Part-II

→ English Translation
तिर्थनिरुपणम्

अथ धातु प्रकृतितिड़ा प्रसिद्धत्वादादृशं निरुपय्यते।

Translation: Because the personal suffixes are well known as having roots as their bases, their meaning is being discussed.

तत्र कर्तुक्कर्मविविधितिड़ामाश्रयोद्धतः।

Translation: There the primary meaning of the personal suffixes is locus, in both active and passive voices.

स च कर्तरी व्यापाराश्रयः कर्मणि फलाश्रयः।

Translation: That meaning of locus is, locus of function in the case of active voice and locus of the result in the case of passive voice.

आश्रयत्वाच्चारण्डोपाधिरूपं शक्यतांच्छेदकाम्।

Translation: Locusness is the delimitor of the state of being the primary meaning and it is an indivisible property.

न च तस्याश्रयसंबन्धनिरुपकादिनेवभिज्ञात्वाच्छायताच्छेदकानन्वयम, समवायबद्धक- त्वेंपि क्षत्यभावत्।

Translation: It is not the case that, one will have to postulate endless number of delimiters of the state of being the primary meaning on account of the difference in the locusness, which will be differentiated on the basis of different loci, because there will be no difficulty if we accept it as one
property like the relation of inherence.

अश्रयताल्वचातःतिरिक्तं कक्षाश्रयतानामन्युगमध्ये वाच्यम्।

**Translation:** Additional property will be postulated such as the property of being locusness, which will be one and present in all locusness.

न चाश्रयः प्रथमान्तरपदेनेव लोकः इति, न तत्र शक्ति कल्यन्ना युक्ता, अन्यंतरस्येव शब्दार्थास्ततातिरिक्ते वाच्यम्।

**Translation:** One cannot raise a doubt that since the locus is obtained from the word ending in nominative case ending, it is not proper to postulate a relation with regard to the locus again. Because; a word meaning should be that which cannot be obtained from any other constituent of the sentence.

‘चैत्र: पचति’ इत्यादि चैत्रतचादिना तल्लामेड्यपि पविथात्ततार्थ्य व्यावाराश्रयत्तेन तदलाभात्।

**Translation:** Because in the sentence *chaitraḥ pacati* etc., though the locus is obtained as someone qualified by *chaitratva* but it is not obtained as the locus of the function, which is the meaning of the root *pac*.

शैतन्यास्यकः

**Translation:** Logicians have the following to say:

न कर्तृकार्मणि वाच्ये,

**Translation:** The agent and the object cannot be the primary meanings of the personal suffixes.

कृत्याश्रयादेः कर्त्रादित्तेन तत्र शक्ती गौरवात्।
Translation: If that is accepted then since agent means the locus of volition (kṛtṛi), there will be cumbersomeness (with regard to the (śkyatiśvchedaka).

किन्नु कर्तृलकारे कृति।

Translation: But, volition should be the meaning of the personal suffix in the active voice.

न च धातुनेव सा लब्धा,

Translation: And, it cannot be obtained from the root.

‘पचति - पाकं करोति’ इति यत्नादेह पुष्पक्षया विद्विमाणतवेन तस्य धात्वशक्यवत्वात्।

Translation: Because, in the paraphrase ‘pacati- pākan karoti’, the internal effort is being separately paraphrased for the personal suffix and so it cannot be the meaning of the root.

न च घञ्जादिसमविभावःतत्त्तवेत् फल एव शक्तिः

Translation: It is also not the case that the root in association with the primary suffix ‘ghañ’ means the result.

ग्रामो गमनवा्रु, इति प्रतीच्यापत्तेः

Translation: Then there will arise the contingency of an unwanted usage like ‘grāmo gamanavān’.

‘काढे: पाक’ इत्यादि तव कारकान्यानापत्तेष्व,
Translation: Moreover there will arise a contingency of lack of relationship with kāraka in the sentence like kāṣṭhāḥ pākah, because invariably your kāraka is related to action.

तव भावनायां कारकान्यनियमात्।

Translation: In your doctrine the kāraka is related to the volition.

तस्माद् यत्नातिसर्वत्रयापार एव धातुशक्यः।

Translation: Therefore, the root should mean some action other than the internal effort.

ननु ‘रथो गच्छति’ इत्यादिः कृतेऽवधात्, करोतेऽवध्यापरासामान्यात्कत्वाच्च धातुवर्तांनु- कृतेऽवध्यापार एवार्थात्तथः।

Translation: In the case of ratho gacchati etc., the meaning volition is obstructed also because ‘karoti’ means action in general; the meaning of the personal suffixes should be the action, which produces the root meaning

अत एव बीजादिनाकरुः कृत: इति व्याख्याः।

Translation: That is why, such usage like ‘bud is produced by seed’ is possible.

‘पच्छति’ इत्यस्य ‘पाकं भावयति’ इति व्याप्तान्यायार्थक्षाब्ययतिनां विवरणम्।

Translation: Pacati means pākam bhāvayati, here explanation of bhāvayati is the paraphrase of action in general.
‘स्थो गमनं करोति’ इति च विवरणं दृश्यते।

_Translation_: So also the sentence _ratho gamanaṃ karoti_ is used, which is the paraphrase of _ratho gacchati_.

_कर्तृपदेनापि व्यापाराश्रय एवोध्यते।_

_Translation_: By the word ‘agent’ also the locus of action in general is understood.

_आख्यातार्थश्रय इति (मीमांसकोलो) मतन्तु न युक्तम्,_

_Translation_: The opinion, (of _Mīmāṃsakas_) that locus of the meaning of personal suffixes is an agent is also not proper.

_आमन्ने कृति च दोषापते।_

_Translation_: In the case of verbal form ending in ‘ām’ and a primary suffix in the sense of an agent, this, is not applicable. This will be a fault of narrow application.

_कृतिरित्यादृश च कृतः कृती निरूपलक्षणा।_

_Translation_: In the case of _kṛti_, the root means _kṛti_ by _niruddhulakṣṇā_ (i.e. by settled or decided _lakṣaṇā_).

_पत्तिलक्षणादेश्च न पाकाध्यानुकूलत्वम्, अनुकूलताविशेषस्येव संसर्गत्वात्, पचति इत्यादिप्रयोगरूपो दोष।_

_Translation_: Action of buying rice etc. does not produce ‘cooking’. Because: only a particular relationship of causality is accepted as the relation between the action and result. Therefore, even if someone uses the expression _pacati_
(cooking) in the context of buying of rice it is not a fault.

‘पचति’ इत्यादि यत्नानुभवस्तु यत्नाविनाभूतपापादिक्रियाविशेषण कारणस्य यत्नानुमानात्।

**Translation:** In the case of *pacati* etc., the volition is understood by the inference. Because, we infer the cause, which is volition and which is the producer of particular action of cooking.

यल्ले वर्तमानत्वप्रतीतितिर्ये तत्पर्यं सिद्धगेन

**Translation:** Present time in the volition is also understood by the inference.

यल्ल्ताव्यिचित्रे वर्तमानत्वानुमित्युपगमनवोपपध्यात्मावद्वर्तमानत्वप्रतीतिती शास्त्रत्वं तु सन्विदायेव।

**Translation:** Understanding of present time, which is delimited by the state of being a volition comes by inference. When, by the inference such present time is understood which is in the volition then, it can be explained without a problem. Whether such an understanding is a verbal understanding remains a matter of dispute.

वर्तमानत्वाध्यायस्तु आखातार्थ्यापार एव,

**Translation:** State of being the present time will be related to the meaning of the personal suffixes, namely action (*vyāpāra*).

पचति, ‘पाकयत्नवान्’ इति तु तात्पर्यार्थविवरणमिति चेत, न,

**Translation:** The paraphrase *pacati* means ‘*pākayatnavān*’ is the paraphrase of the intended meaning. If such objections are raised, it is not proper.
Translation: Because; in comparison to action-ness the volition-ness is simpler because it is a universal property.

Translation: Same thing happens in the case of karoti also. (Means, volition will be the meaning of the verbal form ‘karoti’).

Translation: Volition should be the meaning of the verbal form ‘karoti’. Because of the revelation in the case of chaitra, who is suffering from a filarial disease and quivering by an action of air other than the general inhalation, though the action is understood (in his body) he says-‘I am not quivering but, my body is being quivered by the filarial fever’.

Translation: Also in the case of patāṅkuruṣayoh (clothes and buds) where, in one case an action is performed and in another case action is not performed. (So it reveals that the volition is the meaning of the verbal form karoti).

Translation: In the case of bijādināṅkurah kṛtaḥ (buds are produced by the seeds) etc., the action will be the secondary meaning of the root kṛṇī.
Translation: *Bhāvayati*, the paraphrase is also volition intended.

Translation: It cannot be said that if the root *kr̥ṇi* means volition, it will become intransitive like the root *yat*. Such question cannot be asked because of the nature of words is like that.

Translation: Or, the root *kr̥ṇi* means volition, (volition connected with action) which produces action. And, the meaning of the verbal form *yatate* is simply volition, and hence there is no fault.

Translation: It cannot be said that *utpādayti* will be paraphrased as *‘utpatim karoti’* because; whatever is produced cannot be produced again.

Translation: In that case only action in general will be understood by the *lakṣaṇā* (of the root *kr̥ṇi*).

Translation: It is not the case that, it is impossible of having volitionness as
the delimitor of the state of being the primary meaning. Because; volition-
ness is found in the both the meanings of the personal suffix, in an affirmative
and in negative sentence.

इष्टसाधनान्तरज्ञानज्ञातावच्छेदनक्रियात्मात्रात्रिज्ञातसम्बन्धितत्वित्विनिरत्वम्।

Translation: This is not a fault because we accept yatnativa, which is the
delimitor of the state of being the product, which is produced by the
knowledge of the state of being the means of a desired object.

अत एवेश्वरकृतेर्ज्ञानमानकल्पसे ‘ईश्वरः पञ्चति’, ‘ईश्वरो भुज्जके’ इत्यादियो न
प्रयोगाः।

Translation: That is why there are no usages like iśvaraḥ pacsati, iśvaraḥ
bhunkte (God cooks, God eats), although God’s volition is the cause of all
products.

‘ईश्वरो वेदं वक्ति’ इत्यादियो तु यथार्थ लक्षणा,

Translation: In the sentence ‘iśvaro vedam vakti’ (God utters Veda) etc.,
however, the secondary sense is accepted.

तस्माद व्यथा यथाकथायतरः।

Translation: Therefore, volition is the meaning of the personal suffixes.

अत एव ‘चैत्र एव पञ्चति, ना चेतन नामाहिं’ इति स्थारसिको व्यवहारः।

Translation: Therefore, lucid usages like chaitraḥ eva pacsati (Chaitra is
cooking) and, not, inanimate wood is cooking is accepted.
Translation: So, kāśṭhāni pacanti (wood are cooking) is not as lucid as of chaitraḥ pacati (Chitra is cooking).

Translation: It is not the case that the ‘volition’ will be understood twice, because as in the case of the numbers ‘two’ the two-ness is not repeated.

Translation: And, in the sentence like ‘ratho gacchati’ etc., secondary sense will be accepted as the meaning of the personal suffix.

Translation: And the action (kriyā) will be related to function (vyāpāra) by the relationships of co-locatedness and cause-and-effect.

Translation: This is the reason that the verbal form gacchati (going) is not used for someone who makes somebody else move.

Translation: Or, because of the particular relationship of (janya janaka bhāva) cause-and-effect relationship the kriyā can be related to vyāpāra in the same locus. Therefore, there is no problem.


Translation: If it is argued that, from the verbal form ‘nidratī’ etc., no one understands the function of sleeping which stands for the contact of mind with nerve cells, and then, same is the case with ‘ratho gacchati’ also.

Translation: Then, in such cases like jānāti, gacchati, yatate, dveṣṭi, karoti, nidrāti (he knows, he goes, he takes effort, he haters, he goes, he sleeps) etc., locusness will be obtained by the extended relationships.

Translation: Well, let the root meaning be related to the meaning of the nominative form with the relation of locusness why through the extended relationship?

Translation: Moreover, if the locusness is accepted as the relation, then this dharma requires another relationship to be related with dharmin. And in that case like ‘jānāti’ etc., an extra relationship will have to be postulated and that will lead to cumbersonessness.

Translation: The following also cannot be said; in order to avoid relationship between rice and the action of cooking by the relationship of objectness in the
expression ‘taṇḍulaḥ pacati’. There an be no direct relationship between the meaning of a nominal stem and the root meaning and so no such understanding is possible.

Translation: Because, although an understanding in which the meaning of the nominal form is a qualifier is possible still an understanding in which the meaning of the root is a qualifier cannot be accepted.

‘घटा! करोति’, इत्यादि ‘कृतिकर्मिःमौतो घटा’, इत्यन्ययोधवाचरणाय क्रियाप्रकारणामार्थभोध्यभाष्यभवत् सम्बन्धशास्त्रीयं तु न दोषावहम्, प्रामाणिकत्वात्।

Translation: In order to avoid an understanding from ‘ghaṭah karoti’ etc, in which the pot appears as an object of volition, one has to say that there does not arise an understanding in which root meaning appears as a qualifier and the meaning of a nominal stem as qualificand. Appearance of relationship, however, is not a fault because this is justified.

अस्तु वा तथा, वर्तमानत्वाद्वायत्सु सर्वदेहेऽवशे धात्वार्थ एव, न त्वाश्रयत्वादि।

Translation: Or, let it be such. Still the relationship of present time will be with the meaning of the root only. Relationship of time cannot be with locusness.

ज्ञातिवस्तुमूलप्रस्तुतव्यन्यविशेषुप्रस्तुतिरिक्तस्य वा, आश्रयत्वादि सम्बन्धेः सत्वे ज्ञातित्वादिप्रयोगावते।
Translation: If the present time is related with locusness, which is either a svarupasambandha or an additional entity, there will arise a contingency in the cases like ‘jānāti’ (he knows) etc., i.e. even if he does not have knowledge. And there will be the usage like jānāti.

Translation: If it is necessary to relate present time with locusness qualified by knowledge then it is necessary in all cases of the knowledge of qualification and hence it is better to accept that only.

Translation: If, volition is accepted as the meaning of the personal suffixes, it will not go against the rule of ‘Pāṇini ‘kartari laḥ’ etc.

Translation: If volition is accepted as the meaning of the personal suffixes, and by its relation with the meaning of nominative case as qualifier the ‘agent’ is obtained and as such the meaning of ‘la’ will be understood, and in that case it will not go against ‘Pāṇini’s rule.

Translation: As a matter of fact in the case of ‘laḥ krmaṇi’ the meaning of the locative case ending is the state of causing understanding and not the state
of expressing.

न च ‘चैत्र: पचति’ इत्यादिभिन्नां सोपायमेकर्मिभोधकत्वलस्यानुमयोऽवराधोऽयति वाचयम्,

**Translation:** The following cannot be said, if the volition is accepted as the meaning of personal suffixes then in the sentence like *chaitraḥ pacati* etc. we cannot experience of co-located ness coming from two different forms.

तथा न नुषुवातः

**Translation:** It is not understood in that way:

तादात्मयान्तर्भवेण स्वभावितार्थत्वाभ्येष सामानाधिकरण्यस्य प्रतीतिः।

**Translation:** What is understood is a co-referentiality, which incorporates identity between two referents.

अस्तु वा तथा सामानाधिकरण्यं लक्षणम्, शक्तिः शक्त सत्यवाद यत्न एव, अत एव

‘युष्मद्युपपदे समानाधिकरणे’ (१.४१.९०५) इत्यादीनां नानुपत्तिः।

**Translation:** Or, let the co-locatedness be accepted through the secondary significatory power. Volition should be accepted as the meaning of the personal suffixes, because of its logical simplicity. Therefore, there does not arise any problem in the aphorism ‘युष्मद्युपपादे समानाधिकरणे’ (1.4.105) etc.

अत एव च ‘फिक करोति’ इति प्रश्ने ‘पचति’ इत्येवोतरे दत्ते देवदत्तादिपवामावेदिपि

मन्नोपपस्थिते कर्तिरि नैकत्वसंस्थायः,
Translation: That is why, in the question of ‘kim karoti’ the given answer ‘pacati’ does not create any doubt about the oneness of the agent, which is in the mind of the listener, when the agent i.e. ‘Devadatta’ etc., are not uttered.

लक्षणयोपस्थिते धर्मिन्यो सवर्णयेनवादोपात्।

Translation: There is no fault if the number is related with the ‘dharmin’, which is (Devadatta etc.) is presented by the secondary significatory power.

‘पचति’ इत्यादि कालान्वयस्तु कृतावेव, न तु धात्वर्थः,

Translation: In the case of ‘pacati’ etc., the ‘time’ should be related with the volition meaning of the personal suffix, but not with the meaning of the verbal roots.

यल्लशून्येद्विति पुरुषे तद्धीनानिनियोगादिशुपपवाहकर्थ्या विद्यमानत्वे ‘अर्न न पचति’
इति प्रयोगात्,

Translation: Because a man (for the time being) has stopped cooking though, the act of fueling etc., initiated by him continues one says; ‘He does not cook’ and it is justified.

‘अर्न पचति’ इत्युक्ते इवानीमयं पाकघनत्वात्र वेति संशयप्रकृतेष्च।

Translation: And also, when it is told that; ‘he is cooking’, now the doubt about his (attachment with) cooking or not cooking is cleared.

जानात्तत्त्वादी धात्वर्थं एव तदन्यप्रश्रृव्यतः।

Translation: It is fixed, in the case of ‘jānāti’ etc, the time will be related to the meaning of the verbal root only.
पचतीत्वादायपि तथैव, यत्ननिरौत्तो पाकानुृत्तो ‘अयं न पचति’ इति तु न भवत्वेव
पचतीत्वायने दर्शनाच्छ।

Translation: (In such conditions, therefore,) Time is related to even root
meaning in the case of ‘pucati’ etc. Because, when volition has ceased and
action of cooking continues, one says; ‘he is not cooking’, but at other normal
condition the usage is found as ‘pucati’.

एवच्च कालान्नये नानाकार्यकारणभावकल्पनापि न।

Translation: Similarly, with regard to the relation of time, there is no need to
postulate various cause-and-effect relationships.

इदानीमयं पाकयत्मकाः कैति संशयनिमुक्तिस्तु तत्तथमलिङ्गेन यत्नत्वाविष्ठेऽ
वर्तमानन्तनानुमूलकप्रभृपमेत्योपेक्षेत्र्ये।

Translation: According to some (others), the doubt arises on whether now he
is cooking or not will be removed by inferring present time in the volition on
the bases of intention of the speaker.

नश्यतीत्वादावुत्तिरिपि धाताधः, आवश्यातार्थों वा इति तद्रेव कालान्नय।

Translation: In the case of ‘nasya’ the root meaning is ‘utpati’ also, or it
can be the meaning of personal suffix and so, time should be related with that.

अतो धातुस्य नित्यवेच्चमि न सर्वदा नश्यतीति प्रयोगः।

Translation: That is why ‘nasya’ is not always used, although destruction is
 eternal.
यद्य, उत्तपतिभद्भाव(त)स्येव नाशपदार्थत्त्वेन तदेकदेशोत्तप्ती तदनवः।

**Translation:** Or, since the destruction is (understood as) the absence of the beginning, hence, time should be related with the one part of it, i.e. with ‘upati’.

‘अनभिहिते कर्तरी तूलिया’ इत्यादेशवानभिहितायां कृताविध्याः।

**Translation:** In the case of ‘anabhihite kartari tryiya’ the meaning will be ‘when volition is not expressed by the personal suffix’.

कृतिश्चाश्रयत्वादैनामुपलक्षणम्, कर्तृध्वंसनभिहिते इति यावदिति केविल।

**Translation:** The volition is the indicative of locusness. That is, when the property of agent is not expressed.

तत्, न, लकारसामान्यस्येव कर्तृत्वे शक्तित्वेन, ‘पच्छये तपदुः चैत्रेण’ इत्यावपि तूलियानापि।

**Translation:** This proposal is not acceptable. Because, as the personal suffix in general expresses agentness, there will arise the contingency of not getting instrumental case ending in the sentence ‘pacyate tanḍulah chaîtreṇa’.

‘कि क्रियते देवदत्तेन’ इति प्रश्ने ‘पच्छये’ इत्युत्तरेण। कर्तृपदार्थसहित्याहते ‘पच्छये तपदुः’ इत्यादिः, ‘फलजनकस्यन्तरमानकृतिजन्यो न वा’, इति सन्देहानुद्दयेन च ‘चैत्रेण पच्छये’ इत्यस्य ‘चैत्रेण पच्छये क्रियते’ इति विवरणेन चाक्षात्माज्ञस्य कर्तृवृत्तसहित्याय आवश्यकत्वाः।

**Translation:** When some one asks; ‘kim kriyate devadattena’, the answer comes as ‘pacyate’ (which implies the meaning of the personal suffixes is kartā that is Devadatta etc.) and in the case of ‘pacyate tanḍulah’ where the
agent is not associated with the action of softening never gives a room for
doubt about the agent whether he is the producer of this action or not and,
also the paraphrase ‘chaitreṇa pakvah kriyate’ of ‘chaitreṇa pacyate’ etc., are
the ground for accepting that the personal suffix means agent-ness.

न च कर्मविरोधाय प्रातिपदिकार्थिविवक्षिते सति तुलीया, कर्मविरोधाय
प्रातिपदिकार्थिविवक्षिते सति वितीया, इत्यादायः।

Translation: When the meaning of the nominal base is not intended as the
qualificand of the agent hood then the instrumental case ending will be applied.
When the meaning of the nominal base is intended as the qualificand of the
objecthood there will be accusative case ending. This also cannot be the
interpretation.

अत एव सूत्ते धर्मिनिर्देशशस्त्रितथाः

Translation: Therefore, dharmin indication of ‘kartā, karma, and karaṇa, in
the aphorism is justified.

अतो न दोष इति वाच्यम्,

Translation: Therefore, it cannot be said that there is no fault.

चैत्रमैत्रेयकर्तुर्कपाकस्थले चैत्रकर्तुर्कपाककल्ला मैत्रा इत्यन्यतात्पर्यं ‘चैत्रेण पचति
मैत्रा’, ‘चैत्रेण पक्ववान मैत्रा’ इत्यादेशप्रयाप्तोः।

Translation: If it is accepted, there will arise the problem in the case of
‘chaitrah’ and ‘maitrah’ where the both are cooking and, according to the
relation of ‘chaittrakartika-pākakartā -maitrah’ we will have the forms like
‘chaitreṇa pacati maitrah’ and ‘chaitreṇa pakvavān maitrah’.
न चाष्यातिरिक्तविशेषणताप्रमाणं यत् कत्स्वपदम, तद्विशेषणतापत्तिक्रियायां विशेषणतत्त्वं।
प्रातिपदिकसंसाधनविशेषकर्त्तव्यविवक्षायां तदुत्तरं त्रृतीयामति सुस्थार्थं।

Translation: It cannot be the meaning of the said rule that whatever is the agent-word which is not the qualifier of anything other than the substratumness after that an instrumental case ending can be added when agentness is to be related of which the meaning of the stem is the qualificand.

‘चैत्रेण पाचयति मैत्रं’ इत्यादी प्रातिपदिकसंसाधनविशेषणताप्रमाणात चैत्रादिककर्त्तव्यविवक्षे तत्र तृतीयासिद्धं आश्रयातिरिक्तविशेषणताप्रमाणं।

Translation: Being the qualifier to anything other than the substratumness is added in order to justify the use of instrumental ending in the sentence ‘chaitreṇa pāchayati maitraḥ’ etc., in which the agentness of ‘chaitra’ is related to ‘pāka’ which has root relevance of the qualifier of agentness.

तच्चाक्ष्यातार्थःश्रयत्वे विशेषणम।

Translation: That agent-hood is the attributive to the locusness of the meaning of the locus-ness.

तस्य चाष्यातिरिक्तत्त्वं स्पष्टमेव।

Translation: And, that agent-hood is other than the locus. It is clear.

कृतिविशेषयक्षयबोधिमप्रयोगं ‘चैत्रेण पचति’ इत्येतद्वारणाय आश्रयविशेष्यत्व-मुप्रक्ष्याश्रयातिरिक्तविशेष्यत्वं निर्येषितमिति वाच्यम।

Translation: Intending to convey the volition (kṛti) as the qualificand and to
avoid such usage like ‘chaitreṇa pacati’ etc., it is necessary to add the clause ‘being the qualifier to anything other than the locus’ ignoring the qualification to the locus. One cannot say this also.

Translation: Because; the ‘sūtra’ does not imply such meanings.

पाचयतित्या तिंप आक्रये लक्षणाप्राप्तवयुरुक्तीय- ‘चैत्रण पाचयति मैत्रा’ इति प्रयोगे तृतीयाया असाधुक्षयास्तेष्वः।

Translation: In the case of ‘pācayati’ etc, if a man having knowledge of secondary indicative power understands ‘tip’ as locus, then, the instrumental case ending will be ungrammatical in the usage of ‘chaitreṇa pācayati maitraḥ’.

तस्मात् ‘अनभिहित’ इत्यादेयनभिहितसक्र्याकेष्वतः।

Translation: Therefore, the meaning of the ‘anabhihite’ is ‘when number is not expressed’.

न च ‘चैत्रण दृष्टो घट’, ‘घटदृष्टवान् चैत्र’ इत्यादिविनापि तिंक सक्र्याप्राप्तीतः कल्पनासिद्धकेन सुपैव सक्र्योपास्थितिसम्मवे तिंक न तदनिभावकल्पम्।

Translation: Since, the number is revealed without the application of the personal suffix (tīṇi) in the cases like ‘chaitreṇa drṣṭho ghaṭaḥ, ghaṭaṁ drṣṭhavān chaitraḥ’, and, (on the contrary) the number is understood by the nominal case ending by a person who has the knowledge of primary meaning, therefore, it cannot be held that tīṇ expresses number.


एवम् ‘चैत्रः पञ्चलि’ इत्यादावापि तृतीयापतिरिति

**Translation:** Thus, even in the case of ‘chaitraḥ pacati’ etc, the application of instrumental case ending cannot be avoided.

(न च) वाच्यम्,

**Translation:** This cannot be the solution.

‘चैत्रो मैत्रशेष गच्छन्ति’ इत्यादि विनापि हित्वादिविभोधकसुपुण द्विविधिअन्त्यवादः।

**Translation:** Because, in the case like ‘chaitraḥ maithraḥ ca gachchatāḥ etc, where, there is no expressive dual (sup) nominal suffixes, but dual number is understood.

न चैकत्वपरिमिावचछेदकहित्वादिव्योः कुतः,

**Translation:** It cannot be said that how number two is understood as the delimitor of the state of being the locus of number one.

एकत्वायावचछेदेन हित्वादीसम्भवताः।

**Translation:** It is possible to know number two by two ‘ones’.

न च सूबैकत्वचनस्येव हित्वादो लक्षणास्तु,

**Translation:** It cannot be said that let the nominal singular suffix express number two by secondary relationship.

सुपुरुषाक्तिन्यायाशास्त्रावधोधकत्वे चैत्रश्रयमैत्रश्रयवोधापते।
Translation: Since, a nominal suffix expresses number of the meaning of the stem there will arise the contingency of understanding two ‘Chaitras, and two Maitras.

Translation: Moreover, since the number is not expressed by the primary suffixes, there will arise such problem.

Translation: The problem can be settled on the ground whether an agent or an object is expressed or not.

Translation: When the agent and the object are not expressed there will be instrumental case ending. This is the meaning of the ‘sūtra’.

Translation: According to the view that in the passive voice, the volition (kṛti) is not the meaning of the personal suffixes not expressing volition means not expressing an ‘agent’.

Translation: It cannot be said that since the dichotomy of ‘ukta’ and ‘anukta’ is based on expressing and not-expressing of number, there is handle in relating number to an agent and object there will be no way to avoid non-use
of accusative case-ending in the active and passive voice.

एकपदोपात्तत्वेन भावनाविशेषे सङ्क्ष्यान्यनियमस्वीकारेणादोषात्।
Translation: It is not a fault. Because the number will be related along with volition, to the qualificand, because, both are presented by one and the same morpheme.

भावनायास्वचितिरितिरिति भूतप्रथमान्तरपदिपस्थापयोन्यत: तथ्यात्कल्पितत्वतः।
Translation: The volition will be related to that, which is expressed by the form ending in nominative case ending and which is not a qualifier to anything else.

भावनापदेन सङ्क्ष्याकल्पितस्तत: आख्यातोद्भोधोऽऽहंते॥
Translation: By the word ‘bhāvanā’ what is understood is that ‘which is other than the number and time’.

तेन जानातीव्यादीनं सङ्क्ष्र्मः॥
Translation: By accepting such, (āśraya, the meaning of the personal suffix) ‘jānāti’ etc, can be justified.

‘नारायण इव नयो हन्ति’, ‘चन्द्र इव मुख्य दृश्यते’, इत्यत्र नारायणे चन्द्रे च सङ्क्ष्यान्यं वारणायेतस्वविशेषण इति।
Translation: To avoid the relationship of the number (with the nominal case ending ‘naro’ and ‘chandraḥ’) in the sentence like ‘nārāyaṇa iva naro hanti’, ‘chandra iva mukhāṃ dṛṣyate’, the clause ‘which is not a qualifier to any
thing else’ is added.

Translation: Really speaking since no understanding arises from ‘ghaṭaḥ nityaḥ’, if some thing appears as a qualifier to something else it will obstruct any verbal understanding and so here even if it is not specifically mentioned, there is no harm.

Translation: Thus, for understanding the meaning of the personal suffix that is other than the time and ‘iṣṭasādhanatva’ the remembrance caused by the word ‘which ends in nominative case ending’ is the cause. In this way the cause-and-effect relationship can be stated.

Translation: Thus, in the sentence ‘na pacati’ the number will be related with the agent that is not related to the volition. Hence, relation of this kind is not a fault.

Translation: There, the volition will be related to the meaning of the negation, that is absence.
Translation: Here, in the sentence ‘chaitreṇa supyate’, ‘chaitraniṣṭhah svāpah’ (sleeping occurs in Chaitra) is the meaning understood. And, to debar the relation of the number in the (svāpu) sleeping that is the qualificand, the word ‘prathamāntārtha’ the meaning of nominal case ending has been mentioned in the doctrine.

Translation: Therefore, in the case of passive voice the number cannot be related because of the absence of the nominative case ending.

Translation: Therefore, here the singular number in general is added.

Translation: Moreover, in your case also where the agent would be the meaning, where the object would be the meaning is settled on the basis of ‘ṣup’ etc., and by the intention of the speaker.

Translation: Exactly same thing for me also, where the number would be related, where the volition would be the meaning, where the result would be the meaning are settled down by some rules. So, it does not create any problem.
‘मैत्रेण पच्यते तण्डुलाः,’ इत्यत्र मैत्रनिन्द्यभावनाविश्वासपकजन्यफलशाली तण्डुल इति बोधः।

Translation: In the case like ‘maitreṇa pacyate āṇḍūlaḥ’ (rice is cooked by Maitra) here the verbal cognition produced is that; ‘rice grains are the possessor of the effect (softening) produced from the action (activity) occurring in Maitra’.

कृतिः फलव्यायः।

Translation: The volition and the result are the meaning of the persona suffixes.

तत्र कृतिधार्मिकविशेषणम्, फलं विशेषयम्, निष्ठतं तृतीयार्थं, संसर्गं वा, सदृश्यार्थं तृतीयार्थं, भावनापदेन सदृश्याकालतिरिक्त आयुतार्थं जन्मते।

Translation: Here, the volition is the qualifier (viśeṣaṇa) to the meaning of the verbal root, the result is the qualificand, existing ness is the meaning of the instrumental-meaning or relation, and number is the only meaning of the instrumental-meaning by the volition the meaning of the personal suffix excluding number and time, is understood.

अत एव भावनाविशेषयं सदृश्यान्वयस्य न भवेण।

Translation: This is why there is no violation of the rule: ‘volition will be related to that to which the number is related’.

‘स्थेन गम्यते ग्रामः’ इत्यत्र ध्रुवनिन्द्यवाचनानुकूलव्यापारजन्यफलशालीति बोधः।

Translation: In the sentence like ‘rathena ganyate grāmāḥ’, here, the verbal
cognition will be produced as—'the village is the processor of the effect (contact) produced by the activity occurring in the chariot'.

अत निष्ठत्वं तूतीवर्ध्।

Translation: Here, ‘existing’ is the meaning of the instrumental meaning.

तस्य धात्विं हृदनमेवन्यः।

Translation: It, existingness is related with the meaning of the verbal root, that is ‘gamana’.

न च फलमपि संसर्गाण गमने,

Translation: And, the result will not be related to ‘gamana’ by the samsarga (a relation).

नामार्थादात्मायायंदेनान्यस्यायस्यावृत्तते।

Translation: Because, there can be no direct relationship between the meaning of a nominal-stem and the root meaning.

यद्य, तेन संसर्गाण स्वस्यादात्मायात्मायावृत्तते।

Translation: Or, by that (niṣṭhatva, existence) relation the chariot can be related to the volition (bhāvanā) the meaning of the personal suffixes.

न च फलमपि संसर्गाःस्तु, किं तत्रात्मनेपदस्य शक्तिकल्पनाः, तस्य प्रकार्तया भानानुभवतु।

Translation: It cannot be said that let the result be incorporated in the relation and then why to postulate a power in the ‘ātmanepada suffix’? Because; it is understood as a qualifier.
न च फलावचित्रक्यापरस्य धात्वार्थान्तिन्न धातुनेव तत्त्याभ्।

*Translation:* It cannot be said that since the meaning of the root is the function qualified by the result that can be obtained from the root.

विशेषणविशेष्यावैपरीत्यस्वास्थ्यत्वेन क्रियाजन्यफलालाभात्।

*Translation:* Because, the qualifier and qualificand cannot be reverted and so, one cannot get the result caused by the action.

यदृपविषिद्य शक्तिः, तदृपविषिद्यस्येव पदनेपश्चिति।

*Translation:* In whatever form the meaning is presented, in the same form a word expresses it’s meaning.

तस्माद्व्यापार एव धात्वर्ध्यः।

*Translation:* Therefore, the function is the meaning of the root.

फलं त्वात्नेपदार्थं, कृतिष्ठेती।

*Translation:* Meaning of the ‘ātmanepada’ (meaning of the personal suffixes in ātmanepada) is result and volition.

ननु कृतेनपि तत्रात्यात्वर्ध्ये आस्थातपस्याधिभावनाया: क्रियाविषयायाः फलेऽन्यः,
उत्त भावनाविशेष्यक्रियायाः फलेऽन्यः।

*Translation:* Well, if volition (kṛti) is also the meaning of the personal suffix, then whether the volition (bhāvanā) presented by the personal suffixes will be connected to the result, cognition of the action (kriyā) or, the volition (bhāvanā) qualifier of action (kriyā) will be related to the result.
नाध: फलस्वय क्रियान्वयनस्थित्वस्वपकर्षकारकप्रतीतिविरोधः।

**Translation:** The first alternative is not true. Because, it will contradict the understanding in which objectness, which is the possessor of the effect produced from the action.

अन्तः, तितिस्थाप्यभावनाया क्रियाया विशेषणत्वेनान्तर क्लूपतान्त्रे भ्रमयेत, किन्तु तृतीयार्थ एव।

**Translation:** In the second alternative, it will contradict the known relationship of action to the volition expressed by the personal suffix but it will be accepted as the instrumental meaning only.

‘चेत्रेण पक्व’ इत्यादिनुरोचन सुवर्णकृत्यं क्रियायं विशेषणत्वेनान्तर्वयुप्तसहितीय-प्रकारणेवान्त्रयबोधः।

**Translation:** In the example of ‘chaitreṇa pakvaḥ’, since volition, the meaning of the nominative is related to the action (kriyā) as a qualifier there will be understanding of the relationship in the second way.

‘ग्रामिः गच्छिति’ इत्यादिः तु फलं तृतीयार्थः।

**Translation:** In the case of ‘grāmaṃ gacchati’ etc., the result (phala) will be accepted as the meaning of accusative.

वस्तुततः ग्रामिकानुपपत्तिः कृत्यप्रयत्नात्त्वत्त्वात्तत्स्वविवशकम्। व्युपत्त्वत्ततरसेवात्र कल्पनिति प्राप्तः।

**Translation:** Really speaking, as per the contingency raised before, here also volition is necessarily the meaning of the personal suffix. In such case, other
alternative form of understanding should be postulated. This is what the old Naiyāyikas say.

In other words, some others think that a root means an activity qualified by the result as per the arguments of ‘dhātvartanirupāna’.

Translation: It cannot be said that since the result presented as the qualifier of the root-meaning is likely to be related to the object, one should accept its relation with the meaning of the ‘ātmanepada-suffix’.

Because that (ātmanepada) expresses result in general or in a specific way.

Moreover, in the sentence ‘gamyate grāmāḥ’ village is not understood as possessing the result namely, the contact regularly.

From the association the root ‘gam’ which expresses an action qualified by contact the ātmanepada suffix, which expresses result, in
general in association with the root can be understood. And, if the \textit{ātmanepada} is understood as expressing, causing the knowledge of result, namely contact. And, if this is accepted there is no difficulty.

\begin{quote}
न च विशेषरूपेण फलसामान्यवोधकत्वे शक्त्यानन्तरम्, इष्टापते।
\end{quote}

\textbf{Translation:} It cannot be said that if result in general is accepted as the meaning with specific result in the mind, then, one will have to postulate a number of primary relationships. And, if this objection is raised, we welcome it.

\begin{quote}
तदादिवद् बुद्धिस्थतवेन, शक्त्यात्ववच्छेदकानुगमेन वा न शक्त्यानन्तरम्।
\end{quote}

\textbf{Translation:} Because, as in the case of pronoun \textit{tad} etc., by delimiting the state of being the primary meaning that which is in the mind. And, by understanding it there will be no numerous primary relationships.

\begin{quote}
एवेच् ‘गम्यते ग्रामः’ हत्यत्र ‘संयोगवच्छिन्नव्यापारजन्यसंयोगाश्रयो ग्रामः’ इति बोध।
\end{quote}

\textbf{Translation:} From the sentence \textit{gamyate grāmaḥ} the understanding is produced as; ‘the village which is locus of the contact produced by action associated by contact’.

\begin{quote}
‘ग्रामं गच्छति’ इत्यादी द्वितीयार्थस्वाधिकरत्वं युत्पत्तिवैविध्याय धात्वर्ध्वतावच्छेदकेवपि फलेऽद्वैते।
\end{quote}

\textbf{Translation:} In the sentence \textit{grāmaṁ gacchati}’ the meaning of the accusative case ending will be located-ness, because of the difference in structure of verbal cognition. And, the located-ness will be related to the result.
एकदेशान्यासीकारे तु तत्रापि फलयेव द्वितीयार्थः।

Translation: If, the relationship of a part of the meaning of the root is not accepted, there also, the result will be the meaning of the accusative case ending.

ग्रामनिष्पशंस्योगजनकसंयोगाविशेषक्रिया नुकूलकृतिमानिति बोध इति वदन्ति।

Translation: The understanding occurs as; some body has volition, which causes the action, which is a producer of contact and which exists in village.

अत्र पश्चात श्रेयारयु कथामण्डनमुनामविश्वासमिति द्वितीयातल्नेपदयोर्त फलमयेक, किन्तु धातोरेय,

Translation: Here, the contact mentioned twice, goes against the experience. The result is not the meaning of the ‘ātmanepada’ and the meaning of accusative case ending. But, the result is the meaning of the root.

फलवायारो वृत्तक शक्यारि।

Translation: The result, and the volition separately denote their meanings.

एवज्ज द्वितीयाया आधेयत्वम कर्मात्यातस्याश्रयत्वम्,

Translation: Thus, the accusative case ending means located ness and the passive suffix means locus-ness.

फलं तु कर्तृप्रत्ययसमविधायारेण धात्वर्ते व्यापरे विशेषणम्।

Translation: The result, however, will be qualifier to the root meaning that is
action in the association of active voice suffix.

कर्माख्यातसमभियाहारे तु यथानेपदादिरूपतात्पर्यंश्राहकवशाद् विशेषत्मित्वेव साम्प्रतम्।

**Translation:** And, in the association of passive voice suffix, the result will be qualificandum on account of the 'yak'-suffix, 'ātmanepada'-suffix', which are the indicators of the speaker’s intention.

‘देवदत्तेन ज्ञायते ’ इत्यादी विषयवचं कर्मप्रत्ययार्थं, तृतीयत्त्वं आधेरत्तम्।

**Translation:** In the sentence like ‘devadattenā jñāyate’ etc., object-ness will be the meaning of accusative case ending, and, located-ness will be understood as the meaning of instrumental case ending.

‘क्रियते घट्’ इत्यादी साध्वत्या कृतिविषयत्वमेव कर्मप्रत्ययार्थः।

**Translation:** In the case of ‘kriyate ghaṭaḥ’ etc., meaning of the passive suffix will be the state of being the object of volition (kṛti), which is to be accomplished.

अतः ‘आकाशं करोति’ इत्यादयो न प्रयोगः।

**Translation:** That is why Sentences like ‘ākāśaṁ karoti’ etc., are not found in the common usage.

नन्देवं कृतामिपि कर्तृकर्मणोः शक्तिनः सिद्धेत्,

**Translation:** Well it cannot be established that the primary suffixes mean agent and object.
Translation: Because, it is proper to say that the denotative power of those suffixes resides in the locus of the volition (krtya), i.e. agent.

Translation: As the meaning of the indeclinable and the particles, so also, a suffix causes the experience of relation of difference. Therefore, there is no difficulty in the relation of identity between meanings of two nominals. If someone asks this, it is not proper.

Translation: Caitra will go, village is reached, Mitrā is the she-cook, the city is reached, the enjoyer is satisfied, he eats the cooked foods, the cook be removed.

Translation: In the case of 'chaitro gantā' etc., since there is agreement in gender such as masculine, feminine, neuter, it is accepted that the meanings of the first parts are related with identity relationship. But, that is not possible without accepting locus as the meaning.
Translation: Moreover, it will contradict the relationship of locus-ness of satisfaction with the volition, which will produce the act of eating and also with the objectness of softening of rice produced by the act of cooking.

तस्मात् क्षुचिविहितकृतां कर्तरि, कर्मविहितानां तु कर्मणि शक्रि, ‘चात्रस्य नपता’
इत्यादाविव पदार्थतावच्छेदककृत्या धातव्यान्यः।

Translation: Therefore, when the primary suffixes enjoined in the sense of agent, mean the agent and when enjoined in the sense of object they mean object. And, the root meaning will be related to the volition (kṛti), which is the delimitor of the state of being the word meaning as ‘Chaitra’ is related to his grandson.

यहा, पक्तात्स्वानुकृतकृत्याभवित्वसम्बन्धेन पाकादेर कर्त्यāवेशान्यः।

Translation: Or, in the case of ‘paktā’ etc., the act of cooking is related to the agent by the relationship being the locus of volition, which produces that.

कर्त्तृककर्मवाच्यानन्याने तृतीयाप्रदिपितीयादय इति न दोष, कृता विशिष्टस्यायनन्यानरात्।

Translation: Where the agent and object are not expressed by the suffix, nominative and instrumentals meaning will be added, and so there will be no fault. Because; that which is qualified is not expressed by the primary suffixes.

ननु कृतांपि धर्मवाचकायेवास्तु, विशिष्टे तु लक्षणागस्तु।

Translation: Well, let the primary suffixes express property and by secondary function it will express the qualified one.
Translation: In the case of 'bhokīā ātyatī' etc., because of agreement of verbal form, there should be such agreement in the case of 'chaitro gantā' etc., also. But, this is not true.

Translation: Because, there will arise a contingency of the uprooting of the relationship in a qualified meaning. Everywhere the denotative power will be accepted in the (dharma) property and in the qualified the extended relationship will be accepted.

Translation: The 'titva' will be the delimitor of the state of being the śkta, but not the 'tiṅtva', which is a common property found in all 'tiṅ'.

Translation: If it is proposed that, by the indication of 'Pāṇini's rule 'tiṅtva' can be the said delimitor and the rule 'ādirantyenaśaḥetā' can be treated as the indicator of that. But it is not correct

Translation: Because that, titva is understood even by a layman.
Translation: Moreover, if some one imposes another word, (suppose, *Paṭah*) by his own intention on the word ‘*ghaṭah*’, which is the denotative meaning of ‘*ghaṭah*’. Then, on the same ground there will arise a contingency of that word-ness as the delimiter of being the word meaning.

Translation: As ‘*Paṇini*’ assigns meaning to ‘*tiṅ*’ for ‘*tip*’ etc., it is also possible for somebody to assign another meaning, there will be no decision as to what should be the ground for application of the term.

Translation: By this argument this is also ruled out that ‘*ākhyātapadatva*’ can be the delimiter of ‘*śktā*’ by the relation of a particular primary relationship.

Translation: Not also, ‘*latva*’ can be the delimiter of the personal suffixes because even a layman understands without knowing that (*latva*).

Translation: Moreover, if the tense affix ‘*la*’ is accepted as the expressive one as in the case of ‘*śatṛ*’ etc., ‘*la*’ will become polysemous.
Translation: Moreover, in stead of accepting both the delimitor of the state of being the reminder and the delimitor of the state of being capable to express meaning it is simpler to accept the delimitor of the state of being the capable of expressing meaning in the case of ‘papāca’ etc., one will have to postulate innumerable number of state of being the reminder and the ‘sthānin-s’ are not invariable and so they are not used and hence, one will have to accept that the ‘ādesa-s’ (substitutes) are expressive and in that case this argument alone is proper.

अत ऐवधामित्यादावामरोल्ल कर्त्तव्यः।

Translation: Therefore, in the case of ‘edhām’ etc., agent is understood from the suffix ‘ām’.

न च ‘हरेडवा’ इत्यादि पूर्वरूपादिस्थले परलोपाविधानाद् व्याकरणानां कोषे कियान् सम्बोधनविश्वार्थस्य, कियान् क्रियायाः इत्यथास्य, वर्णसादी कियान् इवावाचकः, कियाँस्च कर्मचर्यादेहितयथस्य च नियतनुभावावतेन प्रथमचय्युत्तशे समुदाय एव सत्चेन च पदे वाक्ये च शक्तिकल्पनापति वाक्यपदस्फोटातिरिति वाच्यम्,

Translation: In the case of ‘sandhi’ like ‘hareaba’ etc., common dispute ground of grammarians in the application of ‘pūrvarūpa’ and ‘paralopa’ (some accept ‘pūrvarūpa’, while some elide the subsequent phoneme) to get such forms, where arises difficulty in demarcating the portion belong to vocative and portion belong to the verb. So also in the case of ‘vas’ and ‘nas’ where difficulty arises in knowing the part and portion of the substance and
accusative case. Since, the cognition produced from the word as whole, there arises a contingency in accepting denotative power again in the word and sentence, and so there will be contingency of sentence-\textit{sp\textipa{\textk{h}o\text{\textk{a}}}} and word-\textit{sp\textipa{\textk{h}o\text{\textk{a}}}} as well. If someone raises such question it is not proper.

\begin{quote}
प्रत्येके पदानामक्षुतशक्तिकानां समुदायन यथा व्युत्पत्तिस्मृतानां तत्तद्वावस्थापनन्दारा वाक्यार्थवोधकत्वसम्भवान तदापतिः।
\end{quote}

\textbf{Translation:} Because, the denotative power of every word expresses their meaning in the word as a whole, as the particular word expresses the particular meaning in the memory for the cognition of sentence. Therefore, there will not arise any kind of contingency with regard to sentence-\textit{sp\textipa{\textk{h}o\text{\textk{a}}}} or word-\textit{sp\textipa{\textk{h}o\text{\textk{a}}}}.

\begin{quote}
लस्य तु न क्वापि शक्तिवृद्धीति न दोष इति वदल्स।
\end{quote}

\textbf{Translation:} Nowhere the tense affix ‘\textit{la}’ has been assigned a meaning and there will be no fault in holding such a stand.

\begin{quote}
अतःएः
\end{quote}

\textbf{Translation:} Here is our answer:

\begin{quote}
लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकत्वस्य शक्यतावच्छेदकत्वस्यापि गुरुणि स्वीकारे बाधकाभाव।
\end{quote}

\textbf{Translation:} As the delimitor of the state of being the secondary meaningness can be a cumbersome property so also there is no difficulty in accepting a cumbersome property as the delimitor of the state of being primary meaning.
न च कारणतावचछेदकल्पवात् शक्यतावचछेदकल्प्य स्वरूपसम्बन्धविशेषः।

**Translation:** It cannot be said that as the delimiter of the state of being the primary meaning ness is a self-linking relation so also the delimiter of the state of being the primary meaning is a self-linking relation.

तत्च सम्बन्धति लघु गुरौ न कल्पयते।

**Translation:** In that case if a simpler property is available, one will avoid a cumbersome property as a delimiter.

लक्ष्यतावचछेदकल्पां तु न तथ्यति वाच्यम्, वैषये श्रीजाभावात्।

**Translation:** The delimiter of the state of being the secondary meaning ness is not like that. Such a distinction cannot be maintained.

किज्ञ, स्वरूपसम्बन्धो यदि तत्तत्त्वरूपम्, तदा गुरुभूमाणामपि सत्त्वात् कानूनपति,।

**Translation:** Moreover, if the self-linking relationship is of the form of individual items (*tattatsvarūpam*), then, the same cumbersome property can be found as the delimiter also in some case and so where is the contingency.

अतिरिक्तवर्ते लक्ष्यतावचछेदकस्थापणी गुरौ कथं कल्पनम् ?

**Translation:** If it is a distinct one, then why the delimiter of the state of being the secondary meaningness also is postulated?

किज्ञ, गुरुभूमाणवचछेदकाल्पनापेक्षाया अन्यत्र कल्प्यानावचछेदकस्थीयं-

**Translation:** Moreover, instead of postulating the absence of the delimiter of the cumbersome property, postulation of the relation of the delimiter of the
cumbersome is viable. Because; the postulation of existing one is simpler.

\[ \text{किज्ञ, अवच्छेदकत्वं न स्वरूपसम्बन्धः, नापतितिर्यः, मानाशावादः।} \]

\textit{Translation}: Moreover, delimitor-ness is not a self-linking relationship. It is not an additional entity because there is no proof for it.

\[ \text{किन्तुन्यूननिरित्ततत्रत्वभेदः।} \]

\textit{Translation}: But it is a technical concept that may be put as follows: ‘that which occupies exactly the entire space not more and not less is a delimitor’.

\[ \text{तत्थ् गुरुशयमि।} \]

\textit{Translation}: Even that may be a cumbersome property.

\[ \text{एवं कारणतावच्छेदकत्वप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकत्वादिविभाज्यत्र विस्तरः।} \]

\textit{Translation}: Similarly, and, the delimitor of the state of being the cause-ness (kāraṇatā) and also the delimitor of the counter-positive-ness (delimitor of counter correlation-ness) etc., are like that which have been discussed elsewhere.

\[ \text{एवज्ज्वच्छेदकलाधवगौरवविन्दिताःकुर्क।} \]

\textit{Translation}: Thus, it is not proper to discuss whether a delimitor should be a simple or complex property.

\[ \text{किज्ञ, यज्ञलघुगुरुपाल्यः बोधो निर्विवादः, तत्रेव लघुपालवच्छिन्नः शाक्रि, गुर्जरवच्छिन्नः लक्षणः।} \]
Translation: Moreover, where there is no dispute regarding the understanding of simple or complex property there alone the power of expressing is with reference to thing delimited by a simpler property, as the primary meaning, and that possessed of a complex property as a secondary meaning.

प्रकृते च कृतित्वेनाख्याताद् बोधः सविवादः।

Translation: In the present context, understanding of volition (kṛtī) from the personal suffixes in the verbal form like ‘pacati’ etc., are a matter of dispute.

न चानन्तकृत्तीना शक्यतत्ववच्छेदकर्त्ते तद्भेदात्राख्यातन्त्रायपि,।

Translation: It cannot be mentioned that if innumerable volition are treated as the delimitor, there will be innumerable primary relationships of being the primary meaning.

आश्रयत्वस्यैवयं शक्यतत्ववच्छेदकर्त्तात्।

Translation: Because, the locus-ness which is one; is accepted as the delimitor of the state of being the primary meanings.

तस्य नानात्वेक्ष्याश्रयत्तत्त्वे शक्यतत्ववच्छेदकानुगमकर्त्य सत्तेन शक्यत्त्वाख्यातात्।

Translation: Although there are innumerable locus-nesses still, one can bring all delimiters together through the property of being locus-ness. And, hence there will arise no contingency of postulating innumerable primary relationship.

किञ्च, कर्तृतः कृति, कर्मकालः फलम्, आश्रयत्वं वैति त्वत्पक्ष एव शक्यत्त्वाख्यात्,
Translation: Moreover, the suffix ‘taṅ’ enjoined to the ‘agent’ means volition (kṛti) and suffix ‘taṅ’ enjoined in the sense of object means result, or, locus-ness. And so you will have to postulate many primary relationships.

मम तु सर्वत्राश्रय एवेति न तत्।
Translation: But, in my case everywhere locus is accepted. So, that postulation is not required.

लक्षणायं विनिगमना विरहाच्च।
Translation: And, if one resorts to secondary relationship there is nothing to decide in favor of one of the alternatives.

किच्च, करोतिरपि धात्वंशयौ विवरणम्,
Translation: Moreover, the verbal form ‘karoti’ is also a paraphrase of the root.

विवरणे पाकश्यदश्च विकल्पसमाभाषयक॥
Translation: In the paraphrase, the occurring word ‘pāku’ expresses softening also.

अत एव फलानुसारदश्यां पाको जातो न वेति प्रश्ने भविष्यत्वत्वपुतरं दृष्टवते।
Translation: Therefore, in the time of the incompletion of cooking, when somebody asks whether the cooking is ready or not, ‘will be’, is the answer.

व्यापारान्तबंविण प्रश्ने जायत इति च।
Translation: And, when action is included in the question, ‘is going on’ the
answer comes.

न च धात्वर्न्तः पृथ्विविवरणानुपपति।

Translation: And, the paraphrase does not arise other than that of the root meaning.

पत्तीन्त्रं धात्वर्धक्यातर्थयोः संस्कर्भयादाय भास्मानस्यान्तुकुलत्वस्याकारकः
शक्तिन्द्रवप्यायी पाकमिति हिन्तियाया कारकशक्तिस्पेषेण प्रकारतया विवरणवद्यं
धात्वर्ध्यूततया अपि कृतेत्तथाविवरणोपपत्ते।

Translation: In the case of ‘pacati’ the relationship appearing between the meanings of the root and the suffix on account of ‘samsargamaryādā, namely, the state of being the producer, although not coming from a ‘kāraka’ is paraphrased as a qualifier as ‘pāka’ is done by the objective form and so even if kṛti is accepted as the meaning of a root, and there is no problem.

अपि च, कृतेत्तथाविवरणतया कृतिन्द्रभवयानुगतत्वेऽ फूल्कारादी धातोः शक्तिकल्पनाया
आवस्यकत्वेऽन करोतीत्यादी धातौर्निष्क्रियापाप्तेऽव।

Translation: Moreover, since volition, the qualified function, which resides in both the suffix kṛti and tin and, as it is necessary to postulate power like hissing etc., in the root, there arises contingency of redundancy in the case of ‘karoti’ etc.

प्रकृतेष्वर्य शक्तिकल्पनाया युक्तवेन धातुतः एव लाभाः प्रत्येकायात्यस्य शक्तिन्द्रस्वंसंव एव

Translation: When postulating power in the stem is justified and that is obtained from the root, it cannot be said that; that is the meaning of the
personal suffix.

Translation: Really speaking, the root krñ does not mean ‘yatna’. This has been said in the ‘dhätvarthanirupaṇa’ (while discussing the meaning of the root).

Translation: Devadatta, while quivering from a disease like filarial etc., speaks: ‘I am not quivering’, such kinds of usages come into being because of the meaning in general (of the root krñ) favorable to the making of quivering.

Translation: Because; such kind of action does not take place in Devadatta.

Translation: Because of the inclusion of krñi into action (vyāpāra) ‘bud does not sprout’, such usage takes place.

Translation: Here, meaning of the root krñ is ‘krñi’ that which is not favorable to the production or that will be accepted by secondary power.

Translation: It is just like the case of your understanding in the case of ‘by
seed sprouting is done’.

\textbf{Translation:} In spite of accepting different relationships in different volitions there will not be any excessive delimitative power. Because; all those relations will be brought together into the state of mind.

उत्पत्त्वक्षिणायणारणांतः अत्यन्तर्द्विगुणतया अत्यन्तर्द्विगुणतया अत्यन्तर्द्विगुणतया अत्यन्तर्द्विगुणतया

\textbf{Translation:} Though, volition being delimited by origination and by accepting secondary power in it, sentence like ‘uptaṇṇa karotī’ he is producing is settled.

न स तव मते अपेक्षान्वयनात्तकार्यात्मकाकारकबोधोऽष्टि प्रथमान्तरिष्यज्ञयोपस्थितिः, तदर्थसक्त्याकारकबोधाः तदर्थअन्योपस्थितिः, तदर्थकालप्रकारक-शास्त्रबोधे धातुज्ञयोपस्थितिः पुरापरिक कार्यकारणाभावतः

\textbf{Translation:} It cannot be said that; by the relation of identity for understanding of qualified locus which is the meaning of the personal suffix; the remembrance of the nominative case ending is cause, for understanding of qualified number which is the meaning of that (personal suffix), knowledge of locus which is the meaning of same (personal suffix) is the cause, for the understanding of qualified time in verbal cognition knowledge of root is the cause. In this way three kinds of cause-and-effect relationships arise.

मम तु कालेपसाधनात्मकतिरिक्ताकार्यात्मकबोधे प्रथमान्तरिष्यज्ञयोपस्थितिः पुरापरिक कार्यमानबोधेऽसौक्याभावायोरेक इति लाघवमिति वाच्यम्,
Translation: And, in my (logician) case for understanding the meaning of personal suffix other than the time and desired object knowledge of nominal case ending is cause. There will be one relation both the time and volition (bhāvanā) will be related to the nominative case ending, which is simpler one. (This also cannot be said).

Translation: Because in the case of a query; ‘kim karoti’ (what is doing?) Without the inclusion of agent, (in the question) pacman (cooking), the answer comes. In the given answer there arises no doubt about the oneness of the agent. Here in this case you also accept the relationship between oneness and agent that is understood by the secondary meaning.

Translation: Because, for the understanding of qualified number knowledge of agent that is the meaning of the personal suffix is the cause. Such cause-and-effect relationships you have also accepted.

Translation: If it is not accepted and if the relation is postulated in every sentence there will arise excessive cumbersomeness.

Translation: if, in the relation of number and bhāvanā the time other than the
desire object is included it will be more cumbersome.

Translation: Moreover, sometimes (you understand) volition (kṛti) from the personal suffix; sometimes you understand locus-ness, sometimes volition by the root, and sometimes volition from the suffix. Such types of admission creates innumerable of difficulties in cause-and-effect relationships according to your view.

तत्तद्यथेषत्वनुसारेण तथा तथा कार्यकारणाभावानां सर्वशास्त्रस्थाप्तवेन तत्त्वाध्यायाभिविचारस्यायुक्तवचाच।

Translation: As per the understanding (of specific meanings) every one has to postulate different cause-and-effect relationships. Therefore, discussion of simple and complex properties is not called for.

किंच, युष्मद्युपपदेः(१।४।१०५) इत्यादिसामानाधिकरणे इत्युते ऋष्यनुभवसिद्ध-सामानाधिकरणस्य तत्त्वादेर्युपपतात।

Translation: Moreover, ‘co-location’ (sāmānādhiṇ卡拉) stated in the sūtra ‘yuṣmadyupapade samānādhiṇ卡拉nte sthāninyapi madhyamaḥ’ etc., which are experienced by the seer will become difficult to explain according to your view.

न च तिर्थसहस्स्वाध्यायविवाचकत्वेवतत्रसामानाधिकरणेणृ,

Translation: There, the co-location does not express the relation of number, which is the meaning of personal suffix.
तातृभस्य सामानाधिकरण्यपदेनाव्यवहारात्।

Translation: Because, the (word) co-location has not been used in this sense.

न च लक्षणया सामानाधिकरण्यम्, शक्तियोक्तित्वात्।

Translation: And, co-location cannot be accepted by the secondary relationship. Because; it is decided by the primary relationship.

अन्यथा विशिष्टशक्त्युक्ते,

Translation: Otherwise, there will arise contingency of qualified cognition.

कृत्तिमात्रावोधस्य कवाप्यभावात्।

Translation: Nowhere volition (kṛtī) can be understood.

यदि तु पचतीत्वातःव्याख्यातीते, तत्त्वं तदुक्तो कर्तरी एकत्वसंशयाप्तिः,

Translation: If the word ‘pacati’ is uttered and merely the same (pacati) is understood then, there will arise a contingency of one-ness with regard to the agent.

‘पक्ता जाता।’, इत्यादी कृत्यंपि कृत्तिमात्राविभायणं प्रयोगस्य वर्गुर्भ शक्त्यत्वात्

Translation: In the case of ‘paktā jātāḥ’ etc., where ‘kṛti’ (volition) also can be stated as to be (volition) ‘kṛtī’ oriented only.

तिब्बूक्तिः वैयायं दुरुपपादवम्।
Translation: And, it will be very much difficult to explain the difference between the personal suffix (tiṇi) and primary suffix (kiṛt).

Translation: Moreover, for the understanding of the meaning of personal suffix other than the time and the means of desired object, the remembrance of nominal case ending is the cause. And (acceptance of) this cause-and-effect relationship will be a fallacy.

Translation: Acceptance of other than the cause-and-effect relationships will be cumbersome one.

Translation: Moreover as putting the object into subject category is not justified so meaning expressed by it will be improper.

Translation: In active voice, while ‘yuṣmad’ is (upapada) co-referential, second person (madhyama) should be replaced in the place of affix ‘la’.

Translation: Moreover, rule regarding the relation of number cannot be explained also.
न च शब्दादिकं तात्पर्यप्राप्तकम्,

**Translation:** It cannot be said that the ‘sap’ etc. are the indicators of the intention of the speaker.

कत्रथं सार्वभावतुके याविद्वाध्यक्षं सत्वेन ते क्षण्वयान्वये तात्पर्यप्राप्तकल्तस्य
निरूपिततुमयक्षण्यतातुः

**Translation:** The augment sap added in the sense of agent when a ‘sārvadhātuka’ suffix follows. As having such meanings, it is impossible to decide it’s meaning as an indicator of intention of the speaker in respect of relating numbers.

यदषपि अनभिहिते, इत्यसानन्मिहितसंक्षणाक इत्यथं इति। तदषपि न, देवदत्के
परेत्यात्तां तृतीयांपि।

**Translation:** The view that ‘anabhīhīte’ means, ‘when the number is not expressed’ is also not correct. Because, in the case of ‘devadattaḥ paktā’ there will arise the contingency of instrumental case ending.

अषेषाः भूतिविधो भूतक्षणिर्विद्याबृहस्पतिस्य उष्णिः राक्षसथर्थक्रमणाविधियथः, उत्तर
सिद्धान्तार्थांमध्यमद्विद्याबिधियथः?

**Translation:** Moreover, in the case of injunction tiṃ, i.e. ‘dvyeκayordvivacanaikacanaikacana’ etc., whatever is expressed, does it mean the number of the meaning of ‘la’ etc., or does it mean the number related to the referent of ‘tiṃ’.

आदे सिद्धं न इष्टम्।

**Translation:** If the first alternative is accepted then it is most welcome by us
(the grammarians).

अन्यथे तु देवदत्तादिपदोत्तरसुपूव तस्योक्तनेन तत्र तिहिन्धानानुपपत्ति।

**Translation:** If the second alternative is accepted then as the number is expressed by the ‘sup’ suffix that comes after the stem like ‘devadatta’ etc., there arises contingency with regard to ‘titi’ application.

किम्ब्र, तव मले पचति, झालेत्यादी नानारूपं कर्तृतवाख्यम्,

**Translation:** Moreover, according to your viewpoint, in the case of ‘pacati, jānāti’, etc., different agents are to be expressed.

मम तु सर्वश्रेष्ठप्रसत्व तत्।

**Translation:** In my case everywhere only one type is accepted.

किम्ब्र, तव लिङ्गी कर्तृप्रहणस्य नानाथान्तपत्ति,

**Translation:** Moreover, according to your opinion in the case of injunction ‘la’ (laḥkarmāṇi ca bhāve cākarmakebhyaḥ) there arises many more contingencies of polysemy.

तृतीययादिविधायपि कवित्व’ कृतो, कविविदाध्यत्व इत्यादिधेः सृष्टयम्।

**Translation:** Moreover, in the case of instrumental ending application, sometimes volition (kṛti) sometimes locus are to be accepted as the meaning and so there will be divergence.

नच कृतो तृतीययादिविधेष्व सृष्टयम्।
Translation: And, instrumental ending in the sense of volition (krtau triyā) is not the meaning of the sūtra.

‘रथेन गम्यते’ इत्यादावनुपपत्त्वा तृतीयादीनां लक्षणेति वाच्यम्,
Translation: It cannot be said that as in the case of ‘rathena gamyate’ as contingency arises with regard to instrumental case ending, secondary relationship should be accepted. Because, in the case of primary case ending the secondary relationship is not accepted is your doctrine.

सुब्र विषयः न लक्षणेति त्वस्तिद्वान्तात्,
Translation: There should not be accepted secondary relationship in the suffix ‘sup’, is your doctrine.

अर्थनिर्देशश्च व्यर्थवापत्तेष्च,
Translation: Moreover, there arises contingency in respect of the mention of meaning.

अन्यायं साधुत्वबोधनं हि तत्कलम्,
Translation: If it is used in a different sense it will become grammatically incorrect. This will be the result.

त्वात्र्प्रायं लक्षणम् सर्वत्र साधुत्वस्वेष्टवत्, व्यायामशास्त्रवैयथ्यापत्तेष्च।
Translation: According to you if by the secondary relationships every expression becomes correct grammatically, then the prohibitive rules will become redundant.
किम्, ‘कूलं पिपिशति’ इत्यादावचेताने चेतनत्वारोपयत् स्थादावपि चेतनत्वारोपेण
tिदाहीनं कृत्यर्थक्तचोपपति लक्षणाश्रयण वार्तमान।

Translation: Moreover, as in the case of ‘kūlaṁ pipatiśati’, life is imposed on this inanimate ‘kūlaṁ’ so also imposition of life in the case of ‘rathaḥ’ etc creates contingency of volition (kṛti) as the meaning of the personal suffix. Therefore, acceptance of secondary power here is useless.

न च व्याकरणस्यूः साधुत्मात्रेः तात्त्वयोगशब्दस्य शब्दस्य च दोषाः इति वाच्यम्,

Translation: It cannot be said that grammatical rule is only oriented to declare an expression as grammatical it does not decide meaning and so there is no fault.

अर्थविशेषप्रकारे रेणेः साधुत्स्व वक्तव्यत्वेः ऋषियनुभवानुरुक्तमार्थनुवादनस्य तात्त्वार्थ्यम् एव साधुत्स्थित्यचित्यात्।

Translation: Because, by placing the specific meaning in the forefront as the grammaticality is decided. And, so it is proper to explain ‘Pāṇinian’ rules keeping this in mind.

अत एव पचतित्वयूः कः कीदृढः इति प्रश्नेः ‘पण्डितो घनस्याम’ इत्युत्तर्त्व सब्बगच्छते।

Translation: This is why when some says ‘pacati’ someone else asks, who, of what kind? And the question is answered as follow: ‘pāṇḍita Ghanasyāma’, etc.
अन्यथा कर्तृरूपपस्थिति के इति विशेषज्ञासानुपपति।

Translation: Otherwise if agent is not presented by the personal suffix, specific enquiry about the agent cannot arise.

कि चैव कृतायं कर्तृवाचकत्वानापति।

Translation: Moreover, there will be no problem if primary suffixes express agent.

न च चैत्रो गन्तेवादी समानाधिकरणप्राप्तिपादिकार्थ्योपेतेदान्ययुन्ततेमुदेनान्यो
चैत्रोदेवोर्विद्वाराविभिन्नमृत्युपद्योपस्थितेऽत्तुत्वाच भेदेनान्यायसमभेदेनान्यो वाच्यः
स च कर्तृवाच्यतां विनाद्वृत्तपस्य इति वाच्यम्।

Translation: It cannot be said that in the case of ‘chaitro gantã’ etc., the identical relationship is produced because of the co-referential ‘prātipadikas’, and for the non-identical relationships; presence of different case endings at the end of each word is the cause. And when identical relationship is not possible a non-identical relationship will be accepted. And that cannot be produced unless an agent is expressed.

राजः सुतस्य धनमित्वादी सति तत्त्व्यं उभयविभागोप्यापि दर्शनेन कार्यकारणभाववस्यापि व्यभिचारितत्वात्

Translation: Because, in the case of ‘rājīyaḥ sutasya dhanam’ etc., as we experience both types of understanding both of the cause-and-effect relationships are violated.

तथा तथा बोधे तत्त्व्यानहेतुतैव निर्वाहस्यावस्यकत्वेन चैत्रो गच्छतिवाच्याविव
कृतेयास्रयत्या चैत्रेयन्यायनाश्च।
Translation: For such different understanding (of sentence), intention of the speaker is the cause. As such settlement is necessary, then, in the case of ‘chaitraḥ guccati’ etc., volition (kṛti) as a locus and its relation to Chaitra is violated.

न चैत्रभि सित्रा पवनीति लिङ्गसामानाधिकरणयात् कृति कर्ता वाच्या,

Translation: It is also not the case that in the case of ‘mitrā paktri’, because of the co-referentiality of gender the volition (kṛti) is treated as agent.

ईश्वरानां धर्मवाचकवेदपि शुक्लादिपदानाभिमविशेषनिन्दनत्वस्य वक्षे शक्यत्या वस्तववियवस्त्याकल्पतात्।

Translation: Because, in spite of the fact that in these cases a property is expressed, as it can be stated about the words like ‘śukla’ etc. the formal criterion are not enough to settle the tactual relationship.

किभ, समानाधिकरणविशेषणस्य विशेषवस्मानलिङ्गगत्वत् तादृशविशेषणस्यविशेषणात् समानसूक्ष्मतिनियमादानाभावास्पापि धर्मवाचकत्वमावश्यकम्।

Translation: Moreover, the co-referential adjectives take equal gender as of the noun. As such co-referential adjectives are to agree in number with the noun. So it is also necessary for the personal suffix to express ‘dharmin’ i.e. agent.

अन्यथा देवदत्त: पवतीत्यादेक्ष्यापते।

Translation: Otherwise, there will arise contingency of having a usage like ‘devadattaḥ paktā’ etc.
Translation: If you say that in the case of ‘chaitro maitraḥ ca sundaraḥ’ etc., because there is violation of this rule, then, in the case of ‘kṣud upaḥantum śakyam’ as it is violated. Such a rule cannot be universally applicable.

Translation: And, not only in the case of primary suffix it is inapplicable but in the case of the personal suffix also.

Translation: And, because of impossibility of self-production by the locus of volition in the case of ‘pacako jātaḥ’ etc., where it (kṛt suffix) is available.

Translation: It is not the case that if primary suffix expresses volition (kṛtī) there arises contingency only in the case of ‘chaitra gantā’ etc., but in the case of ‘chaitra gacchati’ as well.

Translation: Although, the meaning of the personal suffix is related to the meaning of the nominal case ending only, still, it being volition as the meaning and its expectancy of relation to ‘kāśṭha’ etc, will be difficult to
explain in the case of unwanted usage ‘chaitre pacti kāṣṭhaṃ’ etc.

भोक्ता तृप्ततीत्वादि तु कृतः कर्तरि लक्षणास्तु,

Translation: In the case of ‘bhoktā trpyati’ etc., let agent be the meaning of primary suffix by the secondary relationship.

तस्मादेदान्तवानुभव एव कृतस्तु कर्तृणि प्रमाणाणि वाच्या, विशिष्टशक्तिपूच्छदापतिश्च।

Translation: Therefore, experience of the relation of identity can be stated as the only proof i.e. agent is meaning of the primary suffixes. And, there will arise contingency of removal of primary meaning.

एवं च ‘परति कल्यं देवदत्त’ इत्यावशेषदान्तवदर्श्नानार् लक्ष्मीम् युक्तवाच्च चैत्रः

परतीत्वादान्तवानुभावाच्च विशिष्टशक्तिपूच्छदापतेस्वाच्छायातस्यापि कर्वाचकवर्तकसिद्धः।

Translation: Moreover, because of the occurrence of identical relationship in the case of ‘pacati kalpani devadattaḥ’ and as it is correct according to your viewpoint. And, because of the ‘experienced relationship’ in the case of ‘chaitraḥ pacati’ etc. And because of removal of primary meaning the personal suffix expresses agent, is established.

यतः नामार्थसोपरिवर्त्त नामलवं न वैयक्तार्थपरिभाषितस्मि, किन्तु सुपः पूर्ववृत्ति त्वर्त्वस्मि

सत्त्वार्थव्यवस्मि। एवच्च तितुतत्तरं सुब्भावावः दोष इति, ततः, न:

Translation: This cannot be said; here in the case of ‘nāmārthayoh... the word ‘nāmatvam’, has not been defined by the grammarians. But as the suffix ‘sup’ follows, it is meaningful. Moreover, the suffix ‘sup’ does not come after the personal suffix and hence there is no difficulty.
Translation: The suffix ‘sup’ after the suffix ‘ām’ in the case of ‘pācayāmāśa’ etc. creates no contingency with regard to the distinct relation of volition.

Translation: The affix ‘li’ after the suffix ‘ām’, as it indicates ‘dharmin’ there can be no indistinct relationship between the suffix ‘ām’ and personal suffix.

Translation: Moreover, if the definition of ‘nāma’ is accepted in such a way, then, in the case of ‘cchatri’ etc., there will arise contingency of identical relationship between stem meaning and suffix meaning.

Translation: If the relation between two meanings is established on the basis of pāṇinian rules then it will establish our point of view.

Translation: And, in the case of ‘kalpa’ etc., the agent cannot be obtained by the secondary relationship. Because in the case of ‘pācakaḥ’ etc, also the agent will have to be achieved as the meaning of the ‘sup’ suffixes by the secondary relation also.
आचार्यकल्पाविवक्षादिविवक्षायं पचति कल्पामित्वादावपि हिवचनाधारितं,

Translation: As in the case of ‘ācāryakalpa’ etc, there is an expectancy of dual agent similarly in the case of ‘pacatikalpam’ etc, there will arise contingency of dual number also.

अनुशासनविविधतार्थं स्वेच्छामात्रेण लक्षणायामसाधुतापत्तेऽः

Translation: If secondary relationship is accepted in the case of a meaning, which is obtained by Pāṇinian rule, it will amount to ungrammaticality.

किज्ञ, तत्र कर्त्तिरि लक्षणायं पक्षा गच्छतीतिविवत् पचति कल्यं गच्छतीत्याधारितः।

Translation: Moreover, if the agent is accepted by the secondary relationship, as there is a usage ‘paktā gacchati’, there will arise the contingency of a usage like ‘pacatikalpam gacchati’.

यदद्इ कर्मावग्याते फलमात्मनेपदार्थद्वितिः। तत्र धातुर्वर्त्य एव विशेषणविशेष्य-भाववित्तासामात्रेयोपपत्तिः पृथक् प्रत्ययस्य शक्तिशल्ये गौरवालं।

Translation: Although in the passive voice the result is the meaning of ‘atmanipada’. As here arises in inverting order of qualifier and qualificand in the root meaning, acceptance of a relationship in the separate suffix will be cumbersome one.

तत्र तात्पर्यावहाकमात्मनेपदं यथा चास्तु।

Translation: Here, let the ‘atmanipada’ be indicative of the intention of the speaker.

किज्ञ, नवहनैयाधिकनयेत, तत्र कृतेरायातार्थवापावेन तृतीयात्मासामविवाहतं ‘कि
Translation: Moreover, according to the doctrine of *Navya Nyāya*, when volition is not the meaning of the personal suffix in the case of unassociated instrumental ending when some one asks, ‘*kim kriyate*’, there will not arise the answer such as ‘*pacyate*’.

Translation: Because, volition is the meaning of the root *kṛṇi* according to your view.

Translation: Here volition also is not the meaning of the personal suffix.

Translation: As the meaning of the root is substantially well established as related to that (volition) there arises the contingency of its non-relatedness.

Translation: Moreover, if it is said that expressing volition the expression of agency is settled, then, there will be no instrumental ending after the stem expressing the agent.

Translation: If you accept *kṛti* as the meaning of the root it will support our intention.
तदन्त्वेन वैशम्यापति।

Translation: Moreover, according to the doctrine of ‘Prācina Nyāya’ since in the case of ‘karoti’ etc., the ‘time’ is related to the root meaning, so in the case of ‘pacati’ etc., that time cannot be related to the meaning of the personal suffix. There will arise the contingency of divergence.

मम तु सर्वत्र धात्तवे एवान्य इति न दोषः।

Translation: In my case everywhere the ‘time’ will be related to the root meaning and it is not a fault.

एतेऽन कालस्य धात्तव्यत्वात् पद्धत्यापितं कार्यकारणभवस्तव,

Translation: By this way as the ‘time’ is related to the root meaning there arises two cause-and-effect relationships according to your (Naiyāyikas) viewpoint.

अस्माकन्त्वाख्यातार्थ एवेति लाघवित्वप्रस्तम्।

Translation: Relating ‘time’ to the meaning of the personal suffix, this ours viewpoint is simpler one that objection is also removed.

‘पूर्तं पक्वं जानाति’ इत्यादी कालान्याय तस्य तवाथावश्यकत्वाच्छ।

Translation: In the case of ‘bhutam pakvaṁ jānati’ etc., for the relation of time you too require that.

किंच कृती कालान्येपाकशालायाः काष्ट्ज्वलनाधनुकूलं व्यापारं कृत्वा ‘पविमानोदनं पवयति’ निर्विय्यापारतया तिष्ठति देववस्ते पचशीवनापति।

Translation: Moreover, if time is related to the volition (kṛti) then, while
Devadatta is in the kitchen after having made the effort favorable to fueling and stands without any work just looking at the rice, which is being cooked (in the mean time) if someone wants to say he is cooking, he cannot say so.

Translation: But, in my case, since the root meaning ‘volition’ in the form of staying in the kitchen, which is locus of special activity favorable to softening which resides in the cook-able, is present, there arises no such difficulty.

Translation: However, the Mimamsakas hold the following view:

Activity (vyāpāra) associated with the result, this form of activity (vyāpāra), which, is favorable to the root meaning similar to volition (kṛti) is the meaning of the personal suffix.

Translation: This one is accepted as activity (vyāpāra) in general.

Translation: Therefore, in the case of ‘jānāti’ etc, no more secondary relationship is not required.
Translation: The function such as volition etc. is to be the meaning of the personal suffix only on the same grounds of the logicians and also on account of its forming the position of a qualificand.

Translation: Time can be related either to the volition, the meaning of the root or to the meaning of the personal suffix.

Translation: Agent is the locus of the activity of root meaning.

Translation: Object is the locus of the result of root meaning.

Translation: The rule ‘anabhihite’ means, when the agent is not expressed.

Translation: This understanding is either by the primary relationship or by implication or by secondary relationship.

Translation: There, the agent will be understood by the primary relationship and volition will be understood from the personal suffix by implication or by
secondary relationship.

न च विपरीतमेव कि न स्यात्, प्राणान्येन प्रतीयमानत्वात्।

**Translation:** One cannot ask: why it cannot be postulated other way around? Because; it appears to be prominent one.

भावनाया: प्रत्ययवाच्यते स्थिते तथा कर्तुरक्षपो युक्तस्तिर्हि, कृति त्वाक्षेपलाभ्यते
तीव्रवतस्याप्रधान्यापात्ति।

**Translation:** Since volition (bhāvanā) is regarded as the meaning of the personal suffix, it is proper to imply agent from it (personal suffix) if agent is obtained from the personal suffix by implication, there arises the contingency of its (agent) prominence.

प्राणान्येन प्रतीयमानत्वाच तस्य वाच्यत्वम्।

**Translation:** Since it (vyāpāra) appears to be prominent so it is the meaning (of the personal suffix).

संख्यान्यायानुपप्तिः सामानाधिकरण्यानुपप्तिः ‘लः कर्मणि’ (३१ ४१ ६९) इत्यादि
धर्मिनिदेशनं च क्रत्रादिलक्षणावसीयते।

**Translation:** To avoid the contingency which arises in relating number and to avoid the contingency of co-referentiality and because of the indicative instruction of dharmin in the rule ‘laḥ karmāṇi ca bhāve cākarmakebhyaḥ’ etc., the agent is postulated by secondary relationship.

लक्षितकार्तारमादाश्येव च ‘देवदत्त पचति’ इत्यादि सामानाधिकरणयोपपत्ति।
Translation: Postulating the agent by secondary relationship co-referentiality is justified in the case of ‘devadattaḥ pacati’ etc.

Translation: Pāṇinian rule ‘laḥ karmanī ca bhāve cākarmakebhyaḥ’ etc are the indicative rules, the aforementioned viewpoints are held by the Mīmāṃsakas.

Translation: Although, these your viewpoints are already answered by the earlier criticism still some more criticisms are stated.

Translation: For instance, ‘I make him understand by the use of words’ this is contrary to our experience. So postulating implication (ākṣepa) is not proper.

Translation: Moreover, if this rules regarding expression (abhidhāna) is settled by implication then the same can be applied in the case of passive suffix also. Since the verbal ending ‘pacyate’ is observed to be paraphrased
as ‘pākah kriyate’ and as it is necessary that the volition should be primary meaning (of the suffix) and as there arises no contingency of not having locus and when there is a scope to implicate the agent and when the agent is expressed there arises no contingency of instrumental ending.

Translation: It cannot be said that the active suffix will express agent and in the case of passive suffix the secondary relationship will be postulated. So, there is no proof or ground of difference between the implication and secondary relationship. And the expectancy will be settled by the word ‘chaitraḥ’ etc.

Translation: Moreover, when vyakti, which is obtained by implication, is prominent according to your viewpoint and since it is prominent postulating power in it is not justified. Otherwise, because of the contingency arises in expressing the primary meaning of vyakti will create contingency of removal of ‘ākȳtyadhikaraṇa’.

Translation: If vyakti is not distinguished then, there cannot be a relationship in the case of ‘bāha’ and ‘doha’ etc.
न च परिच्छेदयावगत्तत्त्वाद प्रवं तथा आख्याते परिच्छेदयाबिन्दकर्तृकस्तत्त्वेव विशेषत्वापते।

Translation: It cannot be said that since it is understood as determinable so it is substantive (dravyam) and when it is determinable in the case of personal suffix the implied agent is like vyakti and there arises contingency of determination.

किभज, प्रत्यार्थ: प्रधानमित्यज्ञा, छलगोत्वादी व्याख्यारितम्।

Translation: Moreover, if the meaning of the suffix be prominent then, it will be illogical in the case of ‘ajā’ and ‘cchāgi’ etc.

किभज, कर्त्ता भावनया एवाक्षेपोऽस्तु, सास्तु भावनया एव वाच्यत्वम्।

Translation: Moreover, let the agent be implicated from volition and volition should not be the primary meaning.

ननु भवनया कर्तृरक्षेपो युक्तः, न तु कर्त्ता तस्याः।

Translation: Certainly implication agent by the volition is justified. But the agent cannot be the meaning of the volition.

कर्मप्रत्ययस्थले भावनाप्रतीत्यज्ञापतेविति वेदू, न,

Translation: If it is said that there will arise the contingency of not understanding volition in the case of passive voice, this is not correct.


Translation: Because, volition is related to the passive voice and object also can be implied.

Translation: Because, to imply agent in the ‘karmakartṛ’ and kṛt suffixes you also hold this view.

Translation: Therefore usages like ‘kim kāryam’ pacanīyam, kim kṛtam pakvam’ etc. paraphrase like ‘pākaṃ kṛtavān’ of ‘pakvavān’ are observed.

Translation: And, in the rule ‘kartāri kṛt’, the agent is not the primary meaning of the ‘kṛt’ suffix.

Translation: Since the rule ‘lāḥ karnaṇi ca bhāve cākarmakebhyaḥ’ exists in the personal suffix, agent follows form the rule ‘kartāri kṛt’ to this rule.

Translation: This rule of Pāṇini should not be treated as the indicative of
established *lakṣaṇā*.

Translation: The same contingency will arise in the case of ‘*kartari kṛt*’ also.

ननु ‘ल: कर्मणिच’ ‘सद्पाच्छ’ ‘हरेरको’ इत्यादिनामकवाक्यतया विधायकत्वः कर्तुः
गतस्यस्यपि लस्य स्थापने एकवचनं तिबादि प्रयोगाल्पादिकङ्गमेणार्थानि कर्तुःऽवाच्यता
सूत्रावाच्यातीति चेतुः न,

Translation: Well, if it is said that the rules like ‘*śāh karmanī ca bhāve
cākarmakebhyaḥ*, *tiptāśiḥ*, ‘*dvayekayordvivacanaikavacane*’ etc., employed
as one sentence and to convey one-ness of the agent there comes singular
suffix like ‘*tip*’ and so on for dual and plural in the place of affix ‘*la*’. All that
means the *sūtra* does not express the agent. This is not correct.

विद्वानादिसङ्क्रामनामादेवनिश्चित्वम् तद्विद्विना, हरेरकोः इत्यादिनामकवाक्यत्वेऽपि ततः
कर्त्तर्तथस्वाभावेन तस्यैवक्तवाचिकरणवाच्यासंभवत्।

Translation: Since there the dual numbers are *ādesas* and for their
employment when ‘*dvayekayordvivacanaikavacane*’ etc., from one sentence
where the agent is absent the singular number etc, cannot be its qualifier.

न च वाक्यमित्रादिविवर्णोपयोक्तवाच्यताःस्तीति चेतुः, अंतः, पर्यायः वाक्यमित्रादिकः सा,
न पद्यकाब्यता। वाक्यमित्रादिविवर्णानुवाददेशसंविष्यं प्रवृत्ते।

Translation: It is said that there is no unity of a sentence between the
injunction of ‘lah’ and ‘tip’ etc, then, the answer will be yes. But it is
syntactic one-ness of the sentences (vākyeikavākyatā) not the syntactic one-
ess of the words (padeikavākyatā). The lakāras obtained from the injunction
lah (lah karmanī ca bhāve cākarmakebhyaḥ) are enjoined to the ādesa
(injunction).

Translation: Moreover, while the agent is obtained from the ‘lah’ injunction
where in the same time there found no singularity etc. How can it be the
qualifier?

न चावान्तरवाक्यार्थंनिनिःस्य सदेकावाक्यतवेलायमावृत्ताया एकत्वादिविशेषणमपीति
वाच्यम, आवृत्ती मानाभावात्।

Translation: It cannot be said that the meaning related to some other
sentence will be read at the other sentence for forming single-sentence-ness.
So the singular etc can be the qualifier. There is no ground for repetition.

ननु लाकर्मणि,(31 81 61) इत्यत्र ल इति उस्तम, आदेशापेक्षया वष्ठी।

Translation: Well, here ‘lah’ in the ‘lah karmanī ca bhāve cākarmakebhyaḥ’
is a nas ending. This genitive mark stands for a ādesa.

लत्व य आदेशा, स कर्मणीत्वादिक्रमेणार्थः।

Translation: The ādesa comes in the place of ‘lah’ means karma etc.
Translation: If it is said that the lakāra has been appointed by the rule ‘vartamāne laṭ’ and which is not a fault. This is not correct.

Translation: If it be the case then, the affix laṭ will be redundant or it will be expressor of time.

Translation: In that case, the suffixes like ‘ṣatṛ’ and ‘śānac’ will not express agent (kartr) and object (karma).

Translation: Thus, in the case of bhāva construction like āsyamānegataḥ and also in the case of karmaḥ like kriyamāṇaḥ, there would be no śānac suffix.

Translation: It cannot be said that the suffix śānac expresses the agent on the basis of the sutra kartari kṛt and the bhāva and karman usages will be understood by the secondary relationship.
Translation: By transgressing the grammatical system if someone adopts secondary relationship according to one’s own wish it would result into ungrammatical.

Translation: It cannot be said that the rule ‘laṭṭ ṣatṛṣāna cau’ (3.2.124), which is employed in both the ātmānepada and the parsmaipada, and since sentence unit is dropped and when its absence exist through relation abhāva cannot be conveyed and hence that meaning cannot be specified.

Translation: This also cannot be said that, since the rule laṭṭ karmanī (3.4.69) involves syntactic-one-sentence ness with the order-performing rule m and when it is accompanied with luk there accepting ām ending by secondary relationship is not a fault.

Translation: Even then, if it ends in jas then it is related with that which is heard and if it ends in genitive then, an ādeśa would be supplied.

Translation: Similarly the ādeśa could be supplied to the rule laṭṭ karmanī (3.4.69) also.
ते च लस्य, इय्यव्यक्तिः, तिपत्तिः (3. 4. 78) इति विहिताः।

**Translation:** The ādeśas, tip, tas, jhi (3. 4. 78) etc, are enjoined under the jurisdiction of the rule lasya.

तथा च परिपूर्ण वाक्यस्तैवानुवादसमर्दकान्तमहावाक्यार्थोऽधं प्रति कारणवाच्च तदेक वाक्यतत्त्व । पदविशेषपुरुषविशेषव्यवस्थापकानामिव वचनविशेषव्यवस्थापकस्तथापि प्रकृतिमूलेये पुनर्विदानान्म प्रवृत्तिनिमूला।

**Translation:** Similarly, since a complete sentence alone is capable of getting generating verbal understanding, becomes the cause for the understanding of a group of sentence (mahāvākya) and by such one-sentence-ness alone settlement is made. So, there will be a settlement in the case of number also. And, as there is a surety of its employment there is no scope for the further mentioning.

कत्राथ्याञ्च द्विवचनादिदसाध्याविनिमुक्तत्वात्।

**Translation:** Because what is identified as agent etc, are devoid of the designation of dual number etc.

किवच, पुनः प्रवृत्तिच्चथ, ‘तिपत्तिः’(3. 4. 78) ‘द्व्येकयो’ (3. 4. 72) इत्यादिवाक्यतत्त्ववैक्तानात्व वाच्यतत्त्वा सिद्धत्वात्।

**Translation:** Moreover again employment is purposeless. Because the rules tiptasjhi.. (3. 4. 78) dvyeke yeoh (1. 4. 22) etc, as a single-sentence express singular etc, on the basis of sentence-unit.

न च कत्राथ्याथ शक्त्यवैधनेन स्मांसकमतसिद्धिसे फलसँ
Translation: It is not the case that the non-cognition of the denotative power at agent means admitting Mīṃśāsak’s viewpoint.

Translation: For the admittance of the viewpoint another relationship is required and when there is another relationship there will be admittance of the viewpoint. It is a case of mutual dependency.

Translation: Moreover, the repetition will lead to undesirable result and also cumbersome one.

Translation: Moreover, if oneness is accepted in the agent and as it is enjoined being a qualifier to the agent there will be a difficulty to avoid its prime expressiveness.

Translation: This also cannot be said that since the number is expressed by the secondary relationship it cannot be a primary meaning (vacyatvam).

Translation: In these places as there is no relevance other than the speakers’ intention and since there is a relevance of secondary relationship at the
oneness of the agent there arises the contingency of its expressed ness of the meaning.

अपि च, सक्रुक्यायः परिच्छेदक्लें विशेषणतै वौधिता-एकसिन् कर्तरीति।

Translation: Moreover, as a number is a delimiter, it should be treated as a qualifier. Therefore ‘ekasmin kartari’ is applied.

तथा च धर्मिणि शक्तिरुवृत्रा।

Translation: Therefore, denotative power in the dharmin is inevitable.

अपि च, ‘भावकर्मणोः’ (६१. ३१. ६३) ‘शेषत्’ (६१. ३१. ६८) इत्यामः
शान्तादिविधिनैकायक्यत्या यथा धर्मिणि शक्तिबोध्यते, तथा तिबादिविधेऽकायात्वेपि
युक्तम्, वैषम्यं बीजाभावात्।

Translation: Moreover, as in the case of ‘bhāvakarmanah’, (1. 3.13) šeṣāt (1. 3. 78) etc, and in the case of ‘sattr’ performing rules the denotative power in dharmin is understood because of their being syntactic one-sentenceness. So the same will be accepted in the case of tip performing rules and it is justified and there is no ground of discrimination.

अपि च त्वदुक्तरीत्या। अनुशासनेन धर्मिणि शक्त्यभावे सिद्धे तिहां धर्मे शक्तिरपि न
सिद्धे, अनुशासनाभावात्।

Translation: Moreover, according to your viewpoint if it be the case that the absence of the denotative power in dharmin by the rule is justified, all that means that if the rule by itself does not say about the dharmin then in the case of the personal suffix the denotative power cannot be postulated in the dharmin also. Because there is no such kind of rule.
तं विनापि तत्सिद्धः, कर्तरि कत् (३. ४. ६७) इत्यदीनां वैयक्त्यापस्तः।

**Translation:** If without a rule the *dharmin* is justified then, in the case of ' kartari kṛt' (3. 4. 67) etc, there will arise the contingency of their becoming redundant.

किम्च, जातिशासिनेऽन्ये, घटितव्यादी जात्याधिक्षिणस्ये, जातेविशेषणस्ववद् भावाङ्किप्तो भावनाया विशेषणत्वाय भावनाप्रकाष्ठानोधानापासे।

**Translation:** Moreover, with regard to the doctrine, which claims that the denotative power lies in a word with reference to jāti, there, in the case of *ghaṭṭḥ* etc as the *vyakti* is implied by the jāti and it (jāti) becomes the qualifier to it (vyakti), if so be the case with the volition (*bhāvanā*) and it implies *vyakti* (i.e agent and object etc.) then, there will arise contingency of volition being a qualifier. But volition is understood as the prominent one, and there is no contingency of its acceptance.

स च तचापि सम्मतः।

**Translation:** And, this same view you also admit.

ञुत्तवन्तत्वकल्पने तु गोरवम्।

**Translation:** Postulating other explanation will be cumbersome process.

किम्च, लक्षितक्रमः देवदत्ते: सामानाधिकरणवहि पिन्कास्मादियौगिकानामृपि द्वयवाचिलं न स्थातु।

**Translation:** Moreover, if by the (help of) secondary relationship agentness is obtained in *devadatta* etc., and by which a settlement on co-locatedness is
justified then, in the case of the derivate meanings like *Piṅgākṣin* etc, there cannot be expressed *vyakti*.

**Translation:** Because, the co-locatedness is accomplished by the implied *vyakti*.

तथाहि -दच्छीतया दच्छसम्बन्धवानिति प्रतीतिरनुथवसिद्धाः।

**Translation:** For instance, the word *daṇḍi* is understood as ‘who possesses a relationship with the stick’ (*daṇḍasambadhavān*) and such knowledge is of our experience.

तत्र, तदस्यास्त्यस्तिष्टिति मतुप्र०५। २। ८४। मल्लेण बहुव्रीहित्याध्यक्षस्यनेन विश्रेणे

**Translation:** There in the case of *sūtra* like ‘*tadasyaśyasminniti matup*’ (5.2.94) and in the case of ‘*bahubrihiḥ*’ which is used in the sense of ‘*matup*’ as there the genitive in the extension (*vigraha*) is prominent (there) the denotative power should be postulated in the *sambandhaḥ*.

**Translation:** Implying such *sambandha* the co-locatedness can be explained.

तथा अरुणया पिक्र्मक्ष्या एकहायन्या दोस्य क्रिणाति, इति वाक्ये द्रव्यानुक्रेष्याः

**Translation:** Thus in this case of the sentence ‘*arunaya piṅgākṣyā ekahāyanyā somaṇ kriṇati*’, as the *vyakti* is not expressed and as the doctrine
claims that ‘a relation should be made with the *vyakti* comes from the sentence itself’. So there arises the contingency of removal of ‘Aruṇa section’ in *Jaimini*.

न च लक्षणापक्षे न दोषः,

**Translation**: It cannot be said that there is no fault in accepting the secondary relationships.

आक्षेपपक्षेऽपि जातिशासनेऽवेश्यस्याप्यताभावायपि वृत्ति प्रयोज्योपाधितिविषयत्वायायायं तत्र प्रत्ययार्थाल्प्यवदा विषे स्ववाययोपात्त्वम्यापि वर्तपु बाक्यत्वादिति वाच्यमः,

**Translation**: There lies the fault in the implication theory also. And, this also cannot be said that as in the case of doctrine that claims the denotative power in *jāti* and in such cases though there is an immediate absence of *prakṛti* owned property in the *vyakti*, still considering the presence of that property in *vyakti* as there made a relationship (of *vyakti*) with the meaning of the suffix the same can be accepted in the case of implied one also

एवमपि लक्षणिकाद्र्यनिवेशोरुणणपदस्यापि गुणिनिन्ति लक्षणिकत्वात् पदीयद्र्य-निवेशोन्नवयति वाक्य्यद्र्यनिवेशसिद्धान्तात्त्वकसम्बन्धात् स्पष्टैः

**Translation**: Even then, in the case of postulating the *vyakti* by the secondary relationship; there, since the word ‘Aruṇa’ (quality) secondarily means the *guṇi*, so it is justified to postulate that *vyakti* from the very word. But the decision of postulating the *vyakti* from the sentence is incongruous with the conclusion.
मम तु शक्त्याःपथितद्रव्येऽव निराकारःक्षत्रियलक्षणाःप्रसरं एव, नारूणपदे इति सिद्धान्तोपपत्ति।

Translation: In my case, however, since there resides the denotative power in the \textit{vyakti} there is no expectancy and there is no extension of the secondary relationship required at the word \textquoteleft\textit{Aruṇa}’. So, our conclusion is justified.

\textbf{किज्ञ,} \textbf{एवं सति विशिष्टशक्त्युच्छेदापत्ति।}

Translation: Moreover, if it (your viewpoint) is accepted there arises the contingency of rejection of the qualified meaning.

\textbf{न चाकृत्याधिकरणन्यायेनेवन्दापत्ति:}

Translation: And, it is not be desired according to the doctrine of the \textquoteleft\textit{kṛtiv section}\textquoteright\ of \textit{Jaimini} also.

\textbf{तेनाव सिद्धो पृथक्कर्त्रिकाधिकरणार्थवैयथ्यापत्ते।}

Translation: If it is settled by this way then, there arises the redundancy of separate \textquoteleft\textit{kartrādhikaraṇa}’.

\textbf{किज्ञ,} \textbf{घटादिमदेम्यो घटत्वनिशिल्पयेव नियतो बोध इति घटत्वस्य कृत्यविषयवेदो शाब्दिष्ठत्त्वायोगात् तदनेक वृत्तिकल्पनावस्थयथेन नागृहीतविशेषणायं तन्मात्राविशिष्टसिद्धं द्वयाक्षणं युक्तः।}

Translation: Moreover, since from the word \textquoteleft\textit{ghaṭa}’ one regularly understands \textquoteleft\textit{pot}’ qualified by \textquoteleft\textit{potness}’ it is impossible to get \textit{sābdabodha} unless \textquoteleft\textit{potness}’ is accepted as the object of a \textit{vṛtti}. And so it is necessary to accept relationship with that potness, it will mean only that and in that case it
is proper to raise objection about substance.

न चाक्षुश्यापदर्थवचारुः तत्र प्रत्ययार्थिन्यन्वयप्रसंगः;

*Translation:* This also cannot be said that; as the implicated one is not a word meaning it cannot be related to the meaning of the suffix.

वृत्तिप्रयोज्योपस्थितिते तत्र नियमकन्यादोषः

*Translation:* It is not a fault because the ground is the remembrance of that which is caused by the word-meaning relationship.

न चैव दण्डीत्वादी।

*Translation:* it is not the case of *daṇḍi* and the rest.

नन्त्रार्पि दण्डसम्बन्धीति बोधात् सम्बन्धी वाच्यः

*Translation:* Well, here also because of the understanding of related to ‘*daṇḍa*’ one should say that it expresses the relation.

सम्बन्धः शक्यतावच्छदकः

*Translation:* Relation is the delimitor of the state of being a primary meaning.

सम्बन्धत्वं च शक्यतावच्छेकानामुपलक्षणम्।

*Translation:* ‘Relationness’ is the indicative of all the delimiters of the state of being the primary meaning.

एवधानार्थि घटवस्थानीयः सम्बन्ध एव वाच्यः स्थायिति चेतुः, न
Translation: Thus, here also if some one says let the relation in the place of potness be the meaning, it is not justified.

जातीय शक्तिहि अनन्त्यादि दोषभिः, नागृहीतविशेषण-न्यायेन अन्यायः स्वीकृतयोऽनये।

Translation: A universal is accepted as the primary meaning because otherwise it will lead to postulation of endless number of relationship. It is alone on the basis of the maxim ‘without knowing the qualification, the qualified cannot be known’.

सम्बन्धस्तत्तवाय्य तत्स्थ तद्वस्थलेन न व्यक्तिप्रकाशद्विषेषः।

Translation: Even if relation becomes the meaning, the situation remains the same and so there is no difference from the doctrine of ‘particular as the meaning’.

न व सम्बन्धशस्त्रात्वाय्य सम्बन्धत्वेनोपलक्षणीयोर्नानुगमाण्यात्मात्वादिष्टोऽनये।

Translation: Even if relation becomes the meaning it can bring all of them together as a relation as such and so there will not any fault of postulating infinite number of relationships.

परस्परया तदुपलक्षणीकृत्य सम्बन्धिन्येव शाश्वेतोहर्तुमुचितत्वात्।

Translation: Indirectly it is proper to show relationship with the relation making it an indicator.

न चैवं सम्बन्धत्व एवं शक्तिरस्तुः।

Translation: It also cannot be said that; let the power be postulated in the relationness only.
तदादिज्ञाबोधे बुद्धिस्थल्यदेरिव दण्डीत्वादिज्ञाबोधे तदभानात्।

Translation: Because, although in the understanding caused by the pronoun ‘tad’ etc, as the conceptual is the meaning, it is not so because it is not understood in that way from the word danḍin.

नीलादिभ्यशः नीलखण्डः प्रतीतेनुभवसिद्धात्। तेषां गुणत्तुजजातात्वे शक्तिप्रियति मतोपपपति॥

Translation: In the case of the word blue etc, because one understands that which possesses blue colour as blueness. This is our experience and so the word primarily stands for the universal of quality.

एवं यज्ञ्यावधे यस्य नियमन प्रकारतया भानम् अनुगतत्त्वं, तत्रैवावकृत्यविकरणायाम्यूखति: तत्रैव च तदाक्षिप्तेन सामानाधिकरण्यनिर्वाहः, नायत्रेति बोध्यम्॥

Translation: Thus, whatever appears as a qualifier regularly and consecutively there alone the theory of universal as the meaning prevails. And there alone co-referentiality suggested by that prevails, and no where else. This is to be noted.

शक्तिः कारकम्, इति पशुद्रमांकु न न दोषः।

Translation: According to the view that ‘kāraka is the power’, we do not have any problem.

कर्मादिज्ञास्वतः कृष्णोपवषेषसन्तुमुद्येदेनिमतः प्रकारतया भानेन तत्रैव शक्तिप्रियतः तदाक्षिप्तेन सामानाधिकरण्यनिर्वाहः, शक्तिमश्रितभास्येदाद् वा तदुपपपति।

Translation: In the understanding of agent and object, invariably agent hood
etc, which are not divisible appears as qualifiers and so the primary relationship is established with that and implied by that co-referentiality can be explained because there is identity between ‘power’ and the possessor of power.

कर्मपदेन हि शक्तिमदेनमापण्श्च शक्तिरुच्यते इति, सार्वधातुके यक्, (31 67) इत्यत्र कैवते स्पष्टम्।

Translation: By the word Karman what is understood is; ‘that which possesses power’. This has been explained by Kaiyata while discussing the rule sārvadhātuke yak (3.1.67).

तस्मात् पूर्वाकाक्खस्तिमिर्भवनाति प्राधवाचवीव।

Translation: Therefore, by the earlier arguments it can be said that bhāvanā also is the primary meaning of the root.

प्रत्ययार्थः प्रधानम्, इत्युत्सर्गस्यापि भाष्यकारार्थनुसवलेन त्याग।

Translation: The general rule; ‘meaning of the suffix is prominent’ is given up on the strength of the experience of Patañjali etc.

किर्योज्वम्, क्रियाप्रधानमाक्खातम्, इति निरूत्सतिद्विविशोध, तत्रत्त्वक्रियाश्वास्य प्रत्ययार्थायापार परस्परे आख्यातसामान्यालब्धार्थायाः भावाख्याते।

Translation: Moreover, ‘kriyāpradhānaṁ ākhyātum’ (in a verbal form action is prominent), this doctrine goes against Nirūkta. As there the word kriyā is taken as the meaning of the suffix, in the posterior of the vyāpāra, the general definition of ākhyāta will not apply to the personal suffix in a passive construction.
Translation: Because, in the case of ‘chaitreṇa supyate’ etc, the meaning of the root has been accepted as qualificand by you also.

Moreover, since for the question ‘kiṃ kṛtam’ (what is done?) there is found the answer ‘pakvam’ and because of the paraphrase ‘pākam kṛtvāṇ’ of pakvavān and because of the separate observance of the root meaning the kṛti should be (synonym) the primary meaning of the bhāvanā.

Translation: If that (bhāvanā) is accepted as the meaning, there also, arises the contingency of its prominence according to your approach. Because, it is the meaning of the suffix.

It cannot be said that because of the observance of the relation between the gender and number, presented by the kṛt suffix, the agent is the primary meaning (of it).

For the relation of number there arises the contingency of agent being the meaning in the case of tīṇi.
Translation: And, it is possible to explain the relation of number and the gender in the case of ‘ṛghaṭām’ even by implication.

Translation: And, because of the formation of a long range definition i.e. ‘the affix kṛt occurs to denote agent’, there, both the affix kṛt and tiṅ are understood as equal.

Translation: Moreover, if it is said that the kārakas relate with the bhāvanā which, is the meaning of the personal suffix, then in the expression ‘sthālyāṃ’ the kārakas are to be related and in that case you should accept the relation namely, ‘being the cause of the softening of rice existing in the rice which exist in the pot’ (which is cumbersome).

Translation: But in my case the relation is (svavrtītivṛtvāṃ) the state of that, which exist in that which exist in the pot, which is simpler one.

Translation: Similarly it is not possible to show naturally any relationship as ‘being the instrument of bhāvanā with the wood’.
Translation: Since it is not the producer of the root meaning if some one tries to relate through that as its instrument to bhāvantā, it is futile to adopt an indirect relationship when a direct relationship with the root meaning is possible.

Translation: Moreover, in these rules like ‘kārṭikarmanoḥ kṛti’, (2.3.65) karaṇe yajah (3.2.85) kārṭikarṇe kṛtā (2.3.32) etc, there arises the contingency of lack of cogency. Enough of further elaboration.

Translation: Well, if the agent is taken as the meaning of the ākhyāta then, the negative injunction like ‘nāṁtṛam vadet’ in the ‘darsapūrṇamāsa’ section, cannot be treated as meant for the sacrifice, because on the strength of the śṛti (direct statement) it will be related to the sacrificer.

Translation: According to the context, it should be related to the sacrifice, but it will become weak because of the strength of śṛti. This is very clear. Such objection should not be raised.

Translation: kārṇavāpye ukṣaṇīdantaḥ, ukṣaṇīdantaḥ ca tadnuçcaveṇe tasyā vācaśālmātya pariṣvāraśārvopāśāntatvam.
Translation: If agent is the meaning, then that doctrine becomes, applicable and when that doctrine becomes applicable then according that doctrine the agent is not the meaning. Thus, there is the fault of mutual dependency.

Translation: Moreover, even if the agent becomes the meaning of the personal suffix in the śṛti, then let it (nāṁṛtam vādet) be accepted the property of the person associated with the sacrifice on the basis of śṛti and prakaraṇa pramāṇa.

Translation: Otherwise the sentence of the jañjabhyamāna-adhikaraṇa is interpreted as causing saṃskāra to the person on account of vākya and prakaraṇa pramāṇa according to you, but this will not hold water.

Translation: Thus has been said by Bhaṭṭa: -

Translation: Though the prohibition of going to wife and eating meat stand for the purpose of human welfare, still, its prohibition is meant for the sacrifice.
Translation: Moreover, even if the agent is taken as the meaning, since the action is prominent and the agent being sublet the bhāvanā of ‘telling a lie’ does not become the object of the purpose of human endeavour.

Translation: Thus, when the question arises as to what for the bhāvanā? It is possible to hold as per the context that it is meant for pure sacrifice only.

Translation: And, in the case of kṛt suffix as the agent is the qualificand it can be said to be for the sacrifice through the purification.

Translation: Moreover, if it is said that by the bhāvanā primary meaning is understood and the agent is implied then, in your view also, as the agent is implied by the bhāvanā presented first by sṛti in comparison to the meaning presented by the context, it will be impossible to show that it is meant for the sacrifice.

Translation: Thus, it is established that the locus or locusness is the expressed meaning of a personal suffix in active and passive voice. This has been resolved in the commentary (of Patañjali) under the rule
'gatyarthalotā '(8.1.51).

**Translation:** There the result, the meaning of the root often becomes qualifier to the action, which is expressed by that.

आख्यातार्थेः कारकं धातुर्ध प्रति विशेषणम्, कालशः,

**Translation:** The meaning of the personal suffix namely, a kāraka will be the qualifier to the root meaning. So also the time (is the qualifier to the root meaning).

नक्ख्यात्वा ख्यातार्थान्तिवर्तिनः।

**Translation:** The number will be related to the meaning of the personal suffix.

तत्रश्रयस्य कव फलेऽन्याय, कव प्यापारे इति चेत् ? अत्र वदति-

**Translation:** There, if it is questioned that in which case the locus is related to the result and in which case it (the locus) is related to the action then, the following is the answer: -

तक्ष्यक् विनादयं फलेआश्चर्यायन्याधौतकाः, श्रवणमाधयो व्यापारे।

**Translation:** The suffix like taṁ, yak, chin etc, are the indicators of the relationship of the locus with the result and the śap, śnam etc, are the indicators of the relationship of the locus with the action.

वस्तुतः प्रकरणायोग द्वोतकम्, कर्तव्यविषये वैष्णवद्वर्ष्णात्।
Translation: Really speaking, the context etc., are the indicators since we find opposite situation in the case of agent and object.

न च तिर्दां शाबादीनांज्ञानामसनबलात् कर्तृवाचकत्वे तस्य वारद्धय बोधापसिः, शाबादीनां
ध्योतकत्वस्वीकारात्।

Translation: It cannot be said that if the personal suffix and the vikaraṇa śap etc., are taken as expressive of agent then there arises the contingency of double contradiction, since we have accepted that the vikaraṇas like śap etc., are indicators.

स्यादेवत् - आश्रयस्येव प्राधान्यमुच्यतम्, कालातित्रिकायात्मार्कारकबोधे प्रथमेन्ततः
पदज्ञयोपस्थितेहेतुत्वादिति चेत, न,

Translation: It may be put like this: it is proper to accept the prominence of locus only because for the understanding of the suffix-meaning as a qualifier other than the time the remembrance caused by the word ending in the nominative case is the cause.

आर्यात्मार्कारकरुपोधो धातुज्ञयोपस्थितेरेव लाघवेन हेतुत्वात्।

Translation: Because, for the understanding of the meaning of the personal suffix as a qualifier the remembrance caused by the root should be the cause, because it is simpler.

स्पष्ट्यान्यस्तु समानाभिधानश्रुत्यायात्मार्कार्य एव।

Translation: The relation of number will be to the locus that is the meaning of the personal suffix, because of its being expressed by the same expression.
Translation: Postulating of another cause and effect relationship for the relationship of time will have to be done by you too.

Translation: But both the relationships of cause-and-effect as narrated by you are cumbersome as constituting different words, compared to mine, which involves only one word and hence mine is simpler.

Translation: Moreover, in the case of karoti, jānti etc, since the time is also required to be related to the meaning of the root only and so, that too is necessary and hence that is cumbersome.

Translation: Moreover, your stated cause-and-effect relationship does not hold good in the case of ‘na pacati chaitraḥ’ etc, since the meaning of the personal suffix will have to be related to the meaning of the negative particle.

Translation: This also violates the rule, namely ‘the number will be related to that to which the volition is related’ if number is related to Chaitra only.
Translation: This also cannot be said that in the case of the juxtaposition with *Nipāta* (particle) one should be accept different cause-and-effect relationship.

Translation: If many cause-and-effect relationships are postulated it will cause cumbersomeness.

Translation: Moreover, in the case of passive construction ‘*chaitreṇa supyate*’ etc where the root in intransitive one will have to supply a form ending in nominative case.

Translation: If it is bracketed by saying ‘in a case other than the intransitive root’ it will lead to more cumbersome.

Translation: Moreover, this will go against the Yāska’s statement i.e ‘*bhāvapradānamākhyātam*’ (action is prominent in a verbal form.

Translation: It will also go against the state of the *Mahābhāṣya* namely ‘action being prominent of synonyms of the root’.
तिलक्ष्यपिक्रिया धात्वर्थः प्रधानस्वरूपोऽत्तरः।
Translation: It means the root meaning is prominent in comparison to the meaning of the personal suffix.

न च धात्वर्थपिक्रिया क्रियाकृतिः प्रधानस्वरूपोऽत्तरः,
Translation: This does not mean that the action or volition is prominent in comparison to the root meaning.

तस्याः कृतेयन्त्रत्र विशेषणाचेदपि धात्वर्थपिक्रिया प्रथान्यमस्त्येव,
Translation: Although it becomes an adjunct to an element other than the bhāvanā or kṛti still, it has prominence in comparison to the root meaning.

भावशब्देनादि भावप्रति व्युत्पत्तिः कृतिरूपोऽस्ये इति वाच्यम्,
Translation: It cannot be said that the word bhāvanā means volition by the derivation bhāvayati.

भावार्थकलकारेश्वयापते।
Translation: Because, it will be under applied in the case of construction of intransitive roots.

किंच, तव पश्यमूलो धावतीति वाक्यं न स्वतः, मम तु धावनिधिया दृष्टिः कर्मस्वातः
Translation: Moreover, according to your view the construction ‘paśya mṛgo dhāvati’ is not justified. But, in my case since the action of running becomes the object of the verb drś there is no fault.
नच तत्त्वा दर्शनविशेषणात्ये क्रियाया। प्राधान्यमिति त्यत् सिद्धान्तविरोधः।
Translation: It is also not going to violate your doctrine if the action of running becomes the object of seeing.

प्रत्यासत्त्वाः स्थायतं गट्टरत्याधार विशेषणाया क्रियाया। प्राधान्यबोध नादक्षते।
Translation: By the principle of proximity, the root meaning becomes more prominent than the meaning of suffix, which forms the constituent of the verbal form, and so it will not cause any fault.

‘सत्यप्राधानानि नागानि’ हि वाक्यशैलेन सत्यवाचकवाचकार्थविशेषणत्वाभावस्येव,
‘क्रियप्राधानम्’ इत्यनेन बोधनाच।
Translation: By the narrative statement ‘the nouns express substance (sattva)’ what is conveyed is ‘the absence of the attribute expressed by that which express the substance (sattva)’.

अत्र शब्दज्ञोपयोगिष्ठतेऽये शाब्दबोधकारणत्ये कर्मस्तं संसर्ग एव।
Translation: Since for the verbal understanding the remembrance caused by the morpheme is the cause, the objectivity will function as a relationship.

तव त्वैद्रुशो विषये भाषाविशिष्टायुक्तवाक्यता भर्जैत।
Translation: But in your case, the unity of sentence accepted in the Mahābhāṣya etc. will be violated.

न च भृगस्यैव दर्शने कर्मचेनान्तयेः,
Translation: It is not the case that the deer is the object of seeing.
विषयक्ष्यमादारीकृत्य नामाधारात्वयोः साक्षात् भेदेनान्वयायोगात्।

Translation: Because without accepting the suffix meaning as the link, it is not proper to relate directly the nominal meaning and the root meaning.

न च ततो ब्हितियास्तु, एवमपि प्रागुक्तवाक्यासिद्धिरेव।

Translation: This also cannot be said that let there (deer) be accusative case ending. Even then the sentence stated earlier (paśya mṛgo dhāvati) will be unjustified.

किञ्च, प्रथमान्तरपदज्योपस्थिति भावेन धातुत्तात्त्वम् मूर्तिविशेषणत्वानापति।

Translation: Moreover, since no meaning is presented to the mind from any form ending in a nominative case the volition of dhāvati cannot be an adjunct of deer.

किञ्च, अप्रथमान्तराविधिकरणं तिङो बाधित्वा शास्त्राध्यापति।

Translation: Moreover, if there is no agreement by the rule ‘śṛṣāncāvaprathmāsamānādhikarāṇe’ (3.2.124) it will debar the personal suffix and there will be unwanted application of śatṛ etc.

न च बाणसरुपन्यावेन तिङोपिः,

Translation: It cannot be said that the personal suffix will also apply as per the rule ‘vāsarūpo’striyaṁ’.

लादेशेषु तद्भावस्य शब्दन्युस्खरे प्रतिपादितत्त्वात्।

Translation: Because, that is absent in the replacement of the ‘la’ suffix. This has been explained in the śabdānduṣekhara.
न च वाचनिकी प्रथमेवात्र कर्मवायत्ति वाच्यम्, तद्वृत्तावचननानुपलम्भात्।

**Translation:** This also cannot be said that the expressed nominative case ending only expresses objectness. Because no such rule is available.

न च यो धातिति मृग, तं पश्च, इत्यधारेणान्याः, वाक्यभेदाभेदः।

**Translation:** This also cannot be said that by bringing forward the term (tam) the sentence ‘yo dhāvati mṛgaḥ tam paśya’ can be related. Because this will lead to the contingency of division of a single sentence.

उत्कटाधारत्क्रियाया एवं दर्शनकर्मालयः प्रतिपिपादित्यत्त्वाच।

**Translation:** Also because, the action of superior running is only the object of the verb *dṛṣ*. This is what is intended here.

न च विशिष्टस्य वाक्यार्थस्य कर्मतासांसर्गेण दर्शनेवन्नयं।

**Translation:** It is not the case that the qualified sentence meaning can be related as the object to the action of seeing.

एवं न व्युत्पत्तिविरोध, व्युत्पत्तेनाभार्थविषयवत्तचात्।

**Translation:** Thus, there will be no contradiction to the understanding since the meaning of the nominal is the context of the verbal understanding.

विशिष्टवाचकस्यप्रातिपदिकत्वाच्च न द्वितीयप्रतिपत्तिति वाच्यम्।

**Translation:** This also cannot be said that there is no accusative case-ending since the qualified meaning is not a *prātipadika.*
Translation: Because, the qualified in your view also is not an additional entity.

Translation: This is why, when the pot qualified by blue colour is intended to be the object of seeing in the case of ‘nilaṁ ghaṭaṁ jānāmi’ etc, the accusative case-ending is not justified.

Translation: Moreover, such usage as ‘devadattaḥ pacati karoṣi in the sense of ‘devadattaḥ pākam karoṣi’ (tvam) in which Devadatta is the agent, action of cooking is the object and volition exists in the second personal pronoun is ruled out.

Translation: The action presented by the personal suffix is not capable of taking pronoun and hence by supplying also it is not going to serve the purpose.

Translation: Moreover, in the sense of ‘pākakriyā bhavati’ (the cooking takes place) ‘pacati bhavati’ cannot be obtained, on the contrary, there will arise the contingency of the unwanted usage.
न च तथा तथा व्युत्पन्नान् तथा बोधस्य तथा तथा शक्तिप्रहस्य च सत्तेन कथमापत्तय इति वाच्यम्,

Translation: One cannot say that for those who are expected to understand in a particular way will have a particular knowledge of the relationships and so how can such contingency arise?

बोधस्य व्युत्पन्नसारिणो जायमानश्रेयसि तदृढःस्य साधुत्त्वस्यापाध्यात्, साधुत्त्वस्याध्यात्मिकस्यत्त्वात्।

Translation: Although the understanding may arise as per the knowledge of relationship still one has to consider whether in such sense such usage is grammatically acceptable or not and this involves semantic consideration.

तच्च तद्धेतनिरपिनासिम्युक्तैयाकरणासम्मतार्थे एव, नान्यश्रेष्ठतेताविद्धोच्यते।

Translation: And, that is possible only with regard to the meaning intended by the grammarians, not elsewhere. This much is being stated here.

न चैवमेशार्थस्य क्रियाप्रधानत्वानापत्तिसिद्धान्तवावादिति वाच्यम्,

Translation: This also cannot be said that in the case of ‘edhām’, there arises the contingency of action not becoming prominent. Because this is not a form, which ends in a personal suffix.

लितो वाचकत्वादापस्वयमित्वास्तव चान्यस्य प्रधानत्वं योगस्याभावेन, अर्थात् तथा एव प्राधान्यात्,

Translation: Here, the suffix ‘liit’ is the expressive suffix. Because it maintains its own meaning and because there is nothing else to convey the
prominence, it implies that that itself is prominent.

आख्यातपदेन कृदादेवशहितलान्त्यप्रहणे तु दोषश्रव्यबः न,

**Translation:** If the term ‘ākhyāta’ the ‘la’ ending is accepted without the ādeśa of kṛt suffix there arises no room for such doubt.

सत्त्ववच्चकार्त्यानात्तानाभावेन,सत्त्वप्रधानानि इत्यस्याप्रवृत्तेष्च।

**Translation:** Since the suffix denoting substance is not found there the maxim ‘satvapradhānāni nāmāni’ cannot be applied here.

किम्‌, ‘नानू特朗त’ इत्यनार्थायशीते चचने दर्शपूर्णमास्तस्तापणत्वे च

बिनिगम्यनबिरवहाच्चवर्गानुवाटवे वेतृज्ञमययमि निकिष्ठते इत्यन्यत्र निर्भावम्‌।

**Translation:** Moreover, in the case of ‘nānṛtaṃ vadet’, which is not a part of a regular context in the context of ‘darśapūrṇamāsa’ section, since there is nothing to decide in favors of one of the alternatives both the falsity of word and falsity of meaning are prohibited. This has been decided in other places.

तथा च साधुवचनिर्णायकसूत्तवार्तिकमाख्यकारेतितिदान कर्त्येव साधुवकथनात्

**Translation:** Thus, the authors of sūtras, vārtikas and the bhāsyas, which should decide correctness of the words, have said that the personal suffix expresses an agent.

तद्भवुल्क्ष्णनेन यास्क समि भावनासुपेतेऽथ प्रस्बूजनानाम भीमासंमादवशचतुष्ट्र्याभिन्न सत्त्वाभिधेऽथ

कर्म न प्रत्ययवन्तु।

**Translation:** By violating this ground why do the Mīmāṃsakas who use it in the sense of bhāvanā not use genitive case ending like the dative case ending
in the sense of genitive?

कथं वा यज्ञो नाविगुण इति विचारयन्।

Translation: How does, the sacrificial performance not become defective one should think.

न च निर्मूलमेतदनुशासनम्, तस्मात्, प्राहाणेन निष्कारणो धर्मं श्रद्धन्या वेदोध्येयो ज्ञेयच, इति शुरुमूलत्वात।

Translation: This instruction is not without a base. Therefore, a Brahmin should study and understand the Vedas with their six ancillary texts. This Vedic injunction is the basis.

पाणिनीवं महाशास्त्रं पदसाधुत्वलक्षणम्।

सर्वोपकारं प्राहां कृत्तने त्यायं न किवर्।।

Translation: Pāṇini’s great treatise, which deals with the grammaticality of words, is to be adopted in entirety and nothing of it should be left out.

इति परासरसाहिःपुराणाच।

Translation: This has been stated in the ‘Parāśarapurāṇa’ also.

जैमिनिप्रसृतीतिः तच्छर तत्त्वंवधवद् न तदुक्फः साधुत्वनिर्णायिका।

Translation: Since Jaimini etc. have nothing to do with it; their statements are not the deciding factor of grammaticality.

तदुक्फः, साधुत्वनिश्चयं सैषा व्याकरणस्तृतिः, इति

Translation: That is why it is said that the knowledge of grammatically
correctness is the subject matter of the treatise of grammar.

Translation: The grammar is also the cause of grasping the relationship of the word and its meaning. As it is stated by the learned ones the cause of grasping of the relationship of the word and its meaning are grammar, comparison, etc.

न चैत्यायमसाधुवः तत्तस्तत्तदर्थरक्षस्तेवः तेषां न स्पदिति वाच्यम्

Translation: It cannot be said that if they are ungrammatical, one will not have understanding of their meaning in respective cases.

वस्तुतःसाधुवः अभाल्यकालज्ञानसम्भवत्, साध्वज्ञानस्य कारणवावाबादरसिः

Translation: Really speaking, even though a formation is ungrammatical still, it generates erroneous knowledge. Because for the generation of understanding the knowledge of correctness is not the cause, and the definite knowledge of incorrectness prevents the understanding. One may note this.

कित्च, प्राधान्यविशेषंकके कीट्वशस्त्रवा बुल ? इति प्रश्ने, कीट्वशश्रवच्छ ? इति प्रश्ने च, पक्तवशस्त्रवा, पाचकशश्रवं इत्युतंतत् पच्चये पच्चीतत्त्वस्तयप्याप्तिः

Translation: Moreover, in the case of the understanding arising from a form ending in nominative case ending when a question is put as ‘what kind of rice? and ‘what kind of Chaitra? There as the correct answers like ‘rice is cooked’ and ‘Chaitra is the cook’, one can also have answers like ‘pacyate, and pacati’ respectively.
न च, पश्य मृगो धावसित, पचसति, भवति, इत्यादिक्रियाया: कर्तृकर्मान्तःक्रियादिनान्तः तस्य अस्त्तरूपता न स्यादिति वाच्यम्,

Translation: This also cannot be said that in the case of ‘paśya mṛgo dhāvati’, ‘pacati bhavati’ etc, since the action is related as an agent and object etc, it does not satisfy its ‘non-substantial form’.

कर्तृकर्मान्तरकारकत्वनान्तरस्मात्मात्रण तथात्तत्त, क्रियाकाराकारकत्वनान्तराः वा, कर्मचार्याप्रकारकत्वाक्षरीकराधि वा तत्तवम्।

Translation: Because, it will be so only when the relationship is with relata other that an agent and object, or, on the basis of its relation that which is not the locus of action, or, due to non-acceptance of abjectness etc. as qualifiers.

न वैवमाण्यसिद्धः दर्शनकर्मान्तःस्मात्तत् कथं धार्मनस्थ दर्शनकर्मात्तिति वाच्यम्,

Translation: This also cannot be said that since, the action has not yet come into being and so how can the action of running be an object of the act of seeing?

समूहस्यसिद्धान्तवेदिपः अवयवशा सिद्धान्तन प्रत्यक्षकर्मचतुपपति।

Translation: Although, the collection of action s has not yet come into being, individual actions have come into being and they can be the objects of perception.

नन्देवमपि सोदितीव पञ्चतीत्वादि क्रियरूपमानोपपेयस्यावस्तुचात्

Translation: well, still, in the case of ‘rodāṭibā paṭhati’ etc. the comparison (upamā) and comparable(upameya) relationship exists between the two actions
i.e. ‘weeping and reading’.

साधारणधारणात्वरूपस्य सत्त्वस्य, तेन तुल्यम् (५। १। ९९५) इति सूत्रकौटियानुकृतस्य सत्त्वाणसत्त्वपताभ्रेक्षण।

Translation: The substance which is considered to be the locus of common factors exists there as stated by Kaiyāṭa under the rule ‘tena tulyam kriyāyoge’ and so it is not the case that it is not substance.

न च प्रत्ययोत्तरभिवचनश्रवणेन धात्वध्योरूपसमा दुर्लभेति वाच्यम्,

Translation: This also cannot be said that since the word ‘iba’ is heard after the suffix, it is a difficult to obtain the comparison (upamā) for both the action.

तिक्तञ्जोत्तरभिवचनश्रवणेन तदवरोत्स्या। सुलभवचात्।

Translation: Because, as the word ‘iba’ is used after the finished verbal form, it is easy to find the comparison for both of the action.

न वाच्य कट्टरोपमानोपपलमाधवायुक्तस्तु, तस्य क्रियां प्रति विशेषणात्तेन तत्त्वस्वभावविदितं वेत, न

Translation: It cannot be said that; let there be comparison (upamāna) and comparable (upmeyā) for the agent only. Because since the agent becomes qualifier to the action it is impossible to have them in that form.

तिक्तञ्जसमिश्रयाहेतुवचनश्रव्य सादृश्यार्थकल्पवातात्।

Translation: Because when the word ‘iba’ is mentioned in juxtaposition of the finished verbal form, it cannot mean ‘similarity’.
तदुक्तं भाष्ये, न वै तिक्तनेनोपमानमस्तीति,

**Translation:** This has been stated in the commentary of Patañjali: certainly there is no comparison in juxtaposition of the form ending in personal suffix.

किन्तु तत्रतत्व भावनार्थ इव शब्द, इति केयदः।

**Translation:** But Kāiyata opines that the word ‘iba’ is used in the sense of possibility.

अत एवालक्कारिका अपि, सिम्पलीव तमोक्गानि, इत्यादिवृत्प्रेक्षामेवोदारजाण।

**Translation:** Therefore, the rhetoricians also give the example of ‘utprekṣā’ in ‘limpattva tamoṅgāni’ etc.

सर्वनामपरामार्षायोग्यत्वप्रमेयास्त्रं क्रियाया इत्यथायेः।

**Translation:** The non-existence of action is ‘is state of not being fit to be referred to by a pronoun’.

ननु वैयाकरणमतेऽपि, पचति कल्पं देवदत्ता, इत्यत्रान्वयो दुरुपपादः,

**Translation:** Well according to the grammarians (opinion) also, the relation, (here) in ‘pacatikalpanā devadattaḥ’ becomes difficult to be explained.

आख्यातश्च धर्मविचक्तेऽपि कत्यात्तेन क्रियाविशेषकवोधजनननाभेदस्य वाधात्।

**Translation:** Even though the personal suffix expresses a *dharmin*, since the verbal understanding in which action forms the prime qualificand at the end of a ‘kalpa’ the relationship of identity is obstructed.
Translation: If it is said that the relationship of difference between the meaning of two nominal forms is not allowed; but it is not correct.

Translation: Because, it is not the case that we relate bhāvanā with Devadatta, on the contrary that is related as qualificand with reference to the personal suffix.

Translation: It is also not the case that ‘devadatta’ can be related to the bhāvanā, because when the case ending is absent, there is no ground for such relation. Moreover, no expectation is left for relationship as the locus of the meaning of the personal suffix.

Translation: But, the relationship should be with the locus of the meaning of the personal suffix, the relationship of identity, because there exists an expectation of qualificand, and therefore, that relation is justified. Moreover, the above-mentioned maxim means between two qualificands in an understanding caused by nominals, are related by identity. But, not the identity of these very two.
Translation: Well, still according to your view in the case of such single sentence like ‘pacati bhavati’ etc, since, we find two personal endings in a single sentence and in order to exclude this, it is necessary to have the mention of ‘atīn’ in the rule ‘tiṇṭatiṇāḥ’ but this will go against the Mahābhāṣya rejection.

Translation: Even though there is a sentence in ordinary sense, still there is no unity of a sentence as defined by technical definition namely, A sentence is that which contains one verbal form. This is the purport of the Mahābhāṣya.

Translation: A sentence in a general sense refers to the notion of a sentence as expressed in the statement ‘A collection of inflected forms is a sentence of an action syntactically related with a kāraka. Thus says Amarasimha.

Translation: Here the word ‘vā’ has been used in the sense of aggregation.

Translation: Thus, it means ‘A collection of inflected forms related to action
and karaka is called sentence’.

सूप् च तिङ्ग्र च सुपिङ्ग्र, सुबिङ्ग्रिं तिङ्ग्र सुपिङ्ग्र, तयोरेक्षेषः तन्तवदन्त समासः।

**Translation:** The suffix ‘sup’ and the suffix tīṅ both together are formed ‘suptīṅ’ it means the suffix tīṅ qualified by ‘sup’ suffix. When this pair is compounded with the word anta, we get the form.

तेन सुबन्तचयतिङ्ग्रन्तचयसुपिङ्ग्रन्तचयानां त्रयाणामपि लाभः।

**Translation:** By this derivation we get three sets:

(i) **Subantacaya.**

(ii) **Tīnantacaya.** And,

(iii) **Suptīnantacaya.**

किया वेत्तनेन नियोर्क्यपदसमुदायव्यावृक्ति।

**Translation:** By the term ‘kriyā vā’, the groups of redundant words are excluded.

यतु, वा, शब्दव्यायार्थस्यापि वाक्यत्वमिथि। ततु, न,

**Translation:** Some hold that meaning is also a sentence by interpreting ‘vā’ in a different way but it is not correct.

अर्थे वाक्यशब्दाययोगाः, वचोशब्दसंज्ञायाम् (७। ३। ६७) इति निषेधेन कुच्चानापोषणेषः किंतु दिक्।

**Translation:** Because, the term ‘vākya’ is not used in the sense of meaning. Therefore, because of the prohibition by the rule ‘vāco‘aśbdasañjñāyām’ there will be no substitution of ‘ca’ by ‘ka’ in the place of ‘ca’
तत्सिद्धमाख्यातार्थश्रावणपेयम्य धातुर्म्यः प्रधानमिति।

Translation: Thus it is established that instead of the locus, of the meaning of the personal suffix, the root meaning is the prominent one.

एवज्ज देवदत्तं पचर्युदक्षेत्रहयंदिक्तकंकानुकूलक्रियेति बोध।

Translation: Thus, from the sense ‘devadattaḥ pacati’ one understands the action, which causes cooking, the agent at which is Devadatta and he is one in number.

तपकुलः पथ्यते चैवेऽपि कर्मलकारे त्वेकचैत्राश्रविका एकतपस्याविभास्यविका या विकिलितः, तदनुकूलः वर्तमानः भावनेति भावनाविशेषक एव बोध इति प्राप्यः।

Translation: From the passive construction ‘taṇḍulaḥ pacyate chaitreṇa’ one understands - the present action, which causes softening of rice which exists in ‘one’ and which exists in the locus called ‘Chaitra’ which is one.

नव्यास्तु पक्वस्तपकुलः, इत्यदौ कर्मकृतसमभव्याहारे फलयापारयोव्यवस्थासन बोधस्थापितकः कर्मैवातेशिधिन्प्रविशेषयथाएव बोध।

Translation: For the new-grammarians in the case ‘pakvastapakulah’ etc, since in the case of (the association of) passive active construction exchange of result and action is necessary it is held that in the passive construction also, we should accept an understanding in which the result is the prime qualificand.

अत एव प्रत्ययार्थः साक्षातस्मन्नेछं प्रकृत्यांविशेषायन्यमित्वम् सर्वंत्र क्लूप्तस्य न त्यान।

Translation: This is why, the theory that the meaning of a steam is directly
related to the meaning of a suffix in which the suffix meaning is a qudalificand and which is an established norm is not given up.

अन्वयित्वं विशेष्यत्या विशेषणतया वा।

**Translation:** The state of being the relation can be either as a qualificand or as a qualifier.

अत एव कर्त्तकारे न फलविशेष्यको बोधः, कलप्ताप्राप्तिनयममभ्रमापते।

**Translation:** That is why ‘la’ suffix in active construction does not cause understanding in which result is the qualificand. Because there will arise the earlier stated contingency of the breaking of well-established doctrine.

अत एव, इष्यते पुत्रः, इत्यथः पुत्रीयतीति न प्रयोगः, भिन्नार्थवातः।

**Translation:** That is why, in the sense of ‘िष्येते पुत्रः’ (a son is desired) ‘पुत्रियते’ is not used. Because, it denotes different meaning.

कितनुः पुत्रिनिन्यति, इत्यार्थं एव।

**Translation:** But, it (पुत्रियति) is used in the sense of ‘पुत्रम इच्छति’ (desiring a son) only.

क्यज्ञतात् कर्मणि प्रस्तावस्तु दुर्लभः, अकर्मक्षल्याशिति स्पष्टम्, सुष्प्स्त आत्मनः क्ययः(३।९)

8) इत्यार्थ भाष्य।

**Translation:** The passive suffixes are hardly found after the (stem ending in the) क्यार suffix. Because, the क्यार endings are intransitive. This has been explained in the commentary of Patañjali under the rule ‘सुपह अत्मनहः क्यार’.


Translation: But ‘time’ because of the diversity of understanding is related totally with the action, which is the root meaning.

Therefore, after the action is complete and if softening exists, there may be the unwanted usage ‘pacyate’ but there will not be ‘apāci’; similarly, at the time of blowing if the softening has not started then there cannot be the usage of such arguments are rejected.

Translation: There, when the derived result is produced, at that time when all functions have stopped, it is the case of a ‘past action’ and when such functions are going, to occur it is the case of ‘future action’ and as long as all the actions which are required to generate the result have not stopped, it will be the case of ‘present action’. All this we are going to state very soon.

Translation: But in bhāva construction the action vyāpāra should be the qualificand.
Translation: In the case of the *kta* endings since the both of the actions are found related to each other by co-referentially there is no ground to reject the general qualificandness existing in the *vyāpara*.

Translation: The personal suffix repeats the root-meaning and it indicates time as well.

Translation: There, it (*tiṇi*) does not denote the number. Because the agent and object related with the number is not understood.

Translation: The root meaning is not compatible for relating the number in it. If the root-meanings are many, then there arises the contingency of not having the usage like ‘*maītṛṇa* *sthiyate, supyate*’ etc.

Translation: Thus, since the number is absent, generally, singular number is applied.

Translation: There, the second person and first person also will not be there. Because, pronouns like *yuṣmadda* etc, which are agreement with the personal suffix are not there.
Translation: In the case of ‘uṣṭrāśikā āsyante’ (camels sit in different ways) ‘hataśāyikāh śyyante’ (those who are killed in the battle-field lie down in a variety of postures) here, since the commentator has used plural under the rule ‘sārvadhātuke yuṭ’ therefore, it is correct. This is what the grammarians say.

Translation: In the case of ‘ākāśo’sti’ (the sky exists) it is understood as follows: The present action which causes the holding of its own form and which is located in the sky, which is one.

Translation: In this way the similar usage should be comprehended.