Part-I
अनादिनिधरं ब्रह्म शब्दतत्त्वं यदक्षर्मः।
विवर्त्तेऽर्थशाचेन प्रक्रिया यज्ञे यति॥

V.P-1.

Chapter-I
  ➤ Introduction
  ➤ Methodology
  ➤ Personal Suffix
Introduction:

Justifying an issue seeks more latent effort than refuting it. So far the Indian śāstric tradition is concerned almost every school of philosophy viz. grammarian, logician, and Mīmāṃsakas etc. maintained mostly the defensive attitude and strictly adhered to their respective standpoints and doctrines. For this, sometimes they developed their technical language, modernised the theories and also well equipped themselves with the potential arguments. Every succeeding great scholar to these schools by exchanging their potential protective arguments and discussions not only upheld and enriched their viewpoints but also fertilised the śāstric tradition as a whole. Perhaps this attitude of the śāstric tradition has been the key cause in putting the Indian philosophy at such a high altitude.

Nāgeśu Bhaṭṭa (19th) among such a succeeding great scholar to the school of grammar brought a kind of development in the philosophy of grammar due to his perception into the nature of philosophy. One of the most profound books of his early period ‘Vaiyākaraṇa Siddhānta Mañjūśā’ is considered to be the most significant document by a neo-grammarians. The text contains many important issues including the ‘Meaning of the personal suffixes’, which has been selected as a subject of research here. While discussing a particular issue he not only unfolds the over refining views of grammarians but also in the same time brings together the views of other systems as well. Therefore, it is necessary, while taking up a research of this kind, particularly related to the philosophy of language, to be familiar with
the issue in philosophy of language, to have certain method and methodology for achieving a decisive goal.

Before discussing the specific issue concerning methodology of our research work, we would like to discuss, what methodology means.

In this respect, Dr. R.P Sing says: -

As soon as the enquiry concerning methodology develops; a technical terminology becomes a sine qua non of fruitful expositions. For a technical term is simply a term whose meaning is known exactly: and hence if one does not use technical terms it means he is not interested to think with precision. One can easily trace such situations in chemistry or geometry. Chemistry could develop on the basis of exact conceptions of alcohol, of acid or, in geometry, of circles, of triangles or of planes. The situation in philosophy concerning methodology is not different. Hence, at the point where one ceases to be superficial, technical terms far from making for unintelligibility are on the contrary, the only means of being unintelligibility ¹.

**Methodology:**

Research methodology is the most general study of methods in various branches of study. It is the way to systematically solve the research problem. It may be understood as a science of studying how research is done scientifically. In it we study various steps that are generally adopted by a researcher in studying his research problem along with the logic behind them.

Basically we can say methodology is a study of producers of disciplines through which one could be able to attain a definite ordering an activity. A method is an exact way of ordering an activity. And there may be several methods and, the general study of all these methods is called methodology. And also, it is not always necessary for a researcher to follow the conventional methods. As the problems are different to one another, one may design his own methodology for his own problem. For example, an architect, who design a building has to consciously evaluate the basis of his decisions i.e. he has to evaluate why and on what basis he selects particular size, number and location of doors and windows etc. uses particular materials and not others and the like.

But, in this respect one can say why it is necessary? We will say that in order to obtain some particular goal methodology is necessary, like water is the combination of Hydrogen and Oxygen, and it requires definite procedure for its production. This production is nothing but outcome of the methodology. Moreover, the followed methodology should be mentioned in the ‘thesis’, which will open an easy way for the further study and, also it could be evaluated from this point of view as well.

The methodology followed for this thesis can be broadly called ‘comparative translational’ method. By comparative we mean bringing out the similarities and distinction of thoughts regarding the meaning of the personal suffixes, among the grammarians, logicians and Mīmāṁsakas. And, here we have tried to unearth the ideas and arguments- projects by Nāgeśa, for refuting the views of other systems. And also we have explained the differences of the systems in respect to the syntactico-semantic relationship in
deciding the chief-qualificand in a sentence in the process of verbal understanding. And, by translational method we mean the translation of the Sanskrit text i.e. ‘Tiṅarthavicāra’ of ‘Vaiyākaraṇa Siddhānta Mañjūśā’ into English. For deciding the Sanskrit text two editions, one by Dr. Kalika Prasada Sukla, published from Sampurnananda Sanskrit Vishvavidyalaya, Varanasi, and the other by Kapil Dev Sastrī, from Kurukshetra University have been consulted.

Since, the scope of this thesis is limited to Nāgēśa’s writings of the early period, the central discussion has focused primarily on the meaning of the personal suffixes. But, relevant references from his later writings especially from ‘Paramalaghumañjūśā’ and ‘Vaiyākaraṇa Siddhāntalaghumañjūśā’ have been drawn upon as and when required.

**Personal suffixes in Sanskrit:**

A group of eighteen suffix added to the verbal root are technically called tiṅ. It is a brief term pratyāhāra, formed of very first letter and last letter of the group suffixes in Pāṇinian technique. These all are common for all tense and moods. All this means, the tiṅ suffixes (personal suffixes) i.e. tip, tas, etc., come in the place of ‘la’ affixes, the common initial letters of all the lakāras (tenses and moods). Out of these personal suffixes the first nine are called parasmaipada, while the other nine are called ātmanepada or taṅ also. The ātmanepada suffixes are enjoined to the root, which has indicatory anudātta vowel or, an indicatory ‘ṅ’ (ṅit) in it. Moreover, after the root marked with a svarita or, which has an indicatory ‘ṅ’ (ṅit), when the first of
the action occurs to the agent. However, the three triads in both the sets, parasmaipada and ātmanepada of the personal suffixes (tīṅ) are, called in order, lowest, (third person), the middle (second person) and the highest (first Person). Again, these three triads of personal suffixes, which have received the names of the lowest etc, are called (as regard the three expressions in each triad). Severally: ‘the expression for one (singular) the expression of two (dual) and, the expression for many (plural). When the pronoun yuśmad ‘thou’ is understood, and also, when the same expressed is the attendant word in agreement with the verb, then there is the verbal termination called the middle. When the pronoun aṃmad ‘I’ is understood and also, when expressed, is the attendant word in agreement with the verb, then there is the verbal termination called the highest or, the first person. Moreover, when joke is implied with reference to an action the verb denoting it is used in the second person: provided that the word manya ‘to think’ is the attendant word (upapada) of such verb, and the verb itself, the suffix must be of the first person and singular number. In other cases, namely where, ‘thou’ or ‘I’ are not the attendant word in agreement with the verb there is the verbal termination called the lowest (or third person).

The verbal affix in Sanskrit is generally called lakāra. The most admired Sanskrit grammarian ‘Pāṇini’ used his technique ‘la’ is known as Pāṇinian meta-language, for all verbal suffixes i.e. laṭ, loṭ, laṅ, liṅ, luṅ, and lṛṅ. These endings of affixes do not occur in actual utterances. It is only this particular lakāras (laṭ, liṭ etc.) that is replaced by substitutes in the form of tip, tas, jhi, ta, ātāṃ, jha and so on, are occurred in the usage. But, for grammatical purposes, these are considered to be ādesas of the ‘la’ members.
Pāṇini has nothing specifically mentioned about the meaning of the personal suffixes (tiṅ) i.e. tip, tas, etc, (now called ādesa). As they are ādesa, come in the place of sthāni, they carry the same meaning as that which they replace (sthāni). Thus all the personal suffixes subsumed under the single symbol ‘la’ to which Pāṇini assigns a general sūtra i.e. ‘laḥ karmaṇi ca bhāve cākarmakebhyaḥ’ (p. III. 4.69).
Chapter-II

> Process of Verbal Understanding

- Abhidhā
- Lakṣaṇā
- Vyañjanā
- Ākāṅkṣā
- Yogyatā
- Samnidhi
- Tātparya
In this chapter we will discuss the issue of śābdabodha (verbal cognition) keeping up the earlier reference i.e. ‘the personal suffixes and their referents’ in our mind. In the pragmatic illustrious tradition of ours like other debatable subjects, the issue like personal suffixes also has been a centre of attraction for the śāstric discourses. Prominently, these systems like, grammar, Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā have been engaged in a long, lively and hair splitting debate to decide their meaning, the kind of relationship it keeps up with the other components in a sentence and also on the issue of its acceptability as a chief-qualificand in a sentence in the context of verbal understanding. This difference emerges because each system starts with certain presuppositions with which others do not agree in toto. However, as per as the verbal understanding is concerned and our thesis is involved to it we will project three different significant theories in this chapter i.e. 1. The meaning of the verbal root is the prominent 2. Meaning of the noun in nominal case ending is the prominent and 3. The meaning of the personal suffix is the prominent promulgate by the grammarians, the logicians and the Mīmāṃsakas respectively.

What is Śābdabodha?

The understanding of the meaning of the sentence is called śābdabodha (verbal understanding) Prof. G.M Bhattachary accepts this view and further adds that verbal cognition is the successful communication between hearer and speaker. The very word śābdabodha the compound may be dissolved as śabdeśa nirvṛtaḥ- śādah śābdaścāsau bodhasca śābdabodhaḥ means a cognition or understanding that arises from a sentence. According to
Naiyāyikas, the cognition of the meaning of a sentence is called śābdabodha. It is also called anvayabodha because it is an understanding of the relationships among meanings.

**Process of verbal Understanding: -**

One of the four ways of knowing is the process of verbal understanding. It is a psychological process. śabda means a sentence and it consists of morphemes. Each morpheme generates remembrance of its meaning and when the final morpheme will generates the remembrance of its meaning the knowledge of the morpheme also acts as an udbodhaka and the entire chain is presented in the mind and we get the verbal understandings.

\[\text{Viśvanāth}^{\checkmark}\text{ in his 'Nyāya Siddhānta Muktāvali' explains the complete process of śābdabodha (verbal understanding) as follows: -}\]

\[\text{Padajñānamtu kaṇaṇam dvāraṃ tatra padārthadhiḥ} \]
\[\text{Śābdabodhaḥ phalāṃ tatra saktidhiḥsahakārīṇī} \]

\[\text{N.S.M- kārikā-81.}\]

In his opinion, the knowledge of morphemes (padajñāna) functions as an instrument (kaṇaṇa), the process (vyāpāra) is the presentation of the meanings of the words (padārthopasthitiḥ), the product (phala) is the verbal cognition (śābdabodha), and, the knowledge of meaning (sakti) generated by manifold factors like fitness etc, is auxiliary or associates (sahakārīṇī).
It can be explained as follows:

Let us take an example that is ‘pot’. As it is produced, hence, is a result or effect of some causes i.e. the stick is the instrument through which the pot is produced, hence, the stick is the extraordinary cause (asādhāraṇa kāraṇa) or, a instrument, where as the movement of the ‘wheel’ functions as the operation (vyāpāra) in producing the ‘pot’ so, the ‘wheel’ is the intermediate cause (dvāra) and, the knowledge of the clay etc. functions as the help in producing the ‘pot’ so, they are auxiliary causes (sahakārini).

The same cause and effect relationship can be applied here in the case of verbal cognition also. Since the verbal cognition is produced too must have minimum three causes. Here knowledge of the morpheme (padajñāna) is extraordinary cause, the recollection of the word meanings, produced from words (padārthadhī) is (dvāra) intermediate cause, and, the knowledge of the functional such as expressive power between words and meanings is the auxiliary or associate cause (sahakārikāraṇa).

Since, the auxiliary causes are important and part and parcel for the cognition of the meaning of a sentence let us discuss these factors in a brief.

**Auxiliary causes:**

In the process of verbal understandings several auxiliary causes or factors play important role, without which a correct understanding cannot be obtained. One of the most important factors is the knowledge of the words
function (vṛttiṇāna). Therefore, hearer must have the correct understanding of, what word has what functional relation with what word meaning.

There are three types of vṛtis (1) Abhidhā (primary relationship) (2) Lakṣaṇā (secondary relationship) and (3) Vyaṇjanā (suggestive relationship).

1. Abhidhā:

   It is the primary relationship and the meaning expressed by this is called vācyārtha or, the primary meaning. This meaning is known as abhidārtha, sanketārtha also.

2. Lakṣaṇā:

   When the primary meaning or literal meaning is not applicable or when the primary meaning is not compatible it an occasion for secondary meaning.

   It takes place when: -

1. The primary meaning is obstructed (Mukhyārthavādha).
2. Substitution of another meaning associated with the primary meaning (Mukhyārtha-yukta).
3. Some convention (ruḍhi) or, purpose (prayojana).

   This secondary meaning is of two types. (a) Conventional (ruḍha) and (b) Purposive (prayojanavati). When the secondary meaning becomes fixed by constant usage, it is called (ruḍha) conventional and, the other type is called
purposive, when the meaning is root fixed. Naiyāyikas clarify it in three kinds i.e. *Jahat-svārtha lakṣaṇā*, *Ajahat-svārth lakṣaṇā* and *Jahat-Ajahat-svārtha lakṣaṇa*.

3. **Vyañjanā:**

It has the capacity of suggestiveness, which differs both from the *abhidhā* and *lakṣaṇā*, for example in the sentence The light went out here the primary meaning is general ‘the light is off’. In a secondary meaning it may mean that ‘a glorious man died etc.’ but the sentence has the third meaning that is different in different context. It may mean ‘shut down the computer’ to an operator in the cyber cafe, to the people in a war waged country it may mean ‘a war is broke out’ etc. It has also many other verities as *śābdī* and *ārthi* etc.

Of these three, *abhidhā, lakṣaṇā* and *vyañjanā* only first two are accepted by the Naiyāyikas.

Except all these above mentioned auxiliary factors there are some other kinds of auxiliary factors are necessary for the verbal cognition such as *ākāṅkṣā*, *yogyatā*, *samāśinī* and *tātparya* as follow:

**Ākāṅkṣā** (expectancy)

Expectancy is the foremost requirement of a sentence. According to Raja, k. kunjunni, *ākāṅkṣā* is accepted as an essential condition for the unit of
a sentence.\(^1\) Expectancy is a relation of one word to another word, which produces a connected idea of speech, without which the sentence cannot express its complete sense. In another way it can be said that desire of a word for another word express its complete meaning is called expectancy. Gaṅgeśa in Tatvacinīmaṇi and Anambrhaṭṭa in ‘Tarka samgraha’ defines it negatively.\(^2\) For example, if someone simply says pot, cow, horse, man or something like that then, the desire at once is created to know, what about the pot, cow etc. and, when a verb like ānaya or āsti is supplied, then, the sentence completes the sense. This desire of a word for another word is called ākāṅkṣā. The definition of expectancy given by Anambrhaṭṭa is further modified by Viśvanātha.\(^3\) A word ‘pot’ cannot become syntactically connected (with the rest of the sentence) without ānaya of āsti. Then, here we have to understand the ‘pot’ has expectancy for ānaya or āsti.

\textbf{Yogyatā} (Compatibility): -

It is an another important auxiliary factor for verbal understanding, without which a sentence cannot express sense. For example the sentence like \textit{vahināṃ siñcāti} etc. though grammatically well formed, do not express a sense. It is the power of the sentence, or it’s a property, which makes a sentence intelligible. Otherwise a sentence like the moon is made of green cheese will be considered as a sentence.

---

\(^1\) Raja, k. kunjunni- Ākāṅkṣā, the main basis of syntactic unit. A. L. B Vol-21. 1957. p-284.

\(^2\) Abhidhānaparyavasānam ākāṅkṣā yasya yena vina na svārthānvyanubhāvakatvam tasya tādpyavasānam. T. C. p- 208.

\(^3\) (ii) padasya padāntara-vyatireka parayuktānvaya. anubhāvakatvam-ākāṅkṣā.
Annaṃbhaṭṭa in his ‘Tarkasaṃgraha’ says competency is the compatibility of meaning. Therefore, a word obtains yogyatā with another, when it gives a compatible or consistent meaning. Hence, Jalena dahyate, Paṅguḥ dhāvati etc. cannot be called correct sentences. So, they are meaningless. According to Nyāyasiddhānta-Muktāvali the connection of meaning of a word with that of another is called competency. Gaṅgeśopādhyāya defines yogyatā as the logical compatibility or consistency of the word in a sentence for mutual association. Thus the word ‘He sprinkles with fire’ cannot constitute a valid proposition nor can they generate the cognition of any rational idea, they are totally insignificant.

Sāṃnīḍhī (proximity):

The third auxiliary factor for understanding an adequate sentence is proximity. It is defined as the contiguity (temporal when uttered and spatial when written) between words. For example, if word a word ‘gām’ is uttered in the morning and ‘ānaya’ is uttered at the night or after a month, here each i.e. ‘gām’ and ‘ānaya’ cannot constitute a sentence. Therefore, rightly Keśab Miśra points out that ‘the proximity is the utterance of words without abnormal delay, which gives the listener or reader a scope to combine or constitute them together for obtaining meaning’. According to Maṇḍkaṇa

---
3 Arthabādho yogyatā - T. S p-52.
(i) Vahnnihā niścayenā prativandhiḥ na śabdabodhah. N.S.M., P-127.
5 ...which will be spatial in the case of written words and temporal in the case of spoken words.
Datta, D.M. The six ways of knowing, pp -313-110
(ii) āsattīśca-avvyavadhānena padajanya padārthopasthitih. Vedānta paribhāṣā -iv-10.
contiguity is the presentation of the correlations of the syntax conjointly caused by words. Borough’s opines, proximity is not the linguistic condition, only expectancy is the linguistic condition but the logicians accept it as a linguistic condition.

However, there is no doubt that the proximity or contiguity is an essential auxiliary factor for the verbal understanding.

Tātparya (speaker’s intention): -

Jayanta, the promulgator of the theory ‘Tātparyavāda’ says, tātparya is the power on account of which the words convey a related meaning of the words contained in a meaning. Some scholars hold that speaker’s intention (tātparyya) too is a distinct auxiliary factor for the verbal understanding. For example the sentence ‘saṁdhavam ānaya’, which can mean either ‘bring salt’ or ‘bring a horse’ and, it is the speaker’s intention that enables one to choose the appropriate sense under the given circumstances. The importance of speaker’s intension in the context of verbal cognition has been recognized by almost all schools of Indian thought. Gaṅgeśa and Viśvanātha hold that knowledge of tātparya is the fourth requisites along with ākāṅkṣā, yogyatā and suṁnidhi for verbal cognition.

---

7 Āsattīṣh anvaya pratiyogināṁ yaugapdyena padajanyaopasthitih. M.K, P-70.
8 Tattvacintamaṇi. Ch. 4.
9 N.S.M. Kārikā . 84
Nägeśa also accepts the importance of tātparya 'speaker's intention.\textsuperscript{10} Accepting the intention as the fourth requisite Kaṇḍāda states- it is the speakers’ intention towards utterance \textsuperscript{11}. According to many ancient writers the ‘tātparya’ is the contextual factor that determines the meaning of an utterance. Therefore, a conclusion can be drawn on the ‘tātparya’ that it is one of the important requisites for verbal cognition without which an intended comprehension cannot be made.

**Structure of Śābdabodha:**

Verbal cognition (śābdabodha) is held to be the comprehension of semantic relation between word meanings. Indian philosophers namely grammarians, logicians and Mīmāṁsakas admit the sentence meaning is essentially cognition of different syntactico-semantic relations such as substratum ness describer ness etc. between the different word meanings such as the object ‘pot’ and the object hood of the ‘pot’ and between the object hood and the action of bringing etc. in the sentence like ‘bring the pot’ etc. Despite their acceptance on the fact that the verbal cognition is held to be the comprehension of syntactico-semantic relation between the individual word meanings, they differ and propose three different proposals regarding the states of such relations and the chief qualification of such relation.

\textsuperscript{10} nānārtha-padasthala pada-viṣyopisa tathātadagraḥkapam ca prakaraṇā -dikam. N.K.-P- 327.

\textsuperscript{11} Tātparyaṃ ca tatpratītivāya uccāritavam. tathā ca ukta-sthale saindhavapade lavoṇaṭaṇḍaḥyaabhaśvāt na lavoṇa- śābdabodha iti dik. B.R. PP-203-4.
Grammarians’ structure of Śābdabodha: -

The grammarians accept the meaning of the root as prominent or, principal focus in the verbal understanding. For instance, in the sentence, in the sentence like Maitraḥ cooks the rice \((\text{maitraḥ} \ tṇḍuḷaṁ \ pacaţi)\) here, the meaning of the root \(\text{pac}\) is prominent.

Here are the steps of verbal cognition according to the grammarians: -

1. Maitraḥ - The nominative base, refers to ‘Maitra’, a person.
2. The suffix ‘su’- Nominal case ending, refers to oneness in ‘Maitra’.
3. Rice- The accusative base refers to the rice.
4. The suffix ‘am’-Accusative case ending object (and oneness).
5. \(\text{pac}\)- the verbal root refers to the effect of softening and the action of cooking.
6. The personal suffix ‘\(\text{ti}p\)’- refers to the agent, number and time.

The relation comprehended between the various word-meanings are-

(i) The identity between the ‘rice’ and the object.
(ii) The occurrence between the object and the effect ‘softening’.
(iii) The conduciveness between the effect and the action of cooking.
(iv) The identity between ‘Maitraḥ’ and the agent.
(v) The occurrence between the agent and the oneness.
(vi) The occurrence between the agent (Maitrah) and the action of cooking, the chief-qualificand.

Hence, a verbal cognition of this sentence produced as- 'the action of cooking, which is conducive to the 'softening' that occurs in the object identified with the rice isocurrent in the 'agent', identical with Maitrah having the oneness'.

Logicians' structure of Šābdabodha: -

The Naiyāyikas such as Gadādhara and others hold quite a different theory. According to them the subject, expressed by the nominal case ending is prominent in the verbal understanding. They opine that the nominal meaning is agent, who is independent and the controller of all other Kārakas in the same sentence, and not a qualifier to others (other words). Therefore, it functions as the chief-qualificand of all the Kāraka relation.

Here are the steps of verbal cognition according to the logicians of maitrah taṇḍulaṁ pacati.

1. Rice- the accusative base refers to the object (rice).
2. The suffix 'am'- accusative case ending, refers to the object hood of the rice.
3. Maitrah- the nominal base refers to the agent 'Maitrah', a person.
4. The suffix 'Su'- Nominative case ending, refers to the oneness.
5. pac- the verbal root refers to the action of cooking.
6. The personal suffix 'Tīp'—refers to yatna (effort) or Vyāpāra (operation).

The relations comprehended between various word-meaning are:

(i) The locusness between the object 'rice' and the object hood of the rice.
(ii) The describing between the object hood and the action of cooking.
(iii) The conduciveness between the action of cooking and the effort (yatna).
(iv) The locusness between the effort (yatna) and the agent Maitraḥ.
(v) The possession between the agent and the oneness.

The verbal understanding will be produced, as 'Maitraḥ, the agent, possessing the oneness, is the locus of the effort conducive to the action of cooking which describes the object hood occurring in the rice'.

Mīmāṃsakas’ Structure of Śābdabodha: -

For, the Mīmāṃsakas the entities obtained from the words in a sentence are the object of verbal understanding. Not only the entities of a sentence are capable of verbal understanding but also the sentence formed by the connected utterance, which creates a conducive comprehension of the syntactico-semantic relationship, which causes the verbal cognition. They
divide the finite verbs into two parts (i) an action (kriyā) and (ii) an activity (bhāvanā). According to them, the bhāvanā (accomplishing activity) is the main or chief qualificand in the verbal cognition. Therefore, all the parts of the sentence meaning including the action are syntactico-semantically connected to the bhāvanā in the verbal cognition.

Here are the steps of verbal cognition according to the Mīmāṃsakas with same example.

1. Rice- The accusative base refers to the object ‘rice’.
2. The suffix ‘am’- Accusative case ending refers to the object hood an indivisible property.
3. Maitraḥ- The nominative base refers to the agent, that is, Maitra.
4. The suffix ‘Su’- The nominative case ending refers to the action of cooking.
5. pac- the verbal root refers to the action of cooking.
6. The personal suffix ‘Tip’- refers to the productive activity.

The relations comprehended by the Mīmāṃsakas are: -

(i) Occurrence between the object and the object hood.
(ii) Occurrence between the agent (Maitraḥ) and the agency.
(iii) Describing between the object hood and the action of cooking.
(iv) Conditioning between the agency and the action of cooking.
(v) Conduciveness between the action of cooking and the
bhāvanā.

Therefore, the verbal cognition can be described as: The productive
activity (bhāvanā) is conducive to the action of cooking, which describes both
the object hood occurent in the rice and the agency occurent in the agent
Mitraḥ.
Chapter-III

>Summary of Tiṅ arthavicāra
The verb consists of two segments (1) root (dhātu) and (2) affix (pratyaya). According to the grammarians, including the neo-grammarians, like Nāgeśa Bhāṭṭa etc., every root has a group of two meanings (a) result (phala) and (b) volition (vyāpāra). Both of them remain associated with each other. For example: the root gam means ‘phalāvacchinna vyāpāra’ volition associated with result or ‘vyāpārāvacchinna phala’ result associated with volition (vyāpāra). In this, volition and result are combined in such a way, that one is subordinate to the other. In an active sentence, volition is prominent, whereas, the result is the subordinate or qualifier. On the other hand, in a passive sentence, the result is prominent. It must be noted here that the result (phala) always resides in object, whereas, the volition resides in the agent. And, the suffixes added to the verbal roots, technically called ‘tin’ means, locus in general. To avoid the fault of cumbersomeness raised by the opponents (Mīmāṃsakas), Nāgeśa proposes the property of being the locusness (āśrayatātva) as the state of being the primary meaning, which is one and resides in every locusness. Here, locus means locus of the result (phala), that is object and, the locus of the volition is agent. This entire means, the agent and the object are the meanings of the personal suffixes (tin) and the agent is qualifier to the volition whereas the object is a qualifier to the result.

Moreover, apart from these agent and object the time (kālaḥ) and the number (sankhyā) are also the meanings of the personal suffixes (tin). The number (sankhyā) is related to the agent (kartā) and the object (karma) both;
in the active voice this number is related to the agent whereas in the passive voice it is related to the object. But, time (kāla) is always related to the volition (vyāpāra) only, and becomes a qualifier to it. It has been suggested that there is a special relationship between result (phala) and volition (vyāpāra). That relation is anukūlatā or janyajanakabhāva (relationship of cause-and-effect). In other words, there is a relationship of cause-and-effect between a result and volition. And volition is the cause of a result and, the result is the effect of the same action. In the end one-way or other all become qualifiers to the volition. Thus, the cognition of a sentence likes ‘maitraḥ pacati’ (Maitra is cooking) would be volition causing cooking having a single locus that is not different from Maitra (maitrābhinnāśrayako pākānukuḷo vyāpāraḥ).

In the passive voice the cognition runs as: ‘volition existing in Chaitra and causing softening which has for its locus one not different from rice’ (taṇḍulāśrayikā yā vikliṭh tadānukūla chaitraṇiṣṭho vyāpāraḥ). Thus the volition becomes prominent in a sentence in the context of verbal cognition. The point here must be noted is; the neo-grammarians like Nāgeśa etc. are of the view that in the case of passive voice, the verbal understanding will have the result as the chief qualificand and in the case of active voice, volition will be the chief qualificand, because the result and the volition are prominent in the case of passive and active voice respectively. But, according to the older section of grammarians, in both cases i.e. active and passive voice prominent is volition (vyāpāra) only.
On the other hand the older-section of the Mīmāṃsakas advocate that the root has only one meaning namely result (*phala*) and volition is the meaning of the personal suffixes (*tiṅ*). Result (*phala*), the meaning of the root is qualifier to the volition (*vyāpāra*), which is the meaning of the suffix *tiṅ*. The volition (*vyāpāra*) is the synonym of *bhāvanā*. But, the newer-section of the (Mīmāṃsakas like Pārthasārathi, Khaḍadeva and others are of a different view. According to them result (*phala*) and volition (*vyāpāra*) in its particular form (*vyāpāraviśeṣa*) are the meaning of the root (*dhātu*), where as, the personal suffixes signifies volition or effort in general (*vyāpārasāmānyā*). Time, the meaning of the personal suffixes (*tiṅ*) is related either to the volition in particular (*vyāpāraviśeṣa*), which is the meaning of the root or, to the volition in general (*vyāpārasāmānyā*), the meaning of the personal suffixes.

According to the older-school of logic ‘activity’ alone is the meaning of the root whereas according to the new school the meaning is activity qualified by a particular result. The meaning of the personal suffix is not ‘subject’ or object as declared by the grammarians but it is activity (*kṛti*). It is not very much different from grammarians’ opinion except for the fact that the logicians’ view is less cumbersome in that the ‘subject’ is the locus of activity. But the meaning of the locus (*āśraya*) is essential for the import of the sentence and this meaning is supplied by syntactical connection (*saṃsarga*). Thus, cognition of the sentence in active voice is ‘the locus of activity causing cooking’ is Chaitra from ‘Chaitraḥ pacati’.
In passive voice the understanding is one where object is the primary locus and activity qualifies the result. In the sentence like ‘chaitro jānāti’ (Chaitra knows), chaitra icchati (Chaitra desires), the meaning is the locus of knowledge, desire etc, is Chaitra. In the sentence like ‘ghaṭaḥ naśyati’ (the pot perishes) the personal suffix signifies counter positive-ness. This cannot be said to be obtained by syntactical connection. With regard to the nature of the potentiality in the case of verbal affix (ākhyātasakyatāvucchadaka) some opine that is original ‘la’ that signifies activity though it is not actually found in the verbal forms like ‘pacati’ etc. (But the personal suffix tip, tas, etc. replace ‘la’ are found). In this case, those who do not know original ‘la’, knowledge is produced by a mistaken notion of the potentiality.

In verbs like ‘naśyati’ etc, it means coming into being. Otherwise even when once the thing is perished and is not seen, there is the contingency of the usage of a sentence ‘the pot is perishing’.

Here are some of the arguments and counter arguments:

1. **Logicians**: Agent and object cannot be the primary meanings of the personal suffix. If it is accepted, then, since agent means locus of volition (krīti) there will be cumbersomeness with regard to the śakyatāvucchadaka.
2. **Grammarians:** It is not proper to consider whether a delimitor should be a simple or a complex property. Delimitor is that which occupies exactly the entire space, not more or not less than that space. And also, as the delimitor of the state of being the secondary meaningness can be cumbersome property so also there is no difficulty in accepting a cumbersome property as the delimitor of the state of being primary meaning.

3. **Logician:** Volition should be accepted as the meaning of the personal suffix in active voice, which is not obtained from the root. Because the word ‘pacati’ is paraphrased separately as ‘pākam karoti’.

4. **Grammarians:** No, here ‘karoti’ is also the paraphrase of the root part. In the above paraphrase the word ‘pāka’ expresses only softening. Therefore, when cooking is not ready and somebody asks whether the cocking is ready or not, ‘will be’ the answer comes. And when action is included in the question the same question is replied as ‘cooking is continuing or going on’.

5. **Logicians:** Meaning of the word ‘karoti’ is same as of ‘yatna’. Because, Chaitra, who is suffering from a filarial fever and quivering by an action other than that of general air though the action is understood still speaks: ‘I am not quivering but I am being quivered by the filarial fever’. And also in the case of ‘patānkurayoh’ where in one case an action is performed and in another case action is not performed.
6. **Grammarians:** The root *kr̥ṇī* is not the meaning of ‘yatnā’ which we have settled in the ‘Dhātvārthanirupāṇa’ section and as per your example i.e. Chaitra is quivering.. etc, is concerned that happens because of the meaning in general of the root *kr̥ṇī* favorable to the making of quivering. And in the case of ‘bud does not sprout’ it happens because of the inclusion of ‘kṛttī’ into the volition.

7. **Logicians:** For the understanding of the meaning of personal suffix you have to accept three kinds of cause-and-effect relationships i.e. for the understanding of locus, remembrance of the nominal ending is the cause, for the understanding of qualified number which is the meaning of that personal suffix knowledge of locus which is the meaning of the same personal suffix is cause, and for the understanding of qualified time in verbal cognition knowledge of the root is the cause. In my case for the understanding of the meaning of personal suffix other than the time and desired object knowledge of nominal ending is the cause. And there will be only one relation. Both the time and volition (*bhāvanā*) will be related to the meaning of nominal stem. This is simpler one.

8. **Grammarians:** You cannot say so. Because while someone asks: ‘kim karoti’ without including agent in the question, ‘pacati’ comes as the answer. In this given answer there arises no doubt about the one-ness of the agent. So, here in this case you also accept a relationship between ‘one-ness’ and ‘agent’. And, for the understanding of qualified number
knowledge of agent is the cause and, such cause-and-effect relationship you do accept in the sentence also. And if it is not accepted and ‘tattatvākyāyata’ is postulated everywhere it will be more cumbersome. Moreover, sometimes you understand activity (kṛti) from the personal suffix, sometimes locus-ness, sometimes and volition by the root and sometimes volition from the suffix, which demands innumerable cause-and-effect relationship. Apart from that, as per the understanding every one has to postulate different cause-and-effect relationships. Therefore, discussion of such kind is not called for.

9. **Logicians:** In the case of ‘chaitraḥ pacati’ etc there arises no contingency with regard to co-located-ness. Because we accept co-located-ness as ‘Svārthanvīrthabodhaka’ where identity will not be understood. Otherwise co-locatedness can be accepted by secondary power. But volition will be the meaning of the personal suffix because of its loigical simplicity. Therefore, there arises no difficulty in the case of ‘yuṣmadyupapade samānādhikaraṇe sthānīnypī madhyamāḥ. etc.

10. **Grammarians:** Here, co-locatedness does not express the relation of number. It ‘yuṣmadyupapade samānādhikaraṇe sthānīnypī madhyamāḥ etc. has not been laid down in such a sense. Moreover, co-locatedness cannot be accepted by secondary power. Because it is decided by the primary meaning. Otherwise, there will arise contingency with regard to the removability of qualified primary meaning. Because, nowhere volition will be understood.
11. Mīmāṃsakas: We, (Pārthasārathi and others) accept ‘volition’ (vyāpāra) as the meaning of personal suffix. This ‘volition’ is other than that of the root meaning i.e. volition coupled with result (phlāvacchinnavyāpāra). As per the ‘time’, meaning of the personal suffix is concerned it can be related either to the volition (vyāpāra), meaning of the root or to the volition, meaning of the personal suffix. Agent, locus of the volition (vyāpāra) and object locus of the result are obtained from the root meaning but not from the personal suffix.

12. Grammarians: You cannot say so. Because, if you do not accept agent and object but, volition (bhāvanā) as the meaning of the personal suffix there will arise contingency with regard to the Pāṇinian rule ‘anabhiḥite’ etc. Nowhere the agent and the object will be found to be stated. Because, everywhere suffix will indicate the volition. (vyāpāra).

13. Mīmāṃsakas: If it is the case then we can short out the way by the help of ākṣepa or by the secondary relationship. In active voice volition (vyāpāra) will state about its locus (that is agent) and in passive voice result (phala) will state about its locus (that is object) as scholars admit power in genus (jāti), which implies its vyakti, the locus.

14. Grammarians: This given solution is not correct. Apart from this, your viewpoint contains many other faults as well. With regard to ākṣepa, what you proposed in terms of solution inasmuch as it is contrary
to our experience ‘I make him understand by the use of words (śābdayāmi) and also the number (meaning can not agree with a thing supplied by ākṣepa (which is of the form of inference or presumption) for in that case it will be inference that helps (sentence) understanding and not words.

Moreover, if you settle this issue by the help of ākṣepa then also there will be difficulties for you. Because in the case of ‘pacyate’, which is paraphrased as ‘pākah kriyate’ one cannot find its locus in passive voice. If you bring up agent there arises contingency in application of instrumental case ending. Because; agent will be expressed (abhiḥita).

Apart from this, your reasoning for the settlement of ‘abhiḥita’ does not seem sound. By ‘ākṣepa’ you cannot maintain such system of ‘agent’ and ‘object’. Because, though ‘vyakti’, the locus is inferred by ‘genus’ (jāti) but in such cases ‘vyakti’ is considered as to be the main one but not genus (jāti). So, your inference of ‘agent’ and ‘object’ by volition (vyāpāra) will be considered as principal which is contrary to Yāska’s opinion that you also do not accept. On the other way around it will lead to another contingency of ‘Ākṛtyadhikarṇa’ becoming redundant.
Chapter-IV

Comparison with other Systems
We have earlier discussed that according to the grammarians, speaking in a general way, the root expresses 1. Result (phula) and 2. Volition (vyāpāra). The word result means a single effect of an action (kriyā) produced by various activities conveyed by the root. For example the root pac means only of actions that go to make up the action of cooking i.e. kindling fire under the pot, putting rice in the pot, fanning the fire and so on. Then, we find all the actions result a single effect that is softening. So also in the case of khād the result is pacifying of hunger, in the case of the root path the result is knowledge in the case of the root gum the result is connection and so on. And volition is a specific short of activity another name for which is bhāvanā, which is also, called sādhyā (accomplished). Similarly, vyāpāra, bhāvanā, upādanā and kriyā all are synonymous.\(^1\)

For the older school of Naiyāyikas the action alone is expressed by a verbal root whereas result is the meaning of the accusative case ending (karmapratyāyārtha). The new school of Naiyāyikas accept that the meaning of the root is activity qualified by a particular result.

In this context there is another opinion with regard to the meaning of the verbal root. The Mīmāṁsakas hold that the result (phala) is the meaning of the verbal root.\(^2\) But the newer section of Mīmāṁsakas like Khaṇḍadeva and others are of a different opinion. They opine that the result (phala) and volition (vyāpāra) in its particular form (vyāpāraviśeṣa) are the meaning of the root.

---

\(^1\) व्यापरो भावना संयोगार्दना सृज च क्रिया. B.V.S, p-256

\(^2\) Tattvachintāmaṇi 1 śabdakhaṇḍa, p-847
As such, for the grammarians a personal suffix added to the root to form a usable verbal form in the sense of agent and object means locus. Here a question may be asked: locus of what? The answer is locus of the root meaning i.e. result (phala) and volition (vyāpāra). Here the point should be noted that agent is the locus of volition (vyāpāra) and the object is the locus of the result. All together it means the agent and the object are the meanings of the personal suffix. And, the agent is expressed in the active voice and the object is expressed in the passive voice. Locusness is the delimitor of the state of being the primary meaning and it is an indivisible property. So one should not postulate endless number of delimiters of the state of being the primary meaning on account of the difference in the locusness. That can be differentiated on the basis of different loci. Because this delimitor of the state of being the primary meaning can be accepted as one property like the relation of inherence. The property of being the locusness can be accepted as an additional property that is one and presents in all locusness. So this locus cannot be obtained from the word ending in the nominative case ending. Because a word meaning should be that which cannot be obtained from any other constituent of the sentence. Therefore it is not justified to postulate locus from the nominative case ending again. Therefore, in the case of ‘Chaitraḥ pacati’ etc, locus is obtained as someone qualified by ‘chaitratva’ but not as the locus of the function of the root pac.

1 तत्र कर्तव्यांविधितितत्रार्थप्रणोदिति, V.S.M, p-57
2 आत्मावल्लभाविकताः शब्दसनातनानुदेशकम् | V.S.M, p-57
3 आत्मावल्लभाविकताः संकल्पावल्लभानुदेशकम्, V.S.M, ibid.
4 न चाक्रमक प्रमाणात्मेन लक्ष्यं भवति, V.S.M, ibid.
5 अन्तर्लक्षणमेव शब्दर्थस्यवर्धवर्त, V.S.M, ibid.
6 न तत्र प्रक्रिया कल्पना गुणसे इति, V.S.M, ibid.
7 ‘चैत्रा प्रक्रिया’ इत्यादिचैत्रावल्लभि तलामेद्यि पवित्रावल्लभायार्थम् शब्दसनातनानुदेशकम्, V.S.M, ibid.
The *Naiyāyikas* do not accept all these above-mentioned views of the grammarians on account of the meaning of the personal suffix. They point out saying that the agent and the object cannot be the primary meaning of the personal suffix.\(^{10}\) If this is accepted then, since agent means the locus of the volition, there will arise cumbersoness with regard to the *sakyatāvaccchedaka*.\(^{11}\) They propose that the volition should be the meaning of the personal suffix in the active voice. And this volition cannot be said to be obtained from the root. Because, the verbal form *‘pacati’* is paraphrased as *‘pākam karoti’*, where the internal effort is separately paraphrased for the personal suffix. So it cannot be the meaning of the personal suffix. The grammarians object this viewpoint of the Naiyāyikas. They say that: if volition is accepted as the meaning of the personal suffix instead of the meaning of the root then, the sentence like *‘grāmaḥ gamanabān’* etc, will come into usage, which is not correct. Because, only the result will be the meaning of the root and village can be the locus of the result. Moreover, the sentence like *‘kāśṭhaiḥ pākaḥ’* cannot be justified. Because according to your doctrine the *kāraka* invariably related to the actions. Here, as the root does not denote volition but only result so, it cannot be related with the *kāraka* i.e. *kāśṭhaiḥ*. Moreover, in the case of *‘ratho gacchati’* etc. *krit* cannot be related with the chariot (*ratha*). Because, the chariot is an inanimate one, which cannot be the locus of the *krit*. And as per the verbal form is concerned and found in *‘pākam karoti’* which is the paraphrase of *‘pacati’* expresses volition in general. Therefore, the sentence like *‘bijādināṅkurḥ kṛtaḥ’* becomes possible. Apart from this the verbal form *‘pacati’* is also paraphrased as *‘pākam bhāvayati’*. Here the term *‘bhāvayati’* means volition in general\(^{12}\). So,

\(^{10}\) न कर्तुरुक्गमनी बाबु: ibid.
\(^{11}\) कृतार्थयादिन: कर्तुरुक्गमनी तत्र शरीर सारसवत। V.S.M, ibid.
\(^{12}\) व्याख्यासारः सङ्कारः स्वतधिः विवक्षम्। V.S.M, ibid
the sentence like ‘ratho gamanam karoti’ becomes justified when the term ‘karoti’ signifies volition.

The Naiyāyikas put forward an argument to strengthen their viewpoint. They exemplify that when some one say ‘pacati’ there the ‘yatna’ is understood by the inference exactly as the fire is inferred from the smoke\(^\text{13}\). Therefore, volition should be the meaning of the personal suffix. Because, in the case of ‘Chaitra’, who is suffering from a filarial disease and quivering by an action of air other than the general inhalation he speaks I am not quivering but my body is quivering. Here, though volition (vyāpāra) in general is understood because of the quivering in his body but when he says; I am not quivering (nāhaṃ spandaṃ karomi) here, it means the term ‘karomi’ signifies (yatna) internal effort. So also it is the case with ‘pākaṃ karoti’, which is the paraphrase of ‘pacati’. Here, the term ‘karoti’ means ‘yatna’ (internal effort) is separately mentioned cannot be the meaning of the root but, the meaning of the personal suffix.\(^\text{14}\) And, in comparison to actionness volitionness (yatnatva) is simpler. Because it is a universal property.

Here, in this context the grammarians say that the inference of volition (yatna) from the ‘pacati’ only can be an intentional interpretation (tātparyārtha-vivaraṇa) but not the literal interpretation.\(^\text{15}\) Again, if the verbal form ‘karoti’ is accepted in the sense of ‘yatna’ (internal effort) there arises contingency of its being intransitive like root yati. But, the Naiyāyikas object to it saying that the natures of the words are different according to its own

\(^\text{13}\) पचति इत्यादी यत्नविनिमयस्ते। V.S.M, ibid.

\(^\text{14}\) न च धार्मिक सा लक्ष्या, पचति-पक करोति। V.S.M, ibid.

\(^\text{15}\) पचति, धार्मिकविवरणसिद्धः। V.S.M, ibid.
denotative power (śabdaśaktisvabhāvāt). As it is experienced in the case of water which tests different that the milk according to their own nature. Or, the root krñ can be understood as-‘the (krñi) volition favorable to the origination’. And, the verbal form ‘yatate’ only means simply volition. But the grammarians object the modified theory i.e. the root krñ means ‘the volition favorable to the origination’. They point out saying that if the root is accepted in such sense then the paraphrase ‘upatiṁ karoti’ of the verbal form ‘upādayati’ cannot be justified because whatever produced cannot be produced again. Here, the Naiyāyikas accept (vyāpāra) volition by the secondary relationship. Here, the grammarians raise doubt on the Naiyāyikas view point and point out that if the personal suffix denotes volition (yatna) then, in the case of ‘karoti’ there the volition would be understood twice. Because, one ‘yatna’ would be understood from the root and another would be from the personal suffix. And in the case of ‘ratho gacchati’, ‘yatna’ cannot be related with the ‘chariot’. The Naiyāyikas refute it saying that there will not arise any contingency of two ‘yatnas’. Because, in the case of the number two, the twoness is not repeated. And in the case of ‘ratho gacchati’ there will be action favorable to the volition (vyāpāra) by the secondary relationship. And the action (kriyā) will be related to (vyāpāra) function by the relationships of co-locatedness and cause and effect. Similarly, in the case like ‘He knows, He goes, He takes effort, He desires, and He sleeps’ etc. the locusness will be understood by the extended relationship.

\[16\] śabdaśaktisvabhāvāt | V.S.M. p. 58.
\[17\] यतलोहितैऽक्षरक्रस्ते सत्ता | V.S.M. ibid
\[18\] उपाध्यायार्थते विधिवदा उत्तरीति करोधितैऽक्षरक्रस्ते | V.S.M. ibid
\[19\] न च करोधितैऽक्षरक्रस्ते सत्ता | V.S.M. ibid.
\[20\] यथे गच्छति उपाध्यायार्थ ते क्रियाक्रमकृतन्न्यां प्रतिपादित्ते | V.S.M. ibid.
\[21\] जनानि, गच्छति, यतलोहितैऽक्षरक्रस्ते | V.S.M. ibid.
But the grammarians do not accept this Naiyāyikas argument they object in saying that if yatna is accepted as the meaning of the personal suffix then it will go against the rule of Pāṇini i.e. ‘laḥ karmāṇi ca bhāve cākarmakebhyaḥ’ (3.4.69). The rule states that the ‘la’ affixes denote the agent and the object in the case of transitive roots and the agent and action in the case of intransitive roots. For, the Naiyāyikas settle this issue in their own way that the ‘kṛti’ expressed by the personal suffix can be related with the nominative case ending as a qualifier and the agent will be understood so, there will arise no contradiction with the sūtra ‘laḥ karmāṇi ca bhāve cākarmakebhyaḥ’ (3.4.69). The locative case ending, here, does not mean the expressor of the agent but that signifies the understanding of the agent.

The grammarians again refute it saying that if ‘kṛti’ is accepted as the meaning of the personal suffix, there, arises another contingency in the case of ‘chaitraḥ pucati’ etc, where co-locatedness cannot be established coming from two different forms. The Naiyāyikas reply it saying that we do not understand this sentence in this way. What is understood is a co-referentiality, which incorporates identity between two referents.22 Or, let the co-locatedness be settled through the secondary relationship. But, ‘yatna’ (volition) should be accepted as the meaning of the personal suffix because of its logical simplicity.23 Therefore, there arises no problem in the rule ‘yuṣmadyupapade samānādhiṣṭhikarāṇe’ (1.4.105) also. So, when some one asks; ‘kim karoti’ the given answer ‘pacati’ does not create any doubt about the oneness of the agent when Devadatta etc, is not uttered. And, if the number is related with the dharmin by the secondary relationship it will not lead to a fault. In the case of ‘pacati’ etc, the time will be related to the ‘kṛti’ (volition), the

22 तदन्त्यांत्यांविशेष अवाचरणिगतयोगोक्तसौदैव सामान्यविद्यवस्य प्रतिपादति। V.S.M, p-59
23 शस्त्रलिप्त लाघवाद्य स्यन्ते एव। V.S.M, ibid.
meaning of the personal suffix but not to the meaning of the root.\textsuperscript{24} Because, when a man, for the time being, stops cooking while the act of fueling etc, meant for cooking initiated by him continues, one says ‘He does not cook’ and it is justified. Altogether it means, here the volition (vyāpara) in the form of fueling etc, continue but the man is not putting further effort towards it. So ‘yatna’ (volition) is not observed. Therefore, because of the lack of ‘yatna’ the man cannot be related to the present activity, which is ‘cooking’. So, one’s saying He is not cooking is correct. And, when it is told that ‘He is cooking now’ the doubt about his attachment with cooking or not is cleared. But in the case of ‘jānāti’ etc, the ‘time’ always will be related to the meaning of the verbal root only\textsuperscript{25}.

The grammarians find another flaw in Naiyāyikas viewpoint. They point out that if ‘kṛti’ is accepted as the meaning of the personal suffix, then, the domain of expressedness and unexpressedness come under the section-heading rule i.e. ‘anabhihite’ (2.3.1) by Pāṇini will be disorder. According to the rule ‘kartr-karunayoh-trtiyā’ an instrumental case ending occurs to express agent and instrument when they are not expressed by the personal suffix. But in accordance with this view as ‘kṛti’ is the meaning of the personal suffix; these agent, object and instrument can never be expressed by the personal suffix. But the Naiyāyikas explain the expression like ‘anabhihite-kartari-trtiyā’ as ‘when the kṛti (volition) is not expressed by the personal suffix’.\textsuperscript{26} Here, ‘kṛti’ (volition) is the indicative of the locusness.\textsuperscript{27}

\textsuperscript{24} ‘पचाति’ इत्यादि कालान्तरस् कृताति, न वाल्कि। V.S.M, ibid.
\textsuperscript{25} जानतिस्वतः वाल्किः एव न तदन्याविव्यस्त। V.S.M, p-59
\textsuperscript{26} ‘अन्त्य्रिहिते कतरीया’ इत्यादिः ‘अन्त्य्रिहिताया कृती इत्यया’। V.S.M, ibid.
\textsuperscript{27} कृतीश्चान्तिपत्तादिनानां उपलक्षणम्। V.S.M, ibid.
According to some Naiyāyikas the sutra is explained as; when the number of the agent is not expressed\(^\text{28}\).

The grammarians are not satisfied with such kind of the settlement. They point out that; if the agentness (krtitva) in general is expressed by the personal suffix then, there arises contingency in the case of ‘pacyate taudulah chaitrena’ etc. because, since the agent i.e. ‘Chaitra’ is expressed, it cannot take instrumental case ending. But, the Naiyāyikas bring forward a counter argument to strengthen their viewpoint. They point out saying that; when some one asks: ‘kim kriyate debadattena’ the answer comes as ‘pacyate’ and in the case of ‘pacyate taudulah’, where the agent is not associated with the action of softening it never gives a room for doubt about the agent whether he is the producer of this action i.e. ‘pacyate’ or not, and also the paraphrase ‘chaitrena pakvah kriyate’ of ‘chaitrena pacyate’ etc are ground for accepting that the personal suffix means agentness. So, the Naiyāyikas propose that when the meaning of nominal base is not intended as the qualificand of the agenthood there will be applied the instrumental case ending and when the meaning of the nominal base is intended as the qualificand of the objecthood there will be accusative case ending.\(^\text{29}\) Therefore, the dharmin indication of the agent, object, and instrument in the sutra is justified and is not a fault.\(^\text{30}\)

But the grammarians are not happy with such kind of explanations and point that: if it is accepted it will lead to another problem that is; when both ‘Chaitra and Maitra’ are cooking means ‘chaitrakarti kapakakarta maitrah’ will appear like ‘chaitrena pacati maitrah’ and ‘chaitrena pakavahan maitrah’.

\(^{28}\) ‘अनुभव्यते कल्ल्रि तुलीया’ इत्यादित्वान्वित्वात् कृताविश्लेष्यते। V.S.M, ibid.

\(^{29}\) ‘कर्मविश्लेषणात् प्रार्थिणेतिकायेविशिष्यथि सति तुलीया’, ‘कर्मविश्लेषणात् प्रार्थिणेतिकायेविशिष्यथि सति द्वितीया’, इत्यादियते। V.S.M, p-60

\(^{30}\) अति एव सूने धर्मिन्देशस्यार्थिता। अति न दोष। V.S.M, ibid.
Simultaneously the grammarians oppose the redefined definition i.e. 'when the number is not expressed' is the meaning of the śūtra ‘anabhihite’. Here according to the Naiyāyikas, the number is revealed without the application of the personal suffix (tiṇi) in the cases like ‘chaitreṇa dṛṣṭo ghaṭah and ghaṭam dṛṣṭavān chaitraḥ’. On the contrary the number is understood by the nominal case ending by a person who has the knowledge of primary meanings. Therefore, the ‘number’ cannot be expressed by the personal suffix. In the case of ‘maityreṇa pacyate tāṇḍulaḥ’, according to the Naiyāyikas, the understanding is made as ‘the rice grain’ are the processor of the effect i.e. softening produced from the action occurring in Maitra’. Here, the volition and the result are the meaning of the personal suffix. The volition is the qualifier to the meaning of the verbal root, the result is the qualificand, existingness is the meaning of the instrumental meaning or relation and number is the only meaning of the instrumental meaning. By the volition the meaning of the personal suffix excluding the number and time is understood. This is why there is no violation of the rule ‘volition will be related to that which the number is related’. In the sentence like ‘rathena gamyate grāmaḥ’ here the verbal cognition is produced as- ‘the village is the processor of the effect i.e. contact produced by the activity occurring in the chariot. Here, ‘existing’ is the meaning of the instrumental meaning. It is related with the meaning of the verbal root i.e ‘gamana’. And the result will not be related to ‘gamana’ by the ‘samsarga relation’. Because, there can be no direct relationship between the meaning of a nominal steam and the root meaning. Or, by this existing relation the chariot can be related to the volition.

31 न च चैत्रेण वृष्टी घट: ‘घट वृष्टीवान्’ वैत्र इत्यादि विनाभिषिते तिरीण विगत्रायात्रीतस्ति: कृतस्तिकन्ति कुष्टिक वस्त्रपीतः स्मृतिसाधनम्। V.S.M, ibid.
32 कृतस्तिक वस्त्रपीतः। V.S.M, p-61.
33 न्यायवायां संस्कृतीश्चावर्तितिन्तित: अवश्यायातरं उच्यते। V.S.M, ibid.
34 न च वस्त्रपीत विगत्त्रायात्रिण गमने। V.S.M, ibid.
(bhāvanā), the meaning of the personal suffix. Here, the grammarians question the Naiyāyikas that; if the chariot can be related to the volition (bhāvanā) by the relation of existence then let the result be incorporated in this relation also. Then, why do postulate a power in the ātmanepada suffix? Because it is understood as a qualifier. On this point the Naiyāyikas clarify their position that; since, the meaning of the root is the function qualified by the result, that result cannot be obtained from the root.35 Because, the qualifier and qualificand cannot be reverted and, so one cannot get the result caused by the action.36 In whatever form the meaning is presented in the same form a word expresses it’s meaning. Therefore, the function is the meaning of the root and the result and the volition (kṛtī) are the meaning of the ātmanepada suffix. Here, the grammarians ask for the clarifications that; if volition (kṛtī) becomes the meaning of the personal suffix, then, whether, the volition (bhāvanā) expressed by the personal suffix will be related to the result or the volition (bhāvanā) qualifier of the action (kriyā) will be related to the result? The first alternative, the Naiyāyikas reject, is not compatible. Because, it will contradict the understanding in which objectness that is the possessor of the effect produced from the action.37 In the second alternative it will contradict the known relationship of action to the volition expressed by the personal suffix. But it will be related to the instrumental meaning.38

In the example of ‘chaitreṇa pakvaḥ’ since, volition is the meaning of the nominative case ending it will be related to the action (kriyā) as qualifier and the action will be related to the result. And there will be an understanding

---

35 न च फलस्वायत्तशास्त्रपरम्परा धातुस्त्वक्त धातुनेत्र तत्त्वाद V.S.M, ibid.
36 विशेषणविशेषणविशेषणमेवप्रतिसाधारणविशेषणक्वाश्रयविशेषणक्वाश्रयविशेषणक्वाश्रयविशेषण V.S.M, ibid.
37 फलस्व क्रियाज्ञ-विशेषणविशेषणविशेषणविशेषणक्वाश्रयक्वाश्रयक्वाश्रयक्वाश्रयक्वाश्रय V.S.M, ibid.
38 हितुत्त्वायत्तशास्त्रपरम्पराय 'क्रियावत्र विशेषणविशेषणविशेषणण्य अन्यत्र क्रियात्त्व्यो भज्जेत, किंतु दूसरा एव। V.S.M, ibid.
in such a second way. In the case of ‘grāmam gacchati’ etc, the result (phala) will be accepted as the meaning of the accusative case ending.

According to some for the new school of Naiyāyikas a root means an activity qualified by the result. They do not agree with the view that; the result presented as a qualifier of the root meaning is likely to be related to the object. For, one should accept its relation with the meaning of the ātmanepada suffix. Because; that ātmanepada expresses result in general or in a specific way. And, in the case of the sentence ‘gamyate grāmaḥ’ the village is not understood as possessing the result namely ‘chariot’ regularly. They explain that: ‘from the association of the root gam, which expresses an action qualified by contact the ‘ātmanepada’ suffix, which expresses result in general in association with the root can be understood. When the ‘ātmanepada’ is understood as expressing causing the knowledge of result i.e. contact and if it is accepted it will not be a problem. Moreover, if the result in general is accepted as the meaning with specific result in the mind, then, one will not have to postulate a number of primary relationships. Because, as there is understood the state of being the primary meaning in the case of the pronoun ‘tad’ etc, the same can be accepted in the case of the result in general also. So, by understanding this, there will be no numerous primary relationships. So, from the sentence ‘gamyate grāmaḥ’ the understanding is produced as; ‘the village, which is locus of the contact produced by action associated by contact. In the case of the sentence ‘grāmaṃ gacchati’ etc. the meaning of the accusative case ending will be locatedness. Because the

39 केदित्रस्तु, धालाप्रतिष्ठानोपमानप्रतिष्ठानोपायप्रतिष्ठानाधीनायेन | V.S.M, Ibid.
40 संयोगानिर्दिष्टप्रतिष्ठानप्रतिष्ठानोपायप्रतिष्ठानाधीनायेन | V.S.M, p-62.
41 प्रामण गच्छति इत्यादि द्वितीयवर्ग आवेदकम् | V.S.M, Ibid.
structure of verbal understanding is different. And the locatedness will be related to the result. If the relationship of a part of the meaning of the root is not accepted there also, the result will be the meaning of the accusative case ending. So, the understanding occurs as; ‘some body has volition, which causes the action which is a producer of contact and which exists in village’.

The grammarians defend their viewpoint that the locus is the meaning of the personal suffix they do not agree with the Naiyāyikas that ‘if innumerable volition are accepted as the delimitor there will be innumerable primary relationships’. Because; the locusness, which is one is accepted as the delimitor of the state of being the primary meaning. Although there are innumerable locusness still one can bring all delimitors together through the property of being locusness. Hence there arises no contingency of postulating innumerable primary relationships. To bring fault against the Naiyāyikas they say that the acceptance of the suffix ‘taṇi’ enjoined to the agent means volition (kṛti and suffix ‘taṇi’ enjoined in the sense of object means result or locusness designs one to postulate many primary relationships. So, if locus is accepted as the meaning, the grammarians propose, there will be no requirement of such postulation. If one refers to secondary relationship then there is nothing to decide. The grammarians accept that the verbal form ‘karoti’ of ‘pākaṃ karoti’ the paraphrased of ‘pacati’ is also paraphrase of the root. By such evidence one cannot argue that as the internal effort is separately paraphrased for the personal suffix so, it cannot be the meaning of the root. Therefore, in the time of the

---

42 व्युद्विवैविविद्याद | V.S.M, ibid.
43 आश्वतात्त्वात्त्वाँकवेद्य वांकवेद्यावलीत्वत्व नानात्त्वातिष्ट्विर्याव्याप्तिः शक्तियाव्याप्तिः | V.S.M, p-64.
44 क्रिया करोति अपि शाक्तिवेद्य विवेचन, विवेचने पाक शब्दात्मक विविधतिवादात्मानप्रकार | V.S.M,ibid.
incompletion of cooking, when somebody asks whether the cooking is ready or not will be the answer is reciprocated. And, when action is included in the question is going on the answer comes. While disusing the meaning of the root *kr̥n* the grammarians do not accept the Naiyāyikas view point that the root *kr̥n* means ‘yatna’. They explain that while ‘Devadatta’ quivering from a disease like filarial etc, speaks: I am not quivering. Such kind of usages come into being because the root *kr̥n* expresses meaning in general favorable to the making of quivering.⁴⁵ Because such kind of action does not take place in Devadatta.⁴⁶ In the case of the ‘bud does not sprout’, such kind of usage takes place because of the inclusion of *kṛti* into action. Here, meaning of the root *kr̥n* is: ‘*kṛti*’ that which is not favorable to the production or that will be accepted by secondary power. They propose that if there are accepted different relationships in different volitions there will not be any excessive delimitative power. Because; all these relations will be brought together into state of mind.

The Naiyāyikas come down heavily on the point of cause-and-effect relationships accepted by the grammarians, which the *Naiyāyikas* believe is cumbersomeness. They point out saying that in the case of the relation of identity for understanding qualified locus, which is the meaning of the personal suffix the remembrance of the nominative case ending becomes the cause. For understanding qualified number, which is also the meaning of the personal suffix knowledge of the locus becomes the cause. And for the understanding of the qualified time in verbal cognition knowledge of the root becomes the cause. In this way there is accepted three kinds of cause-and-

⁴³ वातोगदिना कम्पने देखते नाह हथ्य हतन्त्र करोजपति व्यवहारानु तथ्यदोषसयकूला तात्त्वादानकः।
V.S.M. Ibid.
⁴⁶ तात्त्वादानकः द्वन्द्ववेशभावतः, V.S.M. Ibid.
effect relationships, which is cumbersome process. To strengthen the argument noteworthy the Naiyāyikas meanwhile put their own viewpoint by saying that for understanding the meaning of the personal suffix other than the time and desired object knowledge of nominal case ending is the cause, we accept. By this way there will be only one relationship. Both the ‘number’ and volition (bhāvanā) will be related to the nominative case ending, which is simpler one.\(^4\) On such point the grammarians opt a tit of tat way to defend their viewpoint. They explain it saying that: when some one asks ‘kim karoti’ (what is doing?) without including the agent, the given answer ‘pacati’ does not create any doubt about the oneness of the agent. Here in this case the Naiyāyikas also accept a relationship between oneness and agent, which is understood by the secondary meaning. Because, for the understanding of qualified number knowledge of agent which is the meaning of the personal suffix is the cause. And such cause-and-effect the Naiyāyikas also accept. Moreover, the grammarians point the finger at the Naiyāyikas acceptance of volition from the different sources.\(^5\) They point out that the Naiyāyikas understand volition (kṛti) from the personal suffix, sometimes locusness from it some times volition from the root and some times from the suffix. And such types of acceptance creates innumerable of difficulties in cause-and-effect relationship. Therefore, as per the understanding of specific meaning are concerned every one has to postulate different cause-and-effect relationships. So, the discussion of simple and complex prosperities is not called for. Moreover, the grammarians point out saying that co-location (samānādhikaraṇa) stated in the sūtra like ‘Yuṣmadyupapade samānādhikarne sthāninyapi madhyamaḥ’ will be difficult to explain if kṛti

\(^4\) कालेवद्याकाद्रितिशिताकालधिवन् नायिका प्रमाणद्वयोपपत्तमिति हेतु, इति सर्वस्याद्यान्वेयेके, इति लाभम्। V.S.M.p-65.

\(^5\) कित्वत्र आचार्येन कथितम् कुस्ते, कथितम् आभासवल्लम् बोध: कथितम् धातुनां, कथितम् प्रश्लेषने भोज। V.S.M.ibld.
becomes the meaning of the personal suffix. There can be no co-locatedness between ‘sarvanāma’ like ‘yuṣmad, aṣmad’ etc. and the personal suffix. Here the Naiyāyikas replay that the co-locatedness can be established by the secondary relationship and the contingency arises in this case can be solved. The grammarians reply that co-location cannot be accepted by the secondary relationship. Because it is decided by the primary relationship. ⁴⁹ Otherwise, there will arise contingency of rejection of qualified cognition. And the volition (kṛti) will not be understood anywhere. ⁵⁰ As such, if the word ‘pacati’ is uttered and merely the same ‘pacati’ is understood then, there arises contingency of oneness with regard to the agent. So also, in the case of ‘paktā jātaḥ’ etc., the volition (kṛti) can be stated to be ‘kṛt’ oriented. Then, it will be extreme difficult to explain the difference between the personal suffix (tin) and the primary suffix (kṛt). Moreover, for the understanding of the meaning of the personal suffix other than ‘time’ and the meaning of the desired object, the remembrance of nominal case ending is the cause. And, acceptance of this cause and effect relationship will be a fallacy. Acceptance of other than the cause and effect relationships will be cumbersome one. If the object is put into the subject category then it will not be justified. So, meaning expressed by it will be improper also. So far the active voice is concerned, while ‘yuṣmad’ is co-referential, second person should be replaced in the place of ‘la’. And rule regarding the relation of number cannot be explained also. Despite the meaning that is, the augment ‘ṣap’ added in the sense of agent when a sārvadhātuka suffix follows it is impossible to decide it’s meaning as an indicator of intention of the speaker in respect of relating number.

⁴⁹ न च लक्षणयाय सामानाविकरणम्, नतकेरूपितत्वात्। V.S.M. Ibid.
⁵⁰ अन्यथा विशिष्टास्तुकृच्छेद: कृत्विमात्रविद्ययो गतायमापत्। V.S.M. Ibid.
Taking up the earlier issue of the Naiyāyikas that the rule ‘ānabhihitē’ (2.3.1) means ‘when the number is not expressed’ the grammarians reject it saying that it cannot be the correct meaning. Because, in the case of ‘devadattaḥ paktā’ there will arise the contingency of instrumental case ending. The grammarians, moreover, attack the Naiyāyikas vital tool i.e. secondary relationships by saying that if by the secondary relationships every expression will be correct grammatically then; the prohibitive rules will become redundant.\(^5\) Moreover, as in the case of ‘kālam pipatisyati’ life is imposed on this inanimate ‘kāla’ so also imposition of life in the case of ‘ratha’ etc creates contingency of volition (kṛti) as the meaning of the personal suffix. Therefore, acceptance of secondary power is useless. The grammarians continue it saying that the co-referential adjectives take equal gender as of the noun. As such, the co-referential adjectives are to agree in number with the noun. Therefore, it is necessary for the personal suffix to express the ‘dharmin’ i.e. agent. Otherwise, there will arise contingency of having a usage like ‘devadattaḥ paktā’ etc.

Further, to show the Naiyāyikas faults the grammarians add that in the case of ‘kalpa’ etc, the agent cannot be obtained by the secondary relationship. Because, in the case of ‘pācaka’ etc, also the ‘agent’ will have to be obtained as the meaning of the suffixes by the secondary relationship. And, as in the case of ‘ācāryakalpaṃ’ etc, there is an expectancy of dual agent similarly, in the case of ‘pacatikalpaṃ’ etc, there will arise contingency of dual number also. Moreover, if the agent is obtained by the secondary relationship as there is a usage ‘paktā gacchati’ so, there will arise the

\(^5\) संस्कृत सर्वनाम सामुक्षस्तेत्रतात् वाचवदयानुशासन्वय्यांपलेप्तः। V.S.M.p-66
contingency of usage like ‘pacatikalpam gacchati’. Although, in the passive voice, the result is the meaning of ātmanepada. As there arises an inverting order of qualifier and qualificand in the root-meaning acceptance of relationship in the separate suffix will be cumbersome one. Moreover, according to the doctrine of Navya-Nyāya when volition is not the meaning of the personal suffix in the case of unassociated instrumental ending when someone asks ‘kim kriyate’, there will not arise the answer such as ‘pacyate’. Because, the Naiyāyikas accept volition is the meaning of the root kṛṇ. And, as the meaning of the root is substantially well established as related to that (volition) there arises the contingency of its non-relatedness. Moreover, if it is said that by expressing volition the expression of agency is settled then, there will be no instrumental ending after the steam expressing the agent.

To set forth the faults the grammarians point out that according to the doctrine of ‘Prācina-Nyāya’ since in the case of ‘kuroti’ etc. the ‘time’ is related to the root meaning and in the case of ‘pacati’ etc. that time cannot be related to the personal suffix. If it is accepted there will arise the contingency of divergence.52

Therefore, considering all these factors the personal suffix should mean agent, object, time and number conclude the grammarians while discussing with the Naiyāyikas.

However, on the other hand, the Mīmāṃsakas hold the following view that activity (vyāpāra) associated with the result in the form of activity (vyāpāra), which is favorable to the root meaning similar to the volition (kṛti)

52 करोति इत्यादिकालान्वयनं धात्विक हुज्जानीकरणं, पचति, इत्यादि आर्थिकतायं व तदनुच्च शैष्ठायांकितं। V.S.M.p-68.
is the meaning of the personal suffix. This one is accepted as activity (vyāpāra) in general. Therefore, in the case of ‘jānāti’ etc, no more the secondary relationship is required. The function such as volition etc, is to be the meaning of the personal suffix only on the same ground of the logicians and also on accounts of its forming the positions of a qualificand. So far the ‘time’ is concerned, according to the Mīmāṃsakas, it will be related either to the volition the meaning of the root or to the meaning of the personal suffix. The ‘agent’ is the locus of the activity of root meaning and the object is the locus of the result of the root meaning. But, some of the Mīmāṃsakas like Maṇḍanamīśra and others propose that the personal suffix expresses volition (vyāpāra) only. Because, in the case of ‘pākaḥ’ associated with the suffix ‘ghaṇi’ expresses volition (vyāpāra) and denotes result. The root pac should express only result i.e. softening, which is simpler one. If volition like kindling fire, putting rice in the pot etc, are included in the meaning of the root it will be a cumbersome property.

Nageśa rejects this Mīmāṃsakas viewpoint. He points out saying that if volition (vyāpāra) is accepted as the meaning of the personal suffix, it will be more difficult to justify ‘lah karmanī ca bhāve cākarmakebhyaḥ’ (3.4.69) Pāṇini’s rule. The rule is not complete in itself. So, the term ‘kartari’ is carried over from the rule ‘kartari kṛti’ (3.4.67) to this rule. Then, the rule ‘lah karmanī ca bhāve cākarmakebhyaḥ’ (3.4.69) signifies that the ‘lah’ affixes denote the agent and object in the case of transitive roots and agent and action in the case of intransitive roots. Here, the ‘tip, tas’, etc. are called personal suffix replaces the ‘lah’ affixes. Moreover, if volition is considered

---

53 फलाचिंचिरायपरललखालालेन्द्रुकल भावारे, कृत्यादिरूप आखादादेश। V.S.M. Ibid.
54 एवध्र ज्ञातिहुतादी न लक्षण। V.S.M. Ibid.
55 कालान्तरस्थ धातव्यापारे, आखादादेश। V.S.M. Ibid.
as the meaning of the personal suffix then, there will arise contingency of one kind of volition in different suffixes added to a particular root. For example in the case of ‘pacati, pakṣati, pakṣavān’ etc. all the different suffixes added to the particular root pac shall have to be accepted as the expressor of the volition like, kindling fire under the pot, putting rice in the pot etc. which is cumbersome one. Apart from this, there arises another flaw in accepting volition as the meaning of the personal suffixes. For, example, in the case of ‘pacati’, here, the suffix ‘ti’ expresses volition like kindling fire, fanning the fire, putting rice etc. will have to be accepted as the meaning of the suffix ‘ti’ in the case of ‘gacchati’ also. To avoid such unwanted expression if a relationship is accepted to determine the kind of volitions expressed by the personal suffixes according to the roots will be cumbersome one. Time, the meaning of the personal suffix either can be related to the volition obtained from the root or to the volition obtained from the personal suffix. The rule ‘anabhīhite’ means ‘when the agent is not expressed’. This understanding is either by the primary relationship or by implication or by the secondary relationship, put forward the Mīmāṃsakas.

Nageśa objects to this theory of implication (ākṣepa) of the agent suggested by the Mīmāṃsakas. He points out saying that it is in as much as contrary to our experience “I make him understand by the use of words and the number (meaning of the personal suffix) also cannot agree with a thing supplied by implication (ākṣepa) for in that case it will be inference that helps understanding sentence and not the words.\(^{56}\) Moreover, it is not proper to say that the agent can be obtained by the implication. Because, if it is accepted as in the case of ‘jāti’, which implied ‘vyakti’ as the significative

---

\(^{56}\) तथाहि शाब्दवाचि इत्यनुवा विरितत्वात आक्षेपो न युक्त। V.S.\textit{ibid.}
power of the word and gets prominent same also will be the case if ‘agent’ is obtained by the implication and will be prominent and as such the Mīmāṃsakas theory of prominence of ‘bhāvanā’ will be compromised.\(^{57}\)

And, if the volition is admitted as secondary, then, it will go against ‘Yāska’s statement i.e. ‘bhāvapradhānaṃākhyātaṃ’.\(^{58}\)

Moreover, if volition is accepted as the meaning of the personal suffix there arises an innumerable difficulty in the case of ‘guruḥ śiśyābhyāṃ pācayati’ (the teacher makes cooking by the students). Here the suffix ‘ṇic’ will have to be accepted as the expressaor of the volition of the prompter i.e. Guru. Because, Pāṇini has mentioned suffix ‘ṇic’ to express the volition of the prompter by the rule ‘hetumati ca’ (3.1.26). And, as here are two volitions i.e. one is of the prompter, guru, and another one is of the prompted ‘śiśya’ will have to be accepted as the meaning of the personal suffix. Then, the number, meaning of the personal suffix will be related to the prompted i.e. ‘śiśya’. If it happens the, it will bring unwanted result i.e. either the word ‘śiśya’ will have to be changed into singular number or the verbal ending ‘pācayati’ will be made dual in the both of the cases of the changes are not justified.

There is another flaw observed in this example. Because, Guru, the prompter is not expressed by the personal suffix. And when the prompter is not expressed it will take instrumental case ending. And so will be the case with the prompted. Because, when volition of the prompted is expressed, and by such volition the agent i.e. ‘śiśya’ is implied it will take nominative ending

\(^{57}\) जातिशिक्षिकन्ये घटनु इत्यादिदा जातिशिक्षाकित्वाय जातिशिक्षामात्रयम् भावान्वितो भावान्वितेऽविशेषणांवात्रती। V.S.M.p-70

\(^{58}\) भावप्रदनामाहयात् इति यासकविशेषेन। V.S.M.p-74
instead of instrumental ending, which is not desired. Moreover, if the meaning of the suffix be predominant, then, it will be illogical in the case of ‘ajā’ and ‘chhāgi’ also.

Against the grammarians the Mīmāṃsakas continue their argument on the viewpoint that the personal suffix in ‘pacati’ denotes agent. To explain the paraphrase of ‘pacati’ as ‘pākaṃ karoti’, the accusative case ending ‘ām’ in ‘pākaṃ’ is not understood syntactically but is obtained semantically. In a similar manner ‘dhavakhadirō’, which is a co-ordinate compound is paraphrased as ‘dvava ca khadira ca’. Here, ‘dhava’ and ‘khadira’ are a syntactic paraphrase where ‘ca’ is a semantic one.

The grammarians do not agree with the Mīmāṃsakas viewpoint. They point out saying that if Mīmāṃsakas’ view that the agent is semantic explanation were accepted, the same could be applied in the case of bhāvanā also, that is, if the agent is accepted as the syntactic explanation then, bhāvanā can duly be admitted as a semantic explanation. It means that the semantic explanation (tātparyārthavivarana) can be applied equally. And it does not also help in determining the meaning of a particular term.

Moreover, in the case of ‘devadattaḥ pacati’ etc, there is co-referentiality between the noun ‘Devadatta’ and the verb ‘pacati’ like ‘paktā devadatta’ (Devadatta is the cook). Unless the agent is denoted by the personal suffix there cannot be co-referentiality between the nouns and the verbs.
However, Nāgeśa means that the identical case endings alone are not the determining factors in the understanding of the relation of nondifference. If the Mīmāṃsakas persist that it is only the identical case ending which determine the co-referentiality then, the relation of non-difference accepted by the Mīmāṃsakas in ‘somena yajeta’ etc, would stand compromised.

Taking up the issue of implication (ākṣepa) Nāgeśa points out that if Mīmāṃsakas accept implication to obtained the agent, then, there arises the contingency of removal of ‘Aruṇa section’ of Jaimini. Because the Mīmāṃsakas do not accept implication in ‘Aruṇādhikarana’. Here, in the case of ‘Piṅgākṣy’ (having two brown eyes) and ‘ekahāyanī’ (one year old) to obtained the co-referentiality of ‘Aruṇaya’ (reddish) with these two words, the Mīmāṃsakas hold that the words ‘Piṅgākṣī’ and ‘ekahāyanī’ denote relation as is clear from the syntactic explanation ‘piṅge akṣiṇī yasyāḥ’ (she who has two brown eyes) and ‘ekaṁ hāyanam yasyāḥ’ (she who is one year old) respectively, this is how Kumārla Bhaṭṭa explains in the ‘Tantravārttika’. All together it means the Mīmāṃsakas hold the view that the words ‘Piṅgākṣī’ and ‘ekahāyanī’ not imply but denote the substance to which they co-refer. In these cases the compounds were understood to express the relation so, there would not be any co-referentiality between ‘Aruṇay’ and the relation expressed by the compounds. Because; both are incorporeal entities. Therefore, Nāgeśa rejects the Mīmāṃsakas viewpoint on the use of implication (ākṣepa) in the case of the personal suffix ‘tī’ in the case of ‘devadattaḥ pacati’ and advocates that the personal ending should mean agent apart from the object, number and time.

59 अरुणया विक्रवया एकाहार्या चौम मृणाभि इति बाल्ये, इवा नामकः सत्वाक्षेपादे इवो एवान्वयातीताद्व-अरुणादिकरण ैवं देवदत्तात्प्रति। व.स. म. p-70
Modern linguists' position:

In modern linguistics, the inflectional endings or suffixes that indicate person (and usually, number) are called personal endings.\(^6\) In general, whether it is a personal ending or a suffix all are called morphemes.

Morpheme is the basic unit of grammar. It is a distinct linguistic form, semantically different from other phonetically similar or identical linguistic forms.\(^6\) Some linguists describe morphemes as the smallest recurrent elements of grammatical patterning and leave meaning out of the definition. Moreover, morpheme is a class of forms that have the same meaning or grammatical, which are distributed non-contrastively either mutually exclusive environment or free variations. However, these morphemes are lacking in precision, definition and independence compared with words. For example, the element 'milit-' has morphemic status in the words militancy, militant militate, militia, equally easy to see that the meaning of the morpheme is not so definite that it totally predicts the meaning of the word. Point here can be noted that the word itself is the minimum lexical unit in the sense of the minimum unit with an independently usable meaning.

Morphemes can be divided into two categories 1. Lexical morphemes and 2. Grammatical morphemes. Those morphemes, which have primarily lexical value, so-called steam and roots, are the lexical morphemes. For example, 'boy, love, expense, dent- econom-' are the roots and called lexical morphemes. And, those morphemes, which has grammatical value, we may term these not-steam or non-roots, are grammatical morphemes. For example:

---

\(^6\) Dictionary of linguistics. P-165.

\(^6\) Essential of grammatical theory A consensus view of Syntax and Morphology. p-210.
in - , -ive, -ing, -(e) s, the, of etc, are the non-roots and so, these are grammatical morpheme. Therefore, minimum meaningful unit of an expression is called a morpheme.

**Root:**

According to the modern linguistics, the ultimate constituent element common to all cognate words i.e. that element of a word that remains after the removal of all inflexional endings, formative (q.v.) etc, are called roots. The root is usually present in all members of a group of words relating to the same idea, and is thus capable of being considered as the ultimate vehicle of a given idea concept in a given language.

**Non-Root:**

On the other hand non-roots make a semantic contribution that is subsidiary to that of lexical items, either modifying the meaning of the latter or organizing the relationship between different lexical items.

Again, each of the categories i.e. lexical morphemes and grammatical morphemes are divided into two classes 1. Bound morphemes and 2. Free morphemes. 62

1. **Bound Morpheme:** A bound morpheme can be used only in combination with another morpheme, which itself may be free or bound. For example: in ‘untruthfully’ truth is only free morpheme and the other three are bound morphemes. And, in the case of ‘conceive’ both ‘con-’ and ‘-ceive’ are bound morphemes.

---

62 Essential of grammatical theory A consensus view of Syntax and Morphology, p-213.
2. **Free Morphemes**: Free morphemes can be used independently or in combination with other morphemes. For example, boy, love, expense, fire, wash, and machine all these are free morphemes and can be used independently.

Let us look the tree, which makes the picture clearer-

```
                 Morpheme
                   |      |
                 Lexical morphemes  Grammatical morphemes
                     (Roots)         (Non-Roots)
                           |      |
                       Bound Morphemes  Free Morphemes  Bound Morpheme  Free Morpheme
                       (Bound roots)  (Free roots)  (Affixes)   (Particles)
```

Roots may be either bound or free. In English the vast majority of all roots are free but there are a reasonable number of bound roots e.g. dent-, (cf. dental, dentist) econom- (cf. Economy, Economic) matern-, (cf. maternal, maternity). In inflecting languages, on the other bound roots are in the majority. Therefore, the major categories of word at least (i.e. noun, adjectives, verbs, and possibly adverbs) require some kind of inflection whenever they occur.
Non-roots also may be either bound or free when they are free, they of
course constitute grammatical words in their own right and are often referred
to as particles.\textsuperscript{53}

Bound non-roots, where they do occur, are generally referred to as
affixes. As we have already mentioned earlier that affixes are bound
morphemes, depending upon the position the affixes in relation to the base are
conventionally classified into three categories i.e. (a) prefixes (b) suffixes and
(c) infixes.

A. \textbf{Prefixes}: Those bound morphemes placed before the stems are called
prefixes. For example untruth, here ‘un-’ is a prefix.

B. \textbf{Suffix}: Those bound morphemes placed after the steams are called the
suffixes. For example ‘untimely’ here ‘un-’ is a prefix, ‘time’ is the
base and ‘-ly’ is a suffix.

C. \textbf{Infix}: Those bound morphemes are inserted inside the base are called
infixes. To illustrate infixes we must go out side English languages like
‘Tagalog’ or ‘Arabic’. For examples in Tagalog ‘-um-’ and ‘-un’ occur
in the words ‘su mu:lat’, ‘one who wrote’ and ‘sinu:lat’ that which was
written, compared with the root ‘su: lat’ ‘write’. It should be noted that
in- fixation has the effect of making the stem or root morpheme into a
discontinuous phonological sequence. In Arabic ‘qariba’ means ‘be
near’ it becomes ‘iqtaraba’, which means ‘to cause oneself to come
near’.

\textsuperscript{53} Essential of grammatical theory A consensus view of Syntax and Morphology.p-219.
The affixes normally are not added to each other. For example: un, ish, re-, action, etc are not found to be added together. Being both bound and nonlexical they normally have to be added to a lexical element to form a word. For example, (un) real, (tempt) action, (book) s etc, are possible because real, tempt, book all are the bases.

However, an affix may also be added to a combination of morphemes as in the case of ungentlemanly, footballer, revisionists. This complex or compound element to which an affix is added is termed a stem and the word formed is a complex word. A steam is not specified for size, and a root may be thought of as simply a minimum steam.

Amongst affixes two fundamentally different kinds need to be distinguished. One is derivational affix, which form derived words and another one is inflectional affixes, which form inflected words.

\[ \text{Affixes} \]

\[ \text{Derivational affix} \quad \text{Inflectional affixes} \]

In other way it can be said that the affixes to change words from one type to another are called derivational affixes. And, the affixes that are used to inflect words are inflectional affixes. Derivational affixes occur before the base. And, in the position before the base the derivational suffixes are added first and then the inflectional suffixes are added.
Thus walking, walks, walker have in common the root walk and the affixes ‘-ing’ ‘-s’ and ‘-er’. An inflectional suffix carries certain grammatical restrictions with it for example; with the plural inflection ‘-s’ a change from singular to plural in the noun tree to trees requires a concomitant change in the verb form from singular to plural: ‘the tree is green’. Other examples of English inflectional suffixes are the verb tenses. Many languages have far more extensive inflection that English, e.g. Sanskrit, Latin, Eskimo, Arabic etc. In Latin grammar typical noun and adjective are inflected for case and number, and the adjectives are additionally for the gender of the noun. Latin and Sanskrit verbs have overlapping categories of inflection: mood, voice, tense, person and number.

The name stem is given to a root to-gather with its derivational affixes thus in racket-eer-s, racket is the root racketeer the stem and ‘-s’ is the plural inflection. Beginning in the 19th century the modification of a root or base by the amount of inflection or derivation in a language was used as a basis for classification. In isolating languages there are found only roots. For example in Chinese languages there are not found any such derivation or inflection. On the other hand inflected languages like English and Latin use roots, stem and affixes. But there are some agglutinative languages where roots and affixes are readily identifiable. For example, in ‘Turkish’ language ‘baba’ means ‘father’ babam, ‘my father’ and babama means to my father. Point to be noted that there was an old believe that the agglutinative languages were the most primitive and the isolating languages are most civilized language. But, now it is no longer accepted. Every language is just as expressive as any other can develop new vocabulary to fit new situations.
In English there are some inflectional affixes, which are added to both the nominal bases and verbal bases and some inflectional affixes specially used for the verbal bases. Let us consider these suffixes and their meaning they denote.

**Plural ‘-S’:** This inflectional suffix ‘s’ is added to nominal bases and indicates that there is one object or person. An alternative form for this inflection is ‘-es’. For example in the case of ‘they saw two snakes there, I like to touch flowers’ etc. There are of course, some words look which like as if they have plural endings but they are not. For example the words like ‘clothes, pants, scissors etc, are the nominal roots. But, these words have no singular stem. There fore these are described as one morpheme synchronically.

**Possessive ‘S’:** This inflectional affix is added to a nominal base to indicate that the referent possesses something. For example I am interested for the teacher’s pen. That is Bhagban’s bag etc. in written English possessive ‘-s’ is preceded by an apostrophe.

**Past ‘-ed’:** This inflection ‘-ed’ added to the main verbal base of a sentence to indicate that an event happened in the past or that a state of affairs was true in the past. For examples, He crossed me very quickly. That is what they decided; he dragged the chair over the window etc.

**Perfective ‘-ed or-en’:** This inflectional affix added to the main verb of a sentence to indicate that an action or event is as-of-now completed. The
auxiliary 'have' or 'has' always accompanies it. For examples, The thief has taken it, you might have dropped it, I have forgotten now etc.

Present participle '-ing': This inflectional affix is added to the verb in several different contexts. It can indicate that a verb is secondary to the main verb and completes its meaning. For example when I finished cooking dinner. Here the word 'cooking' completes the meaning of 'finished'. Finished of what? The answer is 'finished cooking'.

Past participle '-ed' or '-en': This inflectional affix '-ed' or '-en' is similar to the present participle. It is added to a verb to change it into an adjective. For example: now it is fixed, here fixed is a participle that function as an adjective. Similarly 'it is blue, it is huge, this thing is getting wrecked up, I thought it is broken'.

Third person '-s': This inflectional ending '-s' is added to the main verb to indicate that an action or event happens regularly or that a state of affairs is usual. It is only used when the subject of a sentence is a singular third person noun. For examples she walks to the department. Debashish lives here. She goes to my school etc. All these are therefore minimum units of English language and hence they are called morphemes. The same is true with Sanskrit also. Here also smallest meaningful units will be called morpheme.

As per the verbal cognition is concerned we strongly believe that the modern linguists cannot overlook the oriental perceptive. Because, whatever the meaning personal suffix denote it has to be related to verb and the subject or subjects and the verbal form will have to be co-referential with the subject
or subjects. Therefore, here we would like to close this chapter by briefly introducing the analysis of meanings, as we have made in the earlier chapters with the similar judgments in English in different modes of expression. For example, ‘John cooks rice’ and ‘rice is being cooked by John’ can be analysed in the light of the techniques of the Vaiyākaraṇas and the Nayiāyikas.

The sentence ‘John cooks rice’ has got three terms i.e. 1. John 2. cooks and 3. rice the term ‘John’ is the subject, a particular individual possessing some peculiarities and properties relating to him alone which may be describe by the ‘Jhonness’ or ‘Jhonhood’, the term ‘cooks’ is a verbal form consists of two parts (1) the root ‘cook’ and (2) the suffix ‘-s’ in the present tense and active voice third person singular number. The verb ‘cook’ would mean the particular actions and process by which softening of the rice would take place. The softening of the rice is then the effect of those actions taken together right from the beginning of placing the utensil of cooking on the oven and getting it down from it on completion of the action of cooking. Therefore, a series of actions, in fact, comprises the act of cooking and a single act, which has been clearly pointed out by the Sanskrit scholars and approved by the thinkers of other school of thought.

The suffix ‘-s’ indicates present time, singular number and the agent, according to the grammarian school of thought. The present time is construed with the act or acts of cooking. Whereas; the singular number is to be construed with ‘John’, the agent. The meaning of agent is to be construed with ‘John’, who is qualified by Johnhood. Therefore, any other individual though being the same name should not be considered as the agent of this
particular act of cooking, because that individual, does prosesses ‘that-John-ness’ and not ‘this-John-ness’.

Rice, the object of cooking has got a special property called ‘rice-ness’ in it, and as such, the objectness is delimited by ‘rice-ness’. The delimitor of the objectness in each and every case is used to make the sense specific. Because rice as rice, i.e. qualified by rice-ness is considered to be the object here only not in any other place. Rice may have a number of properties in it like ‘rice-ness’, contentness of knowledge (Jñānaviṣayatā) etc. But ‘rice’ has been taken here as an object of cooking only as rice qualified by rice-ness and not by any other property, which may be existing in it. Similarly, the ‘softening’ of the rice also is to be taken as being qualified by the relational abstract property called ‘softening-ness’ determined by the particular act of cooking here. The particular act of cooking here also is to be understood as being qualified by the particular actness (vyāpāratvaviśeṣa) to avoid ambiguity.

The (vikṛtti) softening of rice should be understood to exist in the rice through a normal relation and not through an uncommon relation. Now if we use the English name ‘John’ and some other English words to be use in the Sanskrit language then according to the grammar school of analysis we may say ‘Johnābhinnaka kartṛka rice niṣṭhāvikṛťtyanukālo vartamānakāliko vyāpāraḥ’, which means, ‘the action relating to the present time and conducive to the softening of rice is existent in John which is qualified by the singular number’. If this sentence is analysed in accordance with the Naiyāyikas school of thought, then instead of the action (vyāpāra) becoming
the most prominent of the contents of the verbal understanding. 'John' would become the most prominent one.
Chapter-V

» Conclusion
Man is a talkative animal. He is the only creature in the world that can speak. To communicate his notion what he speaks is called language, the most essential tools he always deals with. Through this language window he sees the world, understands its structure and behaves accordingly. For, from the beginning of the long past until the present time this fact has been so fascinating and the centre of attraction and has been stimulating the intellectual minds. As a vehicle of thought language has fallen under the severe scrutiny of the philosophers and of the common people in general. For the understanding of its behavior and characteristics there has been a lot of research on brain. More we explore more mysterious it becomes. In this direction inquiry was begin. Systematical analysis started. And, for the better convenience and easier understanding the language was split into sentences. Then the subject, object, noun, adjectives etc, were divided and discussed in the sentence. This was done to understand the function of language and to teach languages as second language.

Right from the Rg Veda the language has drawn attention of the Indian thinkers. The tradition has also shown a great interest towards it. Almost all philosophical systems have been engaged into this ferry and have contributed a lot. Earlier, for the better transmission and well preservation of the Vedic contents the scholars made logical approach. They divided the Vedic sanhitās into padas. Noun, verb, indeclinable etc. were separated, defined and recognized. This is how opened a new horizon of systematic studies on language in the Indian soil.
Now starts up the real problem while separating the *sāṃhitās* into *padas*. What is a sentence? How do we understand it? Which segment in the sentence is prominent one? etc. Different theories come up because of different perceptions. While some thinkers predefined their stand and shape up their argument accordingly others adhered to their realistic view point and some others became protective on the basis of their earlier stands and upgraded and added more and more teeth to their arguments.

**Sentence:**

Sentence is that through which communication takes place\(^1\). Generally, a group of words, which make a complete sense and expresses the idea properly, is called a sentence\(^2\). According to the modern linguists sentence is a grammatical form (a group of words), which is not in construction with any other grammatical form, a constituent, which is not a constituent i.e. independent (complete in itself) is conveying its sense or meanings\(^3\). Nevertheless such definition of the sentence is quite formless and never meets the definition of the definition. Rightly, Wittgensteen opines; the sentence is not mere a jumble of words but is a complex of words with internal structure\(^4\).

---

\(^1\) The sentence is a unit of thought because the ideas are communicated only in the form of sentence. Murti, M. Srimannarayan-'Introduction to Sanskrit Linguistics', p-99.

\(^2\)(i) A set of words expressing a statement, a question, or an order, usually containing a subject and a verb, Oxford Advanced Lerner's Dictionary, p-1165.

\(^2\)(ii) A group of words stating something. Webster's New International Dictionary, P-p-2280.

\(^2\)(iii) A numbers of words arranged grammatically and syntactically so as to constitute a grammatically complete sense unit. Pel, Mario. A and Gayner, Dictionary of linguistics, p-194.

\(^2\)(iv) Sentence is a collection of word.... Dikshit, Krishna Kummar, 'Indian Logic', p-97.


\(^4\) The sentence is not a jumble of words, just as the musical theme is not a jumble of notes, the sentence is articulated. Quoted by Sengupta K.K, 'Language and Philosophy', p-12.
Grammarians like Patañjali and others analyse the nature of the sentence by adopting a prominent syntactic criterion. For them, a sentence must consist of at least one verb. For example in the sentence ‘chaitraḥ pacati’ (Chaitra cooks) here, the sentence contains the verb ‘cook’. Again it does not mean that a sentence is a set of words that consist of a single verb only. Therefore, ‘pacati bhavati’ (cooking takes place), a set of words where two finite verbs occur is considered as a sentence and is conducive for a verbal cognition. That is happening of cooking.

The grammarians also propose an alternative approach of the sentence. According to this view a sentence consists of words that refer to ‘the item yet to be accomplished, i.e. ‘kārakas’ are the items already accomplished (siddha) and the ‘kriyās’ are the items yet to be accomplished (sādhyā). In the sentence ‘maitraḥ taṇḍulam pacati’ Maitra cooks the rice’ here, the subject ‘Maitra’ and the object ‘Taṇḍula’ are the items which are already accomplished (siddha) where as the action of ‘cooking’ is the item yet to be accomplished (sādhyā). All time greatest philosopher among the grammarians, Bhartṛhari holds the view that; ‘sentence is an indivisible verbal hole and complete in itself’. According to him only the external and indivisible meaningful verbal whole is the reality and other forms of verbal essence (sphota) such as the word essence (pada sphota) syllabic essence (varṇa sphota) etc. are the unreal abstraction of the real sentence. Therefore, the grammarians believe that the sentence as a hole has the ability to express

---

5 ekatiṁvākyārṇ.
6 vakyaṇaḥ, (i) 72-73 kārikā.
7(i) Eko'navayavaḥ śabdhā, V. P II. 1.
(ii) Padena varṇaAvadyante varṇesu avayavānaca / Vākyāt padanā-atyayantam praviveko nakaścana// V.P. I. 73.
(iii) V. B. S. pp- 490-93.
the thought and cannot be analysed. If it is split into parts they will be inexpressive and meaningless.

In the ‘Nyāya sūtra’ of Gautama, the oldest work on Nyāya philosophy no grammatical definition is found regarding the concept of sentence. ‘Āptopadeśaḥ sabdaḥ’ only the indication gives room for the later interpreter like Vātsāyana to explain it. He explains the words upadeśa as ‘chhyāpayiṣayā’; it is derived from the root khyā means ‘Prakathane’.

Then, he further explains it as sarvesāṁ vyavahāraḥ iti (by the language all people communicate to others). Later on Vācaspati Miśra in his commentary on Nyāya Vārttika clearly explains the word ‘upadeśa’ in terms of ‘Vākyajnāna’.

Keśba Miśra in his ‘Tarkabhāṣā’ also gives a clear-cut definition that ‘a sentence is a collection of words having expectancy, compatibility and proximity in it’. According to Gaṅgeśa the sentence is a cluster of words uttered with the intention of conveying the qualified cognition. The most common definition of sentence is found in the ‘Navya Nyāya’ text is; simply a group of words called a sentence.

However, while Patañjali and his followers adopt a syntactic criterion in analysing sentence the logicians such as Gaṅgeśa and others adopt a semantic criterion in analysing the sentence.

---

8 Āptopadeśaḥ Sabdaḥ N.S 1.1.7.
9 N. Bhāṣya, p-173.
10a Laghu Siddhānta Koumudi p-130
11 N. Bhāṣya, p-176.
12 Upadiṣṭaye’nena iti upadiṣo Vākyajñanam... N. Vārttika. T. Tiki p -173.
13 vākayaṁ tu ākāṅkṣā yogyatā samnidhimatāṁ padānāṁ smūhaṁ T.B. p-121.
14 Viśistārtha prāśabdatvam, Tatva cintāmaṇi-4
15(i) N.Koṣa, p-75.
(ii) T.C, p-482
(iii) T.S, p-50.
(iv) T.K, p-44.
The words by expressing their own meaning create expectancy about the other words or the meaning of the other words and by a relation give a compatible meaning are called sentence say Mīmāṃsaks. According to the Mīmāṃsaks, the sentence is a syntactic connection, which is nothing but the connected utterance of the words causing understanding the relationship of both the main and subordinate. Moreover, Kumarila Bhaṭṭa holds, that sentence is not merely a collection of words, but rather is a meaningful unit, of words, distinct from individual words. According to him Sentence consists of both nouns and verbs (liṅgādipadagḥṭitavāṃ). Jaimini defines vākya as ‘arthaikattvāt ekaṃ vākyam sākāṃsam cet vibhāgesyāt’.

**Verbal understanding:**

The understanding of the meaning of the sentence is called Śābdabodha. The very word Śābdabodha the compound may be dissolved as śabdeha nirṛṭth = śābdah śābdascasau bodhasca śābdabodhaḥ means a cognition or understanding that arises from a sentence. It is also called anvayabodha because it is an understanding of the relationships among meanings.

One of the four ways of knowing is the process of verbal understanding. It is a psychological process. śabda means sentence and it consists of morphemes. Each morpheme generates remembrance of its meaning and when the final morpheme generates the remembrance of its

---

16 Nyāyuṣaṇa, Śadācchrutat jāyāmāno bodhaḥ. P-560
17 jaimini sūtra-M.S.II.1.46
meaning the knowledge of the morpheme also acts as an *udbodhaka* and the entire chain is presented in the mind and we get the verbal understandings.

Viśvanāth in his *Nyāya Siddhānta Muktāvali* explains the complete process of Śābdabodha (verbal understanding) as follows:

*Padajñānamtu karaṇam dvāraṁ tatra padārthadhīḥ*

Śābdabodhaḥ phalaṁ tatra saktidhīḥsahakārini

_N.S.M- kārikā-81._

In his opinion, the knowledge of morphemes (*padajñāna*) functions as an instrument (*karaṇa*), the process (*vyāpāra*) is the presentation of the meanings of the words (*padārthopasasthitīḥ*), the product (*phala*) is the verbal cognition (*śābdabodha*), and, the knowledge of meaning (*śaktī*) generated by manifold factors like fitness etc. is auxiliary of associates (*sahakārini*).

**Chief qualificand in the Sentence:**

Now the important question is which segment of the sentence should be considered as the prominent one? Whether it is a noun or a verb or a verbal suffix? The Naiyāyikas hold the view that the meaning of a noun in the nominative case ending is the prominent in a sentence meaning (*Prathamānta mukhya viśeṣyaka śābdabodhaḥ*). That noun is an agent in the active construction and an object in the passive construction. But a verb or action is the prominent in the case of passive construction without an object that is known as *bhāva* construction. For example in the case of ‘*chaitraḥ grāmaṇi gacchati*’ here, the word ‘*chaitra*’ is the agent in the nominative case ending
and ‘chaitreṇa grāmaḥ gamyate’ here the word ‘grāma’ is an object with the nominative case ending are prominent in the active construction and passive construction respectively. But in the case of ‘chaitreṇa supyate’ where neither an object nor a nominative case ending is found there, the action or verb is the prominent one.

Here the point can be noted that: even though the Naiyāyikas accept the noun in the nominative case ending is prominent one in a sentence but do not hold it uniformly in all kinds of sentences. They adopt a practical way for the sentences according to the demand and situation.

On the other hand the grammarians hold the view that only the root can be the prominent in all kinds of sentence. Whether it is an active construction or a passive construction or a bhāva construction. They also propose that the action and the result are the meanings of the root. In the active construction the agent that is the locus of the action and in the passive construction the object that is the locus of the result are prominent. Since, both of the meanings i.e. action and the result are the meaning of the root therefore the grammarians hold the ‘dhātvārthamukhya veśeyyaka sābdabodha’ theory. Therefore all such kinds of sentence like chaitraiva maitrogacchati, bhutale ghato na etc. are easily explained. To make their theory stronger they project the Yāska’s statement i.e. ‘bhāvapradhānaṃ-ākhyātam’ as the main authority. Though there are little difference among the new-grammarians and old grammarians with regard to the meaning of the root whether it is only volition or both volition and result are the meaning. But all are unanimous in the case of verb as the prominent in verbal understanding.
While deciding the chief-qualificand in a sentence the Mīmāṁsaks, on the other hand, focus themselves more on the result of the verbal communication rather than the structure of it. According to them a verbal communication always induce a man into action. They call it bhāvanā (volition) another kind of action that directs such activity or activities is prominent one in a sentence. This volition (bhāvanā) neither comes from a root nor from a noun but it is the meaning of the personal suffix they advocate. The Mīmāṁsaks divide this bhāvanā into two kinds (1) Śābdibhāvanā and (2) Ārthibhāvanā. Desire of the speaker is called śābdibhāvanā and the desire of a hearer is called ārthibhāvanā. Since, there is no speaker in the Vedic sentences the śābdibhāvanā is rooted in the personal suffixes. Moreover, they advocate that all the sentences are action oriented and a desiring force always resides in it. Their theory of verbal understanding is known as ‘bhāvanā mukhya viśeyaka śādabodha’. The meaning of the personal, therefore, becomes the chief qualificand according to the Mīmāṁsakas.

**Meaning of the Personal Suffixes:**

Now the question is what do the personal suffixes mean? The traditions attempt to solve it by their own ways. The grammarians hold the view that the suffixes added to the verbal roots, technically called ‘tiṇi’ means, locus in general. Nāgeśa proposes the property of being the locus-ness (āśrayatātva) as the state of being the primary meaning, which is one and resides in every locus-ness. Here, locus means locus of the result (phalat), that is object and, the locus of the volition is agent. This means, the agent and the object are the
meanings of the personal suffixes (tīṅ) and the agent is qualifier to the volition whereas the object is a qualifier to the result.

Moreover, apart from these agent and object the time (kāla) and the number (saṁkhya) are also the meanings of the personal suffixes (tīṅ). The number (saṁkhya) is related to the agent (kartā) and the object (karma) both; in the active voice this number is related to the agent whereas in the passive voice it is related to the object. But, time (kāla) is always related to the volition (vyāpāra) only, and becomes a qualifier to it. It has been suggested that there is a special relationship between result (phala) and volition (vyāpāra). That relation is anukūlatā or janyajanakabhāva (relationship of cause-and-effect). In other words, there is a relationship of cause-and-effect between a result and volition. And volition is the cause of a result and, the result is the effect of the same action. In the end one-way or other all become qualifiers to the volition. Thus, the cognition of a sentence likes ‘maitraḥ pacati’ (Maitra is cooking) would be volition causing cooking having a single locus that is not different from Maitra (maitrābhinnāśrayako pākānukūlo vyāpāraḥ). In the passive voice the cognition runs as: ‘volition existing in Maitra and causing softening which has for its locus one not different from rice’. (taṇḍulasṛyikā yā viklitīḥ tadānukūla maitranāṣṭho vyāpāraḥ). Thus the volition becomes the chief-qualificand in a sentence in the context of verbal cognition. The point here must be noted is; the neo-grammarians like Nāgeśa etc, are of the view that in case of passive voice, the verbal understanding or cognition will have the result as the chief qualificand and in the case of active voice, volition will be the chief qualificand, because the result and the volition are prominent in the case of passive and active voice respectively.
But, according to the older section of grammarians, in both case i.e. active and passive voice volition (vyāpāra) only becomes prominent.

On the other hand the older-section of the Mīmāṁsakas advocate that the root has only one meaning namely result (phala) and volition is the meaning of the personal suffixes (tiṅ). Result (phala), the meaning of the root is qualifier of the volition (vyāpāra), which is the meaning of the tiṅ. The volition (vyāpāra) is the synonym of bhāvanā. But, the newer-section of the Mīmāṁsakas like Pārthasārathi, Khaṇḍadeva and others are of a different view. According to them result (phala) and volition (vyāpāra) in its particular form (vyāpāravīṣeṣa) are the meaning of the root (dhātu), where as, the personal suffixes signifies volition or effort in general (vyāpārasāmānyā). Time, the meaning of the personal suffixes (tiṅ) is related either to the volition only particular (vyāpāravīṣeṣa), which is the meaning of the root or, to the volition in general (vyāpārasāmānyā), the meaning of the personal suffixes.

According to the Naiyāyikas ‘activity’ alone is the meaning of the root whereas according to the new school the meaning is activity qualified by a particular result. The meanings of the personal suffix are not ‘subject’ or object as declared by the grammarians but it is volition (kṛti). It is not very much different from grammarians’ opinion except for the fact that the logicians’ view is less cumbersome in that the ‘subject’ is the locus of activity. But the meaning of the locus (āśraya) is essential for the import of the sentence and this meaning is supplied by syntactical connection (saṁsarga). Thus, cognition of the sentence in active voice is ‘the locus of activity causing cooking’ is Chaitra from chaitraḥ pacati.
In passive voice the understanding is one where object is the primary locus and activity qualifies the result. In the sentence like *chaitro jānāti* (chaitra knows), *Chaitra icchati* (Chaitra desires), the meaning is the locusness, desire etc. In the sentence like ‘ghataḥ nasyati’ (the pot perishes) the personal suffix signifies counter positive-ness. This cannot be said to be obtained by syntactical connection. With regard to the nature of the potentiality in the case of verbal affix (*ākhyātaśakyatāvacchedaka*) some opine that it is original ‘la’ that signifies activity though it is not actually found in the verbal forms like ‘patati’ etc. (But the personal suffix ‘tip’, ‘tas’, etc replace ‘la’ are found). In this case, those who don not know original ‘la’; knowledge is produced by a mistaken notion of the potentiality.

In modern linguistics, the inflectional endings or suffixes that indicate person (and usually, number) are called personal endings. In general, whether it is a personal ending or a suffix all are called morphemes.

Morphemes can be divided into two categories 1. Lexical morpheme and 2. Grammatical morphemes. Those morphemes, which have primarily lexical value, so-called stems and roots, are the lexical morphemes. For example boy, love, expense, dent- econom- are the roots and called lexical morphemes. And, those morphemes, which has grammatical value, we may term these non-stems or non-roots, are grammatical morphemes. For example in-, -ive, -ing, -(e) s, the, of etc, are the non-roots and so, these are grammatical morpheme. Therefore minimum meaningful unit of an expression is called a morpheme.

\(^{18}\) Dictionary of linguistics. P-165.
Again, each of the categories i.e. lexical morphemes and grammatical morphemes are divided into two classes 1. Bound morphemes and 2. Free morphemes.

1. **Bound Morpheme:** A bound morpheme can be used only in combination with another morpheme, which itself may be free or bound. For example in ‘untruthfully’ **truth** is only free morpheme and the other three are bound morphemes. And, in the case of ‘conceive’ both ‘con-’ and ‘-ceive’ are bound morphemes.

2. **Free Morphemes:** Free morphemes can be used independently or in combination with other morphemes. For example **boy, love, expense, fire, wash, and machine** all these are free morphemes and can be used independently.

Non-roots also may be either bound or free when they are free, they of course constitute grammatical words in their own right and are often referred to as particles.

Bound non-roots, where they do occur, are generally referred to as affixes. As we have already mentioned earlier that affixes are bound morphemes, depending upon the position the affixes in relation to the base are conventionally classified into three categories i.e. (a) prefixes (b) suffixes and (c) infixes.

**Suffix:** Those bound morphemes placed after the steams are called the suffixes. For example ‘untimely’ here ‘un-’ is a prefix, ‘time’ is the base and ‘-ly’ is a suffix.
Amongst affixes two fundamentally different kinds need to be distinguished. One is derivational affix, which form derived words and another one is inflectional affixes, which form inflected word.

In English there are some inflectional affixes, which are added to both the nominal bases and verbal bases and some inflectional affixes specially used for the verbal bases.

Let us consider these suffixes and their meaning they denote.

**Plural ‘-s’:** This inflectional suffix ‘s’ is added to nominal bases and indicates that there is one object or person. An alternative form for this inflection is ‘-es’. For example in the case of ‘they saw two snakes there, I like to touch flowers etc. There are of course, some words, which look as if they have plural endings. For example the words like ‘clothes, pants, scissors etc, are the nominal stems. But, these words have no singular stem. Therefore these described as one morpheme synchronically.

**Possessive ‘S’:** This inflectional affix is added to a nominal base to indicate that the referent possesses something. For example I am interested in the teacher’s pen. That is Bhagban’s bag etc. in written English possessive ‘-s’ is preceded by an apostrophe.

**Past ‘-ed’:** This inflection ‘-ed’ added to the main verbal base of a sentence to indicate that an event happened in the past or that a state of affairs was true
in the past. For examples, He crossed me very quickly. That is what they decided; he dragged the chair over the window etc.

**Perfective ‘-ed or -en’:** This inflectional affix added to the main verb of a sentence to indicate that an action or event is as-of-now completed. The auxiliary ‘have’ or ‘has’ always accompanies it. For examples, the thief has taken it, you might have dropped it, I have forgotten now etc.

**Present participle ‘-ing’:** This inflectional affix is added to the verb in several different contexts. It can indicate that a verb is secondary to the main verb and completes its meaning. For example when I finished cooking dinner. Here the word ‘cooking’ completes the meaning of ‘finished’. Finished of what? The answer is ‘finished cooking’.

**Past participle ‘-ed or ‘-en’:** This inflectional affix ‘-ed’ or ‘-en’ is similar to the present participle. It is added to a verb to change it into an adjective. For example now it is fixed, here fixed is a participle that function as an adjective. Similarly ‘it is blue, it is huge, this thing is getting wrecked up, I thought it is broken.

**Third person ‘-s’:** This inflectional ending ‘-s’ is added to the main verb to indicate that an action or event happens regularly or that a state of affairs is usual. It is only used when the subject of a sentence is a singular third person noun. For examples she walks to the department. Debashish lives here. She goes to my school etc. All these are therefore minimum units of English language and hence they are called morpheme. The same is true with Sanskrit also. Here also smallest minimum meaningful unit will be called morphemes.
Observation:

As per the verbal cognition is concerned we strongly believe that the modern linguists cannot overlook the oriental perceptive. Because, whatever the meaning personal suffix denote it has to be related to verb and the subject or subjects and the verbal form will have to be co-referential with the subject or subjects. Therefore, here we would like to close this chapter by briefly introducing the analysis of meanings, as we have made in the earlier chapters with the similar judgments in English in different modes of expression. For example, ‘John cooks rice’ and ‘rice is being cooked by John’ can be analyzed in the light of the techniques of the Vaiyākaraṇas and the Naiyāyikas.

The sentence ‘John cooks rice’ has got three terms i.e. 1. John 2. Cooks and 3. Rice. The term ‘John’ is the subject, a particular individual possessing some peculiarities and properties relating to him alone which may be describe by ‘Jhonnness’ or ‘Jhonhood’, the term ‘cooks’ is a verbal form consists of two parts (1) the root ‘cook’ and (2) the suffix ‘-s’ in the present tense and active voice third person singular number. The verb ‘cook’ would mean the particular actions and process by which softening of the rice would take place. The softening of the rice is then the effect of those actions taken together right from the beginning of placing the utensil of cooking on the oven and getting it down from it on completion of the action of cooking. Therefore, a series of actions, in fact, comprises the act of cooking and a single act, which has been clearly pointed out by the Sanskrit scholars and approved by the thinkers of other school of thought.
The suffix ‘-s’ indicates present time, singular number and the agent, according to the grammarian school of thought. The present time is construed with the act or acts of cooking. Whereas; the singular number is to be construed with ‘John’, the agent. The meaning of agent is to be construed with ‘John’, who is qualified by Johnhood. Therefore, any other individual though being the same name should not be considered as the agent of this particular act of cooking, because that individual, does possesses that ‘john-ness’ and this ‘john-ness’.

Rice, the object of cooking has got a special property called ‘rice-ness’ in it, and as such, the objectness is delimited by ‘rice-ness’. The delimiter of the objectness in each and every case is use to make the sense specific. Because rice as rice, i.e. qualified by rice-ness is considered to be the object here only not in any other place. Rice may have a number of properties in it like ‘rice-ness’, contentness of knowledge (Jñānaviśayatā) etc. But ‘rice’ has been taken here as an object of cooking only as rice qualified by rice-ness and not by any other property, which may be existing in it. Similarly, the ‘softening’ of the rice also is to be taken as being qualified by the relational abstract property called ‘softening-ness’ determined by the particular act of cooking here. The particular act of cooking here also is to be understood as being qualified by the particular act-ness (vyāpāratvaviśeṣa) to avoid ambiguity.

The (vikāti) softening of rice should be understood to exist in the rice through a normal relation and not through an uncommon relation. Now if we
use the English name ‘John’ and some other English words to be use in the Sanskrit language then according to the grammar school of analysis we may say *Johnābhinaika kṛtka-taṇḍula niṣṭhavikṣṭtyanukālo vartamānakāliko vyāpāraḥ*, which means, ‘the action relating to the present time and conducive to the softening of rice is existent in John which is qualified by the singular number. If this sentence is analysed in accordance with the Naiyāyika school of thought, then instead of the action (vyāpāra) becoming the most prominent of the contents of the verbal understanding ‘John’ would become the most prominent one.

The grammarians accept ‘dhātvārtha’ is prominent one in the case of verbal understanding. They make their viewpoint justified on the basis of the *Nirukata* statement i.e. ‘bhāvapradhānaṁ ākhyātam’ of Yāska. They claim that this statement is to be supportive to their stand. Therefore the grammarians interpret ākhyāta means root. And the bhāva means action, which is the meaning of the root everywhere. But ‘bhāva’ the meaning of the root always does not fix its meaning such as in the case of ‘bhāve ghṛṇ’ and in the case of ‘tad adhite tad veda’ where the theory of the dhātvārtha does not work.

On the other hand the Mīmāṁsakas’ theory of ‘bhāvanā mukhya viśeṣyaka śābdubodha’ brings contingency for them. And the theory of implication (ākṣepa) of the agent suggested by them does not suit to their position also. Because, if it is accepted that as in the case of ‘jāti’, which implies ‘vyakti’, so ‘agent’ is obtained by the implication can be prominent and as such, the Mīmāṁsakas’ theory of prominence of ‘bhāvanā’ will be
compromised. And, if the activity is admitted as secondary, then, it will go against Yāśka’s statement i.e. ‘bhāvapradhānam ākhyātm’.

If the ‘Naiyāyikas Prathamānta mukhya viśeṣyaka’ theory is taken into consideration it is seen that there is no uniformity. According to them if every sentence is interpreted according to its nature then one has to postulate innumerable of cause and effect relationship. Moreover the grammarians point out the drawback in the sentence like ‘Paśya mṛgo dhāvati’ etc. The cases like ‘paśya mṛga dhāvati or pacati bhavati’ raise doubts whether these expressions should be treated as single sentence at all. If the answer is ‘yes’ there no single theory can be worked out for all the individual systems and there is bound to be variations. But if the answer is ‘no’ the problems created for analysis will disappear. If we elevate the level of ‘pacati’ in the expression ‘pacati bhavati’ from verb to noun, the problem vanishes. Similarly, in the sentence ‘paśya mṛgo dhāvati’ if we treat the object of seeing as the deer qualified by ‘running’ the problem is reduced because action is visible only because the locus is visible.

We do not any attempt in the west to analyse the process of verbal understanding either in the tradition of linguistics or in the tradition of western philosophy of language. Therefore, Indian tradition of ‘Śābdabodhaprakriyā’ is a unique contribution to the study of language-philosophers.

In addition this analysis of the process of understanding a sentence can provide unique insights to computer-scientist who are engaged in artificial
intelligence, language-technology, machine-aided-translations and many other similar areas.