Acīt? If one of them is Acīt then there is no relation of part and the (अभिन्नात्मक) whole as accepted by you; for Acīt cannot become a part of Cit. Hence it follows that both are Cit alone (अभिन्नप्रत्ययमन्तरात्मका स्वस्विन्यतिर्न ॥)¹. Moreover, the world also is not a form of Brahman if it is known to him, for the knower and the object are different². And how can the world which is born of Brahman oneself be called Brahman itself?² So ultimately the Bheda should be regarded as metaphorical

¹ Ibid p.245
² ॥ न जग्निते जगार्गम्य इति ॥ Ibid p.245
and this is not far from अनिवार्यिक. So Anyathākhyāti if at all to be accepted should be based upon भाष्यावादः. The fact is: नौकरस्करमस्क्रियः प्रिन्तोः
नाथानो नामहस्तिनिमित्ति। नामहस्तिनिमित्ति नामशालाप्रक्ष्याचार्यो। तामस: शास्त्रोपि युक्ते॥ ॥ १८

Thus all distinction innate (सत्त्व), of the same kind (सत्त्वात्), and from other things(निगृहित) is to be denied in आत्मन. "Vimuktatman is very hard-hearted against Bhāskara and pronounces: अनीतानेतरां अभिनवस्य राजमन्त्रः सदृशेः कल्याणः। अतोरभेपरे पुराः चर्चा: सम अनं ते पुरा: पारिः: तुम्हि।"

The Mīmāṃsaka Bhāṭṭa also is refuted in Ch.II, III and IV taking respectively the three alternatives. The identity between shell and silver is not to be sublated for the cognition is 'This is not silver' (अत्नं रज्ञतम्) and this cognition being real is not sublatable. The main point of attack concerns with the statement: अत्नं रज्ञतम् ज्ञातस्मात् ज्ञातस्मात् ज्ञातस्मात् ज्ञातस्मात् etc. "Vimuktatman proves that knowledge of existence (ज्ञात) and non-existence (अज्ञात) cannot simultaneously be with reference to one object. The refutation of Anyathākhyāti is methodical and arguments":

1. Ibid p. 103
2. नौकरस्करमस्क्रियः प्रिन्तोः पारिः। नौकरस्करमस्क्रियः प्रिन्तोः पारिः। नौकरस्करमस्क्रियः प्रिन्तोः पारिः। 108
follow one another in logical sequence. It speaks highly of the dialectical skill on the part of the author.

(iv) Asatkhyāti. - Uptil now the असत्क्षयि has been refuted. Here comes the Mādhyamika with his Asatkhyāti.

The silver which appears is unreal as is known from the sublative knowledge नेवा रज्ञे which proves that it was not there. Further, the cognition cannot remove a thing if it is real, its business is only to illumine the fact. It is also backed up by experience, for people doubt whether it exists or not, but not that it is indescribable अतिरिक्ताचिनहियाः or not. And they do conclude that it is unreal.

The Advaitins' reply is: भैलं मा व्यूँवरे मायामिति विद्वाने यत्रात्मात्मिकेतरसत्त्वाति द्वैते क्षणमेव त्यां न ॥ ५६ ॥ (Do not accuse me like that, for without indescribable Māyā the unreal cannot be proved; not to speak of its perception; impossibility of illusion goes without saying.) Is this Asat distinct from Sat or not? If yes, then it is not unreal. If not, then it cannot appear. There is no silver at all according to you. So how can it appear in illusion? Hence we must accept that a thing which exists is seen as non-existing.

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1. Vimalakītansu, like others, does not give much importance to this khyāti as it is contrary to all experience. He wrote—रूपो यस्मिन्नामाला यथासत्त्वाति (भैलं मा व्यूँवरे) p. 161
2. 7.52 p. 154
Cognition cannot take place without corresponding object. So if at all you want to say that unreal is known by cognition, why not better call it indescribable? Sruti in असात्र रक्षणे आसार दोषे does not imply that Sat was produced out of Asat but Asat means bereft of Nāmerūpa and not unreal. तस्य नामस्य असात्र असतो असतेषां सत्ताः नासमहेन:। The Sūnyavāda is to be ignored being contrary to the experience.

(v) Anirvacanīyakhyāti. - After refuting all the theories, the Advaitin sums up his position as:

असात्रेऽ न ॥ असात्रेऽ एवत् नासात्रेऽ आसात्रेऽ ॥

If the silver is granted to be real, we cannot account for its illusion and sublation later on, for a thing which is real must remain so for ever; it can never be sublated. If it is taken as unreal, then its appearance to our view and its sublation cannot be explained away. The opponents opposing one another have thus established Anirvacanīyakhyāti. It cannot be stated as Sat, real nor as Asat, unreal, and so we should call it indescribable (अनिर्वकने-विकृतेः). The illusion also has the

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1. शब्द 4.163
2. सनातनवैभव्यो हृदिक्षितव: सारासनव: तस्य। शुउर्वे नेकुम्भनोर्घ्यश्रवीं श्रवी: तदन्तरीक्षेऽपि श्रवाः।
3. इति न श्रुताः सुव्यायाम् नारायणस्य नामस्य स्वायत्तेऽन्तर श्रवणम् नित्यमित्रमित्र्याः काणाः कुपलोक्युभू

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...
same characteristic. Cognition also is indescribable together with its objects (सङ्केते: सङ्खे).

The work लितासिद्धी gives much importance to the discussion of Khyātis, so much so that two-thirds of the book deals with it. To prove उपक्रियात्मक the whole trouble is taken. Prof. Hiriyananda remarks, "the exposition of the doctrine of Mâyā is so complete that the work may well be described as Anirvacaniya-Sarvasva a name given to later Khandana-Khandakāhyā." That is why the Khyātis as dealt by him are entered into here though it is not the proper theme of the Thesis. While dealing with Vimuktatman one cannot pass over the problem.

Cause of Avidyā.- Thus the indescribable Avidyā is at the root of illusion. A suitable cause should be searched for this Avidyā. The material is beginningless Ajñāna which is also indescribable. The objector argues that this Ajñāna is nothing but illusion which can be accepted as the cause of another illusion according to the maxim of the seed and the sprout.

1 Vide Introduction to लितासिद्धी p. XV
The reply is given in the negative. अज्ञातमात्र cannot explain causality. It depends upon the continuity of the cause in the effect. An effect cannot be found continued in another effect; as for example the human body is not found in a jar but clay is found and so it is the material cause of the jar. Further a momentary thing cannot be a cause of something else. Hence beginningless Aj्ञाना should be accepted.

An objection is here taken that if the shell which has got beginning, how can the Aj्ञाना be beginningless? The answer is that it does not belong to the shell but to the knower who is beginningless. Even though the silver thus is created through the ignorance belonging to the knower, it appears on the shell through समायमान्यिकरण like the sun though firm in his place appears in the well.

Nature of Aj्ञाना.- What is meant by Aj्ञाना? Is it previous absence (समाभाव) or the subsequent

1 नाय्तनेषु कार्यसेः कालिनेषु अन्वम्। तिष्ठते च चतुरा। इत्यादित्यादि प्रकाशम्
2 धिद 6.56—सिन्धुम नितं तत्ति । अशक्यायेत्।
3 तथा अज्ञातमात्रापि सम्यक्सु युक्तिः समायमान्यिकरणमेति। स्वस्थ्यस्मात्वद इत्यादि
4 नाय्तनेषु विशेष अथाभो । अतिष्ठते । 6.57
absence (नास्क्रिय) of knowledge? Or is it some other knowledge (नास्क्रिय) or something else which is positive? If removal of ignorance is equal to knowledge, then अज्ञान or subsequent absence would become ज्ञान existence (of ज्ञान) which is contrary to the accepted views. Further, if it is something else than knowledge, then it cannot be styled indescribable. The Advaitin replies that all these alternatives and arguing are not necessary as अविद्या and its effect are proved on the strength of eternal experience. Though the experience at the root is eternal, still it requires the eye, etc., for its manifestation. He writes:—अध्यात्मिक बांधुमण्डल निर्माणः तत्त्वात्मानं ज्ञानमिश्रितं न ज्ञानमिश्रितं न स्वप्नमिश्रितं स्वप्नमिश्रितं न ज्ञानमिश्रितं न ज्ञानमिश्रितं न ज्ञानमिश्रितं

As the light of the sun or a तम is said illumining or not illumining when the object is found or otherwise, so also the absolutely eternal experience (अत्तमसीता) though uncontaminable, is styled as known or not known respectively in the presence or otherwise of an object manifested by it. If this is not accepted, then अज्ञान cannot be proved. As a proof does not require another proof, so also this अज्ञान; therefore it is indescribable. ज्ञान being proved by ज्ञान, cannot be indescribable like अज्ञान. Knowledge of ब्रह्मā being related to real object (मन्त्रविमष्ठ) is valid. Even unreal things like

1. ज्ञानसिद्धि p. 61
2. ग्रंथ p. 62.
elongated syllables etc. are also valid as they refer to real subjects!

But in fact the indescribability of Ajñāna according to us does not depend upon the validity or otherwise of proof but it is because Ajñāna is sublatable by knowledge like the silver. A real thing cannot be removed by knowledge nor an unreal one; the former for the fear of undesirable contingency of everything being sublated and the latter as it is not perceived. It is indescribable. As Vimuktātman puts it: तदवें अनेकं, कसु ने ना, मिल्लिक्षितं न उपवन्य निनिष्ठतं कसुप्रक्ष्यः

The objector points out that the silver appears again even when ignorance regarding shell is destroyed. The answer is that it appears again due to misapprehension of shell again and not when the shell is being known. If you ask, "are the Ajñānas infinite," we say, "yes, there are infinite Ajñānas if there are infinite cognitions." Vimuktātman holds that there are as many Ajñānas as cognitions (अज्जनित अज्जनिति तत्कालविरागाः) . Later writers also ascribe this view to him.

The Ajñāna again is not absence which at best is

1. श्रीमद्भागवत  नर्वेशद्वै देष्यमतविन्धमय सामान्योऽसामान्ये । १६५ । ६२
2. नर्वेशद्वै देष्यमतविन्धमय सामान्योऽसामान्ये । १६५ । ६३
3. नर्वेशद्वै देष्यमतविन्धमय सामान्योऽसामान्ये । १६५ । ६३
4. नर्वेशद्वै देष्यमतविन्धमय सामान्योऽसामान्ये । १६५ । ६३
known by either direct perception or Abhāva. Both Prāgabhāva and Pradhvāmaśa being created do not comprise Ajñāna. Hence Ajñāna is not the absence of knowledge. It resembles darkness which is not an absence of a lamp but still is removable by it. When it is styled Ajñāna, its opposition to knowledge is implied, while when it is called indescribable, material or Māyā, etc., no such opposition is meant.

Causality of Brahmān.—Through the indescribable Avidyā or Māyā, Brahmān becomes or appears as the cause of this world. In scriptures what is referred to as Māyā or Avidyā is the material of this world, for all illusion takes place due to Māyā. This is proved by passages like नेव नामको विख्यत यो मूलोः मे कृष्णेन नामकोल्यम् अ विन्दुः नामको विश्वम्। or अन्तःकरणं स्वतंत्रं नामित नामितेऽं नामितेऽं. These prove absence of duality and its notion also; hence they lead to establish indescribability of Māyā. The effect cannot stand without the cause. The use of the word 'रूप' in यद तथा रूप क्योऽः shows that the world is only an appearance - ज्ञानका कारणात्मको न वेष्टते कृपा तुडूळे। Here also Vīmuktātman refutes Bhāskara’s view on causality.
Bhāskara holds that by स्रूति, Sruti denies plurality (गणनात्सर) with reference to Brahman which is the cause but it does not mean that the effect comprising plurality and variety which is established by direct perception and Sruti itself, is denied. But according to the Advaitin this is not a proper way. The word गणना does not point to गणनात्सर. And further, if the plurality of effect (गणनात्सर कारण) is denied the Brahman, the cause (कारणप्रकार), it would not be found anywhere. The effect again cannot be stated whether distinct or identical or both with the cause. So the effect should be accepted as the play of Māyā like the silver and that is denied. वेदमहा दृष्टिः shows that the world is indescribable. दृष्टिसम्यक्षात्सर does not state that the world is identical with Brahman but that it is one with it. There is distinction between Abheda and Aikātmāya.

Further, Brahman is not साइज also as Sruti refutes it, in अव्ययः साइजः अव्ययः असाइजः साइजः. The view that अव्ययः साइजः अव्ययः असाइजः साइजः असाइजः असाइजः असाइजः असाइजः असाइजः असाइजः as given in वेक्यायपदिध्व is not also correct.

1. नस्ताप्यं कीन्नरिषिकृणे श्रेष्ठानां ज्ञानम्। नायिककृपाद्यं। अन्यो ज्ञानश्रेर्विवेतस्येकादशं। संप्राकार्यात्तिरिक्तं केन्द्र ज्ञानस्यं इति नायिकम्। (क्येको) ज्ञायस्य। १५६ १६, १५६
Substrate of मयाः or अज्ञाना. Thus मयाः is responsible for the causality of Brahman. अज्ञाना is impossible in case of an inert one so it cannot belong to the inner organ (अन्तःकरण) etc., as these being momentary are not fit to become substrate of beginning-less अज्ञाना. Hence it follows that it should belong to the आत्मन. It cannot be said against this that अज्ञाना being insentient cannot belong to the sentient आत्मन as it cannot be stated whether the essence, quality, attribute or effect thereof. For though it is not the essence, etc., of आत्मन still it belongs to it as you cannot point out any instance that this inert thing cannot be styled ignorance of आत्मन, as all insentient things come under our अज्ञाना. Hence the आत्मन itself, जो is absolutely real, undergoes all activity worldly as well as Vedic through its on मयाः, upto realization like the juggler who takes the form of mountain etc. through his magic. If मयाः is independent by itself then it will be आत्मन जो alone is independent. Hence its resort is आत्मन as is known from experience, viz.,
"I do not know", etc. The relation between Atman and Avidya also is indescribable. Further, relation requires two things and duality arises out of Avidya. So all relation as such is Avidya.

The objector here points out that if Avidya belongs to Brahman, then there would be no Salvation as all become free by one’s salvation. If nobody is yet free then no such hope can be entertained. Hence it should belong to the Jivas and if Brahman is alone there is no classification (कालवर्ग) of Jivas some of whom are bound, some infatuated, some free, etc. So let the Jivas be many and Avidya belong to them.

The reply to the above objection is that it cannot be assigned to Jiva who being imagined by Avidya is Anatma. If Avidya is not taken with reference to Brahman, then there would be no knowledge of Brahman, nor can it give salvation as it has nothing to do with Avidya and there will be no universe through misapprehension of Brahman. Avidya should have the same resort and object so that when one gets rid of it the resort and object which are one and the same become clear.

1. ज्ञेयसमृणेऽज्ञानस्मिन। ज्ञेयान्यात्वममुक्तिस्मिन। ज्ञानस्मिनीस्मिन्यात्वममुक्तिस्मिन। अस्मिन्योज्ज्ञानस्मिन।
2. ज्ञेयान्यात्वममुक्तिस्मिन। ज्ञेयान्यात्वममुक्तिस्मिन। अस्मिन्योज्ज्ञानस्मिन।
3. ज्ञेयसमृणेऽज्ञानस्मिन। ज्ञेयान्यात्वममुक्तिस्मिन।

The
cit itself takes all forms and so it should legitimately belong to one who is not imagined, i.e., the Self.

If it belongs to an imagined one, it cannot be removed through knowledge. Now, is this Avidyā only one or many? If one, then all would become free by the salvation of one. But this is not accepted by Vīmuktātman for his opinion is—नमः तु एकतन्त्रते एकस्वार्थीते। Avidyās should not be imagined as many, for one Avidyā would be sufficient. Otherwise, infinite Avidyās should have to be posited in case of one, and if they are posited of only one, then they would go to manage the whole thing and hence there is no necessity of imagining them again of another. The conclusion is expressed as:

अनेक विद्यामभिः केवल विद्याय रुपमिन्तुयोऽत्यतः।

एकतन्त्राय नसतान् तथा अन्यनत्यं श्वसंस्करणे न ||

सुधा कार्यमार्प्याय॥—If only One is bound through infatuation and becomes free, then who is the preceptor and where is the pupil? Therefore plurality of Jīvas should be accepted. The Advaitin disagrees with the Dvaitin answering—हैं तदाद्वाय ज्ञातानां अन्य जनकं च ज्ञात्यां जगद्गृहां ज्ञितं सुधाविद्यार्थीः।

(Trans.—Not so; Ātman entangled in Māyā and hence ignorant is only one and the distinction takes place through Māyā; Salvation is possible through the removal of Ajñāna by knowledge; bodies etc. do not exist (independently as supposed by the Ārādhikas).

The objector still argues that if the Guru, having


4 अवेदनानि सत्ये क्षेत्रियः अतुः—सयु एक् एत मायेनिन्द्रवहस्य मूर्तयां श्रियं।

(Trans.—Selfless, wide-awake, subtle, wise, etc.)
realisation, sees all the distinction, viz., pupil, etc. then he becomes infatuated (रक्त) and hence unqualified. If he does not see them, then how can be a Guru? A man who sees himself drowning with many people in ocean, in a dream, does not exert himself to save them after waking up even though he remembers them. It is not proper to think that the Guru imagines plurality on himself and then starts his precept. For in that case, knowing full well that all would be free by his own salvation, he should not proceed to teach and even if he teaches for removal of their illusion, he should frankly advise them to desist from any effort, assuring them that they will be free by his रक्त !. Thus unity of ऐतमन or विश्वसर्व is untenable. The reply to this argument is that these faults would be the same even if we accept plurality of जिवात. Hence विश्वसर्व is the logical outcome.

Otherwise, we would not have witnessed this world to-day as until now hundreds of aeons (कल्पान्नस्य) have passed and all the जिवात even infinite, should have ceased to transmigrate by now. It cannot be argued that these are innumerable, for even though the number does not fall

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1. न गणनः कालोऽसि: स्वरे रक्ते महा: नामसः नामोऽसि।
उपनिषद्धाकूट: उवठूहि तान्न ममसः काम वेदायते " || 3-35:1-34" 1-56:1-34

2-35:1 3-34

3. उस्माने हृदयोऽनागद्वृक्षात्: पुंशु पुंशुक्षः । इति उपपत्तिर्वाहोऽत्मात् एवं श्रुतं इति पुराणे" (156:3-34)
in our human compass of knowledge, still the Isvara who
is accepted as omniscient must be knowing it. Once
we accept distinction, its companions like sentiency, etc.
(वसंत, अवभवति - ) follow suit. So it is better to
regard the Atman as one and leave everything to Avidyā
(अविद्या, अवभवति सर्वकालिक अभिव्वचनम् अविद्यान्तः तत्र अर्था उस्मिकोऽन्तः अव्वचनम्)

The Ajñāna is removed by knowledge.
Removal of knowledge (or अज्ञानिवैधुरी) is not again to be
removed as it cannot be removed, being same as knowledge.
For in the opinion of Advaitin, one cognition cannot
cancel another. What ज्ञान does is to illumine an
object and not to remove it. For does this removing
knowledge (महत्त्वम् ज्ञाने) characterise Brahman's unity as it
vanishes with the Avidyā verily on the fire which after
having devoured the fuel is extinguished by itself.
Brahmajñāna which requires a Vṛtti (psychosis) of the
intellect presupposes some kind of Ajñāna and hence aris-
ing out of Ajñāna it automatically melts away with the
Ajñāna. It might be importuned that if Brahmajñāna is
not thus real, how can it put an end to the Ajñāna Once
for all? But the validity of knowledge does not depend

1 यथाविषये गोपि वर्षम् नाकाशां शिशुपन्यविधानां न वैभवमहाशास्त्राः प्रभावीताः
2 इद्यं ज्ञातपि द्राक्ष्ये
3 तत्त्वं गोपि द्राक्ष्ये शास्त्रानि निधिष्ठाते शिशुपन्यविधानां न वैभवमहाशास्त्राः
4 अविद्यार्थी वृत्तिः सन्धि ज्ञाति शिशुपन्यां न शिशुपन्यविधानां
5 ज्ञाते द्राक्ष्ये शास्त्रानि निधिष्ठाते शिशुपन्यविधानां अविद्यार्थी शिशुपन्यां न शिशुपन्यविधानां
6 अविद्यार्थी वृत्तिः सन्धि ज्ञाति शिशुपन्यां न शिशुपन्यविधानां
7 अविद्यार्थी वृत्तिः सन्धि ज्ञाति शिशुपन्यां न शिशुपन्यविधानां
8 अविद्यार्थी वृत्तिः सन्धि ज्ञाति शिशुपन्यां न शिशुपन्यविधानां
9 अविद्यार्थी वृत्तिः सन्धि ज्ञाति शिशुपन्यां न शिशुपन्यविधानां
10 अविद्यार्थी वृत्तिः सन्धि ज्ञाति शिशुपन्यां न शिशुपन्यविधानां
11 अविद्यार्थी वृत्तिः सन्धि ज्ञाति शिशुपन्यां न शिशुपन्यविधानां
12 अविद्यार्थी वृत्तिः सन्धि ज्ञाति शिशुपन्यां न शिशुपन्यविधानां
upon its being real but it concerns to the nature of the object it pertains. Knowledge of Brahman though not real, has Brahman, the reality for its object and hence is valid. Or Brahman itself accompanied by the Vṛtti destroys the Ajñāna and having burnt that Vṛtti also, remains alone:

What is this removal of Ajñāna? If it is real (सत्वी), then Brahman would become अद्वैतानिधि. If it is same as the Ātman, then it would always be there and so no possibility of Ajñāna anytime. If it is absence (अभव इति) अद्वैता, then it being identical to the Ātman, Ātman becomes absence. And if it is taken as Asat, it would not remove the Ajñāna and thus no possibility of सेरा. Obviously it cannot both be Sat and Asat. If it is not real, nor unreal, and thus indescribable (अद्वयतरत्वी), what is its distinction from the Ajñāna which has अनित्यादर्शिभक्तिः as its characteristic? Ajñāna and Ajñānanivṛtti must be two opposite entities, otherwise the former would not be sublated. So it cannot be आदिनिधि also. Thus all the four alternatives are

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1. अद्वैतानिधि तद्विव्यवस्थानिधिः द्विभावानिधिः सत्वी तथापि सत्यं भवेत्... अद्वयादनिधि
   आदिनिधि तस्माद अद्वयतरत्वी... 36:3 6.68

2. अद्वैतानिधिः अद्वयतरत्वी अद्वयतरत्वी अद्वयतरत्वी... 36:3 6.68
not possible and so it cannot be explained as no other way is known. The Advaitin replies that there is no harm in accepting Ajñāna-vṛtti as of some different type additional to these four (प्राकृतत्त्व). The forms you have cited are possible only in case of a concrete (विद्ययम) thing and not अन्तरभागीय भूमिकायाः. Hence he concludes: अतोऽऽ अन्तरभागीय-वृत्तिः न निरूपिताय तथापि। अन्तरभागीय यथा अतीतः। As Ajñāna is extraordinary, its removal also is extraordinary. You cannot accuse that there is no proof for this removal, for it is well-known (निरूपिताय अतीतः). Further, when there is no means to know the nature of Ajñāna, how can one insist for a प्रपण for its removal?¹

So some uncommon fifth kind is to be accepted for the removal.

The Ātman having realisation is itself the removal of its Ajñāna. Vimuktātman remarks: अति-आत्मक विद्ययम अति-आत्मक- निरूपिताय हृदयम! अति-आत्मक इत्यादि रागातिम अति-आत्मक दहलः.²

And having again burnt the अतिय (removing knowledge) remains alone. This is on the authority of Suresvara who proclaims: अति-आत्मक इत्यादि रागातिम अतिया। असतानीसः अतिया। असतानीसः अति-आत्मक इत्यादि रागातिम अति-आत्मक इत्यादि रागातिम.

So destruction of Ajñāna means the highest Ātman. Thus Advaita is not threatened.²

This Ajñāna once burnt does not appear again as it is beginningless. A thing which has no cause cannot
be produced. Thus Salvation through Jñāna is established. The objector here remarks that Jñāna would destroy Ajñāna with some remnant as the Jñāna of the shell leaves a remnant of Ajñāna. The answer is that there is no such possibility of any remnant being left beside, for a remnant like that should be accepted only when it is reasonable (अनुभवयोगस्वलयमात्राय ज्ञानमयमयमात्राय अनुभवयोगस्वलयमात्राय अनुभवयोगस्वलयमात्राय). Necessity of positing an Ajñāna as the cause is only upto realisation of Brahman as given in śruti. Before the final realisation, the removal of knowledge is gradual.४

Veda itself implies that the removal takes place step by step, as it furnishes remedies to remove ignorance and projection (अप्रज्ज्ञानोपरहार) etc. in addition to अवदभुत. It had to advise अज्ञानस्य नीति nine times. When ultimately all Ajñāna is removed it gives out तत्त्वज्ञानी शरणार्थी। So many means are enumerated श्रवण (hearing), भावन (thought), ध्यान (meditation), ध्येय (object of meditation), अश्वेत (Self-control), अनुभव (knowledge) etc. These would have been futile if Brahman can be realised at first hearing.५

The objector points out that even at the realisation of Brahman some remnant of Ajñāna (अज्ञानस्य नीति) in case of a Vidvān does remain as his body is seen to persist. Otherwise, there would be no possibility of finding out a properly qualified preceptor who can
initiate. And moreover the body should continue up to the end of the Касмам i.e. Касмам the enjoyment of the fruit of which is started. The Advaitin admits this, of the same opinion and that he would to state that there is remarking that he is no remnant as would give rise to another birth! All the śruti passages referring to Jivanmukti and Smrti referring to Sthitaprajña are to be explained in this way. Sūtrakara also supports it:

At the end of the book he takes stock of the whole work and states: अखिते मुक्तिनिर्भोजिसामाहोस्मदुःस्मितम् : आच्छाद्यस्माहोहस्मदुःस्मितम् नन्दोऽस्मदुःस्मितम्। परमात्मानवेदान्तार्थमपि इत्यतः सर्वोष्णस्माहोहस्मदुःस्मितम् नन्दोऽस्माहोहस्मदुःस्मितम्। परमात्मानवेदान्तार्थमपि इत्यतः सर्वोष्णस्माहोहस्मदुःस्मितम्। परमात्मानवेदान्तार्थमपि इत्यतः सर्वोष्णस्माहोहस्मदुःस्मितम्। परमात्मानवेदान्तार्थमपि इत्यतः सर्वोष्णस्माहोहस्मदुःस्मितम्। परमात्मानवेदान्तार्थमपि इत्यतः सर्वोष्णस्माहोहस्मदुःस्मितम्। परमात्मानवेदान्तार्थमपि इत्यतः सर्वोष्णस्माहोहस्मदुःस्मितम्। परमात्मानवेदान्तार्थमपि इत्यतः सर्वोष्णस्माहोहस्मदुःस्मितम्। परमात्मानवेदान्तार्थमपि इत्यतः सर्वोष्णस्माहोहस्मदुःस्मितम्। परमात्मानवेदान्तार्थमपि इत्यतः सर्वोष्णस्माहोहस्मदुःस्मितम्। परमात्मानवेदान्तार्थमपि इत्यतः सर्वोष्णस्माहोहस्मदुःस्मितम्। परमात्मानवेदान्तार्थमपि इत्यतः सर्वोष्णस्माहोहस्मदुःस्मितम्। परमात्मानवेदान्तार्थमपि इत्यतः सर्वोष्णस्माहोहस्मदुःस्मितम्। परमात्मानवेदान्तार्थमपि इत्यतः सर्वोष्णस्माहोहस्मदुःस्मितम्। परमात्मानवेदान्तार्थमपि इत्यतः सर्वोष्णस्माहोहस्मदुःस्मितम्। परमात्मानवेदान्तार्थमपि इत्यतः सर्वोष्णस्माहोहस्मदुःस्मितम्। परमात्मानवेदान्तार्थमपि इत्यतः सर्वोष्णस्माहोहस्मदुःस्मितम्। परमात्मानवेदान्तार्थमपि इत्यतः सर्वोष्णस्माहोहस्मदुःस्मितम्। परमात्मानवेदान्तार्थमपि इत्यतः सर्वोष्णस्माहोहस्मदुःस्मितम्। परमात्मानवेदान्तार्थमपि इत्यतः सर्वोष्णस्माहोहस्मदुःस्मितम्। परमात्मानवेदान्तार्थमपि इत्यतः सर्वोष्णस्माहोहस्मदुःस्मितम्। परमात्मानवेदान्तार्थमपि इत्यतः सर्वोष्णस्माहोहस्मदुःस्मितम्। परमात्मानवेदान्तार्थमपि इत्यतः सर्वोष्णस्माहोहस्मदुःs

[Trans.- (1) There takes place Salvation through knowledge; ignorance and killing alone. Ignorance resides in the self knowledge dispels and when it is destroyed Atman remains.
(2) "The highest Bliss desired by all is proved by the Vedāntas" this I wanted to establish in particular, as it is the opinion of one who knows Veda.
(3) And it becomes object if indescribable Avidyā is proved; hence I exerted myself to prove Avidyā for Īśānāsiddhi (accomplishent of my desire).]

Thus Vimuktatman had to prove that the upanisads prove the highest Atman as consisting of Bliss hankered after by each

| अनो निम्नलिखितं आच्छाद्यस्माहोहस्मदुःस्मितम् नन्दोऽस्माहोहस्मदुःस्मितम्। परमात्मानवेदान्तार्थमपि इत्यतः सर्वोष्णस्माहोहस्मदुःस्मितम्। परमात्मानवेदान्तार्थमपि इत्यतः सर्वोष्णस्माहोहस्मदुःस्मितम्। परमात्मानवेदान्तार्थमपि इत्यतः सर्वोष्णस्माहोहस्मदुःs |}
and everybody. To prove that he had to resort to Avidyā which is indescribable. Thus all this ultimately boils down to establishing the Marāṇeśvara which is essential for Īstasiddhi. Thus the work exhibits, as Prof. Hiriyanna remarks, far more interest in theory than in the practical teaching.

The style though somewhat concise and hence terse is not boresome. It is at times highly eloquent and the interest in the subject is kept up to the last. Advaita meets a systematic methodical treatment in his hands. Arguments follow logically one another. He gives consideration to all views regarding truth and error extant in his days. The work is rich in dialectical wealth.

Īstasiddhi bears a great influence on the subsequent writers on Advaita. Ānandabodha, Īṣṭitsukha, Prakāśārtha-kāra and others refer to him. Even Vivarana cannot shed away its influence as it so many times follows the argument occurring in Īstasiddhi. The treatment of Anyathākhyāti, meaning of ātman-वेदांतविद्या etc. are prominent examples for this. Even opponents refer to him as Vedāntadesika and others.

Īstasiddhi being mainly concerned with ātman-वेदांตविद्या does not contain much discussion about the Jīva, Īśvara,
etc. It is not clear to which of the three theories Ābhāsa, Pratibimba or Avaccheda, Vimuktätman belonged. It might go to establish his earlier date when these Vādas did not attain great importance. It was Vivaraṇakāra who analysed the problem in the light of Pañcakapādikā after which it attained saliency in Advaita doctrine. Vimuktätman quotes only Suresvara as a big authority on Advaita, besides the Sūtrakāra and Vākyakāra. This also adds to his priority. His main contribution to Advaita is the dialectical wealth to prove Advaita.

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1. संदर्भ तृ विकर्षणमानः इति --तद्वर्त्ते बाक्यार्थः- स २:१२ प्रकाश ७०-७१.
Prakāsātman or Viverana School,

2. Prakāsātman

In the history of Advaita Vedānta, Prakāsātman alias Viveranakāra is a great name to conjure with. The whole Post-Śaṅkara Advaita can be summed up in three or four terms like Ābhāsavāda, Pratibiśa, Avaccheda, Drśṭisṛṣṭivāda, etc. which give a clue to the fundamental position of post-Śaṅkara Advaitins. As seen before Suresvara propounded Ābhāsavāda and Pādmapāda was an upholder of Pratibiśavāda. But the real advertiser of the latter is Prakāsātman, who has written Viverana, a gloss on Pañcapādikā so much so, that Pratibiśavāda and Viverana go together and Viverana-prasthāna has become a famous term in Advaita. The majority of Advaitins including even Vidyāraṇya belong to the Pratibiśa school as expounded by Viveranakāra. This is evident from the rich literature based on or connected with the Viverana. Great Savants like Nrisimhāśrama have written a gloss on it.
Following are the works connected with it:

1. Vidyārānya: *Vivaranaprameyasamgraha*
2. Akhandānanda: *(Vivaraṇa) Tattva-Dīpāna*
3. Rāmānandasarasvatī: *Vivaranopanyāsa*
4. Nṛsiṃhārāma: *Vivaranabhāvaprakāśikā*
5. Raṅgarājādhīvarīn: *Vivaranadārpana*

Thus *Vivaraṇa* has established a great epoch in the history of Advaita. As to its date, there is no certainty as the author does not mention it expressly. But from the views he mentions in the *Vivaraṇa* he can definitely be placed after Vācaspāti. On p. 232 he quotes four views regarding the causality of Brahman.

They are:

1. *Vijñānavādins* (शब्द मात्रारूप माननार्योऽये नानाकृति अजसर्ववृत्तिचतुर्भावः)
2. *Advaitins* (तत्त्वस्तितिर्मिनां श्रेष्ठ जस्त्वायांग्मनां, जिनां श्रेष्ठ जस्त्वायांग्मनां नैचयायां विश्वस्य सत्त्ववृत्तिचतुर्भावः)
3. *Vācaspātar* (वाचस्पातीर्मिनां श्रेष्ठ जस्त्वायांग्मनां जिनां श्रेष्ठ जस्त्वायांग्मनां नैचयायां विश्वस्य सत्त्ववृत्तिचतुर्भावः)
4. *Mimāṃsākārs* (विश्ववृत्तिचतुर्भावः स्वप्नादियां सत्त्ववृत्तिचतुर्भावः)

The third of this view is attributed to Brahmā-śiddhikāra. According to Vidyārānya who does not mention the source of the first two opinions. It is well-known that Vācaspāti many a time accepts Brahmāśiddhikāra’s view.

The fourth goes according to the same authority to Iṣṭaśiddhikāra. The date of the former cannot be

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1. Vide *Vivaraṇa* in *Vijayanagara Sanskrit Series* No.
2. Praharājalām also expressly refers to Brahmāśiddhikāra e.g.
later than 8th Cen. A.D. even if the identity between its author and Śrūṣṭiśvara is not conceded. According to Prof. M.Hiriyanna, the probable period in which Vimuktātman alias Īṣṭasiddhikūra flourished is 850 A.D. to 1050 A.D. as Yāmunācārya, grand-teacher of Rāmānuja quotes from him. But the latter date might be pushed back. Even a superficial comparison of Rāmānuja's Mahāpurvapakṣa and Vivarana will show that the former bases his argument regarding Avidyā etc. on the latter. Nay analogies, terms, inferences are word for word, similar. The रामण्यलोकलोकम् 3, the भक्तिप्रियलोकलोकम् 4 etc. will prove this. Thus Rāmānuja seems to base his Pūrvapakṣa on Vivarana also as on Īṣṭasiddhi and so Prakṛtātman can be said to have preceded Rāmānuja. The accepted date of Rāmānuja is the latter part of the 11th century. So Prakṛtātman can be assigned to the 10th Century A.D. at the most.

Prof. Dasgupta and Rādhākrṣṇan assign him to 1200 A.D. From the references to Bhāskara in the text

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1. Vide p. 161 above.
2. Vide his Bhāṣya on B.S. I. i.
it seems that Prakṣaṁatman must have lived shortly after him. Bhāskara can be taken as a junior contemporary of S'., as represented by the tradition. Probably 9th Cen. (second part) might be the correct date, of Prakṣaṁatman.

Following works go in his name:-

Pancapādikā-Vivarāna (published in the Vija-
nagran Sanskrit Series ), (ii) Sādā-niṁayā, (iii) Mānasollāsa, (iv) Sārīrakanyāyasaṅgraha, (v) Laukikanyāya-
Muktāvalī.

1. Pāncapādikā-Vivarāna.- As the name points out, it is a commentary on Pāncapādikā only on the Cākṣūśīr portion. The work is divided into nine chapters in accordance with the original. It seems that only the Cākṣūśīr portion of Pāncapādikā was extant after the mishap to it at the hands of the maternal uncle of Padmapāda even though the title Pāncapādikā avers a gloss on the first five Pādas being rested by
Śaṅkarācārya. The extant composition of Vivarana is complete in itself. It is the best manual of Advaita, discussing all the salient features in detail. Though it contains many a discussion on subtle matters or difficult problems, still it is an interesting reading. Nobody who is desirous of obtaining information regarding the essentials of Advaita can go without it. It has immortalized the author for all times to come.

(ii) Śābda-nirnaya.- It is a booklet discussing the various views on śābda-bodha or the process of cognition, a very important point in Indian Philosophy where all have their own say - (Published in Kerala-Hassan, Trivandrum, series no. 183).

(iii) Menasollāsa.- Whether the namesake going in Suresvara's name is wrongly attributed to him or whether there existed a separate composition bearing the name cannot be decided. The extant work published as Suresvara's, contains glorification of the term अम्ल. The last stanza goes "अधार्मिक-भाषा भविष्याभास सिद्धान्तः

प्रकाशगतः के निव ह्यं अक्षुरोहिष्ठः प्रकाशार्धम्!

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1 cf. १०८४ भृगुप्त विश्वामित्र राजाले जानेकर भविष्याने।

२ अभिप्रेरणा-प्रकाशम् अंके आयेति कुटूटमिती। (Commentary on the 8th verse)
Doubt arises whether this work could belong to Prakāśātman. There are references to the author of the दलितांमूर्तिस्तोत्र as Guru which would go to prove the composition of Mānasollāsa by Sāṅkarācārya's pupil, viz., Suresvara. Many verses in the commentary resemble the Vārttikas. Further deep investigation is necessary in the matter.

The remaining two books, viz., लोकव्याचरणम् and एष्टविचारसंग्रहम्, are neither published nor available in manuscript. The former may be related to Brahmāsūtras.

As in the case of almost all famous Sanskrit writers, no information regarding the life, the whereabouts etc. of Prakāśātman is available. The only data we have is that he was a pupil of Ananyānubhava whom he salutes at the beginning of his work.1

Prakāśātman's Pratibimbavāda.—As has already been pointed out, Prakāśātman is the arch-stone of Pratibimbavāda. Padmapāda depicted the Pratibimba theory only in

1. किंद्रे तत्तत्त्वमात्रमेव तत्त्त्वमेव तत्त्त्वमात्रायाम... अर्थं न सौदर्शनम् (I salute him, the preceptor, who has fortified his name Ananyānubhava through the realisation of Brahman illuminated at the knowledge of real Ātman).

2. The following estimate of the Pratibimbavāda is based on the विवरणम्, the magnum opus of Prakāśātman.
elements or in outline. Prakāśātman has discussed it in detail and proved it to be the only correct position, having refuted the Avaschēda theory. This discussion takes place in connection with the relation between the Jīva and Brahman. Brahman is the highest and purest one, the only Reality, the one without a second. It is the same as Ātman. Here the question arises of the experience. We see so many Ātmans acting as knowers etc. So if Brahman or Ātman is the only Reality, how the world and its happenings came into being. This problem is technically styled in Advaita as समाजात्मानस्तः (Classification as the knower, the object of knowledge and the means of knowledge etc.)

The knower is the Jīva and the variety of objects in this universe constitutes the Viṣaya or object of knowledge.

Thus the existence which falls to our view is divided into two classes animate and inanimate. Brahman which is described in the Śrutis as Prajñānaghana consisting of

1 तृतीय सिद्धांतकालिने प्रमाणं नृतीतियां अवचड़कालः । जिवानमः तृतीयः ॥
Knowledge and hence अविद्या (One homogeneous whole), presents itself variously as Jīva (the individual soul), Jagat (the world), etc. How this happens is to be investigated, that is the Problem of Indian Philosophy or rather of Advaita.

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Prakāśātmāna discusses this Jīva
Its Nature --- in detail. It is the reflection
(Pratibimba) of Brahman in Avidyā (Nascience) according
to him. We will see later on the nature of the Nascience according to Prakāśātmāna. This much would suffice to note here that Avidyā and Māyā are identical in his opinion on the authority of Pāḍmapāda. Thus Brahman or the highest Self is the Prototype (Bimba) and Jīva or the individual soul is its Reflection or image in the Nascience. We have already seen the nature of this reflection or how it occurs while dealing with Pāḍmapāda. The Bimba or the original is not at all contaminated by the impurities of the Nascience. The image is influenced by the colour or the uncleanness of the material in which it is reflected.

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1. प्रतिमा रत्नाकर स्वतंत्र जीवनेपर प्रतिमित् संसारे परमदेहः साधारणाकेर लक्षणिको तत्त्वप्रतिमित्। इसे p. 45
2. इसे p. 85 above.
3. इसे p. 52 above.
reflection of moon in moving water also moves but this
does not make the real moon move. So also the faults
of Avidyā or Nescience colour the reflection and thus
distinguish it from the prototype. Thus Jīva becomes
limited.

As has already been noted above, Madhusūdana
Sarasvatī distinguishes between Ābhāsavāda and Prati-
bīmbavāda as follows:— According to the former the
reflection is Māyā or unreal while the latter take
it to be real. This statement seems to be based on
Prakāśātman’s exposition of Pratibīmbavāda as Padmapāda
does not appear to stress this point. He only remarks
that the unity or rather the identity (एकत्व) between
the बीमा and Pratibīmba is true. While refuting
the criticism of Bhāskara against the Pratibīmbavāda
Prakāśātman writes:— अन्न उपर्युक्तावली, प्रतिबिंभाप्रेमस्थानाजुगप्रायणां
गौतम: प्रतिबिंभाप्रेमस्थानाजुगप्रायणां
गौतम: प्रतिबिंभाप्रेमस्थानाजुगप्रायणां
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गौतम: प्रतिबिंभाप्रेमस्थानाजुगप्रायणां
गौतम: प्रतिबिंभाप्रेमस्थानाजुगप्रायणां
गौतम: प्रतिबिंभाप्रेमस्थानाजुगप्रायणां

1. Vide p. 35 above.

2. Vide p. 92 above. Pratibīmbabodha, Mundanadigīti Pratibīmbānyāśī: śīīṣyād

आत्मवादन: Siddhanāthaśānti p. 25.

3 Vide p. 88 above.
Here the Nihilist talks that the individual soul cannot be the reflection (of Brahman) for the reflection is (on all hands) accepted to be false. To this (is to be replied) that falsity is not accepted (lit. desired) of the reflections of the face (in the mirror) and the Cit or Brahman (in Nescience). Even though the distinction as such or the reversion are taken to be unreal, no damage is (wrought) to either the face or the भेतन्त्र. We take the face and the Cit to be the Prototype. So this absurd statement is nothing but illusion on his part arising out of misconstruction of our views]. Here Prakāśātman expressly says that the reflection is not an अवस्था or unreal but it is real and so there is nothing wrong in taking Jīva to be the reflection of Brahman. Jīva being one with Brahman must also be real. Pratibilāma-vāda does not make it unreal and thus it is not incongruent with the highest Doctrine, viz., आके दृष्टीम नापेत्। (The individual soul is Brahman itself and nothing else).
This Pratibimbavāda is backed by Sruti itself. Prakāśātman quotes scriptural passages in this connec-

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Authority for Pratibimbā-Vāda (He became reflected in every object). He also gives Smṛti, viz., एकधा लक्ष्मी वनेन हस्यने नरमण्डल: 1 (It appears as one and also manyfold like the moon in water). The Sūtrakāra also supports it. अनं एव प्रेमस्य सूक्ष्मतातिः ।

[That is why it is compared to the reflection of the sun (in the water)].

How Brahman which is invisible and incorporeal can be reflected? The answer is that it happens like the sky or ether. Do we not see its Possibility the sky reflected in water even though it is āmbu or incorporeal. Likewise Brahman though it is (नील ) formless and impartite (निरस्त्रता) becomes reflected in Nescience. Has not Saṅkarācārya said "अभावोदेहम् एवं हस्यनेन अन्तःस्तितं विकृता गणिति।" (प्र.० १० ७ १)।

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1. To what Smṛti he refers is not clear. But he gives importance many a time to प्रकाशुपरिवर्तका.cf. शिरोधारणकोटि नागो शास्त्रावलीने शाक्तेनको एकनांसन्तरस्य कौन्यपाठीयां निष्काशणः तिरुभागः।

The passage giving the prakāśa for pratiṣṭhānapāda शुमा:—

"अनं अरुपस्य प्रतिपरिवर्तका विशुद्ध एवं वैविद्यमान: नाथ इत्यं प्रेमस्य सूक्ष्मतातिः एवं सूक्ष्मताम् निरस्त्रताः प्रति- विकृतादिति गणिति।" (प्र.० १० ७)।
The objector here crops up stressing that Avacchedavāda or the Limitation Theory would be more useful in explaining the जीवांशात्मकता etc. So why not जीव or the individual soul be taken as demarked by the adjuncts like the ether in the जर? The reply of the Pratibimbavādin is that it is not proper. For the difficulty according to him in accepting this

Criticism against Brahman would have remained over and above the जीव in that case. To explain further, the individual soul would be that which is demarked or limited by the adjuncts. But then that part which is not limited would be something different from the जीव and thus the चिन्तने सिखिते, जीवं इत्यतः नास्ति would be called into question. Further the pure Brahman cannot be omnipresent and the controller etc. of everything as it cannot exist doubly within and without (तस्मानसत्तत्वविद्यतामूलम衔र्न अत्यन्त न समाद्वस्यक्स्वतः प्रत्ययोगोऽयुक्तं श्रेष्ठ अनन्ताभिनियम दीर्घकृते)1. You cannot argue that omnipresence etc. be applied to Natural Brahman and not

1. नन्दो ज्ञातायात्मकमध्यात्मिकां जीवं चिन्तन स्यात् 1५५५ प.५६
2. नासामस्तायपञ्चविद्यतामूलम् अत्यन्तं न समाद्वस्यक्स्वतः प्रत्ययोऽयुक्तं श्रेष्ठ अनन्ताभिनियम दीर्घकृते स्यात् 1५५५ प.५६
with reference to outer Brahman, for in passages like वो निःस्वाति निःचन् (who residing in Brahman) etc. do point to Brahman distinct from the individual as residing in it. No such fault accrues with the Pratibhāvādā for in that case the double existence of the sky— one natural outside and the other in reflection— can be reasoned out. Thus Brahman by its nature can remain as the controller over and above the Jīva or the individual soul. Thus it goes without saying that Pratibhāvādā is preferable to Avasāchedavādā.

This minimization of Brahman into the individual soul does not serve as the red rag to it. For do we see Devadatta pained at the sight of his small image in a socket of somebody’s eye? For he is sure that he is not so small in stature as is reflected in it. So also Brahman due to its omniscience and real knowledge does not receive any damage through being reflected in Nescience.

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1. cf. इन दुःखपेनिष्ठा दृष्टयो न अभिविधित्वादेशकः कुत्ते यो विद्ने निःशुध्यते। दृष्टानि बोधिति सिद्धेऽर्थे अभिविधितवादेशकः निःशुध्यते । उपद ४-६५

2. cf. अतः बिधेः सत्रेत्त्वं लक्षण-प्रकक्षिपात्य विभिन्नोऽस्मिन अतः बिधेः। उपद ४-६५
What is this Nescience where-in Brahman gets itself reflected? Vivarana being a gloss on Pāṇaipaśā dikā which itself is a commentary on Saṅkara-bhāṣya takes up the question of Adhyāsa at the very outset as is done in the original. The definition of Adhyāsa or superimposition as given by Saṅkara is of course accepted and amplified and supplied with reasoning. Superimposition is the appearance of another thing on one thing, as has already Avidyā been seen before. The objects (styled as तुष्टिक) have been superimposed upon the Atman or the Viṣayin and vice-versa. But these two are radically opposite to each other. What is meant by this opposition (विलेख)? Prakāśatman gives two types of opposition here. The first opposition is nothing but the absence of capability in two things of existing simultaneously in one place. When two things cannot exist at one time and in the same place, there is opposition between the two. Thus this first type of

1. Cf. तथानुप्रमाणात्रिद्विविधविनोदनकोः । सः । व. ।. ।

2. Cf. तथा क्विन्द्रो विशेषः … दूरोऽपि प्रदेशर्तमः प्रदेशमात्रायमेति कारणः पदार्थादिक विशेषः। Vivarana प. 8.
opposition refers to the place and time. The object of knowledge and the knower are opposed to each other in the sense that they do not exist in the same place and for the same time. The second type of opposition is defined by him as the absence of the capability of becoming identical in two things. One thing cannot in reality become another. (Cf. ज्ञान-प्रतिक्षेत्यात्मो न ज्ञानानाचार्यवेदयः). Thus the object and the subject being utterly distinct in their nature cannot be identical or one. The former is inanimate or insentient, while the latter is sentient and ज्ञानानाचार्यवेदयः.

Thus there is opposition between the object and subject and it follows logically that the two can never be represented as one. But the fun of the matter is that the two are identified from the very beginning of the time in nature of things. This superimposition is thus beginningless like the बृजाकुमार स्वभाव or the maxim of the seed and the sprout. The world cannot start without it. Adhyāṣa necessary for it is

1. अपराधिनु पदार्थोंको ज्ञानोत्पत्तिसः सार्वभौमः निरोधः।

2. गौरःपिदकारकाः
nothing but the association of the faults of action and enjoyment with the Ātman. Prakāśātman explains their mutual dependence as follows: तत्र भूस्तूचावतः
कर्मलाभामागममेतरोत्तरसङ्कारायतनेत अर्थात्
कर्मन न्या समाक्षेपसाध्यामागमसम्वतेन तद्रहितेन
कर्मलोभाभावत दोषसम्योगाय भूस्तूचाव नेरात्तेन नायका
प्रभागोद्वरणे निष्कालसंहाराति।

(These the superimposition of the enjoyer presupposes the super-imposition of the aactor, for a non-aactor cannot enjoy [the fruit]; further, the action requires beforehand the superimposition of attachment or hatred as a person void of love or hatred does not proceed [to do anything]; and the contamination of these impurities [viz. love and hatred etc.] has in its turn expectancy for the enjoyment as love etc. cannot arise without enjoyment etc. Thus superimposition being beginningless through the constant chain of the causes—like the seed and the sprout—is ingrained in the human nature.)

An objection is here taken that the statement "the cloth is white" can even be included under

1. आचार्य- कर्मलोकस्तूचावतरोपसाधनं योगः इत्यादिः। इतिदेशः।
Adhyāśa which same is Avidyā, if it is characterised as appearance of another thing in case of a thing. For here the whiteness would be identified with the cloth though the two are naturally distinct. Prakāśātmān remarks that in order to avoid this fault Saṅkaraścārya refers to the mixture of real and unreal. Avidyā or Nescience is the appearance of the combination of two things one of which is real and the other unreal.

Misapprehension or Mithyā is the cause of giving rise to this Adhyāśa or Avidyā. Padmapāda splits the term as Mithyā and Mithyaḥ. (Mithyaḥ is equal to indescribable Ajñāna). Prakāśātmān justifies this dissolution remarking that if mere Ajñāna is used it would go to point out the absence of knowledge and if only the term Mithyā is used, it would extend to illusion as well. In order to avoid both these faults, the word Mithyā is used. It is the material of Adhyāśa or superimposition. Either the Ātman or the inner

1. अथवास्यायनांनामसमानकालेवरून हस्त्यानं रुपं वा इत्यादितत्वानामविशेष

2. तथा त्यामी त्यान्यां नामधिकावरणं उसं स्वानं मिथ्यानं वहस्तेऽवरूपमात्र विनित्तेऽपि विश्वा व नामदानं येतादित्त्वं । १५:५ ।
organ (अज्ञाḥ) cannot be the cause, for Atman does not undergo any change and the inner organ presupposes sense-organs etc. Further, it cannot be connected with real things which are contradictory to all experience. Thus अज्ञाः alone is the cause of Adhyāśa and the same is Avidyā or Nescience.

This Ajñāna again is positive and it is not opposed to Atman. Padmapāda remarks "आज्ञामकानां असाध्यायां किमि..." Nescience is the power of Atman undoubtedly. The words अत्साठे and उपल point to the two प्रग्रह or proofs proving Nature and Pramāṇas of Nescience refers to its direct perception in the experience अवकाशः.

Herein comes the oft-quoted passage in the Vivarana, viz., सर्वे नमुः द्वारा एतकालयम् का सत्तिष्ठतथ्यम् विश्वः। (All things without exception are the object of the eternal witness either as known or not-known). Therein things which are the object through knowledge, expect

1. Ibid. ibid p. 112.

2. अर्थाधिकरिता तथा सत्ता सर्वदा विद्याविवेचनात्। Ibid p. 112.
the mediating of various proofs while others are always
cognized in general or in particular. Thus Ajñāna
also comes under the object of the witness (मात्रिन्).
The very fact that it becomes the object of perception
(in अज्ञान: "I am ignorant") proves its positive
existence and goes to deny its being the mere absence
of knowledge. Inference also shows the same thing
viz., its positiveness. The following Syllogism

\[ \text{(Vivāraṇa 6:13)} \]

(All knowledge established by one of the different means
of proof is preceded by something else, which is different
from the mere antecedent non-existence of knowledge,
which hides the object of knowledge which is terminated
by knowledge, and which exists in the same place as
knowledge; because knowledge possesses the property
of illuminating things not illumined before; just as the
light of a lamp lit in the dark illumines things). 2

1. As translated by Dr. Thibaut from Rāmānuja

2. A cursory reading of Rāmānuja-bhāṣya will prove

that he bases his grand premisa (B.S.I.1.1) on

Vivāraṇa.

3. As translated by Dr. Thibaut from Rāmānuja-bhāṣya.
very fact that knowledge through one of the means takes place, shows that it is preceded by something, which it removes by its appearance. It is not the antecedent non-existence, for it covers the object of that knowledge. For example, the darkness precedes light. The darkness covers the same objects which are illumined by that light and it resides there. Thus the substrate of the two is one and the same. One thing only can exist in a place at a time. When light appears, it removes the darkness. The fact that darkness resided there is proved by the illumination of things by light, not illuminated before. It would be argued that darkness is a mere absence of light and hence cannot be compared to positive misapprehension (अप्रकृतिको($('#$'))). The comparison on the other hand would end in making the Ajñāna itself non-existence or absence of knowledge. But this argument cannot hold water before the Advaitin who answers that darkness (अंशक्ति) is a substance over and above the absence of light. Darkness is seen
and thus has a form. We do qualify it as darkish or blue when we say नज़र नये तस्वीर etc. It cannot be said against this that a substance which has form should also possess touch and so darkness which has no 'touch' cannot be a substance. For air which has got touch (अचारण) does not possess form and so the argument that form and touch should go together topples down. Thus darkness is proved to be a substance and likewise Ajñāna also is a substance, which has the same substrate and object as that of knowledge.

Not only Inference but Presumption also proves the same thing. Take for example the standard example of Superimposition, viz., भूमिकार्थम् रचात्मकः. Here we do know that the perception of the latter is unreal. An unreal thing must have an unreal cause. For if we take a real thing for its cause the superimposition itself would be real as the effect according to us is nothing but the cause. Thus as the effect here is unreal its cause also must be sought in an
unreal thing. Similarly for the greatest superimposition on Brahman, i.e., Ahaṅkāra or Egoism, a false thing must be found out as the cause. Prakṛti-satman says: विद्युत्मवषयविधिर्मौक्तिकः निर्द्वीपकान्ताच सम्बन्धावलक्ष्य लिङ्गाकारात्मकण्य लिङ्गात्मकमेव किंविभुज महाभावस्य अन्तेत आंकेतान्तो अर्थश्रेण्यसारानान्त वसरेवरस्याकमिति

(In the case of unreal superimposition of Ego on pure Brahman or say silver on the shell - superimposition, consisting of perception of some object - some unreal cause must be found out. In taking a real thing for its cause, there would arise undesirable contingency of the superimposition being real as the effect has the same nature as the cause).

An objection here is raised that the Atman cannot be veiled by this Ajñāna. For, what is this veiling? It is surely not the destruction of light as the nature cannot be destroyed. Nor can it be obstruction to light which persists after the covering. Thus with respect to the self we cannot explain what is meant by veiling and so it is advisable to suppose that no veiling etc. takes place on the part of the Ajñāna.

1. 36.14 p.13

2. 5 तत्वशास्त्रवर्णं अज्ञानाविद्ययेः एवार्थसादननान्त:। नानावेति सत एव
उपास्य सदैव चार्ममिदं नानिकिलेकाः। 36.14 p.15
The reply is given as follows: If we analyse the notion "it is not; it does not shine" (तास्ति, न शक्यते), we must resort to the positive Ajñāna for its explanation even though there exist more than one causes pointing to it. If a jar is nearby and not covered by anything, we say 'it shines', only because there is no veil among other causes. Thus the statement 'Brahman does not exist, it does not shine' cannot otherwise be accounted for except taking positive Ajñāna for granted. Hence the non-perception of Brahman should be attributed to the veil of Nescience.

The objector here again crops up from the Bhedābheda circle. Prakāśātmāna is irritated with Bhedābheda and always takes him severely to task. He remarks: अतः ऋषिः तृतीयोधिको शरणस्वताराध्यमिष्ठीयो रुपित्वात्मानन्तरोऽविनं अत्यं नालकिति। न विनिर्देशिता वायव्यमित्वात्येव अवविवाहितामानो न्येव अभाव्यस्वरूपिनी शरणस्वताराध्यमिष्ठीयो रुपित्वात्मानन्तरोऽविनं अत्यं नालकिति। किंतु अभाव्यस्वरूपिनी शरणस्वताराध्यमिष्ठीयो रुपित्वात्मानन्तरोऽविनं अत्यं नालकिति।


2. Tādib p.17.
According to Bhāskara there does not exist positive Ajñāna over and above the absence of knowledge for it is only illusion or non-perception. Ajñāna which is at the root of this universe cannot be imagined to exist independently as something. Prakāśatman refutes this argument with a counter-question, viz., what is the nature of this so-called illusion (आश्चर्य) ? He cannot surely answer that illusion is nothing but notion of Ātman on non-Ātman consisting of body egoism, etc. for in that case he is stating Advaita view.

Prakāśatman here analyses the doctrine of Bhedābheda propounded by Bhāskara. "In case of "मैं शेर" (Khaṇḍa is a bull) you argue that there is notion of Bhedābheda. Khaṇḍa which points to a particular individual bull shows distinction while शेर (cow) refers to शेर or cowness common to all cows and thus unity of them all. But then why not say the same thing in नाग मनुकम (I am not man) for does not word मनुकम here refer to distinction while अहम to Brahman or Abheda? You
cannot deny that even in the cognition नायं स्वप्नः मूर्तिः किंतु मुखः और: (This bull is not Khaṇḍa but it is Mūnda) गोत्स्व or cownness does refer to identity. Likewise you must accept identity of Jīva with the body as well as Brahman.

Let us go further in your Bhedābhedā view.

If you argue that it pertains only to some special cases, viz., individual and species (आत्मविभागः), the quality and its substrate (गुणपुर्येऽ), cause and effect (रूपपूर्वका), part and the whole (पर्वत्सङ्गीती) and the qualified and pure nature (विशेषज्ञत्वेऽ), we ask you why cannot the relation between the body and the self come under it like the गुण and गुणितः sth. Thus your Bhedābhedā jumble cannot be accepted as it is incapable of accounting for all cases and so you must accept Abheda or unity which only is true and found in every cognition.

To come to the original problem of the nature of illusion - you cannot explain that illusion is the modification of the mind (आत्मकरणपरिणाम) for in that

1. लोकस्थानसमानो जीवसंबंधेऽपत्तिं साधारणः (5481 p.17).
2. लोकस्थानसमानो जीवसंबंधेऽपत्तिं साधारणः चोत्रि गुणमुक्तात्तुलिक्षणेऽलेखतेऽलिखितिन्नः चित्र न संगायः (सूत्रप्रकारादेवशास्त्रम्) (5481 p.17).

Prakṛti always accuses Bārthāra as वेदकारासुरंकिलिता इत्यादि विशेषज्ञताः पर्यावरणात्मकाः मुर्दकायिता उपर्यायम् (5481 p.17).

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case Avidyā would not have the self as its substrate. It cannot be argued that illusion can be modification of the mind but superimposed upon the Self for it is not compatible with Anyathākhyāti which you accept. Because in that case, Ātman and the Atmanārtha would be two separate entities and there being no third thing joining the two, Ātman would never get connected with Avidyā or Nescience (which according to you is the illusion). Nor can illusion be proved to be the modification of Ātman or the Self for the Self is accepted by all to be non-changing. Thus the Bhedābhedaśādavādin cannot explain what is the illusion which is at the root of this world. So he should not find any harm in accepting our view about Avidyā arising out of prabhāsā and in accepting it the eternal purity of the Self is not damaged at all as the connection between this prabhāsā and the Self is also imaginary.1

The superimposition of the Ego is the first

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1. अनन्यघृणालेक्षणकृतं भिन्नात्मानं भिन्नात्मानं नाचिनोर्विन्दकलाबिनि: अविद्यां भः संप्रस्फुटः। अनन्योद्धार्थसंविक्षणकोपोऽयं अविद्यां अनन्योऽभिन्नात्मानं समानतापरिश्रवस्थितायाः कृतेत्वा कर्मादिः निष्ठाविन्यासायाः। १६१० धार्मिक विज्ञानशास्त्र ४२१.
superimposition according to Pāḍmapāḍa. The objector argues that the body, unlike the mind and the sense-organs does exist over and above the self and hence cannot be said to be superimposed. The reply is that everything is created for the sake of the Self and so on the strength of the dream-experience it should be taken to be naturally unreal. Prakṛtiṃtman writes:

श्वरण्तिवृहिष्कुपस्तां मिश्रातन्त्रेऽकृतामध्यंन्ति।

संस्कृतम् परमहेमस्य।

श्वरण्तिवृहिष्कुपस्तां मिश्रातन्त्रेऽकृतामध्यंन्ति।

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संस्कृतम् परमहेमस्य।

All objects as such exist for the Self which is imagined wrongly as the doer and the enjoyer etc. These objects further can be classified into four categories. Some are to be effected by him, some are to be enjoyed while some are to be known and also there are others to be scorned off. Thus everything exists for this imaginary Jiva and thus it can be inferred to be unreal.

Thus positive misapprehension is at the root of all evil. S'ruṭi also proves it. Passages like अन्नीतं शोकवति मूलभोजः।

(Infatuated he grieves through dependence) show that मेत- or

1. sīkhā. p. 7

2. sīkhā p. 42.
misapprehension is the cause of grief. Similarly भ्रगोदेशः (covered by mist) points to Ajñāna covering Brahman. The words आकाश (darkness), भ्रगोदेश (mist), एकत्व (misapprehension) are synonyms in the Śruti. So also अवधिन Nescience in passages like आकाशायामि समस्तं (entangled completely in Nescience) proves the existence of positive entity. Arthāpatti or presumption also boils down to the same. For passages like अत्याचारः कथा श्रुयोऽरुऽमने अनन्तः... presuppose a state when Atman is not known. So to account for this behest of Śruti we must take previous positive misapprehension for granted. So also Śrutis like भ्रान्तिते दुःस्वागाय इति which describe that bondage is removed through the realization of Brahman cannot be explained without accepting a previous misapprehension as the root of the superimposition.

Thus it is proved that a positive misapprehension (आकाशायामि) is responsible for the Nescience or

1) ऐर्थिकोत्सरः - अण्डकारायामि भ्रान्तिते एकत्वः; अवधिनः अठाति - प्राणवलोकः े ध्यानसहन्ते पुनःस्वागाय इति फलसङ्गमुपघविर्तिस्य श्रुयः कृष्टः दुःस्वागाय इति भ्रान्तिते एकत्वः; प्राणवलोकः श्रुयः । ७१।५॥
superimposition. Here Prakṛtisatman discusses the point of existence as such in connection with the experience of unreal silver - He mentions the view that existence is threefold. But then this division is alternatively suggested; really speaking, there should be only twofold existence, real and unreal. Prakṛtisatman writes: 

अधिक्रियारूपोऽभावं सत्यम् (Or the existence might be accepted as threefold) परमार्थिष्ठब्धम् भूतानि: अभिशिष्टानावृद्धयमानं सत्योपाधिर्वाचारोऽभिशिष्टानावृद्धयमानं सत्योपाधिर्वाचारोऽभिशिष्टानावृद्धयमानं सत्योपाधिर्वाचारोऽभिशिष्टानावृद्धयमानं सत्योपाधिर्वाचारोऽभिशिष्टानावृद्धयमानं सत्योपाधिर्वाचारोऽभिशिष्टानावृद्धयमानं सत्योपाधिर्वाचारोऽभिशिष्टानावृद्धयमानं सत्योपाधिर्वाचारोऽभिशिष्टानावृद्धयमानं सत्योपाधिर्वाचारोऽभिशिष्टानावृद्धयमानं सत्योपाधिर्वाचारोऽभि (p.31 ibid). (The existence of Brahman is real, that of the sky etc. is qualified by Maya and is capable of undergoing fruitful action while that of the silver (in shell) is qualified by Avidya; (hence it is) styled as indescribable with reference to real existence). Objects are of three types; some are apparent like the silver in the shell or the rope-serpent, while some others - and these constitute the everyday parlance - are helpful to carry out certain end (अध्यदंश). The former have Avidya for their
adjunct, i.e. they exist due to Avidyā, projected by it. While the other type is qualified by Māyā, i.e. they are presented to our view through Māyā and these have relative stability as compared with the shell-silver type, in as much as they carry out human purpose. The former are technically called अन्तर्भाविक, apparent while the latter are अत्यधिकारिक, or which exist only for use. Brahman is altogether distinct from these two and possesses absolute Reality.

Here comes the question whether Avidyā and Māyā are distinct from each other and if so, what is this Māyā? For, the two varieties of existence owe their

Identity between Māyā and Avidyā distincion to the two, viz., Avidyā and Māyā. That which

is contaminated by Avidyā is shadowy, a phantasmagoria; while that which is related to Māyā is comparatively static. This leads us to suppose that the two are separate entities. Otherwise, if they are one and the same, as mentioned by
Padmapāda and others, only one word should be resorted to. According to some, Māyā and Avidyā are different and so instead of saying मये पतितं the proper word should be अविद्यापतितं. For they contend that Māyā and Avidyā cannot be one for Māyā is defined as मया कस्य भवायस्मात् मोहंत्या करुणिक्षुणम्. Māyā or magic is that which without infatuating its substrate acts according to the will of the performer. The magician is not confounded by his own magic. But not so with Avidyā. For it does lead away its substrate, viz., the individual soul and entangles it. Further, it does not obey the will of its substrate. Thus there is a lot of difference between the two, viz., Māyā and Avidyā. Nobody watching the magic elephant (मलकदग्गी) styles it Avidyā or Nescience. This view is contradicted by Prakṛtiśetman who analyses the idea of distinction. We distinguish between two things if their characteristics are different or on the strength of the worldly parlance. But here

1. अनं कैसियते: - अलोकितयत्वयथसत्मत्विन् बलाच न गुणाभुक्तयथसत्मत्विन्।
2. अनं कैसिएति तत्र भवेत्: - गुणाभुक्तन् न भवेत्।

93 P. 31
there is no distinction as far as their respective characteristics are concerned. Both are indescribable and present wrong appearance obstructing the real nature. Both माया and मायारत्न are perversions of the real state. Still they are presented to us and we do perceive them, might be for a moment. Thus we cannot describe their real nature whether they are real or unreal and hence they are indescribable. An objection is here taken that माया cannot be called indescribable. The reply is given in the negative. Nobody applies the word माया to a real thing but to only an unreal but seen thing. Thus there is not great difference between the two such as to be made much of. Moreover Sruti itself identifies the two, when it states मायं तु अवैतिक विवेकं। (let him know माया to be the primumordial stage). The distinction as stated in non-infatuation and otherwise of the substrate also does not hold good. For,

1. अनिर्वचनीयता तत्त्वानेक्षेत्रप्रति अविभाज्यात्मासतत्त्वत्वात् निर्वचनं । १८५६ ।
2. मायेश्वरित्स्वयमात् एव माया न अविभाज्यते। १८५६ । परिशिव नामविशेषत्वं सामान्यविशेषकारः । १८५६ ।
the case of Avidyā also the will of the substrate can be carried out into practice. When a man purposely puts his finger before his eye, does he not perceive two moons etc.? When both Sūtrī and Smṛti proclaim the two to be identical, who can question it? Sūtrī shows the unity when it puts the term Māyā instead of Avidyā in Bṛhadāraṇyaka 1.3.15. Smṛti also follows it - तरंतत्र विद्वान् निलल्ला हृदि मात्रम् निविद्धिते। योगी मुखाभिमाना न विखालनो न (Bow to Him - to One who is immeasurable and constituted of illumination - setting whom in his heart the Yogin crosses the vast Nescience, the Māyā). The Sūtrakāra also has the same identity in his mind in giving out the aphorism मात्रम् तु विकृतिनम् ॥

3. The Bhāṣyakāra also has often and referred to them as one and the same. The commentator Padmapāda expresses this in clear-cut terms while even the author of Brahmasiddhi also identifies them. Thus on the strength of the tradition it should be accepted that both are one and the same.

1. सदाशिरसाति अहुरांवलिपिमारिनी विमूच्छेतोष्ठकान्तिमग्नात् अनुपायेऽविद्याय
2. ब्र. ३२. ३०. १. ३
3. अद्वितीयप्रायोगिकप्रमाणस्य विकृतिप्रमाणस्य तथा विकृतिप्रमाणयोगिः निर्देशानि। दिनोक्तः
4. आविश्वास सारदारक्षरितविनिभुतानां नृषान्तिसिद्धिनायां नृत्येर्यावरथक्षरै सारसिद्धान्तस्य
5. निर्देशानि। [Ibid. p 32]

It is not clear whether he accepts the identity between शास्त्रसिद्धि and दाशिनकार but mostly he must have presupposed it as Mahādy Mīraśī was also Śīl's pupil. Otherwise there is no point in stating him after Padmapāda. Had he preceded Śīl, his opinion should come between the Sūtrakāra & Bhāṣyakāra.
Resort of Avidyā.—An interesting discussion in this connection occupies an important place in Advaita compositions. It verges round the problem of the substrate of Avidyā. To whom does it belong? For, it cannot be attributed to Brahman which is निर्विकल्पित प्रारुढः भव (eternally pure and hence without any contamination such as Avidyā, etc.) nor can it belong to Jīva which itself is a product thereof. Prakṣeṣṭman discusses this point and comes to the conclusion that it belongs to Brahman. He refutes the view that Jīva is the Āśraya remarking भन । सारा सरस्य भास्यते। कारणस्येकपत्नानां न आनामि। This view is attributed to Bhāskara according to Vivaraṇa-Prameya-Saṅgraha of Bhāratītīrtha. Prakṣeṣṭman analyses this point urging the objector to state.

1. आत्मा तस्माद प्रारूढः भवन्ति आत्मावते। अन्तः भवन्ति सति विषयः भवन्ति।—भास्कररूपी। ग्रंथा पृ. १५।

The Ajñāna belongs to the Jīva and it is with reference to the Jīva itself.

2. विषयं भवस्येकर्तव्यं कुर्बन्ते विषयं भवन्ति। महते तत्त्वं नानादेवत। अतः अस्तित्वं नु भवन्ति धिनिन्त्य।—तर्कसम्पन्न बालविरल्लोंक विद्वानसे। विद्वान्तवत्तावनपुयोऽनेव।—Vivaraṇa-Prameya-Saṅgraha p. 59.
whether the Self is omniscient or not? If not, then it amounts to saying that he will, at times, know nothing (अज्ञानः विद्यानोक्तः कषायगतः विद्यास्य गतिष्ठ स्वाभाविकः). Thus ultimately अज्ञान belongs to आत्मन. Further, what is this अज्ञान (ignorance) which is attributed to the inner organ? If something other than knowledge (ज्ञानदार्शन) like the eye-disease etc., we have no objection to it. But if it is interpreted as something opposed to knowledge (ज्ञानविरोधम्), it is impossible as no contradiction is seen between knowledge and ignorance pertaining to the same object but having different substrates. Knowledge according to Bhāskara belongs to the Self while ignorance to अज्ञान (अज्ञातः ज्ञातः) or the inner organ. Thus they dwell in two distinct places, hence they cannot contradict each other. Otherwise, it would mean that one's ignorance is removed by another's knowledge. Thus it is clear that the inner organ is not fit to be the
resort of Ajñāna. So it must be attributed to Caitanya or Pure Intelligence; in other words, Brahman. Śruti does state covering of Intelligence by Ajñāna; hence Brahman is the real resort of Ajñāna.

Thus Avidyā or Ajñāna, according to Prakāśātmā, belongs to Ātman. Ātman is both the substrate or subject as well as the object of it. The self through its own Avidyā does not know its Real nature. This view is not unanimously accepted in Advaita circles. Vācaspati takes Ātman to be the object while the Jīva to be the subject of Avidyā. As remarked by Dr. Dasguptā this is the fundamental difference between Viverana and Vācaspati lines. In this, according to the same authority, Prakāśātmā agrees with Suresvara and Sarvaṭātmā.

This Ajñāna is sublated by the realisation of the highest truth, viz. the identity between the individual soul and the Highest Self. This is given by the Śruti itself, e.g., दिशने दुर्दशालिलकिन्ने सर्वसंज्ञानः ॥ ॥ तस्मात आर्यम शक्तिति
लाभिने इते परमार्थे ॥ or in passages like आर्यम शक्तिति विशेषायनिन्न.
But what is this sublation or आर्यम or putting an end of आर्यम? Prakṛṣṭatman defines it as आर्यम शक्तिति विशेषायनिन्न.
Pratiṣṭhānaḥ na sā Ṛg-sūtraḥ Viśevadāniḥ (8.34). Sublation is the destruction of Ajñāna root and branch, so that its product also shatters. It is obvious that an effect cannot stand without the cause, hence when Ajñāna, the foundation of this universe-illusion is put an end to, it necessarily presupposes that the effect or product of Ajñāna, viz., superimposition and the paraphernalia also cannot stand. When there is no semblance of Ajñāna left behind the final sublation takes place termed by the Śruti as आर्यम शक्तिति विशेषायनिन्न.

The product of Ajñāna can be twofold. The first type
consists of the paraphernalia of superimposition etc. existing in fact. This refers to the states of the dream and the waking when the inner organ is active, in giving rise to variety of projections. This is called अविलीन merged product lying dormant in subtle state. The second type is that of अविलीन merged product lying dormant in subtle state. This pertains to the slumber or मुनुरिस state when according to the Advaitins the whole अविलीन becomes merged in its seed and when due to the absence of the inner organ no activity is performed. Thus this मुनुरिस stage is exclusive of the three ordinary states, viz. जागरूक्त, स्वाधिश्वास, अविलीन. It is beyond these three and hence styled as अविलीन, the fourth stage. The same is Salvation or शिवाय which is nothing but the attainment (or rather realisation) of the natural state of the Self. This is the sublation or अथ of Ajñāna. It is called cessation of Ajñāna (अवमाननार्थवी) which itself is Salvation. The opponents of Advaita do
take objection to the आज्ञानिदेशी on the strength of the real denial of any discussion of its nature. For, is it positive or negative or both? If positive, it would be existing over and above Brahman and thus would call its one-ness in question. Nor can it be negative as nobody exerts himself for some negation. Thus the nature of आज्ञानिदेशी cannot be precisely stated. This point is discussed in detail by later writers like Ānandabodha.

That the आज्ञाना is put an end to is proved on the strength of Sruti which is the last or final word according to Advaitins. Of course direct realisation (अतुलनतत्व) or experience does apply to the case but only in case of selected few. To silence the opponents Sruti passages are flung in their faces.

What is this world then if Brahman is the only reality? Is it identical to Brahman or not? If it is, Brahman would be involved in many faults like momentariness etc. which pertain to the world. If it is not identical with
Brahman, then the Oneness (अनिवृत्तित्व) of Brahman would be lost. To escape from the horns of this dilemma Advaitins answer that the world is and is not identical to Brahman. It is one with it in the sense that it depends upon Brahman for its existence and it is not so in the sense that it is distinct from Brahman in so many respects, viz. अनिवृत्तित्व etc.

Parāśākata here records various rulings in Indian Philosophy about the nature or constituents of the universe. He begins with the Vedántins who take the world to consist of name, form and action. The Bhāṭṭas divide it into four, viz., object, quality, action and generality. S'āivas come to five things as effect, cause, Yoga, Vidhi and end of pain while the Vais'ēśikas choose the number six adding Particularity and Samavēya to the Bhāṭṭa categories. The Jains take up seven things as Jīva, Ajīva, Ās'ēva, Samavēra, Nirjara, Bhāndha and Mokṣa.
while Prabhakaras enumerate eight entities as object, quality, action, generality, particularity, Power, Dependence and Niyoga. Naiyāyikas, as is well known hold the reality to exist in sixteen ways, viz., समन्त, प्रभेस, अनिशाच, etc. Sāṃkhyas followed by Yogas, arrive at the number twenty-five giving five sense-organs, five motor-organs, five elements and their subtle forms, mind, ego, Mahaţ, primordial matter and Purusa.

These classifications are from different points of view. The Sāṃkhyas divide the existence on the principle of gross and subtle things as seen in the world while the Naiyāyikas do the thing on a very different principle of academic discussion.

Prakāśātman is fond of recording such views in one place. Vide Vivaraṇa, p. 212 on the cause of the world and p. 232 for the various opinions regarding Brahmaṇ and Jīva.
The first is material while the other is epistemological. The Mīmāṃsakas and Vaiśeṣikas look from the common point of view. But all others except Advaitins regard the world as real while the Advaitins take it to be Avidyaka or Mithyā, existing for all practical purposes but from the highest point of reality it does not exist as it is. The apparent form of the world is analysed in three things, viz., name, form and action. And what does an object consist of? Everything we see here, has got some form and it is capable of undergoing some action. We name it such and such and that's all. Thus one thing, viz., Brahman appears many taking through Avidyā these three things. But as the Vedāntas proclaim - कथारण्यं विकारे नामपेयं मृदित्तेतेन अत्यंत। Only the material or the cause is real while all the effect is only name and so Mithyā or unreal (Cf. अत्यंतं यथेऽ आत्मस्थः...). The objector desires to know why the Advaitin should show partiality towards
Mithyātva when both the reality and unreality are common to the creation.¹ The answer is that the unreality is proved by direct perception, inference and also by the Āgama or Scripture. All the perception conveys the object as 'existing', e.g., the jar exists, the cloth exists! Thus the existence is qualified by something or is referred to some time or place. Take off these adjuncts of place and time and the thing, what remains, is the highest reality, Brahman.² Inference also leads to the same conclusion. It can be put as follows: सत्त्व विद्याम् स्वात्स्ययोऽक्षमिन् अस्तुति जस्तिनां। जलदात्तकामात्रानुविनहले मिनिस्कन्तस्तत्॥ शैवश्रवणः

All effects or transformations if analysed point to unity of cause as one nature underlies them all like the many reflections of the moon. The द्वृत्तिः are given as जलदात्तका, नार्यमात्रा, शैवश्रवणः. An effect presupposes cause and distinction is founded upon unity. Arthāpatti or presumption also proves the same thing in as much as the world undergoes birth or creation.

¹ कुम: तुषात: सत्त्वस्यभासाभावाय मूम्पो मिद्ईत्तेत: पश्चात: । ॥ १६६॥

² अतः द्वृत्तिकानुस्तुतं भासा भासाय जातिनां जातिनां जातिनां जातिनां । ॥ १६६॥ ॥ २०७॥
and destruction. A thing which can be created and destroyed, i.e., which can be changed cannot be eternal or absolutely real for the nature can never be subjected to transformation. Thus ज्ञान, अनुभव, असंवेदनः संपन्नति-go to support Scripture which proclaims आत्मादिवेद्व मायेपूर्वे... (This verily was darkness at the beginning .... ) or मायेतु प्रकृति विश्वात्। (Know the primordial matter to be Māyā). The first cause thus cannot be described whether real or unreal and its effect being identical with it has the same nature viz. मिश्रतृत्व or indescribability. So the Advaitins do not blindly give out anything.

Why then this world if unreal finds place in the Scripture wherein the creation etc. is described in detail as अभिषेकः अभिभाषः संबोधः etc. The Advaitin admits that passages like दूरं सर्वं सर्वात्मनः do refer to the world, but it does not mean that the Scripture is interested in describing it. The purpose behind

\[\text{अधिपतिराधि - प्रसंगन्धमनिर्विन्नोऽनुपपश्चै तस्मि विन्दविप्रमशेना}\]

\[\text{Ibid p.208}\]
this mention is altogether different. It speaks in the same breath as "नेत्रिः-नेत्रिः" (This is not...) and properly reconciling the two things we cannot but conclude that the mention of the creation etc. is for the sake of negation. The purpose of Veda, as admitted on all hands, is to state things not known before...

(अमलकोपलं). The world is already visualised and so is an object of direct perception. It needs no express mention in the Scripture without some special purpose. So the Scripture refers to the universe to point out its unreality, from the highest plane. The objector is at his wits' end to understand why the scripture should take all the trouble to prove that Brahma is the cause of this world if its purpose is to throw it away later on? Who but a fool involves himself into a mess and then try to get rid of it?

The popular proverb goes प्रकृतज्ञानीरुपम्म दुस्तरस्य सर्वस्वस्वरूपम्।

The Advaitin replies that the Scripture does betray full cognizance of this maxim. The world is

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1 तेर्निः बुद्धिः: महर्षिपादलक्ष्मीसानि साध्विकोहितप्रसाांम् अनुकृष्ट-कलास्विन्यः कर्षितवर्त्ताय हितकालक्यान्तर्काल्याकालिकोपस्यात्मवियोजनं अवतारवति।

2. यद्नू सत्त्वं प्रथमं लोकस्य सर्वस्वस्वरूपम्: प्रथमं ज्ञातस्य सर्वस्वस्वरूपम्।

Sutrakriti, ibid pp. 97.
taken up in order to make Brahman known and thus help the devotee to his goal. The objector might be knowing the maxim of Arundhatī. The negation always takes place in case of known things. In order to fight out, an opponent is required; thus प्राकृतिक न मे हो एवं न प्राकृतिक न नाते नामितम् नामि प्राकृतम्।

Thus the scripture takes this world to have emanated from the Brahman due to Māyā. This Māyā is responsible for all duality, distinctions, evil in the world. A question arises here why should not then Māyā be regarded independently as the cause of this world if it has the lion's share in the creation? Let Māyā be equal to Prakṛti, the primordial matter (Śruti does mention it as मनि नु सक्तिर विभक्त). and thus the material cause of the world. The reply given by Prakṛśītaṃ man is that the scripture does not mention Māyā as the cause but on the other hand passages like दुस्मिते मागाथि: ... represent it only as

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1. आचार्यमण्डिलालप्राचीनिकर्तवम्। सर्वोपरि नृ-मार्तलप्राचीनसाध्वीदेव प्राचरण श्रृंगारिणी अनुभवसाहित्यातिपुरुषर्च्छिन्नसिंहसिंहमुन्मुनैति विषेषो गुणस्तो। अः तथा।

2. Cf. The Nyāya dēlum of लिङ्ग सङ्ग्रहेभेन नासाक्षेपे साधो।

3. Vide Viśvaśāpa 6.211.
an instrument; further Brahman is directly referred to as the cause, e.g. यदेवादि वृत्तिः भूतस्य आत्मस्य आदि.

or आत्मस्य आदि. The objector suggests that the two then be taken as the cause like the two chords making one rope. Māyā might have been identified through implication (ेत्रते ) with Brahman in the scriptures. The reply is that Māyā is equal to Intellect (प्रेत ) and so same as श्रेष्ठसेवय, hence no contradiction in taking Māyā equal to Brahman. It cannot be urged that the word Māyā is applied to magic alone and that nobody calls one who has excellent brain as Māyāvin for the term Māyā which expresses the effect has been metaphorically applied to the cause and thus there is no fault. This is clear from passages like भूतस्य देवानि विज्ञानमानि मिनुमि।

Thus Brahman qualified by the indescribable

1 तवी परमेविनी एवानि व्रिज्ञानी जुगक्षताते स्मान्। अर्थभाबस्य \(\text{त्वमि} \) साधारणमा अर्थि जुगक्षाते देवानिमि स्मान्। २ विवायम् १.२१।

2 नथ श्रृणिविनासानि मायाधवलै बलाति गर्भीनि या तिरीके मायादात्रेमोक्ति। ३बिद।
Māyā is the cause. This casuality can take place in three ways, viz., (1) Brahman qualified by Māyā may be the cause like two connected chords, or (2) Brahman having Māyā for its power (from passages like देनामाहिः स्वगुणे निषुद्धिः), or (3) Brahman as the support of Māyā which is the material cause of the world. Here the second and the third views make Māyā depend upon Brahman and hence the world also depends upon it through Māyā. If Māyā is a power of Brahman both become identical according to the dictum शास्त्रेण्कायिकतेऽकष्म: and thus Brahman is the ultimate cause. If Brahman is taken as the resort of Māyā then the whole world being an emanation of Māyā ultimately is based on Brahman. Thus Brahman is the final cause. According to the first view Māyā becomes a quality (विशेष) of Brahman and thus subordinate to it, by the power of implication Māyā itself points to Brahman which indirectly

1. नैविध्यमनं संबंधितं स्थिः संघुरस्वनामालाक्षितेऽवेदात् कारणादिति ना
   -- मायाधिक्षरकणामिति ना सत्त्वदर्शनन्यायश्च अवेदन्तार्थाति ना। विद्येन्दु । २।
2. उत्तरपूर्वक्षोद्व प्राचार्यां ब्रह्माक्षरं विपणीतां क्रियामिति प्रकृतिपरं
   श्लोकिः यथा अंगुपतिन्तकारकदाविभाजी यथे अवेदन्तान्तरोक्तम प्रोक्ते। विद्येन्दु ।
3. ततन विशेषज्ञस्तन्ते सत्त्वनामालाक्षितेऽवेदात् सामाजिकालक्षिकम्
   कठोणेन मायाधिक्षरकणां वेदेन्न संबंधाविषयं।
produces the world when entangled by it.

The causality of Brahman according to Advaitins takes place by Vivarta which is defined by Prakāśātman as एवं तत्तदारक्षुतस्य वृत्तिशीलतास्मातानावतासोि (p. 212). Apparent view of many perverted forms on one thing which is not changed during the time. Thus all this variety of the world does not effect any change in Brahman whereupon it is projected. This Vivarta is distinguished from transformation (or परिवर्तन ) which is एवं वृत्तिशीलतास्मातानावतासोि। Pariṇāma means change of the form after giving up the first form. Milk is changed into curds where the former form is given up once for all. If Brahman is taken as the cause of this world through transformation, then it is bound to undergo change which is accompanied by momentariness. Bhāskara, among the Vedāntins, takes to Pariṇāma Vāda and meets severe criticism at the hands of Advaitins.
Prakāśātmāna takes every opportunity to refute him on all fronts — may be Avidyā, Bhedābheda, Pariṇāma and what not! — The main objection against it is that there is no proof proving it. Brahman is not an object of direct perception; hence Pratyakṣa cannot proceed to prove Pariṇāmavāda. Inference also is not useful as the Scripture describes Brahman as श्रेष्ठ-कार्यो विद्यान्ते अत्सर्थ मन्यस् मूर्ति ०१ मेधा तन्मेच्छ अतिरिक्तमते etc. Agama does not support it, as no word like transformation (परिनाम) is met with in the Scripture. The term 'real' (सत्य) also is not heard with reference to the creation. The Pariṇāmavādin cannot argue that identity between Brahman and the world in the form of continuity makes it real, for the identity is not known before the realisation. Thus the only purpose of the Scripture in giving the process of creation is to nullify it later on. So on the strength of the Scripture Vivarta or apparent

1 सत्यं तत्त्वं तत्त्वं: परिणामो अवेश्यासख्य सत्यस्त: प्रप्तसप्तां जलिपया वामपालिति येत् । नायु अस्वाभावस्यात पर । Gītā २०६

2 तत्त्वं परंतपं अत्साक्षे शक्त्यक्ष शक्त्यक्षा इति चैत। लोम्बतिरेत्युक्तमाकारिः सर्वस्चिद्विश्रृंगै: तत्परिमर्दते। शैवधार्मिकिन्तु सर्वाधिकारिः हैल: नित्यानुवाचायुक्तकुशल सिद्धिशीतोऽन्तः प्रकाशाभाष्यं अर्थाभावाभागाभेष्म सिद्धिः। Gītā २०६
presentation is preferable to Pariṇāmavāda. In this way Brahman without undergoing any contamination happens to be the cause of the world through Avidyā or Mayā. But this causality is from the practical point of view, in as much as, the world with all distinctions appears only up to the moment of realisation of the highest Reality. Once there is realisation, all the evil vanishes with the world.

How to achieve this realisation is a problem. Herein consists the practical side of Advaita Vedānta. Experience or Anubhava is regarded to be the final proof which tells against the charge of dogmatism against levelled against Advaitins. Direct experience of the Reality puts an end to all infatuation and illusion etc. It is the goal bestowing final beatitude. It is the knowledge of Brahman, void of all qualified etc. It is argued that this knowledge of Brahman also
should be Mithyā as it rests on superimposition in
that it requires the knower etc. This is accepted
as long as the distinction as knower, the object
of knowledge etc. persists. But when everything
is merged in One at the moment of realisation, the
unreality is shed out. Unreality or Mithyātva
depends not on superimposition but on sublation.
Whatever is sublated later on is Mithyā. The
world is Mithyā not because it comes out of super-
imposition but because its independent existence
vanishes to the eye of a Brahmajānīn. To a
layman the world is not Mithyā while to a Jñānīn
it is. Thus it has only a relative existence.
So also knowledge of Brahman when it involves all
the distinction etc. The impression and influence
of this world is to be removed from the mind. The
Advaita furnishes two types of means for this —
Internal (अन्तर्गत्), viz., ज्ञ, अम, अभ... etc.

1. अनु मृतस्थलायिणि अधाशोपालकतान्तरामिश्यितामर्यादा।
मार्गं तत्त्वं प्रभुमात्रमुखं अयोरकृतमेव लग्नं अर्थातः नवविद्यामिश्रं
द्वे अहंसायिणि भवत्र। ज्ञविद्यायिणि आधाराध्यायी मिश्यितां अध्यात्मको
विश्वस्तान्तरामन्तरान।
and External as संस्कार etc. The gradual development of the purification of mind as given by Suresvara has been accepted by almost all Advaitins though there is some small difference of opinion on some points. That Karma is useful only for the purification of mind (सिद्धान्त) and not directly helpful to knowledge is unanimously accepted. Sannyāsa also is regarded as essential for Śāṅkara. Prakṛṣṭātmaka refutes the view of combination of Jhāna and Karma held by Bhāskara. He points out that there is nothing to be achieved by knowledge (विद्या) in case of a Samuccayavādin for adjuncts like Karma etc. being real are not removed while if any unreal superimposition is accepted, it will be destroyed automatically, being temporary. Both variety and unity is real according to him. So Karma etc. being useful to Salvation, in his opinion, does persist on. Then what is to be removed by knowledge? Further

1. शान्तिकृतमुमुक्तयादि - अत्र कामिकेष्वेतानेच शर्मस्थ्रुततत्वी भेदाभेदमुक्तत्त्वादि विविधवाक्यादेव कर्मणेमात्रादिरमात्र विद्यातीत स उपेक्षार्थ एव। Ibid p.160.

2. मुक्तयादि: न विद्याएव अध्यात्मिकदेव पदमस्थित। कामीप्रसाधीमये धर्मसाधनाय सिद्धांचलमयाः बिद्यातिनिर्विविधवानिश्चेत्यायाः कर्मप्रकृत स्वाधेय निरुपमे। Ibid p.165.
Bhāskara argues that knowledge of Brahman takes place after knowledge of Dharma on the strength of the Samuccaya. But in that case the order should be reverted. He remarks: तत्तद्फलं कामविवेकास्मिनि कर्मसिद्धि समानं नामसमानं नामसमानं नामसमानं नामसमानं नामसमानं नामसमानं नामसमानं नामसमानं नामसमानं

His view is that Karma performed by a Jñānī in proper way leads to Salvation. So everybody should first exert for realisation of Brahman and then go in for investigation into Dharmaśāstra to understand what Karma is to be performed and what not. Thus the proper order should be Brahma-vicāra first and then Dharma-vicāra. If the devotee first indulges in Dharma-vicāra the Karmas done after that would be futile. Further persons desirous of Salvation are seen even in the first Āśrama, i.e., when he is yet a celibate student. It cannot be urged that investigation into Dharma should be gone into
first as Dharma is common to all; for the problem
is not of an ordinary man or of doing something
done by all but the ideal is to remove the illusion
and nothing else. Hence if at all investigation
into both Dharma and Brahma is necessary for Salva-
tion then the order must be reverse. But in fact
nothing is to be achieved for the Samuccayavādin
and hence no endeavour is required.

Sannyāsa is of course inevitable. This is
clear from the mention of Pravrajyā in the Srutis
like भगवान विरमेत तत् देव अत्मनं विनश्च | क्षणं श्रेयसं कैलासम् | etc.
Smṛtis enjoining paying off the three debts do not
stand in the way as these are only laudatory. It
should not be argued that (Sannyāsa) renunciation
is enjoined only for those who are not entitled for
Karma as for example the blind, lame, etc. For
the injunction goes अन्वयां कृत्तिम् भवेत् कृत्तिम् निविदिताम् | .
Renunciation can be adhered to in any stage.
Moreover the blind etc. cannot be taken as

\[ \text{अन्वयां कृत्तिम् भवेत् कृत्तिम् निविदिताम्} \]
unqualified for Karma, for the five Mahāyajñīs are prescribed for them also. Blindness etc. is not a passport to Sannyāsa but the required qualification is detachment of mind. Moreover, it is prescribed only for those whose sense-organs are strong as given in passages like: यस्मिन् भूते विचुंबुनयः, निवधो मृत्युज्ञनां कतरितां च धृते च। Only Sannyāsa leads to Realisation of the Self.

A question arises, what should be renounced. The reply given by Prakāśātman is that everything except the body should be given up. Even the sacred thread is to be thrown away as expressly mentioned in Jābālastruti which runs: अन्यत्र वर्धप्रारूढः विभासनस्त्रें।... The answer to the question how can he be a Brahmin without the sacred thread is supplied there as the Self itself is his Sacred thread. It is not proper for Bāṣkara to dub this passage as interpolation. The Maitreyaṇi

1. Vide Vivaraṇa p. 162.
2. विचुंबुनयः परिस्वलाने य स्वरूपरञ्चनिषिद्धेऽसर्वेऽ जीविताणि प. 162.
3. इत्येतोहया तथाविश्वासी य आदात्...
4. अत अवस्थनस्वातां पुरस्तवितावितायान्तरस्यार्थानिषिद्धलाभात्। केषरभक्षयोष्णीयो इति प्रवृत्तश्च जस्य भवनातुसाधिकारमिदं नालक्षणितिः अद्वित्तीयतं अवक्षचलिता। तस्यतत्त्वदेवताश्चिन्त्यमेऽर्थं पुराणिकममेव एव यथा प्रस्तुताणि। Vide Vivaraṇa p. 162.
Sruti also mentions him as उत्सर्जनकोलेश्वर 'void of the sacred thread.' Baudhāyana also includes it in the list of things to be renounced.

With the help of renunciation and guidance of proper preceptor – which is also necessary – the realisation is attained. It is Salvation.

Prakāśatman describes it as : कल्पिताशुलोकशस्योगस्याद्वादशस्य तत्तत्त्ववस्त्रकर्मस्व अवस्था-निगृहित।² Salvation consists of removal of ignorance or misapprehension giving rise to superimposition of actor and enjoyer on Brahman. When it is removed Brahman which constitutes of Pure Bliss (आनंद) is experienced and the experiencer merges in It.

This Salvation is of two types. Jivanmukti or salvation while alive and Videhamukti or that after death. The former is proved by Sruti and Smṛti. Vyāsa and others are known to be free or Tattvajñānins while alive. For, the fruit of the

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² Prakāśatman
³ Jivanmukti or salvation while alive and Vidhīmukti or that after death. The former is proved by Sruti and Smṛti. Vyāsa and others are known to be free or Tattvajñānins while alive. For, the fruit of the
Karma, the enjoyment of which is started, is not destroyed. Everything else is destroyed.

Prākāśātmān states that the realisation is unable to remove the duality producing the Prārabdha-Karma. But the Karma done hereafter does not bind him any further. The objector here raises a doubt that the Jīvanmukta knowing full well that whatever he does, has no effect, would act in any way even contrary to the Śāstra rules. The Siddhāntin retorts that there is no possibility of such fear for he would be engrossed in enjoying the Bliss, unmindful of anything. He has nothing to be achieved; much less something detrimental to this world. After enjoying the necessary remnant of the प्रारंभ he enjoys final Salvation after his death.

Thus Prākāśātmān pronounces his opinion on every salient feature of Advaita. To sum up his position, he is a staunch Pratibimbavādin regarding

1. तत्त्वस्थानमेव ज्ञानद्वारेः अर्थमये ज्ञातः स्मृतिकालार्धमन्विते।

2. नेत्रवस्थिते ज्ञानद्वारे अस्थेश्यार्थं स्मानं। न तत्वस्थिते आस्थेश्यार्थं स्मानं।

| 1. In the context of the above, the author states: |

| 2. Not in the context of the above, the author states: |
śiva as the reflection of Brahman into Avidyā which is positive (नाविद्य) and material (ज्ञ). Knowledge alone leads to Salvation for which rigorous Sannyāsa is required. He seems to be orthodox in the sense that he denies, unlike Vidyārāṇya, Brahmaidyā to women and Śūdras. He bases his views on Pañcapādikā and amplifies it supplying with proper logic.

His style is quite fluent, befitting a Prakaraṇa-Grantha Advaïta. Though somewhat terse, it is interesting reading. He refers to popular maxims like अनात्मनीयम् etc. He is a fearless critic of other views. He has a particular charge against Bhāskara whose Bhedabheda doctrine is done to pieces by him.

Some influence of Īstasiddhi is discernible as in his treatment of Anyathākhyāti or in explaining the तृतीयव्रत्तिःक्रियाः etc. But mainly he relies on Pañcapādikā. Unlike Vīmuktātman he discusses Advaïta both in theory as well as practice.

vide Vīmuktātman p. 285
He wields a greater influence than Vīmuktātman on the later Advaītins who are almost all his followers or where his opinion is not accepted, it is referred to at least for refutation. Chītākta refers to him as अज्ञानज्ञातिकर: which proves his rather earlier date.

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī makes some distinction between the presentation of Pratibimbavāda by Prakāśātman and that by Sarvajñātman. It pertains to the nature of Jīva and Īśvara. He remarks:

अज्ञानन्तरत्कर: विभिन्न ज्ञेयजन्यभीत्तर: अतः करणातस्य वाच्यविन्यासस्य अज्ञानन्तरत्करतिर्मिनि पैदान: जीवः इति विविधरणकारः। अज्ञानन्तरत्करतिर्मिनि ज्ञेयजन्यभीत्तर:। (नुस्खे-प्रतिनिधित्वाय ज्ञेयजन्य जीवः।) अज्ञानन्तरत्करतु सुविर्धवापन्तं शुद्धिन्तिमंशाप्प्राप्तिर्।

Īśvara or the cause of the world is the highest Brahman entangled into primordial Ajñāna while the Jīva is a reflection of that consciousness in the Ajñāna limited by the adjuncts of the inner organ according to Prakāśātman; while Sarvajñātman holds

1. Siddhāntabindu B.S.S. P.46
that consciousness reflected in promordial Ajñāna is Īśvara while the same reflected in the individual intellect is Jīva, while Brahman which is the prototype is not associated with any type of Ajñāna and remains pure. As to the nature of Jīva, there is not much difference as Buddhī and Antaḥkaraṇa are not distant. Sruti includes them under the mind. But while Prakāśātman takes it to be a reflection in the Antaḥkaraṇa plus the impressions, Sarvajñātman is satisfied only with the Buddhī. As to Īśvara, Prakāśātman associates the शिशुपृथ्विपत्ति with the Ajñāna which according to him surrounds it while Sarvajñātman keeps it above, making Īśvara only a reflection of that शिशुपृथ्विपत्ति which cannot be/any way connected with Ajñāna. The God also is aloof from the शिशुपृथ्विपत्ति.

It cannot be denied that Prakāśātman proved the biggest authority in Post-Saṅkara Advaita.

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1. लक्ष: कश्चेत- शिशुपृथ्विपत्ति - जीयाधिकृत एवं सत् कृष्ण
(iii) Sarvajñātman

On Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's authority, Sarvajñātman who proclaims himself to be a pupil of Devesvāra, was supposed to be a disciple of Suresvarācārya. This view was based on the identity of Devesvāra and Suresvāra as Deva and Sura are synonyms and it was argued that Sarvajñātman names him as Devesvāra because a pupil is not to take the name of the Guru. But this view has recently been contradicted.

Dr. T. Cintamani, in his introduction to Pāṇcaprakṛiyā of Sarvajñātman discusses the above problem and comes to the conclusion that the popular tradition should now be given up. For Sarvajñātman in his Pramāṇalakṣaṇa gives the order of his preceptors as follows:

1. Śreṣṭhānandapāda
2. Devānanda
3. Devesvāra
4. Sarvajñātman.

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1. Vide his commentary on Sankṣeṣa I.3 - cf. Astimāṇī: देवानंद अवज्ञानार्थतः सुपरवर्धने देवेस्वरस्य: साधूकेत्य
   नाममन्यायारथः।


3 Vide p. vii
Thus it is clear that Devesvara, a pupil of one Devânanda is not identical with Suresvara who was a disciple of Śaṅkaracārya. Who these preceptors were is not yet precisely known as no facts in their connection have turned up as yet.

Sarvajñātman is greatly respected by later Advaitins. He is alluded to as Sarvajñātmaśāṅcarāṇa, a title eloquent of his position in Advaita circle. He is an advocate of Pratibimbavāda which differs but slightly from Vivaraṇa School.

Date

He is rather late as compared to Īṣṭasīddhi-kāra or Vivaraṇakāra as can be seen from the fact that he quotes about seven opinions in connection with the nature of Jīva etc. He also refers to Īṣṭasīddhi-kāra in his Sāmkṣepa Sāriśka IV:14 by the term शुद्ध-निर्लक्ष्य: according to the commentators. He also expressly quotes the same authority in his

Pañcaprakriyā: This makes him posterior to nineteenth century A.D. when Vīmuktātman flourished.

At the end of his Sañkgæpa, he gives the name of the reigning king. The last but one stanza reads:

"श्रीमद्भगवानंपूजयंजराजं: संकङ्कलितम्
तथा प्राभसारिणीरत:"

(Trans.: "The ascetic known as Sarvakṣatman with his mind purified through the association with the pollen of the feet-lotus of revered Devesvara, has composed this Sañkgæpasārīraka which is verily the ornament to the minds of noble men: (composed) when King Manukulāditya, born of a royal race, commands the globe with his behest unimpeded.

Thus it is clear that Sarvakṣatman lived during the reign of one Manukulāditya. It is also obvious from his reference to God Padmanābha, presiding deity of Trivandrum, that he was associated with

1. तुलसी देविके ते - सुवन्दर्य याति कागमनामानानबधारीः
   अलोकालिता अकेतास्वर भेजेन्द्रि जैग्रेष  सत

2. अर्यिमस्वपयथे: पालस्मनस्तुपुरः
   करणक्कुस्तान्त दृष्टिप्रकाशी: 
   जानन्त्रियमेव || सारिका २५/४.६||
Trivandrum. According to Gopinatha Rao, Manukulā- 
ditya is mentioned in the Huzur Office plates and 
Tirumūlikkalam inscription of Bhāskara Bārivarman. 
The latter dates 1027 A.D. Sarvājñātman might have 
belonged to this period; at least there is nothing 
against it.

His Works

Saṃkṣepasārīraka, Pañcaprakriya	extsuperscript{a} and 
Prāmāna-
laksāna.

1. Saṃkṣepasārīraka.- As the title shows, it 
is a summary of the Saṃraka-mīmāṃsā as dealt with 
by Saṅkarācārya. It has been divided into four 
Adhyāyas named after the B.S. as Samanvaya, Virodhaparīkṣa, Sādhana and Phala. It is a voluminous 
work consisting of 1240 verses in all, though styled 
a Saṃkṣepa. It deals with all the problems commonly 
discussed in Advaita Circle and so might be

\textsuperscript{a} Vide - Introduction to Pañcaprakriya \textsuperscript{b} p. vii

\textsuperscript{b} It has been commented upon by Ānandagiri, 
pupil of Sudhānanda and also by one 
Pūrṇavidya, pupil of Vedāpūrṇa.
valued even as an independent work on Advaita. The work is his magnum opus and has served to help many pupils just initiated in Advaita. Its popularity can be judged from the number of commentaries it evoked. To mention only a few - even Madhusudana Sarasvati considered it important to comment on Sāmkṣepa. Nṛsiṁhārāma also has written a commentary on it. One Visśaveda wrote his Siddhāntaśīra on it which helped Rāmatīrtha, pupil of Kṛṣṇatīrtha to write his Anvārīrtha-Frakāśikā, while Agnīhit-Puruṣottama, pupil of this Rāmatīrtha again gave out his own commentary as Subodhinī.

2. Pāṇcasūtrakriyā.- It is a small work containing the salient points of Advaita. It is divided into five chapters, viz.: (1) दक्षिण-शिलावेलापी (2) रक्ष-आनंदपी निषेधराम, (3) तत्कामसुदिकेशरभद्ररथ (4) अनान्तरामालेकी-अष्टविन्नां (5) अष्टविक्रत्री निषेधराम. The first chapter deals with the three Vṛttis of a word, viz., - Denotion, Implication and suggestion

1. Published in Madras University Bulletin No. 4-1946.
2. Sarvajñatman gives hereunder the Mahāvākyas as "को भक्तिः'. It belongs to Śrīniggari Mutt. Does this refer to the Bhāṣa of Sarvajñatman?
The last two alone can apply to the inner self, while in the case of Tat and twaṁ only implication of the Jahedajñatī type can be resorted to. But in the interpretation of the passage मैं - हूँ (Iam Brahman) the implication of Jahatī type is to be accepted, if the term Brahman stands for the secondary or Sagunā Brahman denoting the whole paraphernalia of Ajñāna etc., and the term Aham denotes the ego. Both the words give up their primary meanings and convey by way of implication one homogeneous entity (अनेकस्वतः) viz., the Highest Atman. Thus Savaññatman states - सावानियनानेन अंतः अपि ज्ञाताः पञचमर्जानवः इत्यादि लिङ्गविशेषानां विभूति तु महंतं देवानां

At the end of this chapter he mentions

3. cf. सुन्दरो नामितं अज्ञेयं गुणविषयं अण्डः: पुराणप्रकाशिकण्ड 9.

2. अति ज्ञातो , i.e., some part retaining its meaning. Here तत्र retains its sense, viz. the Highest Brahman, void of all attributes etc. while अहम gives up its sense in as much as it means the individual soul entangled in adjuncts. These are thrown away, hence अहम as regards अहम and अहम as regards अहम - Thus अति ज्ञातं.

3. This verse also occurs in Saṁkṣetarāva.
the name of his preceptor Devesvara. The second chapter considers his Mahavyākya, viz., 31.2 Ṣaṇḍh in detail. The third deals with the passage Ṣaṇḍh while the fourth interprets other passages from Śrutī. The fifth discusses the problem of the bondage and salvation in the same manner as the Saṁksepa.

3. Pramāṇalaksana.— It deals with the epistemology of the Mīmāṃsakas. It is important to the historian in the sense that it contains the order of Sarvajñātman's preceptors.

Advaita of Sarvajñātman

As has already been stated Sarvajñātman accepts the Pratibimbavāda. The pure consciousness serves as the original (तत्स्तत्व) which gets reflected into Ajñāna and Buddhi and these reflections are styled Ṣāvāra and Jīva respectively. But the Bimbacaitanya, the eternal Kūṭastha Brahman remains aloof from any association of the adjuncts.

1. The following estimate is based upon his Saṁksepasārītraka.

2. This fact might show that he is not a disciple of Suresvara. Otherwise he would have been inclined towards Ābhāsavāda. Sarvajñātman does not innovate the Pratibimbavāda. He accepts a view in vogue before. Viole view no.(ii) on page 230 above.
At the very beginning of his work Sarvajñātman describes the Pratyakṣātman, the inner consciousness, as:-

The Brahman is styled as the Pratyagātman or Pratyakṣātman in Advaita. It implies the consciousness immanent everywhere as the essence or being. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī explains it as the consciousness void of all distinction and self-luminant. It is in consonance with the Śrutis which describes Brahman as Vijñānaghana—a homogeneous mass of consciousness. Thus the Reality is the highest Intelligence abundant and great in itself. Through its own Aijñāna various distinct forms are superimposed upon it; so also the causality. It really consists of eternal Bliss and absence of miseries. This is clear.

1. **Translation.**—The highest consciousness (which is) the only source of this universe, the greatness of which is darkened with the various distinctions, viz. the individual soul, the God, the universe etc. which are only imagined through its own misapprehension; which rests in its own natural glory, void of ignorance, is victorious.

2. He comments: प्रत्यक्षात्मकितैतीम् — प्रतिनिधि-प्रतिकीर्तितीभ्रातारूपलिं। कर्तवतीयांति:।

3. Vide Sāṅkṣeyha I. 22. The त्रि is stated to be एकाश्च which is further explained as void of miseries (निरुपंधम्) and consisting of Bliss (निराम्बस्तथा). This is proved on the strength of Shūla, inference and direct homophy.
from the direct perception or experience of the natural state in deep sleep (सुनिर्वेश्य). That the Highest Self is of nature of Bliss is established on the strength of inference also which can be stated as - "everything is aimed at Bliss while Bliss is not meant for anything else; the Ātman also has the same characteristic; hence Bliss and Ātman are identical. Sruti also speaks of Ātman as consisting of Bliss or Ānanda. The highest Ātman itself is salvation which is nothing but unsurpassed Bliss (रमणिशिष्ययसुर) and cessation of all misery. For, both these constitute its nature which is pure homogeneous consciousness and self-luminant. Some state it to be sat, cit, Bliss

1. सर्वं अदर्शमिष्टं संसु अत्मसि विकृत्वार्थम् दुःखाच्छादितां अव अमन्त्रयतां सैन्यां तत्त्वभूते हृ मुक्त्युक्तेऽक्षमाणाम्बृज्यांतर्गतामयी सुस्थे समसाराम तदानीति
Influence of Īṣṭasiddhi is discernible here, vide p. 175 above.

2. निरवित्तात्मसुर्वं च दुःखलालसुपरमणं च अत्मसि लोकसागरम्।
And उपमानापि पराक्ष: सत्यं विशालिक्षितं देहसे देहयोगक्षीयः॥
Samkhyaka T. 67-68
and one while others give it as Sat, cit and Bliss. There is no doubt that the highest reality is eternal, pure, free and enlightened, real, subtle, omnipresent and unique; it is an ocean of Bliss, the highest one.

This Pratyaksha is further equated to the highest Pada of Visnu. Most of the Advaitins are also ardent devotees and Sarvajñātman is not an exception to it. In Saṁkṣepa, 1.265 he states that तन्त् refers to the highest Pada of Visnu which is one without second (cf. अर्थं अर्थात् विवेकेऽ विशेष: परं परमः). He calls the Vaishnava Bliss as the nature of inner Self. Saṁkṣepa 1.1 describes this highest Pada of Visnu as अन्तर्गतान्तर्गतिकारणां परम्परां सबसे सबसे सच्चिदान्तत्त्वात्। असर्वनान्यकालासन्धिगुणाः परमपरं प्राणायामेव भिन्नाति॥ Thus it is opposite of material and unreal and hence pure consciousness. So also it is void of misery.

1. Saṁkṣepa 1.17
2. Saṁkṣepa 1.173
and bereft of any transformation. Madhusūdana explains it to be the essence (परि = स्वरूप) of Viśnu who is a reflection in pure Māyā. The concluding stanza of the work also contains a salutation to Viśnu.

This pure highest Ātmān is reflected in Ajñāna, the original ignorance (as it were), the primordial matter and the reflection is styled Isvāra, Paramāsāvāra, the cause of this world, the

Fratibimba Vāda

God, the witness. Usually the highest Ātmān is accepted as the eternal witness on the basis of Śruti like सती सेवा कैलाशी निर्मलावत । अनन्तनार्योजपितामहसिद् ॥; but according to Sarvajñātman the highest Cit cannot

2. मुद्रयेत् नमःनमः सतिःसमेतिः अनन्त: नादहृदयोऽर्जुनम्: अर्जुनो: बहुविधाणादिष्ठिताः नाथमात्राणी परामर्शसि। वा मायामयीमात्रानाम नानतयोऽर्जुनम्। अनन्तानन्तरादिश्वरस्वयं भविष्यान। द्वैताक्षरवादं विक्षिप्तम्। सूत्रवेदम् ॥ ४६ ॥

3. जुग्न्धुभक्त्वेश्वराध्ये विनायकारामिभवे हृदेषु कुपशाधारिणे अन्तः रथाश्रयेऽपि ऋषिते। सूत्रवेदम् ॥ ४६ ॥

3. Mundaka.
be witness as it presupposes association with the object of witness. The term Sākṣīn being relative cannot refer to the Reality which is beyond all associations and relations. Due to the adjunct of Māyā the one becomes Īśvara, hence this Īśvara-hood is not real. It resembles the redness of the crystal due to the proximity of the jasmine flower. As the highest Bliss, when reflected in the worldly objects and associated with sense-organs, is spoken of as produced etc., likewise the One eternal when reflected in the Māyā is styled Īśvara. According to some God-hood should also be considered as a constituent of the highest Ātman but this is not correct as Sruti never refers to it, as it refers to consciousness.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{1}}\text{Sākṣīn - Vijnāna, Vijnānakārta, Vijnānabādha.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{2}}\text{Sankara, \textit{Sāṅgītakāra} III. 182.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{3}}\text{\textit{Prabhāsāntaka} III. 170.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{4}}\text{\textit{Prabhāsāntaka} III. 148.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{5}}\text{\textit{Prabhāsāntaka} III. 152.}\]
(सिन्धु) or Bliss (अनेन्द्र) of the आत्मन. On the contrary in passages like नेति नेति --- ... ...
God-hood is denied and what remains as the ultimate Reality is only faultless pure Cit (cf. Saṁkṣepa-III. 162). Hence the term Īśvara or God with reference to the आत्मन is metaphorical conveying independence.
Likewise the term Paramēśvara also is only laudatory.
Sarva-jñātman argues :-

सार्वज्ञात्मना स विशेषतब्रह्मात्मेन्द्रे स नामात्मश्च तत्
विभाज्येऽवै धार्मिकः सपेश्वराय द्वेषम्।
स्वात्मानत्वाभिक्षितं भवति वन्मात्यायमेव स्वभावतः
लक्षाधिकारतां कल्पिततुष्टी समानसं।।Saṁkṣepa-III.193.

(Trans.: The generality cannot stand independently in the absence of a particular thing and the latter without the former. Hence (it follows) that this dual is relative and what is relative is made up of माया like the dream. Therefore we accept God-hood etc. as imaginary on logical sequence).

In the popular usage 'Māṇavaka' lion', the term lion suggests the valour of Māṇavaka. Likewise the term Īśvara in case of Brahma suggests Independence or Self-sufficiency of Brahma.
Generality and the individual go together. Similarly the witness goes with the object and same is the case of God-hood. For a Lord requires things to rule. A ruler cannot be without the subjects. These are thus relative and not independent by themselves; hence they cannot be included in Reality which is bereft of any duality. Thus God-hood, witness, etc. belong to the Kāryabrahman.

This interpretation of Brahman void of even Sāṅgītva, Īśvaratva, etc. requires some innovation in the representation of Pratibhānavāda as given by Prakāśātman, who opines that Īśvara is nothing but Brahman associated or surrounded by Māyā. Sarvajñātman effected essential distinction between Īśvara and Brahman in as much as the former is the reflection of the latter and the two are not the same.

The Jīva or the individual soul is the reflection of the Bimba-caitanya in the individual intellect
which is a product of Māyā and hence is called
Kāryopādhi or adjunct of the effects. While
interpreting the passage 'Thou art That' (तत्त्वज्ञान)
Sarvajñātman analyses the idea behind Pratibimbāvāda. Four things according to him are understood
in the terms तन्मय and समय. The adjunct or the
Upādhi, the appearance of Cit on it (which is
styled Aupādhika), the reflection and the proto-
type are these four entities. In case of Tat
the adjunct means the beginningless cosmic Ajñāna
while the Aupādhika or appearance of Cit (चिन्तमान)
is God-hood (Īsvaratva), the Cit going with it is
the reflection while the original is the pure
consciousness. While with respect to 'Thou' (or
समय), the adjunct consists of the mind, the
appearance is here the individuality or Jīvatva,

1  उपाधिभेतार्थायथाबन्धन्ति विचिन्तितान् न

2  उपाधिभेतार्थायथाबन्धन्ति अमर्निपिराभ्यामाणीक्षरतम्यू।

उपाधिभेतार्थायथाबन्धन्ति अमर्निपिराभ्यामाणीक्षरतम्यू।

वर्णिताः चिन्तयित्वस्य वै गुरुवीचितं शुचियिस्तेन चिन्तयम्यू।
the consciousness inside it is the reflection and
that which is not connected is the original or
Bimba. Out of these four things the first two,
viz., the adjunct and the appearance are unreal
while the reflection is partially real and the
original is absolutely real. It resembles to
the reflection of the sun in the water. Upto
Brahman everything is unreal, though serving the
purpose of worldly activity (सौरश्रवणशस्त्र). Once
the realisation takes place, it vanishes once
for all.

Sarvajñatman embraces the Ekajivavāda.
According to him only one individual self, viz.,
Brahman (entangled by adjuncts) exists and he
imagines the whole universe. In this connection
he remarks :-

Saimgeba II 128

1. उपाधिबिप्र่อนम् तक्षिणः वक्तुः प्राप्तेऽविवेकोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽमोऽम
(Trans.: The free as well as not-freed one, the realiser and the ignorant and all others than you, so also the universe comprising the sky and the earth, all this should be understood to be the edifice of the Ātman due to his own nescience; do not take it in any other way).

As the cause, viz., the Īśvara or the witness behind the collective and individual bodies is one, the imagination of distinction or opposite entities like Vidvān, Avidvān etc. as well the objects of enjoyment viz. the elements etc. are taken to be the effect of the mind which itself is a product of Avidyā. The commentary Subodhinī on this verse goes :- अग्निमकामाक्षिक्याकलापिवृत्तेऽथात । तत्त्वेऽन्वतिक्षणस्य तत्त्वं एवं अविभाज्य अविभाज्यकेवलकोन्फलण ।

On the basis of Sruti, Avidyā is only one and hence the individual soul reflected in it should also be regarded as one. It takes many forms of enjoyers
etc. through the Avidyā. Thus two types of Avidyā viz., the cosmic one and the individual one, as propounded by Vācaspati are not necessary. When the imagination of one Jīva serves the purpose, there is no need to posit many individual souls in order to explain the everyday parlance. This should be accepted on the analogy of the dream, wherein only one soul, raises a number of persons as enjoyers and also various objects of enjoyment. This dream experience should be extended to the working state. No objection can be taken that if the Jīva is only one, nobody has as yet achieved Salvation, as the world goes on as before. For, everything is valid upto the moment of realisation. The plurality of persons etc. does exist before the realisation. The time as compared to the Vyavahāra stage is beginningless and sometime Suka got his salvation;
so also the time is infinite and somebody else would attain salvation. The persons in the dream cannot accuse one another as regards their existence etc. They do exist and take part in the activities during the period of the dream; likewise the persons do exist in the waking state and can go on with their work. Some become free while others remain bound. Hence an objection like that is not permissible.

Here Sarvajñātman enumerates some opinions as regards the relation between the Jīva and the Brahman. Commentators do not care to identify these. They are as follows:

(1) Ajñāna belongs to Jīvas which are nothing but the reflections of Brahman. This Ajñāna again has Brahman for its object in as much as the ignorance is with reference to it. Thus the Ajñāna is जीवाध्ययन and भूतविज्ञ्य. Jīvas further are many and one Ajñāna pervades them
just as the generality (Jāti), the individuals.¹

To whom in particular does this view refer is not clear. Manḍanamīśra followed by Vācaspati does regard Ajñāna as bipolar residing in Jīva and having the Brahman as their object but they are not Pratibimbavādins.²

(2) Ajñānas are many and Jīvas also are innumerable so also there are a number of devotees of Mokṣa in every aeon and they get the salvation; Māyā resides in Īśvara and provokes the world entering into the Jīvas.³

This view admits many different Jīvas and one eternal Māyā which cannot be removed by knowledge. What is the relation between the infinite Ajñānas and the Māyā is also not explained. Further the Māyā is incongruent with the salvation as also with the Advaita. So it goes without saying that this view cannot be accepted.

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1. cf. Maniṭārthavāda: Vedanta Samhita

2. Some tinge of Pratibimbavāda can be seen in examples cited by Manḍanamīśra, cf. 2.6 cf. Tattvikadhyayana

3. Antarānta: Madhyamakakārya: Sāṅgītiśāstra, p. 184-185 (82)
(3) Avidyā can be said to reside as well as not to reside in a way in Brahman, just as a bird soaring high into the sky can be described as remaining in it as also not resorting to it. Thus a thing can be looked upon from two points of view. The bird flies in the sky and therefore it is correct to describe it as 'the bird is in the sky' but as a matter of fact the bird is not a radical part of the sky and hence we may not qualify it that way. Likewise Avidyā also can be taken as belonging as well as not belonging to Brahman.

It seems a sort of Avacchedavāda but it does not appear to be held by Vācaspati. It is also akin to Bhedābheda view which regards Brahman as both Bhinna and Abhinna but it is not expressly stated here.

(4) According to this view mind alone is
responsible for the relation between the Brahman and Ajñaṇa. Thus Ajñaṇa through its projective (निशेप) nature enters into Brahman, and while entering creates infinite minds through which it resides in Brahman. With the adjunct of mind, even remaining in subtle form outside, the Ajñaṇa entangles Brahman.

This theory is liable to the fault of Mutual dependency (अनुप्रयवर्त्तता) in as much as it is claimed that Ajñaṇa depending on Brahman creates the minds and through these minds again enters Brahman.

(5) This view that Brahman influenced by Ajñaṇa gets reflected in many intellects and thereby takes the forms of static and mobile objects in the world; somewhere through proper realisation it becomes free. Thus the same Ajñaṇa, remaining in part and vanishing in part produces the Vyavahāra.

1. नवीन यथाधिकारिणि अविनाशी भावात वर्णः कारणं मूलभूताणि तत्र ज्ञानार्थं मध्यस्थस्य अलसस्वेन विशेषत्।
/तत्तत: कर्म मुक्तेन मुक्तेश्वर निलेखातः अर्थात् वैत्तिके तर्कस्य निशाचार्यानि मध्येः कुरुक्षेत्रस्य वृद्धमः। ग्रन्थनं परं ग्रन्थनं निरूपमिति तथा। अर्थात्: स्वविनाशाय विनाशाय भवति।

The Commentary of the anonymous pramukha notes:—असाधारणे विनिदेशते वर्णे अविनाशी अप्रकृतिका साधारणे मुनिजी, तवानि: निरवतमिति विनाशाय स्वविनाशाय भवति।

2. अविनाशी विनिदेशेन्द्रोदयाति कर्म मुक्तेन मुक्तेश्वर निलेखातः अर्थात् वैत्तिके तर्कस्य निशाचार्यानि मध्येः कुरुक्षेत्रस्य वृद्धमः।

तत्तत: विनिदेशेन्द्रुपतिः स ज्ञानोदयेन भवेत। अन्य स्रवणानि निरूपमिति तथाः।
(6) The Mâyā of the God is the cause of the sentient and insentient objects in this world and due to the will of the God it spreads itself upon the Jīvas like the net of the fisherman, while through His desire it contracts itself in some Jīvas; may it be taken to be either real or unreal but this much is certain that the expanse and contraction depend upon His will.

This appears to be founded on the utterances of the Lord: 

(7) The last view is that of Jñānakarma-

(Contd. from last page—) अन्तिमान्त्वमुक्तां मः प्रविष्टं अन्य अमेरेन्द्रसमुल्लभ: रुक्किनिरीक्षण न सुख्यं इति निहर्ष्टतीर्थयतुहूँ।


do not hallucinate.
and Karma some devotees exert for salvation while some prefer to remain entangled in this worldly existence.

The commentator Rāmatīrtha (vide Sāṅkṣépa II.138) attributes this view to the followers of Maṇḍana-mīra who regards Jīva as the seat of Āviṣṭā and Brahma as its object; he also propounds Jñāna-Karma-Samuccayavāda.

After refuting all these views Sarvajñātman gives his own opinion as follows:

(Trans.: - Thus Brahma with its own nescience becomes Jīva and in that form experiences all the paraphernalia including the sky and earth through the mind).

He himself imagines the preceptor, scriptures, etc. and attaining realisation through these means becomes free.
The Ajñāna serves as the mirror for the reflection of the Brahman. It is the cause of superimposition which is mutual, the consciousness (Pratyakṣa) being superimposed upon the objects (Parākṣa) and vice versa. With its two powers, viz., the veiling (Āvaraṇa) and projecting (Vikṣepa), the Ajñāna first covers the nature of the Ātman and then raises this edifice of the universe. It projects the various forms as the individual soul, the God, the world, etc. Further this Ajñāna belongs to the Ātman and has the same for its object.

The cause of illusion is Ajñāna alone and nothing else. The notion of resemblance or faults in either the object or the sense-organs or wrong
impressions cannot be accepted as the cause. The substrate itself is the object of Ajñāna. Hence the objection that the world would be void if there is mutual superimposition cannot stand as the reality in itself survives as the prop throughout. Further, mutual superimposition does not lead to any contingency of nihilism. The talk of nihilism is permissible only if the two are unreal and therefore vanishing into nothing. But here the case is altogether different. When one of the two entities to be mutually superimposed is real, no criticism of this type can apply to it.

The superimposed thing alone appears in illusions. Whether superimposition is possible in case of pure consciousness is a problem by


2. Ibid I - 32-33.

3. सामक्षेपाचार्यां बिशुष्णं विशेषेश्वर ध्यामयो निमित्ते सुश्रुष्णं ज्ञातवयो ।

3bid.1-33

4. अध्यक्षमेव वि परिपुर्वकं भर्तोऽः
itself. A thing which has no form cannot manifest itself to our view as the common sense directs. But Ś. has himself stated in his Ādhyāsbhāṣya that the Ātman is not an absolutely non-object. The illusion in direct perception can take place only in case of an entity which falls under the ken of direct perception. The objector here points out that the means of knowledge cannot refer to Brahman at all as a Pratāpa makes us know something which is not known before (अद्वितीयबोधक ) and no ignorance can be shown in case of the Brahman; hence the Vedāntas cannot authorise it. Moreover the so-called adjunct of Ajñāna is incongruent with the self-luminant Ātman. If it is taken as indescribable, then Brahman being realisable (Meya) becomes imaginary. This indescribable Ajñāna

1. Cf. अद्वितीयबोधक अपरमात्मानस्य प्रतापस्वपनवषयः स्वस्वल्लक्ष्यः स्वल्लक्ष्यः स्वविषेधः / Ibid I.41.

2. अद्वितीयः परमात्मानिः सुमन्तिः / Ibid I.113.
again is not heard of in all the three worlds and last but not the least Ajñāna being the absence of knowledge cannot give rise to duality as an unreal thing cannot produce something; it is as good as saying that a barren woman has given birth to hundred sons.

Servajñātman refutes this and proclaims that Ajñāna alone is responsible for the distinction of Jīva, the world, etc.\(^2\). That it is possible in case of consciousness is proved by direct experience in the form 'I do not know'. Of course, this experience of Ajñāna is unreal.\(^3\) Further, Ajñāna is well-known as a veil of the Ātman, named as insentience, infatuation, of primordial matter and it embraces the Ātman, the one without second, like

\[\text{3. Cf.} \text{ नासन्तनाविद्वेषी सम्मचनो अमरस}^3\]

\[\text{नन्दिस्मृयकु न सदुकु उनचासे प्रस्तुते}^3 \text{ (Gīdī I. 121).}\]

\[\text{4. अद्वित्तान वात्रेशाथें भवेन्दुद्भव वाणिज्यं अ परमात्मसुरस्वध कूदिन्य्}^4\]

\[\text{ (Gīdī I. 103).}\]

\[\text{5. अद्वित्तानाढिः च देवोऽद्वित्तानकु चार्मिकोऽद्वित्तान सहस्राध्य:}^5\]

\[\text{अद्वित्तवृत्तानं न अ चेष्वं नददातितो कृत्ती अल्पतितां दृढ़धी करितां ते नस्यां}^5\]

\[\text{ (Gīdī I. 316).}\]
the ghee, the glazened fire. It is also styled as Tamas and also Māyā, the power of the Lord.

The resort as well as the object of Ajñāna is Brahman alone, for the Jīva which comes into existence as its effect, cannot be its cause. Ajñāna being prior to Jīva has rightly the Brahman for its seat. Sarvajñātman writes:

आगमनामन्तराभासितिर्मवनिमित्ताधिनिश्चयक ।
यस्मिनमध्ये तत्तथम शुचिप्राकृति नावस्य।
भावस्य नापि यथा व । सैः ॥

(Trans.:—The impartite consciousness (Citi) alone can be the substrate and the object; as in case of the darkness which is already in existence, a thing yet to be produced can neither be the subject nor the object).

This Ajñāna cannot be described as the absence of knowledge as it is a cover according to the Sruti and Smṛti and hence we regard it as positive. Through this Ajñāna, the Citi becomes the cause;

2. अद्वैत केहिं न ज्ञाते ज्ञातिः सा श्रीमद्भागिन सारं श्रावनस्ति: मनोहरदीतिभास्वरूपिनि सम्म त्रावलिप्त इत्याहितिसिद्धेन।

2. cf. I. 319 and III. 64-69.
it is the only means leading to transmigration.\footnote{1}

As to the argument that the Pramāṇa points out unknown objects, we say that all Pramāṇas are not so; having seen a white cloth, one who has never seen dirty cloth before cannot state with certainty whether the whiteness is due to washing or it is so naturally; likewise, Brahman which is not known before cannot be said whether self-luminant or otherwise.\footnote{2} Thus all Pramāṇa resting on sentient objects is incapable of conveying unknown things; it is helpful only for the worldly parlance in as much as it causes all the activities.\footnote{3}

\footnote{1}{सत्यसन्तुष्टप्रमृणिक बिन्दुकुटिलीय सर्वरत्नार्थसृपि प्रदर्शनिये धीरे।
सत्यसन्तुष्टप्रमृणिक मृणालिकार्णाचे कुरुः पवित्रे भवनां वर्णनां हरिसुं।

\footnote{2}{प्रकृतियाचे भवने स्थितिवादन बहुत द्वितीय पंचणियर्षांने प्रस्तुत शब्दे झवणे।
प्रकृतियाचने शास्त्रात दिन्दुमाचर्य स्वयं पुरुषार्थी।
प्रकृतियाचने शास्त्रात दिन्दुमाचर्य स्वयं उल्लोकाती.
प्रकृतियाचने शास्त्रात दिन्दुमाचर्य स्वयं उल्लोकाती.
प्रकृतियाचने शास्त्रात दिन्दुमाचर्य स्वयं उल्लोकाती.
प्रकृतियाचने शास्त्रात दिन्दुमाचर्य स्वयं उल्लोकाती.
प्रकृतियाचने शास्त्रात दिन्दुमाचर्य स्वयं उल्लोकाती.
प्रकृतियाचने शास्त्रात दिन्दुमाचर्य स्वयं उल्लोकाती.
प्रकृतियाचने शास्त्रात दिन्दुमाचर्य स्वयं उल्लोकाती.
प्रकृतियाचने शास्त्रात दिन्दुमाचर्य स्वयं उल्लोकाती.
प्रकृतियाचने शास्त्रात दिन्दुमाचर्य स्वयं उल्लोकाती.

\footnote{3}{अन्ततर्भितबालोधितना न शास्त्रीय प्रमाणनिवेदन नास्तुणलिष्यम।
किं अन्ततर्भितबालोधितना शास्त्रीय प्रमाणनिवेदन नास्तुणलिष्यम।}
It is only phenomenal (अपराधित), valid as regards this world alone. For the same reason what Jaimiti gave out on Dharma is also Vyāsahērika and it was left to Bādarāyaṇa to deal with matters beyond that.

The Ītman, the consciousness, is the cause of

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Causality of } & \text{ this world as inner entities} \\
\text{Brahman} & \text{ cannot enjoy that position as proved by the Sūtrakara in B.S. I-1.5. But this causality is only an extraneous attribute (Upalakṣaṇa) and not the characteristic of Brahman.}
\end{align*}
\]

What is the nature of this causality? Does Brahman really change into the world? Bhāskara and others adhere to Pārīṇāma-vāda. Sarvajña-ītman refutes this view on the authority of Sūtra which supports only the Vivartavāda or the theory of

1. अत्र यथाभिषेक परिवर्तनसाधनं सर्वज्ञपरमेचार कल्पविलसायत्वोग्याय।

दृश्यमातिनिन्यस्त मिश्रविभासनाय विद्रश्यमानव्यलयवेगतिपद्मः॥

महोऽर्जुनवाचोऽहे तत्सनायां सत्यसमप्रत्यक्षोऽभूतदेवाय।
appearance. The Sūtrakāra also has established the same in the second Adhyāya. He first refers to Pariñāmāvāda in the Sūtras 'पौरणाध्याय ज्ञाति वर्णमपूवा etc.' as it is a stepping stone to Vivartavāda.

Here comes the oft-quoted remark: विितरख्य ते पूर्बनुभूतिरमभिः करे परिणामकार्ते। 3. Vivarta is not a long step from Pariñāma; for what is Pariñāma? Servajñatman defines Pariñāma as the presentation in another real form of the same thing possessing parts as e.g. the earth is changed into crops. There is no change as such in the thing-in-itself, but its condition or external form is once for all changed. Milk is transformed into curds which cannot again be changed into milk but the two are not altogether two independent entities (अभोस्वतेत).

1. संक्षेपा दिशाणुि, द्रवयं व न नसस्याद्: सिद्धान्तादिकं विभाषण द्वारा विभाषणद्वारा इत्यादिक।
2. B.S. II.1
4. अभोस्वते: नमस्ते सकम्—
विष्नुं नमस्ते कृपयमे 
वनुि ६.७: परिणामकार्ते: 
वनुि ६.८: इम न स्थितिं श्रुतिं। सिद्ध II.65.
This is also called Satkārya-vāda.

Vivarta is explained by him as the appearance in many unreal forms without any change in the thing, as e.g. the moon appearing in many drops of water. The moon appears to be many when reflected in many ponds but in reality she is one; so also one thing without change wrongly appears to be something else. A rope is many a time mistaken for a serpent; this is Vivarta. This is what is meant by the causality of Brahman.

Without undergoing any transformation Brahman appears to be many. The Śruti first gives Parināma-vāda as in passages: अं नृि त्व द्रविधयि etc., but it is only aimed at Vivarta when just next it declares: सी नाधे इसेन सन्तरभ।

The Śruti purposely gives different views. There are three theories meant for three different
types of men. These are: (i) Āropa, (ii) Apavāda and (iii) Vyāmisrā.
The first is meant for ordinary people who believe in the everyday world. This is the Pariṇāmavāda for common men. The second is the opposite one meant for one who has realised the highest truth while the third, viz., Vyāmisrā i.e., a mixture of the two, belongs to one whose mind has just become free from all impurities.
These three types of men are styled by Sarvajñātman as a कृपणेति; तद्विचाले; and अपकस्तन्तन्त्यमेशः.
It is as if a ladder of realisation to be climbed step by step. The first to be faced is the Āropa based upon Pariṇāmavāda, then comes the Vyāmisrā based on Vivādā which falls between the two and the last is the Apavāda which denies all duality as such.
The Vyāmisrādṛṣṭi again is twofold; Ekajīvavāda which represents the Jīva to be one and all other Jīvas as subsidiary to him; the whole world existing in his own imagination, and (ii) Nānajīvavāda, i.e., plurality of Jīvas with one beginningless and endless world. Having given up the Pariṇāmavāda the devotee of truth, takes to the Vivartavāda and finally throwing it away attains to the realisation. Vivarta is in a way denial (Apavāda) of Pariṇāma while it is super-imposition with reference to the ultimate truth.

Thus the maxim goes - उत्तरोत्तराः परापराः निमित्तं प्रपण्डते Thus
Thus the causality being only appearance does not contaminate the consciousness. For all practical purposes (संबन्धवशस्त्र) the world remains valid up to the time of realisation. And it being made up of मयाः no objection can be taken against it. Ātreya Brahmanandin also stated that the whole product (कृत्यम्) exists only in activity. The Vākyakāra also says the same. Even Dārmādārā, the Bhāṣyaṁkāra supports this when he writes : अतः अत्राः समस्ततिः अनुमुः ।

The distinctions perceived in the world cannot be proved as real and hence should be discarded. Every object is void of distinction. If Bheda is accepted as its essence the object

1. Cf. अत्रेयानात्मविवि शंक्तवार्तामर्त कायं समस्तस्यि न: अतिमेधवाशुः। बिद्याभित्र अक्षमायित्। अतिमेधवाशुः।
The commentators identify this Ātreya with one Brahmanandin author of a commentary on Chāndogya Upaniṣad.

2. अतिमेधवाशु शंक्तवार्तामर्त कायं समस्तस्यि अनुमुः। अतिमेधवाशुः।
The Vākyakāra is known to the tradition as Taṅka.

3. Is this citation of authorities meant to oppose Rāmānuja who mainly relies on them?
will consist of pieces, e.g., if a cloth is Bhinna then it is as good as torn and cannot be styled as cloth. (पत्ते सिकमंदर कुतरन फरः। सम्बसपा II.104). Thus Bheda is not the nature of the object. If the cloth is to be distinguished from the jar, then it becomes relative and hence only imaginary. For without the knowledge of the counterpart (प्रक्षेपिक्षें विष्य।) Bheda is not grasped and the knowledge of a thing as a counterpart to something cannot be had without the notion of distinction. Thus it involves mutual dependence and hence is not permissible.

To get rid of this Ajñāna is the goal, for it is at the root of all evil. As an emerald Salmon put into the bottom of a bowl full of water turns the whole water to its colour, so also this Ajñāna

1. अभ्यासः प्रक्षेपे हिन्दुविषया विद्या।

2. The refutation of Bheda in the work also exhibits influence of Īstasiddhi.
influencing the pure \textit{Atman} helps to produce the universe. The \textit{Mumukṣu} should first know this \textit{Ajñāna} as experienced in sleep and then he should grasp that it does not exist even in that State. In other words, the \textit{Jīva} is the highest \textit{Atman}. Thus when the notion of \textit{Ajñāna} is discarded, the knower becomes one with the \textit{Atman} and no semblance of either desire or action is found that time. Of course this is not final salvation but only temporary due to the absence of the seed of evil in the form of waking and dream.\textsuperscript{3}

The mind of the pupil becomes fit to grasp the purport of the \textit{Mahāvākyas} after the removal

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textit{Vide} III.127-128
\end{enumerate}
of the sin through rigorous discipline. Karma is only indirectly helpful for the purification of mind and through it causes the rise of the desire to know Brahman. The Samuccayavāda advocated by Maṇḍana, Bhāskara and others should be discarded. For, at the time of realisation all Ajñāna is dispelled and Karma being included in it is not at all present that time. There is nothing to be affected regarding the knowledge of Brahman as it cannot be grasped without knowing what is Brahman. And when Brahman is known, the knower becomes free and hence no necessity of Karma. Therefore the conclusion is: "लक्ष्येन महोक्तिपि विनम्रागाराणां। संक्षेपा प्रपित ॥ ४५७॥"

The means to salvation are discussed in Sāṁkṣepa III-330-360. These are twofold, internal

1. समविषम संपुज्जयो न शुचो नाधि सगाराः स्वयमप्रसृतिकारे। कृत्ति तन्न विहितकियासमृतः कमलिन्तन संपुज्जयोऽपि पालि। संक्षेपाः IV.9

2. न अख्तारिका अर्थवृक्ष्यां तदिनः कल्याणं काष्ठे दीर्घियुगं॥ संक्षेपाः I.457
and external. What is helpful for the advent of the desire to know Brahman, viz., the four-fold requisites etc., is external while the internal is the direct means to the highest realisation and it is the grasping of the Sruti passages (शृंखला योग). For the Mahāvākyā (viz., नदव दिशा or अन्ध दिशा) belonging to one's own Veda, when heard with due respect from the lips of a Guru who is an ascetic and who has realised the truth, directly helps towards salvation. Through Laksana of any of the three types the Akhandārtha is grasped after going through

1. अनशुरुत शिक्षितोऽरुद्ध तत्कथितत्व अत्तितुतमः।
अनात्मानमिवर्धयते नानांन्यर्थसतानातिसाध्यन्त॥ खण्डः ॥ ३३०॥

2. संतोषायस्मात्रपितलिने निव्वले मार्गमेवं न भविष्यतीमार्गादर्पणं पर
शास्त्रसिद्धां परदेवा गुरुपरिष्ठं आक्षेपित्वा यथाविशेषं विनेत

3. Sarvajñātman summarises the authoritative views like Abhāsavāda and Prakāshibimbavāda and discusses what type of Laksana should be resorted to in various theories. When in ज्ञानां ज्ञानी, ज्ञेय प्रेषणते the ego and also Brahman the cosmic Ajña, then the Laksana is Jñāna i.e. both give up their senses:— cf.

मार्गायतर्कितकरियोष् ।
धर्मं मन्त्रमुक्तेद्वहश्चादस्ति—
भद्रेऽपि देवोहस्ति भवनि तु अहं भास्करां योगं चक्षुः॥
The realisation can take place even in this birth. Karma which comprises the external means should be offered to the feet of the Lord which goes to remove all sin.

Realisation can be achieved only by proper renunciation as enjoined by Sruti and Smrti. Only a Brahmin is entitled to undergo renunciation according to Sarvajñatman who advises: \[ \text{I \& V \& N} \] The removal of Avidya is of the fifth type as all the four alternatives, viz., real, unreal, real-unreal, no-real-nor-unreal cannot be accepted. In this matter Sarvajñatman follows Iṣṭasiddhikāra who regards the Avidyānivṛtti as of the fifth type. He himself states this:

\[ \text{चिन्तिताभुजोऽवेदनका समुद्धिरन्नको मृत्युमात्रम} \]

\[ \text{परिच्छेत} \] तन्मोन्नितत्त्व प्रथमात्मकं एवं सुमितिशोऽविद्यामात्रम॥ Sanākṣepa

1. Vide Sanākṣepa III.352.
2. महा-प्रतिष्ठित-सुमूनितविहितं परिच्छेन्द्रमुँडः स्मृति परमहेंद्र सिद्धांतम्।
3. Cf. अद्वितीयत्वम् इत्यत्त्वम् तत्त्वम्। चतुर्विध्यमानमोक्षदीपिकानिलासम्॥
Or let the Ātman itself be equal to removal of Ajñāna like the shell which is itself the removal of silver-notion.

Thus the knowledge arising from Upaniṣadic passages removes Ajñāna and then vanishes on its own account, like the hot iron which becomes cool after devouring the water poured on it. And thereafter the pure consciousness, viz., Brahman remains alone.

In this way Sarvajñātman handles the Advaita in the light of Śaṅkarabhāṣya. In this he also takes help from other Advaitins mostly Iṣṭasiddhi-kāra and Vivaranakāra. He refutes Bheda and Bhedabheda as also Manḍanamiśra’s views regarding the seat of Avidyā etc. and fearlessly proclaims that Mandana is to be discarded. His contribution

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1. नेदान्ताक्यन्त्रकीता मलिष्टालिकेशमुव्यधितिल: सन्तु खेमब्रह्माण्डम्।
   वीणो सति न सन्तु शास्तौ शास्तौ शिवज्ञेष्यति अश्वावतः।
   सन्तितेन तु सांख्यके।
   शास्त्रिविवेकम्। सांख्यके। चर्चितम्।

2. नेतरलं परिद्वृत्तं समूनकर्षणं: न किसस्य सः। शास्त्रसम्य।
   श्रीमद। श्रीमद। श्रीमद।
to Advaita is the change effected by him in Vivaraṇakāra's Pratibimbavāda, as also the detailed discussion of Akhandārthabodha by various Lakṣaṇās as given in his Pañcaprakāryā and Śaṅkaparāśāmāraṇa.

His style is quite fluent and forcible and in keeping with the work. He utilizes various figures of speech like Upamā, Rūpaka, Nidarsānā, etc. which can best be illustrated as follows:

(i) Rūpaka: tathāteṣu prakāśānām nādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhānādiṣṭhां

and (ii) Nidarsānā: nādiṣṭhānā nādiṣṭhānā nādiṣṭhānā nādiṣṭhānā nādiṣṭhānā nādiṣṭhānā nādiṣṭhānā nādiṣṭhānā nādiṣṭhānā nādiṣṭhānā nādiṣṭhां

Sarvajñātman takes a comprehensive view of the whole Advaita and hence has served as a great attraction to many later writers in the field.
(iv) Ānandabodha

Ānandabodha also is a big name in Post-Saṅkara Advaita in as much as he serves as a guide to Citsukha and his pupils. He seems to have flourished in a time when the Advaita literature was enhanced considerably in volume. He appears to be a pupil of one Ātmavāsa as is known from his commentary on Prakāśātman's Śābdaniṁaya. But his independent works like Nyāyamakaranda, etc. do not furnish any clue as to the preceptor and the colophon also contains only the author's name as Ānandabodha Bhaṭṭaraka while he styles himself in the works as Ānandabodhamuni or Yati.

In his Pramāṇamālā (published in Chowkhambā series No.38) he alludes to Iṣṭasiddhikāra as एकत्र देवांगुरुं मुनिकेता: नामस्कर कारणकार्यः न योनयोऽक्रोक्षानि। Whether the term 'Guru' here refers to his direct preceptor is not precisely clear. His Nyāyamakaranda

1. Vide his अवासमकर्तर, which, as he says, has been composed after looking into many works.


3. दृष्टिपूजयथारूपसर्वगृहानिविषिताम् ओषधीकर्षयत: समाधियोक्ति श्रीराजः हस्त परिसरास्पर्शमीमांशत्मकप्रमाणनायासाधनं प्रकाशयति।

4. आनन्दबोधिति निधिन्ना गुणानासाधनस्य उपयोक्ताशायां निर्देशनान् मृगप्रभावणत।

Mayat Pramāṇamālā
abounds in quotations from Iṣṭasiddhi which influences him to a great extent from the fact that he refers to its author as अन्त्यसदीत्वं etc. Perhaps he might be the direct pupil, but then looking to the antiquity of Vimuktatman and the extent of literature presupposed by Nyāyamakaranda, one cannot pronounce a certain judgment on the problem.

Date.- He is regarded to have flourished in the eleventh century. This date has been arrived at by Prof. Dasgupta from the fact that he is prior to Chitsukha, his commentator, who flourished in the 12th century, A.D. Prof. Hiriyanna gives his date as 1050 A.D. He probably might have Rāmānuja in mind, when he refutes the objections against Nivṛttiyanupapatti, Nivartakāntarānupapatti, etc. which resemble the Avidyānupapattis enumerated by Rāmānuja in his 'grand premiś'. He also refers to Vivaraṇakāra and hence seems to have lived in the 11th Century A.D.

1. Vide his 'History of Indian Philosophy' Vol. II pp. 110-118
2. Vide his Bhāṣya on B.S. I. i. 1
Works. - शास्त्रमल, शास्त्रीयाली, प्रमाणाद्वा ह साधुनिदिष्टवर्गाथात

All the three works, viz., Nyāyadīpāvali, Pramāṇamālā and Nyāyamakaranda are published in the Chowkhambā series. Burnell makes distinction between Ānandabodha, author of Nyāyamakaranda and Ānandabodha, author of the other two works; but this is not correct as the ending verses of all the three works are almost the same. Thus, Nyāyamakaranda concludes with -

The last line appears at the end of the Pramāṇamālā, also, the verse in question being: आचार्यभाचार्यवियुतुरुपसुकर्मेण

The Nyāyadīpāvali as ends as follows: शेषनां भावनां यस्यस्मात् प्रसंसनां -

which appears as one of the ending verses in Nyāyamakaranda. Thus it is clear that these works have come from the same pen. The commentary on Prakāśatman's Sābdanirmaya going in his name is not yet available in print.

1. सेवनम् सुभिक्षुः, सरस्वती वचनित्वम्।
   आनन्दोधिकृतम्: श्रस्यनिदिष्टवर्गाथात लिखितम्॥
It is a प्रकरणवस्त्र of Advaita. The work is in prose having संक्षेपक्ष्य or summary-कारिकास. It discusses all the problems that usually face an Advaitin. Thus it refutes at great length the difference or देश doctrine, establishes अनिवर्जनीयता or indescribability of error, defines the nature of Ātman, answers the allegations against Avidyā and examines the nature of salvation. Other matters also by the way crop up into the text, e.g., the अनुवर्तन or the purport of Śābda, the प्रतिभिंभवादा etc. He bases his views mainly on इतसिद्धि of विमुक्तत्मन occasionally referring to विवरणa and also ब्रह्मासिद्धि.

The work has been commented upon by Cāitsukha and Sukha-prakāśa, his pupil and also by Anubhūti-śvarūpa Muni.

It is a small booklet of fifteen pages
discussing various with the help of reasoning and meant to obviate the charges against Advaita. The work begins with a salutation to Viṣṇu. The aim of the work is given by him as: विकर्षणातिकादारोपितं भव्याक्षरात्मकं।
सवर्षितं अपाराधःसाम्यं तत्त्वात्मकं॥ It deals with the nature of the world, the object of illusion.

The work possesses commentaries by Sukhaprakāśa and Anubhūti-Svarūpa. It is also a small essay somewhat bigger than Nyāyadīpāvali. While Nyāyadīpāvali aims at discussing the nature of the error this work takes up the problem of the truth or reality, viz. Brahman and all that is understood by the term. Thus at the very beginning Ānandabodha writes:

आनंदान्तिकादारोपितं भव्याक्षरात्मकं।
सवर्षितं अपाराधःसाम्यं तत्त्वात्मकं॥

Thus, the work explains how Brahman consists of Ānanda and the falsity of distinction, etc. The

1. मात्रदु: सतसन्द्राय बिकार्यामुद्भुते वे
   गुरुरं विद्यामेत्याय नमः श्रावनस्य विम्भाने॥

2. B.O.R.I. Ms. No. 764
   1897-98
distinction between the Paramātman and the Jīva as also between various individual souls is not real but it is only false appearance like the mutual different appearances between the Bimba and the various images. All distinctions as such are only imaginations on the Reality. The problem of the validity of the universe is then taken up for discussion. The conclusion is that it is valid for all practical purposes. Then he considers how Śruti even though included in universe can convey highest Brahman. Then comes the nature of salvation. Thus the work is a bird's eye-view of Advaita Vedānta.

Ānandabodha's Dialectics.—The fact that Citsukha, the commentator of Śri-Maraṇa writes a commentary on Ānandabodha's Nyāyamakaraṇa shows the polemic nature of the latter. Uptil now,
Advaita was developing in its various branches, viz., Ābhāsa, Pratibhāma, Avaccheda, etc. But now in the period comprising eleventh to thirteenth centuries, it advanced through the dialectical wealth in which it was clothed by Śrī-Ārṣa, Citsukha and others due to the influence of Naiyāyikas like Udayana and his followers. The line of argument was already paved by Vimuktatman in his Īstāsiddhi and Maṇḍana whom Ānandabodha alludes as 'Vṛddhāh'.

In all his works Ānandabodha discusses all the salient problems of Advaita systematically. In Nyāyamakaranda, his magnum opus, he first takes up the notion of Bheda and refutes Jīva or Kṣetrajña; it after fully considering it in all its aspects. He first gives the difference between Kṣetrajñas or individual souls and then after refuting it he discusses the distinction between

\[\text{J. cf. तुम्हः: परिक्रिया । न्याया । p.75} \text{ whereupon Citsukha}
\]

\[\text{comm.:- तुम्हः: बृहस्पतिकरम्यकारकथिति:।} \]
Jñeyas or objects. The objector argues that Bheda or distinction between Jñivas should be accepted on the following three grounds:

1. The distinct phenomena in the world cannot be otherwise accounted for,

2. The fact that one individual does not experience or remember the feelings experienced by other individual,

3. The scriptures propounding monism are not opposed to inference as their respective spheres are distinct.

The reply to the first point is that we cannot explain the phenomena as it involves mutual dependency in as much as you explain it taking distinction for granted and at the same time you want to prove distinction on the basis of the phenomena. Further, distinction between attributes cannot mean distinction between the qualified. So also you cannot explain opposition if we take phenomena to mean possession of many opposite qualities. Thus all phenomena is

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1. अनसममत्वशास्त्राचनुपपति: असममत्वस्थान + अनसममत्व
   अनसममत्व । absence of अनसममत्व
   are the three reasons.
only imaginary. About the non-remembrance of one's feelings by others, etc. it can be explained away as follows:— A part of a body cannot experience the feelings undergone by another part, likewise, Caitra does not experience the pain or pleasure of Maitra. Take for example a man who is standing in waist-deep cold water and who is tormented at the upper part of his body by the hot sun. He experiences both pleasure and pain simultaneously. As a matter of fact Brahman remembers (अनुस्मरिन्तु) the feelings of both the bodies of Caitra and Maitra, but it being the non-enjoyer (अभोज्यं) Maitra's hand does not proceed to ward off Caitra's pain. Further, the statement that there is no opposition to scripture is not correct for both Sruti and Smriti proclaim that Ātman is only one and omnipresent. Moreover there is superfluity (संपवत्तयथात्) in contending many souls. Thus imaginary distinction is competent

1. संरक्षण: रूपान्तरण निर्देशनायस्तु शर्मरथस्ताविद्वाद्रास्ताः अग्नितचारमेषध्यायम्
   भूसन्तु: सन्तानांसंभवान्त। अति। p. 10
2. आदिः पागम्बरवाचित्विग्रहं सक्रोदयं। तेजुसः। Ibid. p. 24.
3. एको देव: सर्वभूतसु मूढः सर्वायमां सर्वशून्यतारु म।
4. एकं एकं शून्यत्वं शून्यं भूते भूतस्य अभासितम्। — —
to arrange the phenomena.

There is no distinction even in the objects, for the direct perception and other means of knowledge cannot convey it. For "what does Pratyakṣa show? The object or the distinction? or what first or simultaneously?" There can be no sequence in perception which is momentary. Nor can both be apprehended simultaneously as two cognitions cannot take place at one and the same time. Other Pramāṇas also are incompetent to prove distinction.

Thus as Bheda cannot be determined, Ekajīvavāda follows. Anandabodha resorts to Ekajīvavāda after viewing it from many points. Thus, firstly it is proved as Bheda between individual souls cannot be proved. Further, he discusses in detail the युक्तिशैलीरिच्छवित्कं and comes to the same conclusion. The objector here gives a long list.

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1. ज्ञातात्त्वस्य विनिरुपित्वार्गमानुपप्ते: | अनुपयोगः ६.३३
2. अबोधात्त्वः स्वाध्यौस्त्रावर्त्तमानाः | अभिनवः ६.३७
3. This problem is already dealt with in both गृहसिद्धि विवरणः. Anandabodha takes up the same enriching it with further syllogism.
of faults arising from the acceptance of Avidyā.
He points out that if the view that Brahman itself becomes the target of transmigration through Avidyā and is freed through Vidyā is embraced, then one cannot explain either the nature of entanglement (अब्ज्ञान) and salvation (मुक्ति) or the distinction between a preceptor and a pupil. For if Vidyā or realization dawns, who is then the pupil as all distinction vanishes and if it does not, where is the preceptor without whom Vidyā cannot be had? You cannot contend that the relation of the preceptor and pupil rests upon Māyā, for the preceptor possessing ultimate knowledge cannot be connected with Māyā. Moreover, a preceptor cannot be presented as arising out of the Avidyā of the pupil, for in that case he would become insentient.

Why not say that as your preceptor imagined by you, taught you, so also you who are imagined by me, are instructing me? You would as well tell

1. न च शिष्यात्मानि निवासितो श्रवणितिः अन्यथा तद्यथा काशितर्थ
    गुरो निर्विवादन-तानुपदो श्रोव्याश्चानुपदसः। N.M. 314
me that you and your preceptor etc. are imagined by my Avidyā and that I am the Paramātman, then my pupil when addressing his pupils also would be Paramātman for the time being. Then good bye to your Paramātman! Moreover, it is doubtful whether anybody achieved his salvation in the past, for we are still experiencing the world.

Ānandabodha replies: The relation between the preceptor and the pupil lasts only up to Avidyā. If there is realization, there is no pupil at all. The relation between the preceptor and the pupil can be had without the real distinction between the individual souls. The preceptor even though possessing real knowledge does have the association with the pupil by whose Avidyā he is produced. Even though he is imagined, still he has realization and everything is obtained on the analogy of a dream. My preceptor is imagined by me so also you and your Avidyā as well are thought of by me and not that I

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1. अन्तहें मुडूँत्व अकेंद्रि अन्दाचिद्वचित्वविषारिता: ओ च तुम्हं: परमात्मा, तालं मन्त्रिश्चाय मसालेद्वेदपदेश्येण। अद्वेळे नेलू—अन्तुप्रेष्येण परमात्मा दति: मुनिरक्षिनः परमात्मा। ibid p.326.

2. यदि उल्लॊवा विचार कस्तता विश्वे इति न कर्पिष्ठाते चुमः। मुनिश्चित्रिविश्वविष्यां यन्त्रदाने। ibid p.326.
am created by your Avidyā. Thus one basic Avidyā is inevitable. Moreover, what do you understand by the term "imagined by my nescience," the limited consciousness or unlimited homogeneous one? You cannot take it as limited for it cannot be the resort of Avidyā. So it has to be accepted that Brahman, the consciousness without adjuncts, undergoes the variety of transmigration. 2 Thus all the distinctions like 'I', 'You', 'We', etc., are the appearance only on one Atman as in dream. As regards the doubt whether anybody was ever freed or not, we say that nobody is yet freed and hence we do experience the world as ever. 4 That there is no hope in future for salvation is also not correct for Sruti does ordain that salvation can be obtained. Thus there is only one Jīva as given in passages like 'नान्दोदम तोससि दृष्टा... ... 

With his Ekajīvavāda, it is not clear what

1. नान्दोदम तोससि दृष्टा... 
2. अभावमी अभावं श्रवनुरोही, लिन्दुस्विति विविधान्वेध्वं श्रृद्धातानि... 
3. अन्यानाइ नै आदिप्रतिमाविलिनिति... 
4. नान्दोदम तोससि दृष्टा...
theory about the relation of the Jīva to Brahman Ānandabodha accepts. For he does not expressly state his view. A tinge of Avacchedavāda can be observed in one of his statements regarding the nature of Jīva. He writes:

\[\text{The measure of Jīva cannot be atomic as the consciousness is felt over the whole body, nor can it be of the size of the body which is changing. Hence it should be taken as infinite and this infinite consciousness is limited by the different bodies and is styled as Jīva like the limitations of the ether called the ear. It is indescribable whether real or unreal.}\]

After refuting other khyātis Ānandabodha discusses in detail Anirvacanīya Khyāti enumerating different views in this connection.
The objector is not prepared to accept Anirvacanīyatva as there is no Pramāṇa proving it, as it is against all experience and last but not the least the object if neither Sat nor Asat would be unsublatable. Moreover, what is meant by Anirvacmyatā? Not surely unfit for description as in that case there would be silence. Nor can it be opposite of Sat and Asat, for if it is opposed to Sat then it is Asat and vice versa; so also it cannot be opposed to both together as even then it is opposed to either Sat or Asat singularly. It cannot be argued that Anirvacayatva would mean opposed to both Sat and Asat as a squint man is not styled blind who is defined as bereft of both the eyes; for in that case the squint man does come under the definition of the blind. It should not be contended that the worldly convention does not testify this; it might not. The Kūnda
(holy pond) even though associated with many sages is named as Agastya-kunda (belonging to the sage Agasti alone) and though all types of lotuses arise out of water only red-lotus (Tāmarasa) is called 'water-born' (Mīraja). Thus Anirvācyatva is untenable. Further Avidyā being non-entity (Adravya) cannot be its cause.

The answer is that there is no harm in defining Anirvacanīyatva as 'other than both Sat and Asat' as it is opposed to both singularly. The argument that there is no Pramāṇa is not true as presumption proves it. A thing like human born which is absolutely non-existent cannot appear so also the absolute reality cannot be sublated and hence the world which appears to view and which is sublatable is Anirvacanīya. The argument that it is opposed to Sat and Asat singularly even when taken as other than both Sat and Asat together does
also not avow high originality, for Sat and Asat is the cause of unsublacability and non-appearance respectively and not their opposites. Our method of explaining has brevity and hence should be accepted. The everyday experience also is not contrary as what is perceived in the first cognition cannot be described. Others accept three types of existence - absolute Reality of Brahman, phenomenal existence for practical purposes of sky, etc., and apparent in case of the silver-on-shell - and define AnirvacanIyatwa as other than the absolute reality. This view also is correct.

If still there is any doubt regarding the later cognition, viz., 'this is not silver', we proclaim once for all that it refers to the non-existence of the phenomenal silver taken as absolutely real by the people. That the object, if neither Sat nor Asat, would be unsublactable is not accepted by us and hence as good as refuted.

1. तथापि सूचिव्ययेवनासंस्कृतिः तत्तसंस्कृतिवादि आद्वितीयविद्यान्वेयवचनश्वेतात्
अमंतेक्षा नरतसंज्ञायः अनुप्रसूचकोहिन्दुः आयीते सुधुमनी
श्रीमान प.प.17

2. सांडिकोभावायमि समासः | इbid p.117. C. E. W. S. rightly adscibed this view to Vivaranakaraka distinguishing Maṅgala & Aniruddha as सांडिकन्तकोऽहिन्दू विनिवेर्तित्रशृंगी केनुमोहिः, स्वास्तं अहो निवृत्तंतः
तांत्रिकै ज्ञातिवो भक्तेभी अविवेकः प्रेति। cf. pp.237-239 above.

3. नेत्रे रस्त्रिणिः संयातः नोन्योत्पत्तिः औपनिख्यातिं रजतातिमोर्भ्रिमेनावतां
सतीमा सेवितात्रतत्तत्ता ततं एव अतिप्राचीन विकाशिकथानुसरणार्ये
इbid p.117.
Hence the cause of this Anirvacaniya should also be temporary as also beginningless to avoid any other cause for it.

Others again explain Anirvacaniya as capable of being sublated.

Thus Avidyā which is neither Sat nor Asat nor Sadasat is the cause of this world. For we do not contend that the world is absolutely non-existent like the sky-lotus.\(^1\) It is the creation of Avidyā. The validity of this world exists only upto the influence of Avidyā. Thus all Pramāṇas are true only for all practical purposes, and they vouchsafe the validity of the world even though not real.

Though Pratyakṣa and other Pramāṇas are valid only on condition, the scriptural passages have real validity in as much as they convey the absolutely real Brahman. All Pramāṇas for the matter of that consist of Māyā but some of them are valid for all time while others are not;\(^3\)

\(^1\) _Ibid_ p. 129
\(^2\) _Ibid_ p. 127 and also _Pramāṇavidyā_ p. 11. Cf. footnote \(3\) to p. 317 above.
\(^3\) _Ibid_ p. 154.
unreal things do convey real results as for example an image in the mirror points to real Bimba.

The Upanisadic sentences proclaiming ultimate unity by their Akhandārtha or one homogeneous meaning hasten the salvation. Who can take objection to this? Not the grammarian who resorts to it for his Prātipadika and Nominative. The Buddhist also cannot question it for he also accepts it when he interprets

Salvation

'निर्वाणविहिताः' as meaning one and the same thing. The Prābhākaras also sail in the same boat. The Naiyāyikas and Bhāṭṭas who propound Bheda as the essence of the object are already refuted when we dealt with Bheda. Thus everybody agrees to अस्वादः. In interpreting the sentence 'निर्वाणविहिताः', the Jahadajahallakṣaṇā should be taken. Thus the realisation of the identity (एकत्वम्) of the Jīva and Parātman

\[\text{1. न तत्वेवाकल्पः लोक स्वामी नातिपादित् प्रसादहीभवित्वोरेकस्य-}
\text{श्रृङ्गतित्राध्यायाम्। अनिष्ठानः। अहाय। 9818।}
\[\text{2. ज्ञाति सत्त्वातितन निर्वाण भिषज्ञानि ज्ञातो निर्धारत्वोस्योद्धारी-}
\text{श्रवणार्थाताध्यायाम्। अनिष्ठान। 9817।}
\[\text{3. तत्स्तत्वाकल्पित्वाध्यायः अस्वादः इति अविश्वासः। 9818।} \]
leads to Mokṣa.

But what is this Mokṣa or salvation? Ānandabodha here takes stock of all systems of Indian philosophy. According to Mādhyamika Buddhhas it means the cessation of the continuity of misery, while Yogācāras take it to be the purified state of mind through Bhāvanās. The Naiyāyikas interpret it as the attainment of real form by the individual soul after giving up all qualities including Jñāna. The Jains give it as the 'going up' (प्रवर्तन) of the Jīva after shedding off all pain. The Vaisnavaśākārālikas prize the award of imperishable body, while according to the Sāmkhyas it is the indifferent natural state of the Puruṣa through the realisation of the discrimination between Puruṣa and Prakṛti. The Advaitins headed by Madanamisra explain it as the destruction of all misery which is the same as the manifestation of eternal Bliss.

1. cf. तदाद्—अत्रि प्रवर्त्तन निर्मिति निमोक्षस्मय लाभिनः।
2. नेपालोपिसंहितेन श्रवणशीलपत्तिः स्मृतिः यः दीर्घस्मृति सम्राप्तानि। वन्यकुलम्। प्र. २३०।
3. निति दाति गृहम नु सुकाश्चरित्वत नीरुप सुप्रेमं स्त्रियो यथापद्येंकाव्यांग्न। खण।

The quotation is ascribed to Madanamisra by Čāṇka.
After recording all these views, Ānandabodha examines them one by one thoroughly and proves how only the Advaita position can stand to the reason. The Mādhyamikas cannot prove their Mokṣa as a Puruṣārtha either to the महत्तविन्दु or the भूतानि so also the relation between the two. The Yogācāras also are faced with the same difficulty and in addition the Anyonyāśraya of Vāsanā and Bhāvanā. Nobody would go in for the Mokṣa of the Naiyāyikas as all happiness also is destroyed and hence no Puruṣārtha. It cannot be argued that all efforts are directed towards the destruction of misery alone as for example a man suffering from chronic disease commits suicide. For it is an exception. Granted that those people who cannot bear any further pain wish its destruction but what about ordinary people? As has been remarked :-

कुम्भकन्त भो दुःख सुख दुःखान्त वरेन।
नाहि कावितं दार्शिष्यो मोहासिष्यो अवलंबे॥
The Jain view is already refuted by the refutation of their doctrine of the measure of Jīva as equal to that of body and further, the idea of constantly going up also is useless and troublesome. The Vaiṣṇava body also must be temporary, being a body and hence an effect. Sāṃkhya also are not very helpful as they do not include Bliss which is the only Puruṣārtha in their Mokṣa. Moreover the Bandha and Mokṣa should obviously belong to one and the same individual; but how can the Bandha which is created by Ajñāna belonging to the Buddha according to you, belong to Puruṣa? न कर्मादिः साधुभिंत्व अक्षयः साधुकुमारं भुक्तानि तस्मात् गौरवं प्रोक्ते। Bandha and Mokṣa cannot be said to be metaphorical in case of the Puruṣa as metaphor (उप-मार्ग) can never be without cause. The analogy of a dancing girl (Nartāmā) is also useless as the dancing girl obliges the audience creating pleasure while the Buddha does not impose any such obligation on the Puruṣa. Further an indifferent person cannot

1. नर्तकां रक्षसा स्वामिसाहकारं तद्प्राच्यम् चामराविभेषेऽसा वर्तनां मेंवुक्तारिक्षः न च शुद्धिः। चुम्बकः किञ्चिदुक्तस्यस्त दर्शन संयमितः। उपनिषादं भक्ति ॥ २८४।
enjoy any sight at all. The Prakṛti might even entangle the Mukta as again, there being no controller over it. Therefore, the Sāṁkhya view also should be discarded.¹

It naturally follows from this that the salvation should consist of the highest Puruṣārtha which is nothing but Bliss unmixed with any misery. The truth is that Brahman, the one without second constituting Bliss which is nothing but self-luminance, is named as Jīva when it is contaminated by the qualities of the transmigration through the influence of beginningless Avidyā.² Of course, this world consisting of variety is not identical with Brahman but it cannot be said whether it is distinct or not from Brahman and hence the plurality of the world does not affect the Brahman.³

To realise the real nature of Brahman or in other words to uproot all the association of variety from it means the salvation. Karma or ritual cannot help here. Therefore Jñānakarma-samuccayaya is not acceptable. Jñāna is the only

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¹ नस्सद चारितरेंमलीय एनदामबिण्डः पालेत। यदि p. 284
² एनदेम ऊर्जनवन्नाभिलयानिविद्यानदयं अनायाववन्नाभिलयानिविद्यानदयं अनायाववन्नाभिलयानिविद्यानदयं अनायाववन्नाभिलयानिविद्यानदयं अनायाववन्नाभिलयानि वायु जीवात्मा वेदान्तानि वायु जीवात्मा वेदान्तानि वायु जीवात्मा वेदान्तानि वायु जीवात्मा वेदान्तानि वायु जीवात्मा वेदान्तानि वायु जीवात्मा वेदान्तानि वायु जीवात्मा वेदान्तानि वायु जीवात्मा वेदान्तानि वायु जीवात्मा वेदान्तानि वायु जीवात्मा वेदान्तानि वायु जीवात्मा वेदान्तानि वायु जीवात्मा वेदान्तानि वायु जीवात्मा वेदान्तानि वायु जीवात्मा वेदान्तानि वायु जीवात्मा वेदान्तानि

³ अन्तः अर्थ तेत्रुप्रकाश तल्वत्विविदमाः तेत्रुप्रकाश तल्वत्विविदमाः तेत्रुप्रकाश तल्वत्विविदमाः तेत्रुप्रकाश तल्वत्विविदमाः तेत्रुप्रकाश तल्वत्विविदमाः तेत्रुप्रकाश तल्वत्विविदमाः तेत्रुप्रकाश तल्वत्विविदमाः तेत्रुप्रकाश तल्वत्विविदमाः तेत्रुप्रकाश तल्वत्विविदमाः तेत्रुप्रकाश तल्वत्विविदमाः तेत्रुप्रकाश तल्वत्विविदमाः तेत्रुप्रकाश तल्वत्विविदमाः तेत्रुप्रकाश तल्वत्विविदमाः तेत्रुप्रकाश तल्वत्विविदमाः तेत्रुप्रकाश तल्वत्विविदमाः तेत्रुप्रकाश तल्वत्विविदमाः तेत्रुप्रकाश तल्वत्विविदमाः तेत्रुप्रकाश तल्वत्विविदमाः तेत्रुप्रकाश तल्वत्विविदमाः तेत्रुप्रकाश तल्वत्विविदमाः तेत्रुप्रकाश तल्वत्विविदमाः तेत्रुप्रकाश तल्वत्विविदमाः तेत्रुप्रकाश तल्वत्विविदमाः

⁴ या स्नानै अत्तिकालिकित धर्माणी एवं वेदान्तनिर्देशां वेदान्तनिर्देशां वेदान्तनिर्देशां वेदान्तनिर्देशां वेदान्तनिर्देशां वेदान्तनिर्देशां वेदान्तनिर्देशां वेदान्तनिर्देशां वेदान्तनिर्देशां वेदान्तनिर्देशां वेदान्तनिर्देशां वेदान्तनिर्देशां वेदान्तनिर्देशां वेदान्तनिर्देशां वेदान्तनिर्देशां

⁵ नाथे नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य

⁶ नाथे नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य नवरात्रिकावाचार्य
means to Salvation as is backed by Smṛtis like

Ishvaraköva śāṅkaraḥ smarastīna mahāpuruṣo varṇedvam 
hrūva śāṅkaraśīna chādiḥ śāṁkaraśīnaḥ 

Is this salvation real or not? If real, then is it the same as Ātman or something else? How can it be the same if salvation means removal of Avidyā and if it is something else then, where is the Advaita? Now if it is not real, is it Mithyā, i.e., indescribable? Then what is the difference between Avidyā and salvation?

Ānandabodha replies in the words of Īstasiddhi that this Mokṣa or removal of Avidyā is neither Sat, nor Asat, nor Sadsat, nor also Anirvacaniya but of the fifth type according to the maxim 'प्रत्यावृत्तेः तथा तस्मात्'. He also mentions another view that the Ātman itself is the removal of Avidyā quoting (Brahmāsiddhi?) 'उपस्थितात् स्वाभाविकत्यानम् अत्यन्तरात्मात्' But this is not correct according to him as it is given as a reply to silence the objector. It is an indifferent answer or it might be the mistake of the Ācārya (Maṇḍana?).

1. अन नेप्शिलिट्स्ट्राईट्सयन्त्रसान्तरात्मकः: केदारः ज्ञातेवात्मानन्तरात्मिन्नित्वाति मात्र आत्मेति।...न ज्ञातेवात्मानन्तरात्मकायां दुःश्च निष्क्रियं अपनमात्र। अनात्मानादस्यो
अत्यन्तात्मायेत्रियाम् एवविनीतभिः न तः केदारः।स्वाविवेश्चित्त वत्सविवेश्चित्त तेषां द्वः।।ibid p 35:7
A third view also can be maintained that Avidyā-nivṛtti may be taken as indescribable. Citsukha attributes this view to Ānandabodha himself.

Thus Ānandabodha discusses the salient features of Advaita. His style is fluent, ornamental and attractive, consisting of dialogue between the debaters. The arguments are properly fortified with force and syllogism. He many a time is humourous and sarcastic. Often and anon he cites popular maxims like 'अभ्य परिष्ठानं निश्चयं विश्वेषं परमेव प्रजेत्' १० 'अद्वैतं स्वतं भवता सत्यं अस्यहृदयी १३ 'सत्यं दुःखितं तुहँदैः जगानं किं ' परशारं ॥

He is emphatic and clear in his statement and a candid critic of others. His works present an interesting reading throughout.

He is mainly influenced by Brahmāsiddhi of Manḍana whom he styles as Vṛddhā and Ācārya quoting him profusely. But still he is not a blind follower of Manḍana and does not accept the Jñānakarmasamuccayavāda favoured by the latter as also he differs as regards the seat of Avidyā. Manḍana attributes Avidyā to the Jīva

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1 Cf. Commentary on p. 357 - “स्वरूपेन परिष्ठानी अपरे पुनामाति।” on अपरे पुनामाति सत्यमीन्द्रियावेदिकाविभाजितोऽनु जो हाकाति।
2. Ibid p. 343
3. Ibid p. 342
4. Ibid p. 177.
while Ānandabodha takes Brahman as the resort of Avidyā on the ground that Bandha and Mokṣa should belong to one and the same. He is also impressed by Ćistasiddhikāra whom he calls Guru. The views of Vācaspati and Vivaraṇa also find place in his work. His is a job of criticising others and thus strengthening the Advaita with logic. Therefore, he takes for granted all the big authorities in Advaita and hence does not embrace a particular Vāda like Ābhāsa, Pratibimba or Avaccheda, etc. A follower of Maṇḍana cannot but be other than what Ānandabodha is!

1. अद्वैत जीवात्माप्रतिरूपणं अमृतेन्द्र ज्ञातां गुणमयायमपरित्यञ्ज सताधीनम्।
   वैद्यसिद्धिकारकामात्सरस्वस्य द्वितियामासमीति परित्यज्येत अस्वामि कर्त्ते हि यद्यपि

   सर्वायं मविद्याद्विष्ठार्थमथ्युपगच्छते। इति व. 32.3
(v) Sṛhṛṣa

Sṛhṛṣa, the author of the Mahākāvya 'Naiśadhiya', is a big name in Advaita Vedānta also and is a nightmare to the Naiyāyikas whom he has completely vanquished observing their own method of dialectics. In his Naiśadhiya at the end of every canto he mentions his other books, one by one, of which only two viz., Naiśadhiya and Khandana-Khanda-Khādyam, the Advaita granthas - have survived to us. He was responsible to a great extent in bringing Nyāya methods of argument in Advaita which reached its culmination in the hands of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī when he wrote his Advaitasiddhi.

Life and Date etc. - Unlike other Sanskrit writers, Sṛhṛṣa has given the names of his parents and some details about his life in his Naiśadhiya. He was the son of Sṛhṛṣa and Māmalladevī. He mentions himself to have been patronized by the king of Kanauja (Kānyakubjesvara). The Jain work, viz., Prabandhakosa by Rājaśekharasūri gives an account of

1. cf. Śrīhṛṣa कविशाः मानिः मुकुटाधारीसि: पुत्रः श्रीहर्ष: सुभुष्ये विलेन्द्रस्वर्थः माहात्मेश्वरी: प्रभुः।

2. नाभवलक्ष्मीकारयान् यह कथायां नाः प्रकृतेन भवन्त श्रीहर्षाः।

3. श्रीहर्षविवेचनः मानिः पुत्रः राजा श्रीहर्षविवेचनः।
life and times of Śrīharṣa as obtained from the information through Tilakasūri. The work in question was composed in Sāvat 1405, i.e., A.D. 1348 which thus serves to be the Terminus ad quo for the date of Śrīharṣa. According to this account he was a native of Banaras and was honoured by King Jayantacandra, son of Govindacandra. He went to Kashmir to present his work to Śrī Sarasvatī and Pandits there who became jealous of him, and hence was honoured after many days. He was also a contemporary of Kumārapāla of Aphilavāḍ.

Dr. Bühler notes that the above account tallies with that given by the author himself and that the said king of Kānyakubja was actually the last king of Rāṣṭrakūṭa princes. King Jayacandra is known from his inscriptions and probably ruled between A.D. 1163 and 1177. King Kumārapāla's reign is given as A.D. 1143-1174. Thus Śrī-harṣa must probably flourished in the latter half of the twelfth century A.D.

Another date also is suggested on the assumption

1. Vide ibid.
that his work 'Gāndorvīśa-kula-praśasti' is in the honour of the Bengali king Ādīsūra who brought over four Brahmins including Śrī-harṣa to Bengal. This would make him live in the early 11th Century A.D. But this problem cannot be closed unless and until the work in question is found out.

Reliable stories current among Pundits state that he was the nephew of Mammaṭa who is said to have lamented after going through the Naṣadhiya not to have obtained it before in order to find all the faults of poetry in one place! This does not seem probable as Mammaṭa is ascribed to the 11th Century A.D. Śrī-harṣa is also represented to be the pupil of Govinda Thakkur, author of Kāvya-pradīpa 2.

According to Dr. Dasgupta Śrī-harṣa comes between Udayana (10th Century) and Gaṅgesa (1200 A.D.) as he refuted the views of the former and is refuted by the latter. Prof. Hiriyanna assigns him to 1200 A.D.

2. The concluding verse of Kāvya-pradīpa thus:-

    जोरेज सर्वविद्यः कलाविद्याः नास्तिकतेन मा श्रीरा
    श्रीरेष्व विदितम् गते मधि मनोक्शिते च न: शोधये ।
    दृष्टादिक्षिणणे महपुरुत्तिना अस्वेदव्यासोपितः॥


Works.- His works on Advaita are Khandana-khanda-khādyam and Īśvarābhisandhi.

Other works as mentioned by him are - Naisadhīya-Caritam, Arṇava-varṇanam, Gamḍorvīśa-kula-Praśasti, Cchandah-Praśasti, Nava-Sāhasārīka-Caritam, Vijaya-Praśasti, Śivasakti-Siddhi, Sthairya-Vicārana, and Pañca-Nāliya-Kāvyā.

1. Khandana-Khanda-Khādyam.- Even this work alone is sufficient to raise him to the pedestal of 'Great Pundit' and his boast that he who would study the work and grasp its meaning would become a scholar seems to be not exaggerated, for the work is really a production of great intellect that must have dived easily in the marine realm of Nyāya.

The work is composed to prove the doctrine of Anirvacanīyatva of Advaita Vedānta on the basis of Nyāya syllogism and is rightly styled as Anirvacanīya-Sarvasva. It is divided into four chapters as follows: -

The first chapter contains the discussion and

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1. It has been commented upon by Citsukha and Ānandap of Vidyāsāgara.
refutation of 'valid cognition', Apprehension, Recognition, Remembrance, Negation, Instrument Perception, Inference, Verbal cognition, Word, Presumption and different fallacies. The various definitions given by different authorities on Nyāya are taken up and are refuted in detail. The second chapter constitutes the refutations of important axioms postulated by the Naiyāyika. The third chapter proves the absurdity of objections like 'what is the proof of the existence of God' and the last chapter obverts the Naiyāyika categories like Existence, Non-existence, substance, Quality, Relations, Difference, Causality and Hypothetical Reasoning, etc.

As Dr. Ganganatha Jha remarks: "As the very name (Khandana) implies, destructive criticism of the most thorough-going kind, is its aim. The thesis upon which the entire work is based is that nothing can be explained - neither phenomena nor Brahman."

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1. Indian Thought Vol. VII p. 68
According to Dr. Dasgupta the work is his most important philosophical contribution proving the phenomenality of the world.

2. Isvarabhisandhi. - Sri-harsha refers to this work for the elucidation of many points, more than once in his Khandana, e.g. श्रीहर्ष निर्विभित्तत्त्व नानादेशानिर्देशानि निवितानि

It is not clear whether this is a separate work or whether he refers to the third chapter of the Khandana. Further investigation is necessary.

As with other works of Sri-harsha this also is not found out.

Sri-harsha's contribution to Advaita. - As has already been mentioned, Sri-harsha contributed mainly in defending Advaita with the erection of strong fortification of Nyaya. At the very outset a question is raised about the reality of the Pramanas. Whether there can proceed the debate or not and whether the Vadin should take the Vyavahara or the worldly parlance as real or not? The objector tries to

1. History of Indian Philosophy Vol. II
3. Ibid p. 1165

The following statement is based upon more superficial acquaintance with Khaydana.
establish the existence of the Pramāṇas on the
ground of Vyavahāra which is an action which can
be defined as the effecting of a non-existing thing
into an existent object. And without assuming its
existence one cannot argue about it. The Siddhāntin
rejects the argument on the ground that all this
argument proceeds only when the Vyavahāra is started
and the argument is to prove the existence of
Vyavahāra; thus there arises the fault of arguing
in circle (अवैधिकता:). The mere knowledge of its
existence is competent to start the argument and
not its existence. He further accuses: "should
the existence be inferred from mere apprehension of
it or from its validity (अधिकृतत्व) or from the
cognition of the validity? The first alternative is
untenable as the water-in-mirage would have to be
taken as real. The second has two alternatives.
Does it appear as valid to only three persons, viz.,
the Vādin, (the debater), the Prativādin (the
opponent) and the Madhyastha (the judge) or for all
time? The first cannot do as a man is liable to futile perception in hundreds of ways according to the maxim "to err is human"! The fourth man (other than the above three) might find it invalid. So perception of three men does not always hold good though three witnesses are always recommended in a legal suit! Thus the second remains and hence that thing which is valid for all time should be taken as Sat or real.

Now if the knowledge of the existence for the time being is accepted as the part of argument, we have no objection, for all Vyavahāra proceeds on the same assumption. Thus the debate should start taking for granted the phenomenal existence of the Pramāṇas. For, who can know that a thing is valid in all ways and for all time, except an omniscient person? If we go on accepting everything for the sake of debating, then even the castle-in-the-air (गंप्तयन्त्रास्त्री) should be accepted as real. So better to accept only phenomenal reality.

1. अव चतुर्खलारेण आयतत्त्व आस्ति तत्सदितश्रुपकात्यत्वम्। इबिद p. 42.

2. उपिनिषत्यात्तुपिनिषात्तुपिनिषात्तत्तथानां भावार्थम् उपिनिषात्तुपिनिषात्तुपिनिषात्तवावार्थम्। इबिद p. 44.
The Buddhists also propound phenomenal reality of the world which is styled by them as Samvrti-Satya. Cognition is real and self-illumined. It is self-revealing as well as self-valid (सत्तेन्द्र तथा सत्तेन्द्रा) The प्राणाण view cannot be accepted as it would lead to regressus ad infinitum in as much as to prove the validity of a cognition, another subsequent cognition is required, while to prove this subsequent cognition, a third cognition would be necessary. So, to avoid this fault it should be taken as self-illumined. Further no qualities are included thereunder. Eternality etc. are only conventional (सत्तेन्द्र). Sruti is only external proof to strengthen it (तत्त्वयत त्राभिर) as it is self-proved.

The objector then raises the point that there would accrue opposition between the subject and the object (कर्मकर्मनिरस्स्थ) if Vijñana is taken as self-illumined (स्वसत्तेन्द्रम). The Siddhāntin replies that there is no possibility of such
opposition as the object or Karma cannot be well defined and it does not produce any action. Further, one should not accuse whether there can take place any Viṣaya-Viṣayibhāva if unity is accepted, for, any relation (samastha) is to be held as one with the Saṃbandhin (sambandha) at some point in order to ward off Saṃbandha. Thus at least that moment distinction between the Saṃbandha and Saṃbandhin does not exist and Saṃbandha, becomes the essence of the substrate. Thus Viṣaya-Viṣayibhāva is not inconsistent with unity or Abheda.

Moreover, there is distinction between popular Viṣaya-Viṣayibhāva and that pertaining to self-illumined Viśiṣṭa; obviously one of them must be wrong and the latter being absolutely true sublates the former. The Pramāṇa for the self-validity is Presumption as the experience 'I know!' cannot otherwise be accounted for. And Arthāpatti does nullify inference as the maxim goes: अन्यथा-नपरिशोधयो देश नस्तु प्रमाणिना।।

\[\text{निनां हृदयेऽन्यायेऽस्य स्वर्णवाणाधीना।।}\]

\[\text{नन्दनम् कृती।।}\

\[\text{नन्दनम् कृती।।}\]
All this has been proved accepting your views. As regards our opinion -अनन्तर मलावल्लकालेन ग्रहणः संस्कारस्माक्षायते (Khaṇḍana p.124). The acceptance of this विज्ञान does not mean that the Advaitin accepts the विज्ञानवाद. For he differs from the Buddhist Idealist as far as the latter takes everything without exception as indescribable while the former only the world etc. without विज्ञान. This is clear from the statements of Buddhaliike: अतिशय निदिष्टमानानां स्वभावानों स्माचार्यां।

1 अतेन विदर्भत्वार्थे निदिष्टमानाय देशिताः।

Then follows the discussion of AnirvacanIya-vāda wherein the objector taking his resort on the horns of dilemma accuses: Have you any objection to Sat or Asat or do you embrace a third view? If the first, then one side must be wrong and obviously it must be Sat as the second is impossible. The reconciliation is that the objector has not grasped the point. How can there at all

1 सोगतश्चकलाविद्यार्थम् निद्रोपो धारिन्यं सर्वभ्रमनस्वतिविनीतम् बर्षस्म

निदिष्टमानात्तिरिक्त नुरंिद्विन्द्विषत्वम् सदस्तनूिविक्षणं श्रीहन्तादिनि।

सहिष्नुर्मये | Khaṇḍana 6.125-
be सत्यपर , when we talk of everything as 
Anirvacaniya? To speak the truth, we are indulging 
in the argument only for you; as to us we have no 
interest in proving the existence of the world, etc.; 
we are satisfied with our Brahman. Thus all our 
talk is in accordance with your doctrine and if 
there is any flaw in the argument it is discreditable 
to you and not to us."

The question what is the Pramāṇa for Advaita 
is inadmissible because if the questioner cognizes 
Advaita as valid cognition (Pramāṇa) then that by 
which he cognizes it is Pramāṇa or if he perceives 
it as illusion then there is no point in importuning 
(अतां तद्भव ) like that. Still we say that Śruti alone 
is the Pramāṇa. Pratyakṣa or direct perception 
being restricted (निविकात्य ) cannot invalidate 
Śruti which deals with everything. A king ruling 
over a part of the country cannot oppose the 
sovereign! The diversity of Vedic texts does not 
disprove the non-duality as Veda itself lies within 
the sphere of the unreal.
This is the exemplar how Śrī-ḥarṣa throws the gauntlet over the various philosophers of the day. As has been remarked "our author has given evidence of his having been the clever dialectician that tradition has given him the credit of being." The Naiyāyikas like Udayana held the sway over the pundit mind and it was left to Śrī-ḥarṣa and others to show the shallowness of their foundation. This is his precious contribution to Advaita which he saved in tact from the ordeal of Nyāya Criticism.

1 Indian Thought Vol. VII 188
(vi) Citsukha

In the building of Advaita dialectics Citsukha also has lent a great share. He is famous as a commentator of Śrī-harśa and has also written a gloss on Ānandabodha's Nyāya-Makaranda as mentioned before. Besides these commentaries he has also composed independent Granthas like "Tattva-Pradīpikā." The name of Sukhaprakāśa, Citsukha's pupil is also associated with him.

He is known to be the disciple of Śrī Gauḍesvāra Jñānottama. In his Tattvapradīpikā he cites the opinion of Ārādhya-pāda who is identified by the commentator Pratykk-svarūpa, with Citsukha's Guru, the author of Nyāyasudhā and Jñānasiddhi.

His date is given as the first quarter of the thirteenth century. No biographical data is available.

His works—Tattva-Pradīpikā, Nyāya-Makaranda-Vyākhyā, Khandana-Khanda-Khādyā-Vyākhyā, Bhāṣya-Bhāvaprkāsikā, Adhyātma-Maṇjarī, Viṣṇu-Purāṇa-Vyākhyā, Bhāva-Tattvaprkāsikā, Brahma-Stuti,

1. Vide the colophon to Tattva-Pradīpikā & other works.
Sādārāna-Saṅgraha, Abhirāya-Prakāśikā, Vivaranātātparya-tīkā.

Out of these, his Bhāsya-Bhāva-Prakāśikā* is a gloss (Vṛtti) on S.B., Bhāva-Tattvapraekāśikā* is a commentary on Suresvara's Naiskarmyasiddhi, Abhirāya-prakāśikā on Mandana's Brahmasiddhi and Vivaranātātparya-tīkā on Amandabodha's Pramāṇamāla.2

Tattvapradīpikā.—The work named after the author as Citṣukhī or Tattva-Pradīpikā consists of four chapters, viz., Samanvaya, Avirodha, Sādhana and Phala on the lines of B.S. The first chapter deals with various topics such as Svaprapāśa, Saṃvit, Tamās, Mithyātva, Avidyā, Validity of scripture, Illusion, and Apauruṣeyatva of the Vedas. The exposition is systematic and logical. The argument of the objector is stated in detail everywhere followed by consistent refutation of all points. The second chapter refutes all the other systems of philosophy. Bheda is dealt with at great length. Then the Pramāṇas are taken up and discarded. Brahman is proved to be the first cause of the world.

* Vide Adyar Library Ms. Catalogue.
1. As given by Dr. Dasgupta "Indian Philosophy" Vol.II.
The third chapter determines the means leading to Mokṣa which can be had through Jñāna alone. The fourth chapter puts forth the nature of salvation which is itself the destruction of the fetters of Avidyā. Jīvanānātva and Jīvanmukti are also discussed.

Thus the work defends and at the same time depicts the whole Advaita tenet. As the editor remarks: "तत्त्वज्ञानेऽन्तरंतरविन्दुविविषयः अत्तत्त्वात्तेजस्तत्तस्ततः / ज्ञानत्वत्तत्तत्त्वत्तत्तलोकः ॥ ॥

Defence of Advaita by Citsukha. - Looking to the number of commentaries Citsukha has written, it is evident that he is keen on studying Advaita as a whole and defending it from all sides. In a way he has completed the work of Śrī-ḥarṣa who gave importance to only Anirvacanīya. Citsukha tries to deal logically with all the problems included in Advaita like Svaprakāśa, Advitiya Brahman, the

1. P. 2 preface to T. P.

2. The following tolkāte is based upon his T. P.
Khyātis, Avidyā, its resort, salvation and the means to it etc. Beginning from ŚB. he has taken into consideration all authorities up to his time - Suresvāra, Maṇḍana, Vimuktatman, Prakāśātman, Ānanda-bodha and Śrī-harṣa and number of others whom he quotes in his magnum opus Tattva-Pradīpikā.

His main attack is on the then Naiyāyikas, the followers of Udayana, viz., Līlāvatīkāra and Kandaliṃkāra. For this he follows the method prescribed by Śrī-harṣa. To take up various definitions and to examine them thoroughly so as to ward off the three faults viz. impossibility (Asambhava), Avyāpti (being too narrow) and Ativyāpti (too wide). The objector who is either a Naiyāyika or a Bhāṭṭa suggests many definitions for various Advaita entities and showing them to be faulty, contends that these cannot be accepted at all.
Svapraśātva of Brahman.

After saluting Hari, he reverentially saluted his preceptor Jñānottama who is Paramātmā who formerly descended on this earth from time to time as Vyāsa (the author of B.S.), Śaṅkarācārya and then took the form of Jñānottama to explain the meaning of Brahman. Then the problem of Svapraśātva or Self-luminosity of Ātman is taken up for discussion. It is defined by the Siddhāntin as the capability of supplying direct perception when the thing is unknowable. This is the answer to the objection that Svapraśātva cannot be defined, as, the Brahman as propounded by Upaniṣads would be knowable if there exists Pramāṇa for Svapraśāsa and if there is no such Pramāṇa then it cannot be proved. Svapraśātva can be defined as shown and there are no faults of either Avyāpti or Aparaśiddhānta (unaccepted statement) for Sureśvara also remarks: अभट्टाणा भरण: केवल साधनक्षेत्रके। निश्चयं यथि भस्ति भस्ति ध्येयः। It cannot be

1. उद्वैन्द्रियािन्नानां उपस्थितानानां च। ज्ञोपमात्रां तत्कस्मात् सर्वाङ्गोऽधिकत्रम्। 2. अवस्थानं श्चिति अपवेश्यतिरुध्दिं गोमतिः। 7.8.4
3. तद्भवं वज्रप्रकाशमात्रां श्चिति प्रतिभाः प्रकटेऽवच्च अस्ति। साधनक्षेत्रायेत्र
   न तत्क्षमिति शोभा उपविष्कारः। भविष्यति पाश रघु:। 8bid 8.5

\[ \text{Svapraśātva of Brahman.} \\
\text{After saluting Hari, he reverentially saluted his preceptor Jñānottama who is Paramātmā who formerly descended on this earth from time to time as Vyāsa (the author of B.S.), Śaṅkarācārya and then took the form of Jñānottama to explain the meaning of Brahman. Then the problem of Svapraśātva or Self-luminosity of Ātman is taken up for discussion. It is defined by the Siddhāntin as the capability of supplying direct perception when the thing is unknowable. This is the answer to the objection that Svapraśātva cannot be defined, as, the Brahman as propounded by Upaniṣads would be knowable if there exists Pramāṇa for Svapraśāsa and if there is no such Pramāṇa then it cannot be proved. Svapraśātva can be defined as shown and there are no faults of either Avyāpti or Aparaśiddhānta (unaccepted statement) for Sureśvara also remarks: अभट्टाणा भरण: केवल साधनक्षेत्रके। निश्चयं यथि भस्ति भस्ति ध्येयः। It cannot be.} \]
said that there is no unknowabili is Brahman is known, from the Scriptures (Āgamavedya). For even in scriptures the ultimate realisation which is technically called Phala-vyāpyatā is not present. The scriptures help only to arouse the necessary psychosis¹ (Vṛtti) of the intellect according to the Vedāntins. The entities (Dharmas) cited by Padmapāda that go to constitute Brahman cannot be said to be knowable to yogins as omniscience in them pertains only to things coming into the ken of Dṛṣṭatva. There is Pramāṇa also for Svaprakāśa, viz., inference as "The experience (Anubhūti) is svaprakāśa being Anubhūti; that which is not so is not Svaprakāśa as e.g. a jar." The experience is always 'विद्यमाननिः'. The statement 'a jar is known' does not prove knowability of Anubhūti but of the jar. Thus Ātman consisting of consciousness, being not an object is Svaprakāśa on the strength of Sruti.

¹. This would appear to resemble with the doctrine of Rāmānuja that it is the Dhyāna and not the mere understanding of passage leads to Salvation. But it is not so. The script passages exalt the Vṛtti of the mind prone to Brahmāsākṣatkāra by their real understanding and thus Śrāṇa and not Dhyāna which is a mental action that counts in the end

². अनुभूति: अनुभूतिकारिता अनुभूतिकारिता तत्त्वोद्वैत तत्त्वं सत्त्व सत्त्वं सत्त्वं च चन्द्रादिशिद्यते ।
Samvit! That Atman is Samvit or consciousness is also proved by the inference 'Atman is Samvit; being directly perceived without being the object of it like the cognition' for a Prabhakara, and 'the relation between a jar and its knowledge rests in Atman as knowledge resides in Atman for a Naiyayika.' The argument of Manamoharakara that Sruti proclaiming 'गाते द्रुढेष्टे भविष्यवादीयो मेयस्यले' proves the relation of the subject and instrument (viz. Jnana) is not correct as it should be investigated to whom the Nitya Drsti (eternal knowledge) should be ascribed if the Jiva and Isvara are taken separate. For it cannot belong to Jiva as his knowledge is accepted to be moneta, nor can it be entrusted to Isvara as he cannot be associated with particular knowledge being omniscient for all time. Thus Isvara and Jiva are one and the same and the Atman is Svaprukasa.

The objector argues that the falsity of

\[ \text{Mithyata of } \frac{\text{Brahman}}{\text{Praapäca}} \]

\[ \land \quad \frac{\text{Praapäca}}{\text{Praamana}} \]. The term Advitiya in the Sruti does not mean that Brahman alone is

\[ \text{\textit{1. Vide ibid p.22.}} \]
true but it denies other similar things (समाधानत्वस्थलंदर—
लिमेष्ठ) मा त्येके मथ्य्यते दृष्टि etc. point that there is no
plurality in Brahman as such which is the cause
of the world. The reply is given करोपस्तुमवयमेन।
To explain; the thread etc. are taken to be the
cause of cloth which is the counterpart of their
absolute non-existence. This being the counter-
part (Pratiyogitva), is itself Mithyātva as they
(the threads) do not exist in other things. If
they do not exist in the cloth etc. then also their
falsity is proved. The point is that the objects
like threads are said to be the resort of things
like cloth etc., but these also are not omnipresent
and hence cannot be called real as far as they are
not present over and above their effects. Now if
you contend that they are not present even in
their effects, then it follows that everything is
of fact Mithyā! As a matter the world is taken as pheno-
menally real and its validity is only in name
lasting upto the sublation. When Pratyakṣa itself
cannot prove the reality of the world, what to speak of inference dependent upon it? The term Advitiya is not for the denial of similar things, for this denial is done by the term 'one' (एकम्). Similarly 'हैरान' does not obviate the plurality with respect to Brahman as it is not the matter in hand, in as much as plurality is not at all associated with Brahman.2 And all your trouble of thus denying similar, dissimilar etc. distinction in Brahman would go to prove Advaita of Brahman and you will again come to where you started!3 Thus Brahman alone is real and hence the world is Mithyā created by Avidyā.

The negation in Avidyā should obviously point to either the absence of knowledge (अविद्या) or to the opposite of knowledge (विद्या) or something other than it (अविद्या) and these three Avidyā as the objector points out cannot be shown to be indescribable. Further, there is no definition or proof of Avidyā. Pratyakṣa and Anumāna do not point to any positive misapprehension.

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1. यदि प्रक्षेपिते न तत्त्वादेशैः प्रभावी तद्वा क नृत्य तत्प्राक्षेपिते नीविनो वर्णस्तुत्सनामाश्च: प्रभावात्माश्च। योऽदि 1.45.

2. अविद्यात। नर्त्तो ज्ञेयत: धुतिते वा नास्रेष्ठित्विनो वा अभिलेखान नानताः प्रसङ्गे येन अनुभवते। हेषी।

3. तत्त्वादेशैः संसारस्य नृत्यविषयकृते विद्या नानाधिक्यं एव परमस्ये मित्रसिद्धिः अति एतव प्रत्याविद्यात: प्रसङ्गेत। 1.47
nor the Sruti which means by Tamas 'the absence of knowledge at the evolution' and by Mâyā 'the power of knowledge of the Lord'.

The answer is that Avidyā can be defined as 'The beginningless misapprehension sublatable by knowledge'. There is no Avyāpti as all Ajñānas come under this while there is no Ativyāpti on Ātman who though beginningless and positive is not sublatable by knowledge nor on an atom the beginninglessness is doubtful! No Asambhava also as the term 'positive' is put only metaphorically to show that it is far from unreal. The Pramāṇa to prove it is Arthāpatti and Inference, and also Sruti which speaks of Tamas as positive denying any Asat (Asamārkam...). Mâyā is not merely a power of Īśvara but something sublatable by knowledge.

The statement that 'I do not know' with reference to the object of knowledge should be taken as 'not known by Pramāṇa' and known only to the witness. As has been remarked 'अनाज्ञा विवारणस्या अन्यथा भवन्ते (Vivaraṇa) The term 'unknown' means the objects cognised before the ultimate knowledge.'
Or Avidyā can be explained as 'Ignorance causing illusion.' The substratum of illusion cannot be Asat as it is perceived, nor can be Sat due to sublation. Here the views of Akhyāti-vādins and the Naiyāyikas are refuted and Citsukha throws overboard the argument of Nyāyakalpatarukāra, remarking that he is going against the view of the Bhāṣya and Vārttika of Nyāya when he explains the knowledge 'this is silver' (on shell) as not grasping the relation between the two knowledges, viz., that of 'this' and of 'silver' but as the non-discrimination of the two things which are connected with one knowledge. For the Bhāṣyakara and Vārttikākāra (Uddyotakara) give illusion as 'अत्यादिश्वरार्तिः प्रकृतिः' and both would damn him in the words of Hirapya-kasipu: अभिन्नो अभ्यं बलरे अनेनाधिकिः नीणता। मेषपुक्षिन सर्वरुपम्«कुद्धुक्के गतिः। It cannot be argued that a wrong instrument can perceive the opposite as otherwise a man having bad instruments would be omniscient! Nor can it be said that the object of illusion exists in the idea

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1. अभिन्नं अत्यादिश्वरं वाणिज्यश्रवणं द्राक्षरमृत्वं सर्वरुपे नीणता। यो न अर्थबङ्कनिः सर्वमिर्जातिः सातिः के अपनाते --- 1981 वि. 6.92.
for, in that case the body should burn if fire is superimposed upon the Guṇjā beads. Thus there is no other way than to suppose that it is indescribable (Anirvacanīya) which means other than Sat and Asat or it might be defined as sublatable by knowledge.

Sublation means the grasping of absence of the superimposed adjuncts. It should not be argued that by the knowledge of Īśvara the world is uprooted like a jar with a stroke of the pestle and thus it is not the knowledge of absence but destruction. Some authorities take the sublation as the denial of existence for all the three times.

Thus the beginningless Anirvacanīya Avidyā is established.

Citsukha accepts the view that Brahman is the resort of Avidyā, for otherwise the omniscience of Brahman cannot be proved. It is not incongruent with Brahman whose nature is Prakāśa (light) and it is removed by knowledge of Brahman. No other

\[ \text{Note:} \]
remover (Nivartaka) for this knowledge is required as it disappears with the Avidyā. It cannot be objected that the effect cannot remove its cause, for do they not hold that the impression (Saṃskāra) which gives rise to remembrance is destroyed by it? Is not the last but one syllable destroyed by the last one? Does not the fire destroy the tree from which it is produced?

The object of the Avidyā is the consciousness pervading the objects (Viṣayacaitanya) as the experience 'I do not know myself' shows. All the Vyavasthā of a preceptor and a pupil etc. lasts up to Avidyā as in a dream and no question is admissible regarding him, as he is created by Avidyā. The pure Brahman undergoes all actions after imagining on itself various forms, viz., a preceptor etc. And the same Brahman when identified with Jīva is styled the witness; for pure Brahman without a mind cannot be the knower. Bliss, Consciousness etc. are not the attributes but constitute

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2. वि-वे-बालसंस्कारदिवर्त्य चिन्तामणि श्रीवामशाहेर्चिन्तामणि श्रीमान् साहित्याचे साहित्याचे श्रीमान्। श्रीमान् हे श्रीमान् श्रीमान् हे श्रीमान्।

3. वि-वे-बालसंस्कारदिवर्त्य चिन्तामणि श्रीवामशाहेर्चिन्तामणि श्रीमान् साहित्याचे साहित्याचे श्रीमान्। श्रीमान् हे श्रीमान् हे श्रीमान्।
the nature of Brahman. Thus there is no difficulty in accepting one Avidyā of Brahman.

The view that there are many Avidyās is also not faulty. The objector asks whether one Avidyā belongs to all Jīvas or each has his own Avidyā? Both views are not tenable as in the first view all Jīvas will be Mukta when one is Mukta and as regards the second, is the whole phenomena real or imaginary? If real, there can be no distinction in Avidyā and if imaginary, why not imagine only one and do away with it? Further their number would be infinite.

AAAAAAAAAA Only one is suffice to indulge in
AAAAAAAAA or many this imagination. Even accepting

that it is distinct for each Jīva, does one who is enlightened perceive the delusion and its products created by the fiction of another or not? If he does, then Brahman cannot be described as 'plenitude' (Bhūman) as he perceives the distinction. If he does not, then the preceptor will not see the pupil
and thus no instruction. Hence the view that there are many Avidyās belonging to many Jīvas is untenable.

It is replied that there is no fault in taking many Avidyās as belonging to one Jīva as stated by Iśtasiddhikāra. Sruti also refers to many Ajñānas in न अनुभवते विस्मयान नान्दिनी. The imaginer is one and he can imagine in thousand and one ways. But the whole universe is created by the Māyā of the Iśvara and thus it is perceived by all and hence the preceptor is able to see his pupil.

Some authorities take Jīvas as the limitations of Brahman by adjuncts and propound that Jīva where Avidyā vanishes becomes Mukta while others remain the same as before. The commentator Pratyak-svarūpa ascribes this view to Maṇḍanamiśra and Vācaspati.

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1. अतिरिक्त कुछ न किसी आपातकालभूतियों।
   तथा न अनुभवते विस्मयान नान्दिनी। अथि अवृत्तेऽ॥ श्रीदेव । ३।

2. तत्र इत्यादि अपनायनोपाधिभविषयस्थिः विकल्पस्वात्माकं नु निर्विश्वासः अविकल्पितविवेकस्य सुनिर्विश्वासः अविकल्प निर्विश्वासं जन्मात्माश्च श्रीदेव सूक्ष्म-अति-प्रातिपदिः। श्रीदेव। ३। ३॥
But Citsukha favours the Ekajīvavāda with many Avidyās and Brahman as the only resort to ward off the extreme idealism of Avacchedavāda. Otherwise the various Jīvas cannot be co-ordinated and the Sruti and Smṛti giving Īśvara as their controller would be violated:\(^1\)

The removal of Avidyā is Brahman itself and there is no possibility of coming into Samsāra again on the strength of Sruti. Jīvanmukti should be accepted to finish the experience of strong Prārabdha Karma.

As Nyāyasudhā says: One Avidyā is divided into three forms: (i) cause of the illusion of reality of the universe, (ii) imagination of objects valid in practice, and (iii) direct perception of objects. The first is put an end to by the determination of the reality of Advaita; the second melts away at the realization (Sākṣātkāra) of the truth while the third, viz., Māyā vanishes in the

\(^1\) Vide ibid. p. 287

\(^2\) Vide ibid. p. 393.
final Samadhi of a Jivanmukta, at the end of all Prarabdha Karma.

Thus Citsukha proves the main tenets of Advaita. He holds Ekajiva and though he does not expressly state to what of the three theories - Abhasa, Pratimba and Avaccheda - he belongs, he seems to be inclined towards Pratimba as he does not favour Avaccheda. In his exposition he seems to have been influenced by Anandabodha whose style he follows.

Citsukha bases his arguments on all authorities from S. upto Srijharsha but chiefly his thesis is a combination of Vivarana, Iistasiddhi, Nyayamakaranda and Khandana. He appears to distinguish between Suresvara and Mandanamisra as he quotes the former as Suresvara and the latter as Mandanamisra, the author of Brahmasiddhi. He has written commentaries on both N.S. and Brahmasiddhi and further investigation in this connection would throw light on the problem.

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1. Vide ibid p.9 अद्वेष्ट ज्ञात: ज्ञेयं िर्ति सुरेशवर्षार्यार्यां
2. नितानिन्दन: सादुकरिणीं: 1 जीवस 1480.
Citsukha shows his acquaintance with a vast extent of literature. He refers not only to Vedānta authorities like Ś., Suresvara, Maṇḍana, Padmapāda, Vācaspati, Iśtasiddhikāra, Vīvaraṇakāra, Ānandabodha, Khaṇḍanakāra, Nyāyasudhākāra, etc. but to Mīmāṁśā and Nyāya, authorities as well, like Śabarasvāmin, Prabhākara, Kumārika Bhaṭṭa and Udyotakara, Udayana, Mānamanoharakāra, Kiraṇāvalīkāra, Lilāvatīkāra, Kandalikāra, Nyāyakalpatarukāra and others.

To the student of Advaita he is indispensable.
(vii) Amalānanda

As the only famous follower of Vācaspati’s Avacchedavāda, Amalānanda is interesting to the students of Advaita Vedānta. He wrote a commentary on Bhāmati and he was so enamoured of it, he composed another work Śāstradarpana, a running summary of B.S., just to explain the view of Bhamaśīkāra in detail.¹

Date.- Fortunately for us he gives the name of the ruling king at the outset of his work Kalpataru. He flourished when Kṛṣṇa, the son of Jairādeva of Yādava family was controlling the earth with the help of Mahādeva.² It is known that Kṛṣṇadeva Yādava was ruling at Devagiri in Śaka 1169-1182 (i.e. A.D. 1267). According to the tradition Amalānanda was patronized by Hemādri or Hemādapanta, the minister of Yādavas. Thus he belongs to the second half of the thirteenth century A.D.

He is also styled as Vyāsāśrama, and was the pupil of Anubhavānanda. In his Kalpataru he salutes

¹ अनुवेषित, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सी�ा, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सीता, सत्सी
first Anubhavānanda and then Ānandātman as the grand preceptor, and gives Sukhapraṇāsa (most probably the pupil of Citsukha) as his Vidyāguru. He also extols one Vibudheśvara — most probably Vācaspati as the conqueror of opponents with his arguments. His Sastradarpānā contains his veneration to Anbhavānanda.

His Works.— Vedāntakalpataru, Sāstradarpaṇa and Pañcapādikādarpaṇa.

1. Vedāntakalpataru.— (Also called Gaṅgādrumā).— It is the commentary on Vācaspati’s Bhāmaṭī. The work is lucid and clearly exposes the argument in the original, quoting further authorities. This was his first composition and unsatisfied with it he wrote a Vṛtti on B.S. to depict the views of Bhāmailākāra. He refers to this work in his Sāstradarpaṇa more than once. It has been commented upon by Appayya in his Parimala. The work is available in print.

2. Sāstra-darpaṇa.— The work consists of

\[\text{\textsuperscript{1}} \text{ Jbid vv. 8 and 9.} \]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{2}} \text{ Jbid v. 10.} \]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{3}} \text{ Jbid v. 11.} \]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{4} विशालने महर्षिणां शक्ति-पदार्थापिरक्षिते: }\]
\[\text{तः महर्षिकुलमन्यां शुगलनान्तरे शुगलम् स. द. ्।} \]
Kārikās and their explanation. Each Adhikaraṇa of the B.S. is summarised under the first Sūtra thereof. It is the precursor of Bhāratīrtha’s Adhikaraṇaratnamālā. The exposition is according to S. and Vācaspati but sometimes he suggests some other interpretation than suggested by S., showing him due respect. It is published in Vāṇī Vilāsa Series.

3. Pañcapādikādarpana.— It is mentioned by the editor of Vivarāṇa (in Vizianagram Series) in his introduction. It seems to be a gloss on Padmapāda’s Pañcapādikā. It is not surprising that Amalānanda who states himself to be a follower of Vācaspati should write on Pañcapādikā, for as will be shown later on he also refers many a time to Pratibhābavāda.

Amalānanda’s exposition of Advaita.— After Vācaspati there was no avowed follower of Maṇḍana upto the 13th Century A.D. The Advaitins though often and anon quoted the views of both Vācaspati and Maṇḍana as authoritative did not embrace them.

1. *Vide* S. D. on B.S. 1128, तर्कनौर्ता श्रीकृष्णनाथादि संस्करण, शीलदेव राय श्रीमानु उपनिषदोऽध्यात्मिकम्।
2. The following presentation mainly depends upon S. D.
to the full as has already been clear above. They were alluded to mainly for refutation. But Amalānanda is the next milestone in Avacchedavāda and hence his name is included hereunder as one of the important Advaitins that flourished in the 8th to 14th Century A.D.

As is discussed by Ś', he takes up Adhyāsa first in both of his works S.D. and Kalpataru. It is defined as the appearance of a thing not present in some other thing. The words 'not present' bar Ativyāpti on recognition (Pratyabhijñā) and 'on other' to ward off Ativyāpti on remembrance (Smṛti). Further, he explains that 'not present' (अज्ञाताः परमार्थाः) means not residing in the substrate really (अज्ञाताः परमार्थाः अज्ञाताः).

On B.S. 1.1.2 he remarks that Brahman is the cause of the world like the serpent-on-a-garland and the world is the Vivarta on highest Brahman of the ignorance of the Jīva. Thus he embraces the

1. अज्ञाताः परमार्थाः परस्पर्शिः परमार्थाः: S. D. 1.1.2.

2. अमस्तात् श्रव्येश्वरी निर्विविठः अज्ञाताः S. D. 2.1.2.
view that Avidyā is bi-polar having Jīva as the subject and Brahman as the object. At the outset of his Kalpataru, he states this clearly, while commenting on अविचारितसमवेति. Further, the Jīva being the Pratibimbā in Avidyā is also the Vivarta of Brahman. Brahman is the cause of the world by Vivarta and hence the existence of Brahman persists in the Jagat. The unlimited Brahman is known to be the cause of limited (Avacchinna) effect according to the Sruti. But it does not mean that the effect should be greater than the cause. In the Āraṁbhavāda (creation) there is the rule that the effect should be bigger but not so in Vivartavāda where a man standing on the ground happens to perceive the trees on the peak of a mountain as small blades of grass. The Sruti tells that only the cause is true in स्त्रियांस्यवेषणं, and hence Vivarta should be resorted to and not Parināma. The atoms possessing ‘touch’ are momentary and hence cannot be the first cause.

1. तत्र्विषयमिता श्रमणविद्वेशति। तक्षितस्य तद्विषयं न एव दुस्मिति। कल्पनः। I. 1.1.

2. न केवलं भूतानि क्रोधाबिनिवेशों अणि तु श्रीनामाधी संरचनार्थशीतोज्जाति। तत्रिविषयमलेन तलिलेव। १६१३।

3. उक्तस्य अंगशालिः किचिं कौशयं आभिन्ने। S. D. p. १००।

आराधनामकः अनिवर्तः निधो नाथ।
That entity which exists for all time and which is omnipresent is reality and it exists as a whole as e.g. the inner self, but the thing which exists in some place at a particular time and is said to be existing by only some is not real but only phenomenal as the world is.

The Jīva is in reality one with the Īśvara but the distinction is superimposed like the Pratibimbā. Thus even though Amalānanda follows Vācaspati everywhere he cannot get rid of the influence of the Advaita of the day which inclined to a great extent towards the Pratibimbāvāda. Many a time he refers to it as e.g. in आणेन्द्रेन he proclaims \textit{वर्जितं वार्तिकरसदनां विनिस्मितंस्य रूपं सम्पन्नम्}. The arrangement of Bandha and mokṣa or pleasure and pain can be explained by taking the Jīvas to be the Pratibimbā of Brahman. Brahman like the Bimba is pure even though they are impure.

At the same time he takes the Jīva to be the subject of Avidyā and hence he has to face the

\begin{enumerate}
\item अयस्यं वसु नालस्य शर्भं अर्जुणं सर्विधानमवतेन विनिवृत्तिर्दर्पणं – नित्यं इत्तस्मात्। अर्जुणं वाचस्पतिकत्वं मिल्लितकिंवं बलास्य संक्तिमुक्ते अधिकार्यः
\item न अर्जुनः। न अर्जुनः। न अर्जुनः। न अर्जुनः। \textit{Ibid.} p. 134.
\item तस्मातस्यमेव तस्मातस्यमेव तस्मातस्यमेव तस्मातस्यमेव तस्मातस्यमेव। \textit{Ibid.} p. 155.
\end{enumerate}
problem that the world is the product of the Jīva. Here he tries to get the better of it by interpreting the Sruti 'अनेन जीवनस्य नामकरणं आकाशानि.' in a novel way. Here the Jīva is not to be connected with 'अनुपालम्' but only with 'आकाशानि' and hence he is independent as far as the entrance is concerned, the rest depends upon the Isvara.¹

The all-pervading Brahman does not undergo any transmigration but the same when limited with the adjuncts of body becomes Jīva and is said to transmigrate. The Vedāntas help towards Salvation.

The Vedāntas propound in two ways.² Sometimes the purpose is to manifest the reality while at others there is advice regarding Upāsanā. The teaching of truth also is twofold, by refuting others and by positive means. The creation comes under the first and is alluded to for denial while 'ऐतार्यं' 'सबै एकम्', etc. are the instructions regarding bare truth. The passages like 'स काँतु कुर्लिन' state Upāsanā and so do not contaminate Brahman.

¹ सामान्योत्नामयं होमलस्य गरीविशासंहं आधारप्रदें आधारं अविष्कर्तान कारणं आकाशानि इत्यथानेन सम्बन्धं: धिनुं अनुपालस्य इत्यथानेन संस्करितम्। अन्बत् १.१८३।

² Ibid p.208.
As the moon destroys the darkness which was not created by him so also the Brahmāsākṣātkāra destroys the Avidyā and the illusion thereof.

Thus Amalānanda refers to all problems as they come up for discussion in the light of B.S. and tries to explain Bhameśikāra's opinion. But he also reconciles it to a certain extent with the Pratibimbavāda. He embraces the Nāṇājīvavāda and two types of Avidyā as given by Vācaspati.

He refutes Bhāskara and Kesāva. His style is influenced by Naiyāyikas and is not lucid like that of Vācaspati.

One point is interesting in his discussion of the asceticism required for the ultimate realization. Here he considers the problem of the ascetics taking to Grāhasthāsrama again. The objector argues that the ascetics who again become householders are Caṇḍālas if they do not perform the necessary expiation (Prāyascitā) and quotes the Smṛti "

"पञ्चवस्त्र: प्रलोकाधिनः पारीतं चालत्रेतः।
लोकादित्यं प्रविष्टं च तदेतः सेतु अस्तित्॥"

1. निमित्तं भागदीपोषणं किवसम् तत्रितिवर्णं ततुः।
अपस्वेदनाति षप्पं भागदीपोषणं भवे पुंशे।। बिन्द २३०॥
The Siddhāntin argues that the expiation is not laid for taking to the Grhastrāma but to concentrate again on the same asceticism and the king should look to this. It cannot be argued that those who do not undergo the expiation are Cunda ālas. Some expiations destroy the impurity belonging both to this as well as the other world, while some only that of the other world.

Does this discussion of deviation from Yatītva and taking to Grhastrāma again refer to the parents of Saint Jñāneśvara who is contemporary of Amalānanda? S. denies such deviation from Vānapraṣṭhastrāma while Amalānanda displays no doubt about it and discusses the right to Brahmavidyā of such a defaulter! Is he the child of the day?
(vii) Prakāṭārthakāra

A voluminous commentary on S'B. is known as Prakāṭārthavivarana quoted by Appayya Dīkṣita and many other Advaitins. The book does not mention the author's name and it would have been anonymous for all time to come, save for the recent ingenious identification of the author by Dr. V. Raghavan.

Comparing the work with the works of Anubhūtisvarūpācārya who is connected with the Śārasvata school of grammar, Dr. Raghavan has clearly established the identity between Anubhūtisvarūpa and Prakāṭārthavivaranaṅakāra.

Not much biographical data about the author is available except that he is the preceptor of Janārdana, the author of Tattvāloka and most probably of Ānandagiri, the famous commentator of S'. His precise date is not known but he is ascribed to the 13th Century A.D.


2. Vide introduction to Pañcakāṇki, p. xii.
Works.—According to Dr. V. Raghavan the following books have come from his pen:—

Prakāṭartha-vivarana, Nyāyamakarandasaṁgraha, Candrika, Gāndapādiya-Bhāṣya-Vyākhyā, Śisyahítaisini, Gitābhāṣyatippaṇa, Istaśiddhivivarana and Sārasvata-Prakriyā.

1. Prakāṭartha-vivarana.—It is a commentary on the SāBhāṣya in detail. He explains and amplifies the original arguments frequently refuting other views, viz., those of Bhāskara, Keśava and Brahmaprakāśīkākāra. The style is flowing, impassioned and ornamental, and is competent to vie with that of Bhamati.

2. Nyāyamakarandasaṁgraha.—It is a gloss on Ānandabodha’s Nyāyamakaranda. He has also commented upon the other work of Ānandabodha, viz., Nyāyadīpāvalī and the commentary is known as Candrika.

He has written a gloss on the Sāṅkarabhāṣya to Gāndapādakārikā, and also a Tippana on S.’s Gitābhāṣya, to which Ānandagiri refers. His
Śīṣya-hitaisīṅgī is the commentary on Śrīharāsa's Khandana. He has also annotated Īstasiddhi.

All these works are said to be written for the sake of his pupil who could not understand them.

Anubhūtisvarūpa, a Pratibimbāvādin.—Anubhūtisvarūpa alias Prakāṭārthakāra accepts Pratibimbāvāda which he mentions in clearcut terms. At the very outset of his P.V. he summarises his opinion as follows :-

The Māyā is one, beginningless, indescribable and the cause of all the universe. Īśvara is the Pratibimba in it of the highest Cit or consciousness and is omniscient due to it alone. Brahman without any distinction is the Biṁba. The same Māyā has infinite limited indescribable parts called Ajñānas or Avidyās having twofold powers, viz., of veiling and projecting and the same consciousness when reflected in these becomes the infinite Jīvas.¹

Thus he follows the view of Sarvajñātman regarding Pratibimbāvāda. Īśvara also is a

¹. तद्यथा अस्तेष्य:- एक तन्त्रमाध्यममार्थस्य भूतसकृतीश्चिनिन्यासस्यवाक्ष्याः। तत्त्वादिन्तिकिरसर: तत्प्रारगार्थेन सर्वहिन्दीवात्। निर्विभाजयेन तु निर्विभाजयेन ज्ञेय ज्ञेयमात्राः। तस्मात् एव परिवर्त्य निर्विभाजयश्च निर्विभाजयश्च ज्ञेयानि। ज्ञेयानि निर्विभाजयं श्रद्धेश्वराहिन्यानेन: कारणार्थविशेषमात्रस्य अस्तेष्यमुपर्ययोऽविभाज्यमुपर्ययकारणोऽपि भस्मसंपत्तिः। प. व. प. ३.
reflection of the Brahman in Mâyâ, the greatest adjunct of Brahman. Avidyā or Ajñâna is the limitation of this Mâyâ and infinite. The various images of Brahman in them are the Jīvas or individual souls which are many. Thus he accepts Jivanânātva. In his Īstasiddhi-vivarana he refutes Ekajīvavāda and embraces the view of the plurality of individual souls.

He expresses this view many times in his works. Īsvara, being the reflection in Mâyâ becomes the distributor of the fruits of various actions and also the cause of the world. The same Mâyâ bestows upon him the Sākṣītv. And the same Brahman when reflected in the Ajñâna is called the knower, the seer and the Jīva.

The egoism (Ahamvṛttiḥ) forming the Jīva is the experience clothed in 'I' (Asmat) and the mind pervaded by this egoism is known to be the manifester of the Jīva. Thus even though the Cit is non-object by its nature, it becomes object due to the superimposed ego.
To get rid of the Avidyā, which is the root of all the evil and thereby to attain to the highest bliss is the salvation. For the misery and absence of happiness depend upon Avidyā and hence its cessation constitutes the Puruṣārtha.

Thus for the sake of the pupil Anubhūti-svarūpa succinctly brings out the Pratibimbavāda which appears to be the order of the day. His method of argument is lucid, clear and sarcastic, e.g., अदन असुर: असुरों---लत्तेद्यमशुभामर्मां भाईून्मतसे। प.व. 62

He had his own circle (of course influenced by Ānandabodha); and his Śiṣyas, viz., Janārdana and Ānandagiri; and Praśīyas, viz., Prajñānānanda and Akhandānanda enriched the Advaita literature with commentaries and also independent works.

This is, in short, the picture of Advaita in the period comprising 9th to 14th centuries. The above Advaitins and a number of others annotated and amplified the Advaita which came to their hand. The three theories were already in vogue and were

1. नीरक्षदुःखाण्वुरुः निररक्षदुःखाण्वुरुः परम्पुरुषार्थाः.
clearly classified and systematised by the authorities in this period. The tendency at the beginning was to be original and to express dissentsions if any in clearcut terms as is found in Vîmuktiśatman or Prakāśatman while as we approach to the close of the period a tendency towards synthesis appears to have already been developed. Thus, Ānandabodha or Citsukha in addition to the explanation of their own views try to defend the other available views also. This is clear specially regarding the Jīvanānātva and Avidyānānātva. Many differences were already in existence as e.g. Sarvajñātman’s record of seven different views regarding the relation between the Jīva and the Īśvara, etc.

The main business was to save Advaita from the attacks of Bhāskara and other Bhede-bhedavādins and also Naiyāyikas who held sway over the scholarly mind that time. Thus from the beginning of the eleventh century a gaudy dialectical cloak was stitched
to cover the simple yet subtle Advaita.

Many other names of big authorities are also heard in this period. Jñānottama, preceptor of Citsukha, Mukunda, author of Vivekasindu, Sukhaprakāśa, pupil of Citsukha, Ānandagiri and Janārdana are some of them.

At the end of this period the development of Advaita was almost complete and stagnation, as is natural, started. Nothing could have been further added except the suggestions of polemic nature and thus Advaita attained its zenith in this time.