Chapter 3
Jaina Philosophy as presented in Vedānta system

- Jainism as Presented in Advaita Vedānta Philosophy.
- Anekāntavāda.
- Objections and arguments against Anekāntavāda.
- Answers from the Jaina point of view.
- Objection on the Jaina concept of Soul.
- Answers to the objection.
- Some remarks.
- Dvaitādvaitas’s presentation on Jaina Philosophy.
- Objections on theory of Creation.
- Objections on causes of Salvation.
- Answers to the objections from the Jaina point of view.
- Jainism as presented in Dvaita Vedānta system of Indian Philosophy.
- Jainism as presented in ViśiṣṭādvaitaVedānta system of Indian Philosophy.
- Śuddhādvaitas Presentation of Jaina Philosophy.
Introduction:

In this chapter the *Jaina* Philosophy as presented in the *Vedānta* Philosophy is critically analyzed and examined. At the outset it may be recorded that amongst the theist school of Indian Philosophy, it is the *Vedāntins* who have given due importance and considerable space for the treatment of the basic tenants of *Jaina* philosophy i.e. *Anekāntavāda*. The other tenants of the Jainas, which are also analyzed by Vedāntins, are:

1. The concept of soul.
2. Theory of creation.
3. Concept of God (*Īśvara*).

Of the *Vedānta* systems we have taken into consideration five important schools for discussion viz. *Advaita Vedānta*, *Dvaita*, *Dvaitādvaita*, *Viśiṣṭādvaita* and *Ṣuddhādvaita* *Vedānta*. The most important ground and arguments that are common to all systems of *Vedānta* is criticizing Jaina doctrine of *Anekānta*, is contradiction. All have pointed out absurdity and contradictions in the tenants of the Jainas of the arguments, which are primarily similar, though differ in expression. All have presented *jaina* doctrines with regards to the above concepts in the beginning followed by their argument to refute the *Jaina* tenants are also identical though very in details. We now present the treatment of Jaina Philosophy by *Advaitins* following the order.
Jainism As Presented In Advaita Vedānta Philosophy

Advaita vedantins also have presented the Jaina theory of Anekānta and finally have criticized it by showing contradiction in it, which we have already recorded.

In Brahmasūtra Śaṅkarabhāṣya II.2.33-36, Śankarācārya has recorded the Anekānta theory and allied problems related to it, on the context of analyzing the nature and type of reality after refuting the position of Buddhist.

Śankarācārya has criticized two basic theories to the Jainas namely (a) the theory of Anekānta on which the whole philosophy of Jainism stands (b) the concept and nature of soul of the Jainas.

For convenience we can organize our whole discussion into four parts:
A. Jainism as presented by Śankarācārya.
B. The arguments forwarded by Śankarācārya against the Jaina theory of Anekānta and the doctrine of soul.
C. An analysis of Śankarācārya's criticism.
D. Observations.

Now let us proceed to discuss following the above-mentioned arrangements.

In the presentation of Jainism and framing objections against the Jaina doctrine, my source have been the Bhāmti of Vācaśpati
Mishra on Śaṅkarabhāṣya and Kalpataru of Appaya Dīxita on it, along with the Śaṅkarabhāṣya itself.

The whole discussion from the point of view of Jainism as recorded by Śaṅkara may be reorganized in the following manner.

The Jaina postulates seven categories or Tattvas, viz. soul (jīva), non-soul (ajīva), the issuing outward (āśrava), restraint (sambarā), destruction (nirjarā), bondage (bandha) and release (mokṣa). In short these can be divided into two main categories, viz. Jīva and Ajīva.

सप्तवैशभ पदार्थांसमता जीवजीवाद्विभानिर्जयन्त्यमोक्षा नाम्।
सक्षेपतत्त्वः ह्येवपदार्थां
जीवाजीवात्त्वः।¹

To make clear this point Bhāmatikāra stated that there are two constituents, which forms the reality, viz. sentient and non-sentient i.e. jīva and ajīva respectively. Kalpatarukāra has given the description of jīva beautifully. The very nature of the jīva is going up as like a bird that goes up being freed from the case; or as the sprout getting up from the seed being sucked with the water being dissolved the mud which was pasted on it and which was kept on the button of the water. It means it goes up being freed from the state of bondage in which it was associated for a long time. He says:

उद्धोगमानं जीवस्य स्वनावः केशितु चिरकालशरीरायतस्तिमयुक्तक्रमिक्यमुक्तावृहल्ल्धमानं यथा
प्रपूज्यशुकुशल्ल्ध यथा वा वार्षिकमित्तिपरिश्रेबद्वीत्त्वः
यथा वा
द्रद्धकक्षस्तितजलनिमित्तज्ञसन्तौपक्षकालस्य शुचकालमुक्तस्य इह
वनानादिकालपृत्त
वनानादिकालपृत्त
वनानादिकालपृत्त
वनानादिकालपृत्त
वनानादिकालपृत्त
वनानादिकालपृत्त।²

Further, the jainas hold the view that there are five asthikāyas viz. jīva (soul), ajīva (non-soul), pudgala (matter),

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dharam (the medium of motion), adharma (the medium of rest) and ākāśa (space). He asserts:

तरोतिस्मयं प्रवृत्तिमात्रं भौतिकम् नाम, जीवात्मिकायो वद्धमालिकायो धर्मात्मिकायो अकाशात्मिकायो अकाशः।

These issues are further discussed by Bhāmatikāra and ParimalaIkāra as follows:

Jīvāstikāya is of three kinds viz. bonded soul or mundane soul (baddha), liberated soul (nukta) and ever liberated soul (nitya siddha). Pudgalāstikāya is of six kinds viz. four mahābhūtas i.e. earth, water, fire, air, and immovable substances (shtāvaras) and the mobile things (jaṅgamas). Dharamāstikāya is that which is understood from the principle of motion and adharmāstikāya is from the principle of rest. In other words dharamāstikāya is the principle of motion and adharmāstikāya is the principle of rest. Ākāśāstikāya is of two types viz. lokākāśa and alokāśa. Lokākāśa is that ākāśa which remains inside the two lokas, which exist in an ascending order or in other words lokākāśa exists in the space between the two lokas and above from this is alokāśa in which there is no lokas, and it is the place of salvation.

After these description of reality Bhāmatikāra and Kalpatarukāra has given the ethical division of the reality viz. āśrava, nirjarā, saṁbara and mokṣa.

According to Bhāmati āśrava, nirjarā and saṁ bara are in the form of efforts and efforts are of two folds viz. true and false. Āśrava is the false effort and saṁbara and nirjarā are the true efforts. Āśrava pursues the senses to relate or connect with objects. It means the soul gets connected with objects through the
senses and it transformed into various knowledge like tactual etc.
According to some other Jaina philosophers āśrava is nothing but
the karmic matter only. It is treated as false effort, for, being the
ground of the wrong object i.e. the other than mokṣa. Sanībāra and
nirjarā are treated as true effort because it leads to salvation. Thus,
sanībāra is that effort which is in the form of self-restraint (dama)
and mental quietness (śama) and it stops or obstructs the out
coming flows of āśrava. Gupti i.e. control over body, speech and
mind and Samiti i.e. without giving pain to other creatures and to
travel and to eat as per the minimum requirement being observed
the sun's movement. Nirjarā is the cause of vanquishing of efforts
which has been associated with the kaṣāyas i.e. the attachment of
worldly objects, kaluṣa i.e. the sinful acts and pūnya i.e. virtuous
acts since the infinite time and also it causes the soul to mount on
the hot-rock (siddhaśīlā). And ultimately it destroys completely
the enjoyment, pain and pleasure, good and evil etc.

Bandha is that which binds soul with the karmas. Thus, the
bondage is in the form of eight karmas. These eight fold karmas
can be divided into two viz. ghātikarma and aghātikarma. Ghātikarma is of four kinds viz. jñānavaranīya, darśanāvaranīya, mohaniya and aṁtarīya. Aghātikarma is also of four kinds viz. vedaniya nāmaka, gotrika and āyuṣka. Jñānavaranīya karmas are in the form of illusion (viparyaya) i.e. that knowledge it neither causes salvation nor the true nature of object can be known through it. Darśanāvaranīya karma is in the form of that salvation cannot be obtained through the practice of Arhatadarśana. Many Tīrthaṅkaras in Jaina philosophy have advised many ways and failing to comprehend the most special path out of these, for salvation is mohaniya karma. The person who wants to get salvation in having the knowledge of the obstacles of the salvation in aṁtarīya karma. These four karmas are called ghātikarma, because of these karmas the real intention (śreya) is destroyed.

Mokṣa is the upper word movement of the soul being detached or liberate from the principle of the motion (dharma) and the Principe of rest (adharma). But according to some Jaina philosopher when soul exists in the highest state only in the stage of bliss of knowledge, which is not covered by any impression i.e. the complete destruction of all miseries or sorrows is called liberation.
The prime objection of Śaṅkara is against the postulation of Anekānta theory, called syādvāda which are as follows:

(a) In certain sense it is (syādasti)
(b) In certain sense it is not (syādnāsti)
(c) In certain sense it is and it is not (syādasti nāsthi ca)
(d) In certain sense it inexpressible (syādavyaktavya)
(e) In certain sense it is and it is inexpressible (syādasti avyaktavyaśca)
(f) In certain sense it is not and it is inexpressible (syādnāsthi avyaktavyaśca)
(g) In certain sense it is, it is not and it is inexpressible (syādasti nāsti avyaktavyaśca)

The other objections of Śaṅkara is about the size of the soul:

Unlike the other systems of Indian philosophy, the Jainas postulate that size of the soul as equal to the size of the body, it occupies and it has infinite parts or limbs and therefore it could expand and contract. The soul has no definite size. Thus, when it animates the bodies of an infant or youth it has that size, when it occupies the bodies of horses of elephants it gets the respective sizes by successive expansion and dilation like gas, it fully occupies the entire body, which animates for the time being. Though the size of a particular soul changes form depending on the size of its locus still it is eternal. It simply means that the permanency of the final sizes of the soul which it has at the time of release.
In this way Śaṅkara has presented the Jaina position. Before going to see the objections and arguments of Śaṅkara against the Jaina doctrine, a remark on their presentation or their faithfulness or otherwise is in order. As can be seen, Śaṅkara, Vācaspatimishra and Appaya Dixit putting together have presented the jaina doctrines faithfully without any bias. It can even be said in appreciation of their presentation that one can read Jainism on the basis of their presentation, which we have shown, by drawing comparison to the Vedāntins presentation with some original texts of Jainas.

Let me now record the objection of Śaṅkara against the Jainas. Following are the prime objections raised by the Śaṅkara:

**Objection: 1.** In one substance it is not possible that contradictory qualities should exist simultaneously i.e. the very expression of 'syādasti nāsti ca' is contradictory in nature. Śaṅkara makes this point clear by giving some example. An object cannot be hot or cold at the same time or light and darkness cannot be resided in one place at the same time.

न ह्राक्ष्मन् धर्मिणि युगपत्तसत्तवादि विरूद्धमितस्मादेश्व सम्भविति। शीतोष्णवत् ।

**Objection: 2.** Following the theory of Ariekānta no judgement can be made for certain and all our assertions would be probable. Thus making room for ambiguity and doubt and if everything is probable then what about the doctrine of the Jaina. Are they probable or definite? If they are not definite how are the followers going to accept those?

नन्वनेकालमके वस्तिवति निधीरिति रूपमेव ज्ञान संसारयज्ञानादर्शमाण महितमहिलि।
Objection: 3. The term ‘avyaktavya in the fourth of the seven bhaṅgas is meaningless by its nature. Because if the nature of object is inexpressible how do the Jainas talk about the reality itself?

एवं सति वर्ग प्रामाणभूत संस्तृतंकर प्रमाण प्रमेय प्रामाण्य प्रमित्यनिन्धिक्षातु पदेषु शास्त्रयास्। 18

Objection: 4. On the nature and size of soul Śaṅkara has formulated the following objections:

(a) Since the soul is of limited size and subject to change hence, it could not be eternal and it cannot be omnipresent. To clarify, the bodies of the different classes of creatures are of different sizes. The soul of a man taking the body of an elephant on account of its past deeds will not able to fill up the body of an elephant. Similarly the soul of an elephant will not have sufficient space in the body of an ant or the soul of a child or youth being smaller in size will not be able fill completely the body of a grown up man unless they change their sizes. Thus the soul has to be ‘anitya’.

शरीरपरिमाणां च सत्यासूत्रसंस्तृतं परिवर्त्तमाणां आत्मेत्यतः घटादिव्यतिनिस्त्रावत्वम् प्रसङ्गेऽपि। 19

(b) To the classification by Jainas that the soul is having infinite parts and therefore it could expand or contract, the advaitins argued: could these infinite parts be in the same place or not? If they could then all the parts must be in the same place and could not expand into a big body. Therefore, Jainas have no right to assume that a soul has infinite limbs. What is the proof to justify the view that a body of limited size contains an infinite number of particles?
(c) Jainas clarification that the soul is really of indefinite size means that whenever the soul enters into body having bigger size some particles accede to it and some withdraw from it when it enters to a body having smaller size. Therefore by successive expansion and dilation to, like the air or the light, it fully occupies to the entire body which animates for the time being. To this, Śaṅkara would say that even in this case Jaina philosophers cannot get over the objection and the soul would be liable to change and consequently would not be eternal. Since the soul is not eternal there is no question of liberation and rebirth.

(d) If the limbs of the soul can be increased or decreased depending on the respective locus than how could it be different in nature from the body. So one of the limbs only can be the soul, how do they determine whence do the limbs of the soul come? Where do they take rest etc? They cannot spring from the material elements and re-enter because the soul is eternal.

(e) From their thesis that soul has a definite and eternal size at the state of release it follows that its initial size and its intervening size must be permanent. Therefore, there is no difference between the size of soul in different states or stages. There is no
peculiarity or difference according to the *Jainas* between the state of release and the mundane state.


tadtu paurvavardhānāh | jīvaparināmnāh nityatvaḥ prārusmaśāt svātuḥ. eka śāhī

parimāṇād vṛṣṭaḥ sphuṭṭī tadāraṇārthamasti. adbhva anityasājīvparimānasya

avsthitvāt paurvavardhānāsvabhāvānābhināmātthaparimāṇāḥ eva jīva svātuḥ.\(^{23}\)

Thus, the soul must be regarded as being always of the same size whether minute or infinite and not of the varying size of the body. Therefore, the Jaina doctrine of the soul and *anekānta* theory is untenable and inadmissible and hence stands refuted.

We have formulated in the foregoing pages the arguments and the objections of Šāṅkara, which are basically grounded on two major aspects. One is contradiction, second is absurdity. Let us now see to what extent those arguments stand justified on the light of *anekānta* theory of Jainas.

Now the main contention of Šāṅkara is contradiction arising from the expression in the third of the alternative viz. 'syādasti nāsti ca' which is just quoted. To clarify, Šāṅkara thinks: if something 'is' i.e. exist how it 'is not' i.e. non-existence. Thus assertion of the *Jainas* is nothing but absurd leading to contradiction. The *jainas* answer to this objection of contradiction is simple which will be clear from the analysis of third assertion itself.

The classification proposed in the *syādvāda* theory is dialectical and not ontological. It simply suggests that the reality can be verbalized in seven different ways viewing it from different angle of different aspects of reality. In one and the same moment all aspects of reality cannot be expressed, for, the reality is so dynamic to be brought under one and encompassed by one.
Individual intention only presents one-sided view of reality, which served a single aspect of reality. Hence, there is no contradiction in the \textit{Jaina} theory of relativity of manifoldness. On the basis of the expression given by the speaker or listener uses on a particular aspect of reality. When it is said 'the pot is' in the sense of existence, the user wants to emphasize on the \textit{dravyatva} i.e. the continual aspects of a pot and when it is said 'the pot is not', the emphasize in on the \textit{paryāya} aspect of reality. Further, on the basis of spatio-temporal limitation the expression 'the pot is' and 'the pot is not' is also valid. There is no contradiction, whatsoever which can be pointed out in the \textit{Jaina} theory of relativity. In no point of time the \textit{Jainas} say that a reality delimited by the spacio-temporal relation and delimited by one and same aspect i.e. 'a thing is' and 'is not' in the third alternative expression, the expression of the reality is delimited by two different entity.

The \textit{Brahmasūtra} reads "\textit{naikasminasambhavāt}" to mean it is not possible to predicate positivity and negativity i.e. \textit{āstītvā} and \textit{nāstītvā} to one and the same object due to impossibility and non-applicability. The \textit{Jainas} also favour the same idea that contradictory characteristics cannot be attributed to one and the same reality delimited by the quality of continuation which is one aspect of the reality and 'is not' i.e. non-existent is qualified by the quality of change which also is the essential aspect of reality. And making a singular assertion of the reality in the form of either 'it is' or 'it is not' would amounts to concealing or suppressing the real nature of reality. Thus, there is no contingency of any kind in the \textit{Jaina} theory or relativity is the conclusion of \textit{Jainas}. 

192
As regards the objection to the fourth alternative viz. "syādavyaktavya" it may be pointed out that the concept of inexpressibility should be differentiated from 'avyapadesya' concept as elaborated by Nyāyasūrabhāṣya (I.1.4) or from the 'avyaktavya' of the Vedāntins with regards to the nature of Brahman. The Jainas do not propose that the reality cannot be verbalized. In fact such a view will go against the supposition of the theory of relativity, which is dialectical and verbalizes the experiences of the reality. What the Jainas propose in this 'bhaṅgas' is that the attribution of two or more contradictory properties or aspects in a single expression is not possible. In other words, 'syādavyaktavya' means the inexpressibility of an expression of experience of existence and the non-existence of a reality in a particular place and time delimited by one and the same property. For example, it is not possible to verbalize the cognition of a pot as being present and absent in a particular space and time as delimited either the aspects of continuity or the aspect of change alone. Thus, one cannot have an expression like 'pot exist delimited by this place and that time delimited further by substanteness, (looking from the point of view of dravyattva of reality) and the pot does not exist being delimited by the above mentioned delimiters like the same place, the same time and the same properties. This is the meaning of the term 'avyaktavya'. Thus, the objection that nothing can be verbalized or the realities are inexpressible as posed by the Vedāntins is misleading and based on the wrong interpretation of the concept 'avyaktavya' which is not intended by the Jainas.
As to the objection regarding the size of the soul the Jainas have a practical and empirical approach to it. They feel that it is convenient to assume the size of the soul as limited pervaded by the individual, occupied in a given time. The objection that due to the identical size of the various sizes of soul in various states like the stages of the bondage and the liberation the distinction between bondage and liberation cannot be maintained is not true. The Jainas are arguing that it is not the size that is responsible or in the cause of bondage or liberation but the qualities that soul possesses. When the soul is devoid of karmas it is liberated and when associated with karmas it is bounded. Size has no role to play in this regard.

Further, the objection regarding the soul that it will be transitory or subject to destruction it being of limited size does not sound logical to the Jaina logicians. To them eternality or transitoriness or a reality is not dependent on its size but its nature. The Jainas are true followers of the rebirth theory. To them the soul is eternal irrespective of its size. It is the presupposition of the Vedântins or the logicians that if some reality is on limited size, it is subject to destruction, which is not acceptable to the Jainas. The Jainas argued that a thing is eternal judging from the point of view of its continuity and transitory from the aspect of its change. For the Jainas 'dhrauvyâ' i.e. the continuity and 'vyaya' i.e. change and 'upâta' i.e. emergence is the real nature of each and every reality. When soul takes or fits into different bodies having different sizes like the body of elephant or the body of an ant what happens is that the size and the shape is changed but not the essential nature of the
soul. Thus, it is illogical to argue that the soul will be transitory i.e. anity if is accepted as to be the size of body it resides.

In conclusion it can be observed that the Jaina approach towards the reality is more practical. The Jainas' 'anekānta' theory is grounded on the prime supposition that realities are so dynamic and it is very difficult to encompass of its absolute nature in a single judgement. Hence, all the assertions in the form of judgement are partial truth, which reveals a single aspect of reality where the other aspects are suppressed for the present time. Jainas classifications of seven 'bhaṅgas' are dialectical and are not to be confused with ontological classifications. The Jain concept of 'avyaktavya' should be differentiated from 'avyapadesya' of logicians and 'avyaktavya' concept of Vedāntins. The concept of 'nityatva' is relative as is understood differently by the Jainas from the others. The dialectical analysis of relativity is more practical and nearer to reality to reveal the real nature to it.
Dvaitādvaitas' presentation on Jaina Philosophy:

Nimbārkācārya is the founder of Dvaitādvaita school of Vedānta philosophy. In Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya of Nimbārkācārya i.e. Vedānta Pārijāta Saurabha II. 2.33 to 36, Nimbārkācārya, the founder of dvaitādvaita school of Vedānta has recorded the theory of Anekānta and allied problems related to it, on the context of analyzing the nature and type of reality after refuting the Buddhist.

Nimbārkācārya has criticized four basic theories of the Jainas, viz. (i) the theory of Anekāntavāda on which the whole philosophy of Jainaism stands, (ii) the theory of creation and (iii) the causes of salvation (iv) the concept and nature of soul of the Jainas.

We can organize the whole discussion in four heads:

a) Jainism as presented by the Dvaitādvaita philosophers.
b) The arguments forwarded by the Dvaitādvaita philosophers against the Jaina philosophy.
c) An analysis of their criticism against the Jaina philosophy.
d) Observation.

Let us now proceed to discuss the aforesaid problems following the above-mentioned arrangements.

In the presentation of Jainism and framing the objections against the Jaina doctrine, our source have been the Vedānta Pārijāta Saurabha, the Bhāṣya of Nimbārkācārya, Śrīnivāsa's Vedānta Kaustubha and the Vedānta Kaustubha Prabhā of Keśava Kāśmira Bhaṭṭa.
The whole discussion from the point of view of Jainism as recorded by the Dvaitādvaita philosophers may be reorganized in the following manner.

The Jainā philosophers hold that the universe comprises souls (jīva) and non-souls (ajīva), and is without a lord. They also maintain that atoms are the causes of the world.

They imagine couple of contradictory attributes like existence and non-existence, in all the categories. Thus according to them, there are seven categories, summing up all the scriptural teachings, viz. soul, its stoppage, freedom from decay, bondage and release.

Among these, the souls are sentient, and endowed with the attributes of knowledge, perception, happiness and strength. Thus, knowledge means the apprehension of the real nature of objects through the right discrimination between the soul and the non-soul. Perception means cognizing objects, being free from attachment and detachment. The souls in bondage have worldly happiness, while the freed souls have the happiness, which inheres in them. Likewise strength means proper endurance. The souls are possessed of parts and are the size of the body. Among them, some are souls in bondage some are freed souls, some are ever perfect. The freed souls are omniscient and possessed of unsurpassed happiness.
The non-soul is the group of objects to be enjoyed by the souls. It is divided into merit, demerit, matter, time and space. Thus, merit (dharma) is special kind of substance, inferable from proper actions. Demerit (adharma) is the cause of the existence of the non-freed souls. Matter is a substance possessed of colour, smell, taste and touch. It is of two kinds viz. atoms and their aggregates. The atoms are the causes of the earth and the rest. And they are not of four kinds as hold by the logicians, but identical in nature. The distinctions of the earth and the rest are due to the modifications of these atoms. The four-fold elements beginning with the earth as well as the body, the worlds and so on, are their aggregates.

Time on the other hand is a special kind of substance, which is the cause of the conventional distinctions of long, quick and fast and so on and is atomic in form. Space is the absence of covering. It is of two kinds, viz. worldly space, which in mundane and non-worldly space, which is the abode of freed soul. Influx means the activity of the sense organs, which causes a person to know sense objects. Or else, influx means Karma that compiles to i.e. follows after, pervading the agent i.e. pertains to him. Stoppage means that which stops, the activities of the sense organs, i.e. the stoppage of the sense organs, consisting in a deep meditation.
Third Chapter

Freedom from decay means that which destroys the prior accumulated sins i.e. austerities known from the teaching of the arhatas, consisting in non-bathing, non-speaking, squatting on the things with the lower legs crossed over each other, eating what is spit out from the mouth, mounting on heated stone, plucking out the hairs on the head and so on.

Bondage means Karma and is of eight kinds. Among these, there are four destructive Karmas, viz. relating to the obscuration of knowledge, relating to the mental blindness of perception, relating to delusion and relating to what hinders, which obstruct the attributes of the attributes of the souls, viz. knowledge, perception, happiness and strength. And there are four non-destructive Karmas viz. relating to the knowable, relating to the name, relating to family descent and relating to life, which are the causes of the body, its sense of igodity, regard and disregard for the happiness and the rest due there to. On the cessation of bondage, there is salvation or the manifestation of the natural and real nature of the soul through the grace of the ever-perfect Arhatas.

They have also a set of different categories, consisting in five ontological categories (astikāyās) viz. the category of soul, the category of matter, the category of merit, the category of demerit.
and the category of space. The term ontological category is denotive of conventional objects occupying many places.\(^{33}\)

To all these, they apply the system of seven parallelisms i.e. *saptabhangī-nayas*.

The aggregate of the seven dialectical formulas is *saptabhangi*, it's reasoning i.e. *saptabhanginaya*. The word 'may' (syād) is an indeclinable represented by a verbal ending and should be understood to have the meaning of little ness. Thus, it is to be construed, as it exists partly and does not exist partly and so on. The sense is this, the whole mass of object consisting of substances and modifications are variable. The form of the substance being one, permanent and conceivable as existent, existence, oneness, permanence and the rest are justifiable in reference to it. The modifications are the particular states of the substance having the form of pots, pieces of cloth and the rest and they being many non-permanent and conceivable as non-existent, non-existence, non-permanence and the rest are justifiable in reference to them.

\(^{34}\)

On this contention of the *Jainas*, the *Dvaitādvaita* philosophers maintain: this is not correct. The sevenfold reasoning,
like partly existent, partly non-existent and the rest, is not possible in one object. The simultaneous co-existence of darkness and light is never seen or heard. In the same manner, couples of contradictory attributes like existence and non-existence and so on are indeed impossible in the same place.

अत्र दुम, नैवं वात्यम्। एकस्यन्त पदार्थं किचिदकसि किचिदस्तिसि हत्यादि
सवर्मवहुकर्षसंभवत। न हि तमप्रकाशयोऽऽपदकाशतोपलयः दृष्टः श्रुतम् थात।
एवमेकत्रकस्तत्वसितासितादिविकादधमःस्वस्ससम्भव एव।\textsuperscript{35}

The Dvaitādvaita philosophers forwards further argument to support their position: If the Jainas say that a thing exists by its own form, i.e. a pot exists by its own form but it does not exist in the form of cloth, then no knowledge will be possible. Since, there is no specialty with regards to seven-fold logic in each and every entity. Simply we have to accept that things exist by its own form. If we do not accept it, then no knowledge will arise and you will be always in doubt.\textsuperscript{36}

They provide a further argument thus: Jainas hold that 'everything exists with regards to Anekāntavāda' is a definite knowledge. Now, whether this definite knowledge is definite or probable? If everything is probable your mokṣa will be probable. And if it is not definite then no one will be persuaded to follow your philosophy, where, nothing is definite, including the sole objective namely, mokṣa. In the absense of definite knowledge where will come the pravrtis towards it. This will lead to the fact that whatever scriptures are written by your Tīrthaṅkaras will be meaningless or nonsensical talk.\textsuperscript{37}

Further, he provides a couple of arguments to refute the Jainas' argument namely that 'atoms are the causes of the creation'.

201
First of all, whether atoms are possessed of part or not? If they were possessed of parts this would amount to the fault of an infinite regress, and conversely if without parts then it will be impossible for them (atoms) to be the producer of other evolutes. Thus, there is inconsistency in the origin of the binary compounds from the atoms. And there is all the more inconsistency in the origin of ternary compounds from these binary compounds. Like this, everything admitted by the exponents of the atomic view is inconsistent.

सावधानःनवस्थाप्राप्तगतिरवर्धते परिमाणान्तरत्यादक्षणाशास्त्रात् परमाणुपरं
द्वृत्तत्वतन्तरसामालस्यं तेषांत्यापुरुषोपयोगस्य सुतरामसामग्रिजस्य
ततुतः परमाणुकारणवायुस्यं यत् सन्यमाभ्यासं भवति ।

In addition to it, he further says, because it is impossible for the unseen principle (adṛṣṭa) to inhere in the atoms, as well as because it is impossible for it being connected with the soul, to be the instigator of the motion of the atoms. Thus, even in both ways, the first motion of the atoms is not possible. Hence, there will be absence of the creation of the world through the successive order of binary compound and the rest, due to conjunction, which again is due to the motion of the atoms.

अद्वृत्तत् परमाणुपुरुषतवास्मृतब्रह्मादाय समन्तविन्वतिः परमाणुगत
कर्मफलकतवास्मित्ववेदनेवपुरुषायः कर्म परमाणुगतं नस्मृतस्य: कर्मनिन्यान
संयोगपूर्वकद्वृत्ततवास्माकधिष्ठितां जगदुद्भवस्यात् ।

To complement it further the dvaitādvaitins say, on account also of the admission of the relation of inherence, the doctrine of atoms is not possible, since just as a binary compound is connected with its own cause by the relation of inherence, being absolutely different therefrom, so the relation of inherence itself, too, is to be
connected with the two related objects, by another relation of inherence, absolute difference from the two related objects, being the same, that too, by another relation and so on, creating an occasion for the fault of an infinite regress.

Further, he provides another argument that, if the atoms are admitted to be active by nature, then there being eternal activity alone, there cannot be dissolution. If they are admitted to be inactive by nature, there being eternal inactivity alone, the absence of creation will necessarily result. Thus, the atomic theory is untenable.

Then he gives final argument by asserting that since the effects are possessed of colour etc. the atoms, too, are admitted to be possessed of colour and so on. Thus, the four kinds of atoms are possessed of colour and so on i.e. possessed of colour, taste, smell and touch, non-eternity results, as pot and the rest, possessed of colour and so on are found to be non-eternal. If they are not admitted to be possessed of colour and the like, then the fact that the effects are possessed of colour and so on will come to be contradicted and the initial proposition namely that 'possessed of parts and eternal' too will come to be contradicted. For this reason too, there is the absence of creation. The sense is that an unseen object cannot be determined in accordance with what is seen. Hence the cause of the world is to be understood in accordance with scripture.
To complement it, he says: if the atoms are possessed of more numerous qualities, then the earth, water, fire and air will become similar. If they be possessed of less numerous qualities i.e. each are possessed of its peculiar quality then, too, all the different kinds of atoms being connected with one quality each, the earth and the rest too, having qualities corresponding to their causes, must be connected with one quality each.

In this way they have refuted the views of the Jaina philosophers on theory of creation, that the 'atoms are the causes of the creation'. In the same manner, they have pointed out further that if the Jainas will accept anekāntavāda then their hypothesis of five ontological categories i.e. pañcāstikāya stands invalid, because the number 'five' is not definite. It may be increased or decreased.

The Jainas may find the same fault with the dvaitādvaitins by pointing out contradictions in their theory. In Veda or Vedānta itself, too, admits couples of contradictory attributes in one and the same substratum. For example, in the text 'sarvamkhalvidaṃ Brahmaṇa' i.e. all this verily is Brahma (cha.Upa.3. 14. 1.) unitary is established. While in the texts 'pradhāna kṣetrajña patirguṇesāh' i.e. the lord of matter and soul, the controller of the guṇas
(śve.Upa. 6. 16.), dvā suvarṇā sayujā śākhāyāḥ' two birds are seated in a golden branch (mun.Upa. 3. 1. 1./śve.Upa. 4. 6.) plurality is established.

The answer of the dvaitādvaitins is that those statements are based on scripture; hence, their validity cannot be doubted. Thus, it being impossible for the entire universe, consisting of the sentient and the non-sentient, to be non-different from Brahman by nature, it is non-different from Him only as having its existence and activity under His control and not by nature as indicated by the phrase 'sarvaṃkhalvidam Brahman' 'tajjalān' Cha.Upa. 3. 14. 1.) i.e. emanating from him and so on. But there is indeed a difference of nature between the categories viz. the sentient, the non-sentient and Brahman. Because the texts designated duality, too, are no less authoritative, just as leaves, flowers and the rest are different by nature from the tree and are not different from it on account of having no separate existence. And just as in spite of the difference of the sense organs from the vital-breath by nature, their non-difference from it, as being under its control, similar is the case with the statements showing contradictins. In the same manner the difference and non-difference between the universe and Brahman are natural and established in scripture and smṛti. There is no contradiction between them. In the very same manner, the complementary passage confirms the relation of difference- non-difference between the universe and Brahman. The phrase emanating from Him (tajjalān) is denotative of the reason, because it emanated from that supreme cause (tajjalān, disappears in Him
and breathes i.e. acts in Him (tadena). The elision of the parts is accordance with Vedic use.

Thus, a single cause of the world being established by correct evidence, the causality of a plurality of atoms doesn't stand to reason, because that would involve unnecessary combrousness and also because causality is impossible on their parts, adding to their non-sentence. Further they criticized the Jaina argument namely that one can attain salvation by the grace of the perfect souls (i.e. Siddhas). They say: How, the one reality, knowable from the Veda, being the giver of salvation to result from the grace of the perfect souls, that being impossible. Does the grace of the perfect souls depend on meditation or not? It the first then, salvation cannot arise through the meditation on one perfect soul among many perfect souls of the same nature, for there will be the fault of disregarding many other equally perfect souls. It there is meditation on all that would involve unnecessary complication. If
it is argued that there is one great soul higher than the others, then you fall in with a theistic view. On the second alternative, the consequence would be a universal release. Moreover, there being no evidence of direct perception and the rest for the existence of perfects, it is impossible that salvation can result from their grace.\textsuperscript{46}

Further, \textit{dvaitādvaita} philosophers criticize the Jaina view regarding the size of the soul as equal to the size of the body. They say that as their (Jainas) view is open to the objection that contradictory attributes are impossible on the part of one and the same substratum, similarly, their view that the soul is of the size of body, too, is open to serious objections. When the soul, which is of the size of the body of an ant, attains the body of an elephant through the influence of its \textit{karmas}, then there must be 'non-entirety' on its part i.e. it would not be able to fill up the whole of the elephant's body. And when the soul comes out of the body of the elephant and enters into a small body, it would fail to be small like it.

\begin{quote}
तन्मते यथौक्तिचिन्तित्वादिशिं विरूपितं भीमवर्ज्जनं दोष। एवं तदस्मते देहपरिभाषणे जीविति
दोषस्ति। देहपरिभाषण आत्मा कर्मवाणीश्रीलिङ्गपारिश्चरीर विहाय गुणश्रीरं यदान्तोति तत्ता
तस्याकारस्वयं स्वातः। गजाकारदेहाहारिः निर्णितस्य चातमः सुवश्चारीरे प्रविष्टस्य
तदनुरुच्च सुभव्यत्वं न स्वादिश्यधर्म।
\end{quote}

They provide a further argument against the \textit{Jainas} view on the same context, that 'the soul is possessed of parts'. There is an increment of its parts in the body of an elephant and decrement in a small body. Thus, on account of modification there is no contradiction. They say that 'this cannot be maintained'. Because, on account of change and the rest i.e. because there will then result faults like change and the rest. If the body were possessed of parts,
on your view then it must be mutable like the body and the rest and also non-eternal. Such other faults also would arise.

Again they criticize the argument of the *Jaina* philosophers on the same issue namely that the size as well as the real nature which the soul attains during its state of salvation, after the destruction of the final body, are eternal. At that time there is no assumption of a subtle or gross body by the soul. So there is no contraction or expansion of its. Thus, on account of permanency of the final size as well as of the real nature of the soul, the permanency of both the initial and intervening size, too, must be so. Then, there must be non-distinction everywhere. In short, the soul must have a permanent and constant size in a gross body as well as in a subtle body, in its bondage as well as in its state of release. And the doctrine that, it is of size of body must be but a childish prattle. Thus, this notion of the soul cannot be accepted.

In this way the *dvaitādvaita* philosophers have presented the *Jaina* position. Before going to see the objections and arguments of *dvaitādvaita* philosophers against the *Jaina* doctrine, a remark on
their presentation or their faithfulness or otherwise is in order. As can be seen, Nimbārkācārya, Śrīnivāsācārya and Keśavakāsmirabhatṭa putting together have presented the Jaina doctrines faithfully without any bias. It can even be said in appreciation for their presentation that one can read Jainism on the basis of their presentation, which we have shown by drawing comparison to the Vedāntins' presentation with some original texts of the Jainas by putting them side by side in the foot notes.

Let me now summarized again the objections of the dvaitādvaita philosophers against the Jainas. Their arguments are mainly concerned with four major issues viz. on the reality i.e. regarding Anekāntavāda, on the creation i.e. the causes of the creation, on the soul i.e. its nature and size, and finally on salvation i.e. cause of the salvation. Following are the prime objections raised by the dvaitādvaita Vedāntins against the Jaina philosophy:

Objection on the reality and Anekāntavāda:

Objection 1: In one substratum it is not possible that contradictory qualities should exist simultaneously, i.e. the very expression of 'syādasti nāsti ca' in the third alternative of the sevenfold logic is contradictory in nature. They make this point clear by giving an example that light and darkness cannot be resided in one place at the same time.

Objection 1. ii.: Following the theory of anekānta, no judgement can be made for certain and all our assertions would probable, thus, making room for ambiguity and doubt. If everything is probable
then what about the doctrine of the Jainas? Are they probable or
definite? They cannot be definite, if they are probable then the
scriptures written by the Tirthaṅkaras will be meaningless talk
(unmāda pralāpa) and no one will go to attain the salvation.

Objections regarding the creation:

Objection 2: Atoms are not the causes of the creation because, if
you will accept it then the problem will arise whether atoms are
possessed of part or not? If they are possessed of parts then there
will result an infinite regress and if without parts then it will be
impossible for them to be the producer of other evolutes. Thus,
there is inconsistency in the origin of the binary compounds from
the atoms. And there is all the more inconsistency in the origin of
ternary compounds from these binary compounds. Like this the
atomic view is inconsistency.

Objection 2. ii.: It is impossible for the unseen principle (adṛśta) to
inhere in the atoms as well as it is impossible for it, connected with
the soul, to be the instigator of the motion of the atoms. Thus,
resorting to either of the alternatives the first motion of the atoms
is not possible. Hence, there will be absence of the creation of the
world through the successive order of binary compound and the
rest.

Objection 2. iii.: On account of the admission of the relation of
inherence (samavāya) the doctrine of atoms is not possible. Since,
just as the relation of inherence connects a binary compound with
its own cause, being absolutely different therefrom, so the relation
of inherence itself, too, is to be connected with the two related objects by another relation of inherence. Its absolute difference from the two related objects, being the same that, too, by another relation and so on. Thus, there will be an infinite regress.

**Objection 2. iv.:** If the atoms are admitted to be active by nature, then there being eternal activity alone, there cannot be dissolution. If they are admitted to be inactive by nature, there being eternal inactive alone, the absence of creation will necessarily result. Thus, the atomic theory is untenable.

**Objection 2. v.:** Since the effects are possessed of colour etc. the atoms, too, are admitted to be possessed of colour and so on. Thus, the four kinds of atoms are possessed of colour and so on i.e. possessed of colour, taste, smell, and touch, non-eternity results, as pot and the rest, possessed of colour and so on are found to be non-eternal. If they are not admitted to be possessed of colour and the like, then the fact that the effects are possessed of colour and so on will come to be contradicted and the initial proposition i.e. 'though the atoms are possessed of parts still eternal' will come to be contradicted. For this reason, there is the absence of creation. This means an unseen object cannot be determined in accordance with what is seen. Hence, the cause of the world is to be understood in accordance with scripture.

**Objection 2. vi.:** If the atoms are possessed of more numerous qualities, then the earth, water, fire, and air will become similar. If
they are possessed of less numerous qualities i.e. each are possessed of its peculiar quality then, too, all the different kinds of atoms being connected with one quality each, the earth and the rest, too, having qualities corresponding to their causes, must be connected with one quality each.

Objection regarding the Salvation:

Objection 3: Grace of the perfect souls (i.e. siddhas) results the salvation is not possible. Because, does the grace of the perfect souls depend on meditation or not? If yes, then salvation cannot arise through the meditation on one perfect soul among many perfect souls of the same nature. For there will be fault of disregarding many other equally perfect souls. If it is said that there is one great soul higher then the other, then you fall in with a theist view. If no, the consequence would be a universal release. Moreover, there being no evidence of direct perception and the rest for the existence of perfect souls, it is impossible that salvation can result from their grace.

Objection regarding the soul:

Objection 4: If the size of the soul is equal to the size of the body then it leads us to a contingency namely 'non-entirety'. If the body of an ant attains the body of an elephant through the influence of its karmas then there must be 'non-entirety' on its part i.e. it would not be able to fill up the whole of the elephant's body. And when the soul comes out of the body of the elephant and enters into a small body, it would fail to be small like it.
Objection 4. ii.: 'Soul is possessed of parts and it takes some modification when it goes from one body to another' cannot be possible. Because if the soul be possessed of parts and it takes some modification then it must be mutable like the body and the rest and also non-eternal and other such faults would arise.

Objection 4. iii.: The size of the soul and its real nature which the soul attains during the state of salvation, after the destruction of the final body are eternal. At that time there is no assumption of a subtle or gross body by the soul, is not possible. Because, if it will be so, then you cannot distinct or discriminate between the soul of bondage state and the soul of release state. In short, the soul must have a permanent and constant size in a gross body as well as in a subtle body in its bondage as well as in its state of release. And the doctrine that it is of the size of body must be a childish prattle.

We have formulated in the foregoing pages the arguments and objections of the dvaitâdvaita philosophers against the Jaina philosophy. Let us now see to what extent those arguments stand justified on the light of Jaina's theory and doctrine.

The answer to most of the objections recorded here can be found in our discussion/presentation of the Jaina Philosophy in the Advaita Vedânta, where we have tried to answer their objection for the Jaina point of view.

As to the objection "grace of the perfect souls (i.e. siddhas) results the salvation is not possible", to this our answer is that this is not the exact position of the Jainas, as quoted by the
\textit{dvaitādvaita} philosophers. Though the Jaina philosophers hold that the grace of the perfect souls may helpful to attain salvation, but it is not the sole cause to get it. On the contrary for salvation the Jaina philosophers have prescribed fifteen \textit{gūnastānas} along with severe penance, in mind, body and action. Through these \textit{gūnastānas} one can destroy the \textit{bandhahetus} i.e. the causes of the bondage and the \textit{nirgarās}. Thus after complete destruction of the \textit{jñānāvaraṇīya karma, darśanāvaraṇīya karma, antarāya} and \textit{mohaniya karmas}, a soul can be in his real state that is what is called salvation in Jainism. Thus, the argument of the \textit{dvaitādvaita} philosophers on the grace of the perfect souls is the cause in attaining salvation is not sound.

To the objection that "atoms are the causes of the creation is not tenable, because it creates a contingency called infinite regress" and so on also is base less. As we have quoted, just before, the arguments of the \textit{dvaitādvaita} philosophers against the Jaina philosophers on atoms are the causes of the creation and the allied arguments related to it, it is not the exact proposition of the Jaina philosophers maintain that atoms are the cause of the creation but they do not persuade any unseen principle (\textit{adrṣṭa}) to create the first motion in the atoms as pointed out by the \textit{dvaitādvaita} philosophers. According to Jainism it's the very nature of the atoms i.e. 'the nature of conjunction' and 'the nature of subtraction', which creates the first motion in it. Then they combined with each other to create \textit{skandhas}. In this way the whole creation is created. Not only this, they say that these atoms are having twenty attributes in it and they are eternal. But as the
dvaitādvaita philosophers have pointed out that they accept that atoms are the causes of the creation then they have to accept that atoms are also having form (ṛūpa), taste (rasa), smell (gandha) and touch (sparśa), which amounts to say that they (atoms) are non-eternal. Because it is not true, it is the presupposition of the Vedāntins or the Nyāya philosophers that if something is having forms and touches etc. are subject to non-eternity. For the Jaina philosophy it makes no problem. Thus, the arguments of the dvaitādvaita philosophers against the Jaina philosophy are not justified in the philosophical framework of Jainism.

In addition to our observation made earlier regarding the Jaina theory the following may be added from the point of view of the Dvaitādvaita Vedānta Philosophy.

(a) Jaina approach on salvation is very much practical and it depends on the practice of server penance and good activities of the Jīvas, not depends only on the grace of the god or the perfect souls (siddhas) as hold by many systems.

(b) The arguments of the Jinas on atoms are the causes of the creation look more scientific than others.
Jainism as presented in Dvaita Vedānta system of Indian philosophy:

Madhvanātha (1228 AD.), the founder of dvaita vedānta system of philosophy, recorded the Jaina view regarding the real and the soul. While commenting upon the Brahmasūtra II.2.33-34, he has recorded various arguments of the Jainas, particularly those arguments of non-absolutism (anekāntavāda) and the soul, its states and nature etc.

Here, we have taken into consideration the whole system of dvaita vedānta philosophy starting from Madhvācārya's Pūrṇaprajñā bhasya along with Padmanābhātārthī's Sattarakadīpāvalī, Tattvaprakāśikā of Jayatīrtha, Tattvapradīpi of Trivikrama, Gurvarthadīpikā of Vādirājatīrtha, Raghuvattomatīrtha's Bhāvabodha, Rāghavendraṭīrtha's Bhāvadīpi of Vākyārthamuktāvalī of Tāṃrapāṇi Śrīnīvāsa, pāṇdurārī Śrīnīvāsa's Tattvabodhini, Śrīnīvāsatīrtha's Vākyārthavivaraṇa and Vākyārthamaṇḍarī of Śrisarkarā Śrīnīvāsa.

For convenience, we organized the whole discussion of the Dvaita philosophers into four parts.

(a) Jainism As presented in the Dvaita system of philosophy.
(b) The arguments forwarded by the Dvaita philosophers against the Jaina's view.
(c) An analysis of their arguments or Criticism.
(d) Observation.
The *dvaita* Philosophers, firstly, have presented the *Jainas* view followed by its criticism and refutation by showing some defects in it, in the context of creation (srṣṭitattva) of this world.

According to the *Jaina* Philosophy, there is no need to accept Ṛṣvāra (i.e. viṣṇu) as a creator of the universe. The universe (Jagat), is in the form of ‘sat’ and ‘asat’ etc. Seven fold is created due to the adṛśta of the Jīva (soul) and some other visible instruments, but not due to Ṛśvāra. And size or dimension of the Jīva (soul) is equal to the body (śarira-parimāṇa). Thus, there is no need of accepting Ṛśvāra as a creator. Jayatīrthācārya says.

Thus, *dvaita* Philosophers have recorded the view of the *Jainas*. Before presenting the criticism on the *Jaina* view, let us have a very short discussion about he *dvaita* position regarding the creation of the universe. *Dvaita* Philosophers hold that the universe is created attribute-less by the Supreme Brahman i.e. Viṣṇu, which is not nirguna as Śaṅkara says. He is ananta-guṇa-paripūrna i.e. filled with countless attributes. It is stated in the Brahma Sūtra I.1.2. (*Janmādyasya yataḥ*) Thus the view of the *Jainas* is opposed to this idea of the Vedāntins. Not only this it is also opposed to the Veda’s view.

They have presented the *Jaina* position in the following manner. *Jaina* Philosophy have accepted a theory called saptabhanginaya related to the reality. They are as follows:

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<th>Sutra</th>
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<td>तत्र सत्त्वेवः प्रकारः अतदिति हिन्दौय उभयं सदसदामकालिति तृतीयः</td>
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उपयोगितानुसार सदस्म्हिलक्षणामिति चतुर्थ एतायते सत्यादिति भावयो यथार्थति ह्यायः यथार्थति व्याख्यातः 
मयंति | सदस्मुद्यम्यविलक्षणामिति पद्धमशयः | तत्र सत्य सति सद्यमिलक्षणामिति पद्धमः
| असति सत्यादिति शष्य: | सर्व सदस्मालकेन नैतत्सर्व सदस्मालके सति
सद्यमिलक्षणामिति सप्तम उत्तमिति दृष्टांच्छयः | 52

We can re-arrange it in the following manner:

1. syādasti i.e. in certain sense it is,
2. syādnāsti i.e. in certain sense it is not,
3. syādasthināsti ca i.e. in certain sense it is and it is not,
4. syādavyaktavya i.e. in certain sense it is not expressible,
5. syādasti avyaktavya śca i.e. in certain sense it is and it is not expressible,
6. syādnāsti avyaktaya śca i.e. in certain sense it is not and it is not expressible,
7. syādasti nāsti avyaktavya śca i.e. in certain sense it is not and it is not expressible.

It means, according to Jainism the reality is in the form of these seven-fold or in other words the reality can be expressed or known by these seven ways. And this reality is produced from the adṛṣṭa of the soul or some visible causes, but not by the Īśvara, and the size of the soul is kāyaparimāṇa, equal to the body.

From their presentation of Jainism it is clear that they have presented the Jaina view very precisely. Their whole argument can be formulated in two heads. Viz. (1) argument regarding the reality, i.e. the arguments against the anekānta they (2) Argument regarding the soul and its dimension or size etc.

About the first argument Madhvacārya has rejected it by pointing out that one and the same object cannot have such
contradictory attributes. He says:

\[
\text{सत्यायत्स्यान्तस्यवस्त्तताहस्तन्यत्व स्वादिक्षेत्रस्वैक्षिम्यत्ये अस्पूर्वर्येन}
\]

\[
\text{असम्भवात्} \quad 53
\]

Jayatīrtha records that according to Jainism the whole universe can be expressed through seven bhaṅgas i.e. called Syādvāda, which is not correct. Because, these two viz. sat ‘to be’ or ‘to exist’ and asat ‘to be not’ are sufficient to explain and there is no proof in establishing any further varieties. The Jainas may argue that resorting to any particular type of the above mentioned two bhaṅgas there will be contingency. Hence, all the seven bhaṅgas are to be accepted. To this, Jayatīrtha argues: if due to the fear of ‘doṣa’ i.e. contingency the two fold theory of ‘sat’ and ‘asat’ are to be discarded than, the Jainas have to give up the whole theory of Syādvāda, Because many a contingency can be pointed out in the seven theory of Jainas. Thus, there is no fault in the two-fold classification of universe in terms of ‘sat’ and ‘asat’ Jayatīrtha concludes

\[
\text{जैनेन्निर्वश्चैविजीत्य च तद्यथात्} \quad \text{व्यवस्थितसदसत्र्कार हृतितिरिक्त}
\]

\[
\text{प्रकार्च्छ्वामापाणिकरत्नसंवज्ञात्} \quad \text{प्रकल्पार्यत्स्यांकुरुवस्तुमये इति न}
\]

\[
\text{वाक्यम्} \quad \text{तथा सति दोषभूर्णा सर्वभूष्म परिश्च्वः स्वात्} \quad \text{सतस्याक्षारहतः च न}
\]

\[
\text{कोशिपरिदष्टिस्थि भावा} \quad 54
\]

On the argument namely that the dimension or size of the soul is equal to the body, Jayatīrtha asks: why do you accept so.

\[
\text{यदि प्रजीवस्य} \quad \text{शरीरपरिमितीवतम्यपेते} \quad \text{तत्त्वत्त्वाह्यं} \quad \text{कि}
\]

\[
\text{तत्त्वायश्चैरार्ग्योन्त्वात्मथस्वम्यपेते} \quad \text{शरीरात्प्र्च्छ्वदमहतर्यात्मनः}
\]

\[
\text{परिश्च्चवभवन्मन्यंभाव्यं} \quad 55
\]
There are main two arguments of the *Jainas* as presented by Jayatīrtha regarding the dimension or size of the soul. (1) The size of the soul is equal to the body size because the bodily activities are taking place all over the body. (2) The size of the soul is equal to the body size because without accepting it contingency may arise namely that 'soul has no size', which is not admissible. It means that if we do not accept soul as equal to the body then we have to accept soul as size less. To avoid this inadmissible contingency we accept it.

To the first argument, Madhvācārya says that the *Jainas* theory that the dimension of the soul is equal to the body does not work. If such a position is accepted then a Jīva that was not an ant in one birth if born as an elephant in the next birth due to the good karmas, the Jīva will not be able to occupy the whole body. He says:

\[ जीवस्य शरीर परमित्वाङ्किताःकारेत्यदिशिरस्वस्त्वस्य गृष्ठस्वादिशिरस्वकालैः स्वातः \]

Jayatīrtha also thinks in that direction and makes this point by stating that the soul of an ant can not occupy the whole body of an elephant or a donkey if due to the good karma he gets the birth of an elephant or a donkey etc. in the next birth and vice-versa also. Thus, the theory that the soul is equal to the body size will not stand to logic. He says:

\[ यद्यात्मा सर्वशरीरकेष्टोपमत्यथ शरीरपरिमाणाहं ग्रंथितं एवं तद्हि पित्तिकादिशिरस्वत्वारस्तिपरिशस्त्वत्वारनां एव स्वातत् तथा च तत्स्वयं कर्मवर्धायाकारणमादिशिरस्वप्राप्तेऽत्ततापूर्वतः स्वातः | तत्ततः न सर्वशरीरेष्टे त्वद् गाज्ञिदिशिरस्वस्वायाकारणातिमितेरः स्वातः तथा च शरीर नापरिमाणात्वं इत्यि इत्यि इत्यि इत्यि | \]
To this argument *Jaina* logicians may think that 'the size of the body is equal to the respective body in which it enters in each birth'. To this argument of the *Jainas Madhvācārya* says, in this case also it will have to undergo modification and consequently it will not to be eternal. He says:

नतत्त्वशीर्षस्वतः तत्त्वरिमाणाच्छलिति न मत्तायम् | विकारितादनित्वम् प्रसादेः ||

Jayatīrtha also thinks in the same line as Madhvācārya thinks. In addition to it he says: if the soul under goes modification then it will be subject to decay and hence called as non-eternal (*anītya*). And if it will be *anītya* then it cannot be emancipated. This will go against the whole scripture, which is not proper. Thus, the theory, that "soul is equal to respective body in which it enters in each birth" will not be acceptable to us. He says:

न चालनस्तत्त्वशीर्षस्वतः तत्त्वरिमाणाच्छलिति युक्तम् | तथा सति विकारितादपोः |
तत्त्वानित्वादबुध्योत्सनो बानिमोक्षमसंगतथा च शास्त्रवैध्यपािलामिति भावः ||

Further, he shows the defect on the second reason provided by the *Jaina* logician for accepting the size of the soul as equal to the size of the body namely that "without body the soul has no dimension" (i.e. *Śariravacchedamantaremātmanah svataḥ parināmābhāvāt*). On this' argument of the *Jainas*, a question is raised: whether in the liberated state the soul has the dimension or not? It cannot be stated that it has no dimension, because no entity can exist without dimension. Therefore, the dimension of the soul has to be accepted even in the liberated state. And since, the size of the soul depends upon the size of the body, and then a body also has to be accepted in the liberated state.
Third Chapter

To this, another question may be asked, whether this body is eternal or perishable? It cannot be perishable. In that case there will not be any difference between the liberated state and the Sāṁsāra state. And if the body is also accepted as eternal in the liberated state then further question may be asked why not accept the body as eternal even during the sāṁsāra state. Because there is no difference between these two bodies. If you accept it then you have to accept both soul and the body are eternal, which is not admissible. Thus, your theory that 'without body the soul has no size or dimension' is not proper. He says:

शारीराविक्षिदमन्त्रेषणातुः स्वतः परिमाणाभावात् शारीरपरिमाणात्वं वदनु प्रस्तुतः | किं मोक्षे जीवस्य परिमाणमस्ति न वेदिति | न ताभद्द्वितीयः | परिमाणाभावे स्वरूपाभावात्रः।
| न हि परिमाणांशुव्रे इथ्यमस्ति | अतो मोक्षे परिमाणांशुगताभयमेव | किं च चात।
| तथा सति तस्य शारीरमन्त्रेषणातपि वतः | मोक्षेःशि शारीरसुरतिकर्णीयं प्रस्तुतवेत।
| अंगीकृतित एवातो नानिश्चिति चेतिहीदं म्वायद्यौ यथावस्थाम् | तपश्रीरामन्त्रेश्वरीसः निश्चितवेत|
| वा | नाधा | संस्करणानांतर्गतापातात् | न द्वितीय: यद्यान देहशेषसेवश्चितवेत स्वात।
| शारीरविश्वेषेशादिति गाय: | तत्साधनमत्स्वापातुवेषेवचित्राकवल्लहुक्तं जननकारणाभ्यक्ष्णं विश्वाश्चितिति
| सिद्धम्। | 80

In this way the Dvaita philosophers have rejected the view of Jaina philosophers that 'one and the same object cannot have contradictory attributes' and 'the dimension of the soul is equal to the body'. And hence, this creation is not created by the some visible i.e. external causes that are in the form of kāla (time), ākāśa (space) and pudgala (atoms) of the soul, but it is created by the Viṣṇu.
In this way the *dvaita* philosophers have presented the *Jaina* position. Before going to see the arguments of the *dvaita* philosophers against the *Jaina* doctrine and analyzing it, a remark on their presentation or their faithfulness may be made. As can be seen that starting from Madhvācārya to Jayatīrth and Śrī Sarkarā Śrinivāsa etc. putting together have presented the *Jaina* doctrine faithfully without any bias. But one thing is that in their presentation of *syādvāda* or *saptabhaṅgīnaya* they have not presented it in the same wording as *Jainas* does, but with some other words, for instance, for 'avyaktavya' they have used 'vilakṣaṇa' in the same sense.

From the foregoing presentation following are the prime objections of the *dvaita* philosophers against the *Jaina* doctrine:

**Objection 1:** In one substance it is not possible that contradictory qualities should exist simultaneously i.e. the very expression "sadasad ca" is contradictory in nature.

**Objection 2:** Since the size of the soul is equal to the size of the body and subject to change hence, it could not be eternal and it cannot be omniscient. To clarify, the bodies of the different classes of creatures are of different sizes. The soul of an ant taking the body of an elephant on account of its past deeds will not able to fill up the body of an elephant. Similarly the soul of an elephant will not have sufficient space in the body of an ant. Thus, the soul has to be *anitya*. 

223
Objection 3: If the size of the soul is equal to the respective body in which it enters in each birth then in this case also it will have to undergo modification and consequently it will be subject to destruction. Thus, it has to be anitya.

Objection 4: Against the Jaina argument namely that "without body the soul has no dimension or size", they argue: whether in the liberated state the soul has body or not? as no entity can exist without body or form. Therefore, they have to accept the dimension of the soul even in the liberated state. And since the size of the soul is depended upon the size of the body then they have to accept a body of the soul in the liberated state.

In addition to it, they further argue that whether that body is perishable or eternal. If it is perishable then what is the difference between liberated state and an ordinary state? If it is eternal then why do they say so, as both the body at the ordinary state and the liberated state are same? Thus, they have to accept the body as eternal like soul. Therefore, the theory of anekānta and the doctrine of soul of the Jaina philosophers is untenable and inadmissible and hence, stands refuted.

The whole argument of the dvaita philosophers start with the problem namely that the Jagat i.e. universe is created by omnipotent Viṣṇu, which is objected by the Jaina philosophy, as they have accepted some eternal causes the soul like 'dharma' and 'adharma' and some external causes like kāla, ākāśa and pudgala as the causes for the creation of the universe. In this context they have rejected the nature of the universe as postulated by Jaina
philosophers and the concept of the cause i.e. soul holds by the Jiana philosophers.
Jainism As presented in Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta system of Indian philosophy:

Alike the other schools of Vedānta, Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophers also have recorded the Jaina view when they commented upon the Brahmāsūtra II. 2. 31-34, after refuting the view of the Buddhist philosophers. The present discussion is based on the Śrībhāṣya of Rāmānujacārya, Śrībhāṣyavṛtti of Vāsudevāshātri and Śrībhāṣyaprakāśikā of Śrinivāsa ārādhana. While commenting upon the above-mentioned aphorism, Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophers have recorded some arguments of the Jainas regarding the Anekāntavāda and the nature of reality, arguments on creation and arguments on the soul.

The presentation is organized in four heads: viz. (a) their presentation of the Jaina doctrine in their respective texts, (b) the arguments forwarded by the Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophers against the Jaina philosophy, (c) an analysis of their arguments or criticism and (d) observation.

The whole discussion from the point of view of Jainism as recorded by the Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophers may be reorganized in the following manner.

According to the Jaina philosophy the world consists of selves and non-selves and is without a lord. And it is made up of six substances viz. Jīvas (selves), ajīvas (non-selves), dharma (the cause of motion), adharma (the cause of rest), pudgala (matter), kāla (time) and ākāśa (space). Of these, the Jīvas are of three kinds viz. the bound (vaddha), those who have obtained perfection
through yoga (yogasiddha) and those who have obtained final release (mukta).\textsuperscript{62}

\textbf{Dharma} (the cause of motion) is known to be that particular substance that which in regards to things possessing motion forms the cause of motion and which pervades the whole world. And \textit{adharma} forms the cause of inertia and is all-pervasive.\textsuperscript{63}

The matter (\textit{pudgala}) is that substance which possesses colour, smell, taste and touch. And it is also of two kinds viz. that which consists of atoms and that which has the nature of their aggregates. And it consists of air, fire, water, earth, the body, the world etc. \textit{Kāla} (time) is a particular atomic substance, which forms the cause of the practical realization of the present, the past and the future. The \textit{ākāśa} (space) also is one and consists of infinite special divisions.

Out of these, again also abstracted five substances, which are other than atoms and are known as \textit{astikāyas} i.e. groups viz. \textit{jīvāstikāya}, \textit{dharmāstikāya}, \textit{adhmāstikāya}, \textit{pudgalāstikāya} and \textit{ākāśāstikāya}, which are used to denote a substance which exists in more places.

\textsuperscript{62} जीवाजीवके जन्मेतत्, निरेशदर्मः | तत्त्व यज्ञद्वालकम् | तानि ज द्वाणिजीव

\textsuperscript{63} धर्माधर्मयुक्तालकाकाशाभायिः | त्र्यजीवः बद्धः मुक्तके सत्त्वतित्रिक्षाः |

\textsuperscript{64} पुनर्गतिगति वर्ण गंद रस स्पर्शंतः द्वाणम् | तत्त्व भविष्यम् परमाणुरुपम् तत्संगातरतं पं

\textsuperscript{65} तेऽतु च अणुविभिन्नानि द्वाणिः पथ्य अस्तित्वाओ इति च संगुणाचे | जीवास्तिकायः

\textsuperscript{66} धर्मास्तिकायः अधर्मास्तिकायः पुदगलास्तिकायः आकाशास्तिकायः इति
The *Jaina* philosophers also make another list of things, which is helpful for the *jīvas* in the attainment of final release as which comprises in it, the self (*jīva*), the non-self (*ajīva*), the influx of sense impressions (*āśrava*), bondage (*bandha*), austerities (*nirjarā*), meditation (*saṁbara*) and final release (*mokṣa*). They also have prescribed the means for attaining final release; such means consists of perfect knowledge (*samyakjñāna*), perfect vision (*samyakdarśana*) and perfect conduct (*samyakcaritra*).

\[\text{\textit{Jīvānāṁ mokṣopayośīnāṁ, aparabhīṁ śāntaṁ karunāttī. Jīvājaśeṣacāndrakṣprabhunirjñāśvarnākṣa:}}\]
\[\text{\textit{Itī | mokṣasāṅgreṇ mokṣopayośa gūṛhīte | s c sāmyakdān-darśan-vairātrupu}}. \]

Perfect knowledge is that which is devoid of illusion. And which emerges by its own through the deep study and listening and meditating on it after the complete destruction of the *pramāda*, which is in the form of not encouraging the good deeds (*punyakarma*) or false knowledge (*mithyājñāna*), which is in the form of doubt of the true nature of the object, which always covers the knowledge of which is in the form of un-controlled sense organs, as if the autumnal sun shines after the complete destruction of the clouds. In short, knowledge is produced by itself. Further to have faith on the advice given by the *arhatas* is called *samyakdarśana* i.e. the perfect vision. And, to have a desire to get salvation being bereft of the sinful deeds (*pāpa karma*) is called perfect conduct (*samyakcaritra*). These three are called 'three jewel' (*triratna*) in Jainism.

\[\text{\textit{Mōha rāhitāṁ jñānāś śāmyakdānām | tathā śaryānādānām pāpadveśenāś aśrayāṇām}}\]
\[\text{\textit{Avāsateśānāṃ vāsatvāvānām śāmyakdarśanāṃ śāmyakdānaḥ}}}\]

228
Of those things, the jīva however, is that which possesses the qualities of knowledge, vision, pleasure and power. The non-self consists of all those things, which are fit for the enjoyment of the jīva. The āśrava is the sensory organs etc. that forms the instruments of enjoyment of those jīvas. Bondage also is of eight kinds viz. the four-fold ghāṭikarmas and the four-fold aghāṭikarmas. Ghāṭikarmas are that which injuriously affects the knowledge, vision, power and pleasure, which are all the natural qualities of the jīvas. These are four in number viz. jñānāvaraṇiṇya, darśanāvaraṇiṇya, mohaniya and antarāya. Jñānāvaraṇiṇya karma is that obstructs the perfect knowledge and which is in the form of that 'one cannot know the true nature of the object (vastu) through knowledge'. Darśanāvaraṇiṇya karma is that which obstructs the perfect vision and which is in the form of the knowledge that 'one cannot attain salvation with the help of the ways prescribed by the arhatas'. Mohaniya karmā is that which affects the virya i.e. powers, which is in the form of apprehension that 'one unable to chose the perfect or the best way as there are a lot of ways for salvation'. Antarāya karma is that which affects the pleasure of the salvation and which creates difficulties in the person, who is engaged in attaining the salvation. Thus, these four karmas being the obstructor or slayer of śreya i.e. salvation are called ghāṭikarmas.
Aghāṭikarmas form the cause of the bodily configuration, its personality, its preservation and its consequences of pleasure, pain and indifference.

They are four in number viz. vedaīya, nāmika, gotrika and āyuṣka.

Nirjarā is the tapas which is the means of attaining final release, and which is learnt from the teaching of an arhata. Sarṣbarā is known to be that restraint of the sensory organs, which has the nature of mental concentration. Mokṣā on the other hand, is the manifestation in its natural and true form, of the self of him, whose sins beginning with attachment have all been removed.

The atoms also which form the cause of the earth etc. are not of four kinds as in the theory of Vaiśeṣikas and Buddhists, but
are all of one nature. The distinctions among them such as the earth etc. are the results of their transformations.

They also say that the whole of the totality of things has a varied character in that it is differentiated into existence and non-existence, the eternal and the non-eternal, the identical and the different etc. This is because universally the seven-fold doctrine comes into operation thus, ‘a thing is’ ‘a thing is not’, ‘a thing is indefinable’, and ‘a thing is, is not and is indefinable’. Because the whole of the totality of things is made up of modified states of substances, they hold that existence, oneness, eternity etc. are appropriate and as consisting of modified states, it is made up of opposites of those. Modified states also are particular conditions of substances and these conditions also have a positive as well as negative form and hence existence and non-existence and all else will be appropriate.

The theory of the Jinas is not true, because of the impossibility of the existence of contradictory qualities in one thing i.e. in one and the same thing; it is impossible for contradictories such as existence and non-existence to be found
together as in the case with shadow and light.

एकसिन्न वस्तुनि, अस्तित्व-नास्तित्वादेः विरुद्धस्य छायातपथाद् युगपदसम्बन्धत् ॥७३॥

It is further explained, as because a substance and its characteristic, which is a particular condition denoted by the word 'modification' (पर्याय), form distinct categories, it is not possible for contradictory attributes to meet in one and the same thing. Thus, a thing, which is qualified by particular modification such as existence, cannot possibly be, at that very same time, associated with non-existence, which is the opposite of existence. The impermanence of a substance is it is being the abode of the particular modifications knows as birth and destruction. The opposite of this is also permanence and how can this co-exist in that substance? To be different from a thing is also to be the seat of a contradictory attribute in relation to that thing. Its opposite also is to be identical and how indeed can co-exist in that substance? For instance, it is not possible for the generic properties of the horse and the buffalo to co-exist in one and the same thing at one and the same time.

प्रावस्य तस्तद्विप्रेषणं मृतपर्यंविशालिनिग्रहस्वाभिशेषस्य च पृथक्कर्मदार्थस्तत् न एकसिन्नः विरुद्धयमानसम्बन्धः सम्बन्धति-इति | एकन अस्तित्वाविना अवस्तित्वाविशेषः विशिष्टस्य, तदानीमेव न तद्विप्रेषणानि लोकशिष्टविश्वासतः सम्बन्धाति | उपविने।

यथासारामपरिवर्त्तेषांविशेषस्यमधुस्दिकल्पत् च द्रव्यस्य अनन्तत्वम् | तद्विप्रेषणेत्र च नित्यतः तस्सिद्धम् कथं सम्बन्धितः ? विरोधिकर्माभ्यास्यतं च नित्यतम्, तद्विप्रेषणेत्र च अभिश्चतं, कथं वा तस्सिद्धम्

सम्बन्धितः | यथा अवस्तित-महीश्वरेष्योऽयुगपत्त एकसिन्न असम्बन्धः ॥७४॥

In as much as time is perceived to be merely an attribute of things, it cannot be predicated of it that it has separate existence or non-existence, nor are these required to be disproved here. To
those who practically realize things, the practical realization that time is or is not resembles the practical realization relating to the existence or non-existence of the universal etc. It has already been stated that universal etc. are perceived merely as adjuncts of substances.

कालस्य पदार्थविशेषणतयोऽव प्रतीते, तस्य पृथग्निति-नास्तित्वादयो न वैत्त्वा, न च परिष्ठत्वाः || कालः अवति, नास्ति इति यत्वहह यथवहर्षुर्या जात्वध्यस्तिल-नास्तित्व
प्रवाहारुच्यः || ज्ञवादयो हि त्रययिविशेषणतयोऽव प्रतीत्यन्त इति पूर्वपेतात्माः ||\textsuperscript{75}

It may however be asked how it is declared by those who are learned in the Veda that one and the same Brahman constitutes all things. The reply has been given that it is because the highest person, who is omniscient and omnipotent and who wills the truth, has also been already stated that the difference is complete between the body and the embodied being on the one hand and their several attributes on the other.

शरीरतवत् सर्ववस्तु सर्वशक्तिः सर्वत्ऐकपक्षम पुरुषप्रत्येकणाम् || शरीरसारसेविनो
तद्मीमां च अत्यन्ततैत्तिकमप्यमुक्तम् || कथं पुनः एकमेव ब्रह्म सर्वतंत्रमधिति
श्रुतियैः रुपः ? सर्वते भावे तेनेतन ||\textsuperscript{76}

Moreover, the six substances beginning with the jivas do not possess the character of being the modifications of one substance and therefore in relation to them, it can be hardly be predicated, among others that they are one or many, either because, they consists of one substance or because they consist of modifications. It may be said that these six substances are many or one, either through their own modifications or through their selves individually. In this case also there results contradiction of the admitted theory that all things vary in character from one another,
because there is no mutual identity between them. Therefore, this view held by the *Jainas* is improper.

The *Jainas* position is this that the *jīva*, which has no definite dimensions in space, has also the dimensions of the body it occupies. It being so, in as much as the self, which occupies the bodies of elephants and the like, has to occupy a smaller space when it enters the bodies of ants etc. which occupy a smaller space than those bodies of elephants etc. the character of being a whole does not result to it. The meaning is that it amounts incompleteness.

Again it may be said that the self, owing to its possessing the properties of contraction and expansion—attain the different states, that means owing to its modifications (*paryāyas*), it attains the different states and that thereby the above contradiction is negativized. To this, they say that it is impossible to set aside the above contradiction by reason of the self-acquiring different conditions consisting of contraction and expansion, because the resulting evil, such as other modifications and impermanence etc. due to those modifications, will lead to the assumption by the self
of a character exactly equivalent to that of a pot.

Further, the Jaina philosopher may say that the final dimension of the self is found in association with the condition of final release. This gets established owing to the self not taking up any other body thereafter. Hence, the self and its dimensions in association with the condition of final release are both eternal. And therefore, that final dimension is the natural dimension of the self. And so there can be no difference with the prior state. Consequently the self cannot possess the dimension of the body. Thus, according to this view of the Jainas is indeed full of inconsistencies.

Further, they have objected the view of the Jaina philosophers on the issue namely that the infinitesimal atom is the cause of the world; they say that there is inconsistency in the view of the Jainas. They argue: as Jainas maintain that from 'hurasva' i.e. the short one and the from 'parimandala' i.e. the secondary particle (dvāṇuka) and the infinitesimal atom, likewise the 'mahādīrgha' i.e. very big and long is produced inconsistent. Likewise, all else also that is accepted by them (Jainas) are inconsistent.
Threads and other divisible parts produce the whole cloth, when they are conjoined on six sides forming their own parts. The infinitesimal atoms can become the producer of the secondary and other particles when they are conjoined together on all their six sides. Otherwise, as infinitesimal atoms have no distinct and particular locutions in space, although thousands of infinitesimal atoms are conjoined together, the resultant dimension will not exceed that of one infinitesimal atom. And consequently atomicity and minuteness, which are the qualities of the secondary particles and magnitude and length, which belong to the tertiary particle and other qualities, will not result from the infinitesimal atom. If distinct locations in space be admitted, the infinitesimal atoms become divisible into parts and made up of their own parts and they i.e. the parts of the atom are made up of their own parts and so on, thus, resulting in a regresses ad infinitum.

It should not be urged that the inequality between a mustard seed and a mountain arises solely out of the smallness or largeness in the number of the constituent parts arises between the mustard and the mountain and there is thus, no inequality between them. And that, therefore, it has necessarily to be accepted that the
ultimate constituent part has a limit, because, if the infinitesimal atoms have no location in space, then any size exceeding the magnitude of a single infinitesimal atom cannot come to existence. And therefore, the mustard and the mountain will themselves not be established. If it is asked what then we are to do, it is replied that the view based upon the Veda may be accepted.

In short, the production of the tertiary particle and the secondary particle out of the secondary particle and infinitesimal atom respectively is inconsistent.

Furthermore, according to he Jainas' view that the infinitesimal atom is the cause, the origin of the world is thought to take place in the order in which begins with the production of the secondary particle, which is based on the conjunction of the infinitesimal atoms, which results out of the motion resident in them. It being so, the earliest motion, which is found in the infinitesimal atoms and forms, the cause of the origin of the whole world, is held to be produced by the adrśta or the unseen result of work.

This above-mentioned motion found in the infinitesimal
atom is either produced by its own \( \text{adr\&shnt{\&}} \) or it is produced by the \( \text{adr\&shnt{\&}} \) found in association with the individual self. In both the cases also, it cannot be possible for the \( \text{adr\&shnt{\&}} \), which is produced by the working out of the merit and demerit of individual souls to be found resident in the infinitesimal atom. If it were so found, it is not possible for the \( \text{adr\&shnt{\&}} \) found resident in always. Moreover, it is not possible for the \( \text{adr\&shnt{\&}} \) found resident in the individual self to be cause of the production of the motion resident in the infinitesimal atom. Again it may be said that the motion is originated in atoms through the association of the individual self possessing the \( \text{adr\&shnt{\&}} \). Under such circumstance, the unceasing flow of the \( \text{adr\&shnt{\&}} \) being eternal, it follows that creation would be eternal.

\[
\text{तत्तदं परमाणुगतः कर्मं त्वगतादृः प्रकारितम् \?
आत्मातादृः कारितत्वा \?
उभयसः ॥}
\text{समयं किं श्राववधान पुष्पान्नन्तितसः अद्वृत्तसः
परमाणुगता समस्थवात् \| संयम्ये}
\text{वां
समयं किं श्राववधान पुष्पान्नन्तितसः अद्वृत्तसः
परमाणुगता समस्थवात् \| संयम्ये}
\text{वां
अथ अहस्तदत्तसः तयः कर्ममात्रं \| तदा तसः अहस्तदत्तसः}
\text{नित्यमेव नित्यसर्गमृतं ॥८५}
\]

It may further be said that the \( \text{adr\&shnt{\&}} \) is capable of giving fruits, provided it is ripe therefore, that some \( \text{adr\&shnt{\&}} \) then and there assume the condition of yielding fruits, while others do so in other future births and others again in other future period of time known as the \text{kalpas}. And that, therefore, because of dependence on the ripening of the \( \text{adr\&shnt{\&}} \), its capability to produce it is not established by any authoritative means of knowledge that the \( \text{adr\&shnt{\&}tas} \) which are produced by many kinds of karmas, performed not simultaneously and out previous understanding among one another
by the infinite individual selves, can all at one time attain one and
the same time ripening that yields fruits.

ननु अहस्ते विपाकपेश्व फलायाः। कानिचिथः आहस्तानि तदानीवेश विपाकः।
कानिचिथः कर्मान्तः। कानिचिथः कर्मान्तः। अतः विपाकपेश्वक्षेत्राः।
नावः विपाकपेश्वक्षेत्राः। न सर्वदायित्वादक्तस्यसंगः। इति।

For this very reason the simultaneous absorption of all things
and their existence in a condition unripe for yielding fruits i.e.
pralaya, do not come to pass during to parārdhas i.e. period of
time each equal to half the life of Brahma.

Again, motion does not exist in the atoms in consequence of
the association with them of the individual souls possessing the
particular adṛśta assigned to them at the will of the lord because
under the sūtra "that the Brahman is the cause of the creation etc",
of the universe follows altogether from the scriptures because
scriptures form the source of the knowledge relating to Him.
It has been already explained how such a lord as is arrived at by the
logical process of inference is disproved. Therefore, the
origination of the world has not for its basis the motion associated
with atoms.

न च ईश्वरेऽ्‌कालिकविशेषाद्वृतसंयोगात्। अणुपत्र कर्मः। आनुमानिकः।
शास्त्राः। इत्यतः उपपादित्वाः। अतः जगद्वपर्यंतः। अणुपत्रकर्मपूर्वकशास्त्राः।

If the Jaina philosophers accept relation of inheritance to
explain it, there also arises inconsistency. Because the relation of
inheritance also requires by parity of reasoning some other thing to
explain it, like an organic whole, a genus and a quality respectively
to explain them, that other thing to explain it and so on. Thus, there
results the fallacy of regresses ad infinitum.

239
Samavāya possesses the character of a relation. Therefore, if this relation is accepted to be eternal, then also which possesses this relation will undoubtedly acquire permanent existence. Thus, there arises inconsistency. It means if Samavāya is eternal, the postulation by the Jains of eternal atoms and God is unnecessary.

Further, the four kind of infinitesimal atoms of the elements of earth, water, fire and air are admitted by them to possess the qualities of colour, taste, smell and touch and therefore is contradiction of the conditions of subtlety, indivisibility etc. which are accepted by them as characterizing infinitesimal atoms which amounts to the atoms be non-eternity, grossness, divisibility etc. For a pot that possesses colour etc. are seen to be non-eternal and to be produced out of other causes of a similar kind having colour etc. Thus, an unseen thing assumed in accordance with what is seen is not capable of definitely establishing one's accepted particular conclusion. ‘It is assumed by you only in accordance with what is seen that infinitesimal atoms possess colour etc. Therefore, the atomic theory is inconsistent’.
Again it is not merely the admission alone that the infinitesimal atoms possess colour etc. that is erroneous. Even though they are admitted to be devoid of colour etc. in as much as the qualities of the effect are based upon the qualities of the cause, the earth and other things, which are effects, will have to be devoid of colour etc. If with the object of avoiding this difficulty, the atoms are admitted to possess colour etc. then the error mentioned above come into existence. Thus error arising in either case there is inconsistency.

In this way the viśiṣṭādvaita philosophers have presented the position of the Jaina philosophers. As can be seen, Rāmānuja, Vāsudevashastri and Śrīnivāsaśāstra putting together have presented the Jaina doctrines faithfully without any bias.

Let me now again record the objections of the Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophers against the Jaina philosophy. Their arguments are mainly concerned with three major issues viz: (i) objections on the nature of reality (ii) objections on the nature and size of the soul and (iii) objections on the theory of creation.

Following are the prime objections of viśiṣṭādvaita philosophers against the Jaina philosophy.

**Objection 1:** The Jaina theories that one and the same object the contradictory qualities are not possible simultaneously, because in
one and the same thing, it is impossible for contradictories such as existence and non-existence to be found together, as in the case with shadow and light. Or it is not possible for the generic properties of the horse and the buffalo to co-exist in one and the same thing at one and the same time.

Objection 2 (i): The Jianas' position on soul is that it has no definite dimensions in space, has also the dimension of the body it occupies. It creates contingency called 'incompleteness' i.e. aparipurnatā. They clear this point by giving an example that a soul of and elephant while enters into a body of an ant and vice-versa, due to good and bad deeds then the soul cannot occupy the entire body, sometimes less and sometimes more. Thus, this position of the Jainas on soul cannot be admissible.

Objection 2 (ii): The Jaina philosophers may argue that owing to its (soul) contractions and expansion, in other words owing to its modifications i.e. paryāyas, attains various different states or bodies. Then, it will be resulting a contingency called 'non-eternal' i.e. anityatva in it which will go against the very concept of the soul.

Objection 2 (iii): The Jians philosophers maintain that the final dimension of the soul is found in association with the condition of final release. This gets established owing to the soul not taking up any other body thereafter. Hence, the soul and its dimensions in association with the condition of final release are both eternal. And
therefore, that final dimension is the natural dimension of the soul. So, there can be no difference with the prior state. Consequently the soul cannot possess the dimension of the body.

**Objection 3 (i):** The infinitesimal atoms are not the causes of the creation, because if they accept this it creates a further problem namely that whether the atoms are possessed of parts of not? If yes, then it leads to a contingency called infinite regress and if no, then it would be impossible for the atoms to produce other evolutes. Thus, there is inconsistency in the origination of both binary and ternary compounds from infinitesimal atoms and binary compound respectively. Thus, the atomic view is inconsistency.

**Objection 3 (ii):** It is impossible for the unseen principle adṛṣṭa to inhere in the atoms as well as connected with the soul to be the instigator of the motion of the atoms to produce the creation. Even in both the cases also, it cannot be possible for the adṛṣṭa, which is produced by the working out of the merit and demerit of individual souls, to be found resident in the atom. If it be so found then it will be capable of production always. And if is not possible for the adṛṣṭa found resident in the individual self to be cause of the production the motion resident in the infinitesimal atom. Or if it is said that the motion is originated in atoms through the association of the individual self, possessing adṛṣṭa then the unceasing flow of the adṛṣṭa being eternal it follows that creation is eternal.
Objection 3 (iii): In acceptance of the relation inheritance to explain it there also arises inconsistency. Because, the inheritance also requires by parity of reasoning some other thing to explain it, like an organic whole, a genus and a quality which requires the part, the species and the substratum of the quality respectively to explain them. That other thing which explains inheritance also similarly requires some other thing to explain it and so on. Thus, there results the fallacy of regress ad infinitum. Not only this but samavāya possesses the character of a relation. Therefore, if this relation is accepted to be eternal, then also which possesses this relation will undoubtedly acquire permanent existence. It means if samavāya is eternal, the postulation by the Jainas of eternal atoms and god is unnecessary.

Objection 3 (iv): The four kinds of infinitesimal atoms of the elements of earth, water, fire and air are admitted by them to possess the qualities of colour taste, smell and touch and therefore, in contradiction of the conditions of subtlety, indivisibility etc. which are accepted by the Jainas as characterizing infinitesimal atoms, amounts to the atoms be non-eternity, grossness divisibility etc.

We have formulated in the foregoing pages the arguments and objections of the viśiṣṭādvaita philosophers against the Jīana philosophy. The answers to the objection raised by the Viśiṣṭādvaita Philosophers against the Jainas are more or less same as formulated by us earlier⁹⁴, hence, need not be repeated here.
Śuddhādvaitas' presentation on Jaina philosophy:

The Philosophers of Śuddhādvaita school of Vedānta also have criticized some of the doctrines of Jaina Philosophy. Vallbhācārya the main ācārya of the Śuddhādvaita School has recorded the Jaina position while commenting upon the Brahmasūtra II. 2. 33-36. of Bādurāyaṇa. They have criticized mainly the Jaina doctrine of anekāntavāda and the allied problems related to it, the theory of creation and the nature of soul.

First of all they have presented the Jaina position and then pointed out some inconvenience in their system by showing some contingency in their framework of understanding and then refuted their position with suitable arguments.

In the presentation of Jainism and framing argument against the Jaina philosophy our sources have been the Āñubhāṣya of Vallabhaśīrya, Bhāvaprakāṣikā of Goswāmi Śripurusottamāje, Balabodhini of Śripurusottamāje Śrīdharasarmā and āñubhāṣya pradīpa of Śrī śīkhārāma bhaṭṭajee.

There is no novelty in their presentation of Jaina Philosophy or any addition to it by the Śuddhādvaitins. As a matter of fact the text quoted by earlier authorities of Vedānta like Viśiṣṭādvaita etc. are identical. The reason for such sameness in the treatment of presentation is not far to seek Śuddhādvaita as a system is later development and the original texts of the Jainas and the texts are quoted by Dwaitins and Viśiṣṭādvaitins are before them. And hence, they have made good use of those by merely
drawing the text from them. Thus, in the presentation of the realities like the concept of Jīva and Ajīva etc. the seven bhaṅgas, and in their arguments as well they have reproduced the text as it is not making any change what so ever.
References:

1. a. cf. Tattvārthasūtra. 1.4, Tattvārthasāra. 1.6, Jñānarāṇava. 4.9.
   b. Śaṅkarabhaṣya on BS.II.2.33.
2. Kalpanaru on BS bhāṣya. II.2.33.
3. a. cf. Jīva samāsā prakaraṇa. 85.
   b. Śaṅrabhaṣya on BS. II.2.33.
4. जीवास्तिकाययांश्रिकाओऽत्त्रो जीत्यसिद्धस्यतिः। Bhāmati on BS. II.2.33.
5. पुद्गलस्तिकायः तोठा पुरैव्यावली चत्वारिश्वृतानि स्थायरं जड्गमस्यतिः। Ibid.
6. धर्मस्तिकायः प्रदुःशेषनुमेयोधर्मस्तिकायः स्तित्यनुमेय। Ibid.
7. आकाशस्तिकायो हिंद्र लोकाकाशैलोकाकाशयेति। तत्त्रोपयुक्तपरि स्तितानां 
   लोकां अन्तर्वती लोकाकाशस्तोपमुरिमोक्षस्थानमलोकाकाशः। तत्र न 
   लोकास्तिः। Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. ऊर्ध्वगमनशील हि जीवो धर्माधर्मस्तिकायेन बद्धस्तान्दमक्षांद्वृत्त गच्छेत्येव स मोक्षः 
    इति। Ibid.
11. विगतित समस्त कलेशायाद वासना स्थानावरणाश्चांस्यसङ्गमाऔऽकलास्याम। उपरिदेशावस्थाः 
    मोक्षः इत्येके। Ibid.
12. Śaṅkarabhaṣya on BS. II.2.34.
13. a. cf. Śyādvādaṁja. 9; Dravyasaṁgraha. 2; Jñānarāṇava. 6.17;
    Tattvārthavṛtti on Pañcāsthikāya. v.no. 31.
   b. Ibid.
14. a. Ibid.
15. b. cf. Brahmadeva on Dravyasaṁgraha. V. no. 10; Tattvārtharājavārtika. P.
    202.
15. Ibid.
16. Śaṅkarabhaṣya on BS. II.2.33.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Saṅkarabhāṣya on BS. II.2.34
20 Ibid.
21 Saṅkarabhāṣya on BS. II.2.35
22 Saṅkarabhāṣya on BS. II.2.35
23 Saṅkarabhāṣya on BS. II.2.36.
24 Vedānta Kaustubha on BS. II. 2. 33.
25 Vedānta Kaustubha Prabhā on BS. II. 2. 33.
26 Vedānta Kaustubha on BS. II. 2. 33.
27 Jeevabhoge Vasusthajatamajeevāc Ch Dharmaṁ Puruṣārotyaḥ Kālaṁ Asvesahāṃ
Sangarmanām śtriśatiheiḥpiḥ. Vedānta Kaustubha Prabhā on BS. II. 2.33.
28 Vedānta Kaustubha on BS. II. 2. 33.
29 Kalastu chāvīśvāmaṁ viśvāraṇaṁ vedāntaṁ vedāntaṁ. Ibid.
30 Āvargnāmāvāt Aakaśāḥ vidiyaḥ, Lokākāroḥ saṁsāričaḥ, Alokākāraṁ muñcaṁ
Vedānta Kaustubha Prabhā on BS. II. 2. 33.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Leshmanvāraḥ Puruṣottamaṁ paṁcāntikāyō naṁ. Jīvaḥ patiṣṭhāyaḥ Puruṣottamaṁ
Ađharmādityāyaḥ Ākāśāntikaṁ vahati. Anekadharmānātī parinirvānaṁ, Ādhyatmānātī
Jīvaśaṁsāntikāyaḥ svātṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvāvṛtvावर् वर्तनाती
248
Third Chapter

37 ननु सर्वमैकस्मिकात्मवधारणज्ञान निश्चितमेवति चेत, अवधारणये स्वप्राप्तितिन चावधारणये स्वप्राप्तितिन ऊज्जवलिश्रिवेच: स्वात्। गौतमस्तिस्त। नाराज्यवधारणाद्वृत्तितिर्वेच: स्वात्। ततावत शास्त्रं प्रयुक्तमततुल्यकृति: स्वात्। Ibid.

38 Vedānta Pārijāta Saurabha on BS. II. 11.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid.

41 परमाणुप्रौढ़स्वभावते प्रवृद्धोवाविशिष्टसृष्टिप्रसादद्वाया नित्यप्रशस्तवस्वागताद्वाय। Vedānta Pārijāta Saurabha on BS. II. 14.

42 Vedānta Kaustubha on BS. II. 2. 15.

43 यहुपचितवतुपातप्रमाणवस्तवविविधाणवहनृसुत्पतियाः। अपुवित्तगुण: इष्ट्वा प्रसादोपाये परमाणवक्रियाय: नास्तिकमेव कृत्यविविधाणवहनृसुत्पतियाः। गौतमस्तिस्त। नाराज्यवधारणाद्वृत्तितिर्वेच: स्वात्। प्रकृतीतथा अवधारणाद्वृत्तितिर्वेच: स्वात्। ततावत शास्त्रं प्रयुक्तमततुल्यकृति: स्वात्। Ibid.

44 Vedānta Kaustubha on BS. II. 2. 33.

45 किंचि स्वस्त्येतस्य प्रमाण अवच: बहुमूल्यमण्डुपराण्यां काव्ययां जोऽपि गौरवाङ्कित मोऽवतान्त्रिकवैव्यवाच्य। Ibid.

46 एक्सिन्देवेको मोक्षादेव सति सिद्धानुप्रहार्मोऽद्वृत्तं असम्भव्यत। सिद्धानुप्रहार्मोऽद्वृत्तं समानस्वभावानामकमकस्मिन्मयार्थां नोऽपि गौरवाङ्कित मोऽवतान्त्रिकवैव्यवाच्य। विषये, सर्वमैकस्मिकात्मवधारणाद्वृत्तं किंचि सिद्धानुप्रहार्मोऽद्वृत्तं प्रत्ययादिप्राविशेषगतब्रह्मवाविशिष्टसिद्धानुप्रहार्मोऽद्वृत्तं। Ibid.

47 Vedānta Kaustubha on BS. II. 2. 34.
48 Vedānta Kaustubha on BS. II. 2.35.

49 Vedānta Kaustubha on BS. II. 2.36.

50 TattvapraŚīvikā on Brahmaśūtra II. 2.33.

51 Bhāvabodha on BS. II. 2.33.

52 Tattvabodhini on BS. II. 2.33.

53 Pūṛṇaprajñābhāṣya on BS. II. 2.33.

54 TattvapraŚīvikā on Brahmaśūtra II. 2.33.

55 TattvapraŚīvikā on Brahmaśūtra II. 2.34.

56 Pūṛṇaprajñābhāṣya on BS. II. 2.34.

57 TattvapraŚīvikā on Brahmaśūtra II. 2.34.

58 Pūṛṇaprajñābhāṣya on BS. II. 2.34.

59 TattvapraŚīvikā on Brahmaśūtra II. 2.34.

60 TattvapraŚīvikā on Brahmaśūtra II. 2.34.

61 Śrībhāṣya on BS.II. 2.31.

62 Ibid.

63 Ibid.

64 Ibid.

65 Ibid.

66 Ibid.

67 Vṛtti of Śrībhāṣya. P. 254.

68 Ibid.

69 Ibid.

70 Ibid.

71 Ibid.

72 Ibid.

73 Ibid.

74 Ibid.

75 Ibid.

76 Ibid.
Third Chapter

77 Ibid.
78 Śrībhāṣya on II. 2. 32.
79 Śrībhāṣya on II. 2. 33.
80 Śrībhāṣya on II. 2. 34.
81 Śrībhāṣya on II. 2. 10.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 Śrībhāṣya on II. 2. 11.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
88 Vedāntasūtra. I. 1. 3.
89 Śrībhāṣya on BS. II. 2. 11.
90 Śrībhāṣya on BS. II. 2. 12
91 Śrībhāṣya on BS. II. 2. 13.
92 Śrībhāṣya on BS. II. 2. 14.
93 Śrībhāṣya on BS. II. 2. 15.