Chapter 2
Jaina philosophy as presented in Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika system

- Sense organs.
- Creation of the body.
- Sarvanityatvavāda.
- Components of Inferential cognition.
- Prāmāṇyavāda.
- Śabdagrahaṇapraṇakriyā.
- Āgama pramāṇa.
- Anekāntavāda.
- Inconsistency of the statement of the Tīrthaṅkara.
- No distinction between jīva and ajīva.
Introduction:

We have already recorded in the introduction that amongst the theist schools of Indian Philosophy, it is only the Vedāntins and the Naiyāyikas who have taken the Jaina tenants for critical examination to some extent. Again out of this two, the Veāntins involvement than the Naiyāyikas in refuting some of the basic tenants of the Jaina is more, where as the Sāmkhyas, the Yogas and the Mīmāṁsakas have not taken the Jaina theories seriously at all except making passing remarks here and there in their respective texts. Reserving the treatment of the Vedānta for the next chapter we present here the Nyāya treatment of the Jaina Philosophy. It must be recorded in clear terms that a very few logicians have discussed and recorded the Jaina tenants in their pūrvapakṣa as opponents to criticize and refute them. To be more particular, it is only Bhāsarvajñā where we get some detailed elaboration and refutation of the basic theories of the Jainas viz. Syādvāda etc. The number of authourities being less it was not possible to present the discussion hence, we have arrranged the discussion on the basis of concepts or theories. All the authorities dealing with particular tenants of the Jainas are put in one place. The theories or the concepts discussed in this chapter are:

1. Sense Organ.
2. The Creation of Śarīra.
5. Prāmāṇyavāda.
6. Śabda grahaṇa Prakriyā.
7. Śabda Pramāṇa.
8. Anekāntavāda.
9. Inconsistency in the statement of the Tīrthāṅkaras:
10. No distinction between Jīva and Ajīva.

Now we present the discussion following the sequence mentioned above.

Sense organ:

In Nyāyasūtra, Gotama [2nd A.D.], the founder of Indian school of logic, has recorded the view of the Jainas in connection with the sense organ, when sūtrakāra refutes the view of the Sāṃkhya philosophers viz. the sense organs are being made of matter. He records the view of the Jainas against the Sāṃkhya philosophers to establish their own view. In the meanwhile he also has recorded some arguments of the Jainas and finally refuted their view. Though Jaina view is quoted for analysis, no reference is made to Jainas by him.

At the outset, let us see the presentation of Jainism in the Vārṣāyanabhāṣya. In the context of refutation of the Sāṃkhya view on the material cause of sense organ: Sūtrakāra Gotama records the view of the Jainas to answer the Sāṃkhya philosophers. The first objection is with regard to the nature or the material substance of the sense organs, particularly, the visual sense organ i.e. eye. I reproduce the texts of arguments for better understanding.
The text runs thus:

नर्त्तकरन्ययननापिदार्शानाथः ॥¹

In the nocturnal animals like the cat etc. the visual rays are actually observed. From this it is inferred that such rays also exist in the human eyes. It may be objected that just as there is a difference in species between the animals and the human beings, so also there is a difference in the nature of their visual senses; that is the visual sense of a nocturnal animal has rays where as the visual sense of a human being has no ray. To this Vātyāyana answers that such a difference cannot be admitted. The visual sense of all the animals are similar in nature as is evidenced by the fact that the visual sense of a cat is as much obstructed by a wall as that of the human being. He writes:

द्रष्टन्ते हि नर्त्तक नयनरस्मयो नर्त्तकरणां युष्मदशृष्टिनां तेन रोक्षानुमानवतिः ॥

| ज्ञातिमेवदिविद्रीक्षयेद इति चेत | धर्मभेदात्र चानुषायनश्रवणस्य प्राविश्वितिषेधवर्धस्य
| दर्शनादितिः ॥² |

One of the main objections or arguments of the Jainas against the Nyāya view is that the visual sense cannot be made of fire, because it also reveals darkness. That which is made of fire e.g. the sun or a lamp cannot reveal darkness and that which reveals darkness cannot be made of fire. Assuming the visual sense to be made of fire it would have been impossible for us to see darkness.

The main issue here is concerned with the nature of darkness. Unlike the Mīmāṃsakas who view darkness as substance, the Naiyāyikas consider it as non-existence (abhāva) of the element of fire in the special form in which its colour is manifest and not
subdued. The knowledge of non-existence is not possible when the counter positive (pratiyogī) is present. For an example, in the presence of the ‘jar’, there is no knowledge of the non-existence of the jar. The light of the lamp is the counter positive of darkness or the non-existence of light. Therefore, in the presence of the lamp there is no question of the knowledge of darkness. The visual rays because of the latency of their colour cannot be considered as the counter positive of darkness. Hence, it is possible to have the knowledge of darkness in spite of the presence of the visual rays. Thus, the Jainas cannot claim that nothing made of fire can reveal darkness, only that specific product of the element of fire which is the counter positive of darkness cannot reveal darkness. The products of the element of fire in other forms may reveal darkness.

The main objection is: on the process of perceptual cognition, both the Naiyāyikas and the Jainas accept that in the process of perceptual cognition self or soul is connected with mind, mind with sense organ and sense organ with the object:

इन्द्रियार्थसामनकर्ष्येष्य ज्ञानमन्त्रानुपाठति।

The Jaina objects to the last clause of the definition, namely, the sense organ is conjoined with object: To them, this may be true in case of all other sense organs minus eyes. To them, visual sense organ i.e. eye is aprāpyakāri. No cognition is accepted between sense organ i.e. eye and the object. Gotama has recorded the view of the Jainas as follows:

अप्राप्यभारणं काकाशप्रभतस्तकान्तरितिको।
The visual sense can perceive an object without actually coming in contact with it, because an object screened off by a pane of glass, a sheet of mica or a slab of crystal is also visually perceived. 

*Bhāṣyakāra* Vātyāyana elaborates the argument of the Jainas by giving example before refuting it. This is as follows:

> तुणादिस्फर्द द्रव्यम् कायप्राप्ते वा प्रतिहल्म दृष्टमययवहितेन सत्रक्रृष्ठो व्याहन्नयते वा प्रातिविन्यवानेनेति | यदि च रघुस्तवसिनिक्षेपं ग्रहणते तत् स्वाद् न व्यवहितस्य सत्रिकर्त्यहितं स्वाप्तं | अस्ति च चेवं कायप्राप्तस्तिकान्तिरितोपलब्धि: सा ज्ञानयत्याप्रायोकारीयीन्द्रियाणि | अतएवायतिकानि प्रायोकारित्वम् हि भौतिकधर्मं हति न ।

It is observed that a pane of glass or a sheet of mica obstructs a blade of grass driven by wind. The contact of something is possible only with an object, which is not obstructed. The obstruction goes against the condition of contact. If the contact of the visual rays with the object is assumed to be the cause of perception, there can be no perception of an object obstructed by something because, there can be no contact with an object thus obstructed. But the fact is that an object though obstructed by a pane of glass or a sheet of mica or a slab of crystal, is actually perceived. This shows that the sense need not come in actual contact.

To this, following is the answer of the *Naiyāyikas*. Gotama notes:

> न कुशक्तिरितानुपलब्धोप्रतिशिष्टः ।

The above argument of the Jainas does not disprove that the sense object contact is not the cause of perceptual knowledge, because an object obstructed by a wall is not perceived. Vātyāyana
makes this point very clear by saying thus:

अग्रायकातिले सतीन्द्रियाणि कुःकान्तकतिरस्तपतपलविरेत स्थायत् ॥

It means if the senses are considered as giving perceptual knowledge without coming in actual contact with the object perceived, there cannot be the absence of perception of an object obstructed by a wall.

Further, the Jainas argue that if the senses are considered as giving perceptual knowledge after actually coming in contact with the object, there cannot be the perception of what is obstructed by a pane of glass, a sheet of mica or a slab of crystal. Vātyāyana says:

प्रायकातिलं सु काव्यावर्णाकान्तरस्तलविरेत स्थायत् ॥

The answer is given by the sūtrakāra as follows:

अप्रतिवालास्त्वमेवं प्रकारः ॥

It means, in the case of an object obstructed by a pane of glass etc. the sense object contact is possible because these do not obstruct the visual rays. In other words, a pane of glass or a sheet of mica does not obstruct the visual rays and hence, the visual rays being unobstructed can come in contact with the object beyond.

The next argument of the Jainas is that a material object can never be unobstructed:

न च काव्यावर्णां या नयनरंगि विद्यं भासितानि सर्वप्रतिहत्यानि सति क्रियाधात इति यथा मन्त्यते न भौतिकथ्याविशिष्टानि इति तत्त ॥

To this the logicians say that, this is not true, because there is no obstruction in the three cases viz. (a) the rays of the sun, (b) what is separated by a slab of crystal (c) the thing burned. It is stated by
Gotama as follows:

आदिययस्मेवविधातात् स्फटिकान्तरितोविधातादु दाशेकविधातात् अविधातादि च पदार्मिसमवधेदा दाशेकविधातात् इति। यथावावं चार्यभेदं इति। आदित्यार्थां कुम्भादिपु न प्रितिहन्यस्यविधातात्। कुम्भस्यस्युदक सपतिष्ठान स्त्राणां इत्यत्वाद द्रव्यान्तरगुणस्य उषाध्यस्य स्पर्शस्य ग्रहणं तेन च शीतस्यशास्त्रिविवेक इति। स्फटिकान्तरितोविध दाशेकविधा च न्यायात्मकाणां व्यवहारायणकु ष्ठस्य अविधातादिष्ठाना इति। तत्तत्त्वविधातात्मकं द्रव्यान्तरगुणस्य उषाध्यस्य स्पर्शस्य ग्रहणार्कव्यासायनं न्यायात्मकाणां व्यवहारायणकु ष्ठस्य अविधातादिष्ठाना इति।

Vātāyāna makes this point by saying that the word ‘non-obstruction’ ‘avighāta’ being connected with each of the three expressions yields three different statements namely (a) because there is no obstruction in the case of the rays of the sun (b) because there is no obstruction in the case of what is separated by a slab of crystal and (c) because there is no obstruction in the case of what is burned.

Thus, the rays of the sun are not obstructed by the jar etc., and being unobstructed, these produce heat in the water contained in the jar. Because of this conjunction with the rays of the sun in this water is perceived the quality of a different substance viz. heat which is a quality of fire and the cold touch i.e. the actual quality of water gets subdued by it.
In the case of something separated by a slab of crystal, there is no obstruction between the rays of the lamp and the object to be revealed; because of this want of obstruction there can be conjunction between the two resulting in perception.

Lastly, things placed on a frying pan (Bharjana kapāla) the earthen frying pan get burned by the heat of fire, there is conjunction between the object placed on the pan and the fire bellow the pan because of the lack of any obstruction. And this conjunction causes burning in as much as the element of fire (tejas) does not act without getting conjoined.

The word ‘non-obstruction’ is being repeatedly used. Non-obstruction of an object means the absence of being totally blocked by another object, the blocking object having no space separating its parts (avyuhyamāna avayava). In other words, it is the absence of any factor counteracting the cause of any action i.e. the want of the cancellation of conjunction. As it is observed, the cold touch of water contained within a jar is perceived on the outer side of the jar also. The touch of a substance, which is not in contact with the sense organ, is not perceived. It is also observed that water oozes out (parisravāṇa) and comes out in droplets (parispanda) from a jar. Therefore, there being no obstruction separating the visual rays from an object beyond a pane of glass or a sheet of mica etc. the contact between them is possible and as such there is the perception of the object.

The Jainas further argued: “it cannot be claimed that the visual
sense is obstructed by a pane of glass etc. because it leads to the absurdity of imputing the characters of something to something else”. Gotama says:

\[ नेत्यं तत्वमप्रसादोऽपि निःस्वभावस्य \]

To this the answer of Gotama is: An object screened off by a pane of glass etc. is perceived just as the image perceived in the mirror and water, because these are transparent by nature. He says:

\[ आदशालकारो यथादशायायं तत्वमावश्यम\]

Vātyāyana makes this point by saying thus:

\[ आदशालकारो यथादशायायं तत्वमावश्यम् \]

It means, transparency (prasāda), which is a special quality, is found in a mirror and water and it is a specific quality of only such things, because this is uniformly observed. It is the nature of transparency to reflect an image (rūpaupalambhana). The visual rays make an impact on the mirror and being rebounded back, come in contact with one’s own face, which perception is called the cognition of image. The cause of this cognition is the mirror, which is aided by its transparency; with the loss of this quality of mirror there can be no such cognition. But in the case of wall etc., there is no such cognition of an image. Thus, because of the specific nature of the different substance, a pane of glass or a sheet of mice etc. does not obstruct the
visual rays while they get obstructed by the wall etc.

The Creation (Creation of śarīra):

The main objection raised against the Jaina in this topic is on the creation of śarīra. In Nyāyasūtra III. II. 68 t0 72 Gotama has recorded some arguments of Jaina logicians regarding the process of the creation of the body (śarīra) immediately after refuting the view of Sāṃkhya and yoga philosophers on this issue. The question is: whether it is produced from dharma and adharma or not. Gotama presents the view of Jaina philosophers and examines it exclusively and finally refutes that as it leads to absurdity. In some five sutras, the whole analysis is presented. The sutras are:

तदद्यत्मकारितातिनि चेतु पुनस्तत्वसंग्रस्तृत्वसंपर्वर्ग।
मनाकर्मानितात्त्ववृद्ध संयोगानुभवेत।
निर्द्वित्तत्त्वसंग्रस्तृत्व प्राप्तानुभवत।
अपुरुषामतत्त्वात्त्ववृद्धत्त्वात।
नाकृष्टत्त्वायामप्रसंग्रात्।¹⁵

Commenting on this, Vātyāyana presents the Jaina view ‘the body is produced by adṛśṭa as being a quality of the atoms. In the system of Jaina philosophy, adṛśṭa is only a quality of the atoms as well as the mind and produces movement in them. Being moved by it, the atoms get conjoined with one another and produce the body. The mind being moved by the adṛśṭa, which is its own quality i.e. which is located in it, gets into such a body and the knower has the cognitions in a body as endowed with the mind.
Following Gotama, Vātyāyana tries to refute this point of the Jainas. He has forwarded the same arguments to refute the samkhya philosophers, namely that if it is so, then there is a possibility of the body being produced even after liberation due to the absence of destruction of the quality of adṛśta. If adṛśta be a cause of the body as a quality of the atoms, the body may be produced even after liberation, for, adṛśta being a quality of the atoms cannot be destroyed. Vātyāyana says:

अदृश्य नाम परमाणुनां गुणविशेषः क्रियाहेतुस्त्ते त्रिविद्यां परमाणकः समुद्भिताः।
शरीरयुक्तप्रक्षेपवलिति तत् गति समाविषविति संयुक्तास्त्ते प्रेरितो शरीरे।
इत्यदृश्यस्तरं दशने गुणानुक्षेत्रद्वितिकाश्वसकर्त्तव्यं अपकर्त्त।
शरीरोपले परमाणुगनस्याक्षरश्चाल्लवदिति ॥१६॥

Further, Gotama says: if the conjunction of the mind with the body be due to the adṛśta located in the mind, the conjunction can never be destroyed. Vātyāyana makes this point clear by saying that if it is admitted that the mind gets conjoined with the body because of being moved by the adṛśta, which is located as a quality in the mind itself the said conjunction can never be destroyed. And even if we accept the Jainas view then what would be the cause of the mind’s movement out of the body at the time of the death? If, on the other hand adṛśta is admitted to be the quality of self, it can be explained by saying that when some particular adṛśta, is destroyed through the enjoyment of its result the mind is made to move out of the body by some other particular adṛśta, which has started yielding its results.

Then, he records some further argument of the Jainas: let it be
accepted that the mind moves out of the body because of its own adṛṣṭa? That is, let the same adṛṣṭa, as is the cause of mind’s moving into the body be also the cause of its moving out of the body. He says:

यो दृष्टाः शरीरोपसर्पणहेतुः स एवापर्वणहेतुपीति | १७ |

To this, Vāpyāyana says, no, because the same adṛṣṭa cannot be the cause of both life and death. To explain it he says: if the Jaina’s view is accepted, it would follow that the same adṛṣṭa is the cause of both life, when the mind moves out of the body. This, however, cannot be logically justified.

न एकस्य जीवनप्रायणहेतुत्वानुपलिते | एवं चतुर्व एकादश्च जीवनप्रायणप्रायोहेतुतृति प्राप्तम्,
नैतिकुपपति | १८ |

To explain further, Gotama says: there would be the absurdity of the body being eternal, for, death cannot be explained. Death results when, due to the gradual diminution of adṛṣṭa through the enjoyment of its result, the body falls and there is rebirth due to some other adṛṣṭa. If the production of the body is admitted to be due to only the material elements not depending upon adṛṣṭa, what entity would there be the gradual diminution of which may be said to be the cause of the falling of the body and death. Thus, death being logically unjustified, we would be led to the absurd conclusion that the body is eternal. And, if death is admitted to be merely accidental, the different kinds of death cannot be justified. That is, each person dies under some specific condition. Someone dies at an early age, someone in the mother’s womb, and someone in the ripe old age and
so on. This shows that death too has some specific cause and is not merely accidental.

Further, the Jaina philosophers argue that just as the uncaused black colour of an atom, when destroyed by conjunction with fire is never produced again, so also the body, which is produced by *adrṣṭa*, as located in the atoms and the mind is not produced once again after its destruction. Vātyāyana says:

                                                                   यथा अणोः श्यामः नित्या अति संयोगेन प्रतिविद्धा न पुनरुत्पत्ते एवमुद्दत्कारिति  
                                                                   शरीरसमस्यामुननास्यदत्त इति  
                                                                   20

Udyotakara, the author of *Nyāyāvatārika* explains the implication of the opponent as follows. The black colour of an atom of earth, though uncaused, is destroyed by conjunction with fire. Similarly, the *adrṣṭa* located as a quality in the atoms and the mind, though uncaused, is destroyed by ‘right knowledge’ (*tattva jñāna*). 

As such, due to the complete destruction of the *adrṣṭa*, no further body is produced after liberation.

Gotama’s answer to this objection is that, this argument does not stand to logic, because there follows the absurdity of acquiring the result of an action not performed. He says: the uncaused-ness of the black colour of an atom is not a proper instance, because of the absurdity of accepting what is not proved (*akṛtābhyaśagama*). The word ‘*akṛta*’ means what is not justified by any *pramāṇa* and the word ‘*abhyaśagama*’ means admitting it i.e. accepting it as true. Thus,
one adhering to the instance of the previous śūtra has to admit what is
not established by any pramāṇa. The uncaused-ness of the black
colour of an atom cannot, therefore, be a proper instance. Neither
perception nor inference establishing that the black colour of an atom
is uncaused has been cited. Hence, the instance as stated here only is
similar to the probandum of an inference. That is the black colour is
actually produced by some specific cause. As such, its uncaused-ness,
which is unduly accepted by the Jainas, is not yet proved and cannot
be cited as an instance.

Further, Vātāyana makes this point more clear by giving three
alternatives arguments namely that, the view of the Jainas cannot be
accepted because of the absurdity of the acquiring the result of an
action not performed. One who tries to explain the production of the
body as independent of adṛśta with the instance of the black colour of
the atom would have to face the absurdity of acquiring the result of
an action not performed. That is, there arises the absurdity that the
self has to feel pleasure and pain even without performing the
actions, which are the causes of those particular pleasure and pain.
The view of one who answers in the affirmative i.e. may even accept
the above possibility is contradicted by perception, inference and
verbal testimony. He says:

अथ वा नाकृताभ्यामप्रसंगात् अपूर्वायंतादृष्टान्तोनान्तऽन्निमित्तं शरीरोपत्तिः
समादधानस्याकृताभ्यामप्रसंगात् | अकृते सुखदुःखहेतुकर्मणि पृम्पवस्य सुख
दुःखनिमित्ततत्त्तिः प्रसंगेत् | अभिनति बुद्धतः प्रत्यक्षानुभावानिविशेषः |²¹

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Vātyāyana further explains the contradiction with perception as follows. The different kinds of pleasure and pain of all the living beings are known perceptually, for, they are internally cognized by each self. They may be intense, mild, lasting, short-lived, of many fold types, of only one type and so on, and these are the points of difference. But following Jaina’s view these are no specific cause for pleasure and pain viz. adṛṣṭa as located in each individual self, and a specific effect is not observed to be produced unless there is a specific cause. If on the other hand, the sensation of pleasure and pain are admitted to be due to adṛṣṭa, the difference in the various form of pleasure and pain can be explained to be due to the presence of intensity or mildness in the adṛṣṭas, virtuousness or viciousness of the actions leading to the collections of the adṛṣṭa’s and many-fold-ness or the same ness of adṛṣṭa’s. Thus, in the Jaina’s view the defense in the various forms of pleasure and pain, which is an observed fact cannot be explained due to the absence of the cause and this is nothing but contradiction with perception.

He presented further to point out contradiction with inference.

He says:

दृष्टि हि पुनर्गुणात्मकस्वभावात् सुखदुःखेयस्थानम् | य खलु चेतनावनं साधननिर्वर्तनीयं
सुखं बुद्धमा तदन्विज्ञातमस्य यथायते स सुखश्च यववते न किरित | यथाः साधन
निर्वर्तनीयं | सुखं बुद्धमा तत्ज्ञाताम्बि साधन परिवर्तनाव यथायते स च दुःखश्च
लक्ष्यते न किरित | अस्ति चेत यत्तमानेण चेतनावनं सुखदुःखेयस्थानं तेनापि
चेतागुणात्मक्यस्थानकृत्तेन भवितमयस्मित्तुष्टानाम् | तदत्तदेकर्मनिर्बिको भूष्टुष्टाने
विरुध्यते इति | तत्त्व गुणात्मकसंवेद्यालाम्बे विपक्षकालविन्यासात्मकताः |
It means, the restriction of pleasure and pain is due to the restriction of the quality viz. the internal effort in the self of a person. That is, only a person, whose self is characterized by a an internal effort for pleasure or pain experiences pleasure and pain. Only a conscious person who becomes aware that pleasure is to be produced by some particular means and being desirous of attaining the pleasure strives to get the means it can have the sensation of pleasure and not one who is the opposite i.e. who does not act in the above manner will not enjoy pleasure and pain. Again, one who becomes aware that pain is to be produced by some particular means and being desirous of avoiding the pain, strives to avoid the means it does not have the sensation of pain and not one who is the opposite. But it is a fact that sometimes pleasure and pain are restricted to i.e. produced the different conscious persons even without such internal effort, when the cause of pleasure or pain appears suddenly and there is no scope for the person’s deliberation. It is, thus, inferred that the sudden pleasure and pain, which is not due to internal effort must be due to the restriction i.e. presence of some other quality viz. adṛṣṭa of the conscious self. If the sensation of pleasure and pain are admitted to be independent of adṛṣṭa, the above inference becomes contradicted. The other quality of the self, established by the above inference is called adṛṣṭa, because it is imperceptible. It is also not restricted to a particular point of time, because no specific point of time for the production of its result can be cited beforehand and as such, it can be
the cause of sudden pleasure and pain. Besides, the other qualities of the self like knowledge, internal efforts etc. are destroyed in the third moment after production. Thus, they cannot be the cause of sudden pleasure and pain at a later period.

Further, Vātyāyana explains the contradiction with verbal testimony.

The means, there are śāstras embodying the various percepts of the rṣis concerning the performance of avoidance of different acts. The results of these percepts are the different person’s caste (Varṇa) and stage of life (āśrama) as well as their being prevented from the harmful acts i.e. avoiding them. These two forms of activity viz. being engaged to and being prevented from ceremonies, prescribed by śāstras are in contradiction with the view that there is neither virtue nor vice and the sensation of pleasure and pain of the persons are not due to adṛśta. That is, if there is neither virtue nor vice, nobody would either performs the pious acts or refrains from the harmful ones.

In this manner, Vātyāyana rejects the view of the Jainas by stating that the production of the body is not dependent upon adṛśta and that the sensations of pleasure and pain are not due to adṛśta are only some false notions of the most sinful ones.
All objects are eternal (sarvanityatvavāda):

The nature of reality as proposed by the Jainas is refuted by the Naiyāyikas. We have already discussed in detailed the nature of reality in our introductory chapter. Still, for convenience we reproduced few points to frame the arguments of the Jainas. While making a critical analysis by Gotama in his Nyāyasūtra, IV. I. 33, has recorded the Jaina concept of object i.e. ‘all objects are eternal’ and has criticized it, by pointing out faults in it, after criticizing the Sāmkhya view on the same issue. Vātyāyana presents the position of the Jaina philosophers, without naming them. In Tātparyatīka, Vācaśpati Mishra also has mentioned that this is the view of Svayambhū [738-840 A. D], a Jaina philosopher.

Before going to the actual treatment of Svayambhū by Vātyāyana, let us put in clear terms the position of the Jainas on the concept of dravya. Since, dravya is defined as of having three characteristics in the name of utpāta, vyaya and dhrauvya, it implies that in some sense and from the point of view of substance, all realities are eternal. For, in all changes, and of destructions the basic substance continues to exist. Thus, Jaina maintained that everything was eternal, which is known as ‘Sarvanityatvavāda’ of the Jainas.

Vātyāyana presents the position of Svayambhu that ‘only some particular property of the basic material (upādāna) which is everlasting (avasthita) is destroyed and again only some particular
property of the same is produced. Production and destruction are
spoken of in relation to such properties only and not in relation to the
basic material. The particular property, which is said to be produced,
exists even before its production as latent in the basic material. And
also the particular property, which is said to be destroyed, even after
its destruction are latent in the basic material. Thus, all the objects are
to be viewed as eternal. He asserts:

अवस्थितस्योपादनस्य धर्माक्तिः निवर्तते धर्माक्तिस्यमुपजायते सं खल्पूत्रस्यविनाशयोविशयः |
वच्चर्णापजाते तत्रामाप्यपनानादस्ति, यथा निवर्तते तत्रित्वोदस्तीति।

Vācāśpati Mishra summarized it by stating that the
modification undergone by substances is of three kinds viz. (a)
modification of properties (b) modification of condition and (c)
modification of age. For instance, the original substance ‘gold’ in
lump becomes modified into the ear-ring and here we have the
modification of the property as shape of the ‘gold’. When the ear-ring
is broken and made into the bracelet, we have the modification of
condition i.e. the ear-ring has renounced its present and reverted to
the past condition and the bracelet has removed its future and
reverted to the present condition. In the beginning bracelet was new,
young and now at this time it becomes old. So here we have the
modification of age. But the original gold remains constant all the
time. He says:

अपरे सव नित्यमित्यथार्थं वर्ण्यति | निर्विशेष्क खल्वयं धर्मिणः परिणामो धर्म- |
लक्षणावस्थारूपः | तदु यथा सुवर्णं धर्मिः, तस्य परिणामो कर्मानुचकारं: धर्मस्य तु न | 
लक्षणपरिणामोनागतति: | यदा खल्वयं सुवर्णकारो कर्माननकं महा-क्वतर्चकं रचयति तदा
This position of the Jaina philosophers, has been refuted by Gotama. To him and the logicians in general, the view of the Jaina philosophers cannot be accepted, because in that case, the respective difference (vyavasthā) in certain cases cannot be justified. He says:

‘na vyavasthānupapatteh’

While commenting on this sūtra, Vātāyana argues that if the Jainas’ view is accepted, the respective difference between production and destruction as expressed by this namely ‘this is the production of a property’ and ‘this is the destruction of a property’ cannot be justified. There can also be no justification of the respective difference as expressed thus ‘only this particular property is produced and not any other’ and ‘only this particular property is destroyed and not any other’. Because there is no difference so far as the presence of the properties are concerned. That is, both the produced and the destroyed properties being equally ever present non can be spoken of as ‘exclusively produced’ or exclusively destroyed’.
He argues:

अयमुपजनं इत्य निवृतिरिति व्यवस्था नोपपदाः, उपजात निवृत्तयोविद्यमानल्वात् । अर्थं धर्मं
उपजातोदयं निवृत्त इति सत्त्वभावविवेच्याद्वयवस्था | 26

Further, he argues that the specific difference with reference to
time namely ‘the production of a property or the destruction of a
property relates to this particular point of time and not to that
particular point of time’ cannot be justified. Because a property
whether produced or destroyed remains the same always.

Furthermore, the specific difference between a property with
production and destruction and a property without production and
destruction as expressed in the form ‘this particular property only has
been produced and destroyed and not any other’, cannot be justified,
because they have no difference due to the fact that both of them
remain always. He asserts:

इदानीमुपजनातितृली नेदानीमिति कालवस्था नोपपदाः सर्वदा विद्यमान त्वात् अस्य
धर्मस्योपजननिवृत्ती नास्ययति व्यवस्थानुपस्तः, उपवोरिविवेच्यात् | 27

Again, nor can the specific difference with reference to time
such as this property existed in the past or this property will exist in
the future be justified, because existence (sadbhāva) is indicative of a
relation in the present time only. That is, in the Jainas view all the
properties exist always. This means that they are always related to the
present time and hence, they can be spoken of as related neither the
past not to the future.
On the other hand if it is admitted that production means the appearance of what had been previously absent and the destruction means the disappearance of what had been previously present, these charges can be avoided. Therefore, the claim made by the Jaina that property exists even before its production and that it remains even after being destroyed is illogical and hence absurd. He says:

अनागतोत्तील इति च काल्यक्यस्थापनापति, वर्तमानस्य सद्भावलक्षणादलृ |
अविद्यामानस्यांलाम उपजनो विद्यामानस्यांलामहि निदृश्यितस्येततस्मिन् शति नैते दोषः |
तस्माहृदुक्तः प्रागपुष्पनादस्तिर निवृत्त चास्ति तदसुकृतिः ॥

If we observed the whole analysis by Vātyāyana and his followers we noticed that the arguments is based on supposing the entire reality, the reality as a whole to be eternal, which is not the position of the Jainas, as explained elsewhere with example clarify that the Jainas are anekāntavādins. All assertions are partial from the point of view of their material substance. The substance gold continues to exist in all modes in all modification in all time and all space and hence, it is eternal. Thus, from the point of view of the continuity of this material substance the dravya in called eternal and hence, no contradiction and absurdity of any kind can be noticed in Jainas position. The Jainas never said that dravyas or realities are eternal. On the other hand to them, from the point of view of their changing modes, they are non-eternal. It is no surprising to note even ātmā is transitory from the point of view of its mode.
On avayava i.e. components of inferential cognition:

In the context of inferential cognition (anumiti) the place of Nyāya philosophy is very high. It is generally accepted that inference is the prime issue in the Nyāya philosophy. That is the reason why sometimes Nyāya is identified with the inference. Inference is of two types viz. inference for one's own sake (svārthānumāna) and inference for the sake of others (parārthānumāna). The second one is more complicated one owing to its involvement with dialogue between two persons i.e. vādi and prativādi, which produces the inferential cognition in the third person.

In the process of anumiti the components of inferential cognition i.e. avayava or syllogism are very much important. We have divergent views regarding the actual number of the components of inference. For instance, for the Mīmāṃsakas the number of components are three viz. pratijñā, hetu and udāharaṇa or hetu, udāharana and nigamana; for Buddhist two viz. pratijñā and hetu or sometimes hetu only. However Jainas have postulated ten avayavas, though in later period some Jaina philosophers have accepted five due to the influence of Nyāya philosophy. Sāmkhya has also the same (ten) number, but in Nyāya five avayavas are postulated implicitly in the process of inferential cognition.

In the Nyāyasūtra I. I. 32. Gotama has enumerated five avayavas:

क्रियारूप स्व-प्रत-हेतु-विकारतः सिद्धान्तविनिति निमित्ताये॥

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Second chapter

*Bhāsyakāra* Vātyāyana, *Vārtikāra* Udyotakara, *Tātparyaṭikākāra* Vācaśpati Mishra and *Vṛttikāra* Viśvanātha have commented on these sutras. While commenting upon these, they have recorded ten *avayavas* as the view of the opponent and also have rejected those and have established their own view. Unfortunately none of them have recorded the source of the reference. In the English translation of *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya* of Deviprasad chattopadyaya and Mrinalikanta Gangopadhyaya there is a reference to this source. From a passage in the *Yūktidīpikā*, a commentary on Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s *Sāmkhyakārikā* it appears that a section of *Sāmkhya* philosophers held such a view. Phanibhusana in his ‘Nyāya philosophy’ however, points out that the view held by them is not exactly the same as referred by Vātyāyana. Dhundirāja Śāsthri in his Hindi commentary of *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya* has clearly mentioned that this view is of *Jaina* logicians, more particularly of *Bhadrabāhu*, the last *śruta kavalin* in that tradition. In his text *Daśavaikālikasūtravṛtī* he has also mentioned the same number and the same name, which is rejected by Vātyāyana by stating that these extra five *avayavas* are not necessary for inferential process. He says:

दशाध्वयादेके नैदैविका वाक्ये संच्छल्लेते, जिज्ञासा संस्क्रिय: यथाग्रामम् प्रयोजनं संशयव्युदास

The additional five *avayavas* are: *jijñāsā* i.e. inquiry, *samsaya* i.e. doubt, *sakya-prāpti* i.e. apprehension of the potency, *prayaṇa* i.e. incentive and *samsayavyudāśa* i.e. dispelling of doubt.

He, then, has defined all these additional *avayavas* and rejected on the ground that they do not prove any object.
Then we may discuss those additional members of syllogism one by one following Vātāyana’s exposition. The first one in the additional series is ‘jijnāsā’. According to him inquiry i.e. jijnāsā is that which provokes the desire for definite knowledge of an object. He defines:

तत्तत्तयमानेतर्थ्य वाच्यार्थ्यम प्रवचिन्तिकञ्चनः ॥

Why does one inquiry about an abject vaguely known? Because after ascertaining the true nature of the object one will either seek for it, go away from it or remain indifferent to it. Thus, the result of ascertaining the true nature of the object is either the knowledge, which produces aversion, or knowledge, which produces attraction, or knowledge, which produces indifference. One is led to inquire for the sake of such knowledge.

अप्रतिमानांतर्थ्य कर्माण्तिज्ञासात् । तं तपचतो ज्ञातं हास्यादी चोपायदस्य उपेक्षिते वेदितं ॥ ताता हास्यादीगुणादियमुद्दत्वाति ज्ञानार्थ्यतयाम जिज्ञासात् । सस्य खलु इत्यत्वाभासार्थ्योपदेशिते ॥

However such an inquiry does not prove the existence of any object and as such is redundant as a component of inferential cognition.

The second member of syllogism rejected by the logicians is ‘śakyaprāpti’ i.e. the apprehension of potency. The apprehension of potency (śakyaprāpti) is defined by him as the determination for the knower that the pramāṇas are capable of revealing the prameyas. It is not related as a component to the propositions proving a thesis

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(sādhaka vyākya i.e. inference component) as are the preliminary statement of the thesis. He says:

अन्य प्रमाणोऽयोग साबृहिं मयां सत्यवियत्तां साधकर्ष्य ब्रह्मव्यया भाग्ये ज्ञाते प्रतिशासि विविधालि | 34

Prayājana is defined by him as, the determination of truth (tattva). It is the result arrived at by the propositions providing a thesis and not a component part of this group of propositions. He asserts:

प्रयोजनं तत्त्वात्मारं सत्यास्त्यात्मकस्य वाक्यस्य फलं नैकेकदेश इति | 35

Similarly, Samśayavyudāsa i.e. dispelling of doubt is the demonstration of the defect in the opponent’s thesis. It serves the purpose of arriving at the knowledge of truth by negating it. But it is not a component part of group of propositions proving a thesis.

संयुक्तारं सत्यास्त्यात्मकस्य फलं नैकेकदेश इति | 36

The Nyāya philosophers have criticized these additional member of syllogism with the ground that these additional components of inferential cognition are not required to prove the existence of any object or in other words these are not related as a component to the propositions proving a thesis i.e. sādhaka vākya. He observes:

वाक्यार्थं च संहत्तैः पञ्च निर्यादयतीत्वव्ययाः इत्युत्ते, न पुनः सासानायः

परप्रतिपदकस्य इत्येते न वाक्यव्ययाः इति | 37

Because the very definition of the inference component (avayava) is:

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It simply means that those inference components are the part of the sādhaka vākya called avayavas, which are directly related to the sādhaka vākya. Therefore, Udyotakara explains the real utility of the inference component in the sense that these are the pre-conditions for a debate, without inquiry etc. the question of the application of ‘Nyāya’ (avayava) does not arise. Thus, these five inquiry etc. are taken as the pre-conditions of the debate but not as a part of the sādhaka vākya by which the inferential cognition can be drawn.

The whole discussion on the member of syllogism as presented by Vācyāyana and his followers is logical. It has been rightly mentioned that the addition of five members of syllogism as included by the Jainas are not essential part or do not contribute directly to the productin of inferential cognition: As a matter of fact, same is the view of the Jainas that these steps are necessary for a beginner, for, who is not convergent with technicality of logical tradition. They also subscribe to the view that the members may be five or even less. In fact, if anything is objected to the Jainas in this regard is the none recognition of the distinction between the essential aspects of inferential cognition and the auxiliary factors indirectly involve in it. But before branding this assertion of the Jainas as illogical, it must be remembered the reference of ten numbered syllogism were found in the texts of the Jaina philosophers, which are composed far before the development of logic of the Jainas and the logical tradition of the
Indian philosophy in general. That is why, in later logical texts like Nyāyāvatāra, Prameyakamalamārtanda, Pramāṇanayatattvālaṅkāra, Pramaṇamimamsā and syādvādanaṅjari etc. we have the prescription of five-member syllogism, to which there cannot be any objection. In conclusion it may be mentioned that the Jaina philosophers adopted a practical approach to the problem keeping in conformity with their non-absolutistic standpoint. Thus, the number of syllogism depends on the caliber of the person to whom it is addressed. Accordingly it may be ten or five or three or two or even one. None of the alternatives is to be rejected.

On Pramaṇavāda:

Different theories are proposed by different philosophers as to the validity of one's judgment. For example, the western philosophers have provided two main theories of the test of the truth of knowledge viz. correspondence and coherence. In the same manner Indian philosophers also have provided two opinions viz. svatahpramāṇya and partahpramāṇya. According to the paratahpramāṇya theory we have to resort outside test for the verification of the validity or invalidity of our judgment. But according to the svatahpramāṇya theory the very condition that bring forth valid or invalid cognition make known as the case may be the validity or invalidity of that judgment.

Sāmkhyas maintain that both validity and invalidity are inherent in the cognition itself. Naiyāyikas on the other hand, hold
that both are proved by something else, i.e. external causes such as
inference, etc. The Buddhists are of the opinion that invalidity inheres
in all cognitions, but validity is established by something else. The
Mimāṃśakas and the Vedāntins believe that validity is self-evident
and invalidity is determined by external causes.39 Jaina thinkers say
that 'the validity is either determined intrinsically or extrinsically.'40
The determination of validity is in some cases achieved by a
cognition by itself. As for instance, is the habitual cognition of one’s
own palm induced by a repeated course of experience or the direct
achievements of results such as by the acts of bathing, drinking etc.,
there occurs cessation of heat, thirst etc. and this alone gives final
satisfaction to the subject and a person does not feel an urge for
further scrutiny of his cognition. This shows that validity is self-
determined, i.e. intrinsic. On some occasions, the experience of
validity is secured by means of an external datum. We may point out,
for instance, to the primal perceptual cognition unconfirmed by
repeated experience. Since such cognition has not as yet been
ascertained to stand in unfailing correspondence with the object, its
validity is determined by a subsequent confirmatory cognition of the
same object, or by a cognition of its pragmatic consequences, or by
the cognition of an object invariably concomitant with it. This
establishes the fact that validity is determined by other means, i.e.
extrinsic.

Jayantabhaṭṭa, [9th c. A. D.] of course, is following the position
of Nyāya philosophy i.e. paratahprāmāṇya, have criticized the
positions of other philosophers. In this context, he has taken the position of the Jaina philosophers for refutation after criticizing the position of the Mimāṃsakas. At the beginning he presents the Jaina position and then refutes by showing fault in it.

According to Jaina philosophy the truth of the knowledge of an object that has been frequently obtained when the knower has moved, for, it is self-evident and the truth of the knowledge of an object, which has not been frequently obtained by the knower proceeding for, it is extrinsically determined. Jayantabhaṭṭa presents:

अभ्यस्ते विषये स्वतः प्रामाण्यम्, अभ्यस्ते तु परतः | तत्रार्थसात् प्रामाण्यविनिश्चितं स्वतं न | अनन्यासे तु परतः ||\(^{41}\)

But he holds that when an object has been frequently moved for and obtained the knowledge of such an object is intrinsically true. He really does not follow what he preaches though his attention has been invited to his statement.

सोश्यं अभ्यस्ते विषये इति व ब्रदीति स्वतंतर प्रामाण्यम् मन्यत इति स्वयमेवाल्मानं कस्यवासानं न चत्वरते ||\(^{42}\)

Repetition literally means the doing of an act again and again. When it applies to the obtaining of an object it has a secondary sense. It signifies the frequent movement towards an object. When we very often perceive our body or the walls of our house or a post erected in our house, we have an opportunity of verifying our perception a thousand times by an actual movement. Thus, the successful movement has established the truth of such perceptions. The truth of such perception is not self-evident. The repetition, which applies to
the obtaining of an object, can have no other sense. Hence, the statement of the Jaina philosophers is an absurdity. Therefore, the validity of knowledge is extrinsically determined. Thus, he concludes:

अभ्यासो हि नाम पुनः पुनः प्रयोगः क्रियायाः अभ्यासितः | विचारस्थ साम्यस्तता भूषणमुः प्रवृत्तिः अतर्थः स्वर्शारीराः. निजात्युक्तं कायस्तम्भम्बधिविस्तं से वाक्स उग्रः प्रवृत्ति संवादश्रीराः जनताः प्रामाण्यनिर्वचनः उत्को भवति | स्वतः अभ्यस्तस्य चायस्ता न भवेदिति यत्कर्मिनेदैवत् | तत्स्तात् परस्तः प्रामाण्यनिर्वचनः सिद्धम् ।

On Śabda grahaṇa prakriyā (The process of hearing the sound):

In the context of the manifestation of a letter or production of a letter, sound (śabda) Jayantabhaṭṭa has presented the Jaina position on the process of hearing (the grahaṇa prakriyā) and criticized it by showing fault in it, after refuting the Sāmkhya view. According to Jainism a sound is a whole and is constituted by a number of minute particles. Thus, created, it proceeds from its place of origin towards the ears of a person. Thus it is heard. He says: each letter consists of parts. They are changing particles. They constitute the whole.

succinctly: शब्दपुरुषगतेश्वरकार्यसिद्धां शब्द स्वप्रमाणयुक्तं निक्षेप्य प्रतिपुरुषं कर्मभूतसमृद्धिः

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Then he provides some arguments against this position. He argues that these particles are never perceived. Their process of combination is consequently imperceptible. Each letter has its particular combination of parts. So which letter is constituted by which combination? He writes:
Further, the constituents of a letter are very tight. They have been combined by no body. They cannot frame whole in the space of a letter as a very tight and impact body. Thus, why is not the whole viz. a letter, which is very light, deflected from its path by the blowing wind? Again if it dashed against a tree then why is it not shattered into pieces?

Further, how long does such a weak letter move on to reach its destination? When it enters the ear of a person how is it also heard by other persons? If it is held that it comes out from the ear of that person and goes into the ear of another person then how will the Jaina philosophers explain the simultaneous hearing of a letter by many persons? He says:

Again he has questioned that if the Jaina philosophers hold that many letters are simultaneously created by a speaker in accordance with the number of hearers then it will be pointed out that so many
letters cannot be created by the single articulation or effort of a speaker. Even if we admit that each hearer has a distinct letter to hear then the possibility of the simultaneous hearing of a single letter by many persons is simply ruled out. He argues:

श्रीतुलसंख्यानुसारेण न नानावर्णसंयमः
वकुशतुलस्यायत्त श्रीतुलसंख्यायः।॥

At the end, Jayantabhaṭṭa criticized the Jaina philosophers particularly the Digambara Jaina philosophers by simply neglecting their hypothesis with a very sarcastic expression. He comments that we shall not discuss much about the keenness of the intellect of the naked one (Digambara Jaina) since when they display their intellect to defend their hypothesis the critics simply laugh at their defense. He says:

तदलं परिहासस्य महतो हेतुमूलया
नगरक्षणक्षार्यप्रजाखातुरिचन्द्रसः॥

On Āgama or Šabda pramāṇa:

Both the Naiyāyikas and Jainas have accepted the authority of Šabda or agama pramāṇa. In fact all the systems of Indian philosophy with the exception of Cārvāka postulate Šabda as a valid means of proof, though there is difference of opinion on the minute details of the pramāṇa. For example, when most of the theist prescribes Veda etc, as authority, to the Jainas, only their scriptures are valid and are included under pramāṇa, the Veda etc, are not
pramāṇa. Bhāṣṛvajña in his Nyāyabhusāṇa has refuted the view of the Jainas.

In the context of authoritativeness of Veda, Bhāṣṛvajña has rejected the authoritativeness of Jainas’ āgamas i.e. scriptures, owing to its dissimilarity with the Vedas. He argues that many people have accepted the scriptures of the Jainas though there is no proof. And because it is accepted by many people that is why it should be accepted as an authority alike the Vedas, is not proper. It should be taken as otherwise. He says:

ननु जिनाधामभोजि दृश्चं प्रयोजनं विनायि बुद्धिर्मूढ़ीतत्सैन तत्स्वाधि प्रमाण्यन्येष्ठायम्, न अन्यथा तत्स्व ग्रहणात् ॥ ⁵¹

He has provided the argument as to why the scriptures of the Jainas are not considered as authority alike the Vedas. He asserts that these scriptures of the Jainas are complied by Jainas who are desirous to get fame and describing the study of agamas as the giver of more fruits (falatiśaya), by some ill-fated Brāhmīns who have cheated by the advice of the Jainas as it can remove the sorrow and sufferings, who had suffered from poverty, and by the śūdras who have interested to learn being heard that due to learning one can get great luck and those who were prohibited to learn the Vedas. And like the Vedas these scriptures of the Jainas are not remembered by the Vanastha i.e. the pupils those who are studying at the Gurukūlas or the āśramas i.e. the monastery and by the abahisthas i.e. the house holds. And further, alike the Vedas the scriptures of the Jainas are not taught to three varṇas by the Brāhmīns. Therefore, the
authoritativeness of the Jaina scriptures cannot be accepted alike the Vedas. He says:

अध्ययनाध्यापनेन महामायव शुद्धा शुद्धा के धीदययनाध्यायुन्मुक्ते संजाताते धार्मिकारितेन वेदांगोचरतमामना जिनाइना ख्यातिमिलित भ्रमणीतागृहायवके कलातिष्ठायपर्वत्य प्रवर्तिताः सत्त्वके तथाविधा प्रवर्तिताः, तैरयन्त्रे ब्राह्मणादयोगिं कचन गन्धर्ज्ञा दारिक्षवदुक्त सत्त्वावेशु दुःख ध्यानदेशेन प्रतार्थ्य प्रवर्तिताः इत्येव तदागम प्रवर्य गता, न वेदांगकस्मीपि सर्गागमासहिनुक्तौ तैस्व कण्ठरथ कियले, नापि ब्राह्मणाॅनाध्ययनानस्त्रिमिरेव व्यक्तिमानिना प्रचयं गता|तदस्मय वेदविज्ञनाध्ययनाममपि प्रमाणं प्रस्तुच्यते |52

Further, he argues that the Jainas have proclaimed that there are three types of Vedic sentences viz. ‘pramāṇāni’ i.e. authoritative sentences, apramāṇāni’ i.e. unauthoritative sentences, and ‘sandigdhapramāṇāni’ i.e. doubtful sentences. This is not correct; because the sentences written by ‘sarvajña’ i.e. omniscient have to be authoritative. Similarly, the sentences written by ‘asarvajña’ i.e. the person having limited knowledge has to be unauthoritative (apramāṇa). Thus, the Vedic sentences have to be authoritative owing to it being composed by the omniscient or Īśvara. Thus, he asserts:

यचोबं त्रिथा वेदवाक्यानि-प्रमाणानि-अप्रमाणानि-सन्दिभप्रमाणानि इति | तदनुपप्तं असर्वंप्रमाणीताः हि वाच्यानि कदाचिदप्रमाणयमपि सम्माथते, सर्वंप्रमाणीताः त्वप्रमाणायार्यादात्तमदनुपप्ति | तता चोकम्
रागामान्त्यदिनित्यस्मग्नस्वतादनूतें वदेवं
ते चेष्टे न विवाहते स वृहात् कथमयः ||53

Further, he says that even the scriptures of the Jainas are not to be considered as ‘pūrva-pakṣārtha’ i.e. the meaning provide by the
‘pūrvapakṣa,’ because its shortcomings and philosophical tenets (siddhāntas) are not stated; And if it would be taken as ‘pūrvapakṣa’ then its composer become ‘anāpta’ i.e. not authoritative person because these scriptures of the Jainas create confusion and apprehension in the mind of the listeners. Thus, he argues:

पूर्वपाक्षप्रचारणविद्यायुपमम्, तत्तुषणसिद्धान्तोपरिशिष्टे स्वाक्षरतयोगविधानानुवाचः।
अनेकथा हि श्रोतेः संमोहजनकन्तु तत्त्वादेव तत्त्वावल्लुक्तम्॥५४॥

He argues further that in the case of Vedas, ‘pūrvapakṣa’ and ‘siddhāntapakṣa’ is not possible, because these two i.e. pūrvapakṣa and siddhāntapakṣa can be possible in case of logical treatise (nyāyaśāstresu or yuṭiśāstresu). But in the case of Veda there cannot be any pūrvapakṣa argument or any siddhāntapakṣa argument for establishing any meaning. Because the Vedic sentences are being the final preaching have to be followed as the order of the father. We cannot provide any argument to support or to oppose it. But sometimes some philosophers are engaged in discussing some Vedic sentences with some arguments, this is nothing but the meaningless talk produced from the illusion (Bhramā), which is created from the practice of dry argumentation (suṣkatarakābhyaṣa). Thus, he says:

कि च युक्तिशास्त्रेण पूर्वपाक्षप्रचारणस्य क्रियते ।
वेदस्तवाज्ञासिद्धान्तेऽपि यथे निद्धित्तत॥ ॥
हृदयान्तर्वत्ताय युक्तिकथितां प्रतिपादित्तस्तवास्माचार्य तथाभविश्वास्यमभास्यमभास्यमविद्युत्ताय॥
पूर्वपाक्षप्रकृतिन्यान्तिनिहोत्वाद्विवेद्विवेद ध्यानमयम् ॥५५॥

Let us brief the whole criticism of Bhāsarvajña on the unauthoritative ness of the Jaina scriptures. To us, it appears that whatever arguments Bhāsarvajña has provided against the Jainas can be forwarded against the Naiyāyika as well logically. The only
assertion that the Vedas are ‘apauruseya’ hence cannot be liable to any falsehood is mere a belief and cannot be logically established. The Naiyāyikas have accepted along with Vedas, the validity of āpta vākya, which is the statement or expression of a trustworthy person. According to Bhāsarvajña validity is common to all, normal, to a seer as well an ordinary person. If that is true, how then one accept the Jaina’s as unauthoratative, because they are composed by human being. It must be noted that according to Jainas, the scriptures are the statements of ‘Tirthnakaras’ who are identified with the āptas of the Naiyāyikas. From the above discussion it may be noted that the way Bhāsarvajña has presented rather criticized the authoritativeness of the scriptures of the Jainas is not adequate because without giving very sound and systematic arguments he has criticized the Jaina agamas for the sake of mere criticism.

On classification of Pramāṇa:

We have already discussed in the introduction the Jaina classification of pramāṇa in detail. The two-fold classification of pramāṇa as pratyaksa and pāroksa is being criticized by Bhāsarvajña by stating that it is not experienced by any body. For example no one says that he has knowledge through indirect means of knowing. On the contrary every one has the experience that ‘I know through inference or perception or through the scriptures. He says:

प्रत्यक्षपरोक्षनेवेदत्र द्विविधे प्रत्यक्षादि प्राप्तिः।
न हि परोक्षाप्रत्यक्षादिपरोक्षा न ज्ञाती वै कथिताति
व्यवहार! क्षतिपुष्टिसंहो मया परोक्षाप्रत्यक्षाः ज्ञातामि अनुसरिते चास्बमेव वेदति।

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Further, there is no proof by which Jaina philosophers can maintain the indirect means of knowing i.e. parokṣa pramāṇa, its process, result and the validity of pramāṇa and its expression as in the case of perception, inference and scripture etc. And also there is no need to include inference and scripture into parokṣa pramāṇa. He argues:

निष्ठयोजनन्त्वावध यथा पूर्वकृष्णक्ष प्रमाणप्रतिपत्तिप्रतिपादनं
प्रत्यक्षादिना भेदनाभित्र यथोपजनम्। नैव परोक्षतैनुमानानायामयोः
संग्रहे प्रयोजेन्त किंचिददिति ॥५८

Again, if at all they need to establish this two-fold division due to love on their system, by accepting indirect pramāṇa as very general way which comprises inference and scripture with its separate definitions then we do not have any objection. Because it does not go against of our system, as we have accepted these three means of knowing separately. Jaina philosophers also cannot say that pratyakṣa and parokṣa means pratyakṣa and anumāna as accepted by many philosophers and agama pramāṇa is incorporated into inferential cognition; thus their two-fold division of means of knowing is not acceptable. But three fold division viz. pratyakṣa, anumāna and agama has to be accepted. He writes:

यदि पुनर्यथ स्वपक्षार्दूण दैवित्यमात्रित्वार्थ परोक्षं सामान्यं अधिव्यय दृष्टिरूपायनुमानानायी निजलक्षणी ब्रूति, ब्रूतितू कौसङ्ग निर्विहितता? न त्वैवप्रस्तावकं शैविध्य निवर्तते, अर्थाण हस्तसंकीर्णलक्षणप्रतिपादनादिति | अथ प्रत्यक्षानुमानादिति योर्धः स एवधः
प्रत्यक्ष परोक्षमाति तथापि न हिद्विधं एव | ततोस्तःतःतर्शयांगमस्यापि प्रमाणतत्त्वं | तस्य
चालुनानेनलाभं निफ़ल्यमां तस्य न प्रत्यक्षानुमानभेदनापि हिद्विधम् | तस्मात्

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From the above discussion one thing is very clear that Bhāsarvjaṇa though Naiyāyika accepted three-fold division of pramāṇas unlike other logicians who have accepted four fold divisions of pramāṇa. Another thing is that though Jaina philosophers have accepted two types of pramāṇa they have accepted other five sub-divisions of pramāṇa viz., smṛti pratyabhijñāna, tarka, anumāṇa, and āgama.

It may be observed that the Jaina’s classification of pramāṇa into two kinds namely pratyakṣa and parokṣa, is logical at least as they think. In one case the knowledge is quite independent, hence direct. In another, as for example, in the case of inference etc, they are depended on perception, hence, indirect. There is nothing wrong in holding so and any opposition to this supposition can be explained away. And if it is further classified into anuāṇa i.e. inference etc. it is also all right. But the acceptance of smṛti pratyabhijñāna, tarka etc. as independent pramāṇa does not sound logical. And if the Naiyāyikas have to object, they may object these three suppositions. Thus, instead of opposing or objecting the two-fold classifications of pramāṇa, what Bhāsarvajña or the Naiyāyikas would have objected to was the independentness of these pramāṇas, which they have not done. The reason for such negligence of the logicians, which is noticed through out their text is not far to seek, which we will be observing time and again.
On Anekantavāda:

Bhāsaryāṇa has presented the Jaina position on syādvāda in detail. He has recorded the arguments from Jaina point of view before examining them. He has quoted the argument as presented by Samantabhadra [600 c. A.D.] with reference to the three stages viz. ‘duḥkha’ i.e. unhappiness, ‘pramoda’ i.e. pleasure, and ‘mādhyastha’ i.e. indifferent. It means the nature of the reality can be explained with reference to these three states viz. ‘utpāda’ i.e. germination, ‘vyaya’ i.e. destruction and ‘drauvya’ i.e. continuation. According to Jainism, the whole realities can be divided into seven types viz. jīva i.e. soul, ajīva i.e. non-soul, āsrava i.e. influx, saṃvara i.e. stoppage of the influx, nirjarā i.e. restraint, bandha i.e. bondage, mokṣa i.e. liberation. These seven fold of reality should be understood in the light of syādvāda theory. And proper understanding of these seven fold of reality leads a person to liberation.

To sum up, the whole presentation of the Jaina position can be re-arranged in the following manner.
1. In the anekānta theory kuśala, akuśala, bandha and mokṣa is not possible, thus, we have to accept the anekānta theory.
2. Anekānta is established due to the three stages namely duḥkha, pramoda and mādhyasth of the soul.
3. It is possible in the theory of anekānta and mokṣa is possible through the true knowledge of seven tattvas, which are to be understood in the light of seven fold logic i.e. Satpabhanginaya.
Thus, he writes:

मित्यादित्ववर्त्तकावृष्डमार्गीस्यादिकालापटि, सत्याशेता सेवी दुखी च
स्त्रायां, तत्तुष्टभावाविनाशायां | नायनित्यं प्राणामवागमार्गस्त: तत्त्वादेकवाख्य प्राणः एव
ग्रहेऽपि, तदुक्तः -
"एकादशार्करकानाद्यस्व परदशिर्यामि |
कुशालाकुशालं कर्म वद्वाहीकृतं तु न व्यवजितं ||"
"कटमलसुसुत्वाणिः नासोलस्याद्योपेनुा च |
शोकप्रभोदमध्यस्त्रयं जनो जातिभावालकम ||"\(^{60}\)

Then, Bhāsarvijña has presented the Jaina concept of seven-fold division of reality and syādvāda theory and finally has refuted showing contradiction with these.

*Jīva* i.e. soul is of the nature of consciousness defined in terms of knowledge, pleasure, sorrow and desire etc. and contrast to it is called *ajīva* i.e. non-soul i.e. what is different from that. He writes:

तत्र "चेतुनारस्माधयायात् तद्विक्ललक्षणो जीवः" | तत्त्वाशेतात्
विक्ललम् परियात्तानवसुखद्वेच्चादय: ते लक्षणं वस्त्रात् जीवः
तद्विक्ललक्षणसत्तनात् इति |\(^{61}\)

Āsrava is the door through which soul attracts *pūṇya* and *pāpa*. This is explained with an example: As the ocean is filled in continuously by the water of the river, similarly through *mithyādarśana*, the soul is uninterruptedly filled in by the karmic particles. Thus, the wrong vision serves the work of āsrava. He says:

"श्रष्टुपपामाथाध्राक्षण आस्त्रवः" | आस्त्रव इव आस्त्रवः | क उपाधि: ? यथा
महोद्विनृतिदिस्तिनसिद्धर्स्तापूर्वते तथा निधाद्विनाविद्वारामुविद्व: कमिनित्विद्व: प्राणी
पूर्वते इति निधाद्विनाविद्वारामस्वः |\(^{62}\)
The obstructor of the āsrava is called samvara. Through this āsrava is obstructed. For example, the devil persons or enemies cannot enter to the house being closed by the ‘kapāta’ i.e. the panels of the door. Similarly the karmic matters caused from the bondage of pāpa and pūnyā are obstructed from entering the soul due to the performances of good activities (subhānuṣṭāna). The way of new karmic matters are being obstructed by this good activities. Thus, this called samvara. He notes:

"आस्त्रवत्तिनिरोपयतान संकरः | सत्यश्चवेदनेनेव संकरः | यथा कपाते संपृवते गृहे दुःस्य प्रयोगो नास्ति. तद्वच्च भावानुसारं संपृवते पुनः पुनर्यापपत्तिः संकरेत। कर्मणां प्रयोगो नास्ति | अभिनवकावयविश्वसंकरस्यात संकरः |[53]

Nirjarā is described as is in the form of destruction of the karmic particles in a particular place. It means, in this state karmic matter does not produce any result. For example as poison does not cause any harm its power being weaken by the incantation (mantra) and medicine (auṣhadhi) similarly also karma does not produce rebirth (saṃsāraphalapradan) its power being destructed by the hard austerity (tapā). He says:

"एकदेशकर्मसंक्षयतान निर्जराः | निर्जरेय निर्जराः. यथा सम्भोधलादिकीपीती दिष्य न कोपकर्त्, तथापात्त कर्म तथोविशेषे।
निर्जराः न संक्षयतात्रात् |[54]

Bandha is in the form of relation between karmic particles with the soul and vice versa. As a person is covered with chain becomes bounded or loose his freedom, so also when a soul is covered or associated with karmic particle becomes bounded or losses his
freedom. Mokṣa i.e. salvation is the form of destruction of all types of ghāti and aghāti karmas. As a person is freed from all types of bindings and becomes happy due to attainment of his desired place, so also a soul when free from all types of karmas becomes happy owing to attain his desired place i.e. salvation. He says:

"आत्मकर्मणिर्देशयावेशानुवेशालक्षणः समवन्धो वन्धः" (तत्त्व. वा. १-५-७५) | वन्ध इव बन्धः | यथा निगङ्गादिश्रवे बन्धः पुरुषस्तत्त्रः, तथा कर्मवन्धेनापीति |
"कुस्तकर्मविवा:गालक्षणो मोक्षः" | निगङ्गादिश्रवे स्वातन्त्र्ये सति अभिषेकसमनवन्धेव पुगान नूति सहतीस्वर्णः। ६५

After presenting the seven tattvas from Jaina point of view Bhāsarvajña records the nature of syādvāda. His presentation of syādvāda theory is similar to and there is nothing new in it. References to be made to our introduction where we have discussed the seven bhaṅgas. For convenience we reproduce the same with the text of Bhāsarvajña. The seven bhaṅgas are syādastī etc. Bhāsarvajña comments: ityesa saptabhaṅgī syādvāda ityuycate. Bhāsarvajña adds further, that the seven realities beginning with jīva etc. are qualified or predicated with the above-mentioned seven bhaṅgas.

"जीवाजीवी तथाव्योग्यमारुत्व: संदर्भतः | 
निज्जत्वा तथा बच्चो मोक्ष सम्राम हृदयेत्]]
"स्यादानामित्तपत्तिः परिवर्षिततः सम्मीतिः |
तत्त्वाध्याचार्यपते जीवो मोक्ष हृदयेत्]] ६६

Going further, he has reproduced the definition of saptabhaṅgī from Tattvātharājāvārtika of Akalanka.
The definition runs thus:

"एकसिन् वर्तुनि प्रश्नवशाद दृष्टेनेजेन्त्र च प्रमाणानागार्धविदिप्रतिशेषविकल्पना सप्तभंगी"67

It means the assertion or the negation in respect of a single entity or reality, guided by query without being contradicted by perception or any other means of valid knowledge is called saptabhangī. He elaborates further taking the example of ‘jar’ namely ‘syād ghaṭa, syādaghaṭa, syād ghaṭa aghaṭa ca, syādavyaktavya etc. All the seven bhaṅgas has to be predicated to each and every reality like syād jīva, syāda jīva, etc.

It may be recorded here that the assertion and negation i.e. vidhi niṣedha kalpanā with regard to ghaṭa can also be expressed as syād ghaṭa asti, syād ghaṭa nāsthi etc. He explains further, the pot exists as its own self i.e. svātmanā ghaṭa asthi, it does not exist as something else i.e. delimited by some other property. Here svātmā means with regards to ghaṭa means the cause, due to which something is expressed as pot. Similarly parātmā means cloth etc. the cause of being expressed as ‘tat’, that different from pot. This may be anything, say a cloth or the state of pot-halves.

"तत्र स्वात्मानाति घट, परात्मान नास्ति | घटबुद्धिभिक्षणास्तु शिक्षितम् स्वात्मा | यत्र न घटबुद्धिभिक्षणास्तु नास्ति | स परात्मानापतादि | कथालाभवस्तवः च।।68

If it is argued that the pot does not exist as delimited by its own self then there cannot be uses of pot and if it is accepted to exist as delimited by parātmā then there would arise the contingency of
uses of the cloth etc. in the case of pot etc, which is absurd. In other words when there exist pot in the ground, we have the cognition ‘bhūtale ghaṭo asti’ and ‘bhūtale paṭo nāsti’. In these cognition the pot is delimited by its own self, which means pot exists as a pot delimited by potness, which is responsible for the usage namely ‘there exist pot’ in a place where pot exists. Had it been the case that the pot is delimited by cloth, or any thing else then this would amount to the absurd conclusion and hence, the contingency of usage namely ‘there exist cloth or the kind’ in the locus of the pot. Bhāsarvajñā has quoted the whole text from Akalaṅka’s Rājavārtika which runs thus:

तत्र स्वात्मनापि यदि नालि घटा, तदा घटावहार एव न स्वात् | तथा परात्मनापि यदासि, तदा पटावहारोऽषये संत घटा | तत्सात्म स्वस्थाय जन घटा परस्परं त्वात्सृष्टिः

A classification is given here that in this manner there would be no distinction between ‘ghaṭa’ and ‘aghaṭa’ and if any distinction is maintained it cannot be expressed like that due to lack of co-existence or co-referentiality. But that is not true. Therefore, the realities, say the pot, being of dual nature is called as ‘ghaṭa’ and ‘aghaṭa’ being expressed in a sequence.

It may be argued that the reality having the dual nature ‘bidhi niṣedhāṭmakā’ is called as ‘ghaṭa’ only then this should amount to falsehood because it has not taken on account of the negative aspects of reality into consideration and if it is treated as ‘aghaṭa’ alone still this will be treated as not correct, because the positive aspects or
existential aspects has not taken into consideration here. To clarify: a pot is a pot and also non-pot considering the positive and negative aspects of reality thus, a pot is neither ‘pot’ alone nor ‘non-pot’ alone.

यदि तदःत्रयात्मकं वस्तु घट इत्येवोऽथ । तत्तत्त्तात् सांप्रवाहदत्तत्स्वयमेव स्यात् । अथाघट
एवेत्यथात् । तत्तत्त्तात् पुजादानाध्यात्मकं स्यात् ॥

This give rise to or explains the first three bhaṅgas namely syād ghaṭa or syādaghāta, syādasti ghaṭa or syādāstī ghaṭa and syādasti nāsti ghaṭa. There is no other expression to present or reveal this state or the positive and negative aspects of reality simultaneously, which amounts to the supposition of the forth bhaṅgas. Since, the pot representing the positive and negative aspects of it simultaneously, it is beyond the range of any expression, thus, the Jainas have the forth bhaṅgas syādavyaktavya.

न चावेष्ठे शास्त्रसत्मानावस्थानवत्तानस्वति विद्यते | ततोस्सू घटो वयनगोवर्त्तत्त्त्त्तवत्
's्यादवक्तव्य' इत्यथात् ॥

By further combinations, the rest bhaṅgas are formulated. Following Jainas philosophy Bhāsarvajñā records that all the seven bhaṅgas are to be predicated to all the realities. There is nothing in this world, which is not guided by this principle of saptabhaṅgi.

"एवं सर्वपूर्व वस्तु सप्तभंगी योवेन्द्र" | न तथापुर्तं कश्चिद्विषृष्णस्ति यत्र सप्तभंगी नास्ति ॥

Following anekānta Bhāsarvajñā makes an interesting observations. Since, ekānta is not accepted and invariably or universally anekānta is followed this would amounts to ekānta.

Thus, how can you say that saptabhaṅgi is applied to each and every reality?
To this, the Jainas answer in negative, stating that even in anekānta, ekānta view is not to be accepted. It means the anekānta itself is also anekānta, Thus, it can be phrased as: syād ekānta, syād anekānta, syād anekānta ekānta etc.

The whole argument or presentation of the Jaina position by Bhāsarvajña is authentic. He has quoted the texts from Tattvārthavārtika without much addition to it. After making a faithful presentation of saptabhaṅgi, Bhāsarvajña starts to examine or rather refute this position of the Jainas with argument from the point of view of ekāntavādin in general and Naiyāyikas in particular. As to the view of the Jainas that in ekānta theory kuśala i.e. good and akuśala i.e. bad karmas cannot be explained. Bhāsarvajña answers in ekānta theory kuśala and akuśala, bandha i.e. bondage and mokṣa i.e. liberation are very much explainable. There is no difficulty in explaining either kuśala and akuśala or bandha and mokṣa. Bhāsarvajña explains what is ekāntapakṣa or the theory of absolutism. It means who so ever the doer or performer of any activity he would be the enjoyer of its result. In other words a relation of causality is established between the agent and its respective effects and that in ekānta. And following this theory the ordinary day-to-day behavior is explained. It is noticed that a particular individual either moves forward to act, to effort or to obtain something or keep himself away or runs away from it guided by the logic of
‘िष्ठानिष्ठाप्रतिरूपपरिहारा’. In other words if something is इष्ठ he wants to get it, if it is anिष्ठa he wants to avoid it. This is possible only in theory of ekānta. I quote the text of Bhāsarvajña:

यतावदेकान्तप्रतिरूपपरिहारादेवा, तद्वृत्तम्, एकान्तप्रति एव कुशलाकुशलकर्मणि, तत्र हि – यदि य एव कर्मणां कर्ता, स एव तत्तत्त्वज्ञातो तत्त्त्वाधिकारी स्वातः, तदविनिश्चितानितिपरिहारादेवा तत्त्त्त्वाधिकारी स्वातः श्रेयसंप्रृवत्तराते।

Contrary to this theory of ekānta if one follows anekāntavāda these practical verifiable human behavior cannot be explained. Hence, anekānta theory of the Jaina cannot be accepted. He gives reason subscribing the view of anekānta. No causality between the agent and its result can be explained, for, in ekānta theory the doer is different the enjoiner will be different. There would not be any inclination towards taking food, for, it would not satisfying one’s hunger. If the king is well fed the naked monk will have the satisfaction of eating. And if not, this will amounts to ekāntavāda not anekāntavāda.

As can be seen, Bhāsarvajña interprets anekānta as lack of causality between the doer and enjoiner of any action. According to him in anekānta theory doer of an action may be different and the enjoiner of that will be different. There would not be any guiding principle if ‘a’ does an action he will attain its fruits for certain. And if he gets or if causality is established that would be ekāntavāda to the pleasure of the Naiyāyikas. As a matter of fact the Jainas do not interpret anekānta in this way as Bhāsarvajña has interpreted. The Jainas always establish causality between the doer and the enjoiner.
and this does not affect that position of ankekāntavāda.

अनेकान्तवादे तद्वयूःक्तवादान्वयोगेनभौतिकम् इति स्थानः तथा च भोजनादिक्रियास्वपि प्रेमाणात
न प्रवृत्तिलयम् राजादिकृतक्षेत्र भोजनादिक्रियास्वपि नानन्दरणक्षयापि तुलिपविनिधत्ति. अभवने
झोकान्तवादः स्थानः।

Going further Bhāsarvaśaṅga finds more faults with the anekānta theory of the Jainas. He argued, the Jainas finding faults with the ekānta theory resort to anekānta, For example, if some reality, say soul is treated as absolutely eternal i.e. ‘nitya eva’, some objections or contingency will be there; similarly if something is accepted as absolutely transitory i.e. ‘anītya eva’, still some different contingency will arise. Hence, the reality should be both eternal and transitory- is the mind of the Jainas. To this, Bhāsarvaśaṅga argued that by telling or treating the reality as eternal as well as transitory the Jainas will fall into the trap of inviting or involving contingencies of both the aspects i.e. the contingency involved in ‘nityatva’ aspect as well as ‘anītyatva’ aspect. Sarcastically criticizing the position of the Jainism Bhāsarvaśaṅga observes:

किं च नित्यवित्त्वयोदस्तं दृष्टान्तकान्तक्षर्ग्राह्त: पवित्रश्यामस्वपुर्णम: स्थानः। तद्भवमः
चौमयणक्वस्तका अपि दोषः प्राप्ता इति। क एवं विनान्धानयो दोषान् परिहृत्य जानाति।

Finally Bhāsarvaśaṅga concludes: the self is eternal only (tasmāt nitya evatmā) Now at this state, the Jainas may argue that if the soul is eternal alone how to account for the fact that, somebody is happy at some period of time and unhappy at the other time. Soul being eternal its qualities like pleasure and pain etc. will be eternally associated
with it and if somebody is happy will remain happy always and if some soul is unhappy will be unhappy forever, is the contention of the Jainas. To this, Bhāsarvajña answers that the contention of the Jainas is baseless and does not stand to logic, for, the quality of soul like pleasure and pain etc. are transitory. Pleasure and pain are produced and destroyed due to their association with soul; it is called nitya or anitya. Nityatva or anityatva i.e. eternality and transitoriness is not the essential quality of soul, but of the pleasure, of the pain etc. Due to the production or destruction of these accidental properties like pleasure and pain the soul is said to be produced or destroyed. As a matter of fact, soul is always eternal. Bhāsarvajña explains this further with the examples of a staff possessor or kunḍali i.e. one having ear ornament, chatri i.e. one having umbrella, due to the association with danda, kunḍala or a chatra. An individual say Caitra is called as danda, kunḍali or chatri due to the absence of contact with these danda etc. the same Caitra is called adanda, akunḍala or achatra:

तस्मात् एव तस्मात् सुखोपत्तिः सुखी, दुःखोपत्तिः दुःखीत्युत्यते ।
सुखदुःखादीनं नित्यं से हि नित्योपि सेन सेन चार्गोलकछानाने
विनिश्चयते च तदनां यथादिश्यते यथा दण्डदिश्यते संबन्धमत्वायां
दण्डी कुण्डलीं छत्रीं चादंदण्डोऽकुण्डलोऽकछानाने ॥

Hence, the soul cannot be nitya and anitya but nitya alone – declares Bhāsarvajña. In this context, Bhāsarvajña took tasks Samantabhadra who advanced the logic of ‘kaṭamati’ to establish the anekānta. Bhāsarvajña argued: whatever logic or arguments are
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forwarded by Samantabhadra in favor of establishing the nityatva, anityatva and dhrauvyatva of reality are illogical.

Samantabhadra argued that when a particular ornament kataka, made of gold is changed to mauli, in all the states gold ness continues to exist, the kataka is destroyed and the maulitva is produced. This is in fact how the Jainas defined dravya, which we have already recorded elsewhere.

To this, Bhāsarvajña answers: when the ornament kataka is made to mauli though kataka is not there or destroyed. The katkakatva and suvarṇatva is eternal, for, katkakatva remains or continues to exist and is congnized in other individual kattakas. The person who has attachment with kataka become unhappy due to the non-existence of kataka; similarly when the mauli was not produced previously and now it is produced as that, a person having attachment towards that becomes happy. At the same time who wants gold remains indifferent either in the destruction of kataka or the emergency of mauli, because of the fact that gold continued to exist in all states.

Bhāsarvajña argued: the universal gold ness exists in the parts and the whole of an object made of gold, hence, when the whole is destroyed the gold ness is cognized in its parts and the cognition of gold is continued to exist and thus, there is no knowledge of the
destruction of it. Bhāsarvajña gives the example the lamp or the water of the Gangā, which is treated as the same water or the same light due to its similarity and continuity and individual desirous of that remain indifferent treating it as that. Bhāsarvajña writes:

सुप्रभातिः प्रतिस्वधर्मवासायत्वभाष्यति, तेन तद्विकर्मानां स्वप्रतिभाष्यति।

Sūryapraśānta pratyāhāraṃ bhavanti. Pṛthvīja māyāṁ ca bhavanti. Saḥ pratyāhāradharmanāṁ ca saḥ pratyāhāraṃ pratyāhāraḥ.

Going further with a view to demolish the mansion built by the Jainas with the bricks of the anekānta. Bhāsarvajña further declares, nityatva and anityatva cannot be attributed to one and the same object or entity. Anityatva means destruction and nityatva means non-destruction. And this two are contradictory by nature and cannot be attributed to one and the same object. Not indeed there is anything, which is cognized as destroyed and non-destroyed. Samantabhadra argued:

तत्तत्वातः सत्यमभवितवचेति | अनित्यायं हि नाशितवचेति नित्यायं शान्तिशीतलवचेति |

At this point the Jainas argued: We noticed utpādatva, nāśatva and dhrauvyatva in one and the same object say gold, when kaṭaka is transfer to mukuta, where kaṭaka is destroyed, mukuta is produced and suvarṇatva is continues to exist.

To this, Bhāsarvajña replies: in this case, nityatva or anityatva cannot be established with regard to a single entity due to the fact that the three different forms are associated or delimited by three distinct dharmas i.e. properties. And not delimited by a single properties.
And if it is argued that all the three forms of *kaṭaka*, *mukuṭa* and *suvarṇa* are delimited by single property then the person who has attachment towards *mukuṭa* will be happy or remain indifferent, when *kaṭaka* is changed into *mukuṭa*, since, the three forms are distinct and not one.

कस्यपिदेशकथ्य नित्यानित्यस्वसिद्धः त्रयाणामकारणामन्योन्वयमोऽसंस्यान्। संसर्गे वा कटकार्थिना शौकवत्त्रमोदामयस्यः अपि स्याताम्। अत एव त्रयाणामकारणः नैस्यम्। 81

It may be argued that if the three forms are accepted as different then the co-existence or co-referentiality of these three cannot be maintained.

To this, Bhāsarvajña replies pointing out that such doubts are baseless hence coreferentiality is possible. He explains this by quoting the illustration of *daṇḍi*, *kuṇḍali* etc. Even though *daṇḍa*, *kuṇḍala* etc. are different there is *sāmānādhikaraṇya* in their locus namely *daṇḍi*, *kuṇḍali* etc.

दण्डकुण्डलादिनां भेदिपि तदा यथो पुरस्ति दण्डी कुण्डलीत्यादि सामानाधिकरण्यत् 82

Thus, these three namely *kaṭaka*, *kuṇḍala* or *suvarṇa* are to be taken as distinct and different.

If it is argued that there is identity between these three then there arise a contingency of ceasing of human day-to-day behavior namely that when some one to be asked to bring *kaṭaka* he may bring *kuṇḍala* or any thing made up of gold and vise-versa, which is absurd.

यदि पुनर्भेदः स्यात, तदा कटकाकार्थिनादेव मुकुटाकार्थित्यादि स्याद 83
Because, the form which is know and the form which is unknown cannot be treated as one and the same. And if these are accepted as one then there cannot be any distinction between ‘khara’ and ‘Jina’. As a matter of fact Jainas will not like this that there is abheda i.e. identity between a donkey and a siddha.

The Jaina may argue thus: let there be bheda, mutual distinction amongst the modes i.e. paryāya, but there is no distinction in the locus of these ‘paryāyas’. What the Jaina proposes is that the various modes may be different but the locus of these modes has to be identical.

To this, Samantabhadra replies: in that case also identity cannot be established, due to their cognition by mutual exclusion. To make the point clear Bhāsarvajña takes the help of the examples of ‘keyūra’, it may be cognized as in the form of gold but not in the form of kāta. Similarly what is cognized in the form of rājatakāta i.e. silver bracelet cannot be cognized in the form of gold bracelet. Therefore, due to the contradictory elements of cognition and non-cognition, there is distinction as in between a donkey and camel—concludes Bhāsarvajña.

Further objection is raised by the Jainas, namely that let there be difference but to hold that there is absolute difference is not
correct. Because, this, anekānta has to be applied to each and every state. Thus, in case difference also all the seven bhaṅgas are to be applied. This will amount to the seven alternatives namely syād bheda etc.

भेदस्तिधापि भेद एवेत्ययुक्तम् यतः स्याद्भेदः, स्याद्भेदः, स्याद्भेदश्चाभेदशः, 
स्याद्भेदः, स्याद्भेदश्चाभेदशः, स्याद्भेदश्चाभेदशः, 
स्याद्भेदश्चाभेदश्चाभेदशःश्चैवति ॥ ८७

Because according to the Jainas the whole universe is to be interpreted in terms of saptabhaṅgi. And hence, there would not be any example to establish ekānta.

तदेवं सर्वं जगत्सत्त्वं भस्माधातं न किंचिदेकान्तसयं तस्युदाहरणमिति ॥ ८८

Bhāsarvajña refutes or removes such doubts that there cannot be any example for anekānta. Bhāsarvajña notes: how is that there is no example to establish ekānta. We have example of absolute difference i.e. ekānta bhinna between jīna and khara, sūkara etc. It means jīna is liberated omniscient having all excellent qualities contrary to a camel or a donkey, having low qualities, hence, they are absolutely different. The Jainas cannot argue that even the saptabhaṅgi or the seven bhaṅgas will be applied to jīna who is liberated and thus, one can say:

शत्वृत्तिः वक्तृ-पुनाट्यायस्य जिनं स्मृतिकृततत्तमः ॥ ८९

i.e. Jīna possessed negligible character etc. and thus, they will be similar to a camel or a donkey and hence, no difference can be maintained.
To this Bhāsarvajña say: no intelligent people will welcome or will be happy with the logic of the Jainas, because the argument given is just to defend or offend the opponents and not based on logic.

Going further, if the Jainas would worship a donkey or a camel like jina or would eat stones and human excreta like milk jaggery, or curd then only absolute difference will be established.

A question may be raised here, what is the excellenceness or the speciality, which Jina adorns or possesses and absent in the camel or donkey or again what is the nikṛṣṭabhāva i.e. low quality possessed by a donkey or a camel, which is absent in case of Jina due to which Jina is worshiped and the donkey etc. are not.. Still further, what is speciality that exists in jaggery etc. and lacking in stones etc. because of which people like to eat jaggery etc. not stones etc.

Concluding this discussion Bhāsarvajña observes: there exists something special due to which there is pravṛtti i.e. inclination
towards something not for everything. Thus, anekānta is not to be applicable to everything. Hence, the possibilities are kaścidekānta, kaścidanekānta and in those cases, where ekānta will possible, that will serve an illustration for ekānta.

What Bhāsarvajña wants to establish here is that one can find example for ekānta and the argument of the Jainas that no example of ekānta will be available stands refuted. The difference between jīna and a donkey with regards to their quality is absolute, which the Jainas also accept- observes Bhāsarvajña.

With a view to find a fault with Jainism, Bhāsarvajña observes: as a matter of fact the Jainas do not have an example to establish anekānta.

Explaining further he says, if something is different from another thing then it will be a new thing and the difference would be like a donkey and a camel from Jīna. And if it is argued that there is identity from the point of view of existence that will not stands to logic, and it will go against human behavior. There will be dilemma with regard to distinguishing two things, due to the absence of any guiding principle with regard to something which is describable or otherwise; which is eatable or not. No pravṛtti will be possible. Hence, what is given, as an illustration of difference cannot again be quoted as an example of abheda. Thus, the Jainas has no example to
establish *bheda* and *abheda* leading to the not-establishment *anekānta* itself.

यद्यपायं भिन्न तत्त्वादेकाल्पना भिन्न तत्त्वोत्तरतत्त्वो खर्पीनक्क्षितः जिनादिष्ठितः ।
सत्त्वाशायाकारतेनमेवतत्त्वाशायाति चेतः । नै यस्याकारस्येकाल्पना भेद उपयोगः सिद्धः ।
तस्य द्विस्तान्तानि पादानात् अथ न कस्याप्येकाल्पना भेदविद्यितः । ततः उपायस्याशुचायस्य
भक्त्वाकारतेनसेवकम्यात्मार्यात् कल्यात्विचित्रे प्रश्नितमात्र प्रान्ततिः ॥

Bhāsarvajña takes the view of Akalaṅkadeva for critical examination with regard to *syādvāda*. Akalaṅka in his *Laghīyasthraya* justifies the *saptabhaṅgīnayas*. Taking the example of *ghaṭa* he explains the first three *bhaṅgas* that is *ghaṭāsti*, *ghaṭnāsti* and *ghaṭāsti nāsti ca*, justified the existence and non-existence of the one and the same pot, Akalaṅka comments that the pot exist as a pot and it does not exist as a cloth or as anything else. Thus, where it is said ‘*ghaṭāsti nāsti ca*’ what is implied that pot exists as a pot and not as a cloth.

स्वामानास्थित घटा परात्मा तु नास्तीति ॥

To this, Bhāsarvajña observes that if a single pot is associated with many properties and this existence and non-existence is presented taking into consideration these aspects then the *Naiyāyikas* has no problem.

यदि तत्त्वेदकस्य घटस्यानेकधर्मयोगिल्लितमति, तदा नास्ति विवादः ॥

Because, even according to the logicians the *vidhi* and *pratīṣedha* with regard to a single object is justifiable on the basis of different characteristics.

एकस्याचि धर्मिणो विविधप्रतिष्ठात्त्वानेकधर्मयोगिल्लितमयाशुचिमात् ॥

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Now as to the assertion of the Jaina that an entity is of the nature of existence and non-existence or positive and negative character, Bhāsarvajña notes: what is the meaning or the application of ubhayātmaka. To him, if by ubhayātmaka the Jaina intends ubhayātmaka i.e. delimited by two different properties then, the Naiyāyikas will welcome it. If it is intended to be by one and the same dharma then there will be contradiction.

Further Bhāsarvajña notes that if the pot is to be understood as different from what is non-pot this will amount to accepting the view of Buddhist and this will involve many faults, which he has pointed out elsewhere. As a matter of fact our concern is not to discuss the Buddhist’s ‘apohavāda’ to which Bhāsarvajña has made a reference here.

उभयात्मक इति कोई? यथुमययमर्मकः तदा नास्ति विवाद इत्युपकः। अथ घट एव तदन्यायाय इति, नन्देवं शायय्यात् भवताम्बुप्रयंगत् भवति, भवतात्तद्वा नैव यथौतिरित्यसत्वाभिधानात्। तत्र च दूसरण्योपतोषोक्तम्।¹⁰⁰

The Jainas may argue that let there be the difference between bhāva and abhāva being accepted as ubhayātmaka. To this Bhāsarvajña objects: by mere acceptance the objects are not proved. To establish something one needs some valid means of prove and you have not given any pramāṇa to prove its ubhayātmakatva.

प्रमाणतो हि पदार्थस्यविद्यशिष्य। प्रमाणांच लया नोक्रे यत्सद्वभेदायस्यक्तिविद्येष्व श्यात्।¹⁰¹

On the other hand we have given pramāṇa, which proves the ekāntabhāva i.e. absoluteness of reality and not ubhayātmaka like
bhāva and abhāva i.e. existence and non-existence. Explaining further, Bhāsarvajña writes: the absence of cloth is not ghaṭa i.e. pot, since, it is the absence of pot as for example its destruction (i.e. paṭādibhāva na ghaṭātmakaḥ pradhvīnasavat). To the query asked as to how there is the expression or cognition ‘the pot is not cloth’ Bhāsarvajña replies: it is governed by mutual absence.

कथा तहि घट: पटो न भवतीति प्रतिभासः ? इतरेतराभावनिबन्धनोदयः 102

To explain: the expression ‘ghaṭo na paṭāḥ’ or ‘paṭo na ghaṭāḥ’ i.e. ‘the pot is not cloth’ or ‘the cloth is not pot’ are based on mutual absence where the identity of one with the other is denied. Hence, there is no difficulty to explain the expression of the cognition the ‘pot is not cloth’, even though the absence of cloth is not in the form of pot.

Bhāsarvajña records further objection: how the bhāva that existence is related to ‘itaretarabhāva’ i.e. mutual absence and even though a relation is established one would have the cognition like ‘there is no cloth in the pot’ based on relational absence.

नित्यितरेतराभावेऽसह भावयत्र कः समवेत्य समवेतेपि घटे पटे नातीति प्रतितिः स्त्यादिति 103

To this Bhāsarvajña replies in negative and says that the answer has already been given. There is something between bhāva and abhāva, which distinguishes these two, which is responsible for that distinct cognition and it may be called by any name.

यतावतः समवेत्य इति, तन्न, उत्तरेतराभावात्-उत्तराभावाः भवतदन्वाभावाः सत्तितिविधेः कश्चितावदस्ति, यत्तस्याविर्यवेश्यं प्रहणम् | तन्न यथेष्ठं संज्ञापि क्रियताम् 104

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Going further, Bhāsarvajña refutes the view that bhāva and abhāva are identical, as stated that even there is relation, there will be cognition like ‘there is no cloth in the pot’ as for example ‘there is no pot in the ground’ is not correct.

The distinction in cognition is based on the distinctness of the relation like the bhāvas i.e. the positive entities.

The distinctness of the cognition is evidently based on the distinctness of the bhāvasambandhas. Many example can be quoted, ‘there is blue substance in the pot’ (kuṇḍe nīlī dravyāstiḥ) or ‘the cloth is blue’ (nīlo paṭah), similarly depending on the relation of absence, the cognition will be distinct. Hence, the cause of the difference of the cognition of absence is based on the distinction in the relation of the absence.

In conclusion, Bhāsarvajña notes that in all cases the distinction of cause is established from the distinction of the effect.

Explaining further, when there is pot in the ground the pot will be the counter positive for its absence on the ground.

When the pratiyogī of something is its own self then the counter positive of its absence would be the object itself. For
example, ‘this cloth is not pot.

‘यदा तु तत्प्रतियोगी तदालक्यवेन बुद्धिप्रस्थापित्, तदा तद्भावि तदालीव
प्रतिभात्याष्टोत्थ पति हि’।109

What Bhāsarvajña wants to explain in this line is the distinctness between the two types of absence viz. relational absence and mutual absence. In the relational absence the relation of the counter positive with its counter correlative is denied where as in mutual absence the identity is denied. Finally Bhāsarvajña concludes that the bhāva and abhāva cannot be identical. Further, as is argued ghaṭa and aghaṭa are not different from one another is not correct, because this is contradicted by all experiences. If the negation is interpreted as either prasajya pratiṣedha or paryudāsa then also the identity between bhedā and abheda cannot be justified. In the case of prasajya abhāva the absence of ‘sarpa’ snake) will be ‘asarpa’ (non-snake) because the same cannot be identical with its absence. Now if sarpa will be identical with asarpa then we should be afraid of the absence of sarpa i.e. asarpa as in the case of the presence of sarpa. Because, both are identical, which is not logical, hence, prasajya is not tenable. In the case of paryudāsa also the aghaṭa means ghaṭatva anya i.e. paṭatva. And a cloth obviously is different from pot, which needs no proof. And if one accepts identity between ghaṭa and aghaṭa in the sense of paryudāsa then one has to meet with the contingency of cognition ‘pot’ in the case of ‘cloth’ or vice-versa. Thus, resorting to either prasajya pratiṣedha or paryudāsa identity cannot be establish between bhāva or abhāva and ghaṭa or aghaṭa i.e.
negative and positive aspects of the same reality.

Bhāsarvajña finds fault with the assertion of the Jainas view that a pot is known as a pot by its own self and not as some other self, *ghaṭatvena ghaṭa na paṭatvena*. To him, this view of the Jainas is illogical. To explain, when a pot exists can the cognition of *aghaṭa* i.e. absence of pot would arise or known like that delimited by *paṭatva* (paṭatmanā hi kim jñāpate iti). There is no proof to establish this. When the pot is produced from the clay, it is cognized of the pot delimited by pot ness. It is not that the ‘*aghaṭa*’ is being produced by some other properties. When the pot is destroyed, if it will be *aghaṭa* then it is not a pot. Therefore, it is not that the *ghaṭa* is cognized as *aghaṭa*, delimited by cloth ness.

*Vinaya* 3.5 (c) 111

It is also not cognized like the knowledge of silver on non-silver. Further objection is raised: the pot is not known as delimited by cloth ness, hence, this is called *aghaṭa*.

*Abhidharmasastra* 8.1 112

To this Bhāsarvajña replies in negative stating that this is contradictory. The pot is known as pot only not as cloth but pot alone.
Further, where it is intended to be of dual characteristics due to the existence of both the dharmas there also it is not dependant on one’s own self and other then that. For example, ‘the lotus that is blue’, not intended it as blue lotus as accepted as by other self, but by its own form. Similarly the sadāsadātmaka is to be accepted as by its own form and not by svātmanā or parātmanā.

The satva and asatva cannot be primary by some other form. It cannot be argued that the ‘gold’ etc. exists in the form of ‘mṛt’ etc. not also the asatva or non-existence of sky-flower etc. in the form of pole etc. because they are, non-existence by their very form.

If the positive entities will be of ubhayātmaka namely satva and asatvātmaka then by its own form only there would be the cognition of ghaṭa and aghaṭa.

If it is taken as aghaṭa by some other form that aghaṭatva will be secondary. Thus, the dual characteristics of object by svātmā and parātmā is secondary and primarily, an object is known as that by its own form. If it is argued that let the ubhayātmaka i.e. the dual character of the reality be its own form that will be not accepted, because iṣṭa and anīṣṭasvabhāva i.e. desired and non-desired objects.
cannot go together in case of living beings. And this will amounts to cessation of human behaviour.

For example, the pleasure etc. in case of living beings is īṣṭa i.e. desirable similarly the absence of that is anīṣṭa.

And further the presence of duḥkha etc. is anīṣṭa and its absence is īṣṭa i.e. desirable. If by its own form an entities will be ubhayātmaka i.e. sadāsadātmaka, that being both sukhaduḥkhātmaka as īṣāniṣṭātmaka, no prāvyṛti or nivyṛti will take place.

Further, knowing that something is the cause of pleasure, if some one is inclined to do some work it will not possible for him to do it because of the absence of it. And by non-performing that he will not attain liberation being dragged by this presence and absence of pleasure, which states one would attain. Criticizing the Jainas, Bhāsarvajña says: to what a pitiable condition and unavoidable difficulties, which the human beings are fallen by the bad logic of the naked Jaina.
What Bhāsarvajña wants to express is that in the Jīnas theory, no activities will be possible due to lack of concrete direction. One should know for certain that by performing something, one will get pleasure and by not performing something one will avoid pain. But in case of Jīnas as Bhāsarvajña understand in each and everything ubhayātmaka by its own form i.e. sukhāduḥkhaţmaka.

Inconsistency in the statement of the Tīrthaṇkaras:

Even maintaining the position of the Jīnas a doubt is being raised about the validity of their very scripture. Bhāsarvajña asked: is there any truth in the statement of the Tīrthaṇkaras? It cannot be argued that their statements are true, because it would amounts to postulate ekāntavāda, which the Jīnas would not like to accept. Here also Jīnas wants saptabhaṅgi to employ then result will be ‘it may be true’, ‘it may be false’, ‘it may be true and untrue’ etc. Then there would arise doubt about the validity and non-validity, because syādvāda has to be employed everywhere. If syādvāda would be employed to all the doctrines of the Jīnas then there would be avyavasthā i.e. inconsistency with regards to āsrava, saṁbara, nirjāra and mokṣa as well. This will amount to inconsistency in all cases of the Jīna philosophy.

अपि च तत्त्वींकरवर्मनं कै सत्यम्? आहोविदसत्यस्रिति? सत्य मेघेति न युक्तम्।
एकान्तवादसंसागर् | अथात्रापि सत्यमिणिष्टा-स्यात्। सत्यम्। स्याधसत्यम्। स्यादुभयम्।
स्यादक्तवित्वस्यतमधिकम्। तदा प्रभाणप्रभाणायवथानुपपत्ति। स्याधादस्य।

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To explain, Bhāsarvajña notes: the Jñānas have prescribed the process of attaining saṁvara, nirjarā and mokṣa and also the avoidance of āsrava and bandha. Those who follow or perform some specific observances prescribed by the Jñānas attain the state of saṁvara, nirjarā and mokṣa gradually and those not performing these specific observances incur āsrava and bandha gradually. By employing syādvāda or saptabhaṅgī to this, no consistency will be maintained with regard to the performance and non-performance of the prescribe observation, because by employing saptabhaṅgī the prescription will be syād viśiṣṭa, syādaviśiṣṭa etc. for both the cases viz. in case of mokṣa as well bandha. This means that no distinction can be maintained between saṁvara, nirjarā, and mokṣa or āsrava and bandha.

No distinction between jīva and ajīva:

Not only that, the acceptance of the syādvāda theory of the Jñānas will go against their very doctrine of the classification of the reality viz. jīva and ajīva etc. Bhāsarvajña says: how to maintain a
distinction between jīva and ajīva etc. because following syādvāda jīva will be ajīva, ajīva will be jīva.

तथा जीवाजीवस्थास्यमंको | स्थायिरे हि जीवोऽपि जीवः स्थायिरे जीवः स्थायिति कृतस्थायिवस्था ?

And if the Jainas say for argument sake that let there be inconsistency then is that inconsistency is absolute from ultimate point of view or it only confuse to us. To this, Bhāsarvajña argues without resorting to ekānta, no consistency can be maintain by which some consistency of principle with regards to objects can be established or proved.

अथायायस्यायस्यस्ति स कि परमार्थे कि वास्मानेवमेव प्रतार्थसि क न होकालपास्यमुयुगे क्षतिग्रस्तान् ययां ययांस्योपपः

Finally Bhāsarvajña concludes that the reality cannot be of both i.e. ‘sat’ and ‘asat’ तस्मात वस्तुर्त सदस्यात्मकं वस्तु त ।

The view of the Jainas that the object is both eternal and transitory it is also refuted by Bhāsarvajña. He says ‘nāpi nityānityātmaka’. The reality is not transitory and eternal simultaneously. He explains this further thus: when the soul etc. are eternal in the form of its own paryāyī then they are eternal in reality; in that case the supposition that they are transitory from the point of view of their paryāyas are secondary; primarily they are eternal as stated.

यथालाभिः वस्तु स्वेतविधिकेशु नित्यम् तत्दा वस्तुलतत्त्रत्तर्के ।

It may be argued: by its own form the soul is treated as

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destroyed and not destroyed. स्वरूपेण च तत्त्वमात्रां चेतुपापः |१२५ To this Bhāsarvajña replied that in that case the human behavior will cease because by knowing a soul to be destroyed for certain one makes such usages स्वरूपेण च तत्त्वमात्रां चेतुपापः | नष्टमेवेति निःशब्दपर्वतः
सर्वप्राणिव्यहारस्य दृष्ट्यते, साविन्तं न स्वातः |१२६ The Jains may further argue that the soul is treated as eternal and transitory due to the association with pleasure and pain etc. To this, Bhāsarvajña replies that this cannot be accepted because the pleasure etc. are different from the soul and how pleasure etc. are different from soul have been established elsewhere, while finding faults with the Buddhists'.

अधात्मनं सुखादिरूपेणात्मकः अत्मः, न; सुखादेष्टतोऽन्यत्वश्चेतुपापः च शाश्वस्त्वद्वृण्यानात्रस्य समधितमः |१२७

To the argument namely that “there is ananyatva i.e. anyatva bhinna between soul and pleasure then Bhāsarvajña replies in negative. When anyatva is definite as in the case of moon and sun, the ananyatva can be accepted and if the ananyatva is real then the anyatva i.e. difference will be unreal like the knowledge of another moon by a diseased person who is affected by the ‘tīmira’.

अनन्यत्वमस्तीति चेतु, न; अन्यत्वविलश्यस्वातंन्यत्वमय वाचित्वायुंगनात्त्वविद्योत्तिविधि
अनन्यत्वम् वास्तवम् च न्यात्वस्वातं तैमिरिकोपलब्धचन्द्रानात्त्ववर्त्तृ |१२८

What Bhāsarvajña wants to establish is that the pleasures etc. are to be distinguished from soul. A clear distinction between the two has to be maintained on the basis of the destruction and emergence of pleasure and pain etc. the soul is not treated as a transitory, which is already elaborated by him elsewhere.
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As to the argument namely that in some form soul is eternal, by other it is transitory Bhāsarvajña asks: are these two froms are different from the soul or identical with it. If they are different then the nityatva and anityatva of the soul cannot be established on the basis of their anityatva and nityatva, they being different. And if they are identical, this will amount to the fact that delimited by which form they are nitya, they will be anitya delimited by some property or form. And this will involve many faults, which we have already explained.

अथ ते यथे पुरुषात्मकर च क ि भिन्ते ? उत्तामिनेव चेति ? भेदपक्षे तावत तथोत्तमत्वत्वले पुरुषत्व नित्यात्मत्वत्वम्. अतिप्रसंगल | अभेदपक्षे तु येनेव रूपेण नित्यत्वं तेनेवत्तमत्वमिति प्राप्तम्, तत्रोक्तमेव दूषणम् |\(^{129}\)

And if it is argued that they are bhinna and abhinna they are treated as identity-cum-difference or identity in difference, then in the difference and identity is by one and the same form or property or by different form or property. If by one and the same form then the same fault will arise by different names, which would amount to the fault of infinite regress.

अथ भिन्तामिते, तत्त्वाति कि येनेवं रूपेण भेदस्तेनेवाभेद, अथ्य रूपात्मरेणिति ? यदि तेनेव, तदा पुनस्तदेव दूषणमयं रूपात्मरेण, तत्त्वेत्तरस्त्वाराङ्गं |\(^{130}\)

In conclusion, refuting the position of the Jainism, Bhāsarvajña observes that in Jinas view there cannot be any definite knowledge with regards to any object namely ‘this is this’. And the absence of a definite cognition there cannot be any inclination towards the final goal i.e. puruṣārtha. It is seen that intelligent people by their
activities through predeterminate definite knowledge attains ‘
puruṣārtha’ and not in the absence of that. Thus, there should not be
inconsistency with regards to the distinction between ‘nitya-
anityatva’; ‘bhinna-abhinna\textquoteleft etc- concludes Bhāsarvajñā.
Reference:

1 Nyāyasūtra. III. 1. 44.
2 Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya on III. 1. 44.
3 Ibid.
4 Nyāyasūtra. III. 1. 45.
5 Ibid.
6 Nyāyasūtra. III. 1. 46.
7 Nyāyasūtrabhāṣa on III. 1. 46.
8 Ibid.
9 Nyāyasūtra. III. 1. 47.
10 Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya on III. 1. 47.
11 Ibid. III. 1. 48.
12 Nyāyasūtra. III. 1. 49.
13 Ibid. III. 1. 50.
14 Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya on III. 1. 50.
15 Nyāyasūtra. III. 2. 68-72.
16 Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya on III. 2. 68.
17 Ibid. III. 2. 69.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid. III. 2. 70.
20 Ibid. III. 2. 71.
21 Ibid. III. 2. 72.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Nyāyabhāṣya on IV. 1. 33.
25 Ibid.
26 Nyāyavārtikatātparyatikā on IV. 1. 33.
Ibid.

Ibid.

Nyāyasūtra. I. 1. 32.


Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya on I. 1. 32.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Nyāyavārtikatātparyatikā on I. 1. 32.

Sarvadarsanasamgraha. P. 557

Pramāṇamīmāṃsā. I. 1. 8.

Nyāyamajñārī. P. 450.


Ibid.

cf. a. सति सो पुरम्मो चितो | Pravacanasāra. 2. 40.

b. सश्रयंसशिराधरावधात गुणवत्ते न खल्वशिककरयम्, तस्य
ैविद्याधिकतेऽवशृष्टायाधिकतेऽनोक्तम्बधायात्मकपुरुषार्थार्थायायत्वेवनामिन्यमायमाण्यम् | गुणवत्ते
वा न तावदमूर्त्तित्त्वमुग्न: शब्दां गुणगणितोपविभक्ताविप्रेरयेकवेदकेरवेदवेदवेदमूर्त्तित्त्वमुग्नायांमूर्त्तित्त्वमुग्नायांमूर्त्तित्त्वमुग्नायांसि
ष्ट्रवदेश्यांविवर्त्त्वावार्त्त् | पर्यायलक्षणोत्तत्वं गुणलक्षणत्वमूर्त्तित्त्वमुग्नाया | पर्यायलक्षणं हि
काद्दिकतेतवं गुण लक्षणं न नित्यत्तबम् | ....ततोतस्तु शब्दं पुरुषार्थाय एवेति | pravacanasāra-rattvādīpikā on 2. 40.

Nyāyamajñārī. P. 536

Ibid.

Ibid.

176
Ibid. p. 537.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Nyāyabhūṣaṇa. P. 393.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Nyāyāvatāra. l. l.

Nyāyabhūṣaṇa. P. 80.

Ibid.

Ibid. p. 81.

Nyāyabhūṣaṇa. P. 552-53.

cf. Aptaṁīmāṁśā. 59.

Nyāyabhūṣaṇa. P. 553.

cf. Tattvārthārājāvārtika. l. 4. 14.

Nyāyabhūṣaṇa. P. 553.

cf. Tattvārthārājāvārtika. l. 4. 16.

Nyāyabhūṣaṇa. P. 553.

cf. Tattvārthārājāvārtika. l. 4. 18.

Nyāyabhūṣaṇa. P. 554.

cf. Tattvārthārājāvārtika. l. 4. 19.

Nyāyabhūṣaṇa. P. 554.

cf. Tattvārthārājāvārtika. l. 4. 20.

Nyāyabhūṣaṇa. P. 554.

cf. Tattvārthsūtra. l. 4.

cf. śaddravyasamuccaya. 47.
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67 Nyāyabhūṣaṇa. P. 554.
68 Nyāyabhūṣaṇa. P. 554.
69 Nyāyabhūṣaṇa. P. 554.
68 Nyāyabhūṣaṇa. P. 554.
69 Nyāyabhūṣaṇa. P. 554.
70 Nyāyabhūṣaṇa. P. 555.
71 Nyāyabhūṣaṇa. P. 555.
72 Nyāyabhūṣaṇa. P. 555.
73 Nyāyabhūṣaṇa. P. 555.
74 Nyāyabhūṣaṇa. P. 555.
75 Nyāyabhūṣaṇa. P. 555.
76 Nyāyabhūṣaṇa. P. 555.
77 Nyāyabhūṣaṇa. P. 556.
78 Nyāyabhūṣaṇa. P. 556.
79 Nyāyabhūṣaṇa. P. 556.
80 Nyāyabhūṣaṇa. P. 556.
81 Nyāyabhūṣaṇa. P. 556.
82 Nyāyabhūṣaṇa. P. 556.
83 Nyāyabhūṣaṇa. P. 556.
84 Nyāyabhūṣaṇa. P. 556.
85 Nyāyabhūṣaṇa. P. 556.
86 Nyāyabhūṣaṇa. P. 556.
87 Nyāyabhūṣaṇa. P. 556.
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