Conclusion
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We may now record our findings in the form of observations and conclusion. Before doing so we feel to record the fact that the Jain philosophy and their doctrines have not been taken seriously by the other systems of Indian Philosophy. It is sad to note that even the basic texts of Jain Philosophy are not translated and studied due to this negligence towards the system. Whatever may be the reason of this negligence; the same attitude is noticed in case of ancient texts. For example, though the Jain Philosophers from 9th century downwards have taken great pain to establish their view against the doctrine of other systems of Indian philosophy by refuting those, quoting suitable arguments in thousands of pages in their respective texts, still in non of the texts of Indian Philosophy, the Jaina doctrines have been taken for serious analysis and examination. It is only in few places and few authorities of Nyāya like Vātsāyana Bhāṣya and prakaraṇa texts like Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's Nyāyamaṇjarī and Nyāya Bhūṣaṇa of Bhāsarvajña etc. we met with a casual treatment of Jaina theories. Further, in one occasion only in some four Sutras of Brahmsūtra and their commentaries by Śankara, Madhva, Rāmānuja etc. some of the Jaina doctrines have been discussed and refuted. It is only in some of the major texts of Buddhism that Jainism is taken for serious discussion and critical analysis. Therefore, initially we had a major problem to search and identify from the vast literature of Indian Philosophy from Nyāya, Vedānta and Buddhism to first trace where Jainism is presented. We are very
much aware of our limitations and ability to go through the exhaustive texts of Indian Philosophy and then identify the references. We have tried our best to do justice and it is probable that we might have missed some cases where Jainism is presented due to negligence and over sightedness.

Now we may record our observations on the present study in the following lines on the following heads.

A. The basic doctrines of Jainism vis-à-vis other systems of Indian Philosophy.

B. The presentation and the interpretation of the *Jaina* doctrines by other systems of Indian Philosophy.

C. Some answers from the *Jaina* point of views to the *Nyāya*śikas, *Vedāntins* and Buddhists.

We have noticed that the *Nyāya*śikas, the *Vedāntins* and also the Buddhists have somewhat similar approach against the *Jaina* doctrines. All have objected to the *Jaina* theory of *Anekānta*, their concept of eternity of soul, concept of reality. The arguments developed are almost identical, the basic objection of all being grounded on contradiction and absurdity. Thus, the answers and arguments given by the *Jaina* to one of the systems may be taken as the answer to all those, who do not subscribe to the *Jaina* view.

According to *Jainas*, *Pratyakṣa* is that type of knowledge, which is able to apprehend the objects with all its permanent and changing qualities and that possible only by the self. Therefore, *pratyakṣa* means the knowledge arising in the self directly.
The knowledge of the object derived from the sense organs is called sāmyavahārika pratyakṣa. The Jaina not only defines sāmyavahārika pratyakṣa but also analyze the process involved in it. The process consists in the four stages of avagraha, ihā, avāya and dhāraṇā, which are sometimes treated as four kinds of pratyakṣa. The idea of four states is original to this system. Though other systems of Indian Philosophy distinguish between nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka perception, but their distinction is not as thorough as that of the Jainas. No other system has given us such an account of the different states of sense perception.

Regarding the four stages perception it may be observed that we do not have a definition of avagraha in Nāndisūtra. It records two types of avagraha viz. vyāṇjanāvagraha and arthāvagraha. It is pointed out that vyāṇjanāvagra is not possible in the case of visual sense organs. Umāsvātī records the synonyms of avagraha and states that avagraha is an indeterminate cognition (avagraha-agraha-graṇaṇam-ālocanaṇm-avagrahaṇm ityanarthāntaram). Pujaṇapāda defines it as the first cognition after the contact of the object of sense organs (vaṣaṇa viṣayī sannipāte samāṇāntaraṇm ādyagraṇaṇam avagrahaḥ). Two steps are pointed out: when the sense organ is contacted with the object, there occurs darśana and in the second stage the cognition arising there after is avagraha. He gives the example of the cognition of white colour by the organ of sight (viṣaya, viṣayī sannipāte sati darśanaṃ bhavati tad anantaram arthagrahaṇm avagrahaḥ, yathā caṅkṣusā śuklam iti rūpaṃ
avagrahaḥ). It is significant to record that Pujjapāda accepts vyāñjanāvagraha as indeterminate cognition. He writes: arthāvagraha-vyāñjnāvagrahayor vyaktāvyakta kṛto veṣeṣaḥ.

Māṇikyanandi and Hemachandra also have defined it as a perfect knowledge arising in the self without the instrumentality of the sense organs. To Māṇikyanandi ‘mukhya’ is that clear, non-sensuous and infinite knowledge of which all veils are removed by special condition (sāmagi viṣeṣa-viślesita-akhilāvaram atindriyaśeṣato mukhyam). On the peculiar nature of such infinite knowledge Prabhāchandra notes that it arises when all the veils of karma are removed completely under special conditions. Right knowledge, right faith and right conduct are the internal condition, while space, time etc. are external conditions. When all the conditions are favourable, the karmas are removed completely and there arises mukhya pratyakṣa. It is clear and right knowledge, it is atindriya i.e. it does not depend on mind and sense organs. So it is perfect and infinite.

The Jaina view that the sense organs are not capable to apprehend the objects with all its permanent and changing qualities seems to be reasonable for sense organs have limited capacities.

The concept of non-sensuous knowledge of the Jaina Philosophy is based on their metaphysics. According to Jainas, knowledge is the essential quality of the self. The pure self possesses infinite knowledge, but due to the veil of the karmic matters, it cannot realize its true nature. When the obstruction of true nature is destroyed
knowledge arises in the self. The self can know objects directly without the help of the sense organs.

Regarding the nature of non-sensuous perception, the Jainas are not very clear. They say simply that in āvadhi jñāna one apprehends material objects directly by the self. In manahparyāya the knowledge of other mind is acquired and in keval jñāna, the self possess the knowledge of all things past, present and future and also of its own pure nature. It must be recorded that the problem of knowledge of other minds as discussed by Jainas can be compared with the western treatments of knowledge of other mind. It is the Jainas alone of the Indian Philosophers who singularly have given considerable attention to this problem. The Jainas do not say much about the nature of it. How does the self apprehend the object? Does it apprehend the objects as done by the sense organs? Do other objects come in contact with the self only in the shape of ideas, in this knowledge purely subjective experience like the pleasure and pain? These questions are left unanswered.

The Jainas hold that every body can become an omniscient, while most other schools believe in God as the omniscient being. According to Nyāya, a Yogi can acquire omniscience, which is not permanent because in the stage of final release, there would be no knowledge. Only 'Gods' omniscience is eternal.

Regarding the nature and process of omniscient or keval jñāna, the Jainas are not very clear. They simply say that in kevala jñāna the self possesses knowledge of all.
In Nyāya, there are three types of extra ordinary perception. The first two are sāmānyalakṣaṇā and jñānalakṣaṇā cannot be called atindriya pratyakṣa from Jaina point of view. Atindriya pratyakṣa is not caused by the sense organs and mind where as sāmānyā laksatā and jñāna laksatā arise with the help of the senses. Though there is no direct sense object contact, there is indirect contact. The Jaina also would argue that sāmānyā laksatā of the Naiyāyikas may be in a restricted sense called as atindriya pratyakṣa. It may be compared with kevala jñāna of Jainas.

In the Brahmasūtra of Advaitins it is atindriya jñāna but there is no knowledge of the object of the past, present and future. There is no question of direct apprehension of all objects of the world in Brahmajñāna. There is the direct apprehension of the self only, which is called Brahma. They also accept the direct apprehension of the pure self in the stage of kevala. The Yogi pratyakṣa of the Buddhist may be called atindriya pratyakṣa, because it is not caused by sense organs. It is the direct intuition of transcendental reality. But the Jainas do not accept the Nirvikalpa character of it. According to Jaina, knowledge must be determinate. As mentioned above, determinate ness is the criterion of right knowledge.

The Jaina philosophers though describe the testimony of Tīrthankara as transcendental or lokattara, it is not in fact super mundane and super human. The Tīrthankara are not otherworldly or super natural deities, but the human beings, liberated from the clutches of the bondage of karma. The idea of Tīrthankara hood is
common to all. Anybody, through self-efforts and self-discipline can queer the karma, can attain the state of kevalin and thus, can become ‘āpta’, whose statement qualify for being true or valid verbal testimony. In this respects the Jaina concept of verbal testimony is more appealing then the orthodox concept in which a super mundane divine Being in the name of God is generally accepted to be the ultimate source of the verbal testimony.

Another most important aspects worth noting in this context is the presentation of the Jaina doctrines by the Nyāya, Vedānta and Buddhism as pūrvapakṣa view. They have been very faithful in presenting the prima-facie arguments of the Jainas and it can even be said in appreciation of their presentation that one can read Jainism on the basis of their presentation which we have shown by drawing comparison to their presentation with some original texts of Jainas by putting them side by side some times in the main body or at times in the foot notes.

However, it is interesting to observe that though the Buddhist, Naiyāyikzs and the Vedāntins have presented the Jaina doctrines very carefully and very authentically, still they have in many cases misinterpreted the Jaina doctrines and have refuted accordingly. We have already discussed this in the respective place and here we may just note a few cases like their interpretation of the term ‘avyaktavyatva’ of the third bhanga of Syādvāda theory and the interpretation of the basic concept of Anekāntavāda by the Vedāntins and even by the Naiyāyikas, which are misleading and not correct.
Though the wording and the expressions are kept intact they are interpreted wrongly. No care has been taken either by the Naïyāyikas or the Vedāntins or the Buddhists to see the real interpretation and implication of the expressions. This has happened in most cases, which we have made clear in the discussion.

We now quote some of the answers from the Jaina point of view against the arguments of the Naïyāyikas, Vedāntins and Buddhists.

The Brahmasūtra read “naikasminasambhavā” to mean it is not possible to predicate positivity and negativity i.e. ‘astitva’ and ‘nāstitva’ to one and the same object due to impossibility and non-applicability. The Jainas also favour the same reality delimited by the quality of continuation which is one aspect of the reality and ‘is not’ i.e. non-existent is qualified by the quality of change which also is the essential aspect of the same reality. And making a singular assertion of the reality in the form of either ‘it is’ or ‘it is not’ would amount to concealing or suppressing the real nature of reality. Thus, there is no contingency of any kind in the Jaina theory of relativity in the statement ‘it is’ and ‘it is not’ is the conclusion of Jainas.

As regards the objection to the fourth alternative of the syādvāda theory viz. “syādavyaktavya” it may be pointed out that the concept of inexpressibility should be differentiated from ‘avyapadesya’ concept as elaborated by Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya (I. I. 4) or from the ‘avyaktavya’ of the Vedāntins with regards to the nature of Brahman. The Jainas do not propose that the reality cannot be verbalized. In
fact such a view will go against the supposition of the theory of relativity, which is dialectical and verbalizes the experiences of the reality. What the Jainas propose in this ‘bhāngas’ is that the attribution of two or more contradictory properties or aspects in a single expression is not possible. In other words, ‘syādavyaktavya’ means the inexpressibility of an expression of experience of existence and the non-existence of a reality in a particular place and time delimited by one and the same property. For example, it is not possible to verbalize the cognition of a pot as being present and absent in a particular space and time delimited either the aspects of continuity or the aspect of change alone. Thus, one cannot have an expression like ‘pot exist delimited by this place and that time delimited further by substance ness, (looking from the point of view of dravyatva aspect of reality) and the pot does not exist being delimited by the above mentioned delimiters like the same place, the same time and the same properties. This is the meaning of the term ‘avyaktavya’. Thus, the objection that nothing can be verbalized or the realities are inexpressible as posed by the Vedāntins and others is misleading and based on the wrong interpretation of the concept ‘avyaktavya’ which is not intended by the Jainas.

As to the objection regarding the size of the soul the Jainas have a practical and empirical approach to it. They feel that it is convenient to assume the size of the soul as limited pervaded by the individual, occupied in a given time. The objection that due to the identical size of the various sizes of soul in various states, the stages of the bondage
and the liberation cannot be maintained, is not true. The Jainas are arguing that it is not the size that is responsible or is the cause of bondage or liberation but the qualities that soul possesses. When the soul is devoid of karmas it is liberated and when associated with karmas it is bounded. Size has no role to play in this regard.

Further, the objection regarding the soul that it will be transitory or subject to destruction it being of limited size does not sound logical to the Jaina philosophers. To them eternity or transitoriness of a reality is not dependent on its size but its nature. The Jainas are true followers of the rebirth theory. To them the soul is eternal irrespective of its size. It is the presupposition of the Vedāntins or the logicians that if some reality is of limited size, it is subject to destruction, which is not acceptable to the Jainas. The Jainas argued that a thing is eternal judging from the aspect of its change. For the Jainas 'dhrauvya' i.e. the continuity and 'vyaya' i.e. change and 'uptāta' i.e. emergence is the real nature of each and every reality. When soul takes or fits into different bodies having different sizes like the body of elephant or the body of an ant what happens is that the size and the shape is changed but not the essential nature of the soul. Thus, it is illogical to argue that the soul will be transitory i.e. 'anitya' if it is accepted as to be the size of body it resides.

As to the objection by the opponents namely that “grace of the perfect souls i.e. siddhas results the salvation is not possible”, the Jainas answer is that this is not the exact position of the Jainas as quoted by the dvaitādvaita philosophers. Though the Jaina
philosophers hold that the grace of the perfect souls may be helpful to attain salvation, it is not the sole cause to get it. On the contrary for salvation the Jaina philosophers have prescribed fifteen 'guṇastānas' along with severe penance, in mind, body and action. Through these guṇastānas one can destroy the bandhahetus i.e. the causes of the bondage and the nirjarās. Thus, after complete destruction of the jñānāvaraṇīya karma, darśanāvaraṇīya karma, antarāya and mohanīya karmas a soul can be in his real state; that is what is called salvation in Jainism. Thus, the argument of the dvaitādvaita philosophers on the grace of the perfect souls is the cause in attaining salvation is not sound.

The objection that 'atoms as the causes of the creation is not tenable, because it creates a contingency called 'infinite regress' and so on also looks baseless. The arguments of the dvaitādvaita philosophers against the Jaina philosophers on atoms as the causes of the creation and the allied arguments related to it, is not the exact position of the Jainas. Though the Jaina philosophers maintain that atoms are the cause of the creation but do not persuade any unseen principle i.e. adṛśta to create the first motion in the atoms as pointed out by the dvaitādvaita philosopher. According to Jainism it is the very nature of the atoms i.e. 'the nature of conjunction' and 'the nature of subtraction' which creates the first motion in it. Then they combined with each other to create skandhas. In this way the whole creation comes to being. Not only this they say that these atoms are having twenty attributes in it and they are eternal. But as the
dvaitādvaita philosophers have pointed out that if the Jaina accept that atoms are the causes of the creation then they have to accept that atoms are also having form (rūpa), taste (rasa), smell (gandha) and touch (sparśa). This amounts to say that they (atoms) are non-eternal. It is not true; it is the presupposition of the Vedāntins or the Nyāya philosophers that if something is having forms and touches etc. it would be non-eternal. For the Jaina philosophy it makes no problem. Thus, the arguments of the dvaitādvaita philosophers against the Jaina philosophy are not justified in the philosophical framework of Jainism.

The whole argument of the dvaita philosophers start with the problem namely that the ‘Jagat’ i.e. universe is created by omnipotent ‘Viṣṇu’, which is objected by the Jaina philosophy, as they have accepted some eternal causes of the soul like ‘dharma’ and ‘adharama’ and some external causes like kāla, ākāśa, pudgala as the causes for the creation of the universe. In this context they have rejected the nature of the universe and the concept of soul as postulated by Jaina philosophers.

If we observed the whole analysis by Vātsāyana and his followers we notices that the argument are based on supposing the entire reality, as a whole to be eternal, which is not the position of the Jainas, as explained elsewhere. All assertions are partial from the point of view of their material substance. The substance ‘gold’ continues to exist in all modes in all modification in all time and space and hence, it is eternal. Thus, from the point of view of the
continuity of this material substance the *dravya* is called eternal and hence, no contradiction and absurdity of any kind can be noticed in *Jaina* position. The *Jainas* never said that *dravyas* or realities are eternal. On the other hand to them, from the point of view of their changing modes is transitory. It is no surprising to note that even átman is transitory from the point of view of its mode.

*Bhāsarvajña* in his *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* has criticized the authoritativeness of the *Jaina* scripture. To us, it appears that whatever arguments *Bhāsarvajña* has provided against the *Jainas* can be forwarded against the *Naiyāyika* as well logically. The only assertion that the Vedas are ‘apauruṣeya’ hence, cannot be liable to any falsehood is mere a belief and cannot be logically established. The *Naiyāyikas* have accepted along with Vedas, the validity of āpta vākya, which is the statement or expression of a trustworthy person. According to *Bhāsarvajña* validity is common to all, common to a seer as well an ordinary person. If that is true, how then one accepts the *Jaina*’s scripture as un authoritative, because they are composed by human being. It must be noted that according to *Jainas*, the scriptures are the statements of *Tirthankaras* who are identified with the āptas of the *Naiyāyikas*. From the above discussion it may be noted that the way *Bhāsarvajña* has presented rather criticized the authoritative ness of the scriptures of the *Jainas* is not adequate, because, without giving very sound and systematic arguments he has criticized the *Jaina àgamas* for the sake of mere criticism.
It may be observed that the Jaina's classification of Pramāṇa into two kinds namely pratykṣa and parokṣam is logical at least as they think. In one case the knowledge is quite independent, hence, direct. In another as for example, in the case of inference etc. they are depended on perception, hence, indirect. There is nothing wrong in holding so and any opposition to this supposition will be unjustified. And if it is further classified into anumāna i.e. inference etc. it is also all right. But the acceptance of śrīti, pratybhijñāna, tarka etc. as independent pramāṇa does not sound logical. And if the Naiyāyikas have to object, they may object these three suppositions. Thus, instead of opposing or objecting the two-fold classification of pramāṇa, what Bhāsarvajña or the Naiyāyikas would have objected to is the independent ness of their pramāṇas, which they have not done. The reason for such negligence of the logicians, which is noticed through out their text is not far to seek, which we have observed time and again.

In the context of causality it is stated that contrary to this theory of 'ekānta' if one follows anekāntavāda these practical verifiable human behaviours cannot be explained. Hence, anekānta theory of the Jaina cannot be accepted. He gives reason subscribing the view of anekānta. No causality between the agent and its result can be explained, for, in anekānta theory the doer is different and the enjoier will be different. There would not be any inclination towards taking food, for; it would not satisfying one hunger. If the king is well
fed the naked monk will have the satisfaction of eating. And if not, this will amounts to \textit{ek\=antav\=ada} not \textit{anek\=antav\=ada}.

As can be seen \textit{Bh\=asarvaj\=na} interprets \textit{anek\=anta} as lack of causality between the doer and enjoyer of any action. According to him in \textit{anek\=anta} theory doer of an action and the enjoyer of that will be different. There would not be any guiding principle if ‘a’ does an action he will attain its fruits for certain. And if he gets or if causality is established that would be \textit{ek\=antav\=ada} to the pleasure of the \textit{Nai\=y\=ayikas}. As a matter of fact, the \textit{Jainas} do not interpret \textit{anek\=anta} in this way \textit{Bh\=asarvaj\=na} has interpreted. The \textit{Jainas} always establish causality between the doer and the enjoyer and this does not affect that position of \textit{anek\=antav\=ada}. To explain, \textit{Bh\=asarvaj\=na} notes: the \textit{Jainas} have prescribed the process of attaining \textit{sambara}, \textit{nirjar\=a} and \textit{mok\=sa} and also the avoidance of \textit{\=asrava} and \textit{bandha} gradually. By employing \textit{sy\=adv\=ada} or \textit{saptabhang\=i} to this, no consistency will be maintained with regard to the performance and non-performance of the prescribe observation, because by employing \textit{sapptabhang\=i} the prescription will be \textit{sy\=ad vi\=ishi\=ta}, \textit{sy\=adavi\=ishi\=ta} etc. for both the cases viz. in case of \textit{mok\=sa} as well \textit{bandha}. This means that no distinction can be maintained between \textit{sambara}, \textit{nirjar\=a} and \textit{mok\=sa} or \textit{\=asrava} and \textit{bandha}. This is not correct. In the \textit{anek\=antav\=ada} as understood and explained by the \textit{Jainas} the theory of causality and the distinction between \textit{sambara} and \textit{nirjar\=a} etc. can be well maintained.

We may conclude the present discussion with the following observation: We are not in favour of accepting or rejecting any
doctrine of any system following the true spirit of *Jaina* theory of *anekānta* where every modal assertion or judgment are relative and conditional. Still at places where we have tried to defend the *Jainas* and offend the opponents, is just to show how the doctrines of the *Jaina* are correct in the arena of philosophical speculation in the *Jaina* philosophy only.