Chapter II

1. Immediate Pupils of Śaṅkarācārya

Śaṅkarācārya established the Advaita doctrine by refuting all the extant systems of Philosophy. Herein he had to face Buddhism which attained great popularity in India and which was already attacked by Gauḍapāda, his grant-preceptor, who tried to refute the doctrine in Buddhist terms. The Mīmāṁsakas joined him in the task and Kumārila-bhaṭṭa had become successful in weakening their position. Śaṅkarācārya gave the last blow to the already shaky foundations of Buddhism and the attack proved to be fatal in as much as Buddhism was thenceforth completely effaced from India.

Besides these external enemies, he had to look to the internal opposition -- internal, in the sense that it came from the orthodox circle. Sāṃkhya and Mīmāṁsakas were the chief among the Āstika Darsānas and their claims as to the legacy of Veda had to be obverted. Śaṅkarācārya considered the Sāṃkhya as the 'Pradhāna Malla' and defeated him on all frontiers, viz., from the point of S'ruti, Smṛti and reasoning. As to the Mīmāṁsakas, they were dogmatists and thus the nearest ones, as both Advaitins and Mīmāṁsakas
take their stand on S’ruti. But Advaitins are not only dogmatists as they give more importance to Anubhava or experience on the strength of which they vanquished the Mīmāṃsakas. Applying the same canons of interpretation, furnished by the Mīmāṃsakas, Śaṅkarācārya proved how the last part of S’ruti, viz., the Vedāntas cannot purport at Action or Kārya. Other opponents, viz., the Vaiṣeṣikas, the Yogins, the Bhāgavatas, etc., were very easily silenced.

Travelling over the whole country and visiting all the parts, he spread the Advaita all over India. For the right propagation of Sanātana Vaidika Dharma, he founded Mūṭhs in the four directions and placed his pupils there to look after the religious well-being of the people. The pupils played their part honestly and befittingly as is reflected by the continuous authority held by the Mūṭhs to this day.

We have already seen how Śaṅkarācārya formulated Advaita Darśana basing it on Gauḍapāda’s exposition of the Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad. He explained the Adhyāsa or superimposition as the root of duality, which is nothing but mere name and form or in other words play of Māyā. He stated that the individuality is ascribed to Brahman through
the adjuncts, etc. His followers took up his doctrine and established it on a firm basis properly systematising it. Various theories regarding the relation between the Jīva and the Brahman were formed by the pupils. Ābḥīṣavāda of Suresvā and Pratibimбavāda of Padmapāda are important in this connection. Just after a couple of decades came Vācaspati with his Avacchedavāda. Thus the period just posterior to Ś. saw a full-fledged activity in Advaita School.

Suresvara, Padmapāda, Tṛṭaka and Hastāmalaka were among others the four well-known disciples of Ś. They helped the cause of Advaita by expanding it in many compositions or Prakaraṇa—Granthas. Suresvara comes in the vanguard with a voluminous work on Advaita.

(1) Suresvara

Date.—The dates given in Indian Literature are rightly said to be pins to be bowled down again. Thus there is no unanimity among the Scholars regarding the date of Suresvara. The traditional accounts preserved in the Muṣīs vary among themselves and are too fabulous to be trusted. Modern Scholars have tried to settle his date on the basis of the date of his Guru, which

1 Vidē Śaṅkara-vyākhyā śāstra by Bodas. He notes down as
has been tentatively ascertained as 788 A.D. to 820 A.D. Maṇḍanamisra (name of Suresvara in the former Āśārama) was a renowned pupil of Kumārilabhaṭṭa whom S'. met while the former was ready to enter fire and hence asked the latter to go to Maṇḍanamisra. Thus Maṇḍanamisra seems probably to be an elder contemporary of S'. and thus might have belonged to the latter half of the eighth and first half of the ninth centuries A.D. Prof. Dasgupta and Dr. Rādhākrṣṇa assign him to 900 A.D.

Attempts have been made to push back the date of S'. on the basis of Kumārilabhaṭṭa's date. Kumārila refers to Dharmakīrti who is known to have lived about 632 A.D. and thus his date can be taken to be 650 A.D. Bhavabhūti who is referred to as Uṁveka in one of the Mss. of his uttararāmacarita is identified to one Bhaṭṭa Uṁveka, who was the Mīmāṁsaka pupil of Kumārila. Bhavabhūti's date is fixed at 650 A.D. The upshot of all this is that the date of S'. can be settled about 655 to 693 A.D. and thus his pupil Suresvara should be relegated to the period about 675-720 A.D. Mm. P.V. Kane also considers the whole and comes to the conclusion that Viśvarūpācārya and Suresvara can be taken.

as identical and his date approximately lies about 800 to 825 A.D.

**Māndana and Suresvara.**—Tradition goes that Māndanamisra, Visvarūpa and Suresvara, pupil of S.' are one. Vidyāraṇya in his Saṅkarādīgīvijaya gives two whole cantos to depict his learning and marriage and the consequent decisive debate with S.' after which he took the robes of a Saṅnyāsin at the feet of the latter. A great genius he learned all the then lore with mastery and professed himself as a Mīmāṁsaka and a pupil of Kūmārilabhaṭṭa. He was known as Visvarūpa alias Māndanamisra and was married to Sarasvatī equally adept in all sciences.

---

13 Cantos V & VI.

As a matter of fact tradition speaks of Māndanamisra as an incarnation of Brhaspati, the Guru of gods or Brahmā and Sarasvatī, his wife, was in sooth, the mortal replica of the divine Sarasvatī, the Goddess of learning, who happened to evoke a curse from Muni Durvāsas, the proverbial citadel of fiery wrath! Skanda, the Commander-in-chief of the gods descended as Kūmārila and the denizens of heaven followed him to uplift the masses from the drudgery wrought by the Mīhilists and others. Indra, in the form of King Sudhanvan helped him to wipe out the influence of the enemies of Sanātana Dharma and Divine Śiva himself who was renowned for his compassion for the people by his taking Hālāhala, descended as Bhagavatpāda and vanquishing all the demons of various sects or cults deluding the masses, threw open the path to True Salvation. Who would oppose the great God! Even Māndana with his wife bowed down at his feet.

*Vidā his Introduction to Brahmaveddhi pp.XXV—vii.*
About the identity of Suresvāra and Maṇḍanamisra there is controversy which has not as yet seen its conclusion. Thus Prof. Kuppuswami Shastri and others doubt whether Suresvāra, the author of Naiskarmyasiddhi and the Vārtikās was the same who wrote Brahmaśiddhi. For the latter contains certain views which are contrary to those of Śrī and which are refuted by Suresvāra in his works. The most notable of these is the problem of the substrate of Avidyā which Brahmaśiddhikāra gives as the Jīva while Suresvāra takes it to be the Brahman itself. The next glaring contradiction is regarding the means of Salvation. While Śrī or Suresvāra do not want any semblance of action in connection with the knowledge which is the only means to Salvation, Maṇḍana in his Brahmaśiddhi favours the Jñānakarma-samuccayavāda. There are also other doctrinal differences between the views accepted by the Brahmaśiddhikāra and those of Suresvāra. Moreover no work in Advaita, attributes Brahmaśiddhi to Suresvāra. Whenever it is alluded, it is always assigned to Maṇḍana.

1 Vide his Introduction to Brahmaśiddhi, pp. XXV - vii.

2 For detailed discussion of the problem vide Bid: the introduction.
Some scholars like Dr. Dasgupta and Prof. P.P.S. Sastri find escape from this controversy surmising that Brahmasiddhi might have been the work of Suresvara written before he was changed to Advaitin like his Mīmāṃsā works as one cannot brush aside the tradition. But this looks hardly possible as the work seems to presuppose Śaṅkarācārya’s Brahmasūtrabhāṣya and thus it cannot be prior to the time of his renunciation. Moreover if Suresvara had written the work, one expects him to dismiss it when he is admitted in the innermost circle of Advaitins and especially when his credentials for writing a Vārtika on S.B. were called in question by other co-students as recorded by Vidyāraṇya. Thus the balance of the controversy seems to go down on the side of the non-identity of the two. Prof. Kuppuswami Sastri writes: "Maṇḍana, the author of the Brahmasiddhi was never a disciple of S., did not become a Śaṅnyāsin, was not identical with Suresvara and represented an advaitic prasthāna different from Śāṅkara-prasthāna ... Maṇḍana should have written

1. Vide his Foreword to Brahmasiddhi pp. v-vii.
2. In more than one place S.'s arguments seem to be refuted. Vide the introduction to Brahmasiddhi, e.g. Brahmasiddhi p.32
3. Vide his Śaṅkaradigvijaya Canto XIII.
4. Mm. P.V.Kane in this connection concludes that Maṇḍana’s literary activity lies between 690-710 A.D. & that Maṇḍana & Suresvara are separated by about 100 years. Cf. P.263 History of Dharmāstāra, Vol.1.
his Neïskermyasiddhi mainly as a Sāṅkara counter-blast to the Brahmasiddhi.¹ Suresvara might have been called Maṇḍanamisra but it appears that Brahmasiddhi is not a work from his pen.

As the controversy is not yet generally closed, Brahmasiddhi has been discussed among Suresvara's books for all practical purposes. Of course the views given in it are not incorporated among Suresvara's views as they are contradictory to Advaita Sampradāya. Sarvajñātman is the authority for discarding these. For he says: नेतवं परिक्तम् मण्डनमिश्रसमस्तवस्तनमोपस्तुतम् ॥²

Works

The reputed Vedānta works which go in his name are following:

Neïskermyasiddhi, Taittirīyopanisadbhashya-vārttika, Vedāntasāravārttika, Brahmasūtrasāravārttika, Laghuārttika, Vārtikāsāra, Pañcakārana-vārttika, Mānasottāsa and Brahmasiddhi-Bṛhadāraṇyakopanisadbhashya-vārttika.

Out of these the Vārtikas on Brahmasūtra-Sāṅkarabhāṣya on Brahmasūtras seem to have been

¹. His introduction p. vii.
². Vide Sāmkṣepa II. 174.
proposed but not composed by the author due to the jealousy of his colleagues who doubted his true devotion to Advaita as he was formerly a Staunch Mīmāṃsaka.*

Out of the rest five works, viz., Naiskarmyasiddhi, Taittiriya Vārttika, Brhadāryakavārttikas, Pañcārthakarana and Mānasollāsa are available in print. About Brahmasiddhi it is not certain, as has already been remarked above, whether its author is the same as Suresvara. The remaining are only noted in some catalogues.

(1) Naiskarmyasiddhi.— (Edited by Prof. Jacob B.S.S. Series No. 59). It is a compendium of Advaita Vedānta. The author styles it अनिश्चित वेदान्तसूत्रम्। It is divided into four chapters. Like the textbooks on poetics it consists of कारकाः commented upon by the author himself. The work propounds Naiskarma or absence of इत्य to (अनिश्चितम्) knowledge of highest self leading to

* This is given in the tradition recorded by Vidyārāṇya. He further states that Suresvara irritated by this onslaught, gave a curse that thenceforth there would be no Vārttikas to the Sārīrakṛtiya & if ever a writer makes himself bold enough to try them they would be nipped in the bud. True to the word of the Yati there had been no Vārttika for long time on the Sф.B. But it is interesting that recently a Vārttika on Sф.B. has been composed by Bālakṛṣṇananda (Published by Āśūliā Granthāvilā Nį↑).
salvation which is nothing but destruction of *avidyā* which implies the non-perception of *tāpara.* It appears that Suresvara has composed this work on the same lines as those of *Upadeśasāhasrā* of his preceptor. The order of the topics and the trend of the argument are the same. The style is charming and the work is throughout readable.

Jñānottama has written a commentary on it.

(2) *Tattirīyopanisādbhāṣyavārttika.*- This work was undertaken by Suresvara at the behest of his Guru who belonged to this branch of Veda. It consists of Kārikā's 1027 in all. The work is divided in the original Upaniṣadic vein. It summarises and complements the Sāṅkarabhāṣya on *Tattirīyopanisād.* Technically the Vārttika to any Sāstra comprises Uktānuktadurūktacintā, i.e. it should investigate thoroughly the expressed, unexpressed and refuted thoughts. On the whole the work fulfils the expectations. Stanza second in the beginning contains the salutation to his Guru. The work considers at random the Upaniṣadic passages and allied problems. It also refutes other systems particularly Mīmāṃsā and Buddhism when occasion

---

* देवाराज प्रविष्ट जी एना कालु भवराजांश्रेष्ठ "साहित्य" में "सूरज" एवं "सूरज" तथागत अनुसरणनाम"
arises. Thus it can be read as an independent work dealing with Advaita Vedānta. The last verse gives the author's name - सुन्दरभोधिनीप्रेमि भवनाथसुभूमि यज्ञादेवराज, विद्यार्यान, तन्त्रज्ञ.

(3) Brhadāranyopanisadbhāsyavārttika.- As Vidyāranya* says, this work also was composed by Suresvara at the request of his Guru as Suresvara himself belonged to this branch of Yajurveda. The work is an estimate of Śaṅkarācārya's commentary on Brhadāranyaka. The bulk of the upaniṣad has made it a voluminous composition consisting of about 11151** verses which deals with all the points of Śaṅkara Advaita and also contains the refutation of systems like Purvamāṁśa, Bauddhas, Sāṁkhya, etc. It does not contain any special salutation to his Guru. In verse two at the outset he only remarks that he is attempting an allucidation of the gloss (तिर्ल) of his Guru on Kanvopanisat investigating the whole Vedic exegesis. This great composition seems to have given Suresvara the title Vārttikakāra by which he is later on referred to. The last three verses extol the fame of

* Śaṅkaradīvijaya AD. XIII.
** Originally the work consisted of 12000 verses but only 11151 are available at present. cf. इति आशार्ग्नेन्द्रासनिकमेवालिकामूल्यसिद्धान्तम् | आशार्ग्नेन्द्रासनिकमेवालिकामूल्यसिद्धान्तम् | आशार्ग्नेन्द्रासनिकमेवालिकामूल्यसिद्धान्तम् | आशार्ग्नेन्द्रासनिकमेवालिकामूल्यसिद्धान्तम् |
his preceptor who is known by one of the names of Siva (सिव) and who, by his birth, purified the Atrikula.

(4) Paññikaraṇavārttika.—This small pamphlet goes under the name of Suresvara. Curiously enough it does not give any clue as to the preceptor of the author nor to its authorship. It describes the creation of the world from the Brahman due to the machinations of his own Māyā. Brahman is both the instrument (Nimitta) and material (upādāna) of this universe. First the five elements in their subtle (तमस) form are produced. Then comes Mahat. Then, after the five gross elements styled so after their Paññikaraṇa which is explained at great length -- springs Virēt, the gross body of the incorporeal Ātman. Then follows the threefold division of Adhidaivata, Adhyātma and Adhibhūta of the five Jñānendriyas, the five Karmendriyas, Manas, Buddhi, Citta, Ahaṅkāra and Tamas. Here comes the description of Jāgarita which is defined as अहंकारं कर्मात्मन्तरं ज्ञानं चिन्तामणि (सते स्वं विश्वविद्वानं ज्ञानार्थमथा छले॥)
Visva is its Abhimānin. The कोमेरिक, अलनेट्रिक, श्योचुन्य, 
ग्राण and पुरुषिक are discussed, followed by the 
description of dream as ग्राण ग्राणकस्येवं गुणं सत्यं उच्चं।
In सुःष्टिक the intellect remains in subtle form. And 
thus the One Reality is as though shrouded in plurality 
due to ignorance. Then appears investigation into 
डैकार with its three माता corresponding to Visva, 
Taijasa and Prājña in Māṇḍūkya fashion. The wise One 
should concentrate his mind on the Sākṣīn after eliding 
the three above states, viz., ग्राणिर, सत्य and पुरुषिक। Thus 
with the help of faith and devotion having visualised 
the self, one becomes Jīvanmukta though he continues 
to perceive phenomenal duality (भवात्मक्क्ता)। Herein 
we find the Advaita Vedānta dealt with from the 
practical point of view.

(5) Mānasollāśa.- This is a commentary on Saṅkarā-
caṭya's दक्षिणात्मिकस्यम। It is generally ascribed to 
Suresvara but the namesake is also assigned to 
Prakāśātma। The extant work in Ms. consists of 
verses numbering nearly four hundred. After salutation 
to the highest God and Goddess, the sage extols the 
self who is Paramesvara for attainment of Ātman - the

1 विषार्थमय मेघोहरके तलम विदातात्मक। Karika on Vd
2 B.O.R.I. Ms. ॥
reward for excellence. After producing the universe he entered into it giving rise to the activities (अक्षाक्षर) in the form of अत्मि and अश्रुराते. The hymn is an answer to the pupils' questionnaire which runs: "Where does this being (अत्मा) and light (समाज्ञ) reside? What is meant by शोभन, जितत्त त संख्येत? How can one know it? What is the fruit? How will the self become omniscient and omnipotent?" Thus the work considers the Vedānta in all its domains practical as well as philosophical. Briefly the contents can be stated as: "There is no distinction between dream-objects and objects in waking stage. The same Light of Ātman illuminates them. After the realisation of this Light he does not perceive the objects. This realisation can be had through the favour of the preceptor or through Yoga or through the grace of the God. As a King-in-dream he builds castles in the air and does not realise the decay of his life, being engrossed in a violent stream of the river of Infinity. And here he appears Kīnchijñā and Kīnchitkarta. Knowledge and action are transferred by Śiva to all proving thereby the fact that the Jīva is the God-head. Everything included in

---

1 कालनेत्रकेस्वेजने कीणामनुषा रघुनि
the universe from a blade of grass upto Brahman

and light (कुर्मण) of Brahman are manifest everywhere in accordance with the maxim –कारणवाचः कारणावलक्षणातः।

All creatures due to their tendencies being constituted of Will, Knowledge and Action are God. Yogins like Viśvāmitra created universe only through their will.

So also Īśvara creates, maintains and destroys it through His will. Everything is the play of Māyā.

The gist of all is: एवं कारणवाचः कारणावलक्षणातः। परिचे त्रेन ज्ञातो अद्वेयः न च विद्यते।

The best remedy to destroy the meshes of Māyā-Mohini is, curiously enough, administered to be स्थापये ज्ञानवाचः in v.9. The अवलक्षण also finds its inclusion under it. The work deals with all the salient features of Advaita in brief.

6) Brahmasiddhi.- The work is divided into four Kāṇḍas named as Brahmakāṇḍa, Tarkakāṇḍa, Niyogakāṇḍa and Caturtha-Kāṇḍa. As the title implies the work takes up to prove that Brahman is the only reality and that it is known from valid means, viz., Āgama. The first Kāṇḍa deals with the nature of Brahman which is

---

1 नसल्याकायाितित्वादेहयोजना न गणेशनुसरिन्तु।

2 Maṇḍana, at the very outset, describes Brahman as,

अत्यादे कान्ति विज्ञानानि विज्ञानवलक्षणः। अवलक्षणं प्रसादस्य निषेधम् थप्रतापतिहः

Brahmasiddhi

P-1
pure Bliss (Ānanda). This Ānanda is not equal to removal of misery but something beyond that. He refutes the view that there are two types of qualities - positive and negative. Attributes like One, unborn, immortal are negative and hence do not spoil the unity of Brahma, while attributes like Vijñāna and Ānanda are positive and hence should be interpreted so as to give negative meaning. And thus Ānanda means 'absence of misery'. Mahābhārata refutes the argument on the ground that there is no Bheda even if we understand the terms Vijñāna and Ānanda as they are. The case resembles the usage नकुल सरकार: सकिते where the terms Prakṛṣṭa and Prakāśa are not two different things. Hence the essence of Brahman should be taken as Ānanda. Further Brahman is One as Śruti denies Nānātva, which is due to Avidyā. Thus Avidyā cannot be described as the nature of Brahman nor can it be something different from it; it is neither absolutely unreal nor real; thus it turns out

1. न केदार वृक्षानि बुधमहाकुम्भे! स-कान्ते-सत्कता-सुभक्षे:। ब्रह्मचारीः॥७.३

2. अस्योऽत्तरते स्त्रियः-ब्रह्मचारीः। सार्वस्यादिपरिवर्तने। तद्यथाकर्मसत्। तद्यथाखर्मसत्। तद्यथालक्षणसत्। तद्यथालक्षणसत्।

3. वानक्षित् अद्वितीय: सत्यम्-सत्यमेव। संस्कृतविद्वस्त:। तत्त्वादिकम् सत्यम्। तत्त्वादिकम् सत्यम्।
only to be false appearance (Mithyāvabhāsa) and hence is indescribable. To what does this Avidyā belong? The reply is that it belongs to the Jīvas, which are distinct from Brahman only through imagination. No fault of mutual dependence (Avato-sāraṇa) follows as there is nothing incongruous, according to some, when once Māyā is accepted. Others say that both Jīvas and Avidyā are beginningless and therefore there is no possibility of Anyonyāsraya on the analogy of the seed and sprout (वीजाद्वृक्षः). Even though Jīvas are not distinct from Brahman still they are liable to possess Avidyā being impure like the reflection in dark swords, etc., of a white thing. Thus the Jīvas become Samsārins through Avidyā and get salvation through Knowledge (Vidyā) which is extraneous. Avidyā alone is natural to Jīva while the Vidyā is not so. The means to put an end to this Avidyā are enumerated by Mahānu as follows:

Thus as a way of illustration Mahānu seems to favour Avacechedavāda, cf. एवं अवज्ञानां कष्टान्तर्गतं मेडितं एवं अवज्ञानान्तरगतं मेडितं अवज्ञानगतं मेडितं

Thinking of and meditating on Brahman and observing
celibacy, etc., one marches on to salvation. The अन्नुक्तम् अन्नितां अन्नम्भाः removes all the barriers and vanishes by itself after which the pure Ātman becomes manifested. As the powder removes all the dirt in water and vanishes in it, so also when meditation, etc., vanishes, Jīva becomes Pure Brahman. Though the means are unreal still they lead to truth like the picture of a cow from which we understand a real cow. Further Brahman is the शब्दकर्ता, i.e., it is Sabdātma, the highest word. So also it is unchanging as is known from Sruti which employs the term Dhruva or Nitya. By the term अमर्द्व in the first stanza is meant that Brahman is not identical with all the objects. यद्यपि भवति अल्पाः अर्धस्वरूपिनां सनात्तिकः अर्धेन न्यूनां च वानप्रस्थात् (Brahmasiddhi, p.20). Different views regarding the relation between Jñāna and Karma are enumerated. He gives his own opinion in this connection as: तथा निर्विविधदार्शनाय विविधदार्शनाद्रव्यं धन्यिकामावेशिकानि दर्शितामावेशिकानि कलशादर्शनाद्रव्यं सस्मल्लिः प्रभान्त्वं न देवन्वनायेः, तत्त्र नित्यद्विविहिंशायाः अनादिर्विविद्यायाः; वर्णार्थस्वस्त शाश्वेतमान्यायाः; (Adh. 4.) Even though there is Ātma-Jñāna, still the whole Ajñāna
is not removed and hence repetition of meditation as also ritual is necessary. By passages like गृहस्त्य गापेन स्रुति itself states that Vidyā expects Karma as its auxiliaries. The second Kāṇḍa, viz., Tarka discusses various means of valid knowledge and proves the validity of Āgama as regards Brahman. The third one deals with Niyoga or the Mīmāṃsaka theory that purport of Veda refers to action alone. Herein he gives three types of cognition in case of Brahman. The first arises from passages; the second at the end of Dhyāna while the third is the ultimate when all distinction vanishes (संसाधित विद्या वेदित्त्वं अच्छेदा॥ । अविद्या विद्या विश्वास विद्या वेदित्त्वं अच्छेदा॥ संसाधित्त्वं अच्छेदा॥ ज्ञान अभिज्ञानकोशः प्रकाशकरणम् )

He also notes here two types of Avidyā — veiling ( अविद्यावरण ) and projecting ( विद्यावरण ) and these are related as cause and effect; both pertain to न्याय and महासाहित्य while मुदयति has only the first. The fourth chapter again deals with the problem of the validity of Upaniṣads.

Suresvara's contribution to Advaita Philosophy.

The Bhagavatpāda had already established Advaita.

---

1. This opinion is against S' who proclaims in season and out of season that there is no ज्ञात्यादि of निराधारत्वा once the realisation takes place.
on firm basis driving away all other systems from the 
arena of Indian Philosophy, with his versatile and 
subtle genius. The task of classification and systema-
tisation was left to his followers who availed themselves 
of them in a very remarkable manner, and wrote असाधारण or 
treatises dealing with all the salient features of the 
doctrine. Suresvara on the behest of his Guru composed 
the वार्त्तिकas and नाइषकर्मयासिद्धि as mentioned above. 
The latter treats in detail all the essential points of 
the system. The bone of contention with the various 
systems of Indian Philosophy is the relation between 
the Jīva and the Highest One. Though the Advaita 
proclaims that the two are one and the same, the question 
remains as to how there resulted the apparent separa-
tion or the द्वातिः? Suresvara's contribution can be 
said to be mainly related to the solution of this 
problem.

The Three Theories Ābhāsa, Pratibimba, Avaccheda.—
The main doctrine of Advaita Vedānta that the Reality 
consists of only Brahman or Atman who is identical with 
the individual soul is unanimously accepted by all the 
Advaitins. But in explaining the so-called creation
or the relation of the Jīva and Īśvara to the Absolute One there is some difference. Thus various theories or Vādas have arisen amongst them. Mainly three are discussed by the later authorities like Nṛsiṁhāsūrāna, Madhusūdana, Appayya, etc., who tried to synthesise the views. These are styled as Ābāsavāda or the Theory of Appearance, Pratibhāba or Theory of Reflection and Avaccheda or Theory of Delimitation. Of these Suresvara is traditionally said to have put forth the first, Sarvājñātman the second and Vākṣaspati the third. According to Suresvara, Jīva or the individual soul is a fantastical appearance of the One due to nescience. The original is real while the appearance is unreal. Thus Īśvara is nothing but the Highest with Ātman identified with Ajñāna while Jīva means His identification with intellect or Buddhī. Both of them do not know their real nature as also their fictitiousness. How all this happens is beyond description (अज्ञान-दर्शनीय). Padmapāda and his commentator Prakāśātman held the Theory of Reflection

1 अ-असांकेचे अहंसे आत्मिक्यं तः संस्कृतिसारस्वतां प्रतिविम्बयन्तिः
according to which Isvara is the reflection of Brahman into Ajñāna while Jīva is the reflection in Buddhi or individual inner organ. Vidyāraṇya also belonged to this view as is evident from his Anubhūtiprakāṣa. This theory seems to be popular among the early Advaitins. Sarvajñātman in his Saṁkṣepasāmyāprakāṣa also propounded the same. The third Theory, viz., that of Delimitation or Avaccheda was put forth by Vācaspāti, probably a younger contemporary of Suresvara. According to him Isvara is the object of the Ajñāna and Jīva is its subject. Madhusūdana Sarasvati gives Avaccheda view as: अद्वेद नवितं द्वितीयं अद्वेदाकारणं यद्वेद जीवै ज्ञानमात्रलिपिः । The omnipresent consciousness ( ज्ञानमात्रलिपि) which becomes the target of the ignorance is styled as Isvara and the substrate of this ignorance is the Jīva. The well-known perception of ignorance as 'I do not know' ( अज्ञातः) is with respect to the Highest Self. In other words it can be stated that when Brahman is shrouded by Avidyā or limited (of course apparently) it becomes Isvara. For the same authority further puts it as अद्वेदाकारणं ज्ञाते ज्ञाते ज्ञाते ज्ञाते । Thus

1. cf. मात्रां सारणां आकारं प्रतिपटितम्। तुदारामीकरं द्वितीयं अद्वेदं जीवां शृंगारकरं रूपं। हृदयो शुभ्राणि। सेविते ज्ञातानि श्रुणि। सुभाषितानि श्रवणानि श्रुणि। भूतानि भृत्यानि । द्रोह द्रोहादिकारणं ॥ ॥

2. 5:35.8 (B.S.S.) ॥ ॥
it appears that Jīva is the product of Ajñāna in as much as Ajñāna limits or demarcates it. The plurality of Jīvas is due to the variety of Ajñānas that is to say there is different Ajñāna in case of every Jīva and thus each and every individual has got its independent world. How to reconcile the similarity of experience will be discussed later on when we come to Vacaspati Miśra.

This in brief is the gist of the three Theories. These will again be taken up when occasion arises.

As a matter of fact there are only two main types; one of those who take either Īśvara or Jīva as Reflection of Brahman in Ajñāna and the other of those who equate the two with Ajñāna. Thus Ābhāsavāda is taken to be a fact of Pratiḥāvāda. Both agree in taking Jīva to be a reflection into Ajñāna. The difference is only of a degree and not of kind. The Pratiḥāvādins take the Reflection to be real while the Ābhāsavādins urge it to be unreal.*

Thus there is unanimity among all the Advaitins about the nature of Brahman which is Sat, Cit and Ānanda and they also agree that the God as well as

* Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in his Siddhāntābīndu summarises the position as: 

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pratiḥāvāda</th>
<th>Ābhāsavāda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pratiḥāvādins:</td>
<td>Ābhāsavādins:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sat, Cit, Ānanda:</td>
<td>Sat, Cit, Ānanda:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Īśvara = Jīva:</td>
<td>Īśvara = Jīva:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jīva = Ajñāna:</td>
<td>Jīva = Ajñāna:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real:</td>
<td>Unreal:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

P. 85
the Jīva or individual are identical with the same Brahman. But they differ as to the manner in which this Brahman becomes the God or the individual. Though the God or the individual self are Brahman, we cannot say that Brahman is either the God or the individual.

Even the Bhagavatpāda has given vent to this when he implores: ॥

The God and the individual are Brahman, there is no doubt about it; but Brahman is something beyond that, transcending and emanating both. Here then the question comes up how Brahman the one, without the second, became either the God or the individual.

Suresvāra, as Madhusūdana Sarasvatī states, regards that the Ātman or Brahman when entangled by Ajñāna is styled as God, the inner controller, the witness, the cause of the universe, etc., due to non-discrimination of its own appearance or fictitious reflection identified with Ajñāna. Thus the Ātman is identified with its cidābhāsa or appearance on Nescience. It is only an

---

1 Madhusūdana Sarasvatī summarises Suresvāra's views as: ॥

---

1 Madhusūdana Sarasvatī summarises Suresvāra's views as: ॥
appearance, a fiction wrongly viewed as Ātman. The eternal witness or the controller or the God is not the real Brahman but it is an Ābhāsa of the Brahman due to Avidyā. Similarly the individual self also is the Cidābhāsa on Buddhi or intellect due to engrossment by intellect. This Cidābhāsa is responsible for all the Vyavahāra or worldly activities. It is he who acts, enjoys and perceives what is going on in this world. The non-discrimination between this Cidābhāsa and the original Cit or Brahman is the cause of the appellation "Jīva".

This presentation of the Theory of Appearance by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī gives two things, viz., Cit or Brahman and its appearance in Ajñāna or Buddhi. Due to ignorance of the distinction between the two, Brahman is said to be the God or Jīva as the case may be. This strikes like dualism but it is monism in that the Cidābhāsa itself owes its existence to the Cit. Had there been no Cit there would have been no Ābhāsa. Further this Ābhāsa has another factor contributing to its origination. Ajñāna or Māyā entangles the Brahman and thereby produces its Ābhāsa. This
Māyā being Mithyā or indescribable does not vie with Brahman in eternity. It vanishes with the rise of realisation of Brahman. Thus the oldābhāsa depending on the one hand upon Brahman and on the other on Ajñāna in the case of the God and on Buddhi which is an effect of Ajñāna in case of the Jīva is also Mithyā or सत्सत्सत्सत् like its base, viz., मुल. The Ābhāsavādins take it to be वैभव्य - false or indescribable in the sense that it can neither be said/real as it is fiction being materialized by the fictitious Ajñāna nor unreal as it is observed as working.

To illustrate this Theory they give the example of the jasmine flower (जाँभरस) which, when kept near the crystal, makes it red. The redness pervades all over the crystal; yet it is not indigenous to it. It is adventitious belonging to the flower. So also Brahman due to the vicinity of Ajñāna is veiled by it and appears as the God or the Jīva. But the God-hood or the Jīva-hood are adventitious. Just as the redness does not bring any change in the nature of the crystal which is again seen white when the flower is removed, the God-hood or the Jīva-hood also do not inflict any essential change in Brahman. The adjunct
or the Upādhi of Ajñāna being removed Brahman shines forth in its own eternal effulgence.

Let us now have a peep into the compositions of the Great pupil of the Bhagavatpāda to find out whether his own conclusions tally with the allegations of tradition.

In his Naiskarmyasiddhi at the very outset Suresvāra summarises the whole Advaita Vedānta in a verse: देशालोक-प्रति जनति जनसागुरुरुप हों। विषयं नामस्य विद्वानस्य जनसागुरु गुणधर्मम्। Avidyā or Nescience is nothing but the non-cognizance of Ātman, the One, and it is the root of this world-cycle (कृष्ण)। Salvation would come through the destruction of this Nescience. This universe is the play of this Avidyā which comprises ignorance. In the Taittirīyavārttika this Avidyā is explained as: न भवमेव भविष्यमि — समिक्ष्य न भवार्थं भव नेत्रां न भवार्थं भवार्थं। भवार्थं अभिविश्वासः आलोकितं अविद्याः (Tv.174)
The cause of the universe is Avidyā which is of the form: "I do not know." Its existence is proved by one's own experience. Just as the owl takes the day as night so also the Ātman visualises Avidyā as his own ignorance. It cannot be proved logically for he who wants to prove it resembles one who tries to perceive the darkness in a cave with the help of a lamp (Tv.177). Avidyā does
not require any proof as the darkness does not require any lamp for its manifestation. All that which is not Ātman is the form of Avidyā. It is not absence or Abhāva. The negative (ना ) in Avidyā should be taken to mean "something else" than or "opposite to" Vidyā as in the case of Amita. An दोष or 'not-friend' does not mean the absence of a friend but it means some other man than a friend, i.e., an enemy. Thus Avidyā is "other than Vidyā." It is nothing but the cover or the veil of the Ātman. This Avidyā gives forth desire and other evils and ensnares the Ātman exposing him to untold of miseries! Nobody can escape scot-free from its clutches. It has served the constant red rag even to the Brahman. It causes hindrance even to Him - the God of the gods, He, who makes the three worlds tremble before Him - तस्य श्रयेष्ठे भवेन्द्रेष्ठे त्रिज्ञानेष्ठे:। अन्य तस्माती अवशेṣाय ज्ञातस्मानोऽस्मृतस्मृतोऽपि || (Taittiriya - 470).

This tremendous Avidyā-styled also as Māyā produces this universe which is thus seen only through

---

1 अनामातीरिः अक्षाति न तव आक्षातिः प्रतिमा:। तु भास्मां तः 178
2 Vide Ānandagiri's commentary on आदनार्थविरोधेण नस्ता लक्ष्यमा। न विभावेत्। 167.3179
3 त भुजः बर्त्त भवि भागा अस्तित्वाते यत् कुप्तञ्ज। आदनार्थविरोधेनात्र यात् बहुस्त्रो श्रमणः । (167.2467)
In his Manasollasa Suresvara makes it clear in a very graphical manner. According to him:

That which was implicit in the Paramātmā is made explicit by Māyā comprising Will, knowledge and action. First the will or desire of having something springs in the mind and then takes place the action. This is the rule of the everyday parlance. There is no exception whatsoever to this rule even in the case of the Highest One. The Upaniṣads while describing the creation state that the One first "willed" and then gave concrete form to his will. Thus will is the first stage in the process of the creation. Yogins like Viśvāmitra and others are known to have created the universe only through their will without any outside material.

Likewise the word also with His inexhaustible power produces, maintains and destroys it only through this will. Thus He is not only the instrumental or instrumental cause but also the efficient cause of this universe so far as he creates it through His own will-power. Had he been only निर्मितिनयने ता.

1 हेरेक निर्मिति न द्वम्। प्रजाये!
modification and destruction would accrue to Him as
in the case of a potter. This will of His is not
eternal otherwise He would be creating for ever with
His eternal will (नित्येक्ष्य) and in that case there would
be no hope of salvation. This will is due to Māyā.
It is the first figment of Māyā which makes the One
produce the universe. Thus all this huge edifice of
the universe is nothing but the display of the Māyā
and it is bound to shatter into the air with the
annihilation of its cause, viz., Māyā. The tale of
the creation being thus नित्येक्ष्य unreal, i.e. sublatable
by the true knowledge, the talk about bondage or
emancipation is all relative - due to Māyā. Viewed
through the veil of Nascence the bondage, etc. appear
real but as far as the Highest Reality is concerned
all this is only a tall talk. The Highest Truth
has once for all been pronounced by Gauḍapāda as :

Buddhi or Intellect which itself is an effect
of Avidyā or Ajñāna is responsible for giving the

2 तत्त्व-भरत्तमातिरिक्तत्त्वं अगतकृत्तमातिरिक्तत्त्वं मृगम्।
अहैन्देशेण देशार्थिनेवाश्च एक्षारणां च सभिरि।
मायायम् कामिन हृद्देश करणां समुद्रिनुसरित।

3 मिसार्ते नाम वाध्यते समुद्रिनुसरित सन्ति 1987
name and form to Jiva. The action and enjoyment belong to this intellect but due to ignorance these are ascribed to the Ātman which does not any way get tinged with them. These are only figurative and do not effect any change in the Ātman or Brahman. Thus the Ātman becomes or rather appears the doer and enjoyer through the adjunct of Buddhī. The qualities of the adjunct engross the Ātman and seem to belong to Him. 

The Ātman is the same as before and should be looked upon so, void of all qualities: त्रू वा भ्रमण भ्रमणानां तद्भवत: यथा चिन्तने च चिन्तनानां तथाविनिर्भयों तस्माद अविश्वास्यं। T.V. 94.

The Ātman when entangled by the intellect gives forth Ahaṅkāra or the Ego which is the root of all misery. This Ego is an attribute, - of non-Ātman or the non-sentient. It is also unreal like its substrate. Everything else than Ātman being unreal the Ego also is fictitious - यदा जिन्तनो मिथ्यासंन्यासातः कसुकः। आकार्यकलितसत्कर्तरं द्विपर्याति सामान्यानि॥ (N.S. 2.45).

---

1 cf. परमेश्वर हैं तत्त्वेऽनुप्रेरिता ब्रह्मचार्य एवं T.V. 314a
2 तथा भ्रमणानां द्वारा घृणा भ्रमणानां तद्भवत: | नयानि तद्भवति महाश्रावातोऽस्मात T.S. 322
3 अविश्वास्यं तथा जिन्तनो मिथ्यासंन्यासातः ब्रह्मचार्य परं। M.S. 1011
Therefore everything that is seen in this world is like a castle in the air (अंतरालिकतलीत) without any basis. Though the Ātman alone is real and everything else is unreal it is the Ahaṅkāra which transfuses life into the Anātman or what is called the Drṣṭya, object. The Brahman is Draṣṭṛ, the Seer and the objects are the Drṣṭya and the Ego is the connecting link between them bringing them in mutual contact. Thus the universal illusion springs forth. The objects of the senses are called Drṣṭya or perceivable and hence imaginary and Brahman is the eternal looker-on. The Ego shining upon both produces the mimic play of illusion upon the Ātman. Jñānottama comments on it as follows: नाजुकमेव युक्तज्ञात्मकोऽवतारणसन्त - विवेकेन्द्रमेव अनलोकोऽवतारणार्तः। तदनुजः संबंधोत्साहिति अहंकारावतारणोऽज्ञानसन्तः। ज्ञानविवेकेन्द्रकृत्यं अनलोकोवत्त्वत्साहिति सचयनः अस्तित्वात्। (Col. on VS 2.46)

Thus the Ego acts as a mirror to both the Anātman and the Ātman and reflects forth a combination of both. The face when reflected in a mirror which contains another reflection of red colour appears red. Thus the two, viz., the face and the red colour combine so as to give out one thing. Likewise the Ego puts forth a
mixture of the Ātman and Anātman and causes the illusive world-cycle. And thus it is the root of all evil or bondage of the Ātman. The Ātman due to this adjunct of Anātman appears as many though really it is one.

Like the reflections of the sun in small ponds of rainy season the Ātman appears as many objects. Due to the variety of minds it appears as different. The notion of distinction belongs to the mind (अत्र द्विभाष्य-अन्तः), and thus being illusive opposite attributes appear on one & the same thing, like beauty and impurity in one and the same woman.

This appearance of Anātman does not inflict any change or modification on the Ātman as it is only imaginary. A man always thinks of himself as the doer and enjoyer imposing various relations upon the Ātman. But he is not the real performer and hence all the thoughts and actions of a man are only imaginary. Like Shekh Mahamud, the proverbial day-dreamer he deceives himself imposing imaginary things on the self-Suresvara remarks "अभवत्तिनेन देशो न अत्यवस्थानं युक्तानि किंतु नात्तेषां विनयमण्डिता सभाः || N.S.P. 76. While describing the nature of the Ego he writes: आयनयोगदत्ति कुशाक्षीकृतोपाधिमभावनां

1. इशान अनात्मकम् भाति हैमाद्वयनम् || N.S.P. 47
2. आयनयोगदत्ति कुशाक्षीकृतोपाधिमभावनां || N.S. 47
3. अस्त शाश्वतारस्क्षिष्णकृताब्यं आयनसः कुशाक्षिः परमार्थस्तु स्वाप्ति।
4. N.S. 47
Had the Jīva been the One pure Ātman, there would have been no action as He is void of any action. And then there would have been no necessity of going through all the trouble of composing a Sāstra to lead the Jīva to Salvation. That is why the Ego cannot be admitted to constitute the nature of the Ātman and so it should be regarded as an attribute of the Anātman. The intellect entangling the Ātman gives birth to this Ego.

The Ātman resembles the lustre of a genuine gem. It is there forever. But we regard that it manifests when only there are objects, though the halo is the same, throughout. The manifestation depends upon the presence or otherwise of the objects which thus are responsible for giving an attribute to it. So also He is styled the Sākṣin, the witness only when there are the Sākṣyas or objects. But the absence of the objects does not interfere with the eternal Ātman at all. It is the question of only Nāmarūpa. The Buddhi or the mind is momentary and

1 N.S. 2.66
and the Ātman is the witness to this momentariness. The Ātman is viewed as the witness through Nascience. Thus the adjunct of Avidyā gives a form to the Īśvara and to the Jīva.

It will be clear from the above that Madhusūdana has rightly judged the Theory of Appearance put forth by Suresvara who himself calls it an Abhāsa many a time.¹

Due to this Appearance man gets entangled in the cycle of birth and death. The only remedy according to Suresvara to get rid of it, is tyāga or renunciation.² Karma is not useful here as it adds to the misery instead of removing it. The Mīmāṃsaka seeking salvation through Karma or ritual resembles one who being tormented with severe cold approaches a fallen meteor to warm himself.³ Suresvara severely takes the Mīmāṃsakas to task in all his works. Thus in N.S. he says that Jhāna or realisation resulting through

¹ Vide मिमांसास्त्र-कार-न्याय आम्बासिकोऽस्यां परमांस्या शरूर्द्धा अनुवादः... as quoted above and कोन्या सर्ववेदनेऽनुवादः
² अवस्तु एव वै कर्मस्य शोधकामिकनित्यमेचि
नष्टते तत्सर्वते तत्: प्रसन्नवर्यः परम् "अपील ते
³ कार्यितं अवस्थविहितं शोधकं क्रियाविवर्यमपि
उत्तमविविधयं शोधस्वेतौ श्रीताति: पावणकृत्यं " शुद्धं
detachment is the only means and not Karma or ritual which is caused by ignorance and hence cannot remove it. That the Karma cannot lead to salvation is obvious from the nature of salvation which is nothing but removal of ignorance or Nescience, which is responsible for all action or चूर्णि of men. The case is like that of a golden necklace which though on the neck is searched being forgotten through some cause or to a fictitious demon created by one's own shadow and hence avoided through ignorance. The attainment of the former and the removal of the latter would result only through Jñāna, and not Karma. The person might leave no stone unturned to find out his necklace supposed to be lost but he would get it only when he realises that it is on the neck. Similarly any action on the part of the aggrieved person would result in more and more fear and would not remove the demon. The fear would be dispelled only through realisation that it is false. (परित्यक्तार्किक तर्कालकोपत्रं न कर्मान ॥). That which is to be avoided would only be got rid of through knowledge and so also that which

\[1\] अदानाकारणोदंतान्नुसारे कर्मान २ साधनम्। कर्मसमाधि नागार्य तत्तत्त्वापनिलोकिते

\[2\] द्वाराका सत्यार्थं विवेचनात्। सत्यार्थं विनिज्ञानसुचित लालिताः च।

N.S.I.35
is already present would be found out only through Knowledge. The argument that salvation can be had by actions doing obligatory (रीति and श्रेयसीति) and evading काम के लिए कर्म is not correct. For in case of a free man only two types of could be conceived. The first is that which is already begun and the second the fruit of which is not yet started. The first will end with its enjoyment while the second with expiation. There is also a third method of realising the Atman as non-doer (अनाचरणानलोक) but the objector does not approve of it. Now the deeds which are अपयुक्त (the fruit whereof is not enjoyed) and अनाचरण (not yet come up for enjoyment) cannot be got rid of even by the Lord! What of us the mortals? Nor even the अनाचारण कर्म, i.e., the fruit of which is begun to be consumed, can be dropped off. That act alone which is not yet begun but only planned (मिलिति) can be postponed or dropped but not one that is already started. Moreover the performer cannot have the knowledge of all actions

§1 भक्तिवद्विपथस्यापोजित अनाचारणांकेश्यामुष्टेद्भवः प्राप्तिः p. 1

§2 तानि इत्यावधाने केनसिदित्वे न शक्षमते विकुलम् । N.S. p. 44
the fruit of which is enjoyed by him for many of them belong to various past births. At each birth he is not surely supplied with a list of his Ārābdha and Anārābdha actions! Even an acute brain would not do here.

Further one cannot avoid the कार्य ओळे तीव्रतिथि कर्मणि strictly for to err is human. Suresvara remarks : न च एव अथातः प्रतिसतृणं अनुभवनि च कर्मणि च कर्मिकाति च कर्मभूतानि च सुसाज्जिताय तद्भवत्वस्य बृहत्तिथि।

Thus कर्मणि cannot be resorted to for Salvation. The Sruti also does not authorise Karma in that fashion. But it clearly lays down that Realisation of the Self is the only way to Salvation - निष्ठ: प्रवाह विचित्रः अध्रुवः। The ritual is enjoyed by the Sruti only to purify the mind. And thus somehow or other by meritorious deeds a man happens to feel detachment. And for the attainment of this detachment a सूक्ष्मता should perform निष्ठ: and निरूपिनि as has been ordained by the Omniscient Himself: अनुभवकर्मणि निष्ठा निरूपिनि कारणभूतस्य। B.G., 6.3

Suresvara describes the ladder to Salvation in his Naiṣkarmyasiddhi. The performance of निष्ठ: and निरूपिनि results in merit which destroys all sin and contributes to the purification of mind. Then the real nature of this
world would be known and the devotee would get disgusted with it. He would try to find out the way which is nothing but renunciation. After renouncing the world and resorting to Yoga there would be concentration of the mind. The meaning of the Sruti passages proclaiming unity of Atman ( आत्मां ) would be understood and then there would be complete destruction of Nescience and he would realise his unity with Brahman and this is salvation. Hence Karma has nothing to do with it. आत्मान्यो यो रञ्जुष्मान समुपग्रहयति।

Realisation of the self is the cause of मुक्ति। ज्ञात्वा आत्मा आत्मानां समुपग्रहयति।

Also would not do for it would resemble the combination of the sun and the darkness. ग्रहणस्तु ज्योति ज्योति तदन्तते।

Thus on the whole Suresvara is seen a staunch follower of Śaṅkarācārya. But a tinge of Mimamsaka, the part of which he played formerly, cannot but appear as when he admits -- though ( तुष्णे उपनिषदयेन ) for arguments' sake - that आत्मां समुपग्रहयति in भावमाये सृजये can be at the best a निमिःस्त्वम् or परिवर्त्तता and not an अपरिवर्त्तनिः. Thus he remarks "विद्येवं तत्त्वं नाला कार्यं निर्देशितं। अति आदि तिर्यं विशेषं, परिवर्त्तता न केवलं निर्देशितं अति आदि तिर्यं निर्देशितं पराशुरामनुप्रसहे।" (N.S. I. 55)

The reader of Advaita is taken aback to see the admission of either निमिःस्त्वम् etc. on the part of Suresvara, the staunch follower of S'., who does not admit any semblance.

1 अत्मां समुपग्रहयति।

2 तुष्णे उपनिषदयेन ज्ञात्वा आत्मां समुपग्रहयति। न च निमिःस्त्वम्। N.S. P. 33

3 धर्म प्रकोपं नाला कार्यं निर्देशितं। ज्ञात्वा सत्यं समुपग्रहयति। न च निमिःस्त्वम्। N.S. P. 33.
of action or निषिद्ध which is a Reality and not a निषिद्ध. He does not find any scruple in proclaiming his difference of opinion from that of his Guru's as when he interprets the १४४४ Taittirīya śākhā in Tv. 539-42. While Saṅkarācārya takes अपांगेय of two questions his pupil modestly concludes it to be of three questions and thus records - भवान्तिका तत्त्वसंगमम- शुद्धारणव योद्धयात्रा। सत्ष हंसारिंशा जने उल्लेख्यां चिन्तितियां।। T.v. 546

The style is lucid and forcible, quite reminiscent of that of his Guru. He gives illustrations from everyday parlance like अच्छे चिन्तितक विगत (N.S.P.18) or लोकार्पित (N.S.P.76). The poet in him many a time is awakened as when he depicts the untold of miseries of the womb, childhood, youth, old age and death in his Taittirīya-वार्तिकास, Vv. 190-220. The old age is compared to a dancing girl.

Thus Suresvara tried to delineate Advaita Vedānta in all its salient features and gave a methodical resumé of Saṅkarācārya's doctrine. His contribution to Advaita is आभासवादम or the Theory of Appearance.
(ii) Padmapāda

As Vidyāraṇya records in his Śaṅkaradīgīvijaya, Sanandana, a Brahmin from Chola country approached Śaṅkarācārya who accepted him for his pupil. In a very short time he attained high scholarship and Śaṅkarācārya's affection so as to court jealousy from his colleagues. One day while standing on the bank of the sacred river at Benaras, the beloved preceptor called his pupils who were roaming on the other bank. The obedient and favourite pupil Sanandana, as if through insurmountable joy, started instantaneously without heeding to the environment while others looked here and there for a boat. And lo! His reverence and devotion for the Guru caused such a wonder that the Divine River herself created lotuses under his feet while he was crossing her. That was how he got the name Padmapāda. Would such unique Guru and Śiṣya ever sanctify the sands on the bank of Ganges again!

Padmapāda is reckoned among the four famous disciples of the Bhagavatpāda. His name is associated with the first commentary on Śaṅkarabhāṣya, viz.,

1 Śaṅkaradīgīvijaya adh.
2 Ibid ad 14
Pañcapādikā, a gloss on the first five Pādas of Br. S.'s Vidyāraṇya also cites another tradition regarding the preservation of this work. He records that Padmapāda once went to his maternal uncle while en route to Rāmesvara and deposited his precious work "the Commentary on Brahmasūtras/Saṅkarabhāṣya" with him. The maternal uncle through his partiality for Purva-Māmsā thought of destroying the work which completely refuted his faith. Not being able to destroy it directly due to his pricking conscience he set fire to his house. Further he mixed some benumbing poison in the food of Padmapāda so as to paralyse his intellect and avoid any further composition. When this distress was related to the Guru who, being touched to the heart, dictated the commentary on the first five Pādas through memory and thus the work came to be known as Pañcapādikā.

As to the date of Padmapāda, there is no reliable data forthcoming. It depends upon the date of Saṅkarācārya. Thus adhering to the commonly accepted date of S'. Padmapāda can be assigned to A.D. 810 to 850.

---

2 Ibid. A.D. XIX

3 This is discernible in his later report to his nephew: "निकास्या मा निमित्तवाचस्मि एक्षमायः स वार्तामहसुद्धा पतितं अमालम्।

लालिन्त: सा लघुवाक्षिरः मुनयोऽयाबोधुः पुत्रवनिद्रिक्षुली।

सम ऋभाले।

Jibid. XIV।
No personal information is available to add to the traditional data as noted by Vidyārāṇya. He is generally referred to as Tīkākāra.

His Works.—Aufrecht in his "Catalogus Catalogorum" assigns four works to Padmapāda, viz., Pañcapādikā, Ātmabodhavyākhyāna, Prapañcasāra, and Ātmānātmavivaka. Three other works, viz., Viśnunādiṭīpika, Vivarāṇa-Tīkā, and Pañcāksarībhāṣya also are ascribed to him.

(1) Pañcapādikā

The little avers the work to contain commentary on the first five Pādas of Sū., but the extant work comprises commentary on only the first four aphorisms of B.S. It seems that it was even so in the days of Prakṣātman as he comments only the part come down to us.

The work is divided into nine sections styled Varṇakas. The first Varṇaka deals with the Adhyāsa-Bhāṣya. The second considers the necessity or otherwise of commencing the Brahmajijñāsā or Brahmaidya. The third discusses the meaning of the words comprising the


first aphorism, viz., अन्तर्गतं सङ्गीतिक्याः. The fourth
describes the object, etc., of the Sāstra. The fifth
comments on the second aphorism, i.e., अन्तर्गतं सङ्गीतिक्याः.
The sixth and the seventh respectively contain the two
interpretations of the third aphorism गाण्डेश्यामकालाः. The
eighth proves the authoritativeness of Brahma (अहंकार: रूपः अरुङ्गरात्सकः) and the last discusses the S. B. from
अन्तर्गतं प्रामाण्यन्ते onwards on the fourth aphorism, viz.,
तनु सामन्यालाः.

Though the extent work is only a part still it
contains Padmapāda's views on all the salient features of
Advaita. The work has been commented upon by भाकासात्मन
in his Vivaraṇa.

(2) Ātmabodhavyākhyāna

It appears to be a gloss on S.'s Ātmabodha.

(3) Prepañcasāra

It seems to be wrongly ascribed to him. The extant
work goes in the name of S'. Padmapāda has written
commentary on it which is named Vivaraṇatikā.

(4) Ātmānātmanāviveka

This is also S.'s work, attributed to Padmapāda.

(5) Vijñānadīpikā

It contains detailed discussion of Karma and the

---

1 Published by Tantric Text Series Calcutta.
2 Published by Prayag Visvavidyalaya.
remedy to detach from it.

(6) Pāṇcāksarībhāṣya

It is a commentary on the Śiva-Pāṇcāksarīstotra of Śiva. It runs in verse.

Padmapāda's Exposition of Advaita. Prakāśātman is held to be the advocate of Pratibimbavāda or the Theory of Reflection. But as he bases his composition on Padmapāda's Pañcapādikā, an attempt to trace the beginnings to the latter can be taken up.

According to the Theory of Reflection, Īśvara and Jīva are the reflections of Brahman in Ājñāna and the intellect respectively. Īśvara is the reflection of Brahman in Cosmic Ignorance and he is the Saguṇa Brahman the cause of origination, maintenance and dissolution of this world. He is the controller of all as stated by B.G. The Jīva on the other hand is the image of Brahman in individual ignorance, the mind which is a product of Avidyā. Buddhi or Antahkaranā or the mind catches the image and gives the name and form to the Jīva. Madhusūdana

---

33. Published at Kāśī
41. Following estimate is based on his Pañcapādikā.
Sarasvatī, as has already been pointed out above, distinguishes between Pratibimbavāda and Ābhāsavāda as follows. The image is regarded as real by the Pratibimbavādins while it is taken to be unreal by the Ābhāsavādins. It is interesting to view Padmapāda’s exposition of the Pratibimbavāda in this light.

While commenting on the illustration पद्मपदः पद्माचर्चा| Padmapāda discusses the process of Pratibimba or reflection. This illustration is cited to indicate that the अभिवर्द्धन, i.e., the material part of Aharikāra (Ego) is Mithyā or unreal, like a reflection and not a ज्ञातार्थी or another distinct real entity. Thus there is only one thing, viz., ज्ञातार्थी or Brahman and everything else is unreal viewed wrongly through ignorance. It is only अभिवर्द्धनम् विश्वस्य ज्ञातार्थीम् - The same thing appearing distinct and incongruous due to some misapprehension. It is really the same ( विश्वस्य ) as we recognise its oneness with Brahman. The case is similar to Devadatta sitting inside the house and afterwards outside. One is not taken to be distinct or entirely different entity.

\[81\] तस्य च अभिवर्द्धत्वं ज्ञातार्थीमेव प्रतिभिम्बवादिनि: सम्बन्धितं अभिवर्द्धितं: | Siddhāntabindu (B.S.S.) P. 25
(वैस्तवतः) then in the case of a reflection the mirror itself should take the form of the Bimba or the original which is near and this change in the mirror would remain constant even in the absence of the Bimba. But our experience tells an absolutely different tale. The mirror is seen the same in the absence of the Bimba. So we must accept that the mirror does not undergo any change when it reflects the Bimba.

The case is not analogous to मुक्ति सिद्धार्थ nacre-silver where Mithyātva is due to अलस or negation. The silver super-seen on the nacre is later on sublated by subsequent perception. But here there is no negation at all. Otherwise the mirror also would fall a prey to it. The disappearance of the reflection with the withdrawal of the mirror cannot be styled a proper negation as such.

The objector here crops up with the argument that the sentence जलमघला- may be looked upon asa अलस or negation. The Siddhāntin replies that it is not so. For therein the natural unity of Jīva and Brahman

---

1 यद्पुनः सर्पाणांगेन लवणशीलो न ज्ञातों: सर्पं शीतलं लवणांगेन, इति

Ibid p. 22
is implied in as much as Jīva is the image of Brahman
(तस्मा वामिसि विश्वस्त्रैस्मिस्तन्त्रस्यतत् अनितिहितात्मायोपबंधितम् |).
Otherwise the sentence should have been "thou art not"
like "this is not silver" (नेंद्र रंगम् | ) instead of "thou
art that" (तत्त्वज्ञानी) if a negation is presupposed. Further
the Śāstra shows real unity of Bimba and Pratibimbā
(प्रतिभिम्बम् पारमाशक्षिकाः बिज्ञाताःशपतम् | ). The
Pratibimbā is really one with the Bimba. In other
words it is not a distinct or different (वर्गतः) entity,
This is evident from the barring of the Dārsāna of the
reflection in water of the Sun, in
नास्ति वरस्तयः अशक्तम् नापरस्त्यम् न आरिः न मथ्यं नामी सार्वम् ||
and Had Śruti itself not meant that the Bimba/Pratibimbā
are one, it would not have barred the reflection of the
sun in the water. As the rising Sun, the eclipsed sun,
the mid-day sun are one and the same so also he is
identical with his reflection in the water and hence
the necessity of the denial!

The view that in seeing the Pratibimbā, the Bimba
is not visualised in another place, but the rays from
the eye perceive it after they are thrown back from the
mirror, is summarily dismissed by Padmapāda as going altogether contrary to all the worldly experience. This makes the objector think that the Bimba is perceived as true in two places by the Advaitin and he instantly attacks the Advaita position as incongruous; for according to the Advaitin reality is only one and if he begins to admit two things the Paramātman and Jīva as real, monism falls to pieces and hence the objector asks how can the विन्यस्न be परमार्थिक real in two places. Padmapāda answers that he never said that it was real in both places, but he insisted that the two are really one. Their unity is परमार्थिक and not the Pratibimba which is so to say a disjoined appearance of the Bimba due to machinations of Māyā which, like a magician is well-versed in making impossible (things) possible.

Thus it is clear from the above that Padmapāda’s Pratibimbaṇḍa does not regard the Pratibimba as तथा or true, on the other hand, he expressly states it to be false or अनिर्वृत्त like others. No one regards it to be real as it would militate against the basic

\[1\]

\[2\] न बत्त निबंधवनसे पारमार्थिक जूम: निक्षेपितमस | निक्षेपितमस साध्याविज्ञायितम | न हि साध्याविज्ञायि नाम: | अस्मानसुचितय दुःस्म | खर | २२म | ४:२३.
doctrine of Advaita. All Advaitins exert to prove everything other than Brahman as unreal though there is difference of degree in their exposition. Hence Madhusūdana Sarasvati's remark must be interpreted in that fashion. The Pratibimbavādins according to him take the Pratibimba as not altogether unreal as it is the same as Bimba while the Abhāsavādins regard it as unreal, a mere misappearance.

The ordinary Pratibimba due to inertness does not know its oneness with the Bimba. It cannot be removed only by knowledge, as its source, viz., the mirror is real. But the case of Jīva is exceptional in so far as he is sentient being constituted of consciousness and so is not overcome by the inertness of the mind. He thinks that the nature made up of the ego is the true nature of the Self. But he does not understand his oneness with Brahman and so the removal through knowledge of its real nature is possible. Thus the Ego becomes-Astakṣarakṣa through the

\[1\] जीव: पुनः अनिधिभक्त: जन्मः न: अस्मटात्विक्षिप्यो भागः करण- जयेन्तकश्चिदितः च: चार्हकृत्तनिमानिन: उर्ध्व विरुद्धतार्कवेदवाच्यं समाप्तामत: युक्तस्याप्पलोल: युक्तस्थला-पलोल: भिक्षावाच्यांगे। [बिद ज्ञ 33]

\[2\] तत: पञ्च वयः अनिधिभक्त: जीव: जन्मः आस्म्यान्तः न: अस्म्यात्तिक्षिप्यो भागः. करण-जयेन्तकश्चिदितः च: चार्हकृत्तनिमानिन: उर्ध्व विरुद्धतार्कवेदवाच्यं समाप्तामत: युक्तस्याप्पलोल: युक्तस्थला-पलोल: भिक्षावाच्यांगे। [बिद ज्ञ 24]
Padmapāda takes pains to stress that the Advaita view is not identical with the Buddhist doctrine. The objector charging that the two are the same, might possibly be Bhāskara who appears to be the first to argue that Advaita is not Advaita Buddhism in garb. 1

The objector asks: Thus, if we adopt the Yogasutra's way of the late Śāntideva and Śāntarakṣita, the Ātman is eternal and the Madhyamikas, Śāntideva, and Śāntarakṣita must be regarded as adhering to this view. The Siddhāntin points out that Māhāyānīka view would have been embraced if he had believed in the absence of a constant Ātman but as he believes in the Eternal Self he has no danger to pass under the name of Māhāyānīka. 2

He analyses the appearance of silver on the naacre. How can the mother-of-pearl be the substrate where one perceives silver? The answer is that the shell presents itself to our view but in a different form due to some fault. But this appearance of the shell in the form of the silver is not real obviously for there occurs the subsequent sublation. Nor can it be said that the shell itself changes into silver due to some mistake for in case of transformation as curds of milk there is...

1 Vide p. 124 (भास्कररामच) – महायानीको लाभग्रामान्तर मानकार्य –

2 तात्त्विकानुसारः: महायानीको प्राकृतिकार्थिकोपकारसंस्कार महायानीको खराब रोगान्तरित जनसुन्न्त महायानीकार्थिक: भस्करं। भस्कर ग्राह्याकारस्तु, गुरु ग्राह्याकारस्तु, गुरु महायानीका स्वामीनारायण: कृपया भस्कररामचार्य ज्ञान ज्ञानन्दित्वम्। भस्कररामचार्य ग्राह्याकारस्तु गुरु महायानीका स्वामीनारायण: कृपया भस्कररामचार्य ज्ञान ज्ञानन्दित्वम्।
no sublation at all. Moreover the shell if it is changed to silver as the iron into gold due to the touch-stone would remain so for ever like curds. It is not analogous to the blossom of a lotus at the sight of the sun and then closure again at sunset; for in that case the perceiver should have the knowledge that it is changed into silver and again into the shell and also there would be no sublation. Further, the appearance cannot be explained away as produced from the cognition arising out of faulty material. For in that case the substrate would have been something else and not the same as that of the cognition. Thus it can be accounted for only as śūntiśravaḥ or obscuration of memory. But here some argue that the Purvamāmasā furnishes Smṛti or memory as unobscurable (तथा योः समानहेतुं तथा: अविशेषतः सम्बन्धेता स्मृति िरि।). So the proper solution of this knot seems to be, as the Advaitin in Padmāda states, as follows: "The fault in the cause or material not only does obstruct the power of the effect but contrives, in addition, to
produce some mental impression. Thus the material or
the instrument of the cognition of silver becomes faulty
and hence produces the perception of unreal silver. Here
the substrate of this faulty misappearance is not the
shell but silver itself produced by the faulty material
(कुशस्नम्भरि). Hence निद्राभास: तथा निद्राभास: अनि अति आनन्द
निद्राभास: आनन्दाभास:। Knowledge as
such is never sublated. The sublation (आचर) comprises
अनं रूपम्। Thus its object is unreal and as
perception is associated with it, it is metaphorically
styled as (आचरिते) sublated.

Further this silver is made up of मया. Had it
not been so, everybody would have seen it. Only those
people whose sight is blurred due to some fault happen
to perceive it. The subsequent sublation also goes
to show the same.

Here the objector crops up with the contention that
the definition of superimposition as स्मृतिः परम परावर्तकः
would not hold good everywhere. In case of a dream for
instance there is no contact with something else, so
how can we say परम परावर्तकः? So the proper word
should be स्मृतिः which would suit the cases like
dream, etc., but not स्मृतिः। Here the answer is

1 अन्तर्दृष्टे: अन्तर्दृष्टे: तस्मान भवति निद्राभास: निद्राभासः समस्तान्तरितं भवति।
नानादुस्मृतिः वाक्योपाधिते समस्तान्तरितं नानादुस्मृतिः। अनं रूपम्
तत् अनपरावर्तकः समस्तान्तरितं नानादुस्मृतिः।
that it cannot be called मूलिक as the silver, etc. or the dream objects for the matter of that are directly perceived. It should not be urged that मूलिक also is not there on the ground that it has been produced due to former impression for here मूलिक means only appearance of objects seen before. In case of a dream the mind subjected to many faults of sleep, generates cognition with respect to unreal objects and which is worthy of particular impressions aroused due to the अति or luck. The substrate of this cognition is nothing but Avidyā residing in the Consciousness covered by it. Thus it is nothing but Avidyā taking so many forms in a dream.

The waking state, for the matter of that, is not anyway different from the dream state. Because both are presented due to inner limitations. Otherwise, mere inert things do not manifest themselves as a jar

---

1 उद्धेरणं उज्ज्वलकर्षणं विद्यामार्हितगंगा युक्ते: इसमें प्रकाशित तारीख निश्चितरूप मन: अतःस्वाभाविक मुक्तीश्चितरीर्दशा यथाशास्त्ररूप स्वतः तत्त्वेऽति। तथा स्वनुभूतिः प्रादेशिक विद्याक्षरत्र निश्चितगंगाय युक्ते ॥ ११ ॥

This Avidyā which served the substrate or prop of temporary superimpositions or illusions, i.e., अविद्याशुद्धि is later on styled as Talavidya in Advaita and the Avidyā which is the basis of this universal illusion or अविद्याशुद्धि is called Mulavidya.
shrouded in darkness! The disjointed appearance of so many regions, etc., is also projected by Māyā even in case of waking as all this universal edifice depends upon Consciousness alone which is impartite. The truth is: प्रचारस्थले माया सत्यमित्रयुद्ध सत्यमित्रसिन्ह सत्यमित्रमायारस्त्रैन श्रंस्यि।

Or it might be supposed that the direction (शिर्थां) and the sky are the resorts in all superimpositions.

This superimposition cannot be explained as arising due to mutual dependence, e.g., silver is to be superimposed on Samvid or consciousness and Samvid on silver like the अनंतायुग . For the अनंतायुग illustration does not apply here, as in its case the seed (तीर्थ) does not come out from that sprout (अनंतायुग) which has sprung out of that seed (तीर्थ) but from some other sprout (अनंतायुग). Here there are only two things Samvid and silver so अनंतायुग cannot arise from both. Moreover the अनंतायुग or sublation of the अनंतायुग is not eternal but it has got an end, viz., the realisation of the truth. In case of the serpent seen on a rope

---

श्री नमः निमायादेशोऽनलोकोऽवमिथा सन्तोषितोऽसाधिते निबलोऽसाधिते पूर्णदेशोऽसाधिते निमायादेशोऽसाधिते पूर्णदेशोऽसाधिते
the denial takes place when some trustworthy person asserts that it is not the serpent (नरथ) but this denial ceases with the knowledge of the real nature of the rope. Thus sublation (अक्ष) is not unlimited (अभिनव) or eternal and hence there is no fear of reckoning it as something over and above Brahman the One without the second. For the अक्ष of everything terminates with the realisation of the absolutely eternal Consciousness.

The fact that the silver is sublated later on by the true knowledge does not go to show that it is non-existent or unreal (असत्र). That what is mis-apprehended cannot be described as Asat for the very fact that it is seen though apparently. Otherwise, had it been utterly unreal, it would not have at all presented itself to our view. Here the objector might urge that the Advaitins regard everything as unreal or Asat. The answer is that the Advaitin
never has said so even in joke for his contention is that everything else than Brahman is अनिवार्यनीय or indescribable and made up of Nescience but it is seen wrongly on Brahman and hence everything is Brahman ( सर्व विविध अष्ट्र). Further the silver superimposed on the shell is nullified but not the existence of silver elsewhere! If the unreality meant by you, is with reference to the sublation of Nescience after the highest realisation, you are right, for, when once there is the realisation of the highest Reality all duality ( चैत्य ) ceases to be! Thus all नियोजन or superimposition has got some substrate as evident from the term प्रत्य in the definition of नियोजन given by Sāṅkarācārya.

This superimposition due to Nescience is but natural and inborn in man. He is tied hands and feet from even his birth. He exists under a huge gulf of superimpositions which are nothing but nooses! One after the other, the mass of these nooses is accumulated and the individual gets completely enervated by them. He is subjected to untold of afflictions. His woe is insurmountable and like the fish taken
tawan out of water, he leads on his life struggling with
it. But all this affliction is nothing but a sort of
a mass of darkness or volume of mist. It is only
illusory or imaginary. It does not exist at all in
reality. For is not the individual, the Jīva, one
with the Brahman? If he is Brahman consisting of pure
and eternal Bliss and consciousness how can there be
any pain or affliction which is altogether contradictory
to its nature? The Srutis like नत्वमुणि proclaim
that the individual is identical with Brahman which is
निरमाताजुधामुदज्जनस्वन्धि and really speaking there should
be no kind of pain, infatuation or any dilemma as such.
But we see in this world that the Jīva is dragged here
and there by so many miseries and difficulties which
must be accounted for. And they cannot but be taken
as unfounded or not real. Hence Avidyā or Nescience
is imagined to be the cause, of this. It resides in
the individual covering his real nature of effulgence.
Otherwise had there been no such Avidyā, the Jīva
would have enjoyed it real blissful state and there would have been no necessity of Scriptures to advise him that he is really One with the highest. Thus Avidya is proved on the strength of Sruti and by Arthäpatti.

This Avidya has got many appellations as मृग or Illusion, प्रायो or matter, अवयव or unmanifest, तायस or darkness, कार्त्तिक or the first cause, or the merging state, सक्तिः power of God, मंगळ or Great Slumber, को or the transient, etc.

It performs two functions. The first is to veil the real nature of Brahman. But this is only one side of the coin. Mere covering is not enough. There should be some constructive aspect and this is more important for it gives the individual his individuality.

The Avidya with its विक्रेय power reflects so many things, it produces a puppet show for the Jīva and hence it is called जीवनमार्गिका, giving Jīva its form.

In the state of deep slumber there is only one activity,

1 बद्ध न जीवे लोकोपेक्षा इत्युपरेन नीति:। अन्त एवास्मिति एव अस्मि व अवदानः

2 शून्ये शून्यस्तुतिंशुतस्य पुष्पोऽथुतस्य अर्थस्थलस्य शक्तिस्वाभाविकाः प्रकटिः प्रवृत्तमः ततः कारण ।

2 शून्ये शून्यस्तुतिंशुतस्य पुष्पोऽथुतस्य अर्थस्थलस्य शक्तिस्वाभाविकाः प्रकटिः प्रवृत्तमः ततः कारण ।

2 शून्ये शून्यस्तुतिंशुतस्य पुष्पोऽथुतस्य अर्थस्थलस्य शक्तिस्वाभाविकाः प्रकटिः प्रवृत्तमः ततः कारण ।
viz., वैट्रु or veiling the real nature and here the Jīva experiences at least some Ānanda and is said to merge in the Highest. So त्रेष्वेत or the projection is more powerful in dragging Jīva off from its real nature. With the help of this missile Avidyā succeeds in subduing the Jīva, which thus gets many objects to perceive and gets entangled with them!

This Avidyā or Nescience has Brahman for its substrate. And resorting to Brahman, it shoots forth an effect styled as Ahaṅkāra. Due to the connection with this Ahaṅkāra, the Ego, a product of Avidyā, the eternal, self-effulgent Ātman is known to be the enjoyer. The ego is the real base or prop of the two human powers, viz., perception and activity. It is the doer and enjoyer. This Ahaṅkāra again is self-evident or self-illuminated as it is reflected on the permanent fountain of effulgence! Everybody directly experiences this विज्ञान and equates it with the real Ātman through non-discrimination of real and unreal
things. This same ego is styled by Vedāntins as the heart or mind taking its perceptive aspect in view and as Prāṇa due to its throbbing.

Further this Ahākāra is Mithyā and extraneous like the redness in a crystal due to the proximity of the jasmine flower. If we investigate into the nature of this redness, it would be seen that it does not resemble the lustre of a red gem (णिकृतं) for the crystal in itself is not red and it would be taken as falsely red for the lustre of the jasmine in that case belongs to its own substrate. If anybody encounters that the red lustre itself is seen and not the crystal then, the whiteness of the crystal also must be perceived. If it is said that the whiteness has been overcome by the red lustre then the crystal itself would not be perceived being formless. It can't be said that due to the lustre redness is produced in the crystal which is then perceivable for in that case the crystal would remain red even when the red flower
is taken off. But all this argument rests on the assumption that the jasmine flower possesses lustre like that of a red gem. But this is not valid as far as the everyday experience goes. For the lustre of a gem is seen spread out without any resort but not so the redness of the jasmine.  As the redness belonging to something else is reflected or rather appropriated by the crystal so also the qualities of the Ahaṅkāra, viz., agency (कृत्ति) are superimposed upon the Highest Ātman. Thus the Ahaṅkāra mingles in itself two types of qualities those of the Avidyā whereof it is a product and those of the Ātman and thus becomes a sort of knot and hence is many a time called a knot as in passages like "रिहते तृष्णशयिं..."

The term 'अक्षत्' really refers to the Ahaṅkāra. It is the manifester of the Consciousness associated with it like the mirror which manifests the reflection. Thus the cid which is so to say reflected in the

1 तथा परमात्मादिकं निगतिः भावात्मादिकं तत्त्वात्मादिकं ।

2 तदेवं एकज्ञानं निरालोपणं देवं सिद्धार्थवयुद्धं, पूर्णमपि संसारोक्त विज्ञानं। अस्हितसंसारं-वहस्तितिं भवत्विंशं अव्यक्तेऽस्मिनं श्रीसंगीतं श्रवणे। श्रवणे।

3 राजानंदे अनुभूतं सामी इत्यहं कोलकताः, अन्तर्द्वियं निगतिः मनस्ति धनि। अव्युत्कर्षरिः। नलिकात्योऽभिमथनकामस्य इति न उद्वक्षयः।
Ahaṅkāra becomes the subject of the term 'अभास', only metaphorically. Hence Padmapāda remarks: 

हेतुः पथरमकरणः समस्मार्थः 

अभासवेदनात्मः वा इति केशवोऽत्त्वरमावलितः आभासात्मः अभासवेदनात्मः वा।

And this so-called reflection of cīd experiences the three states, viz., अभासः, मुक्तिः, मुचुक्ति- and the same is styled as the transmigrator (अंतःकरणं), the individual soul (विचित्राधिपतं व विचित्राधिपतिं), the knower (अज्ञ), the possessor of a body (अभासः), the Soul (पुण्डरिकं), the inner self (प्रमाणं), etc. He is the doer and the enjoyer and also the well-known Kṣetrajña. Thus the Ahaṅkāra is responsible for giving the title and form to Jīva which is nothing but a reflection of the Highest Ātman in it. The Jīva is also styled the (विदेशाधिकरणं) showing thereby its connection with the Buddhi or the intellect. The Pratibimbavādins regard the Jīva as a reflection of the cīd into Buddhi, an effect of Avidyā. Padmapāda regards it as a part of Ahaṅkāra which is a परिःवेश of Avidyā.

There is mutual superimposition of 'अभासः' and 'अभासः', for if there is only the superimposition of 'अभासः' or the objects, the inner self would not shine and thus
no activity would proceed and if there is only super-
imposition of 'अस्मिता' there would be no Prapañca or
world! Thus पुरुषस्यासि is a practical necessity (cf.


How to get rid of this Avidyā which is the root
of all अमोचाय? The royal path of Knowledge has once
for all been laid down by the Upaniṣads which denied
any other road - तात्पर्यः पूर्वोऽक्षरोऽवमानः।। The
realisation of the Highest Ātman, the only reality
would automatically kick out Avidyā with all its
retinue. Hence the aim of the Āraversekamāmśa is
two-fold, viz., अत्वसे नात्मविद्यात्मातपि + अन्यस्य हैरुपानवत
The second is implied in the first which is the subject
of the scriptures. It cannot be asserted that there is
no specific mention of the second in the Shruti which
do not propound sublation or निरसन् as there is no


The case resembles a balance (कुण्डा) where
one scale automatically goes up when the other goes
down (कुण्ड्योऽन्तमानवत्वस्य)। The true knowledge cannot
arise at all without destroying its opposite, viz.,

1 द्वैतस्य ब्रह्मात्माश्च सर्वोपयोगमोक्षं सिद्धायते।
ignorance. Otherwise it is useless. The destruction of the fictitious Nescience can be had only by knowledge of Brahman. This is evident from passages like शुश्रुं शाखास्थः पुरुषस्त्र स्वयम् which go to show that the appearance of distinction is unreal and so it can be overcome by its opposite, viz., अभेदानुजः or knowledge of Unity.

Karma consisting of injunctions and prohibitions cannot be useful here. For if we analyse human mind, there exists twofold expectancy in it. A man is always pining to have his ends fulfilled and to avoid things he does not like. Thus all human activity is centred round "र्हे संस्कारितं से मै स्थूलदिल।". But the desired thing again is twofold. It might be that one wants something anew, i.e., a thing which he does not possess at all and hence which is to be attained (साध्). While at times he might also wish for a thing which is already in his possession अभेद but forgotten through some mistake. The avoidable things

---

2. इस पुस्तक में वाक्यवस्था आंशिकता और वैदिकधर्म से संबंधित है।
3. दृष्टिकोण: दुर्भिक्षु कैसे इसी संदर्भ में अभेदानुजः तथा अभेदोद्वन्द्वं
4. तत्त्वज्ञानी अत्याधुनिक विचाराचार्य ने दिया गया है। 1963 1 91
also are twofold. Some things are to be avoided as a pit, etc. But there are also some things which are already at a mile's distance from him and thus no question of their being avoided should arise at all but still due to his own imagination he sees them near and wants to shun at these. As for example a serpent super-seen on a rope. A serpent no doubt belongs to the category of things to be always kept at distance. But in the case of a rope seen as a serpent, he has already avoided the serpent but through illusion he gets afraid of it, thinks it as not desirable (अनिष्ठ ) and hence desires to run away from it. Of these fourfold types injunction or prohibition can operate only with regard to the first and the third. For only that thing which is not yet accomplished can be obtained on some goading as also a thing which is yet to be avoided can be kept at an arm's length. But it is not so with a thing which is already in possession. There is no point in asking or enjoying a thing to be done which is already done; it's only carrying coals to Newcastle. So the second

\[ \text{\footnotesize\textcopyright{\textit{\textit{\textcopyright}}}} \]
and the fourth variety, viz., भावक निर्वूर्ति वास्त्विक + भावक परिणाम | cannot be subjected to विद्या or तिलेख . They can be attained only through realisation which removes the illusion. (cf. दर्शनधर्म तस्मानादश्च तानायस |1 ). Thus Karma is not useful for attaining the goal, viz., अवर्धस्त्रेण removal of evil.

An objection is raised here that Karma leads to attainment of desire. Svarga can be had only from Karma or various sacrifices and thus to attain the highest desirable thing Karma is taken to. Thus by अपितार्थस्त्रेण or a ladder of desires Karma is useful to obtain the ideal. What is this ladder of desires? Is it like a staircase? In the case of a staircase, there is a purpose in the mind of the man climbing it, viz., to reach the upper storey. Likewise is there any aim behind this अपितार्थस्त्रेण ? Surely one does not undergo Karma thousands of years with the view of conceiving desire to know Brahman, obviously because of absence of any proof to that effect! It can’t be argued: "One is not obviously apt to turn to

---

1 One might recall the same line of argument from Suresvara. It testifies their co-, studentship at the feet of the Bhagavat-pāda.
Brahmājīṣṭhāṇ is attracted by desires but one can enter into Brahmā-jiṣṭhāṇ when all desires are fulfilled through Karma or ritual and thus Karma is capable of leading to the attainment of pleasures of Brahmāloka and after that there being no desire, Brahmājīṣṭhāṇ springs forth. (Cf. निश्चितस्य च कामस्थानूपिने; कामविनाशः कामाज्ञानि श्रमित्संसारं कलोः)

For in that case why not say that Brahmājīṣṭhāṇ can come after (कामस्थानूपिने) instead of contending that it should come after (कामविनाशः) Moreover how can attainment of desires result into क्रोध or pacification of desire?

The illustration of fire does not apply here. It had been so, had the enjoyment of the Highest pleasure, viz., that of Hiranyakar̥ṣa been eternal. As matters stand this highest pleasure also comes to an end and at that moment 'desire' is bound to spring up again. The real cause of क्रोध is the realisation of the fault of pleasure, viz., transitoriness of the objects. It is the same as निश्चितस्यन्तुनिवेष्टिने. Thus कामविनाशः कामविनाशकृता कामविनाशिनिङ्गविनाशिनिङ्गनि स as is clear from Smṛti passages like रस्मयः स्मरौ समस्यं परं रथं निरतेऽः।
Jaimini did not give out Dharma or ritual as the only aim of Veda for the problem before him was not of the interpretation of Veda - not an academic necessity - but he had to interpret the term Dharma and therefore accidentally took Vedic passages supporting or elucidating Dharma. That does not mean that his opinion was that the whole Veda points to Karma for in that case the first aphorism should begin as: अथातो वेचार्य्यसिद्धि
& the second as वेचार्य्यसिद्धि धार्यसिम. As the extant aphorisms point out, he did mean that there was a portion of Veda not considered by him and the task of its interpretation was left to Bādarayāna.

So the real requisites for Brahmajñeśā are the fourfold as enumerated by the Bhagavatpāda, viz.,

निर्धारित्त्वापि निमेयं, रक्षणनार्थालोकिनिकाः, एतिहासिकान्तसंपर्क ।

Padmapāda also considers the problem whether

अक्षमान्त उपकृति अन्यान्य किती दिया जाय ती नची बुध्दि रूपकृति... According to the objector Brahmajñeśā not at all attractive and hence nobody would care for it or aspire after
it. For it leads to cessation of mind resulting into
abstinence from all the sense-objects, thus barring all
access to the higher and excellent pleasures existing
in the Brahma-Loka, etc. So one is disgusted with
this Brahmajñana and thus there is no need for wasting
energy on composing a Sāstra for it, there being no
possibility of anybody reading it! The answer to
this objection is that Brahmajñana gives highest content-
ment and hence all desires are fulfilled. So every-
body should hanker after it.

It is argued against this that even the highest
contentment also helps to bring disgust through dis-
junction or detachment from objects. Thus the public
opinion goes - cites the objector - "अभो असंख्य निरंतिपरं पर
कमलिन अन्य सनिधिं भोग्यं न तांत्रिक निरंतिपारिःपरं वत्स्यते रूपितः। शास्त्रीभवं श्रमेन दुर्गतिः
एव पुण्यो वृद्धिः गृहे गृहायंत्यति श्रमं स रूपितिं न दुःखेन हृदेन्मयं मर्मेन कथा निरंप्रणे वैगम्ये।"

In a way this objection has got some value as there are
many devotees of Saguna or Personal Lord who do not
regard it worthwhile to have Advaitic Nirguna Mukti.
Mahārāṣṭriya saints like Nāmadeva do come under this
category!

1 Padmapāda assigns the whole of Vairāgya II for refuting
the arguments based on authoritative passages like
नान्दनयक्षे निरंतीर्यक्षे तामस्यस्यमहंस्यक्षा, etc. He discusses
them in detail & comes to the conclusion that
Jaimini did not bring the whole Veda under Dharma.
Padmapāda answers to this stubborn objector saying that even granting Brahmajñāna has got no attraction, there is every need for a Śūra for Brahmajñāna on the strength of the Sruti which has got Brahman for its pravṛttan. For कृताज्ञान has got some meaning and it is a duty to investigate into it.

The question of वादनोष्ङ्ग also comes up for discussion. कृत्यa is not the only purport of a sentence but all the four, viz., कृत्य, तुष्ट, रोग, शिक्षा + अस्पष्ट have got their own say. In the Pūrvamīmamsa the topics dealt with are interpretation of a particular portion of Veda, ( नवर्तक भिन्न विशेषत्वणि ), the self-evidence and also the question of Sābda-bodha or where the power of a word resides. But here in the Uttaramīmamsā the main problem is to show the purport of Vedāntas to be in the impartite Brahman with passages like ज्ञातं ज्ञाते।

In the passage तद्यथाः both the words तद्यथाः and अस्य go to show the same thing. The passage resembles the sentence: नेत्रायं तेनदत्तः। There अस्य and अस्मिन show the disjunction of place and time. To explain: अस्य refers to some past time and place while अस्मिन refers to the matter in hand. But in शेषें देशरत्रः the
difference between time and place is discarded and both
go to show Devadatta present in front of the speaker.
Likewise in तारणसिके, तत्र should refer to the Highest
Brahman void of all qualities and eternally effulgent
while तत्र shows the Jiva or the individual soul
associated with the Āvidyaka paraphernalia. But तत्र
serves to point to one eternal ज्ञानम where तत् or the
individual soul becomes identical with or merges into,
after having shed out all the distinctions of this
universe, viz., the object, the subject and the instru-
ment of knowledge. Thus Padmapāda writes: सों यथोत्तरे संप्रोक्तः
यथोपएव तत्र ज्ञानम् अज्ञानस्वरूपः भगवान् ज्ञानस्वरूपः
यथोपएव कालाकालसाधनस्य भगवान्। तत्र ज्ञानस्वरूपः
सों यथोपएव ज्ञानस्वरूपः हन्नवैवपतिः 
सों यथोपएव ज्ञानस्वरूपः हन्नवैवपतिः 
सों यथोपएव ज्ञानस्वरूपः हन्नवैवपतिः 
सों यथोपएव ज्ञानस्वरूपः हन्नवैवपतिः। (१६:३ प.२)

The ego in तत्र gets rid of its limitations, becomes
one with the Highest One, viz., तत्र and thus attains
the Highest stage, viz., cessation of all qualities
and activity. Here Padmapāda seems to embrace तत्रज्ञानस्वरूपः
in as much as तत्र gives up its sense while
तत्र retains its own.
This is the general outline of Padmapāda’s exposition of Advaita. He strictly adheres to the line of argument taken by his revered Guru. He amplifies the Bhāṣya, annotating it and thus disclosing the view hidden in the original. The work runs simple and impassioned. The style is quite in keeping with the nature of the work and quite befitting of a pupil of Sū. Many a time there are references to everyday parlance, e.g. नासास्य असहायाः: केन अवश्यकः तदोद्वायस्वरलोकोऽपि न कामं न साक्षात्सरस्वते सागरनिर्मितं परस्परिधितं।

Padmapāda tries to defend his doctrine against the attacks of presumably Bhāskara who accuses Advaitins as Bauddhas under garb! (Māhāyānā Pāka is embraced under different title of Māyāvāda. It is thus clear from this that the tradition giving Bhāskara as a contemporary of Saṅkarācārya as given by Vidyāraṇya in his Saṅkaradīgvidyāja appears to be
true. Vācaspati who gives his date as 842 A.D. also quotes Bhāskara.

The tradition quoted at the beginning about his getting the appellation Padmapāda bespeaks for his unsurpassed love and devotion to the Guru. Nay, the famous verse about a preceptor, viz., गुरुः प्रेमानुप्राप्ता: 
गुरुषः गाम्यान्तः: न तः, etc., seems to be his motto as is evident from his work. The highest devotion in his heart takes tangible form in the following words: ्रससे धान्यात्विद्वेद- गुरुसैं गुरुप्रेममूल कार्यम् गुरुप्रेममभवति तत्र गुरुप्रेममेनान कार्यान्त सन्नाता गुरुप्रेमान्तः 
(361b 20)

The Venerable Guru through compassion for people lest they may go astray has descended to this earth. He is the Prince of Brahmanas and hence His words should be looked upon as veritable scriptures - like Scriptures they are अनंतेनक्षित and should not be put to question much less be contradicted or refuted by those who in vain try to catch the coconut fruit forgetting their dwarfish stature! It is no use trying to lift up a mountain by ants!
the ocean be emptied by taking away a drop? It is only suicidal to attempt to refute the Advaita of Saṅkarā- cārya -

Can we find such pupils again in these days? Bow to the pupil and to his revered Preceptor'.

---
(iii) Totaka

Suresvaracarya and Padmapada have thus carried on their share in their preceptor's task of popularising or spreading the Svarakamimamsa. Though Totaka and Hastamalaka cannot be said to be the major authors still they are highly spoken of and are reckoned among the Siva - Catushayi (four pupils) of Sankaracarya. That is why something should be said about them here. As regards Totaka, he was regarded as an ordinary student by others and hence shunned at. But he attended the lectures of his preceptor attentively and once on the behest of his Guru gave out what he knew to the amazement of his Co-students.

He is credited with the authorship of two works, viz., (1) Shulisa-Samudharam and (2) Kylanitaya, the first of which deals with Advaita and thus interesting for us.

Shulisa-Samudharam.

It is recorded to be a summary of Sankaracarya's teachings everyday sung by Totaka before the preceptor and the pupils. It runs into verse which does not claim any high poetic flash. The number of stanzas in all is 179.

1 Vida Vidyaranaya's Sankaradigvijaya.

2 Published in Amrindrarama series No. 103 and commented upon by Saccidananda Yogindra.
It begins with salutation to Bādarayāna and proceeds in a graphic manner describing a dialogue between a preceptor and a pupil who has approached with all modesty and the fourfold requirements. The Guru advises him to get rid of sensual pleasures and to concentrate upon the highest Being which is तंत्रिक (comprising Intelligence), अत्तर (Infinite) ज्ञात (Highest Reality), विनम्र (void of qualities) and गृहहर (residing in heart). The plurality in the world is like the several appearances of the sun due to the distinction by water or like the धातक (ether-in-jar). The Self is unchangeable (अविभक्त). The mind works with two वृत्तिः pervading the object and अत्तर which appears as an attribute of the Ātman and which effects delusion. Buddhi or Reason is the sole cause of action (अनुभव) or the Ântarâ or the अत्तर which being temporary cannot be an attribute of the Self which is eternal. The individual soul is neither a part nor a transformation of Paramātman. It's only a name of Him as we call the ether in the dish.

2 Nīka Vidyāranyā's Śaṅkaradīgvi-jāya.

31 निम्नलिखित निमित्तार्थसम्पर्क मुखे।
as कर्तव्यांमये so also we style Him Jīva. Scriptural passages relating to the creation like तद्भवं तदेन विविधताः (having produced the world He entered into it) have the Identity as their purport as reflected in हृदिहृदयम् (Thou are That). This last sentence is not to be taken as referring to either meditation (अभ्यासं) or as laudatory (एवं धृष्टं) or in any other way. It only ends in the Identity of Paramātmā and the Jīva and thus helps to remove the world-illusion (सङ्करंक्षणक्). So says also Draviḍa citing the illustration of the prince among Sabaras. As the Prince after knowing full well his real position gave up his misunderstanding, so also the

---

It is clear from the reference in (सूत्रसारं ४५) singular number to Draviḍa that the term does not refer to Śāṅkara cārya whom Śuresvara refers as जनसूत्र. Further the force of अवि shows that the author here wants to cite an authority who does not agree with his doctrine in all respects. "even Draviḍa agrees." Again if the work was really recited before Śāṅkara cārya, the term cannot refer to him. The commentator identifies the statement from उपदेशदोषाः of Śāṅkara cārya but Toṭaka might have some other work before him. Prof. Kuppuswami Sastri in his article in 3rd Oriental Conference Proceedings states that Draviḍa and Dramiḍa, author of छात्रोपन्यासामह एक और एक समान. Ananda giri in his Śāṅkara cārya-वास्तविक भाषा- attributes अप्रमाणानुसारका to Draviḍa cārya. Prof. K.S. Sastri further identifies him as Tirumalissai Álvar of the 8th Cen. A.D.
Jīva realising its natural state gets rid of this
He should know himself to be तृतीय (the Fourth one)
transcending all the three states, viz., असत, सत & सुपरविस, which are only imaginary. All this universe
including even the sky is produced by Him. Neither
Asat (the unreal) nor Sat (the Real) can be produced.
The Self has no bondage or freedom. It is beyond
that. The whole matter is summed up by himself in
the following three verses:

(Trans.- What is the use of saying more? Listen, I
shall tell you the important thing - 'The
three, viz., Waking state, etc., have
been imagined in you and hence these are
for ever unreal. It has been called as
imagined, as unreal, as mind in the scripture
and it has also been proved by reasoning;
hence everything else than you did never
exist. That what is void of outward or in-
ward, what is homogeneous, without effect or
cause, void of any second and absolutely
bereft of all distinctions, which consists of
Intelligence and is infinite and Real—That Thou art.)

Hearing this precept the pupil realises the Paramātman and becomes free.

These are the contents in outline. It ends with a bow to the Guru. The style is simple and argument running in logical sequence though the work does not smell of high study or mastery over logic. It abounds in repetitions. Though the work reveals that the author has grasped the essentials of Advaita, still it confirms that Suresvara and others had a cause to boast of their शास्त्रीय (Scholarship) and all that.

(iv) Hastāmalaka

The last name in the quadruplet of the S'īyas is that of Hastāmalaka. His very name proclaims his erudition. He is reported to be the son of Prabhākara, the famous ब्रह्माष्ट्र. Born Brahmajña he was a true Mauni and was thought to be worthless in his childhood. His father presented him to Saṅkarācārya who made him talk with the famous विद्याधिकारिकोण after beginning with जीते विडण्डों etc. All other pupils he

1 Vide Viṣṇuvarṇah Saṅkarācāryajaya.
belonged to the 9th Gen. A.D. His works are known to be: धृतंप्रज्ञानान्यालक्षणम् मेव विज्ञातिहासिदेवः.

From the titles of these works it is obvious that they deal with Only hymns or अनेकानेकः composed by his Guru. The first is the commentary on द्वितीयोऽगम्याद्वादशमस्मान्याल्पम् while the B.O.R.I. ms. No. 367 contains the other work, viz., द्वितीयोऽगम्यम् verses with a commentary ascribed in the colophon to Śaṅkara-cārya. May what it be, the contents of these verses and commentary can be stated in brief as follows: The work starts to expound the doctrine of Ātmaikya to a proper अधिकारित्वम्. The pupil having come to know of superimposition which is अनुमानः कार्योऽत्सविद्धम् सिद्धान्तस्यास्त्रम् अनुसरणम् (Beginningless yet ending, natural, consisting of misapprehension and experienced by everybody) and deciding to destroy it, implores the preceptor for the knowledge of Self. After describing the Self as eternally pure, etc. (विकृतामनुरुच्च - ...) the Guru remarks that the same Self goes through transmigration (संस्कृति) which is only temporary (स्मरणिका). The cause of this संस्कृति is:

1. There is no unanimity about the text in various manuscripts.
2. B.O.R.I. Ms. No. 714/1895-1902 is another commentary named विशिश्तार्थचारणविधि by one Gopinātha-Agnihotrin, on the verses श्रीसारस्वतीविद्यम् etc.
3. Thus the work starts in dialogue between Hastamalaka, the preceptor and Śaṅkara-cārya the preceptor.
Avidyā or Nescience which resides in Ātman, which has the same for its object, which is experienced by one’s own experience through the power of Ātman and which is indescribable but not real covers the pure Ātman, like the embryo engrossed in darkness. It projects variety over Ātman after having covered it. Though in reality it is unreal (अवस्तु) still it appears as real (वस्तु वर्ते). The illustration is of the reflection in a mirror. Īśvara is the reflection of Cidābhāsa in Māyā consisting of the three qualities Sattva, Raja and Tama while Jīva or individual soul is a reflection of the Cidābhāsa of Īśvara in Sattva (Māyā having prominence of Sattva). That is to say that Īśvara or the cause of this world (styled as शाक्तोक्तम् in Advaita) is a reflection of the Highest Brahman called here कृष्ण भविन्नशर while the Jīva appears to be the

2 Thus the work starts in a dialogue between Hastamalaka, the pupil and Senkaracarya, the preceptor.

31. All the salient features of Avidyā are thus given in one place. No other work describes it in such a simple but complete manner. Further it takes Brahman as the resort and object of Avidyā.
further reflection of this Īśvara in Śiva or limited Nescience influenced by Rājas, action and Tamas, infatuation (Thus the work seems to support Pratibimba-Vāda but in a crude way in the sense that the ideology is not settled as the terms like cāleśvara are used without explanation. Further if a term like ādeśvara which shows some contamination (संकाल) can be called as दृवधड़ा it is doubtful).

Distinction arising out of place, time and object and the superimposition of ego (अतिरिक्त) and notion of possession (सत्य) complete the picture. Then the Jīva not attaining any goal (अत्यत्ताह्यस्य शुभरुपाः) and experiencing all types of miseries (प्राप्ताहोषणयिः) wanders forever in various lives. This is clear from Śrūtis like न तं विदाय य इत्स नंतर ऐंत.

The pupil here wants to know how can there be this Māyā which resembles τα a hare's horn? The answer consists of an analogy of the दोष नागरिक (Phantasmagoria). Do not we regard the tiger etc. as real as long as the magic persists? So also अत्यत्ताह्यस्य अति तुषितमः·

Thus the work is Advaita Vedaṭa in an abridged form in all its aspects. Questions of the
the body, Ātmaikya, Jīvanmukti, etc., are discussed.

As has been remarked in the colophon it is meant for simpletons, (वेदांतसमस्तमण्डितिं अनेकोपदेशायिभि।) without any dialectics. It is a straightforward simple expositing clothing difficult matter in easy terms.
Vācaspatimiśra

...slightly after the immediate pupils of Śrī come Vācaspatimiśra or the Bhāmatikāra. His name is a big authority in Advaita literature. He is credited with the origination of a different Prasthāna styled Avaccheda Vāda in the Advaita circle. His literary activity is not restricted only to Vedānta but true to his name, he dealt with all the Dārsāṇas that were held important in his days. That is why he is called Sarvatāntrasvatantra.

Date.—Fortunately for us, Vācaspati has mentioned the date of the composition of his Nyāyasūcī. It is Vikrama Saṃvat 893, i.e. 841-42 A.D. Thus he flourished in the middle of the ninth century ... 1 The concluding portion of Bhāmatī refers to the reigning king as Nṛga. He is taken to be a king of Mithilā, a predecessor of Vānyadeva of 1019 Vikrama Saṃvat, i.e. .... 962 mentioned as Kiratādhipati in some inscriptions. The identification rests on the surmise that Kiratas are known to have used human vehicles, which is the meaning of Nṛga.

1 nṛgah vamāntañuvapajñānaṁ kauñ ca parayaṁ
   tāsminbhāme mahābhaktā bhavantām sarvīḥ bhavāḥ añgam ॥

Nothing can be decided with certainty in the absence of any reliable data.

Not much personal information is available except the tradition that listening to the lively debates held on the occasion of his marriage, Vācaspati dedicated his life to the study of lore so much so that in the enthusiasm of mastering various Sāstras he completely neglected his wife whose name was given to his magnum opus, viz., Bhāmatī as an expiation later on.

Aufrecht in his C.C. notes that Vācaspati was a pupil of Mārtanda Tilaka. But it seems to be the name of a deity to whom he salutes at the beginning of his Bhāmatī. Udayana and Vardhamāna, his commentators give Trilocana as the name of Vācaspati's preceptor. From his repeated reference to mustard oil he is said to have lived somewhere about Bihar or Bengal.

Works.— Bhāmatī, Tattvasamīksa, Nyāyakanikā, Tattvabindu, Nyāyavārtttakatātparyatikā, Nyāyasūcaññānnibandha, Sāmkhyatattvakaumudī, Tattvavadāraṇī.

3 मार्तान्तिककुस्मादानाग्रापतीम नवम्रं निर्धनानुपन्तमस्यां: सन्तित्रेतानिधानिकं

4. Vide introduction to Bhāmatī p.X.
At the end of his Bhāmati he mentions Nyāyakanikā, Tattvasamikṣā and Tattvabindu by name and also refers to his works on Nyāya, Śāmkhya, Yoga and Vedānta. These deal with all the six Dārsanās. His Nyāyakanikā is a commentary on Maṇḍana's Vidhiviveka, a Mīmāṃsā composition. The Nyāyavārttikatātparyatīkā and Nyāyacintānibandha pertain to Nyāya, while Śāmkhyatattvakaumudī is the commentary on Īśvaraśrīna's Śāmkhya-Kārikās, and the Tattvavaiśaradī is a gloss on Pāṇḍjala-Yogasūtra. Tattvabindu is an independent composition dealing with the discussion of language in its relation to meaning. Only Bhāmati and Tattvasamikṣā are Vedānta works.

(1) Bhāmati. - It is a lucid commentary on Ś'B. The Bhāṣya has been annotated and amplified in an excellent manner with the help of everyday instances. It is important being one of the earliest commentaries, on Ś'B. It is the last composition from Vācaspati's pen. Four commentaries Kalpataru of Amalānanda.
Rjuprākāṣikā of Śrīraṅganātha, the Bhāmatītilaka and Bhāmatīvilāsa are available on the work.

(2) Tattvasamīkṣa:—It is also styled Brahmatattvasamīkṣa and comprises the commentary on Maṇḍana's Brahmasiddhi. More than one reference to this work are found in his Bhāmatī. This gloss on Brahmasiddhi is responsible for many views of Vācaspati like Māṇājīvavāda, Twofold Avidyā, Dhyānabhyāsa (repetition of meditation on Brahman) as the sure means to salvation etc. which are somewhat opposed to other Advaitins.

Vācaspati's Avacchedavāda—

Vācaspati's name is associated with Avacchedavāda or the theory of Delimitation. The pure consciousness being limited or defined by various adjuncts takes the forms of Īśvara, Jīva etc. The standard illustration to prove this Vāda is the ether-in-jar (खटनाय) and the outer ether,(मठलाहर). The ether as a matter of fact is indivisible, homogeneous and all-pervading. But it appears as divided or limited when contained in a jar or a room. When the jar is broken the ether inside becomes
one with the outside ether. Likewise the Jīva is nothing but consciousness demarkated by the adjunct of Budhī or reason. The eternal impartite Brahman gets limited through the association of adjuncts. These off, it becomes again a homogeneous whole.

This Vāda might be traced to Gauḍapāda who proclaims

Saṅkaraṃcārya cites the example of Ghaṭākāśa and Mahākāśa.

Jīva. Basing his arguments upon this example Vācaspati forms his Avacchedavāda. He explains the relation between the Jīva and Brahman as follows:

Trans: So it comes to that a person while saying, "I am here in the House" and thereby referring to the egoism of the self, takes the limitedness of the self for granted due to its identification with the body etc. exactly like the limitedness in case of the ether through the adjuncts, viz., a jar, a jem, a dish, etc. . . .
Thus in everyday parlance when one uses the term 'I', the whole paraphernalia of superimposition is presupposed. The self is infinite, homogeneous, eternal, impartite, one consisting of Cinti or consciousness. Due to adjuncts of the body, sense-organs etc. it is taken as limited and the expression 'I' refers to this self defined by the entanglement of the body. The Ātmā and the body though altogether different in themselves, are looked upon as identical and thus the all-pervading consciousness is demarked by the adjuncts. This limited self is then styled the Jīva or individual soul, or Jantu, the human being or Ksetrajñā, the knower of the body and so on.

Due to the encasement of these adjuncts, viz., the body, the sense-organs and the intellect or Buddhi, the individual soul is able to act and enjoy in this world. The power of action and enjoyment is not natural but it is acquired through these associates. It is the Buddhi which gives the name Jīva to the highest Ātmā making it as if partite and capable of being referred to as the 'I'.

1. तेन चिन्तन एवं नामेनार्थसंवादादेव भविष्यते वर्णानानायायोगावत्ति: सत्यमानोस्वयम्भूतii स्वेतस्वरूपपरिवर्त्तितानि कर्मणां परमस्तत्स्वपविविलय: अविनाशकर्पं जीव इति च अनुप्रेषिते च क्षेत्रवाला इति अवश्यस्ते। Vide Bhāgavata 5.5.
Even though in reality it is self-luminant, it is veiled by the intellect and thus becomes an object of the experience, viz., 'I'.

This limitation does not contaminate the real nature of the eternal self-luminant Ātmā; it is only an appearance (अन्वेषण: ) and due to the non-perception of the distinction between the Buddhi etc. and Ātmā it takes place. The distinction again is not real and hence the real nature of Ātmā does not undergo any change. Even though it is unlimited and imparted still it is taken to be limited, encamped in this body. And all the paraphernalia going with the body, viz., activity, enjoyment, distinctions, egoism and what not is also associated with it.

What is this distinction then which is responsible for the limitation of Ātmā? It is neither real as it does not exist with the one eternal Ātmā, nor unreal as it creates the phenomena which we do experience and hence it is indescribable and is imagined through Avidyā which is beginningless and indescribable. The adjuncts which prove to be the lockers for the Ātmā are only the products of the nescience or Avidyā.

1. Vide Bhāshāki 44.39-40

2. न सात्तो- बुक्तांतिमे भेदसाचिनिक: मेन विश्वासनि भुक्तांचाणे स्वर्गविश्रृंगिनः
   वा भवेत् बुक्तांतिमिनिकितायतें तद्भवस्माय निर्भारामन्विततः ॥ ६४ ॥ ५०
Avidyā.-- In all the Śruti, Smṛti, Itihāsa, Purāṇas, etc., Avidyā is given as the root-cause of all evil. And this is nothing but the superimposition of the Anātman on the Ātman. The material sentient entities are superimposed upon the eternal consciousness and thus the evil starts. It is called the cause of the evil for it makes the Ātman, void of all evil, experience the miseries through the superimposition of the mind, etc., which is detrimental to him being full of all sorts of pain, viz., hunger, thirst etc. Thus Vācaspati remarks: अनात्मनं नास्तिक्षेरे अत्मात्मनं नास्तिक्षेरे। नारायणश्रद्धाये न अन्तरात्मानं नु ज्ञातान्तरात्मानं।

At the very outset of his work he presents this Avidyā as two-fold. With the help of this two-fold Avidyā, the Brahman puts forth this world of appearances. The salutation to Brahman runs as follows: अनिश्चितमिकायिष्ठ्वरं सविनयं प्रवेशते विज्ञाने अस्यनेन विवर्धलने वेदनाः। यतं यथावक्यं च यथावक्यं यथव यथावक्यं सविनयं नमस्ते नमस्ते अपीत्त्वं विव्यक्तं कामाभ्यस्तं॥

1. प्रसादोद्धरणकारिकैसि एव सर्वायस्मिमेतः। इति स ओगमवेच | 96.3 9

2. ग्रंथं 1 प. 1 स. 1.
[Trans: We bow down to that Brahman comprising infinite Bliss, knowledge and immortality—the (five elements, viz.) sky, wind, fire, water and earth are whose appearances and who controls them with the help of the twofold indescribable Avidyās, and (Brahman) from whom this whole universe—moveable & immoveable sprang forth].

Amalānanda, author of Kalpataru comments upon the term अविद्या in these words:—एवं हृदयं आदिक्षमित्रहरूं दैवताधिकाय्यं आदम कर्तव्यं हृदयं अविद्या. अवश्य अनलता हृदयं अविद्या। तथा सितता अवश्य अति भक्तिकार्य करसहायता तदर्श्य अनलता हृदयं अविद्या।... Thus Avidyā is of two types according to Vācaspati. We have already seen that Mādanamisra in his Brahma-siddhi also presents Avidyā as twofold, viz., कारणत्विक and कारण-विद्वान or the veiling and projecting Avidyās respectively. The first Avidyā is beginningless and positive which covers the real nature of Brahman and thus starts the cycle of misery while the other is nothing but the effect of the first, giving rise to subsequent illusions. Vācaspati refers to these two Avidyās more than once, cf. निदर्शनं धनं ज्ञात्रातं वापसनानां विशेषादिएवः। He also expressly

2. Vide Brahmasūtra 2.1.27.

1. Vide, p. 58 above.
states their nature, viz., कारण and कारण as in 

Both these अविद्याः together are the cause of all evil. For only the super-imposition of the substrate ( अविद्याः ) or the identification of तत्त्व and अत्तत्त्व is not enough. The real cause of misery is the notion, viz., 'my' or 'Mine' which is nothing but the super-

qualified thereof (बुधुश्यति). But the super-imposition of the 
imposition of the substrates ( ) is the root of 
the other.

The Resort of अविद्याः

According to वृक्षपति the two-fold अविद्याः resides 
in the जीवा, the individual soul and not the highest one. 
For this view also his commentary on ब्रह्मसिद्धि is 
responsible for मांदनामिस्र ग्रंथ writes: अमूदु कृष्णदेवि तथाचारामति 
( p.10 ). Both अविद्याः belong to the जीवा alone. 
Therefore the ब्रह्मān is eternally pure as it has 
nothing to do with the अविद्याः. Thus वृक्षपति remarks: 

Of course without its association with the ब्रह्मान,

1. 381: 357

2. तत्सहिति 'वृक्षपति' अविद्याः अर्थात् जीवा, जीवा। 'मे' इत्यर्थुच्च ध्यानार्थ अविद्याः अस्थिति 
हेतु यथार्थिर्मणि मन्नात्म अत्त्त्वगणिति अविद्याः अर्थात् 
मांकार चुङधिः चुङधिः इति ... | 381: 357
Avidyā cannot put forth Jīva and in that sense Avidyā is said to be bi-polar in Vācaspati’s opinion. From Brahman springs forth the whole universe – animate, as well as inanimate – only through Avidyādvitaya. Thus it is related to Brahman as its helper. And as the commentator explains this help means making Brahman its own object (निर्विभाग). Thus the resort (अप्रकाश) of Avidyā or the subject of nescience is the Jīva while Brahman is its object. The ignorance belongs to Jīva and is with reference to the nature of Brahman. Thus it has two ends.

The objectors to this view point out that there would accrue the fault of mutual dependency (वेषेतत्स्बंध) if we take Jīva as the resort of Avidyā which again is its producer. Thus Avidyā belongs to Jīva while Jīva depends upon Avidyā for its existence. This objection is met by Vācaspati with the citation of the maximum of the seed and sprout (सीतासुमन्नस्तथा). He states...

1. Vide Introduction to Bhāmaśā (T.P.H.)
The superimposition being beginningless
for this objection.

This ascription of Avidyā to the Jīva makes
Yācaspāti an idealist. For every Jīva would have its
own world. Thus everybody's world would be different
and later Advaitins explain that it appears the same
due to similarity of the imagination. The fault of
various universes might be refuted on the supposition
of one द्वारणाविष्कार giving rise to all Jīvas. But still
where was this Avidyā before the Jīva came into existence.
An entity and the positive entity which the Avidyā is
cannot remain without the prop. To explain it away on
the strength of श्रीमतुकृत्तम is to shun the question.
Again as Padmapāda has already remarked, the seed does
not arise from the sprout which came out of it, so the
illustration does not lend much help. That is why, to
avoid the idealism, many Advaitins take Brahman as the
resort of Avidyā which being indescribable does not
harm Brahman in any way.
This twofold nescience is positive, beginningless and indescribable as accepted on all hands. Because it is not real it can be put an end to by realisation. Vācaspati refers to this in season and out of season. A real thing cannot be sublated even thousands of scriptures join in repudiating it. The rogues can change the ram into a dog for only a proverbial fool and not for all! Thus he writes: अन्तर्गतेः कि उष्ण तत्स्रानावोपोषणे नातु अशितवत्वस्थापने। न तिव रणमार्गस्य सहस्राधि-सर्वप्रभास्ता अवभारितु-मुयहते। (२६५) ९ न तिव आनंदन अहैसाधि-धर्म प्रविष्टमेवः।¹

The scriptures are to be accepted only as giving the highest reality i.e. from the highest plane of truth. It does not mean that they meddle with the everyday parlance. Hence it should not be argued that if everything is unreal or invalid Veda itself is so and hence should not be accepted as the highest proof. For the realisation does not sublate the phenomenal existence of the world but only the real one. Vācaspati states:

नाटे आनंदान्त अहेभिन्नतारिह अक्षात्मस्य आत्मायुपवतीं अत्र नारणामथावस्य अथ तत्त्वात्मिका। (वाक्सपति p.8)

¹ एकेश्वर. परमार्थो न ज्ञातु शास्त्रानां अपि अपवधितत। न ज्ञातु सहस्र्वार्था रस्तायं वास्त्यकोष दृष्टिनें अवभाषितवेत्तुमीमासते। (२६५) -९ न ज्ञातु सहस्राधिकी श्री स्वरूपो धर्म वर्त्तमानं क्रस्तिनो धर्म परामर्शमेति। (२.५५)
Thus Avidyā, as is proclaimed in the scriptures, can be sublated with the means prescribed by it and subsequently the pure eternal Brahman can be attained. The means for Salvation is not only the realisation or knowledge of authoritative passages but it is something more than that. As Maṇḍanamisra says, it is the repetition of concentration (Dhyānābhayaśa), which is the cause of realisation. Mere Brahma-jñāna is not sufficient but it is to be meditated upon with the help of other means (साधनस्मृतिविद्यार्म्भवतुहयात।). This realisation or intuition (लोकायते) is a peculiar psychosis of the mind (वज्रसूत्तिप्न) arising out of the other means, viz., Śrāvana, Manana etc. In other words the removal of Avidyā can be effected only through Upāsanā. (स्नेहस्वरूपं यं न नित्योऽभित्रिते नित्योऽभित्रिते तत्त्वेतर्षे। p. 109)

But curiously enough Vācaspati does not combine Jñāna-Karma-Samuccaya with this view of realisation. His objection points out that on the strength of the

---

1 अन्यायविधिनीति-श्रुतस्मा-सत्यस्य-सत्यविद्यार्म्भवतुहयात।—साधनस्मृतिविद्यार्म्भवतुहयात। p. 108.

Rāmacāya also embraces the same view that mere Jñāna is not sufficient for Mokṣa and do from passages like विवेचना भवेत् मुक्तिः it seems विवेचन = ध्यानेऽश्च = कौशलित = शब्दाकृतिः. The glaring difference from S's opinion on the point is due to Vācaspati's indebtedness to Maṇḍanamisra. All the pains taken by S. to show the distinction between Jñāna and Dhyāna in I.4:4 seem to be in vain.
the Sūtra 'अन्तरिक्षेत्रस्य अवर्तो', the Karma should be recognised as a helper to Jñāna. For a man who is purified through sacrifices and performing various means enumerated in Yogasūtra (as the Śatkāras consisting of celibacy, penance, faith etc.) and meditating upon Brahman is enabled step by step to remove the Avidyā root and cause and then the highest self itself manifests to him. It cannot be argued that Karma arising out of Avidyā cannot destroy it for there are plenty of examples showing the removal by similar entities. Thus sometimes the poison removes another poison and disappears itself. Thus Karma should be accepted with the Jñāna.

Vācaspati replies that Karma cannot be accepted

1. Ramanuja also embraces the same view that mere is not sufficient for and so from passages like it seems that . The glaring difference from Sūtra's opinion on the point is due to Vācaspati's indebtedness to Madanamisra. All the pains taken by Sūtra to show the distinction between Jnana and Dhyana in I 1.4 seem to be in vain!

2. ग्रन्थे कल्याणिकालास्त्र्यं कर्माणि तत्तुष्टंनर्त्ति, कर्मीतव्र ना सदस्येदास्य दुहान 
उपक्रेष्य दृष्टि आक्षेप्त निर्जनांस्वलयोगस्याविशिष्टानि भावानि न्यूनता-विशेषानि।
यथा पुनः पुनः भूतत्वाते गर्भविणि भवनि च जीवितसंग्राहिनि अथवा लिङ्गिनव निष्कृतानि
क्षमति। प. ३४१।
as a direct cause for it is not required in meditation (उपासनायम्) nor in the advent of realisation (साधनम्). But still it is not wholly useless. It can be admitted as an indirect helper or a remote auxiliary (अंकड़कारध). यहाँ --- विषम्प्तिया --- shows that Karma helps through the purification of mind for the effecting of the desire for Brahmajñāna. Here he gives the ladder to Brahmabhāva in the same fashion as that of Naïskarmyāsiddhi. But this applies to only a Gṛhaṇa. A celibate can take to renunciation as permitted by Sūtras like यवं केवलं आहुत्यं परीस्येत्। The three usual debts are to be repaid only by the Gṛhaṇa. Thus indirectly Vācaspati admits that renunciation is the ultimate means to Salvation. His opinion regarding Jīvanmukti is also clearly influenced by the views of Mañḍanamisra on the point. The impressions of Sāṁśāra do persist even after the realisation of the truth through the repeated meditation on passages like "Thou art that" (तदार्थस्मिरि - ). But still

1. Ibid p. 28 Vide p. 77 above.
he knows full well that these impressions and the
tactivities which he indulges in are not real. A
tinge of difference from S.'s opinion is also visible
here. S.' does not admit any remnant of Avidyā
after the ultimate realisation; while Vācaspati does.
He further remarks that the Vidyān thus is not entitled
to learn Karma-mīmāṁsā as he does not believe in Karma
that time. The objector here cannot help remarking
that in that case the Vidyān or Jīvanmukta will prove
a nuisance to the world as he is not likely to abide
by the Śāstra and will do as he likes thereby embracing
even prohibited Karma and thus leading the people astray.
Vācaspati replies that there is no such fear as the
Jīvanmukta is not completely bereft of his human nature
(मनु-कथानसम्बन्धतः) and that it is the injunction and not
prohibition that needs faith, as Gītā remarks "अशांकाः-
पुरा ॥ तत्कः ॥ इत्यादि ॥" Further passages like "त न कर्माणि" ।
पुरा अशांकाः ॥ इत्यादि ॥ clearly express that Karma is not
necessary.

1. अतिविद्यानस्तत्रायु हृदयायुः प्रत्येकस्य यज्ञार्थायुः तदान्तःतथासत्रायुः
अर्थे अतिविद्यायां श्रौतेः समस्ताने गुरुम् न तथास्त्रायुः। शास्त्र १२।२।

2. न शरीरं कस्यधिक असुयमाणि नामस्तितः किंतु अविद्यामृत्युष्णतुधितं भवति
सहिःस्माते निन्दिते ॥ ॥ ॥ ॥

The editors of the Bhāmati in T.P.H. series remark that Vācaspati's ingenious explanation how prohibitions hold good in case of Jīvanmukta has obvious leanings towards Manḍana's doctrine that Jīvanmukti is at best figurative; and that he is inconsistent in as much as in IV-i-15 he follows Sūtra in taking Jīvanmukta to be Siddha while here he takes him as Sadhaka.

Brahman.—There is no possibility of this Avidyā coming into being again after once it is destroyed. Thus when this Avidyā, which is at the basis of all evil, is removed the eternal, pure Brahman consisting of Bliss is realised. Sūtra always clothes Brahman in the following terms: नित्यं नात्र विद्यस्तं अस्वभावन्ति।. Vācaspati explains each and every word there as नित्यं द्वितीयकालन्तो हृदेस्वरुपः—क्षिप्रति।. "By the term Nitya he means the opposition of the evil in the form of decay." गुणवत्से इति गुणवत्से भिन्नमाग्नित्वं नात्मकं भिन्नमाग्नित्वं नात्मकं। "The word Siddha is used to deny the affliction arising out of the adjuncts, viz., the body and others." गुणवत्से समवार्तिन्सर्गभोजनाय मलनकर्तारां तर्कमिति आलाप्यां अन्यं अन्यं अन्यं अन्यं अन्यं अन्यं। 'Buddha' shows the Atman to be self-luminat and consisting of Bliss as

1. Vide p.270 Bhāmati

2. Ibid. p.46.
Bliss and Light are identical. 

"Mukta" points out that he is eternally free (from the clutches of Avidyā) but due to beginningless nescience appears as entangled through illusion. Thus the Brahman or highest Puruṣa is Himself infinite, impartite, free, self-luminant, Blissful etc. But through Avidyā it appears to be limited (अविद्यात्) and hence is as if to be sought after (अविद्यात्) though always near.

Though in scriptural passages like 'मनोष्य सत्त्वनातः' the real unity of the Īiva and the Paramātman is adumbrated still the Īiva is its limited or contaminated form while the pure form is the eternal witness as known from the Upaniṣads alone. This Brahman further is absolutely eternal (दुर्मिलस्य) . If not so, then we must accept it as temporarily eternal (परिनामविलित) granting its changes. Now does it change wholly or only in parts? If wholly then it becomes momentary, if by parts, are these parts distinct or identical with it? If they are distinct then Brahman does not undergo

---

1. [Reference text not provided]

2. [Reference text not provided]
any change as it is not connected with the parts which transform. If it is identical with its parts, then it is the same as changing itself and being thereby momentary. Here Vācaspati refutes the view of Bhedābheda. Brahman, he remarks, cannot be Bhinnābhinnā (both distinct and one) and so the argument that Brahman is one (अभिन्न) as the cause and distinct as the effect cannot stand. The Bhedābhedāvādins argue: अभिन्नस्य अभिन्नस्य तत्त्वस्य करणाभि श्रवणयान | श्रवणयानम् मात्रेऽपि कुसृतस्यादन्त्य विधाः (The plurality exists in the form of effect while the cause is one as unity is found in gold as such while the form of the ornaments, earrings etc. differ). But what do they mean by distinction? If mutual absence, then does it apply to the cause and effect or not? If not, then the two would become one and the same. If they do, then there is distinction between the two and thus identity cannot be had. As a matter of fact, there is no non-contradiction between existence and non-existence as both do not exist simultaneously. If they can exist at one time, then the gold and the ornament should be looked upon as one and the same and it would ultimately mean that gold

1. अभिन्नस्य अभिन्नस्यः परिवर्ढ्याय: अभिन्नस्यः परिवर्ढ्याय: । 

2. This Karaka is found in Bhāskara’s Bhaṣya (2:6) on Brahma-Sūtra. 

3. This Karaka is found in Bhāskara’s Bhaṣya (2:6) on Brahma-Sūtra.

4. This Karaka is found in Bhāskara’s Bhaṣya (2:6) on Brahma-Sūtra.

5. This Karaka is found in Bhāskara’s Bhaṣya (2:6) on Brahma-Sūtra.

6. This Karaka is found in Bhāskara’s Bhaṣya (2:6) on Brahma-Sūtra.
alone is real and not the ornaments as the distinction cannot be explained.\(^1\) That which is not perceived when thing is seen is distinct from the other as a donkey is distinct from camel as it is not seen when camel is perceived. Hence if we have to select between the distinction and identity, it is better to adhere to identity as real because the notion of distinction depends upon it.\(^2\)

**Jagat.** Vācaspati in his commentary on B.S.III-ii-21 refers to the Jagat as not real (अपवासा). For a real entity cannot be sublated by the knowledge of truth. For the highest knowledge contradicts that form alone which is superimposed (अवेशितम् किमेविशेषत्वस्य सञ्‌गमस्य). For the removal (स्वभावलाभ) of this universe then no injunction is required. The passages proclaiming Brahman as the only reality automatically deny the existence of the world. Without this realisation, of the reality, hundreds of injunctions to the effect "destroy this universe", "proceed for the knowledge of Ātman", etc. would be without use.\(^3\)

---

\(^1\) तथा तथा अश्वेषा होस्यमिति तस्ये तस्ये शुद्धश्च: 

\(^2\) तदन्त प्रसरन्तरमेव तम स्वभावमाणा न शेषेन 

\(^3\) तथा तथा अश्वेषा होस्यमिति तस्ये तस्ये शुद्धश्च:
While explaining the nature of superimposition he explains some standard instances, viz., the reflection of the face or the mirage etc. According to Vācaspati the reflection in the mirror or water takes place as follows:—The rays from the eyes go to the clear material, viz., the mirror or water but they are turned back by the strong sun's rays and so happen to perceive another face near the original one, but due to some fault cannot to grasp the real place of that face and also its real direction (towards the water etc.) and thus superimpose the place and direction of the water etc. upon it and thus the face appears to be residing in the water etc. and in the opposite direction. He then refutes the view viz., 'अत्याहितादिपि न स ध्यातिः भवेत् कथायितैः' (a thing is an absence of something else in a way) and discusses the nature of mirage. He argues that if a thing is not real and hence not to be experienceable, then what about the experience of the mirage water? Is it real
as water? The objector answers that it is not real as water for everything is twofold; it is existent in itself while with reference to others it is non-existent, i.e., a jar is a jar in itself but it is at the same time absence of say a cloth. The Siddhāntin still persists asking whether the cognition of water in mirage is invalid or not? The answer is that if the experience is 'mirage as not water' then it will not be sublated. The Siddhāntin criticises this, saying that the identity with water of the rays is not real nor unreal as an absence of a thing is taken as something else and hence the mirage cannot be the absence of water as is remarked "स्वामक रस्ताशंकरैं\।

" लक्षिता किविदेशिक "।" Now obviously the superimposed form is not something else for it would either be rays of the sun or the water of Ganges etc. If it is rays, then the cognition should be 'rays' and not water. If water, then the perception would be 'water in the Ganges' and not "water here". Thus the upshot of all this is that, it is neither real nor unreal nor also real-unreal and hence only indescribable.
Vācaspati quotes profusely from Mīmāṃśā works and also many a time from Buddhists as Bāhyas. He also refers to Dravidacārya. He seems to be acquainted with Pañcapadikā of Padmapāda and Suresvara's works. Thus in the grooves of Padmapāda, he calls Śaṅkara Śadvikṣānī and also refers to Brahmā's Nityatva, Ānanda, Vibhutvā, etc. as identical with it while he divides the goal to be achieved (कालान्तर) and a thing to be avoided (अनिष्ठापरिप्रेय) in Suresvara's manner. He refers the reader to his Nyāyakāṇikā for the details regarding Aparūṣeyatva of Veda, and 24:116, 117. He also cites his Tattvasamāskāra often and anon. Thus विश्वामित्र काला कृपालितमासांगुरु -
कलोकालिका कृपानितान्तरामनवाराज 12.6 etc. so also न दे तिरियति

His style is eloquent and lucid saturated with forcible arguments and sometimes humourous statements. The poet in him often manifests himself as when he describes the Sumeru mountain "रत्रि - अभयादित्याक्षरनाशनस्वरूप विविधश्चरमः
सिद्धिमयक सर्वद्विजसारी भास्यक, विविध दृष्टिकों विविधाध्याय रत्रिद्वरकु विविधानिलोकम्
नवनिर्मितिहासम् बृहस्पतिलीकत्वमिति विनेत्रामः के १ २०६. १ ०४।"

1. अपान: सत्सनात - निधिप्रस्थमनारामालकतवर्तम् क्षिप्रकरी 11 106 b.1 46.
2. पाला: इविर्जिष्ठा । अद्देहादित्याक्षरनाशनस्वरूपः विविधशास्तिकमाराजः । 1 04.
3. ततोऽविश्वामित्रार्थविविधानिर्मितिः कृपालितमासांगुरु विविधशास्तिकमाराजः । 11 106 b.1 46.

Hybrid b.1 54 15 31 b.1 2 22.
6 38 b.1 32 । 7 Bhāmaṇi on III.111.21.
He writes simple, impassioned, vigorous prose and explains every word in the Bhāṣya with all the implications behind it. His explanation of the definition of Adhyāsa (अध्यास: परम पूर्वभास: ) cannot be called in
Though Vācaspati has been accepted as authority by later Advaitins still the difference of opinion from that of S' appears to be glaring on some vital points as shown above. But with all that he explained the Bhāṣya of शास्त्राय ध्याति and refuted Bhedābheda theory, as well as Mīmāṁsakas, which fact must have weighed greatly in his favour.
III. The Three Vādas - Ābhāsa, Pratibimba and Avaccheda.

Uptil now we have summarily seen the activities of the major Advaitins who flourished just after Saṅkarācārya. They amplified and classified what was intended by him. They defined clearly what is meant by the terms Avidyā, Māyā, Jīva, Īśvara etc. and taking their clue from the illustrations cited by Saṅkarācārya in many places, they tried to clarify the relation between the Jīva and Īśvara on one hand and Brahman on the other; they also stated in clearest terms the resort of the Avidyā.

Their views as regards the basic problem, viz., the relation between Jīva and Brahman have been traditionally represented as threefold. As has already been given: they are Ābhāsavāda of Suresvāra or the Vārttika-kāra, Pratibimba-vāda of Padmapāda (and Prakāśātman and Sarvajñātman later on) and Avacchedavāda of Vācaspati. These have been dealt with in their respective places so far. Here a general discussion is entered in so as to take stock of them all to-gether.

1. Vide p.60 above.
Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in his Siddhāntabindu enumerates these three theories with their peculiarities. According to him they can be described as follows:

1. Ābhāsavāda.—The pure eternal homogeneous consciousness is the highest Brahman which is the only reality as the Vedantas propound. It is not at all associated with any impurity belonging to Avidyā and always remains in its effulgent Bliss. But through some indescribable reasons, it is connected with the beginningless Ajñāna and is reflected in it. This reflection in the cosmic or primordial nescience is wrongly taken to be identical with the highest Ātman and then it receives the appellation, viz. Īsvara who is said to be the inner controller, the one witness, the cause of this world and so on. The description of Upaniṣads of his being the underlying principle of the five psychical functions (Jñānendriyas) applies to this Īsvara. He is the eternal witness of the world as referred to in: रिष्यं यत्र रत्नासने किं ब्रह्मा सदार न विद्यते इति (Mund). So this is the Īsvara who is nothing but Ātman.

1. Vide Siddhāntabindu B.5.3. pp.42-47 —

2. cf. — गृहम् शेषं समस्तं समस्तं श्रवणं अद्य लुम्बदेव ते नास्ति हि अद्य श्रवणं प्रकटम्।
   कं तु अति श्रवणं सुरङ्गमुद्राय ब्रह्मस्य प्रवचनस्य महत: सत्ववीर्यो व आयुज्ज्वल:।
   (केमोयन्वार्य)
surrounded by Ajānāna or rather its appearance (Ābhāsa) of consciousness (cid) on Ajānāna. Similarly the Jīva also is the corresponding appearance on Buddhi or intellect. The highest Ātman due to the contact with Buddhi, an effect of Avidyā, is reflected in it and is consequently identified with the appearance and is then called the Jīva or individual soul who undergoes the activities and enjoyments of various objects. He is the one who experiences the cognition. Thus Jīva also is a Cidābhāsa. This is the Ābhāsa theory. It is based upon the examples given by Śr. under जानक तु न।

Both the Īśvara and the Jīva are ignorant of their own real nature and through realisation attain to it. This Ābhāsa itself is indescribable in as much as we cannot decide its nature whether real or unreal. For तस्मात् (That thou art) this theory expects what is called Jahañ-lakṣaṇā where the Jīva gives up all its adjuncts comprising the Ābhāsa and realises its eternal real unity with Brahman.
2. Pratibimbavāda.- This theory obtained many followers among the Advaitins. It can be traced to Padmapāda’s Pañcapadikā but its real advocates are Prakāśātman and Sarvajñātman as will be shown later on. According to this theory Īsvara as well as Jīva are the reflections of the highest Ātman (Consciousness) in Ajñāna and its product, viz., the mind or intellect respectively. Padmapāda’s explanation how a reflection takes place has already been given above. Later on, this theory was interpreted in two slightly different ways as supported by Prakāśātman and Sarvajñātman. Thus Madhusūdana Sarasvati states that according to Prakāśātman, the author of Vivarana, Īsvara means the pure consciousness engulfed into Ajñāna while the Jīva is the reflection in the ignorance pervading the mind. Thus Īsvara is Brahman itself with a slight contamination while Jīva is its reflection in the mind. But in Sarvajñātman’s opinion Īsvara also is the reflection of Brahman, in Ajñāna while Jīva is the reflection in Buddhī. Thus Sarvajñātman interpretes the Pratibimbavāda literally.

1. अद्वीतद्वितीय विद्वान्वेदवीरसिद्धांतकः। आदेशप्रशस्तस्यस्मादात्मात्मनुभवन्ति ज्ञानस्मिर्यस्मि। स्वदेशः श्रीमान्यः इति। तत्र परमधार्माः। श्रीमान्य ज्ञानेन्द्रियाः। तत्र परमधार्माः। श्रीमान्य ज्ञानेन्द्रियाः।

2. अद्वीतप्रतिष्ठानवेदवीरसिद्धांतकः। आदेशप्रशस्तस्यस्मात्मात्मनुभवन्ति ज्ञानस्मिर्यस्मि। स्वदेशः श्रीमान्यः इति। तत्र परमधार्माः। श्रीमान्य ज्ञानेन्द्रियाः। तत्र परमधार्माः। श्रीमान्य ज्ञानेन्द्रियाः। श्रीमान्य ज्ञानेन्द्रियाः।
applying it to both the Īśvara as well as Jīva while the original Brahman is pure and over and above the two. He does not admit even the term Īśvara (the ruler) or 'Paramesvara' to apply to the Highest Atman as these terms are only relative having an expectancy for the objects to be ruled over.

This theory also has been culled out from the corresponding examples cited by Sāhkaraśārya to explain the relation between the Jīva and Īśvara. Sarvajñātman takes the Jahadajahallakṣaṇā for 'लवण दीर्घ ' . Both the Īśvara and Jīva give up their associates but retain the part viz. consciousness and thus it is the ज्ञानार्थसमाप्तिः as in शेतुः दृश्यते.

The Ābhāsavāda and Pratibimbavāda agree in taking the Īśvara and Jīva as the reflections or appearances on Ajñāna and Buddhi, for a reflection and appearance are not much different from one another. The Ābhāsavāda hence can be included under Pratibimbavāda only with a small yet important distinction as pointed out by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī who remarks: तस्य (अक्षरिक) स अक्षरलेखनेनि प्रति अत्यधिक विशेषः। किंतु अक्षरलेखनेन अत्यधिक प्रभावः।
The Pratibimbavādins take the reflection as real in as much as it is one with the original while the Ābhāsavādins suppose it to be unreal. Hence they have to resort to two different Lakṣaṇās and the Ābhāsavādins propound Jāhatī one, as the Ābhāsa is not real and thus is to be discarded wholly, while the Pratibimbavādins can retain the consciousness of the reflection and give up the adjuncts.

Both the views regard Īśvara as the seat of the Avidyā as it cannot belong to the Jīva who is a product thereof. Hence the cosmic Ajñāna is the same for all the Jīvas and the Mānājīvāvāda can be embraced on the ground that each Jīva has its adjunct viz. Buddhi as different and hence the plurality; while the outer world is the same for all, its cause, viz. Ajñāna being the same and hence the same experience for all.

3. Avacchedavāda.—Vācaspati has explained the Īśvara and Jīva as the limitations of the highest consciousness. The illustration given by Saṅkaracārya of the Mahākāśa and Ghaṭākāśa is literally taken by him to apply to the relation between the Jīva and Paramātman. As the impartite ether is partitioned due to the limitations of

1 Vide §. 128 above.
an apartment or a jar etc. so also the one homogeneous consciousness is limited by the Ajñana, Buddhi and so on.

This theory again, unlike the above two, takes Jīva as the reosort of Avidyā and thus the world arising out of the Avidyā is created by each Jīva. The similarity of experience is due to the resemblance of everybody's imagination. If the Anekajīvavāda is accepted then many Avidyās also are required. This would lead to the extreme view of idealism that every-thing exists only in ideas. Further then, what is the function of the Isvara is not clear. He is described as the consciousness which is the object of the Ajñana which resides in the Jīva. Thus the Ajñana belongs to the Jīva and is with reference to the Isvara. But still this connection with the Isvara does not help much in solving the difficulty of explaining the same experience of all in this world. Jīva remains the prominent factor with all residuary powers being under his discrimination. The link to the Isvara is a very thin membrane indeed and he appears to be bogus like the Purusa of the Sāmkhyas.

1 Here Avidyā and Ajñana mean the same entity.
Some try to explain away this difficulty on the basis of Ekajīvavāda. Why not suppose that only one Jīva is the chief or primary or real and all other Jīvas are created by him alone? The universe is his dream and everything is thus controlled by him. Therefore all these subsidiary Jīvas move in one and the same world. Everybody will be freed when that primary Jīva gets salvation.

But this supposition also is not much helpful. For one may ask how are we to know that primary Jīva? Obviously he is not yet freed as still the world goes on. Thus all the talk about the salvation of Vāmadeva and Śuka etc. is only figurative (Arthavāda). And if it is only figurative, who would try for it? Further as we do not know and cannot fix that primary Jīva, why should we endeavour for Mukti as that would not help a jot to Him?

Thus this view of Ekajīvavāda appears funny. Why not then identify him with the Īśvara and say that Avidyā belongs to Īśvara instead of saying that there
is primary Jīva possessing Avidyā and ge in all sorts of difficulties? No fear of Isvara's being impure as the Bhāsyakāra has already proclaimed cempreṣṇa punaṃ ka aparamāyagām asman matter.

Once the indescribable Māyā or Avidyā is accepted, there is no difficulty as nāti maṁ abhin ēśasāṁ bhavanto naṁ.

Moreover, this limitation theory appears to be crude. Prakāśātman refutes it showing all the inconsistencies in it. Further, who effects this delimitation, as Ajñāna being Jāda cannot do it. To avoid all these flaws the majority of Advaitins accept the Pratibimbavāda.

All these theories take for granted the Vivartavāda. Thus the immediate followers of Śaṅkarācārya took his views of Vivarta or Advāsa and amplified the same in these Vādas. A fourth view also is sometimes referred to among Advaita circles viz. the Drstīsrstivāda. Unlike these three Vādas which try to explain the creation according to the maxim 'kṣetra kṣetram ati-deśasāmya this new theory takes that the creation takes place according to

---

1 Vid. ā. 220-221 below.
the cognition. This also is a facet of idealism in as much as objects are said to come into existence when they are perceived. It is generally ascribed to Prakāśānanda Saravatī but Prakāśatman in one place seems to refer to it which shows that it existed as early as the ninth century A.D. in some form or other.

The main opponents in these days seem to be the Māmāṃsakas, the adherents of Karma and the Bhedābheda-vādins. Saṅkarā also hints at Bhedābheda view which is later on taken up by Bhāskara who tries to refute Saṅkarācārya’s Māyāvāda, discarding it as nihilism or Śūnyavāda and calling him a Pracchna-buddha. Padmapīḍa, the favourite pupil of Saṅkarācārya challenges him and Vācaspati also repudiates him quoting his Kārikā. Thus it appears that the tradition that Bhāskara was a junior contemporary of Saṅkarācārya is reliable in as much as he comes between Saṅkarācārya and Padmapīḍa.

---

1. as cited by Umapīṭhara D.V. Jog in his Prakāśatman श्रीमान्य प्रकाशतमांने श्रीमान्य श्रीमान्यांने (Sanatana-Dharma Prakāśa)
Though the various theories discussed here were formulated in this period which thus witnessed a great vigourous movement in Advaita school, they were not valued as important till we come to Prakāṣātman; for Vimukta-tman, the author of Istaśiddhi who seems to have flourished just after Vācaspati does not take them up either to accept or to refute. It is the period of transition which saw the forming up of various fundamental classifications in Advaita.