CHAPTER II

SUBJECTS DEALT WITHIN THE PÅÑCAPÅDIKĀ

Substantiation of anIr vacanIyākhyātīvadā - Vedānta
not forestalled by Jaimini - the qualification of
the agent - Brahman, a known entity - definition
of Brahman - the omniscience of Brahman - Brahman,
established on the authority of Vedānta - Vedānta,
intimates an existent entity
In the Pañcapādikā, the first Varnaka begins with an invocation to Brahman-Ātman, Bādarāyana, the author of B.S. and Pādmapādācārya's Guru Śrī Śaṅkarācārya respectively. The first stanza invokes the Brahman-Ātman. The Ātman is endowed with six strange attributes.

(1) It is anādi, as it has no origin in time; (2) it is sheer Ānandaswarūpa; (3) it is immutable - kūṭastha, (4) it is sheer jñāna-swarūpa; (5) it is the only infinite; and (6) it is also the only existence. It is the entirely unperturbed Sāksin, of the Dwaitafaceted Universe of Nāma and Rūpa. In the second stanza the invocation is to Bādarāyana, the famous sage known as the abode of absolute tranquility of mind. He is the shining sun, at whose dawning all the lotuses, that are the glorious Upaniṣads bloom in adoration. The last three

1. Anādi-ānanda kūṭastha-jñānānanda sat-ātmane
   Abhūta-dwaitajālāya sāksiṇe Brahmane namah

2. Namaḥ Śrutiśirāḥ padmaśaṇḍa mārtanda mūrtaye
   Bādarāyana Śaṃjñāya munaye samavesmane
stanzas of the invocation are addressed to Śrī Śaṅkara-cārya. The third stanza describes the incarnation of Śiva into Śrī Śaṅkara who bears the same auspicious name. (He gives up his manifold serpent ornaments; His Kailasa riches; His consort Uma - the half of his divine body; His anger; the black mark on his throat; and His son Vināyaka. He is going to wander on foot to pour out here in this world, the nectar of learning (knowledge) in poetry, prose and discourses). The fourth stanza is again addressed to Śaṅkara, (but now accompanied by physical prostrating as well). With the fifth verse the author Padmapāda sets out his resolve to explain the Guru's bhaṣyam, with devotion and Śraddha. (It has unsuspected depth. The Bhaṣyam looks like a

3. Namāmi abhogi pariṇārisampadaṁ
   niraṣṭabhūtim anumārtha vigrahaṁ
   anugram-umṛditā kāḷalāṁchanam
   vīṇā vīṇāyakam apūrvāśaṅkaram

4. Yadvākṛtamānasā sarapratilabhājanma-
   bhaṣyāravinda makaranda rasāṁ pibanti
   pratyaśām - umukha-vinitavinyabhṛṅgaḥ
   tāṁ bhaṣyavittaka gurūṁ pranaṁ mūrdhnā.

5. Paḍādi vṛnta bhāreṇa garimānaṁ bibharti yat
   bhaṣyam prasanna gambhiram tadvyākhyāṁ sraddhayārabhe
fragile leaf-stalk. But each sentence carries the full great load of leaf, bud, flower and fruit. The ādi suffix to the word pada in the verse is significant; it is a pointer to the five great tasks about to be undertaken: Padaccheda Padarthakathana, Vigraha, Vākyayojana and ākṣepasamādhanā.

After the invocation there begins the bhāṣya on illusion in general. The bhāṣya on the Vedānta-sūtras beginning with - 'the notion of the object and subject' (Yusmadasmad) and ending with - 'It is on the part of man a natural procedure'. (Naisargiko ayam lokavyavahārah), clearly states the first objection against the view of the illusory character of the entire world of sense and the answer thereto. Thus the bhāṣyakāra concludes this section on illusion. From this it becomes evident that the exposition of illusion (adhyāyasabhaṣya), has its affinity with the first aphorism itself. But in the third varnaka of the Pañcapādikā it has been clearly noted that the subject-matter and purpose are
only implied and not explicit in the first sutra. It has been shown that the first sutra itself points out the subject matter of the sastra and the purpose of the study, and these are the identity of the individual with the universal self - and the emancipation from the miseries of life. When visaya and Prayojana, are indicated in the sutra and rendered explicit in the bhasya, there is little justification for elaborating the nature of illusion and its effects.

If it be so, let the bhasya be thus much only -

"with the object of getting rid of this, which is the cause of misery, and thereby arriving at the knowledge of the oneness of the self with the Absolute, the study of the whole of the Vedanta is begun". Here by the phrases 'Anarthahetoḥ prahānāya' and 'Ātmaikatvavidyā- pratipattaye' indicate the prayojana and visaya respectively.

6. Asyānartha hetoh prahānāya ātmaikatva-vidyāpratipattaye sarve vedāntāḥ ārabhyante iti"
If it is so what is the purpose of the bhāṣya beginning with 'Yusmadasmat' and ending with 'Sarvalokapratyakṣah'.

It is intended to show the error-begotten nature of men's doings characterised by egotism as evidenced in the expression 'ahammanusyah'. Here the self is identified with the body or the senses.

This will be said in answer. It is suggested in the sūtra that the knowledge of Brahman as the solvent of the root cause of the ills of life (anartha) and anartha is established by (the idea that one is) an agent and an enjoyer which again presupposes a knower. If that anartha be genuine, it cannot be annihilated by jñāna, for jñāna can remove only ajñāna. Hence in order that it may serve to establish the meaning conveyed by the Sūtra, by pointing out the error-begotten character of bondage, and as such this prefatory commentary has the purpose of serving as the introduction to the entire śāstra.

The second objection is that the lack of preliminary benediction in the bhāṣya is against the accepted tradition. When one wants to write a book it is customary
to begin with a benediction using the words such as 'atha', 'vrddhi' etc. And it is well-known that the result of such prayers is the removal of obstacles. Though there is no explicit offer of prayer, the fact that the Bhasya starts with the topic of superimposition, i.e. the comment beginning with "the notion of the 'thou' and 'I'" etc. and ending with the mutual identity of their attributes also is absolutely untenable. The meaning is that the being which is free from all evils and is one homogeneous entity is what constitutes the inner self. As such it cannot be said that, it has not sought divine benediction in this bhasya.

After these two objections, now begins Padmapada's comment on the section of bhasya relating to the opposition between atman and anatman, i.e., the reciprocal Superimposition of the substratas dharmin. It is clear that the mutual identity of the object and subject (viṣaya and viṣayi) which are as opposite in character as darkness and light, is impossible. If opposition is defined as mutual exclusion, then the presence of light precludes the presence of darkness. But this is not true. It is
sure that in a dimly-lit room objects are perceived though not distinctly.

Opposition is characterised by the absence of mutual identity. This means that no actual relation is possible in the case of the universal and particular (jāti and vyakti). So the identity of the one with the other, that is their mutual identification is indefensible.

The Purvapakśin wants to show that there is no transference - adhyāsa, even in the notion 'I am a man'. The identity between the 'I' and the 'thou' notion is only apparent due to the fact that the latter manifests itself through the cit or consciousness. The statement 'and of its properties also' (Taddharmānantca) says that when a deaf man says 'I cannot hear' there is no tādātmya between the self and hearing which is the property of the auditory sense. So in the separate mention of the Superimposition of properties. 'In contrast to it of the subject and its properties' - Viśayinā
taddharmānantca means of consciousness and of its properties, there can be no Superimposition on the object.
Superimposition means the manifestation of the nature of something in another which is not of that nature. That manifestation, it is reasonable to hold, is mithyā. The word mithyā is of double significations - it is denotative of negation as well as of inexpressibility, (anirvacaniya). Here it is an expression of negation. 'Mithyeti bhavitum yuktam' means that it is reasonable to ascribe non-existence alone to Superimposition.

Defending the Purvapakṣa against the probability of illusion between the attributes of the self and the not self, here ends the purvapakṣa on Adhyāsa.

The response to Purvapakṣa is on the basis that adhyāsa is beginningless - Naisargikaḥ. Though superimposition is not warranted, yet it is seen to be congenital or a constant accompaniment of the mere being. This means the mutual Superimposition of the 'thou' and the 'I' as exemplified in the world's usage - 'Lokavyāvahāraḥ' (I am this 'and' mine is this'). Here Vyavahāra is used in the sense of knowing and expression. First
arises the illusory knowledge and then is expression given to it. Both are beginningless. The portion - 'Satyaṇāte mithunīkṛtya', coupling together truth and error explains thus - 'Satyaṁ' means Caitanya, 'Anrtaṁ' means that which is connoted by the 'thou' (the insentient world) because even in itself it is illusory knowledge. That which is mithyā and at the same time, ajñāna is mithyājñāna. Here the word mithyā means inexpressible (anirvacaniya) and the word ajñāna means the potency of avidyā which is of the nature of insentience, and is the negation of jñāna. The resolution of the compound mithyājñāna into 'mithyā' and 'ajñāna' is to oppose the view that Superimposition is the outcome of illusory knowledge (bhrāntijñāna). The mention of mithyā would mean illusory knowledge, and the mention of ajñāna would mean absence of knowledge. It is to reject both absence of knowledge and illusory knowledge that the compound is split up into 'Mithyā' and 'ajñāna'. Something other than these namely primal ignorance - mūlā-vidyā constitutes the material cause of the world spectacle.
Again, the question is how Superimposition can be beginningless - 'Naisargikaḥ', because it is proved to be the product of Mithyājñāna'. The answer is that - it cannot but be admitted that there exists this potency of nescience in things, its existence being a constant accompaniment of their inner nature. It is meant that avidyā in its nature as primal cause is beginningless, but as a specific adhyāsa it is a product of precedent illusory knowledge. Hence there is no contradiction in the statements naimittika and naisargika. What is sought to be proved is that nescience does not veil things other than Ātman. In case avidyā which has its ground in Ātman veils non-sentient objects, then, since objects cannot manifest themselves without the destruction of the obscuring veil, the primal ignorance relating to Ātman would disappear with the rise of the knowledge of objects. Even though avidyā exists in Ātman at all times—past, present and future—because objects in their nature are perceived, ajñāna or avidyā, it must
be admitted, does not draw the veil on things other than the self. Hence though the superimposition as evidenced in the notions of men such as 'I' and 'mine' is beginningless, it is spoken as if having mithyājñāna as its cause but not as adventions. It only means that it requires avidyā as its logical precedent if it should be properly explained. Therefore its beginninglessness does not involve any conflict with its coming into existence as the result of a cause. Paradoxical as it may seem, Superimposition may be described both as beginningless and produced from an antecedent cause namely mithyājñāna. It is not self-contradictory.

In the Adhyāsabhāṣya, the part anyonyadhar-māmsca - and of the one with the part of the other - means in some cases Superimposition of mere attributes is perceived as in 'I am deaf'. 'Itaretaravivekena' because of not discriminating the one from the other - means confounding the one with the other. Though the Superimposition of nescience on consciousness which is pure, integral,
bliss, entire and witness of ajñāna is beginningless.

the ahamkaradhyāsa is spoken of as the beginning in the effect series - karyadhyāsa. It is not that the integral cit alone manifests itself in the 'aham-ego' and that there is no additional part either superimposed or not-superimposed. In all cases of Superimposition, two apprehensions are involved; but in the ego concept there is only one and hence superimposition is absent. The answer is that even in this concept two notions are present, the one real, the other transferred, similar to 'this' and the 'silver' in 'This is Silver'.

In the notion 'I am this' - 'aham idam' and 'this is mine' - 'mamedam', nothing appears to be superimposed. When the notion of ego as agent is a case of superimposition, then alone is it evident that its auxiliary also is an erroneous notion. All worldly activities beginning with the ego agency - I am doer etc. - and embracing action, the results turn out to be super-
imposed on Ātman. Therefore, it is by such knowledge as culminates in the experience of the identity of Ātman with Brahman, that destroys the ills of life. Hence a study of the Vedānta philosophy in its beginnings becomes imperative. The 'I' and the 'mine' conceits point to a 'knower' but they need not on that account be erroneous notions. To prove that they are erroneous one has first to define what is superimposition and then show that these conceits are subsumed under that definition.

The term Adhyāsa has to be defined first. The definition should not only define the term, but answer the probable objections reasonably anticipated. The definition of adhyāsa is - "Smṛtirūpāḥ paratra pūrvadrṣṭa avabhāṣaḥ" - the manifestation in some other object, of that which is of the nature of recollection of what had been observed before'. Here the word 'Smṛti' is taken in the sense of what is recollected. It is the vīsesana of Paratra. Paratra becomes evident by implication that the manifestation is of something other than the object.
"The manifested object only resembles the object remembered, and not the thing recollected. And this is clear from the fact that what is presented to the sense is manifested. There can be no manifestation of silver to one in direct sense-contact with the shell, who has not seen silver before. The persistence of past impressions - Samskāras is essential both for memory-recall and for illusory perception. Therefore the use of 'Pūrvadrṣṭa', implies that unless past impressions are revived, neither memory nor illusion is possible. It is clear that this definition is also the definition of the knowledge of the illusory object. The point is that in shell-silver not only is the object silver illusory, but also its knowledge. In this definition the manifestation is similar to the manifestation of recollection. Since the knowledge of the particular object given in the past Prāmaṇa does not manifest itself as such. If it is so the silver in illusion should have assumed the form 'that silver' - tadrajaṭaṁ, but it appears as 'this silver' idaṁ rajataṁ.

In reality, there is no contact between the
eye and the silver. The eye perceives only the shell, but owing to past impressions, Samskaras aided by imperfect vision, silver manifests itself afresh. This is the Vedantic doctrine of adhyasa.

Having thus set out his own Khyātivāda, Advaitin - (Anirvacanīyakhyātivādin) presents the other khyātis of various schools in a very brief form. The first in this field is the Akhyātivāda of the Prābhākara school of the Pūrvamīmāṃsa. They say in the Bhrama of Nacre seen as silver, there are two bits of knowledge. In Pūrvamīmāṃsa all bits of knowledge are valid in their own inexorable right. Of these two bits, the Nacre furnishes a visual percept of which the 'this' is the proof but the nacre is lost by an unfortunate inexplicable error in the functioning of the Indriya, which is vitiated by some unknown defect. This same defect, when dealing with the very next succeeding instantaneous working of the mind has triggered a Smṛti bit from the mind. This is of silver. This bit has unfortunately lost two
adjectival adjuncts. One is the stamp of Smaranam - memory - and the second is the stamp of 'That' as it has lost a part. There is no misrepresentation of each bit, though there is only partial presentation. Suppose we know there are two distinct tall, broad trees in very close proximity to each other. At a great distance, in our interspective look, we see them as one, the space interval having been obliterated by the eye's perspective vision. It is not error. In the case of silver seen in nacre, the normally rapid time-interval between successive bits of knowledge has been obliterated. And the Pramośa - the inexplicable thievery has taken place. So it is Smṛti and not an imposter - Smṛtirūpah-Jñānam - is never be an imposter. Smṛti is a store of valid bits of knowledge gathered at various places and times. Smaraṇam is an act of recall of one particular bit from the storage to the working register of the computer for use. Smaraṇābhimānam is our belief that the mind-computer has functioned correctly.
The Akhyātivādin's point is that the non-discrimination between the perceived and the revived is the cause of Pravṛtti i.e., activity as evidenced in one's going to take the silver. In a bhrama situation there are four elements - jñāna, iccha, kṛti and śabda. Prabhākara maintains that the first is always valid while the other three are false. He says that Smaranābhīmāna is different from Smaranā which alone is in all our vocabulary. It is not grasped as jñānam in its own right. It has not come as an adjectival-adjunct along with the grasped knowledge of a past cognition. Therefore Smṛti can refer back only to the pure object in a denotational sense. A 'word' is a mere tool to arouse knowledge of its denotational object. The 'Smṛti' of the word can likewise be only a tool. Jñānam is different from denotational tools. For example, the Index in an Atlas is merely a tool to be handled, for attaining or re-attaining "knowledge". The index is not itself a knowledge-bit.

So we sum up: there is no special entity like Smaranābhīmāna. Knowledge bits, as and when they are gathered, are not stamped with individual memory. They
are grasped as they are - no additions, no changes. Nor can one infer it from the results, as sensory inputs are strictly functional in their tasks. Hence a Smṛti is triggered to recall from the memory - storage a pure representation. So there can be no thievery - Pramoṣaḥ.

It is to be noted that of all the khyativādins, only the Akhyativadi rejects the name, the idea, and the very occurrence of Adhyāsa. All others accept the name, the idea and its occurrence though they differ in their modes of full explanation. Yet there is among them a hard core of consensus, which is thus phrased in the Bhāṣya, Sarvathāpi tu anyasya anyadharmaavabhāsatvam na vyabhicaranti.

Substantiation of Anirvacaniyakhyativāda (Vedānta)

First of all, from the contact of the vitiated sight with the object in one's vicinity arises the cognition of the 'this' only; then avidyā pertaining to the consciousness delimited by the 'this' stirs itself into
the silver (arthādhyāsa). Likewise avidyā pertaining to consciousness mirrored in the vṛtti appearing as the 'this' transforms itself into the silver - cognition (jñānādhyāsa). Though there is difference between the mental modes, as the real ('this') and the unreal (silver) are undifferentiated (anyonyātmakatayā ekatvāpatteh) the consciousness delimited by these modes is one only, and as the two cognitions are identical, the mental modes also of which the one is real and the other is not, are imagined to be single.

And of that cognition which has arisen through the instrumentality of the particular impression revived by some perverted cause, the erroneous silver-in-the shell manifests itself as the appropriate object. (ālambana) Hence that cognition which has something unreal as its object is unreal cognition, for unreality cannot be attributed to cognition as such, since its sublation (bādha) does not take place. The definition of Māyā or Mithyātvaṃ is nothing other than the counter correlatedness of negation in a known substratum. Here the shell is the
known substratum; the negation of silver is revealed in it by the sublating cognition.

After sublation the awakened consciousness takes the form 'what I saw was not silver, but was only a product of mâyâ'; but it should not be so to the Naiyâyika who maintaining anyathâkhyâti, has to say 'this is not silver', but it is 'that silver' referring to what exists in the shop; as also to the Buddhist Vijñânavâdins who have to say "the external 'this' in which the silver appears is a false substratum, the silver is only a form of internal consciousness". But common experience is otherwise and expresses itself thus — "this is not silver, it is magic, it is neither here nor there". The sublation would be quite otherwise on the theory of error held either by the Naiyâyikas or by the Vijñânavâdins.

The opponents argue that one characteristic of adhyâsa, is that it is the outcome of three factors, sense - contact, defective vision, and revived impressions. This is the indirect or indicative definition - tàtâstha-lakṣaṇa of adhyâsa. Another characteristic is that it is
the manifestation of one thing as another - *atasmin tadbuddhiḥ*. This is the direct definition - *Svarūpa-lakṣaṇa* of adhyāsa. In dream illusion, as the senses are quiescent, there can be no sense contact. So that the first definition fails. The absence of the substratum - *adhiśṭhāna* rules out the second definition; if *atman* is construed as *adhiśṭhāna*, the dream experience of say 'elephant' should take the form 'I am elephant', and everything other than *atman* comes under the category of superimposition and so it cannot serve as the substratum. Hence they conclude that dream-objects as arising from past impressions must be classed as recollective.

The Siddhantin avers that the dream cognition is neither memory nor perception. All disputants, however, have to admit that it is a unique experience. Hence we call it *adhyāsa* or Superimposition. Here the causes essential for its origination do exist and they are the cognition of the substratum, the blurring effect of sleep (*doṣa*) and the mental traces (*vāsana*). The sense-contact
is not dispensable. It is the cognition of adhiṣṭhāna
with doṣa and Saṁskāra, whose offspring is the dream.
Here the adhiṣṭhāna is the caitanya - consciousness
delimited by the egoity (ahamkāra) or the non-delimited
caitanya. The Pāñcapādikā supports the latter view.
And because it is self-luminous, it does not need the
senses for its illumination.

Hence the requirements of both the definitions
are satisfied. It is avidyā that constitutes the evo-
lationary cause of dream-objects and their cognition; and
because caitanya is the substratum of that avidyā, It
(caitanya) is the Vivartopadānākāraṇa. Even in the
wakeful state, mere 'shell' is not the adhiṣṭhāna in
shell-silver cognition, but it is the caitanya delimited
by the 'shell'.

From the use of the word 'Paratra' in the defi-
nition of Adhyāsa, the Asatkhyātivāda of the Madhyāmika
school of Buddhism is refuted. It is also maintained
that there is no illusion without a real ground and that
even the so called illusory object cannot be wholly unreal. The illusory knowledge can nowhere arise without a substratum. Hence the oppositeness of the word 'Paratra' in the definition of Adhyāsa.

The epithet Smṛtirūpāḥ might be justified on the ground that in all cases of illusion, there exists a recollective element, but the fact that the illusion is partly the offspring of memory - revival, becomes evident from the use of the word - Purvadrśṭa so that says the Purvapakṣin, the word Smṛtirūpāḥ may be dropped. It is true but then what is implied by the word Purvadrśṭa would be pure remembrance and not that which is similar to remembrance - Smṛtirūpāḥ. And it has already been stated that what constitutes the object of recollection cannot be characterised as illusory. The objection that is brought to mind by the revival of past impressions is not illusory as already shown.

The use of the word Purvadrśṭa is for the better-clarification of the nature of adhyāsa. In recollection
we perceive the object as associated with past experience, but in illusion we are aware only of the object. The word Smṛtirūpah suggests both, and it is to exclude the former that Pūrvadṛṣṭa is used. It may in passing be noted that the illusory silver is not even the very silver of previous experience; it only belongs to the jāti or the genus, of the silver seen before, for in an illusory situation the Advaita maintains that some indefinable silver - anirvacanīya rajata - newly comes into being. Hence the definition Smṛtirūpah paratratā purvadṛṣṭa avabhāsaḥ is blameless.

Critics point out that in the first Sūtra, what is stated is that the inquiry into the meaning of the Vedānta has to be undertaken for the knowledge of Brahman and that there is no mention of either the subject of the discourse - Visaya or the benefit - Prayojana. They therefore query how the commentator is right in maintaining that adhyāsabhaṣya, serves the purpose of substantiating the Visaya and Prayojana. The answer is
that both are implied in the first Sūtra though not expressly stated. The first Sūtra is an introduction to the whole work and as such it must set forth both Viṣaya, and Prayojana like all introductions.

This is a Sūtra and therefore whatever import comes to light either from the denotativeness of the words or from implication it is from the entirety that its import emerges. It cannot be doubted that a single aphorism can yield a multiplicity of meaning, namely, the duty of investigating the meanings of Vedānta, the statement of the topic and the subject of study, and the illusiveness of bondage. A Sūtra by its very nature can have all these and even many more embodied in it. It is an aphorism. Having stated the Viṣaya, the Prayojana and the bondage of the nature of avidyā necessary for securing the Viṣaya and the Prayojana all ascertained by postulation (Śrutārtha-patti) the explanation follows, of every word to show the competency of the Sūtra therein.

It must be understood that the first is Pratijña
or Upodgātasūtra, indicating Viṣaya and Prayojana — the content and value of the Vedāntaśāstra; the second is the Brahmalaksanasūtra, where the definition of Brahman is given, the third is Pramāṇasūtra where Śāstraic proof is adduced to establish Brahman, and from the beginning of the fourth, reasons are advanced to substantiate that the entire Vedānta texts are congruent in the elucidation of the unity of the individual Soul and the Supreme Brahman — Brahmātmaikya.

Vedānta Not Forestalled by Jaimini

The second Varṇaka is a tough one dealing with objections, rejoinders, and counter-rejoinders by learned Purvapakṣas. Two belong purely to the Purvamaṁśa school, one to the Bhaṭṭa persuasion and the other of Prabhakara. These two pure Purvamaṁśins maintain that Jaimini, the author of the antecedent Purvamaṁśaśāstra, has dealt with the entire Veda portions, including Upaniṣads and has a thousand nyāyas to his credit.
As the Purva-mimāṃsa of Jaimini has traversed the whole range of the Veda by the Sūtra - "Athāto Dharmajñāṇasa," the rejoinder maintains that Bādarāyaṇa need not have composed the Vedāntasūtras separately, with the object of inquiring into the nature of Brahman. The Siddhāntin maintains that there has been no such anticipation and that in consequence a fresh inquiry is justifiable. A school of Vedāntins admitting the mandatory character of the Veda as a whole justify the separate composition of the Vedāntasūtras. They point out that the Saktunyayā also does not apply, for the purified ātman does not serve as an agent in effecting something that is coveted. What is meant is that without  

7. In the mandate "he offers Saktu (barley meal) as an oblation to 'Fire' the word Saktu is not taken in the accusative case, but in the instrumental case, where 'Saktunjuhoti' is changed into 'Saktubhiḥ juhoti' in order to make some sense. The meaning is that 'Saktukaraṇakahomavidhiḥ'.

a break that is immediately after completing Dharmaṁ-
āsā Brahman has to be inquired into, and the bath should not be performed.

In the first aphorism of Jaimini, the word Dharma and not the word Veda is used, so that it is evident that, that part of the veda, namely, the Upaniṣad which relates to the Self-existent entity has been left uncommented by Jaimini. As such it calls for a distinct inquiry. In the first Sūtra, the emphasis is laid on the word Dharma, similarly in the second Sūtra - “Codanā-
laksano artho Dharmah”, the emphasis is laid on the word

8. The ceremonial bath known as 'Samāvartanakarman' has no follow immediately after the pupil finishes his study of the Veda and is about to quit his preceptor's house. The question is whether mastery in the Purva-
mīmāṃsa marks the close of the study necessitating the 'bath' or whether it has to be followed by the study of Uttaramīmāṃsa and the 'bath' postponed. The Āraṁbhavadin holds the latter view. In the Śastra-
dīpika of Parthasarathi Misra the discussion on the 'bath' centres round the question whether residence in the preceptor's house has to be terminated immediately after the pupil has acquired the ability to merely chant his branch of the Veda or to be prolonged for inquiry into its sense - Arthajñāna.
'Codana' which means vidhi or injunction to action. It therefore excludes the inquiry into the entity devoid of any connection with action. Otherwise, to obviate all doubts, Jaimini would have framed the second Sūtra as 'Vedaleksanoartho Dharmah'. Because he has not done so it may safely be concluded that he admits the inclusion in the Veda of something that is not the content of Pūrvamāṇḍa.

The Prabhākara school of Pūrvamāṇḍa explains the word Dharma as Vedārtha. He makes no division of the Veda into two parts, one relating to action and the other to an existing object. His contention is that inquiry is for the purpose of determining what exactly is the teaching of the Veda. According to Kumārilabhaṭṭa, on the other hand, the leader of the rival school, inquiry is to determine what is Dharma, whether it is agnihoṭra etc. or Caityavandana.

The anarāṃbhavādin or the Māṇḍaśaka concludes his argument by saying that what is denoted by the ego-notion or ahampratyaya is itself the Atman and none exists
apart from it. He asserts that expressions like 'He is Ātman' and 'That Thou Art'—'sa ātma', 'Tat tvam asi' enjoin meditation on ātman as possessing actual fancied qualities for the sake of liberation—Mokṣa. Hence he sums up by pointing out that all the Vedāntic texts denote action of the nature of meditation and since Jaimini has made an exhaustive inquiry into all the Vedic statements denotative of action, there exists no justification for any additional treatise, Uttaramimāṃsā therefore is purposeless.

The Siddhāntin says that even according to Prabhākara it is not the whole of the Vedārtha that is indicated but only that section which is concerned with enjoining action, for the word used in the aphorism is Dharma and not Vedārtha.

It may thus be concluded that the study of Uttaramimāṃsā śāstra has to be begun, since the injunction of knowledge is established beyond doubt.

The Qualifications of the Agent

The third Varnaka of the Pañcapādikā explains
the first Sūtra of the Brahmāsūtra - "Athāto Brahmajñānāsā". According to this Sūtra, jñāna as implied in the word jñānāsā, means the attainment of Brahman or Mokṣa, which is none other than freedom from bondage. Jñāna alone can destroy ajñāna or ignorance. If the bondage is real jñāna would not be efficacious. So bondage must be mithyā, or illusory. In order to be free from illusion the knowledge of Brahman is necessary. Therefore the Brahman is to be inquired into.

Knowledge of the meaning of words is necessary for the proper knowledge of the meaning of the sentence made up of those words. First, therefore, an attempt is made here to discuss the words that constitute the first Sūtra: the three words, 'atha' 'atah' and 'Brahmajñānāsā'.

The first word 'atha' in this Sūtra is to be

9. "Alpākṣaram asandīgdham saravadviṣwatomukham astobham anavadyam ca sūtramāstravido viduḥ".

10. "Na sadrūpā nā asadrūpa māyā naivaubhayātmikā sadasadbhyām anirvacaniya mithyārūpīsanātani".
understood in the sense of immediate succession, that is 'ānantaryārtha', and not in the sense of 'adhikārārtha'. In the Amarakośa 'atha' śabda has different meanings. In 'Atha Yogānuśāsanam', the word 'atha' is used in the sense of commencement. In 'athāto Brahmatijñāsa' the meaning of 'atha' is not as in 'atha yogānuśāsanam', because the meaning of the word jñāsa is only the desire to know about, or inquiry into, Brahman. Both these interpretations are not proper in this context. But in 'atha Śabdānuśāsanam' the word 'atha' is used in the sense of immediate succession. Here in Brahmasūtra also the meaning of 'atha' is immediate succession and not a commencement, because Brahmatijñāsa is not fit for commencement. And the meaning auspiciousness cannot enter syntactically into the purport of a

11. "Maṅgalanantatarārāmbhapraśnakātsnyeṣu ātho atha".
sentence. Besides, like the auspicious sound of a couch the word 'atha' even when used in some other sense serves the purpose of auspiciousness from the time of hearing itself. Therefore 'atha' śabda is used in the sense of Ānantarya. The word jijnāsa is construed according to its component parts—avayavārtha, because there is no prominence assigned in the Sūtra either to Brahman or to Brahmajijnāsa. But many scholars have used this jijnāsa as a term denoting inquiry vicāra. Therefore the undivided aggregate has as its sense adhikārārtha that fits in with the word 'atha'. The word jijnāsa means 'śāstra' signifying vicāra or inquiry. Therefore the first Sūtra means that the inquiry into Brahman is necessary. The word jijnāsa is not used purely as a synonym of mīmāṃsa having altogether abandoned the

14. "Omkāraścātha śabdaśca
dvavedau Brahmanāḥ purā
kanthaṁ bhitvā viniryātau
tasmānmaṅgalīkāvubhau".
meaning of the component parts, not supported by grammar.

In the present context 'atha' sabda is used in the sense of ānantarya, implying that Brahman inquiry is preceded by the antecedent requirements for Brahma-jijnāsā known as Śādhanacatuṣṭhayā, or the four essential means. Therefore 'atha' sabda means 'then' - after the attainment of Śādhanacatuṣṭhayā.

The second word 'atah' in the Śūtra shows the reason - hetu. To illustrate the point, just as enjoyable things earned through work get exhausted in this world, so also do the enjoyable things in the other world that are earned through merit. The Vedas reveal

15. 1. discrimination between what is eternal and what is ephemeral - Nityānityavastuvivekaḥ
2. Aversion to the enjoyment of subjects here and hereafter - Ihamutrārthaphalabhogavirāgaḥ
3. Acquisition of mental peace, self restraint etc., 'Sādamādādisādhanasampat
4. Longing for liberation - Mumukṣūtvam

16. "Tadyatheha karmacito lokāh kṣiyate evām amutra puṇya cito api lokkāh kṣiyate".
that the Agnihotra sacrifice etc. which are the means for the achievement of higher things have fruitful results, and 'the knower of Brahman attains the highest human objective', the liberation. The results obtained by mere work, that is, sacrifice, etc., are ephemeral and limited, whereas the results of the knowledge of Brahman is eternal and infinite. Therefore, one should undertake a deliberation on Brahman after the perfection of Śādhanacatuṣṭhayā.

The third word in the Śūtra is 'Brahmajījñāsā'. It can be construed as Brahmano jījñāsā - 'desire for the knowledge of Brahman'. Brahman is 'that from which the universe has its birth etc'. Here 'ādi' sabda denotes sthiti and nāṣa. So there is no misinterpretation of the word in the sense of Brāhmaṇa caste. The sixth case-ending occurring after Brahman is used in the accusative sense, and not in the sense of mere relation, because, a wish to know presupposes a thing wanted to be known, and nothing else is to be inquired into has been indicated.

18. Brahma-sūtra, 1.2.22.
"Yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante
yena jātāni jīvanti
Yat prayanti abhisamviṣanti
tad vijīñāsasva tad Brahma".

This Upaniṣadic Śloka is in line with the Sūtra if the sixth case-ending is interpreted in the accusative sense. Therefore the sixth case-ending is used in the accusative sense in Brahmajīñāsā also.

Jīñāsā means 'a wish to know'. The realization of Brahman is the highest human objective, because it completely eradicates all such evils like ignorance, that constitute the seed of transmigration. Therefore Brahman should be deliberated upon.

Brahman - A Known Entity

The prima facie question is whether Brahman is an already known entity or not. If it is a known entity there is no need for the inquiry. If it is unknown it cannot be expounded, since in order to explain something one must first have it in mind, that is, at least to a
cognitive extent. The answer is that Brahman is a known entity to at least a limited number. By exhibiting the existence of Brahman the Bhāṣyakāra has leaning on its universal acceptance as a known entity. As Brahman is the Ātman of every living creature, that is reason enough for believing in its existence. Everyone knows 'he exists', he never entertains the idea 'I do not exist'.

The Pūrvapākṣin says that Ātman is not Brahman because the common man does not know it. But the Upaniṣads use the word Brahman as synonym for Ātman. The Laukika-prasiddhi gets from the use of the word 'I' to designate Ātman. Thus the word Brahman is known. There are many and widely divergent views on the Ātman's meaning. Really these conflicts in views revolve on the specificity of the meaning to be grasped from the use of the word Brahman, implying the sole Existent and Innermost reality of all things. What Śaṅkara says in the Ātmabodha about Brahman

    2. Brahma vā idam agra āsīt tad ātmānaṁ eva āsīt
    Br.Up.1.4.10.
is that - 'Realize That to be Brahman, the attainment of which leaves nothing more to be attained, the blessedness of which leaves no other blessing to be desired, and the knowledge of which leaves nothing more to be known'.

Definition of Brahman

The first Sūtra states that inquiry into Vedānta is to be undertaken by one desirous of knowing Brahman. It follows, therefore, that a definition of the term should include the nature of Brahman, the valid means to its knowledge, the logic behind its being, the way to its attainment and the fruits to be derived. Thus since Brahman is the most important, its definition is setforth in the second Sūtra viz., "Janmādyasya Yatah".

The meaning of this Sūtra is that from whom the origin etc. Of this world are effected that is Brahman.

20. Yallābhāt-na-aparo lābho Yat sukhāt na-aparaṁ sukhām Yat jñānāt na aparāṁ jñānam tad Brahma iti avadhārayet (54)

The definition of **Brahman** as the cause of the world-creation is untenable, since it is not established. But the five elements are its cause. All material things comprising the world are derived from the elements. Hence **Brahman** cannot be presumed to be the cause of the origination of the world.

There are two kinds of definitions for **Brahman** - **Swarūpalakṣaṇa** and **tātasthalakṣaṇa**. The **Swarūpalakṣaṇa** or **Viśeṣalakṣaṇa** (specific definition) excludes, without exception, all that is not **Brahman**. Śaṅkara's commentary that "**Brahman** is the omniscient, omnipotent cause from which the world takes its birth etc." indicates the **Swarūpalakṣaṇa**. The second definition **tātasthalakṣaṇa** refers to accidents. The Sutra "**janmādyasya yataḥ**" explains the **tātasthalakṣaṇa** of **Brahman**.

The Sūtra's aim is to explain Upaniṣadic passages to aid humanity, and so the Upaniṣadic prakṛtiya of creation

22. **Yataḥ sarvajñat sarvasaṃkṛtaḥ karaṇat bhavati tadbrahma**

23. **Yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante yenajātānijīvantī**
   **Yat prayantī abhisamviṣanti tadvijijñāsasva tadbrahma**

_Tai.Up. 3.1._
is aptly taken up. Hence the Sūtra takes up only the Śruti postulated triad to establish Bādarāyaṇa's conviction that the cosmos is a magic appearance only, thrown on the support screen of the mūlakāraṇa which is Brahman only.

The Omniscience of Brahman

The third Sūtra "Śastrayonītvat" serves as additional or alternative hetu to establish Brahman's Omniscience as cosmos-creator. The meaning of the Sūtra is that - Brahman being the source of the Vedas, must be omniscient. It lays down another reason in support of the omniscience of Brahman which is the cause of the world. The difference between the unutterableness of the Veda and of Brahman is postulated here. The Veda is not eternal since it belongs to the world order, nor is it unoriginated. The Śruti also vouches for its origin from Īśwara. To deny the human origin of the Veda it is

24. Asya mahato bhūtasya niśwasitaṃ etad
Rgvedo yajurvedaḥ Śāmavedo athavāṅgirasa
itiḥsaḥ puraṇam vidya upaniṣadāḥ ślokāḥ...
Br.Up. 2.4.10.
stated that the **Veda** is the manifestation or **Vivarta** of Brahman and as such Brahman is the **Vivartopadana-karana** of the world like the rope in the rope-serpent illusion.

The phenomenal world is differentiated by names and forms. Brahman is the ground of their existence and manifestations. As the material cause Brahman possesses vastly superior knowledge as compared with the object world - **Rupaprapaṇa**, and the world of names - **Nāmaprapaṇa** the latter of which includes the **Veda**.

If the **Veda** is not Īśwara's composition in the ordinary sense, but merely a spontaneous emanation from Him, its authorship, cannot signify His Omniscience. But his Omniscience is evident by the fact that the all-revealing character of the **Veda** is only the appearance - **Vivarta** - of His knowledge - phase.

**Brahman - Established on the Authority of Vedanta**

Here is given an alternative interpretation of the same **Sūtra**. The **Sastra** is the valid means of
knowing Brahman. The objection is raised that since the śāstra as the Pramāṇa of Brahman has been substantiated in the explanation of "janmādyasya yataḥ", the present Sūtra as signifying the same is not needed. It is admitted that the śāstra has been brought forward by the Bhāṣya-kāra while expounding the second Sūtra, but owing to the absence of the word śāstra there, it might lead one to the conclusion that the Sūtra is intended as an aid to an inference or as the Pramāṇa to identify the Brahman. To obviate such a contingency a separate Sūtra, explicitly stating that the scripture is the Pramāṇa, becomes a necessity.

The third Sūtra "śāstrayonitvāt" admits of a double interpretation. The compound may be resolved either as śāstrasya yoniḥ - śāstrayoniḥ or śāstram yoniḥ - śāstrayonih. The phrase in the present context has to be construed in the second way. What it means is that the śāstra beginning with the Rgveda is the pramāṇa or the valid means of proving Brahman's existence. It is
through scriptures, apart from reasoning that Brahman, is known as the cause of the origin etc. of the world. The Sutra, therefore, may be taken as enunciating the Pramāṇa for establishing the cognitive entity of Brahman.

Vedānta - Intimates an Existent Entity

The eighth Varṇaka deals with the authoritativeness of Vedānta since all Vedas should be denotative of action, Vedānta which merely points to an existing entity loses its character as an independent means of valid knowledge.

The Purvapakṣin does not refer to Brahman directly or independently of any action. In order to refute this the fourth Sūtra - "Tattu Samanvayāt" is stated. Purvapakṣin contends that the scripture is not the means of knowing Brahman. But, since the Vedas are not written by human beings, the scripture needs no other Pramāṇas to be cited for its validity. The Sūtra "Tattu Samanvayāt" refutes all the Purvapakṣas, by appealing to the confluence (Samanvaya) among the Vedāntic texts.
This is the key Sūtra, out of the 555 Sūtras of Badarayana, for, in this is displayed the quintessence of all the Upanisadic instructions, given to humanity by the Śruti itself directly as in "Prajñānam Brahma", "Aham Brahmasmi" etc.

This purport of this Sūtra is that Brahman is to be understood from the Vedānta for all the texts are in agreement as to the non-relational entity of Brahman as such - akhañdartha. In this Sūtra the proposition that Brahman having the attributes of omniscience etc. is known from the Vedānta Šastra as set-forth and the hetu is stated in the word "Samanvayat". Samanvaya means intimate connection - Samyak anvaya.

The meaning is that - "But that, Brahman is known from Śruti is the result of harmony of the Vedānta passages". The Vedānta manifests the nature of Brahman.

The Omniscient Brahman then is the cause of the origin, subsistence and dissolution of the world. This is the only harmonious conclusion of the Vedānta.
passages, such as 'Being alone was in the beginning, one, without a second'; and 'that which is seen in front of one's self is the immortal Brahman alone.' When the words in these passages refer directly and undoubtedly to Brahman, it will be improper to imagine that they refer to an altogether different thing viz. action.

The desire to know Brahman is produced in us on account of such directive statements: "verily, the Atman must be seen", "one should worship the Brahman in the form of Atman only", and one who knows Brahman becomes Brahman.

It is on the ground of purposelessness that the Mimamsaka attempted to refute the claim of the Vedanta as a valid means of knowledge, but the Siddhantin has now shown that the Vedanta serves a supreme purpose viz.,

25. Sadeva somyedamagra āsīt ekameva advitiyam (ch.up.6.2.1.)
26. Mun.Up.2.2.11.
27. Ātma vā are draśṭavyāh (Br.Up.2.4.5.)
28. Ātmetyeva upāsīta (Br.Up.1.4.7)
29. Brahmavit Brahmaiva bhavati, (Mu.Up.3.2.9)
the removal of illusion. If the ritual section of the *Veda* is purposeful, so also is the knowledge section. While in the one the means to attain the short-lived happiness of *Svarga* etc. has been set forth, in the other the way is pointed out for the attainment of eternal bliss. Hence both *Karmakanda* and *jñanakanda* have relevance in differing contexts. Hence it is concluded that the *Sastra* is the valid means of the knowledge of *Brahman*. 