Chapter 1
A brief sketch of the important doctrines of the Jaina

- Validity of Pramāṇa.
- Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa and its classification.
- Saṃvyavahārika pratyakṣa.
- Īlhā, Avagraha, Avāya and Dhāraṇā.
- Pāramārthika Pratyakṣa.
- Smṛti Pramāṇa.
- Pratybhijña Pramāṇa.
- Tarka Pramāṇa.
- Anumāna Pramāṇa.
- Āgama Pramāṇa.
- Anekāntavāda.
- Syādvāda.
- Nayavāda.
- Nikṣepa.
- Anekāntavāda.
- Dravya.
- Jīva.
- Ajīva.
- Dharma.
- Saṃbarāra.
- Bandha.
- Āśrava.
- Pudgala.
- Ākāśa.
- Mokṣa.
- Mind.
- Sense organs.
- Omniscience.
- Karma.
Introduction:

In this chapter we propose to present a brief outline of the important tenets of the Jaina Philosophy, which are later criticized and refuted by other systems of Indian Philosophy. Even otherwise, to acquaint the presuppositions and their doctrines which are related to logical and epistemological and metaphysical problems are chosen for presentation. The topics discussed here are:

1. Pramāṇa.
2. Classification of Pramāṇa.
3. Validity of Pramāṇa.
5. Saṃvyavahārika pratyakṣa.
6. Īhā, Avagraha, Avāya and Dhāraṇā.
7. Pāramārthika Pratyakṣa.
8. Smṛti Pramāṇa.
10. Tarka Pramāṇa.
11. Anumāna Pramāṇa.
12. Āgama Pramāṇa.
13. Anekāntavāda.
15. Nayavāda.
17. Anekāntavāda.
18. Dravya.
20. Ajíva.
22. Saṃbarā.
23. Bandha.
24. Āśrava.
25. Pudgala.
26. Ākāśa.
27. Mokṣa.
29. Sense organs.
30. Omniscience.
31. Karma.

Pramāṇa: [The (means of) valid knowledge]:

Many Jaina logicians, right from Umāswāti (1-85 A.D) till Yasovijaya (1608-88A.D) have defined it differently. Though the definition differs in terms of expression, conceptually they are same. Let us record a few definitions of Pramāṇa, from some selected text of Jaina logic:

1. सम्यग्ज्ञानं प्रमाणम् ¹
2. प्रमाणं स्वपरामासि ज्ञानं बाधवाजितम् ²
3. तत्त्वज्ञानं प्रमाणं ते युगपत्सर्वत्थासनम् ³
4. प्रमाणादिप्रमाणं भविष्यति प्रत्येकस्मतः ⁴
5. प्रमाणप्रसंसादि ज्ञानमेतिगताधिक्य सत्यत्वात् ⁵
6. स्वपरसंसादि ज्ञानं प्रमाणम् ⁶
7. स्वपरसंसादि ज्ञानं प्रमाणम् ⁷
As we can notice here the Jainas have defined Pramâṇa in terms of knowledge unlike the other system of Indian Philosophy, who differentiated jñāna from Pramâṇa. Here we intend to discuss a primary question: what was the need or rather what was the reason for the Jainas to define Pramâṇa in terms of knowledge?

A carefully observation of these definitions suggest two basic things:

1. There is a historical development of the concept. The definition seems to be refined (pariśkṛta) in course of time by adding qualifications, keeping the essence of the definition intact, in subsequent period.

2. There is clear-cut influence of other systems of Indian philosophy on the Jainas definitions of Pramâṇa particularly the Nyāya.

Let us analyze these definitions to identify the historical development. The earliest definition of Pramâṇa belonging to logical tradition is of Samantabhadra, who defines Pramâṇa in term of valid knowledge, which illuminates itself and its object. It is Siddhasena Divākara who adds the qualification ‘bādhavarjita’ i.e. devoid of any obstacle, and thus, modified it. Some of the definitions of Pramâṇa are based on derivation as given by Pujjyapāda, for example, “Pramîyate pramîñoti prmîti mātrāṁ vā
Pramāṇa “or as given by Hemacandra, which I have already, quoted. It may be recorded here that Nyāyasūtrakāra Gautama has not defined Pramāṇa, suggesting that it has to be understood by derivation and Bhāsyakāra Vātsāyana fills this lacuna by providing a derivative definition. He defines Pramāṇa as upalbdhi sādhanaṁ pramāṇanīti samākhyaṁ nirvacanasamarthyaṁ bodhavyaṁ pramiyate aneneti karanārthabhidhānao hi pramāṇa sabda. Vidyānanda probably following Umāsvāti, has defined Pramāṇa in terms of valid knowledge: samyagijñānam Pramāṇam. In later time Pramāṇa is defined in terms of knowledge with the additions of following qualification like:

1. Bādhavarjitah: (without any obstruction) as given Siddhasena Divākara.
2. Svaparavyavasāyī: (that reveals both the self and the object) as given by Vādidevasūri and Jasovijayaganī.
3. Avisamvādi: (uncontradicted) as given by Vidyānanda.
4. AnadhigatattvalApuṛvārthattvā: (not known before or novel) as given by Māṇikyanandi and Prabhācandra.
5. Vyavasāyātmakh: definite knowledge as given by Māṇikyanandi and Prabhācandra.

From this it is clear that the simple definition of Pramāṇa in terms of knowledge has developed into some complex definitions presenting new theories. In all these definitions, qualifications are added in later period, which present a view of the historical development.

If we make a comparison with the definition of Pramāṇa we can notice that, there are some similarities between the Jaina
definition of Pramāṇa and other systems. For example, the ideas of anadhigatārtha or apūrvārthtvā etc. are introduced in Jaina logic in the text of Parikṣāmukha of Vidyānandi and Aṣṭasahasrī of Māṇikyanandi. As a matter of fact, the ideas of anadhigatārtha or apūrvārthtvā are already existent in the definition of Pramāṇa as given by Kumārilabhaṭṭa. His definition of Pramāṇa is as follows:

‘tatrāpūrvvārthavijñānaṃ niścitaṃ vādhavarjitaṃ
daṃlocṣṭakāraṇārabdham pramāṇam lokasammatam’.

Thus, it is clear that the Jaina logicians have borrowed this idea of bādhavarjita, anadhigatārtha and apūrvārtha from Kumārila. Further, the idea of avisamvādakatva is definitely taken from Buddhist source that defines Pramāṇa as follows: ‘pramāṇamavisamvādi jñānam’.

Classification of Pramāṇa:

The problem of classification of the Pramāṇa has been treated in Jaina tradition in two ways viz. based on the agamic classification and based on logical classification. We have stated that in Jaina logical tradition there is no distinction between Pramāṇa and knowledge. So, the classification of Pramāṇa means classification of knowledge. The treatment where knowledge is divided into mati, śrta etc. is the one based on agamic classification. The treatment where it is divided into Pramāṇa like perception, inference etc, is based on the logical classification. An unmixed instance of the first type treatment is found in Āvaśyaka.
niryukti, where as an instance of the second type can be noticed in the text of Nyāyāvatāra.

If we see the history of development of the Jaina theory of knowledge we observe that during agamic period the idea was pure and unalloyed. At that time, there were five-fold divisions of knowledge. And at the stage of Niryukti the idea of two-fold division usurps in, which is an external influence. Yet the predominance of āgama was there. But at the state of anuyoga, where the five-fold division of the āgama takes a back seat and the four-fold division of Nyāya comes into prominence. Umāsvāti reverts to the position of the Niryuktis and stresses upon the two-fold division, which was finally accepted. In Nāndisūtra another development is seen where the sense cognition is included into Pratyakṣa. Jinabhadra and Akalanka designated it as “Samvyavahārika Pratyakṣa i.e. perception according to the common usage, just to avoid its contradiction with the Niryukti or Tattvārthenasūtra i.e. agamic authority. Māṇikyanandi and Vādidevasuri again adopted the logical division and try to formulate the agamic conceptions into their own style. The logic of Siddhasena divides Pramāṇa in three types only. Thus, the development of Jaina division of knowledge passes through various stages of phases. In the initial stage it was free from external influence, and in later period slightly mixed with external influences and losing its originality and ultimately establishing its originality and then constructing a parallel system of logical development. Thus, Pāṇḍit Sukhalaljee has arranged these developments into seven stages.

1. Purely agamic or
First chapter


We present here various classifications of *Pramāṇa on the basis of different *Jīna authority by table and diagram.
Division based on *Bhagavatisūtra*:

First chapter

Division based on *Prajñāpanāsūtra*:
Validity of Knowledge:

With regards to the validity of pramāṇa, it is stated that the validity arises from itself or through another ‘tat prāmāṇyam svataḥ parataśca’.

In Nyāya philosophy, it is postulated that the validity of pramāṇa arises through other means. Bhāṣyakāra Vātsāyana says that through inference, the validity of pramāṇa is established. An objection may be raised: if an inference, which is itself a pramāṇa, confirms another pramāṇa to establish its validity, how will this inference be validated. If it is said that another inference will validate this, the result would be an end less chain of infinite regress. So we must accept that in some cases pramāṇa validates itself and in other cases, its validity is established by inference. Jaina writers accordingly holds such view that validity of pramāṇa arises either from itself or through another pramāṇa like inference.

To the question as to, in what case does the validity of a pramāṇa arises of itself and in what case through other pramāṇa, the Jainas answer: in the case objects, with which we are already familiar, pramāṇa rises of itself. For example, when we look at our palm and have knowledge of the same, no inference is necessary to establish its validity. Similarly, when we see a pond previously seen many times, in our own village, the validity does not require the help of other pramāṇa but arise of it self.
But when we see a reservoir of water not seen before at any time, we may have a doubt at first whether this is really water or a mirage. Then we use our inference and say that as we are having a smell of lotuses, feeling cool wind etc., it must be water and no mirage and hence, the former knowledge is pramāṇa ‘tatra tāvadabhyastaviṣaye jalamidamiti jñānejāte tadgataprāmāṇyamiti jñāyata eva. Anyathottarakṣaṇa eva niḥśaṅkapraṇṛtyābhāvāt, asthi hi jalajñānottarakṣaṇa eva niḥśaṅkapraṇṛtyāḥ. Anabhyasthetuviṣaye jalajñānejāte jalajñānaṁ mama jātamite jñānasvarūpa nīrṇayepi prāmāṇyanirṇayenyata eva. Anyathottarakāle saṃdeḥānapatteḥ, asthi hi saṃdeho jalajñānaṁ mama jātaṁ, tatkim jalamutamariciketi? Tataḥ kamalaparimalaśīśilamaṁ- damarūtpraṇāraprahṛtyāvadhārayati, pramāṇaṁ prāktanaṁ jalajñānenaṁ, kamala parimalādyanyathānapatteḥ.\(^\text{18}\)

‘Prāmāṇyaatuḥ svataḥ sidhamabhyāsāt paroṃṇyathā’.\(^\text{19}\)

In Pramāṇanayatattvāṅkāra, it is stated that prāmāṇya and aprāmāṇya arises through others, where their knowledge arise by both, i.e. by themselves and by others. ‘tadubhayamupattau parata eva jñaptautu svataḥ parataśca’.\(^\text{20}\)

**Pratyakṣa pramāṇa:**

Pratyakṣa pramāṇa is defined as follows:

1. ज्ञदि केवलेषा गादं हनिदि हि जीवेश सवचकं \(^\text{21}\)
2. अक्षोति व्यापोति जानातित्वक्षा आत्म | तमेव … प्रतिनियतं प्रत्यक्षम \(^\text{22}\)
3. प्रत्यक्षलक्षण प्राहुः स्पष्टः साकारमपि द्रव्यपर्यंत्य सामान्यविशेषत्ववेदनम् \(^\text{23}\)
4. प्रत्यक्ष विशदं ज्ञानम् \(^\text{24}\)
5. इन्द्रियानिद्रियानपेक्षात्वसिद्धां साकारण प्रत्यक्षम् ॥

In the tradition of Jaina philosophy the treatment of problem of knowledge can be discussed in two levels. The treatment as found in agamic literature and based on agamic classification and treatment based on later logical literature and the classification based on it. By logical literature, what we intend is the systematic logical texts from Akalaṅka (750 A. D.) downwards or even from Siddhasena Divākara (480-550 A. D.). The treatment where knowledge is divided into mati, śruta, etc., is one, based on the agamic literature and where it is divided into pramāṇas like perception etc., is one based on logical classification which we have already recorded. Here we discuss the concept of Pratyakṣa on the light of the discussion made by the later Jaina logicians. Before doing so, it would not be out of place to peep into the agamic literature to know the historical development with a view to acquaint ourselves on the stand taken by them and thus form a ground for further analysis.

The Bhagavatisūtra enumerates five types of knowledge, namely, abhinibodha etc. Abhinibodhika is further divided into six kinds on the basis of five sense organs and mind. Abhinibodhika jñāna arising due to sense organs are sense perceptions where as Abhinobodhika jñāna dependent on mind includes in it all the knowledge ordinarily known as parokṣa, with the exception to Śrta. In Sthānīgasūtra the five kinds of knowledge beginning with abhinobodika is brought under parokṣa. The reason for this contention of the Jainas is not far to seek. Āgama considers only those cognitions to be pratyakṣa for which self has not to depend
on anything else. Abhinibodha jñāna due to five sense organs and
avadhi, manapharyāya, kevala are classed as praytyakṣa in
Nāndisūtra. Out of these, the first five are indriya praytyakṣa and
avadhi etc., are noindriya praytykṣa. Each of the five abhinibodhika
jñāna is accepted to have four stages namely avagraha, īhā, avāya
and dhāraṇā.

Alike Nāndisūtra, Anuyogadvārasūtra also divides
praytyakṣa into two: indriya and noindriya praytykṣa. Jinabhadra
(484-588 A. D.) accepts the knowledge due to sense organs as
praytyakṣa. Umāsvāti (185 A. D.) however, regards such
knowledge as parokṣa following agamic viewpoint. It is only in
the work of Divākara that we find a systematic and logical
treatment of the problem. He defines praytyakṣa as aparokṣa, other
than or different from parokṣa. The sensuous perception, which is
called Parokṣa in agamic period and is called saṁvyavahārika in
later logical period, is stated to be of four kinds or it is presented
in four stages. The four stages are avagraha, īhā, avāya and
dhāraṇā. It is maintained that each stage is an independent
knowledge and subsequently they produce collective knowledge.
What is meant is: in a sense avagraha is independent, īhā
supported by avagraha is another independent knowledge, avāya
supported by avagraha and īhā is still another independent
knowledge and finally dhāraṇā on the basis of the succeeding
three knowledge forms another independent knowledge of the
same object. We may now take for discussion the four stages of
indriya praytyakṣa.
Jaina concept of sensuous perception:

Avagraha:

We do not have a definition of avagraha in Nāṇdisūtra. It records two types of avagraha: vyāñjanāvagraha and arthāvagraha. It is pointed out that vyāñjanāvagraha is not possible in the case of visual sense organs. Umāsvāti records the synonyms of avagraha and states that avagraha is an indeterminate cognition (avagraho-graho-grahaṇaṃ-ālocaṇaṃ-avadhāraṇaṃ ity anarhāntaram)\textsuperscript{26}. Pujjyapāda defines it as the first cognition after the contact of the object of sense organs (viśaya viśayi sannipāta samānāntaram ādyagrahaṇaṃ avagrahaḥ)\textsuperscript{27} Two steps are pointed out: when the sense organ is contacted with the object, there occurs darśana. And in the second stage, the cognition arising there after is avagraha. He gives the example of the cognition of white color by the organ of sight (viśaya viśayi sannipāte sati darśanaṃ bhavatitad anantaraṃ arthagrahaṇaṃ avagrahaḥ, yathā cksusā śuklāṃ itirūpaṃ avagrahaḥ)\textsuperscript{28}. It is significant to record that pujjyapāda accepts vyāñjanāvagraha as indeterminate cognition. He writes: arthāvagraha-vyaṅjanāvagrahayor vyaktāvyakta kṛto viśeṣah\textsuperscript{29}.

On avagraha, Jinabhadra makes some significant points. On the expression of Nāṇdisūtra the avagraha is instantaneous. He observes that this avagraha of Nāṇdisūtra refers to arthāvagraha. According to him arthāvagraha is instantaneous where as vyāñjanāvagraha involves a more lengthy process\textsuperscript{30}. It is evident that Jinabhadra proposes to refute the view of Pujjyapāda, namely avagraha is determinate.
Íhā:

Coming to ‘íhā’, Nāndisūtra describes it to follow from avagraha knows the object distinctly. In avagraha for example, a person simply hears a sound while in íhā he cognizes the nature of the sound "se jahā nāmakei purise avvattaḥ saddam suñijja, teṇam saddo iti uggahie no ceva jāṇai ke saddo..., tao jāṇai anuge esa sadde". It further states that the process of íhā never exceeds one muhūrta. It records the following synonyms of íhā: abhogantā, mārgaṇatā, gaveṣaṇatā, cintā and vimaarśa. Umāsvāti adds four more to this lists of synonyms of íhā namely tarka, parikṣā, vicāraṇā and jiñāsā.

Puṣjyapāda defines íhā as the striving for a specific characteristic of the object cognized by avagraha. He writes: “avagraha grhite arthe tad ciṣeṣākāṁṣaṁ íhā”. Thus to him íhā means inquiring for the distinctive characteristics.

Avāya/Apāya:

In Āvaśvaka niruykta apāya is defined as determinate cognition "vyavasāyaṁ ca avāyaṁ”. Nāndisūtra records the following synonyms of apāya: buddhi, vinñāna. Umāsvāti adds further to the list avarthnātā, apanoda, apavyādha, apeta, apagata, apvidhha, apanutha. Umāsvāti defines avāya as the end of the process, characterized by íhā. It can be gathered from the synonyms as recorded by Umāsvāti that according to him avāya consists in excluding the non-existing character of the object cognized.
Dhāraṇā:

According to Nāndisūtra avāya is followed by dhāraṇā, which means the retention of the perceptual judgment for a number of instants "tao dhāraṇā pavisaṃ taṇṇaḥ dhāraī sanmkejjanī vā kālaṃ, asmkejjanī vā kālaṃ". The following synonyms are recorded in Nāndisūtra as dhāraṇā, sthāpanā, pratiṣṭā, koṣṭa. Āvaśyaka Niryuki also defines dharaṇā as retention. Umāsvāti defines dharaṇā to be the final determination of non-forgetting in subsequent period.

It is significant to remember that except in Jaina logic, we nowhere find that knowledge derived from the senses being called parokṣa. In Nyāya philosophy knowledge derived from senses is known as praytyakṣa.

Akalaṅkadeva, the greatest of Jaina logicians attempted to reconcile this in the following way. He divided Pramāṇa into two, praytyakṣa and parokṣa, but instead of dividing praytyakṣa into 'sakala' and 'vikala' as is done in early period, he laid down two hitherto unknown divisions, namely: Saṁvyavahārika and Mukhya Pratyakṣa.

'prayakṣaṁ viśadaṁ jñānaṁ mukhyasāṁvyavahārikaṁ parokṣaṁ śesavijñānaṁ pramāṇamiti saṁgrahaḥ'.

The Jaina theory of non-sensuous perception:

As stated above, the Jaina classifies perception into two types: the saṁvyavahārika and the mukhya pratyakṣa. The first one is empirical perception, which depends on the sense organs
and mind. The mukhya or the non-sensuous perception is direct knowledge, which arises directly in the self without the assistance of sense organs and mind. It arises when the obstruction of 'karma' is destroyed.

The word 'mukhya' means pradhāna, i.e. superior in comparison to rest of the knowledges. As the face has a superior status in-comparison to other parts of body, Mukhya Pratyakṣa is also superior amongst all knowledges.

Māṇikyanandi and Hemacandra also have defined it as a perfect knowledge arising in the self without the instrumentality of the sense organs. To Māṇikyanandi 'mukhya' is that clear, non-sensuous and infinite knowledge of which all veils are removed by special condition (sāmagrī viśeṣa- viślesita-akhilāvarami atindriyaśeṣato mukhyaṁ). On the peculiar nature of such infinite knowledge Prabhācandra notes that it arises when all the veils of karma are removed completely under special conditions. Right knowledge, right faith and right conduct are the internal condition, while space, time etc., are external conditions. When all the conditions are favorable, the karmas are removed completely, and there arises mukhya pratyakṣa. It is clear and right knowledge. It is atindriya i.e. it does not depend on mind and sense organs. So it is perfect and infinite.

**Kinds of mukhya pratyakṣa:**

According to Jainas, there are three types of Mukhya Pratyakṣa, namely, avadhi jñāna, manahparyāya and keval jñāna.
The first two are called deśa pratyakṣa (vikala) and the last one is called sarva pratyakṣa (sakala).

Avadhi Jñāna:

The 'avadhi jñāna' is non-sensuous knowledge. It means limitation/limited. Though avadhi jñāna is non-sensuous, it is limited. In this knowledge, one can perceive the objects, which possess form (rūpa). All the objects, which have form, are manifested in avadhi but all their modes cannot be manifested. It apprehends objects that possess form, although the objects are of the past, future are distant. It can apprehend very fine objects, such as the atoms and the karmic matter. Avadhi jñāna is divided into many types. All types of avadhi jñāna cannot apprehend all objects of all space and of all time. This faculty differs in different being on account of the development of their spiritual discipline. The highest type of avadhi jñāna is able to apprehend the material objects of all time and all space. The lower type of avadhi jñāna extends to a very small fraction of space and time. With regards to its possessor, the avadhi jñāna is of two types: bhāva pratyakṣa and guṇa pratyakṣa. This also may be interpreted as the knowledge, which are associated with the person right from his birth due to his previous karmas in his earlier births. This seems to us more logical than the traditional view. The former is that which arises in a person due to his birth, for example, beings of heaven and hell acquiring this kind of avadhi jñāna right from their birth.

The guṇa pratyakṣa avadhi jñāna is that which has to be acquired as a result of special merit. Everybody can acquire it
when his *avadhi jñānāvaraṇa* is destroyed by meditation and
discipline. Although both the type of *avadhi jñāna* arises by
destruction and subsidence of its karmic veil, yet for the *bhava prarayakṣa-avadhi jñāna*, the birth is the *nimitta kāraṇa*, who
possess it.

**Maṇaḥparyāya Jñāna:**

The changing modes of minds are called *maṇaḥparyāya*. According to *Jainas*, mind is a material substance. Its modes are
its different changing states. Depending on the change of state of
thought, the mode also changes. And the knowledge, which knows
the modes of thinking of the mind of other persons, is called
maṇaḥparyāya *jñāna* (*parakīya maṇogatārtha jñānam maṇaḥparyāyaḥ*). A person possessing maṇaḥparyāya *jñāna*
directly knows the other mental states without the help of sense
organs and mind. Such knowledge arises by the destruction and
subsidence of *maṇaḥparyāya jñānāvaraṇa*: *‘parakīya maṇogatārtha jñānam maṇaḥparyāyaḥ’*.

There are different views on the nature of *maṇaḥparyāya jñāna*. According to *Jinabhadra*, in *maṇaḥparyāya jñāna*, one
perceived the state of mind substance directly, but the external
objects of thoughts of another mind are known only by inference.
Because the external objects of thought may be material or non-
material and the non-material object cannot be apprehended by
*maṇaḥparyāya* (*The amūrtas are known directly only in kevala*).
Akālaṅka rejects this and points out that *maṇaḥparyāya jñāna* also
apprehend directly that objects of other thought. The knowledge of
such objects cannot be an inference: it is perceptual knowledge. Akālaṇka holds that the external objects also are directly apprehended by manahparyāya, as they are associated with mind. However, mind is not the cause of manahparyāya. Akālaṇka argues that mind is only the apeksā in this knowledge, and not the cause. For example, when one sees the moon in the sky, one cannot see the moon without perceiving the sky. The sky is only the apeksā and not the cause in the knowledge of moon. It is of two types: rjumati and vipulamati. They are different in respect of 'purity' and 'duration'. Rjumati is less pure and it sometimes flatters. Vipulamati is purer, cleaner and more enduring. It lasts up to the rise of omniscience. Man can possess both type of manahparyāya.

**Kevala Jñāna:**

It is the perfect and infinite knowledge. We may call it omniscience. When the obstructions of all the karmas are destroyed, the self attains kevala. In this knowledge one apprehends simultaneously all substances and all the qualities without the assistance of sense organs and mind. Nothing remains to be known and nothing is unknown. It is perfect and eternal knowledge. The causes of omniscience are two: internal and external.

A question frequently asked is: whether the other knowledge like avadhi etc., are present or not, in the state of omniscience. According to some, all other knowledge exist, but is over powered by kevala. For example the stars are not seen during
the daytime. However according to Umāsvāti, this view is not correct, because, kevala arises due to the total destruction of all karmic matter, while the other knowledge arises by the destruction and subsistence of their own jñānāvaraṇa. When there is the total destruction of karmic matters the other knowledge also could not arise. There would only be the state of omniscience.

We may now make some observations on the basis of the aforesaid discussion.

1. The Jaina view that the sense organs are not capable to apprehend the objects with all its permanent and changing qualities seems to be reasonable for sense organs have limited capacities.

2. According to Jainas, pratyakṣa is that type of knowledge, which is able to apprehend the objects with all its permanent and changing qualities and that is possible only by the self. Therefore, pratyakṣa means, the knowledge arising in the self directly.

3. The knowledge of the object derived from the sense organs is called sāṁvyavahārika pratyakṣa. The Jaina not only defines sāṁvyavahārika pratyakṣa but also analyze the process involved in it. The process consists in the four stages of avagraha, ṭhā, avāya and dhāraṇā. The idea of four states is original to this system. Though other systems of Indian philosophy distinguish between nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka perception, their distinction is not as thorough as that of the Jainas. No other system has given us such an account of the different states of sense perception.

4. The concept of non-sensuous knowledge of the Jaina philosophy is based on their metaphysics. According to Jainas,
knowledge is the essential quality of the self. The pure self possesses infinite knowledge, but due to the veil of the karmic matters, it cannot realize its true nature. When the obstruction of true nature is destroyed knowledge arises in the self. The self can know objects directly without the help of the sense organs.

5. Regarding the nature of non-sensuous perception, the Jainas are not very clear. They say simply that in avadhi jñāna one apprehends material objects directly by the self. In manahparyāya the knowledge of other mind is acquired and in keval jñāna, the self possess the knowledge of all things past, present and future and also of its own pure nature. The Jainas do not say much about the nature of it. How does the self apprehend the object? Does it apprehend the objects as done by the sense organs? Do other objects come in contact with the self only in the shape of ideas, in this knowledge purely subjective experience like the pleasure and pain! These questions are left unanswered.

6. The Jainas hold that everybody can become an omniscient, while most other schools believe only in God as the omniscient being. According to Nyāya, a Yogi can acquire omniscience, this is not permanent, owing the state of release, and there would be no knowledge. Only God's omniscience is eternal.

7. Regarding the nature of omniscient or kevala jñāna, the Jainas are not very clear. They simply say that in kevala jñāna, the self possesses knowledge of all.

This may be compared with the Yogic perception of the Nyāya and other systems. In Nyāya, there are three types of extra ordinary perception. The first two, sāmānya lakṣanā and jñāna
lakṣaṇā cannot be called atindriya pratyakṣa from Jain point of view. Atindriya pratyakṣa is not caused by the sense organs and mind where as sāmānyaka lakṣaṇā and jñāna lakṣaṇā arises with the help of the senses. Though there is no direct sense object contact, there is indirect contact. The Jaina also would argue that sāmānyaka lakṣaṇā is not pratyakṣa at all, for the 'pratyakṣa' is a clear knowledge. The Yogi pratyakṣa of the Naiyāyikas may be called as atindriya pratyakṣa. It may be compared with kevala jñāna of Jainas.

The Brahmanda of Advaitins is atindriya jñāna but there is no knowledge of the object of the past, present and future. There is no question of direct apprehension of all objects of the world is in Brahma jñāna. There is the direct apprehension of the self, only that is called Brahma. They also accept the direct apprehension of the pure self in the stage of kevala. The Yogi patyakṣa of the Buddhist may be called atindriya pratyakṣa, because it is not caused by sense organs. It is the direct intuition of transcendent reality. But the Jaina does not accept the Nirvikalpaka character of it. According to Jaina, knowledge must be determinate. As mentioned above, determinate-ness is the criterion of the right knowledge.

Smṛti: (Collection):

We have already recorded that parokṣa pramāṇa is divided into five types viz. smṛti, pratyabhijñāna, tarka, anumāṇa and āgama, because these pramāṇas are depended on other means of knowing i.e. perception.
Recollection is accepted as valid and independent means of knowing in Jainism alone. It is defined as:

1. स्मरण स्मृतिः \[^{43}\]
2. तत्तत्त्वात्सर्वतः स्मरणम् \[^{44}\]
3. संस्कारोद्वरविवचना संदिग्ध्यावरा स्मृतिः स देवदल्लो यथा \[^{45}\]
4. स्मृतिजीवाविवचनानां यथात्मानुस्मृतिः स्मृताः | गुणानुसरणां श यथात्
   शिवाहर्तवमेवतनाम | महापुराण \[^{46}\]

Recollection is a cognition, which has for its condition the stimulation of a memory impression (retention i.e. vasanā or samskāra) and which refers to its content by a form of the pronoun ‘that’ (tad).

When requisite conditions such as the elimination and subsidence of obstructive veils, observation of similar objects and the like (similarity, contiguity and contrast of modern psychology) are at work to bring it to maturation, recollection occurs. And so the clause, ‘which has for is condition the stimulation of a memory impression’ has been stated. The phrase, which refers to its content by a form of the pronoun ‘that’ is inserted for its mode of communication.

Other systems of Indian philosophy including Buddhism deny to accept it as a independent pramana. But all have accepted it and explained it as a helping factor in the process of various pramanas. On the contrary Jaina philosophers have accepted it as a valid means of knowing by asserting that the samskāras recall for any particular purpose the things experienced in the past. The memory of such things is a source of knowledge obtained through
senses. Therefore, it has to be accepted as a pramāṇa, since it is true of facts ‘samvādin’ just as perception.

Pratyabhijñāna: (recognition):

Pratyabhijñāna i.e. recognition is a synthetic judgment, which is the result of observation and recollection as spesified by such forms as ‘that necessarily is it’ (tadavedaṁ), ‘he is that same Devadatta’ (soyam devadattah), ‘it is like that’ (tadśādṛṣaṁ), ‘that is dissimilar to that’ (tadvilakṣaṇaṁ), this is different from that’ (tad pratiyogi) and the like. It is defined thus:

1. तदेवेदयति स्मरण प्रत्यभिज्ञानम् | तदस्मत्वभवतीति योएस्य हेतुः स तदभावः।
   भवन भावः | तत्स्य भावस्तुभावः | येनात्मना प्रमृद्वस्तु वस्तु लेनवालना पुनर्पि
   भावते देवेदयति प्रत्यज्ञायते |\[47\]

2. अनुभवस्मृतिहेतुक तिर्यग्यस्तासामान्यदिगुट्मकं संकल्पत्रम्यकं ज्ञानं प्रत्यभिज्ञानम् | यथा
   तत्ज्ञात्तीय एवायं गोपिण्डः गोविशः गवया स एवायं विनिदत इत्यादि |\[48\]

3. अनुभवस्मृतिहेर्ततिकं प्रत्यभिज्ञानं नास्तीति तदस्तु अनुभवस्य
   वर्तमानकाल्यस्तासामान्यदिगुट्मकं प्राप्तः स वदष्ट्मतः स्मतेर्वात्तीविनिदत्तकालिनिन्त नावस्मृतिः
   कथं नाम तत्योत्तीवर्तमानं |\[49\]

Recognition is a complex mode of cognition. It includes both perception and recollection. Perception is the direct observation of the objects existing before our sense organs. Recollection is reproduction of the latent mental trace. These two are the condition of recognition. Thus, recognition is a kind of synthetic judgment. When perception and recollection are combined in particular form, recognition emerges. It delivers its contents in forms like the following: ‘that necessarily is it’ is one of the forms. It is the judgment of identity. All such judgment as ‘this is necessarily jar, cloth, that man etc. are the cases of this type. When
the same object is cognized on different occasions, such judgments occur. ‘This is like that’ is the judgment of similarity. When we happen to come across an object, which is similar to another one that has already been experienced, such judgments as ‘this is like that’ emerges. All such judgments as ‘this book is like that one’, ‘my house is like that of yours’ etc. are the cases of the judgment of similarity. There are certain judgments that are just reverse to the judgments of the similarity. ‘The buffalo is dissimilar to the cow’, ‘the horse is dissimilar to the ass’ and the like can be mentioned as examples of the variety of judgment. This is called the judgment of dissimilarity. There is also the judgment of difference. All such judgments as ‘ten is less then twenty’, ‘five is more then thee’, ‘the elephant is heavier then camel’ etc. are the cases of the judgments of difference.

**Tarka: (Reasoning):**

Reasoning helps us in arriving at certain conclusions in our experience. It elaborates and expands the materials collected and conserved by the processes like sensation, speculation and perception etc. It is an immense extension of the bounds of our experiences. It helps us in getting a glimpse of the remote past, unseen present and distant future. It is through reasoning that we discover mutual relations of different concepts. It is the power of reasoning upon which out inferential judgments are based. It is defined in the tradition as:

1. ईशा, कथा, तर्क परीक्षा विचारणा जिज्ञासा हवथान्धंतरम् ।

2. साध्यासनसब्याभानविज्ञानिकतपेक्षास्तु स्वाध्यायनयन फले सौधक तमस्तक: ।
3. व्यासित्वातं तर्कः | साध्यसाधनयोगमण्यंगमकभवात्मयोजको व्यविचारनवनाःसाहिष्णु
संबधिविशेष्यो व्यासित्विनामाव इति च व्यासितविन तदात्मयोजको व्यविचारनवनाःसाहिष्णु
गमयति न तु घटादि तद्भवत् | तस्यावश्चावनामावर्णनामाव | व्यासे प्रमिती
यत्साधकतम तदिदं तर्कम ब्रह्माणित्वस्यः | यत्र यत्र धूर्मवत् ततः
तत्राविभाइति ॥ ॥

4. उपलम्मापुपलमसंबधं त्रिकर्णाकलितसाध्यसाधनसंबधाधालम्बनमिदमसिन् सत्ये
भवतीत्वादाधाकारं संवेदनांग्रहस्तन्तिरपर्ययायः | यथा यथान् कन्यित्र धूमः स सवा वहनो
सत्ये भवतीति तस्मिनसाति असौ न भवत्येिति या ॥

Reasoning is the knowledge of invariable concomitance conditioned by observation (upalambha) and non-observation (anupalambha). Observation means the knowledge of existence of sādhyā i.e. the thing to be proved, on the existence of the linga or sādhan. Non-observation stands for the knowledge of non-existence of the sādhanā or linga where there is no sādhyā, or it can be given judgments to a new one. For example, we observe smoke and fire together in our day-to-day experience. This observation is not confined to one or two cases only. We observe the same on many occasions and reach the final conclusion that smoke is necessarily related to fire. On the basis of this, we infer the existence of fire from the sight of smoke. Our inferential judgment develops through the process of reasoning somewhat in the following manner: ‘I saw smoke and fire together so many times and I never saw smoke without fire although I sometimes saw fire without smoke. Thus, we infer, because here is smoke, therefore, here must be fire’. In short, our reasoning derives the
conclusion that whatever is a case of smoke is invariably the product exclusively of fire.

It should not be maintained that such knowledge of invariable concomitance is derived exclusively from perceptual cognition. It is beyond the capacity of perception to derive the knowledge of universal concomitance, since our empirical perception is limited, whereas the knowledge of invariable concomitance is unlimited. In other words perception is not discursive and owes its genesis to the influence exerted by a datum that is present in a limited sense.

Nor, it can be maintained that such knowledge is obtained by inference, since, inference itself is not possible in the absence of invariable concomitance has been apprehended as an antecedent condition of inference. Such being the case, how is it possible that the knowledge of invariable concomitance i.e. the reasoning can be obtained by inference? It follows, therefore, that the reasoning or ‘tarka’ is a separate means of knowledge of invariable concomitance, which is not apprehended by other recognized means.

Anumana: (Inference):

In Jainism Anumān pramāna is included in the parokṣa pramāna, owing to its dependence on other cognition i.e. perceptual cognition (pratyakṣa). It is defined as follows:

1. साधनातःध्यात्मज्ञानमुपायं तदत्तवः
   विरोधान्तःधिविदेकस्य विधानप्रतिषेधायोः ॥ ५४॥

2. साधनातःध्यात्मज्ञानमुपायम् ॥ ५५॥
Inference is the knowledge of the probandum (sādhyā) on the strength of the probans (sādhana). Or in other words the knowledge of the probandum in which is the nature of authentic cognition of a real fact and which arises from a probans either observed or expressly stated is called inference. It means, the cognition of sādhyā i.e. that what is to be known, produced by sādhana i.e. the instrument to prove the sādhyā is called anumāna, which follows lingagrahaṇa (i.e. apprehension of the predicate of proposition and vyāptismarāṇa i.e. the remembrance of invariable concomitance). And because it is avisambādin i.e. non-discrepant in its own subject and removes the obstacles arising due to doubt (samsaya), perversion (viparyaya) and indecision (anadhyayasāya). Thus, it should be considered as a pramāṇa.

It is of two kinds; for one’s own self i.e. svārthānumāṇā or subjective and for the sake of others i.e. parārthānumāṇā or syllogistic.

Subjective inference is defined as:

1. अत्राय्यःशुच्युपस्वेक्षकवेधेतु ग्रहणसंबन्ध स्मरणकारणको साधणविज्ञान स्वार्थम् | 56
2. परोपदेश्याग्नेश्व सवध्वेप्तिकारणातुपुस्तात्वाप्तिसर्षणसहकृतादेशार्थाय \\
   साधनादुपत्रायवतादी ध्यानपरित्यागान्त: साध्यस्य ज्ञात: स्वार्थानुभूतिनित्यायः | 57

It consists in the knowledge of the probandum from the probans ascertained by one’s own self as having the sole and solitary characteristic of standing in necessary concomitance with the probandum. Necessary concomitance with the probandum means the impossibility of the probans apart from the probandum. The knowledge of the probandum from such a probans definitely
cognized by the arguer himself as having for sole and solitary characteristic of inseparable relation with the probandum is called *Svārthānumāna*.

*Parārthānumāna* or syllogistic inference is defined as definite cognition resulting from a statement of a probans having the characteristic of necessary concomitance with the probandum. It is defined thus:

1. परार्थं तदार्थेऽपि साधनासाध्यविज्ञानं परार्थायुष्मानम् | तद्भवनत्तत् तद्भवत्तत् ॥

2. परार्थायुष्मानं साधनासाध्यविज्ञानं परार्थायुष्मानम् | प्रতिज्ञासहेतुनात्
   परार्थायुष्मानम् साधनासाध्यविज्ञानं परार्थायुष्मानमित्यर्थः ॥

The definite authentic cognition of a fact that arises from a statement of a person having the sole and solitary characteristic of necessary concomitance with the probandum is called *Parārthānumāna*. In other words it is the knowledge of the probandum derived from the communication made by another person.

Invariable concomitance i.e. *vyāpti* is the main feature of *anumāna*. It is defined thus:

9. व्याप्ति तिः साध्ये वहन्यादि सत्येव साध्यं ज्ञात्ववर्तम्। असति तु नास्ति
   साध्यसाध्यायुष्मानयत्सहचर्य यत्कारणा। एवेन्द्र साध्यं विना साध्यसाध्यायुष्मानयत्सहचर्य
   यत्कारणे च व्यपदिश्यन्ते ॥

10. व्याप्तिः साध्यसाध्यायुष्मानं स यथा मिथ्यं। सति यद्य य स्थादेव न स्थादेशसतीहः
    यार्थः ॥

*Avinābhāva, anyānupannatva, vipakṣavyāvṛtti* and *nityasāhacarya* are well known characteristics of *vyāpti*. Thus, Akalanka very precisely says that *sahabhāvaniyamah* i.e. having co-relation and *kramabhāvaniyama* i.e. having successive relation
and *tadātpatti* i.e. identical cause or origination serve the ground for inference. But it can also be applied to those things, which do not possess of the *tādāmya* and *tadātpatti* relation. For example, we can make an inference about the taste of something looking of its form, which has no *tādāmya* relation.

Regarding the organs or the constitution of syllogism of *parāsthānumāna* there is no unanimity views of the *Jaina* tradition. They have accepted the number of *avayavas* with regards to the *pramātṛ* i.e. to whom it is addressed, of a particular inferential cognition. In other words the capability or the standard of *pramātṛ* determines the number of the member of syllogism. That is the reason why we find in Jainism sometimes accept ten *avayavas*, sometimes five, or three or even one. In *agamic* period particularly Bhadrabāhu has accepted the number up to ten but in the logical period we find the philosopher like Akalanka has restricted it up to five being influenced by the *Nyāya* school of philosophy.

**Āgama Pramāṇa:**

'Word' according to *Jainas* is a material stuff like earth. It exists even when it is not heard. Thus, the *Jains* view go with the *Mimāṃsā* theory that 'word' is eternal whether perceived or otherwise. But unlikely the *Mimāṃsakas*, the *Jainas* do not maintain that the word stuff is unchangingly real. A change is the form of a word from its unperceived form to perceive form involves a change in the character of word.
It is defined as follows:

1. आपोप्रादर्शसङ्केतं द्वारा विद्याधर्मकम् | स्वस्वप्रदेशसङ्केतस्तत्तज्ञानं प्रदेशस्वत्म 

2. पूर्वाप्रवेशास्त्रेष्योपति दृष्टता | दृष्टक रविभावतागोवाहितितिराम | आणमो 
ह्याप्रवेशानाग्निे दोषमार्गित: त्यक्ते प्रोहोर्धर्मवां वाच्ये नन्दाध्ये सन्मंशात् 

3. आते स्थि क्षीणदोषेन प्रत्यक्षज्ञाने प्रभुतम आणमो नवति न सर्वः | यदि सर्वः स्वायत् 
अनिवेशेष्यात् 

4. आपोप्रवेशानाग्निे नान्दाध्ये सन्मंशात् 

5. आपोप्रवेशानाग्निे नान्दाध्ये सन्मंशात् 

The concept of omniscient being is very much important in the context of verbal testimony. In this regard, the Jains point out that the āgama is 'pauruṣeya'. The Jains deny the existence of 'God' as an Omniscient Being who creates āgama, but they do not deny the existence of Tīrthaṅkaras as omniscient Beings.

The words of an āpta are called āgama. Āpta means a person of superior intellect and character, who is non-discrepant (i.e. avisarāvādin) in his respective subjects. The Jains believe that their prophets were āptas and therefore they accept āgamas as an independent pramāṇa. An āpta is a person who knows the real nature of a thing about which he speaks and who speaks according to his correct knowledge. Only words of such a person established without any opposition are pramāṇa. Such an āpta can be of two types:

(a) Laukika

(b) Alaukika or Lokottara.
An āpta is free from all faults. Regarding the nature of āpta Kundnakundācārya observes: he who is free from all defects and is possessed of all pure attributes in the supreme authority. The defects are: hunger, thirst, fear, anger, attachment, perspiration, fatigue, pride, indulgence, surprise, sleep, birth, and restlessness. A person frees from all these defects is called a perfect one. Being free from faults he reveals the scripture. He is of highest status and is of unsurpassed splendor. He is free from attachment and devoid of impurities. He has no beginning, middle and end and is a friend and teacher of all living beings. Just as a drum sounds being struck by a drummer without any desire of its own, so an āpta reveals the truth for the benefit of all people without any personal motive. That alone is true scripture, which flows spontaneously out of the āpta, which is irrefutable, which, is salutary for the well being of all beings, which is capable of undermining the perverse path and lastly which reveals the objective nature of things.

The most salient and central of all the above features are the belief in the seven tattvas. The Jaina ācāryas are of the opinion that belief in an āpta, the guru, the scripture etc., is valid if it engenders belief in the tattvas.

To overcome the difficulty arising from the scriptural texts propounding contradictory theories, the Jaina philosophers distinguish between valid and invalid scriptures. Akalankaṇadeva uses consistency i.e. avisanīvadatva as the criterion of a valid scripture. But on this criterion, the validity of other scriptures cannot be denied. Consistency cannot be claimed to be the special prerogative of the Jaina scriptures alone. We have a very
interesting objection raised by Śāntarakṣita, a Buddhist philosopher: 'If Saugata is omniscient, why not Kapila also, and if both are omniscient, why are there difference of opinion between them. Any reply to this will only be a shifting of position or a dogmatic assertion of one's own position.

According to the Jainas, Tirthaṅkaras like Mahāvīra are āptas, whose statements being the source of valid knowledge are taken to be the verbal testimony. An āpta is a Kevalin i.e. he has the knowledge of things from all point of view. He is possessed of both jñāna (knowledge) and darśana (intuition). The question, whether jñāna and darśana of kevalin occur simultaneously or successively is a matter of controversy among different Jaina philosophers.

Digambara ācārya unanimously holds that the jñāna and darśana of a kevalin occur simultaneously. Umāsvāti and his followers, Pujoṣṇa, Akāśaṅkadeva, Vidyānanda etc., also support this view. Kundakunda too believes that jñāna and darśana are simultaneously. Jinabhadra, great upholder of the agamic view bases his objections on the scriptural texts and established traditions, which unanimously recognize alternate occurrence of jñāna and darśana.

The Anuyogadvāra recognizes two types of āgamas (scripture), which we have already recorded, (a) Empirical (Laukika) and (b) Transcendental (Alaukika). The non-Jaina Śāstras like the Vedas, the Mahābhāratas, the seventy-two sciences and arts are included in the first category.
The second type comprises the Jaina Śāstra only. It seems that in the early period the words of Jīna i.e. omniscient persons were regarded as pramāṇa but gradually even the words of 'śruta kevalin' came to be regarded as pramāṇa, not independently, but on the ground that they were always in consonance with the āgamas.

Kinds of verbal testimony:

Verbal testimony may be personal or scriptural. If a young man coming to the side of a river cannot ascertain whether the river is fordable or not. And immediately an experienced old man of the locality, who has no enmity with him comes and tells him that the river is easily fordable. The word of the old man is to be accepted as a source of valid knowledge. It is personal testimony or laukika śabda.

Scripture is also a source of valid knowledge, for it lays down injunctions on matters, which baffle perceptions and inference. For instance, it teaches that misery is the consequence of vice. Knowledge derived from this source is called scriptural testimony. Scripture is defined as that which was first cognized or composed by a competent person and which is not such as to be passed over by others. And which is not incompatible with the truth derived from perception, which imparts true instructions and which is profitable to all men and is preventive of all evil paths.
Validity of Verbal Testimony:

The prāmāṇya and aprāmāṇya of āgama depends on the right and wrong attitude of the author. All words are neutral, hence, neither prāmaṇa nor aprāmaṇa. The validity or invalidity of words depends upon the attitude of this knower. If his attitude is right, whatever he knows becomes right, and if his attitude is wrong, his knowledge also become wrong. Siddhasena Divākara defines śabda or verbal testimony as a valid knowledge, which arises from a right understanding of the words that come from the mouth of an āpta, express the real object, and not contradicted by perception. The purpose of verbal testimony is to instruct, to relate the nature of reality, to be beneficial to all and to remove false notion. But is it not possible to speak the untruth consistently? Again, is it not possible to have coherence in the body of the knowledge, in spite of its being wholly wrong? So, it seems that Siddhasena Divākara has taken a step forward in the right direction when he state that verbal testimony to be pramāṇa must be self consistent, and coherent and also must not be in conflict with other pramāṇa like perceptions. Later philosophers like Samantabhadra, Akalaṅka follow his view in this regard.

He elaborates further that words expressing the real objects and consistent with the whole body of the speakers knowledge generate valid knowledge in the hearer, provided he understands the import rightly. Even the words of an āpta may cause wrong knowledge if the hearer is not or suitable receiver. For valid knowledge in the listener, word should not only come from a
Verbal testimony: an independent pramāṇa:

The Buddhists and the Vaiśeṣikas do not consider verbal testimony as an independent pramāṇa. The Jaina philosophers do not subscribe to this view. On the contrary, they along with the Naiyāyikas, the Sāṁkhya-Yoga philosophers, the Mīmāṁsakas and the Vedāntins maintain that verbal testimony is an independent pramāṇa.

The Jainism differs from the Cārvākas, Buddhism, and Vaiśeṣikas in accepting śabda as a pramāṇa. Cārvākas'denial of śabda as a pramāṇa is unconditional, where as Buddhism and Vaiśeṣika do not deny the attainment of knowledge through it, but they do not consider it as an independent source of knowledge. Instead, they take it as a case of inference. But Jainism has completely positive attitudes in this regard. According to it, śabda as a source of valid knowledge is independent of other pramāṇas.

Once śabda in general is accepted to be a pramāṇa, it becomes difficult to differentiate the valid authority from the invalid one. None of the criteria, namely, consistency, coherence, and verifiability through perception can be made basis for rejecting other scriptures as untrue or invalid.

If the validity of verbal testimony is not intrinsic but subject to its verification by perception etc., the independence-ness of śabda pramāṇa, as claims the Jainas falls flat.

In the end it is worth mentioning in favour of the Jaina philosophers that though the Jainas describe the testimony of Tīrthāṅkaras as transcendental, or lokottara, it is not in fact super
mundane and super human. The Tirthākaras are not otherworldly or super natural deities, but the human beings, liberated from the clutches of the bondage of karma. The ideal of Tirthākara hood is common to all. Anybody, through self efforts and self discipline can queer the karma, can attain the state of kevalin, and thus can become an āpta whose statement qualify for being true or valid verbal testimony. In this respects the Jaina concept of verbal testimony is more appealing then the orthodox concept in which a super mundane divine Being in the name of God is generally accepted to be the ultimate source of the verbal testimony.

Anekāntavāda:

Anekāntavāda is the foundation of the Jaina philosophy, on which the mansion of Jaina philosophy stands. According to Jainism the reality is dynamic, which is having innumerable characteristic, hence cannot be perceived or known at once by an ordinary man. Different people look at from different aspects of the same reality and therefore, their partial findings seem to be contradictory to one other. Hence, they indulge in debated claiming that each of them was completely true. The Jaina philosophers thought over this conflict and tried to reveal the whole truth by establishing a theory of non-absolutist standpoint i.e. Anekāntavāda, based on two theories, namely, Nayavāda and syādvāda.

To understand the reality there are two mutually distinct and fundamental standpoints from which all things can be considered. They are universalization and particularization. Universalization
starts with the observation on a synthetic basis of similarities and gradually reacts the revel where distinction exists and finally concludes that any object of consciousness is in reality an element. On the other hand, particularization is based on observation of dissimilarities, which finally leads on to the conclusion that the universe is, but a conglomeration of completely dissimilar existence.

These two standpoints have given rise to several other conceptions in Indian philosophy. They can be classified into five principal categories viz.

(i) The conception of identity.
(ii) The conception of difference.
(iii) The conception of subordinating difference to identity.
(iv) The conception of subordinating identity to difference.
(v) The conception of identity-in-difference.

Out of these five conceptions the last one viz. the conception of identity-in-difference is developed by the Jaina philosophers, which plays a great role to understand the theory of anekānta.

About the nature of reality there are many conflicting views and heated arguments, which confused the minds of the people to such a degree that it becomes essential to reconsider this burning philosophical question in a conciliatory spirit. This important steps was taken by the Jainas and the result was the theory of anekāntavāda, which, postulates a theory of manifold methods of analysis i.e. Nayavāda and synthesis i.e. syādvāda.
The nature of reality, according to his theory is permanent in change. It possess three common characters viz. *upāda* i.e. origination, *vyaya* i.e. destruction and *dhruvyā* i.e. permanence through birth and decay.\(^{71}\) It also possesses the attributes i.e. *guṇas* which is called *anvayī* and which co-exist with substance (*dravya*) and modifications (*paryāya*) which is called *vyatirekā*, and which succeed each other.\(^{72}\) And productivity and destructivity constitute the dynamic aspect of an entity and permanence is the enduring factor.\(^{73}\)

Ankekāntavāda is a theory by which one can able to know the real nature of the many-faced reality. It is defined as:

अनेकेकवोन्ता अंशा धर्मा वा आत्मनः स्वरूपाणि .परो तदनेकालमकं । \(^{74}\)

**Syādvāda (The conditional Dialectic)**

or

**Saptabhaṅgī (The Theory of Sevenfold Predication):**

*Saptabhaṅgī*, or the theory of sevenfold predication, is treated as synonymous with *syādvāda* owing to the fact that the number of possible or alternative truths under the conditional method of *syādvāda* are, as will be noticed hereafter, seven only.

The fact that the term ‘*syādvāda*’ is often treated as standing for the entire Jaina philosophy is due to the dread importance attached to the method of the conditional dialectic with which it (the term) is most intimately connected. The controversy as to whether ‘*syādvāda*’ is a synonym of ‘*saptabhaṅgī*’ or of the entire *Jaina* philosophy is, therefore, a needlessly scholastic one, at any rate from the philosophical standpoint.
*Syādvāda* or *Saptabhaṅgi* is defined in the tradition as follows:

1. धर्मिण्योन्नतृपत्यं धर्मां न कथां य अनेकविश्वनामकं इति ज्ञानमयं मयं।
2. स्थायित्वमिति वियक्षिप्ताभाषणानेनकात्तलभेण यदनं वादो-जल्या कथां प्रतिपादनमिति
   स्वाभावः।
3. उत्ताधि उत्ताधि येनासी वादः। स्थायित्वं वादो वाचकः शब्दो यस्यानेकान्तवादस्वादी
   स्वाभावः।
4. गियमणः इशारास्वतो गियमणः य जोहु खलु तथो, सो तयस्हो भण्यो जो
   सायलयं सत्यापिदि।
5. एकस्रीव वस्तुनि प्रवेशाश्चत्युतार्नपेक्षेण यद प्रमाणाविस्तादविधिप्रतिष्ठां
   विकास्या सत्यांग्यो विदेशया।
6. एकस्रीविराग्यं प्रमाणनयाः व्याख्यातो वर्णादिक्य स्तम्भ सत्यापिदिः
   कथा प्रकार कोशिः जनकस्वादर्था पर्यात्तिस्रादायान्त्र।

*Syādvāda* or *Saptabhaṅgi* is that conditional method in which the modes, or predications (*bhaṅgāḥ*) affirm (*vidhi*), negate (*niṣedha*) or both affirm and negate, severally, (*prthagbhūta*) or jointly (*samudita*), in seven different ways, a certain attribute (*dharma*) of a thing (*vastu*) without incompatibility (*avirodhena*) in a certain context (*prāśnaṃvāṣānti*). That is, no modal assertion, or proposition,- simple or complex; affirmative, negative or both,- can, at once, express anything other than as aspect (*prakāra*) of the truth of a thing. The full truth, or rather the synthesis of truths, can result only from a well-ordered scheme of propositions (*vacanavīṇyāsa*). Each proposition is, therefore, relative to, or alternative with, the other propositions, which, in their totality, present the full of the thing with respect to the particular attribute,
predicated of it. The Jaina maintains that saptabhaṅgī offers such a well-ordered scheme in which the modes (bhaṅgas) are exclusive of one another, but are at the same time, in their totality, exhaustive of the many-sided truth of the indeterminate real under discussion.

It is difficult to translate syādvāda into English or any modern Indian languages. Some of the suggested English equivalents like ‘probably’, may be’, ‘perhaps’, ‘indeﬁnitely’ and so forth are inadequate, if not somewhat misleading. Its main signiﬁcance lies in its emphasis on the indeterminate or manifold nature of the real, which like all other reels-, comes within its purview. Indeterminateness or manifoldness means that the reels cannot be determined as possessing only such and such attributes and not the rest. The nature of reality is expressed completely by none of them for in its concrete richness it admits all predicates. Every proposition is therefore in strictness only conditional. Absolute afﬁrmation and absolute negation are both erroneous. It is this conception of reality ‘as extremely indeterminate in nature’ that is suggested or ‘illumined’ by the term ‘syāt’. A phrase which will approximately bring out this in-deterministic signiﬁcance of ‘syāt’ would be ‘from a certain point of view’, or ‘in a certain sense’, or some other equivalent form.

Another Sanskrit word which is used to suggest that each of the conclusions signiﬁed by the seven modes is exclusive- that is, does not encroach upon the province of the conclusions pointed out by the other modes- is ‘ eva’ which may be translated as ‘only’ or ‘certainly’ (or in some equivalent form such as ‘there is
no doubt', or 'without doubt'). For instance, the first mode, syādastyeva ghatah, means: "In a certain sense, the jar exists without doubt." This sense of exclusion (vyāvṛtyartham) seems to be more prominent than implies the other and both the functions, which may also be, described as restrictive force and the definitive force, respectively- are inherent in the word.

The syādvāda warn us against allowing 'eva' to proceed beyond its prescribed limits of exercising the restrictive and deterministically articulating influence on the mode within which it functions. That is, its force (śāmartya) is confined to the avoidance of intrusions from the other modes and to the bringing of a definitive articulation into the mode with which it is connected.

Let us present the seven modes with the help of the example of a 'jar' or 'pot'. The seven modes are:

1) In a certain sense, the jar is (syādastī ghaṭaḥ).
2) In a certain sense, the jar is not (syānnasti ghaṭaḥ).
3) In a certain sense, the jar is and is not (syādasti nāsti caghaṭaḥ).
4) In a certain sense, the jar is inexpressible (syādavaktavyo ghaṭaḥ).
5) In a certain sense, the jar is and is inexpressible (syādastyavaktavyaśca ghaṭaḥ).
6) In a certain sense, the jar is not and is inexpressible (syānnāstyavaktavyaśca ghaṭaḥ).
7) In a certain sense, the jar is, is not and is inexpressible (syādastināsti cāvaktavyaśca ghaṭaḥ).
The first mode, represented by the proposition, "In a certain sense the jar is", asserts the existent or positive aspect of the jar. By virtue of the fact that the existence of the jar is inseparably bound up with the non-existence of linen (paṇa) etc. in it what the proposition signifies is that for some reason at the moment of our making the assertion, our attention is being focused primarily (pradhānaraya) on the existent aspect of the jar is to be understood in terms of its self-quaternary, and the non-existent aspect, in terms of the other-quaternary. If, on the contrary, the jar is understood to be capable of being the linen as well (itararūpāpattyāpi), then it will surely lose its very nature (svarūpahāniprasaṅgaḥ) as a distinctive existent, viz., a jar. This claim for a distinctive existence is guaranteed by implicitly understood term 'eva' in the proposition.

The second fundamental concept is 'non-being' (asañ). It is embodied in the second predication, viz., 'the jar not'. It is the negative (niśedha) element in the determinate context of the concrete nature of the full make-up of the jar. The main significance of the second mode lies not in the false statement that the jar does not exist as the jar but in the irrefutable statement that the jar does not exist as linen or anything else.

The third mode offers successive presentation (kramārpaṇa) and the fourth one offers a simultaneous presentation (sahārpaṇa) of the two concepts. Although the third mode appears to be one proposition, it entails, in actual fact, two propositions, which are expressed as one owing to a certain verbal facility. But the verbal
togetherness does not signify a logical co-presence of the propositions, or the concepts they embody.

No such difficulties arise in the case of the third predication which is concerned with presenting, consecutively (kramārpanaṇayā), the two aspects of ‘being’ and non-being’, although it is expressed in the shortened from of a single proposition.

The remaining three modes are derived from combining the three primary concepts in such a way that these three, combined with the four modes hitherto expounded, exhaust all the possible or alternative aspects of truth concerning the object in question (the jar in the present instance).

The fifth mode, viz., “In a certain sense, the jar is, and is inexpressible”, asserts the truth of the ‘being’ of the jar conjointly with the inexpressible truth of the competence of the being and the non-being of the same object. This is a combined mode derived from bringing together the first and the fourth predicates in a complex expressed judgment.

The sixth mode, viz., “In a certain sense, the jar is not, and is inexpressible”, asserts the truth of non-being of the jar conjointly with the inexpressible truth of the competence of the ‘being’ and the ‘non-being’ of the same object. This again, is a combined mode resulting from bringing together the second and the fourth predicates a complex expressed judgment.

The seventh and last mode, viz., “In a certain sense, the jar is, is not, and is inexpressible”, combines the consecutive presentation of the ‘being’ and the ‘non-being’, conjointly with the
co-presentation or co-presence, of the ‘being’ and the ‘non-being’ of the jar. This mode is evidently a resultant of bringing together, within its fold, the third and the fourth predicates of the conditional dialectic.

Unlike the first two and the fourth predications, each of which contains a simple predicate involving one of the three primary concepts, the fifth, the sixth and seventh predications are, severally, complex in structure, the last one being the most complex among them. This is so because they are assertions of complex judgments.

These are seven modes each, which contain one alternative truth, while all together contain the total truth of a situation in which any feature predicated of a real is investigated.

**Nayavāda: (The Theory of Standpoints):**

*Nayavāda* and syādvāda are two complementary processes of the relativistic presupposition of the Jaina metaphysics, forming a scheme, which is pre-eminently one of correlative methods.

*Nayavāda* is principally an analytical method investigating a particular standpoint of a factual situation according to the purpose and the level of equipment of the experiment (jñātry). The particular standpoint thus investigated is one among a multitude of different viewpoints which, in their totally, reflect the full nature of the situation. Syādvāda, or saptabhaṅgi, is essentially a synthetically method designed to harmonize the different viewpoints arrived at by nayavāda.
A naya is defined as follows:

1. जीवादीनः पदार्थानः नयति प्राणुवृत्ति कार्यवृत्ति साध्यवृत्ति निर्वृत्तवृत्ति निर्माणवृत्ति उपलब्धवृत्ति व्याजवृत्ति इति नयः ॥

2. नीति ते एकदेशविश्वास्तोर्धः प्रतीतिविश्वासभाविति नीतियोऽन्य नयः ॥

3. शास्त्रं प्रमाणसमित्यादिप्रायो न्यास उच्चते नयों ज्ञातुभिमिमया सुकृतर्थंपरिमहः ॥

4. अनिरंत्राप्रतिपक्षो वस्तुप्रति धातुभिमिमयो नयः ॥

5. प्रतिपक्षुभिमिमयविशो नयः इति ॥

6. वस्तुन्येनकान्तात्तव्यविशो तेहत्यपात्तायविश्वोस्य याधालेलवापापावणः प्रयोगः नयः ॥

It is a particular opinion or (abhiprāya or abhimata) or a viewpoint (apeksā) – a viewpoint which does not rule out other different viewpoints and is, thereby, expressive of a partial truth (vastvamāsāgrāhi) about an object (vastu)- as entertained by a knowing agent (jñātṛ). A naya is a particular viewpoint about an object or an event, there being many other viewpoints which do not enter into the particular viewpoints under discussion.

Naya can be divided into two types: dravyarthikanaya or the substantive view, and paryāyarthikanaya or the modal (or the modification) view. The categories are also called, briefly, as dravyanaya and paryāyanaya respectively. The view of reality conceived under the division is described as the concise (sankṣepa or samāsa) one in contrast to the other (the broad) one.

By a process of further analysis the Jaina thinkers have been led to the formulation of the methodological scheme consisting of seven ways of looking at reality. They are enumerated in the following order of decreasing denotation: naigama, saṅgraha, vyavahāra, rūjusūtra, śabda, samabhirūḍha, and evambhūta.
Naigamanaya: (The teleological or the universal-particular standpoint):

Naigamanaya relates to the purpose (saṅkalpa) or the end of a certain continuous series of actions, which are represented by one or a few of their number. For instance, a person carrying fuel, water, and rice, when asked “What are you doing?” says “I am cooking” instead of saying “I am carrying fuel” and so forth. This means that the general purpose of cooking controls the entire series of actions which are represented by one or more of them such a carrying the materials or drawing water enabling us thereby to grasp the purpose, which governs the individual factors relating to it. This is the aim or function of the naigama standpoint.

According to another interpretation naigamanaya is described as the standpoint of the ‘non-distinguished’. By the ‘non-distinguished’ is meant the absence of distinction or discrimination between the universal or the generic and the particular or the specific elements of the object under review.

Samgrahanaya: (The class view):

This standpoint concerns itself with the general or the class character of a factual situation, unlike the naigama standpoint, which includes the specific characters as well. For instance, when, pointing to a solitary tree at some distance from you, you observe to a stranger asking for direction, “turn left near the tree there”, it is not relevant to the occasion to mention whether “the tree there”
is mango, banyan, or any other, although “the tree” must be one of these.

Vyavahāranaya: (The standpoint of the particular)

In contrast with the saṅgraha standpoint the vyavahāra standpoint specializes itself in being concerned with the specific feature of the object concerned, without, of course, losing sight of the fact that they cannot stand by themselves without the support of the generic properties in the larger setting of concrete reality. For example, when a person it asked to bring a mango fruit he attempts to bring mango, but not any other fruit, although he is aware of the fact that mango is only a species in the genus of fruit.

Ṛjusūtra: (The standpoint of momentariness)

The rjusūtra standpoint relates to the momentary nature of a thing. It is narrower than the vyarabhāra standpoint in that it looks at a particular thing as the thing appears at a particular moment. This standpoint is in operation when, for instance, we treat an actor, who is enacting the role of a king on the stage, as the king for the moment.

Śabdanaya: (the standpoint of synonyms)

The present standpoint of synonyms refers to the function of synonymous words, which despite their differences in tense, case-endings, gender, number and so forth, convey the same meanings. kalaśa and ghaṭa denote the same object (ekārthavācakāḥ), viz., a
jar which is one of the forms taken by clay. Similarly the words Indra, Śakra and Purandara denote one and the same individual in the same manner as the words globe, orb and sphere denote, despite their several differences, the same circular entity.

A misapplication of this standpoint by treating for instance, two synonymous words as being utterly identical in their meanings is said to lead to the fallacy called śabdanayābhāsa.

**Samabhīrūḍhanaya:** (The etymological standpoint)

It distinguishes the meanings of synonymous words purely on their etymological grounds. The synonyms Indra, Śakra and Purandara denote, according to the conventional approach (rudhīḥ upacāraḥ) of śabdanaya, the same individual where as they do not do so if their difference in their etymological derivation is taken into consideration. Indra, for instance, signifies one who is 'all prosperous' and the other two names signify one who is 'the all-powerful' and the destroyer of the enemies' respectively.

**Evambhūtanaya:** (The 'such-like' standpoint)

Evambhūtanaya, or the 'such-like' standpoint, is a further specialized from of the application of the verbal method. It calls for a different designation for each of the different attitudes, which the same object assumes under different conditions. Purandara, for instance, should be, according to this naya, designated as such only when he is actually engaged in the act of destroying his enemies. Similarly the designation Śakra is appropriate only when he is actually manifesting his prowess. A cow ceases to be a cow when she is not in actual motion; and the onomatopoeic
designation of a ghața would no more denote the ghaṭa when the ghata is not producing the peculiar sound ghaṭ, ghaṭ’. Consequently, because of this insistence that designations should be derived from the different functional states of what is ordinarily known as the same object, Purandara becomes as different from sacra as a cow is different from a jar.

**Nikṣepa:**

*Nikṣepa* is one more important contribution of the *Jaina* Philosopher, particularly to the theory of determining the meaning of a word. All systems of Indian Philosophy have postulated some type of ‘vrtti’ (*saṁbaṇḍha*) between word and meaning and the basis of that one arrives at the meaning/sense. Again in case of lexical ambiguity a specific meaning is determined following different principles.

In this context Jinas have developed the *Nekṣepa* theory, which guides in determining the desired meaning. It must be mentioned that this is one of the most important contribution of the Jinas to the Philosophy of language with regards to the problem of meaning from Indian perspective.

Yaśovijaya defines *Nikṣepa* as follows:"

"प्रकरणादिविशेषं अप्रत्यादि यथवचेतक यथार्थम वित्तियोगाय शब्दर्थरवना निक्षेपण।"

Thus, the determination of the meaning for the proper understanding, out of many possibilities is *Nikṣepa*.

Akalaṅkadeva, in his *Laghīyastaya* explains the usefulness of *Nikṣepa*. He says that *Nikṣepa* discards the unwanted meaning
and the intended meaning is grasped. He writes:

अप्रस्तुतार्थपकरणात् प्रस्तुतार्थ व्याकरणाच्य निषेध: फलवानु्88

Making his observation on Nikṣepa theory, Paṇḍit Sukhalalji SangHAVi in his analysis of Tattvārthasūtra writes "the entire behavior and the means of verbalization of knowledge is through language. Language is formed or expressed through words. A single word on the basis of context or purpose is used in a number of meanings. Every word is capable of expressing at least four meaning. The four meanings are the four divisions of meanings in general of that word and these divisions are called Nikṣepa or Nyāsas. And knowing these Nyāsas it becomes convenient and easy to understand the desired meaning".

Let us take few examples for analysis:

1. King is coming: rājā āgacchati.
2. I pray to lord Jagannath: Jagannatham vande.
3. Move the horse: aśvaṁ cālaya.
4. Bring the ghee pot: gṛta ghataṁ ānayā.
5. Look at Lakṣmipati: Lakṣmīpatīṁ paśya.

The first example, rājā āgacchati, the word rājā may mean a person called rājā or a king. It also may refer to a rich person. In all the examples mentioned above, one has to understand the intention of the speaker and then only one can grasp the meaning of expression. The word aśva in third example may refer to a horse or some other thing on which hoarseness is imposed. The ghee pot may mean a pot full of ghee or a pot meant for keeping ghee or a pot in which ghee was kept before and is now used for some other purpose. The word Lakṣmipati may mean a person
called Lakṣmīpati, or a person who is the husband of a lady called Lakṣmī, or a merely a rich person or Bhagavāna Viṣṇu.

To get all these possible meanings the Jaina philosophers have proposed the four-fold 'Nikṣepa' theory, which would enable one to think in these lines on the basis of the 'Nikṣepa' to approve all these meanings. The four Nikṣepas are Nāma Nikṣepa, Sthāpanā Nikṣepa, Dravya Nikṣepa and Bhāva Nikṣepa. Nāma Nikṣepa would allow one to accept a word as mere name, without bothering about its meanings either from etymological or any other point of view like convention etc. Thus, some times we come across the expression like Dhanapati referring to a poor man or Sundaralal for a ugly person or Sunayanā referring to blind girl. Thus, the theory Nāma Nikṣepa would guide us to treat these types of expressions as mere names. Yaśovijaya defines Nāma Nikṣepa thus:

तत्र प्रकृतिधर्मै निरपेक्षान्तः अर्थान्तरपरिणातः नाम निक्षेपः।

Thus, the word rājā in the first sentence, Jagannātha in the second and Lakṣmīpati in the fifth sentence may refer to mere names of individual, on the basis of this Nāma Nikṣepa.

Sthāpanā Nikṣepa is that sense where a meaning is attributed or imposed on the basis of some resemblance or even in the absence of that. It is defined as :

यथौ वस्तु तद्विद्युत तद्भिमिर्द्देश्येण स्थापयं विद्युताय तद्विभाषणं अक्षादिः च निरर्थकम्।

Thus, following this the word rājā in the first sentence or Lakṣmīpati in the fifth means a rich person and the word horse in
the third refer to the horse in the chessboard or a horse yoked to the chariot.

Depending on its association with some future activity or past activity, to ascertain some meaning is *dravya nikṣepa*.

*पूलस्य भाविनो वा भावस्य कारणं वर्तिक्षिप्तं स द्रव्यनिक्षेपः*  

To ascertain the meaning on the basis of its etymology when the etymological sense and the actual activity performed by the object go together it is *bhāva nikṣepa*. For example the word *Sevaka* would refer to the servant when he is associated with service.

What the *Jaina* philosophers are trying to do is to show the possibilities of the meanings, a speaker may intend to convey or the possible sense in which a particular expression might have been made. The *Jaina* philosopher thinks that the proper understanding of these *Nikṣepas* will guide the listener to grasp the intention of the speaker with regard to a particular meaning, from the alternative meanings presented before him.

It may be observed that *Nikṣepa* theory is the innovation of the *Jaina* philosophers and due credit may be given to them for systematically presenting this theory.

It may be further observed that the *Jainas* want that the *Nikṣepas* help in knowing the intention of the speaker, which is not fully correct. It is ultimately the context and some other factors, which helps in ascertaining the meaning and it is evident from their analysis as well. Thus, the function performed by the *Nikṣepas* is to give or suggest the various possibilities on the basis of which a word may be interpreted.
Tattvas or Categories:

The term 'Tattva' is derived from the stem 'tat' (i.e. 'that' pronoun) with the suffix 'tva' in the sense to denote the (exact sense or the real essence of that particular object (Tattvabhāvan Tattvah ). But, in Indian philosophy this term is used in a very technical sense. In Vedic literature this term is used in sense of paramātmā (ultimate truth) and identical with the Bramhan. In the Saṅkhya system, it is used in the sense of the root cause of the Universe. In Indian Philosophy Tattva, Paramārth, Sat, padārtha are used to denote one and the same things. But in Jain Philosophy Tattva, Paramārthas, Dravyas, Sat, Parāpara, Dheya, Śudha, Parama all are synonyms.⁹²

Cārvāka has accepted four Tattvas, Vaiśeṣikas have accepted six, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system of philosophy has accepted six (later with abhāva seven) categories, Saṅkhya system of philosophy has accepted 25 categories, and Yoga philosophers have accepted 26, Vedāntins have accepted only one i.e. Bramhan, Buddhist accepted four Tattvas and Mimāṁsakas have accepted Vedic sentence is the only one Tattva and whatever act is performed with the help of Vedic sentence is Sat.

Jaina philosophers have defined it following the doctrine of Anekāntavāda. They have followed the middle path (i.e. Pariṇāminityavāda), keeping aside the two extreme systems viz. Sarvanityavādin i.e. the Buddhism in the one hand and the Sarvānityavādin i.e. the Vedānta system in the other. Here, one point may be noted that alike Jainas other system like Nyāya
Bandha or according to some, all seven Dravyas can be divided into three categories.

1.

\[ \text{dravva} \]

\[ \text{jīva} \quad \text{ajīva} \]

2.

\[ \text{dravva} \]

\[ \text{jīva} \quad \text{pāpa} \quad \text{āśrava} \quad \text{samvara} \quad \text{moksa} \]

\[ \text{ajīva} \quad \text{pūnva} \quad \text{nirjarā} \quad \text{bandha} \]

3.

\[ \text{dravva} \]

\[ \text{jīva} \quad \text{āśrava} \quad \text{samvara} \quad \text{moksa} \]

\[ \text{ajīva} \quad \text{nirjarā} \quad \text{bandha} \]

Let us discuss in some greater detail the accepted Tattvas of the Jainas.
Jīva (Soul) Tattva:

The concept of soul and its analysis is very essential in philosophical investigation. Each system of Indian Philosophy has created enough scope for its exposition in their respective texts. Accordingly, the Jainas talk of soul in terms of knowledge. No soul can exit devoid of knowledge and there is no knowledge without soul. Omniscience therefore becomes the natural property of the soul and non-omniscience only adventitious or accidental owing its existence to some external causes or objectives. Jaina philosophers argue unlike Nyāya Vaiśesikas, who holds that soul is devoid of all cognition (jaṭa dravya) and consciousness is an adventitious quality of the soul which comes temporarily as an effect of a complete cognitive machinery i.e. contact between sense and object, then between sense and mind and finally between mind and the soul or the Sāṁkhya philosophers accordingly to whom intellect or buddhi as unconscious being an evolute of Pravṛtti, or even Vedāntins, according to whom, the quality of knowing does not constitute the nature of Brahma, for, Brahman above these limitations. He is pure existence consciousness. The quality of knowing is the function consciousness when associated with the internal organ (antahkarana) Brahman is free from the duality of knower and known. The Vedānta treats all empirical knowledge as only pseudo-knowledge, or the Buddhists who do not believe in the existence of any substance like soul. Cognition to them is a
function of the beginningless stream of consciousness (citta) which
takes the form of ālaya vijñāna and Pravṛtti-vijñāna; or Bhāṭṭas
who treat consciousness as the attribute of soul and regards
knowledge as not self revelatory but only inferentially cognizable
by something other then itself (parānumeyā). Thus, to the Jainas
knowledge is identical with the soul, just as serpent is identical
with the coil of his body.

Before discussing more on this, we may see the various
definitions of soul as found in the system. Following are some
definition of the soul:

1. वैतन्यत्वरूपः परिषामी कर्ती साक्षात् भोका देवपरिमाणः
परित्वर्णे सिद्धः पौद्रालिकादृश्याचायम् \[^{102}\]
2. पाणेहि चढ़हि जीविदि जीविसेदि जो हि जीविदो पुष्यं
सो जीवो पाणा पुष्य पोगलदष्टेहि गिबिता \[^{103}\]
3. दशा० प्राणेऽ यथोपपत्तान्त्रप्राप्तिनेषु निधुकाल्लेषु जीवानानुममवत् जीविति,
अन्नीणित्व जीविविभिन्ते इति वा जीवः \[^{104}\]
4. तद्र देव्याकल्कणो जीवः \[^{105}\]
5. लक्षणमिह मणियमादायौ संभवसंगतो सोवि
चेयण उवलवि दसण गाणं च लक्षणं तस्स \[^{106}\]
6. कर्माभिषिक्षापेक्ष ज्ञान दर्शनोपयोगदैत्यप्राप्तेन जीविन्ति इति जीवाः \[^{107}\]
7. अन्यायाधारणाभावः परेश्वरशिर्माकादयः
स्वतत्वं यथ तत्तत्व जीव स भारद्विधयते \[^{108}\]
8. जीवो सि हवदि चेयो उवोगविभिन्तादि \[^{109}\]
9. उपायोग लक्षणोऽ जीवे \[^{110}\]
10. जीवो उपायोगलक्षणो \[^{111}\]
11. कला भोइं अनुसरो शरीरसिद्धो अणातिनहणो य
On the basis of the above stated definitions the main or prime characteristics of soul are:

Soul is identical with Cetanā i.e. consciousness ( Caitanya svarupa). Thus, it is the main line of demarcation between Jīva and Ajīva. And along with other general qualities of substance (sādhūraṇadharma) viz. existence, origination, decay, permanence etc. Consciousness consists of knowledge and intuition (Jñāna and Darśana Upayoga). Jñāna Upayoga is always having eight types of Savikalpaka Jñāna viz. Mati, śruta, Avadhi, Manahparyāya and three viparyayas i.e. wrong knowledge viz. Kumati (sensory wrong knowledge), Kuśruta (scriptural wrong knowledge) and Vibhaṅgāvadhi (limited direct wrong knowledge). And Darśana Upayoga is having the Nirvikalpaka Jñāna i.e. the pure knowledge that is called kṣāyika Jñāna, which is produced after the complete destruction of Karma. Strictly speaking soul is that substance which possesses four infinities (Ananta Catusṭaya). These four Ananta Catusṭayas are infinite knowledge, infinite intuition, infinite bliss and infinite power (Jñāna, Darśana, ānanda, Sāmarthya ). A liberated soul possesses all these infinities. The worldly soul do not possess them in their perfection because they are obstructed by the veil of four destructive karmas (Ghāṭikarmas) viz. Jñānāvaraṇīya i.e. covering the faculty of knowledge, Darśanāvaraṇīya i.e. covering the faculty of intuition, Mohaniya i.e. covering the faculty of bliss and Antarāya i.e.
covering the faculty of power, hence they possess the four infinities in all perfection.

The following observation can be made on the basis of the above discussion.

1. Soul exists in present, past and future, which is beginningless and has no end and which is beyond destruction.

2. It is having a form of the body (*Dehāparimāṇa*) both smallest (*mūrta*) and highest magnitude form (*Vibhūparimāṇa*).

3. It’s form is different in each and every body (*Prati kṣetre bhinnah*).

4. It is the means or path of knowledge (*Jñāna darśana upayoga*).

5. It is the agent of all activities and also the enjoyer of all fruits (*kartā bhoktā ca*).

5. It is not constant in form (*Ekānta nitya*) but it has extension (*parināmi*).

The *Jaina* philosophers discuss the problem of soul in three aspects. The *first* aspect is known as *Jīva Samāsa* i.e. classes of souls, it divides the soul on the basis of different bodies obtained in the different king domes and expressed the evolution of life. The second aspect is known as *Mārgaṇā* i.e. soul quest. It comprises of other inner differences in species, sex, passion, knowledge, conation in the embodical condition of the soul. The third aspect is *Guṇasthāna* i.e. the stages of spiritual development. It discusses the inner progress of soul and describes the stages of the soul from ignorance and delusion to the state of perfection.
Ajīva Tattvas:

Ajīva i.e. non-sentient means, which is not jīva. We have already seen the nature of jīva in the foregoing pages. Precisely it can be said that which is non-sentient conscious which can realize the pleasure and pain and which can obtain the knowledge of all the objects, that is jīva and opposite of that is called ajīva, which is completely bereft of consciousness and which can not realize sorrow ness and happiness etc. In jaina philosophy the number of ajīva tattvas are five viz. Dharma, Adharma, ākāśa, Kāla, and Pudgala. We can divide them into two groups viz. rūpi/mūrta i.e. having form and arūpi/amūrta i.e. formless. Dharma (medium of motion), Adharma (medium of rest), ākāśa (space), kāla (time) are arūpi or amūrta tattvas and only pudgala i.e. matter is rūpi or mūrta dravya.

A brief discussion or description of these tattvas may be in order.

Dharma:

(The medium of motion):

In Jaina philosophy among the six substance only jīva and pudgala are capable of moving. The rest four are devoid of motion. Hence the question is how they are moving or what makes them move. To this, Jaina philosophers have accepted Dharma i.e. the medium of motion. It can be compared with the concept of ‘ether’ as accepted by the scientists. According to the Jaina philosophy ‘Dharma’ is one and eternal and it is pervaded by all

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'Lokas' and it is also devoid of varṇa (colour), gandha (smell), rasa (taste) and sparśa (touch). It helps jīva (sentient being) and the pudgala (matter) to move. And due to this jīva speaks, moves and does all types of developments viz. mental and physical etc. It does not compel to the jīvas and pudgalas to move but when they want to move they have to depend on Dharma. It is the nimitta kāraṇa of the effect moving. Pudgalas and jīvas are the upādāna kāraṇa of moving. And also due to this dharma we can discriminate 'Loka' from 'Aloka'. Because this Dharma is pervaded in loka only and that is why it becomes discriminate factor. In the Bhagavatīsūtra Mahāvīraswāmi describes the necessity of Dharma to Gautama, that if it would have not been there then nobody can know who comes and who goes, how the sound waves are spreaded, how could one see, how could one think, how could one speak and how could one move etc. Thus G. R. Jaina has rightly pointed out that science and jaina physics agree absolutely so far as they call Dharma, ether, non-material, non-atomic, non-discrete, continuous, co-extensive with space, indivisible and a necessary medium for motion and one which does not itself move.

**Saṁvara (stoppage):**

The obstruction of karmic influx (āśrava) i.e. the prevention of the inflow of karmic matter is called saṁvara. It always precedes liberation. Unless and until the inflow of karmic matter into the soul is stopped, the real nature of a soul (śuddha jīva)
cannot be revealed. To obstruct this karmic matter is the main function of *saṁvara*. It is defined as follows:

1. आस्त्रयनिरोध संवर |\textsuperscript{118} 
2. कर्माननिरोधः आदुपतिनिरूपनिरोधः तत् |\textsuperscript{119} 
3. संबिधते संरक्ष्यते मिश्रायद्वीतादि परिणामो तेन परिणामातिरुरुगः सम्यवद्वीतादिना मुख्यवीणा वा संवर |\textsuperscript{120} 
4. दृष्टियुक्तसहस्त्रस्थेन जलजापे जहाजां तु जासयदि | मिश्रित*ताः* आवश्यकः तह जीवे संवर स्वीकार होई |\textsuperscript{121} 
5. अभिव्रत वधूकर्मादानस्तु राख्ये तत्व निरोधः संवर|\textsuperscript{122} 

It is of two kinds viz. psychical and physical. The cessation of activities that lead to transmigration is psychical stoppage. It can be called ‘yoga’ in general terminology. When these activities are checked, the inflow of karmic matter is interrupted. This is physical stoppage. These are sixty-two ways to stop the karmic matter.\textsuperscript{123} They are five *samitis* viz. *āryā*-samit, *Bhāṣā*-samit, *ādāna*-samit, *Nikśepana*-samit, *Eṣeṇā*-samit and *Pratisthāpanā*-samit; three guptis viz. *kāya*-gupti, *mana*-gupti and *vāk*-gupti; five vratas viz. *Aṁśa*, *Satya*, *Āstheya*, *Vrahmacarya* and *Aparigrahā*; ten *Dharmas* viz. *kṣamā*, *mṛdutā*, *saralatā*, *śauca*, *satya*, *saṁyama*, *tapa*, *tyāga*, *audāsinya* and *brahmacarya*; twelve anuprekṣās viz. anitya, *aśaraṇa*, *saṁsāra*, anyatva, *aśuci*, *saṁvara*, nirjarā, loka, *bodhidurlabhatva*, *dharmānuprekṣā*, *āśrava*, *ekatva*, etc. twenty two pariṣahas viz. *kṣudhā*, *trṣṇā*, *śīta*, *uṣṇa*, *daṁśamaśaka*, nagnatva, arati, *sthirī*, *caryā*, *nisadyā*, *śayā*, *ākoṣa*, *vadha*, *yācanā*, *Alābha*, *roga*, *trṣṇsparśa*, *mala*, *saktāra-parāśkāra*, *prajñā*, *jñāna*, *adarśa*, *yathākṣāta* and *saṁyika*. 
Baṇḍha (Bondage):

Since time immemorial the soul and matter has been staying in the lokākāśa. Along with these, there are four kaśāyas viz. krodha, māna, māyā and labha and the impression (saṅskāra) of the actions performed by the soul also be there. But the question is, if the karmic matter is non-sentient (jaḍa), then how they enter into the soul. For this they have accepted the ‘yoga’124 (i.e. the mind body and speech), which makes a kind of vibration (spandana) in the pradeśa of soul, and it helps the karmic matter to enter into the soul through the passage of āśrava i.e. influx. This process is called baṇḍha. It is defined as follows:

1. कथ्यतेऽपूर्वम् बन्धनमात्राऽ वा बन्ध | अथवा बन्धायति कथ्यतेऽपूर्वम् कथ्यतेऽपूर्वमात्राऽ वा बन्ध ।125
2. अभिमन्देशागतिनिरोधेऽवै व ।126
3. आत्मविरुध्दोपन्यासप्रकारसात्तथायेऽवै व ।127
4. दयत्सद सद्यां दयायां वा संजोगो समावायो वा स बंधो गणम ।128

This bondage is of two kinds viz. psychical and physical129 i.e. bhāva baṇḍha and dravya baṇḍha. That conscious state by which karma is bound with the soul is called psychical bondage. The interpenetration of the karmic particles and the soul is known as physical bondage. The cause of bondage is a particular modification of consciousness consisting of passions by which, karmas are tied to the soul. In other words attachment and aversion are the cause of bondage. And also wrong belief (mithyātva), negligence (avirati), pramāda, kaśāya and yoga are the causes of bondage.
Āsava/Āśrava: (influx):

Āsava i.e. influx is a passage or way, those which the karmic matter flows into the soul through the channel of activity done by speech, mind and body, as if water flows into the ocean through streams. It is defined in the system as follows:

1. कायवाड्यम् कर्मयोग स आख्यः \[130\]
2. आसवत विद्वैतित कर्म येन स प्रकृतिपादिरूपः आसव कर्माञ्चादन कारणम् \[131\]
3. आसवत्यानेन आसवण्मात्र य आसवा पुष्चपापामहाराजस्यासवकारणम् \[132\]

From these above mentioned definitions it is clear that āśrava acts as a passage, through which the pāpa and pūṇya enters into the soul and this influx precedes bondage i.e. baṅḍha. mithyārva, avirati, pāmāḍa and yoga are the helping factor of āśrava. It is of two types\[133\] viz. Physical and Psychical i.e. Dravyāśrava and Bhāvāśrava. The modification of consciousness by which karma gets into the soul is known as psychical influx. The psychical influx is defined thus:

1. आसवत्यानेनलन्त्यासः | आसवत्याग्निषति जायते कर्मवर्यति पुनःगानः कारणमात्रेद्यम्परिमाणः स परिणामः आख्यः \[134\]
2. निरासवत्यांवितिःविक्षणञिशुभान्यांपरिमाणे शुभान्यकर्मणांलन्त्यासः \[135\]

In other words psychical influx is nothing but the mental, bodily or vocal activities. It is further divided into two viz. sāmparāyika and īryāpatha.\[136\]

Samparāyika āśrava is defined as follows:

1. सामपरायिकायं सामपरायिकायं \[137\]
2. सामपरायी संसार: तत्त्वयोजनं कर्म सामपरायिकः \[138\]
3. कर्मसि समस्यादालनः परात्मोभिमवः समस्याय: उल्लुढ्यते तत्त्वयोजनं कर्म
Iṣṭvāpatha āśrava is defined as follows:

1. त छद्दुमत्वशीयरायां साजोगिकविदीया वाक वाकीरियवाहकम् जामो ईरणमोय्यायोगे
   गतिश्रव्यः | तद्दारक कर्म ईरणाथम् ।\(^{139}\)

2. ईरणय्योगः साप्तथा मागः हेतुयङ्कस्त कर्मण: तद्विदायसङ्करम् ।\(^{140}\)

3. तद्दुषसं गणितं जोगं ज पुरगले पदेसत्व परिणामदि कर्मावं तं निष्टु दुधसव शीजं
   |\(^{141}\)

4. गणितरणार्थीं जोगं ज पुरगले समासवद द्रष्पासवो तं जैं अलेयमेतो जिम्बालसार
   |\(^{142}\)

The influx of \textit{karma} is of two kinds viz. \textit{Pūnya} i.e. virtuous and \textit{pāpa} i.e. sinful. Meritorious activities cause the influx of virtuous \textit{karmas}, while wicked actions are responsible for the inflow of sinful \textit{karmas}. Injury, falsehood, stealing, envy etc. are wicked activities. The opposites of these are meritorious one. How can activity be meritorious or wicked? That which is performed with good intention is meritorious. The influx of persons with passions extends transmigration and that of persons free from passions prevents or shortens it.

\textbf{Pudgala: (matter):}

The concept of matter has been treated by every systems of thought in its own way from the nominal and phenomenal aspects as it exists in space and continues in time with all its qualities and modes. Does matter exist? It is a very complicated problem in the sphere of philosophy. The Idealists maintain that the universe is a
spiritual reality. Matter does not enjoy any separate existence independent of spirit or thought. But the realists do not agree with this view. They explicitly say that the material reality is absolutely independent of the spiritual reality. It is as real as thought itself.

Jainism, being a member of the school of realism certainly believes in an independent and separate existence of matter. The Jaina thinkers maintain that the doubt about a non-existence object is totally unjustifiable, as in the case of sky-flower and hare-horn where non-existence is certain. The point is that our doubt is justifiable in the case of existent objects only.

The Jaina writers have used the term ‘Pudgala’ exactly in the sense of matter. The word pudgala has two parts viz. ‘pud’ and ‘gala’. The first part ‘pud’ means to combine, to fill and the second part ‘gala’ means to dissociate, to flow. Hence, the etymological meaning of the word pudgala is that substance which undergoes modifications by combinations and dissociation. It is defined by the system as follows:

1. पुरलगलनान्वध्यं संसतावालु पुदगला: भेदसंघातां च पूर्वनः गलनं चेति पुरलगलाल्वास्वक्षा विक्रान्तर्यथिभय पुरलगलश्वोद्धत्व जिन्दगलिन्न्त्व प्राप्तसे जीवा: | तैं शब्दलसाहवस्वयमार्ययाप्रयोगशाहिसावेन गिर्यन्तिः | पुरलगला: |¹⁴⁴

2. गलनपुरलालस्वास्वतत्त्र जीवा: |¹⁴⁵

3. स्वर्णासाधवर्णवष्ठ जीवा: |¹⁴⁶

4. तत्र स्वभावपुरलाल: परमाणु विभावपुरलाल: स्वपाण: | पुरलगलब्ध्य तावत्तु विकल्पनाप्रय स्वाध्य | स्वभावपुरलालविभावपुरलालचेति |¹⁴⁷

Matter has four characteristics associated with it viz. touch, taste, smell and color.¹⁴⁸ Each and every element of matter
possesses these four characteristics. Eight types of touch are described in the jaina works\textsuperscript{149} viz. soft (\textit{mṛdu}), hard (\textit{kāṭhina}), heavy (\textit{guru}), light (\textit{laghu}), cold (\textit{śitas}), hot (\textit{uṣṇa}), smooth (\textit{snigdgha}) and rough (\textit{rukṣa}); and five kinds of tastes viz. bitter (\textit{takka}), sour (\textit{kaṭuka}), acidic (\textit{amla}), sweet (\textit{madhura}) and astringent (\textit{kaśāya}); and two kinds of smell viz. good smell (\textit{surabhiganka}) and bad smell (\textit{asurabhigandha}); and five kinds of color viz. blue (\textit{nīla}), yellow (\textit{pīta}), white (\textit{śukla}), black (\textit{krṣṇa}) and red (\textit{rohita}).\textsuperscript{150} Along with these four \textit{mūrtatva} i.e. having form and \textit{acetanattva} i.e. non-sentient are the six special qualities of \textit{pudgala}.\textsuperscript{151} It is further mentioned that the foregoing twenty are the principal divisions. Each of these may be further sub-divided onto numerable and infinite kinds.\textsuperscript{152}

Matter has two different forms: indivisible elementary particles and their combinations. In the technical terms of Jainism the indivisible elementary particles are called ‘\textit{aṇu}’ and the combinations of these particles are known as \textit{skandhas}.\textsuperscript{153} The last particle of matter, which cannot be further, divided by any means whatever is called ‘\textit{aṇu} or \textit{paramāṇu}’.\textsuperscript{154} In the \textit{Tattvārtharājavārtika} \textit{anu} is defined as the smallest material particle. There is nothing smaller then \textit{paramāṇu}.\textsuperscript{155} According to \textit{Paṅcāsthikāyasāra} the substance that has a single taste, a single color, and single smell and two kinds of touch, which is cause of sound while itself unsounding, which is different from molecules though constituting them is called atom.\textsuperscript{156}
Since, atoms are real entities, five physical attributes viz. taste, and color, smell and two touches are always associated with them. The properties of hardness and softness, heaviness and lightness are not associated with atoms. These qualities are associated with the molecules. These properties are generated by the loose or compact aggregation of atoms and because all the atoms have the same mass there arises no question of light and heavy or hard and soft amongst the elementary particles of matter.

_Skandhas_ i.e. molecule has been defined as an aggregate of atoms.\textsuperscript{157} It possesses a gross form and undergoes process of association and dissociation. Molecules are formed in three different ways\textsuperscript{158} viz. (i) by division or dissociation i.e., _bheda_, (ii) by union or association i.e. _saṅghāta_, (iii) by the united process of dissociation and association taking place simultaneously.

Dissociation occurs on account of two causes, namely, internal and external.\textsuperscript{159} The internal causes in the molecules themselves are the phenomenon of radioactivity and the like. External causes are the disassociation of molecules in solution, the breaking under high pressure, the breaking under artificial bombardment and the like.

Association _saṅghāta_ is defined as the union of separate entities.\textsuperscript{160} The assemblage of atoms to form molecules is an instance of association.

The united process of dissociation and association is defined as follows:- by simultaneous dissociation and association
molecules occupying two spatial particles etc. are produced, just when one molecule breaks the remaining part is associated by another molecules.\textsuperscript{161}

Further, matter can be divided into classes. These classes are not different from atoms and molecules. They are in other words, their sub-division: \textsuperscript{162}

a. Solids: earth, stone and the like are the solid forms of matter. This class is known as \textit{sthula-sthula}.

b. Liquids: butter, water, oil, milk, and the like are the liquid forms of matter. They are known as \textit{sthula}.

c. Energy it manifests itself in the form of heat, light, and electricity etc. It is called \textit{sthula-sūkṣma}.

d. Gases: air etc, are forms of gases this class is known as \textit{sūkṣma-sthula}.

e. Fine-matter: it is responsible for thought activities and is beyond sense perception. This type of matter is called \textit{sūkṣma}.

f. Extra-fine matter: the forms of single elementary particles are composed of extra fine matter. It is called \textit{sūkṣma-sūkṣma}.

The \textit{jaina} system admits that matter does influence the worldly soul (\textit{sānsārika jīva}). It forms the physical basis of the bodies, speech, mind, and respiration of the worldly soul.
According to Jainism there are five types of bodies viz. (a) Audārika i.e. the organic body of human beings, animals and vegetable kingdoms. (b) Baikriya i.e. that which is possessed by the beings of heaven and hell and by human beings as well as animals possessing an extraordinary power i.e. labdhi. It is invisible and is capable of transformation in different shapes and sizes. (c) āhāraka i.e. the subtle body, which is developed by the advanced yogins. (d) Taijas i.e., the electric bodies. It possesses the power of digesting the food we take. (e) Kārmaṇa i.e. the inner subtle body, which is the seed of all mental and physical activities.

Thus, all these five types of bodies, speech, and mind are formulated due to the five Vargāṇās i.e. the kinds of molecules as accepted by the Jaina system. Āhara-vargāṇa causes the audārika śarīra, vaikriya śarīra and the āhāraka śarīra. Tejo-vargāṇa forms the taijasa śarīra and speech and mind are formed by bhāṣā vargaṇā respectively and the kārmaṇa vargaṇā forms the inner subtle body i.e. the kārmaṇa śarīra. And also pleasure; pain, life and death are experience through the agency of matter. Hence, one piece of matter is capable of producing physical and chemical changes in another piece of matter.

Thus, as long as soul is in bondage so long as it possesses the Taijasa and Kārmaṇa śarīra. According to Tattvārtha Sūtra the mundane soul can possess four bodies at the most at a time but not the five. Apart from the body, mind and speech there are also some other effects as the manifestation of matter. There are in the
forms of sound, union, fineness, grossness, figure, divisibility, darkness, shade, heat and light.

Ākāśa (Space):

There are two views regarding the primary material elements (mahābhūtas). One view recognized five mahābhūtas and the other recognized four mahābhūtas. Those who have accepted five elements viz. prthvī, āpa, tejas, vāyu, ākāśa and they have possessed five special qualities viz. gandha (smell), rasa (taste), sparśa (touch), śabda (sound), respectively. Śāṅkhyayoga, Nyāya-vaiśeṣika and the prabhākara mīmāṃsā have accepted this view. These mahābhūtas are the material causes of all the material effect-substances i.e. bhautikakāryadravya. Sāṅkhyay has accepted these five elements are the causes of material effect-substance. Ākāśa is produced from śabda tanmātra. But Nyāya-vaiśeṣika system has accepted only four elements as the causes of material effect-substance. Though, Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā has given the status to ākāśa as mahābhūta but maintains that it is not the substratum of śabda. According to Bhāṭṭa, śabda is an independent substance.

Those who have recognized four mahābhūtas viz. prthvī, āpa, tejas, vāyu maintained that ākāśa either is a form of matter, produced from four mahābhūtas or it is non-spiritual substances. Among them, the Theravādi Buddhists accepted ākāśa as saṁskṛta, it is produced from the four mahāsbhūtas, thus, it is derived matter i.e. upādāya-rūpa. But the Vaibhāṣika Buddhists recognized the four element but they maintained that ākāśa is
asarisra and it is non-material and non-spiritual or rather non-psychical. Srautrantika does not admit the substantial existence of aksha because they believe absolute momentariness of entities. The vedantins have accepted aksha as Brahman, since the characteristic marks are mentioned. All the prominent characteristics of Brahman are ascribed to aksha.

Jainas follow this old tradition of four mahabhutas and hence maintain that aksha is not pudgala, it is an independent substance. Jaina philosophy has conceived the space theory on the basis of the principle of space as positional quality of material objects and space as container of material objects from the stand points of its permanence, fixedness, non-corporeality, singleness, immobility or inactivity and capacity of receiving the succession of things in motion and made synthetic view of all other Indian concepts of space from the aspects of dyava (substance), kala (time), ksetra (locus) and bhava (condition). They defined it as follows:

1. Nitvavisthitamvarpasam aakasaasdekkhavya nishkavya v c aakasvaagah | 171
2. Svavasam joavam sesaan tah y pudgalaan chaan dade viveraveri t loke havya aagasa | 172
3. Jeevpyudgalaanam vargaanam kshetradharmayam sa kshetrasada tadakahaan aatasasrayam | 173
4. Aakasaansadsmita avyaya svam chaakshaat ityakrasham | aavaksha danadha | 174
5. Aagasaan sapde sa tukkadaa tiriiovidhaa | ksetrogha bhyaanahit aantkarantviddevid | 175
6. Bhyaanahidyammutri aayagraanulaksham cha samagam | tad paahadaa jivil doubt | 176
7. Aavakshaanajogam jeevaachar bhyaan aayyam | 177
From the above-mentioned definitions it is clear that, space is a colorless, odorless, tasteless, touch less, non-corporeal, non-living, permanent eternal and fixed substance. It is that in which other substances manifest themselves or exist with their respective, modes without exception or it itself gives room to them. From the point of view of *dravya*, equal to the extent of the universe and non-universe i.e. *Lokākāśa*, all pervasive and infinite, from the point of view of *kṣetra* i.e. locus, it is eternal from the point of view of *kāla* i.e. time, it is colorless, odorless, tasteless and touch less, from the point of view of *bhāva* i.e. condition and it is endowed with the quality of accommodation from that of capacity or quality. According to Jainism, *śabda* is not the nature of *ākāśa* nor is its quality. It is a mode of *mahūbhūtas* or matter (*pudgala*). Aggregates (*skandhas*) of atoms strike against one another and *śabda* are produced from them. If *śabda* were its (*ākāśa*) quality, the quality of *ākāśa* being formless or non-physical it would not have been heard through the organ of hearing. *ākāśa* is one in number. There is no possibility of increase of decrease in its number. It is one and will remain one for ever. It is eternal in the sense that it never gives its nature. As it is present everywhere in the universe, the possibility of movement from one place to another is rejected. Space is *arūpi* (formless). Here *arūpitva* means non-corporeality but not the denial of own nature, for there must be its nature. If there is not, it is not real, as the horse’s horns are not proved real. The effect or conglomeration of color, taste, smells,
touch and figure is called mūrti (concreteness). Thus, there is not such mūrti in ākāśa.

Thus, if we conceive a substance infinite in extent and maintain that there is no substance more extensive than it, or not even as extensive as it, then this conception logically compels us to conceive this substance as requiring no other substance to contain it, because, there is no substance more extensive than it to contain it. Ākāśa is such a substance.\(^1\) Ākāśa must exist in itself.\(^2\) It is a single substance having infinite pradeśa.\(^3\) Pradeśa means ‘unit’. A primary indivisible atom of matter is the ultimate unit of matter. And the space occupied by a material atom is the ultimate unit of space. Hence, ākāśa is called astikāya. It is of two divisions viz. Lokākāśa and Alokākāśa.\(^4\) Loka is that place in which dharma, adharma, kāla, pudgala and jīva exist. That which is beyond this lokākāśa is alokākāśa.\(^5\)

This division is not in ākāśa itself but it is due to its relation with the other five substances. Hence, ākāśa is a single substance, which has infinite pradeśas. When it is relatively divided into lokākāśa and alokākāśa, Lokākāśa has innumerable pradeśas, which alokākāśa from ākāśa is a whole; the remaining pradeśas of alokākāśa are still infinite.

**Mokṣa (Liberation):**

According to Jainism liberation is nothing but the pure or true state of the soul. Injury, falsehood, stealing, envy, attachment, aversion, wrong belief etc. creates influx (āśrava). Due to this influx the soul enters into the circle of bondage. This influx of the
karmic matters are destroyed due to the *saṃbāra* i.e. the stoppage and *nirjarā* i.e. the dissociation. And then slowly all karmic matters are annihilated due to the observation of penance and austerity. Then, the soul becomes omniscience (*sarvajña*). This state of soul is called *jīvanamūkti* or *bhāvamokṣa*. In this stage the four *ghāṭiya-karmas* viz. *jñānāvaraṇīya*, *darśanāvaraṇīya*, *mohaniya* and *antarāya* are destroyed. It is just before the stage of liberation. And then four *aghāṭiyakarmas* viz. *āyu*, *nāma*, *gotra* and *vedniya* are destroyed. And also one gets rid from the four *bhāvas* viz. *aupaśamika*, *kṣayopaśamika* *audāyika* and *bhvyatva*. Then the soul becomes liberated. The tradition has defined liberation as follows:

1. *कृत्स्न कर्मवियोग लक्षणो मोक्षः* 192
2. *निरवशेषनिराकृतकर्ममलकलकस्त्यागारीस्तरानवतनोऽविन्मचस्वाभाविकज्ञानदिगुणमवायाधसु*  
   *वामायत्तिकमवास्थान्त्र मोक्षं हि* 193
3. *आलबनयोदिधाकरण मोक्षः* 194
4. *जं अपसहायो मूलोतरपदिविविषयं मुच्छद तं मुक्तः अविरुद्धः* 195
5. *मोक्षं असने इत्येतस्य धज्ज भावसाधनो मोक्षां मोक्षं असनं क्षणमित्वथा स आत्मनित्वः  
   *सर्वकर्मनिन्दयो* मोक्षं *इस्पुद्यते* 196
6. *मोक्षं इव मोक्षः | कं उपमासः | यथा निगडादिद्वियोक्षात् सति स्मात्तन्त्रे अभिप्रेतादेशगमनात्*  
   *पुमान् सुखी भवति, तथा कृत्स्न कर्मनिद्योगे सति*  
   *स्वाभिनित्तिकज्ञानदर्शनानुगमं सुखात्मा भवति* 197

From these above-mentioned definitions the position of *Jainas* regarding the concept of soul becomes clear. They hold that the annihilation of all *karmas* in liberation. This is of two types viz. *bhāva mokṣa* and *dravya mokṣa* 198 i.e. psychical and physical. The modification of soul, which is the cause of the total
destruction of karmas, is known as psychical liberation and the actual separation of the karmic matter is called physical liberation. As it is stated as follows:

1. निरवस्येरणेन कर्मणि येन परिणामेन शान्तिक हानिकानियांत्यात्यतनिचित्तेन अस्वयत्ते स मोक्षः \[200\]
2. कर्मिनिमुक्ततंत्रः सुदाँतोपलिपिकीलिपीविपरिवाराः भावभोक्तः, भावभोक्तानितितेन जीवकर्मात्रादेशां निर्विशेषः पृथिविभागः प्रथममोक्षमे \[201\]

In the state of liberation i.e. the self-attainment, no new karmas flow owing to the absence of their causes. The soul exists in its pure and perfect state. It attains its natural form and possesses infinite knowledge and infinite bliss. Although, the emancipated souls have no physical forms, as they are not possessed of bodies, yet they have the psychical forms of their last bodies. The liberated soul does not expand to the extent of the universe, because there in no cause for it. Because the expansion and contraction of the soul is determined by the physique making of karma. Thus, the emancipated soul maintains the form of its last physique forever.

Thus, when the soul becomes liberated it goes up to the end of the universe that as it is of the nature of darting upwards. And because, there is no medium of motion (dharma) in the non-universe space (alokākāśa) so it does not go beyond the end of the universe. Though the liberated souls maintain their own forms and individualities still, in all essential qualities there is perfect equality among them and they do not obstruct one another and non-of them enjoys any privilege. Thus, emancipation is the consummation of spiritual development (guṇastāna).
Mind:

In the context of philosophical discussion the concept of mind is very important. Different systems of Indian philosophy have different opinions on this wonderful concept with reference to its ontological status like what is mind, of what is made off, where is it located, what is its size etc.? With reference to its epistemological status like how to establish mind, its relation with soul, its role in the process of acquiring knowledge and finally with reference to its spiritual status like its role in spiritual development. Here we want to analyze the problem of mind from the point of view of Jaina philosophy. In Jaina āgama texts we find scattered information regarding mind. We find the discussion of mind particularly in the context of knowledge. Firstly in the context of matijñāna which is derived through sense organs and mind. Secondly the knowledge of other's mind (manaḥparyāya jñāna). In first category mind is an instrument of ātman to have the knowledge and in second category manaḥparyāya jñāna in which the ātman, without the help of any other toll, have the direct knowledge of objects residing in others’ mind. Here the knowledge is the modification of ātman due to cessation (kṣayopaśama) of jñānāvarṇīya karma. The ātman is knower but the object is only mind molecules gathered in other's mind.

Specific definition of mind is rarely available in āgama texts. Whatever is available is in supporting or secondary literature, like Dravyasaṅgraha bhāṣya, Gommattasāra jīvakāṇḍa, Yogosāstra, Manonuśānam etc. In Dravyasaṅgraha bhāṣya, the
author states it as 'an entanglement of different thoughts'.

1. अनिद्रिय मन: अल्पकरणिनियन्त्यत्वान्

2. नानाविकल्पजातरूप मनो भण्यते

Other synonyms for mind are anindriya, noindriya, antahhrarana etc. It is called anindriya because of the absence of its external organ or manifestations like other sense organ. In Tatvārtādhigama Śūtra author mentions: 'It (mati-jñāna) is caused due to indriya and no-indriya'. Here no-indriya indicates mind.

Mind is classified into two categories:

Dravyamana is the material mind (mentioned above) produced due to fruition of aṅgopāṅga-nāma-karman, where as bhāvamana is the state of ātmans purification caused due to cessation (kṣayopāśama) of vīryāntarāya and no-indriyāvaraṇīya karman.

Bhāvamana characterized with 'labdhi' and 'upayoga' is produced with the support of matter; thus, it is also materialistic (paudgalika). The matters which conceive the thought process and beneficial to ātman, caused due to kṣayopāśama of jñānāvaraṇīya and vīryāntarāya karma and fruition of aṅgopāṅga-nāma-karma can only take the form of mind. Thus, they are also pudgalika.

On the basis of mind all living beings are divided into two categories:

1. Samanaska or saṁjñī : living beings with mind.
2. Amanasaja or Asaṁjñī : living beings without mind.
Living beings having all five senses may or may not have mind. But rest of the living beings i.e. jīvas having one sense organ to jīva having four sense organs are all without mind, 212 jīvas in hell and heaven are all with mind, but some of the animals with five senses are without mind known as 'asmījīī tiryāṅca pañcendriya'. Regarding human state (manuṣya gati), those who are born from all types of excreta of human beings are also human beings without mind known as 'asmījīī sammṣya'.

Though ammījīī jīva are without mind viz. without dravyamana, still they have bhāvamana in very subtle form, as jñāna and virya are not completely covered. There is very minute kṣyopasaṇa of these two karmas. The ātmapradesas (rucaka-pradeśa) are never covered by any of the karmas. 213

This bhāvamana of asmījīīživas is not powerful enough or rather lacks in 'labdhī', which inspires to form dravyamana, in whose absence the operation of thought process cannot be conducted. Again with that subtle bhāvamana asaṃjīīī can comprehend the knowledge of its own sense organ, whereas the saṃjīīživas use their mind while operating their works with other sense organs. 214

Some are of opinion that mind is subtle (aṇu-paarimāṇa) and others say it is deha-parimāṇa. But there is no external manifestation of mind, and again it is produced due to cessation (kṣayopaśama) of jñānāvarṇīya and viryāntarāya karma. Kṣayopaśama like karma baṇdha and nirjarā happens in all ātmapradeśa simultaneously. These can never happen in some ātman points only leaving behind other points unaffected, i.e. all ātma-
pradeśa will be effected simultaneously.\textsuperscript{215} So it can be never be limited to one place, as other parts of the body cannot conduct the work of mind from those parts. So an anu-parimāṇa mind cannot perceive its object from the whole of universe, as mind is a beneficial of matter and matter has its own limitation.

Again it cannot be deha-parimāṇa, as there is no external manifestation of this karma (mind). It is produced out of very subtle molecules thus making it invisible. It is said that mind is an invisible quality of formless and inactive ātman.\textsuperscript{216} Śvetāmbara ācāryas agree with the point that mind is deha-parimāṇa, having more concentration near heart.

As per our observation from all these discussions, mind is deha-parimāṇa, as it is produced with all ātmapradeśa simultaneously. Again when we use out mind (manoyoga) we feel our internal sensation is more near brain.

**Contact of mind with its object:**

For knowledge of any object there should be a contact with that object. But mind like eyes do not need any contact with its objects, as it is aprāpyakāri.\textsuperscript{217} It is said that the field of mind where it can perceive is loka-prarimāṇa, because it does not have to be directly in contact with its object. That is mind does not have vyañhanavagraha in its process of knowledge.\textsuperscript{218} It means moving out of the body or without getting in contact, mind can perceive the whole of universe. In other words mind can create a mental screen within the body and can project anything any Matter, any
place, any body, any conditions etc., on that screen. Thus, it proves that mind can perceive its object without any contact.

Do we need mind for knowledge:

Knowledge is an inseparable characteristic of ātman, source of knowledge is ātman itself. Ātman in its pure state has infinite knowledge (ananta jñāna). But because of the karmic veil or knowledge obscuring karma, ātman cannot perceive the knowledge directly, and has to acquire knowledge through sense organs and mind.

The living beings without mind have knowledge derived through sensory organs. They do not have logic, sense, intellect, mind, etc., to express or analyze their pain and pleasure. But they feel or experience the pain and pleasure. They have mati-jñāna and śruta-jñāna from their respective sense organs. They can comprehend that much knowledge derived through sense organs. That is without mind avagraha, āhā, and avāya are possible. But in case of dhāraṇā, which consists of the lasting impression, which results after the object with its particulars, is definitely ascertained. It is this impression (saṃskāra), which enables us to remember the objects afterwards. There is no memory with these asamjñijīva, but still with the knowledge of available sense organs and drive of four basic instincts (saṃjñā) have desire to live and do activities for there own survival.

This is proved by the 'desire to live' by all living beings and activities towards fulfilling four basic instincts viz. āra-saṃjñā (food), bhaya saṃjñā (fear), maithuna saṃjñā (sex) and parigraha
sānjugā (possession). These four sānjugās are found in all living beings from sūkṣma ekendriya to paryāpta sānjugī paṇḍendriya.

In Bhagavatisūtra while explaining five types of kriyās (the activities of karmabāṇḍha) which jīvas undergo, all living beings from prthvīkāya (earth body), to asanjugī paṇḍendriya, living beings with five sense but without mind, have bondage of karma due to all the five kriyās. More over they do not have logic, intellect, mind or speech to comprehend what they are experiencing, still they experience the feelings (vedanā).

But the sānjugī jīva has the mind to interpret all actions of other sense organs. This interpretation due to mind increases the intensity of attachment and aversion. Thus for the sānjugī jīva only, the sense organs need the association with mind, whereas all other living beings (sānjugī) can comprehend the knowledge derived from their respective sense organs.

Is simultaneously knowledge possible:

Jīva, according to Jaina philosophy, consists of infinite jñāna, and darśana, but certain karmas viz. jñānāvaraniya karma and darśanāvaraniya karma tend to obscure these. When there is cessation (kṣayopaśama) of such class the respective jñāna or darśana are evolved till there is complete destruction of karma. The contact between ātman and object is either done partially through ātman directly (pratyakṣa) or through sense organs and mind (parokṣa). But due to obscuring karma the ātman cannot fully utilize the power of respective knowledge or cognition.
(darśana) at a given time. The medium through which it is derived being materialistic has its own limitations.

Most important action in getting aquatinted with the knowledge of any object is 'upayoga'. Upayoga is the resultant of consciousness or a sort of inclination, which arises from consciousness. In other words, the resultant of consciousness, which is inclined towards any object to accept it, is known as upayoga.\footnote{222}

Again, when explaining 'bhāvendriya' it says that they (bhāvendriya) are due to 'labdhi' and 'upayoga'.\footnote{223} These terms exactly states the conditions for knowledge. 'Labdhi' is the cessation (kṣayopaśama) of jñānāvanīya karma. Thus, except for the kevalins simultaneous knowledge is not possible for other living beings.

**Sense organ:**

In the Jaina philosophy sense organ is defined as:

1. अहमिदा जह देव अविसेंस अहमहं श यमिना | इंतति एकक्षे।क्षे। इंद्र इंद्रिय जामो |\footnote{224}

2. इन्द्रीति इन्द्र आत्मा | तस्य इस्मायम पत्र तदावरणश्यायोपसाने सति स्वयमाधानम् गृहीतुमसर्थश्च यदथोपलब्धित्भवतिन्द्रस्य लिगमिन्द्रियमितिवृत्ते | अधवा लीनमर्थं गमयतीति लिगम | आलन: सुक्ष्मस्वस्तित्वाद्योगे लिगमिन्द्रियम | यथा इंद्र इंद्रियम |

   .... अधवा इन्द्र इति नामक्रमोंच्च तेन सुक्ष्ममिन्द्रियमिति \footnote{225}

3. वदिन्द्रियश्चात्मनो लिग यदि वा इद्द्रेण कर्मणा | सृष्टं सृष्टं तथा दृष्टं दृष्टं दृष्टं दृष्टं तद्विति

   तदिन्द्रियः \footnote{226}

The sense organs are five in number viz. touch, taste, smell, sight and ear having respectively for their characteristics the
capacity of apprehending touch, taste, odor, color shaped and sound and each of these again of two kinds viz. physical (pudgalika) and psychical (ātimka). The physical sense is of material atoms possessed of definite shape like ear, eye etc. It is of two kinds viz. nivṛti and upakarana. The psychical sense is of two kinds viz. labdhi i.e. attainment and upayoga i.e. conscious activity. Attainment means acquisition of the capacity of manifestation of the sense activity. Conscious activity is a particular modification of the self due to attainment.

Omniscience:

In the Jaina tradition the kevalajñāna is called omniscience, which is the highest type of perception that comes under the category of extra sensory or transcendental perception i.e. pāramārthika pratyakṣa. It is defined as follows:

It is the perfection of the cognitive faculty of the self. It is the pure manifestation of the nature of the conscious substance. The perfect manifestation of the innate nature of the self, arising on the complete destruction of all the obstructive veils i.e. the karmic matters is called omniscience.

The self possesses consciousness as its essence. It is luminous nature of the conscious substance is nothing but the self as manifested in the act of knowledge. It occurs on the complete annihilation of the obscuring veils. The annihilation is nothing more than the total destruction of all the veils of the obscuring karmas i.e. the ghāti and aghāti karmas. The person possessing the super normal faculty of omniscience perceives all the substances
with all their modes. For him, nothing remains unknown. No object or any mode thereof remains unperceived. Thus, his knowledge is pure and perfect.

**Karma:**

In Jainism *karma* is defined as:

1. कर्मशास्त्रस्य कठादिभु साधनसंव संत्वसतु इच्छातो विशेषोद्ववकत्वम्। |
   वीणाद्वाजानावरणक्षयोपसामायक्षेण आलंकामपरिवर्तेयाः पुनःगलने च स्वपरिवर्त्याः।
   व्याप्ते च निश्चयवहारनायपूर्णाः क्रियते इति कर्म | करणार्पणाः विनियोगाः
   कर्मध्याःसतिः सति स परिवर्तामाः कुशलमहीक्षणां वा द्वीपभवकल्पं करतीति कर्म |
   आत्मना प्राधान्यविवेकां कर्मत्वसति परिवर्तनस्य करणामयपते: बुद्धार्थस्य
   क्रियते ने कर्मभव्यमेव | साध्यात्मां माध्यमिकित्वात् स्वतःप्रवस्थित
   तत्वकनमात्र कृतिः कर्मभव्यमेव | एवं शेषकारकपरिस्थित योग्या। ॥२२८

2. जीवं पर्वत्निकूष्ठितं, स पर्वत्निकृत्यते वा यथ्यतनिकर्मणि, जीव्यन वा
   निल्यादिवनादिपरिवर्तिका: क्रियते इति कर्मणि। ॥२२९

Following these definition we can observe that in the *Jaina* tradition ‘*karma*’ is not used in the sense of ‘work’ or ‘deed’. According to them *karma* is an aggregate of material particles, which are very fine and are imperceptible to the senses. It is a form of matter, which produces certain conditions in the mundane souls that are suffering from the shackles of birth and death from time immemorial. According to Jainism the entire cosmos is full of that kind of fine matter, which can become karma. Though the action of body, mind and speech, karmic matter gets into the soul and is tied to it accordingly to the modifications of consciousness consisting of *kaśāyas* i.e. anger, pride, deceit and greed. Thus, first of all, there is influx of karmic particles and then there occur
certain activities of mind, which are responsible for the actual bondage. In the state of bondage, the soul and the \textit{karma} are more intimate than milk and water. The bondage is of four kinds: according to its nature, duration, intensity and quantity. The activities of thought, speech, and body are responsible for the nature of quantity. The duration and intensity result from attachment and aversion. \textit{Krama} may remain latent in the soul for certain period without emerging into appearance. When the moment for its enjoyment arrives it becomes apparent and releases itself.

As we have already mentioned the soul has been eternally affected by matter i.e. its association with \textit{karma} has no beginning. Moreover, it is gathering new matter every moment; the liberation of soul from matter is possible by certain means. The soul must stop the influx of new karmas and eliminate the acquired ones. Through this two-fold method it can attain the highest goal i.e. emancipation. All obstacles, which impede the manifestation of its true nature are then automatically overcome, because, it is released from the foreign domination of \textit{karma}. This being the situation, when liberation is attained the soul can undisturbedly make manifest its own innate nature i.e. infinite knowledge.
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