Chapter four

Political Communication and Political Mobilization
As the title suggests, this chapter is divided into two sections: political communication and political mobilisation. In the first section, after defining political communication we go on to examine various related concepts and discuss issues like forms of political communication, mass media in political socialisation, and agenda setting role of the mass media. The second section deals with issues like structure and process of political mobilisation in developing countries, mobilisation and political change, political participation, public opinion, and languages of Indian politics. In all, this is quite a conceptual and rejuvenating chapter.

POLITICAL COMMUNICATION: CONCEPTS, ISSUES AND THEORIES

COMMUNICATION is a powerful factor determining the course, content and effectiveness of political articulation. The ability to communicate has always been a useful skill for the political class. 1 Aristotle kept reminding the statesmen of Athens that although they did not have to be orators, they had to be able to communicate well. In his study of Rhetoric, Aristotle outlined three ways of achieving persuasion. The first depended on the personal character of the speaker, the second on putting the audience into a certain frame of mind, and the third on the proof, or apparent proof, provided by the words of speech itself. 2 Anyone who hoped to persuade successfully, according to Aristotle, needed an ability to reason logically as well as an understanding of human emotions. 3

For the purpose of political articulation is, of course, not just the training of a critical and questioning electorate. “A more basic purpose of political articulation for transitional societies, is that of instilling in people new values and new outlooks. Modernisation calls for the transformation of popular tastes and fashions, the creation
of novel devices and demands, and the welding together of new loyalties. These are all tasks for the popular politicians, and it might seem that if the politicians all present a common front in articulating the new values, the process of modernisation may be facilitated more effectively than if there are conflicting and confusion voices. 

For centuries emperors, kings and aristocrats had less use for voluntary persuasion than the first Greek democrats. But being them officials charged with executing their orders no doubt found life carrier if they could persuade people that decisions which had been arbitrarily arrived at might still benefit those affected by them. By the time representative democracy reappeared at the end of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, mechanical printing had overtaken direct speech as the principal means of communication. This brought with it a huge audience for political messages. In the twentieth century, when the need to persuade is more vital for political survival than of any time in history, radio and television broadcasting have restored the spoken word to competition with the written word as a vehicle for the simultaneous distribution of messages to a mass audience. 

In this context Lucian Pye notes that “a direct relationship exists in all societies between the structure and organisation of communications and the character, tone, and even to a degree, content of political expression.” The politician’s role both as articulator of the collective identity and as champion of specific interests, is invariably conditioned and limited by the media of communications available to him. No leader can rise above the restrictions posed by the specific communications networks to which he has access, and at the same time none can escape the consequences of being surrounded by a communications system. The issue of access along with the level of technology is identified by Pye as two fundamental parameters of any political culture. “The basic character of a political culture is determined, however, primarily by the move complex interrelationships between the structure of the communications systems and the processes by which political interests are given expression and are combined and related to from political programs and policies.” In a study by the committee on comparative politics, a theory of the political process was developed in
which three of the eight universal functions common to all political systems were communications, interest articulation, and interest aggregation.\(^\text{10}\)

Before we go on to discuss political communication and its elements, let's define mass communication specifically suited for a discourse on political system. Let us refer by mass communication "to systems of messages and means of generation and transmission (human and technological) that have three properties: first the messages and the media are intended for a spatially dispersed audience; second, the messages and the media are sufficiently standard to be readily comprehensible to and usable by a large fraction of the intended audience; third, the messages are available, because of media availability, to a large fraction of the relevant population."\(^\text{11}\) The political process relates to mass communication as it affects any of these properties: message content, media personnel and technology, cultural level of messages, and availability of the media output.

Political communication is the deliberate passing of a political message by a sender to a receiver with the intention of making the receiver behave in a way that he might not otherwise have done.\(^\text{12}\) This definition also contains three elements: components of a political message; the methods of passing and distributing the political message; and an intention to make the receiver respond in a particular way.

Messages constitute the raw material of political communication. Without a regular supply of messages any instrument of communication will soon rust up and disintegrate. Before a political message is deliberately constructed for passing to a receiver with the intention of influencing him there must be a conscious political decision. The considerations which surround this decision, the content of the message, and the way in which it is presented are all factors that are worth looking at in examining episodes involving political communication.\(^\text{13}\)

The existence of a message can be established both from the standpoint of the information it contains and the response it attracts. The information needed to prove

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All that is necessary is a coherent and meaningful statement. But the statement must move from sender to receiver and evoke a response. At the basic level, response includes attention and comprehension. Until a message is understood in the same way by the receiver as has been intended by the sender, it will be incomplete.

Once it has been noticed and understood, evaluation and action will determine the effectiveness and lack of effectiveness of the message. If the message has been weighed up by the receiver and if as a result he has decided to do something about it, the message will have succeeded and the chain of communication is complete. But even if the receiver does not evaluate or act, if he listens, understands, and immediately rejects the message, there will still be an example of a completed sequence of political communication, although in this instance as unsuccessful one. Consequently response to a political message can be divided into attention and comprehension, without which political communication cannot begin; and evaluation and action, which are the features of response that determine whether the message achieves its purpose or not.14

The way in which a message is constructed will be affected both by the supposed characteristics of the receiver and by the method of transmission which it is thought will bring the message most effectively to his notice. The variety of ways in which messages are formulated can be grouped into two categories: messages aimed at informing and messages aimed at conditioning.15 A sender who plans to persuade by informing the receiver will construct a message in a form which he anticipates will produce a rational voluntary response in the receiver’s mind. The sender recognises the receiver’s power of choice, but calculates that the information contained in his message is so powerful that the receiver will choose in the way intended. A sender who hopes to persuade by conditioning the receiver incorporates in his message an association between the hard-core information he wishes to communicate and something that he believes will be regarded as desirable by the receiver.
The second element in the definition of political communication is the way in which messages are passed from sender to receiver or distributed to a number of receivers. The first requirement here is to identify sender and receiver. Both sender and receiver will be individuals under the simplest form of communication. In political communication, however, because of the numbers involved, political messages are often distributed by a sender or group of senders to a group of receivers. The same message may also be transmitted through a network of several communications channels at the same time. All this establish the fact that the central feature of political communication as a process remains in individual action. In essence it always comes down to one sender, one political message and one receiver. Often the pattern is repeated over and over again. Sometimes the duplication is immediate; sometimes it is extended over a period. Sometimes receivers will share common characteristics such as support for the same political party. Sometimes they will not, as in a party political broadcast where the number of political opponents in the audience may well be as great as the number of supporters.¹⁶

There is nonetheless a mystique, which surrounds communication and causes it to be regarded as a form of persuasion in itself.¹⁷ This arises partly because of the unusually impersonal character acquired by messages simultaneously received by separate individuals or groups who are conscious of forming a common audience, and partly because of the two principal media of mass communication, printing and broadcasting do tend to spread the indefinable air of authority over both sender and message.¹⁸

FORMS OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION

The method of passing or distributing messages may be written, oral or visual. It may be direct or indirect.¹⁹ In its most simple form, the handing of a slip of paper containing a written message from one individual to another at a meeting is a straightforward act of political communication. Or the message may be
communicated in a public speech made by a political leader to an audience of people who have come along in person to hear what he has to say. Communication between individuals or small groups over a distance may be achieved by letter, telegram, cable or telephone. All these are instruments of direct person to person communication. This form of communication, however, is not efficient for sending across a message to a large group of people. Very large categories of receivers, such as voters, housewives or farmers, are usually so close to the total composition of the society itself as to require communicating with by the nation wide mass communication media which exist to distribute information and entertainment to the maximum audience they can reach.

The main difference between the mass media and other more direct methods of communication lies in their lack of discrimination. Since the message cannot be designed to suit each member of a mass audience, the most that can be done is to try and take into account an estimate of the common features of the audience and make the message as acceptable as possible.

Deliberate political communication will always contain an element of intended persuasion. However, all political messages are not communicated intentionally. Direct but haphazard personal influences like casual conversation, individual conduct, and trust can paradoxically amount to more effective persuasion than deliberately distributed political messages. The extent to which mass attitudes and behaviour are indirectly motivated by intentional political messages, communicated to local opinion leaders (a term used by Lazarsfeld) who then act as social relay points, passing the message out, deliberately or otherwise, to a wider public is one of the major questions addressed to by students of communication.

An intention to make the receiver respond to the message by behaving in a particular way is the third element in the definition of political communication. Persuasion may at times result even where there is no deliberate intention to persuade. In these circumstances, as in cases where there is no deliberate passing of a message, there
will hardly be sufficient material for study and definition. 22

**MASS MEDIA IN POLITICAL SOCIALISATION**

While studying mass media as instruments of political socialisation, our attention is immediately directed to that part of the total media content, which has manifest functions for political socialisation. But the news of the wider world, items about the local and national scene, political commentary, or editorial matter are lessons in politics which are imbedded in a larger media package containing assorted religious, artistic, scientific, commercial, and entertaining content all surrounded by flashy wrappings. 23

Lucian Pye has asked whether political communication has different outcomes for political socialisation depending on the package within which it is contained. 24 The simple general answer must be yes. In pondering the significance of patterns of communication content for political socialization, the relations between core political content and non-political wrappings, one soon realises that the wrapping alone may make some contribution by itself. 25 There are implicit political lessons within the most innocent subject matter. Even that part of the media package designed merely to entertain the audience, or to sell a product and make money for a producer, may well serve the latent function of political socialisation. However, due to the problems associated with the learners, this does not happen always.

The non-political content mediates and modifies the response to political communication by acting not merely as filler but also as buffer between the audience and the political world, insulating them from the undesirable effects of an overdose of politics. 26 Once upon a time politics may have been a fun to watch, a good spectator sport, but now so much of it is unrelieved crisis that the audience can’t take it. Certainly political communication serves the function of bringing home reality, of inducting the citizen into his proper responsibilities and concerns; but it may also make him flee when his anxiety mounts too high. 27 The buffer provided by the non-
political element may thus create a responsive audience for political news, and one that reacts in less extreme fashion.

The non-serious content may however, infuses apathy, passivity, and escapism among the audience, many argue. There may be some truth in this formulation when it is given careful qualification and considerable specification; but empirical evidences do not support this idea.\(^\text{28}\) One escapes into something when one is escaping into something else. Complex political news creates the sense of futility and in turn apathy; news that is too threatening induces a desire to escape. The design of media package just be right as too much buffer prevents the audience from perceiving the reality.\(^\text{29}\)

Indirect support for the "buffer" formulation and refined evidence on the relations between effectiveness of a communication and magnitude of threat are provided by the well-known experiment of Janis and Feshback in which three messages varying in magnitude of threat were employed to persuade subjects to conform to proper dental hygiene.\(^\text{30}\) The message which contained maximum threat was found to be less effective than the moderately threatening message and the subjects exposed to it did not differ from a conjure group. The buffers apart from allaying anxiety may also work in still another fashion to reduce one of the major obstacles to the effectiveness of the media. Selective exposure, attention, and memory, by which individuals defend themselves against hostile information, are less operative when the first part of a medium or communication to which they are exposed is pleasurable or congenial. C. Hovland and his associates have demonstrated this by other experiments in their research programme.\(^\text{31}\)

Janis and Feshback varied magnitude of threat by manufacturing three different messages in the laboratory situation.\(^\text{32}\) The mass media can also manipulate level of threat implicit in real news by editorial handling of political news, but an alternative approach is through a proper mixture of buffer material.
Patterns of audience behaviour, the kinds of overlapping exposure to various media and classes and types of content have been a subject of considerable study in media research in the United States, and the many findings do not lend themselves to ready summary. Some of the relations observed seem to favour the model of opposition; some subgroups concentrate on one type of exposure to the detriment of other types of exposure, easy pleasurable content being far more popular than serious content; but there is much evidence to suggest a simple typology of those who show a diffuse and general interest versus those who are not interested in anything at all in the media. When we come to the findings just now beginning to emerge from media research in fewer countries, the conclusion seem to be even less ambiguous. Given the difficulties of research pioneering, the techniques of inquiry are still rudimentary field work, sampling designs, and instruments must be greatly improved clustering, intercorrelations, of preferences and exposures must be analyzed for individuals and sub-groups in order to arrive at unambiguous interpretations, but fairly confident conclusion. For example, in East Africa those individuals who have come into the orbit of the mass media seem to have diffuse interest in most of the output. Popular music is one of their very strong interests, but so too is news. In a more sophisticated inquiry among urban populations in West Africa, both news and music form a constellation in which the audience is highly interested. Overlapping exposure to several different media seems also to occur. Radio listening and cinema go with reading the press.

Highly elaborate and sophisticated surveys of audience behaviour in traditional societies have been analyzed intensively and reported on by Lerner in his work on Middle East, and his conclusions seem in accord with the formulation presented. The transitional and modern groups within a society have the kind of character structure which makes them responsive to new experience, emphatic, and participant; and they have high exposure to the media. It is the traditional groups, who do not exhibit exposure to the mass media, who are passive and non-political.

To reconcile the various comparative findings a pattern of exposure to the diverse
contents of the media may call for a kind of development model. As a society and population experience their first exposure to the mass media, diffuse and general interest is created and perhaps the simple and palatable contents - the fancy wrappings of the media package - help initiate and as buffer, then maintain the high interest. Later on, interest may become differentiated and canalised into more exclusive types of exposure.

Eisenstadt’s study of patterns of communication as determinants of socialisation may help to throw light or many of the issues being considered here. Within the boundaries of Israel, Eisenstadt found various sub-societies contrasted culturally and located at points along the continuum of modernisation ranging from the most traditional (a Yemenite group) to the transitional (a North African group) to the most urban and modern (a group of European immigrants). For each group, Eisenstadt mapped out the characteristic patterning of communication, the way different classes of communication content are mixed and the vehicles by which they are carried. Such an inquiry might have remained purely descriptive and ethnographic, but Eisenstadt begins to explore the way in which the effectiveness of external communications from the state of Israel intended to instruct and socialise the immigrants is dependent on whether the new packaging matches the culturally prescribed patterning of communication.

Eisenstadt distinguishes three main classes of communication content: technical content, which provides instruction and information; general cognitive content, which covers news ranging from gossip to politics; and normative content, which defines what is proper behaviour and is oriented to the transmission and maintenance of social norms.

Eisenstadt observes that while all the different kinds of communication content were found in the three groups studied, "there are ... important differences in what may be called the pattern of communication, in the interrelation between various types of communications, in the extent to which they go together or are segregated in their
transmission and reception.\textsuperscript{43} Eisenstadt devotes most of his treatment to the analysis of the various patterns. Thus, for example, the Yemenite group does not combine what he term "hierarchical normative" content with other normative communications. But the consequence of this institutionalised patterns noted, for the Yemenites, "have quite often proved a despair to the various instructors who have been sent to guide them, and who usually cannot understand the almost complete apathy of the people to communications in which this separation does not exist."\textsuperscript{44}

Eisenstadt comes up with various suggestive findings. There is a suggestion that subcultures differ in whether local versus society-wide communications can be blended in one package. There is another suggestion that the tone or style surrounding a communication must be the appropriate one for its meaning to be accepted. For the Yemenite subjects, messages boomeranged because "the agricultural instructor speaks every day as if it were Yom Kippur (The Day of Atonement) and wants to be taken seriously."\textsuperscript{45} A study of elite communication in Samoa by Keesings found something on these lines.\textsuperscript{46} In Samoa, the clash of cultures manifests itself in the different oratorical wrappings which Western and Samoan Parliamentarians customarily employ for political discourse. Each group gets offended by the others packaging although they understand perfectly well the inner core of the others communication.\textsuperscript{47}

Responses to a communication are governed in part by whether or not the package within which it is contained is experienced as incongruous\textsuperscript{48} This experience in turn seems dependent upon cultural factors which define appropriate patterns for communications. Responses to a communication are also mediated by the packaging through effects on judgmental and cognitive processes. There is much evidence in experimental psychology that support this formulations for example is one experiment it was found that word descriptions and adjectives take on altered meaning defending on the particular series of adjectives which precede them.\textsuperscript{49} Whatever may be the wrappings that come with communication, it is a fact that the mass media can greatly contribute to political socialisation. "As instruments of socialization, they are efficient and their threat is vast enough to cover the huge populations requiring
modernization.” Their standardization is the very thing suited to producing widespread national infirmities in patterns of behaviour; and their spirit is modern. By contrast, while the conventional agencies of socialization in a society, parents, teachers, peers, neighbours, and the like - can be more flexible in suiting the lesson to the capacities and needs of the particular learner and more potent an influence, the outcomes cannot be as uniform and their efforts are often directed against modernisation. The time and the stage must be taken into consideration in weighing properties of the different agencies of socialisation.

**Barriers to Effective Socialization by Mass Media**

There are barriers to the effectiveness of mass media in socialization, especially in developing countries. Most fundamental is the limitation in the supply of the mass media in the poor countries of the world. According to UNESCO, per 100 inhabitants, the standard of 10 copies of newspaper, five radios, two cinema seats, and two television receivers is used to clarify countries as to the adequacy of their media facilities. “As many as 100 states and territories in Africa, Asia and Latin America fall below this very low ‘minimum’ level in all four of the mass media. These countries have a combined population of 1,910 millions or 66 per cent of the world total.”

“In addition, for print media, high rates of illiteracy cut down on the effective supply; for electronic media, the power and character of the transmitters must be considered; for movies, the concentration of conventional facilities in the urban areas and the variety of mobile projectors for the rural areas should be noted; and for all types of media vehicles, the multilingual nature of the audience in many of the countries increases the cost and difficulty of effective communication.”

There are also psychological barriers to the effectiveness of the mass media stemming from the audience. The mass media are instruments of socialisation, but one must have some prior socialisation before the media can act on him/her. One has to be
prepared to understand the media, to accept the technical convert each particular form of communication.

**AGENDA SETTING ROLE OF MASS MEDIA IN**

Having discussed various dimensions of political communication mass media in political socialisation, we now review some the around the issue of the effectiveness of the mass media in politics.

The might of the pen and of press is conventional wisdom that goe: years. Rosencrantz in Hamlet said: “many wearing rapiers are afrai
But when this axiom was subjected to scientific investigation, questioned. Frank Luther Mott, the Journalism historian, investiga in the 35 presidential election campaigns from 1796 to 1940, the At its majority support - to the winning candidates 18 times and to the 17 times." Chance could not have played a more evenhanded role.

**Hypodermic Theories**

Yet no one to the present day believes that the press is powerless. of the press is implicit in the idea of harnessing the mass media to social, economic military, and political tasks - a thought that go: government in World War II, when it had to farina huge citizen ε The Army’s Education and Information Division needed to find various available techniques of communication were most effecti sequence and in combination. An experimental section was psychologist I. Hovland, to study among other things, the diffe effectiveness of the mass media." Hovland’s team conducted its empirical research in the conte
suggested by political scientist Harold D. Lasswell to describe the communication process: “who says what to whom with what effect?” The studies death with the persuasiveness of the different media, but were later continued by the same group of psychologist’s of Yale University to include the effectiveness of various types of messages and communications.58 Most of them reached the conclusion that all other things being equal, the more personal a medium the more efficiently persuasive it is. Thus, face-to-face communication is more effective than television, which is more effective than film, radio, and print in that order.59

Gerhart D. Wiebe developed deductively a rationale for the greater effectiveness of more personal media and tested his theory empirically. He found out that the reason television is more vivid, more suggestive of “immediate reality” than radio, which in turn is more real than print, is that radio is one symbol system removed from reality (the spoken word), while print is two symbol system - two levels of abstraction-removed. This is because the printed word is a symbol for the spoken word, which in turn is a symbol for reality. Wiebe further argued that television is experienced in an intimate frame of reference, while newspaper accounts are perceived in a distant frame of reference.60

Reviewing the research findings of the previous two decades in 1960, Joseph T Klapper reached the conclusion that “mass communication ordinarily does not serve as a necessary and sufficient cause of audience effects, but rather functions among and through a nexus of mediating factors and influences.”61 He went on to add that “the efficacy of mass communication in creating opinion... can be gauged only in reference to issues on which, at the time of exposure, people are known to have no opinion at all.”62

**Information-Seeking Theories**

These consistency theories, and especially Leon Festinger’s cognitive dissonance theory, put researchers on a new track. The theories stated that people like their
beliefs and judgements about things to be consistent with one another. To reduce the dissonance created by inconsistencies, people expose themselves to facts, events, and judgements through communication or selectively shut out such communication to avoid dissonance. They might even selectively perceive, or misperceive, and selectively retain information to the same land. 63

Contrary to the Lasswellian paradigm, the crucial question here was who needs to receive what messages from whom? The emphasis was on the seeking and avoiding of information rather than on the transmission of instruction or urging of opinion change. Furthermore, a distinction started to be made between informational communication and persuasive communication. The mass media had been weighed in the balance and found clearly wanting in persuasiveness – at least in the short run. People don’t do things or change their attitudes or even opinions simply because they are asked to a told to by an individual, directly and through the mass media. 64

In the light of information seeking theories, Alex S. Edelstein based on his study of audiences of United States and Yugoslavia concluded that sources of information were evaluated not in terms of their trust, worthiness and credibility but in terms of their content, breadth of perception, and availability. 65 Television provided the greatest breadth of perception, and if seeing was important to the audience, television was the preferred medium. Newspaper provided the greatest breadth of content and the most lime to think, while radio was the most available medium. 66 Clearly this view is based on a “uses and gratification’s” theory rather than a hypodermic theory – the user of information being the one who determines what medium to use. He also makes the judgement about its believability, depending on whether it gratifies his needs. It is not the communicator who manipulates his medium or his message and its environment to create a desired effect.

**Agenda Setting Function**

Bernard C. Cohen pointed out that “the press may not be successful much of the time
in telling people what to think, but its stunningly successful is telling its readers what to think about.\textsuperscript{67} Picking up this frame, two communication specialists, Maxwell E. McCombs and Donald L. Shaw, in a landmark study in 1972 found that voters who were undivided in the 1968 presidential election tended to give the same priorities to issues in the campaign as were given to the issues by the news media.\textsuperscript{68} They concluded by saying that the reason for this was that the press sets the agenda for its audiences. It provides the facts, for the most part that make up the cognitive world of each individual. This agenda setting power of the press is directive rather than reactive. The press does not merely reflect developments, which also influence the general public in the same way. The press actually picks certain issues to play up at times that do not necessarily parallel the significance of those events.\textsuperscript{69}

G. Ray Funkhouser showed this by doing a content analysis of three weekly newsmagazines for the 1960s. The number of articles on such issues as the Vietnam War, race relations, student unrest, and inflation peaked in years when the events themselves were not at their highest point of importance and activity. What is especially noteworthy and supportive of the agenda setting role of the press is that the peaks in news coverage coincided with peaks in the proportion of people who picked these issues as the "most important problem facing America" in Gallup Polls. On the other hand, they were not the issues that people felt the government should devote most of its most of its attention to. Funkhouser concluded "the average person takes the media's word for what the 'issues' are, whether or not he personally has only involvement and interest in them."\textsuperscript{70} And one might add: he rates them as important whether or not they have the salience in reality that the press gives them.

All this agrees very well with what information-seeking theorists had been saying for some time and with what those basing their research on the agenda setting paradigm are now saying. The mass media tend to inform rather than to change attitudes. The conclusions drawn from the information denied from the media may direct attitudes one way another, and it is only when nothing is competing from one's own past experience that media experience become real and their value one adopted a one's
own. This however, happens very infrequently in our multimedia society.71

**POLITICAL MOBILIZATION**

Political, as opposed to religious or military mobilization, is the collective and structured expression of commitment and support within society. Such expression may take the form of political parties or quasi parties, interest groups, movements, etc., anything that has a well-articulated structure.

What is the function of political mobilization in society? “Mobilization is not a structure in the strict, possible in any sense; the assignment of a systemic function according to structural functionalism has little meaning. Indeed it could well be viewed as a dysfunction in a strictly systemic context.”72 Some writers of considerable sophistication certainly suggest such an interpretation.

Samuel P. Huntington, for instance, argues that mobilization and political institutionalization of process are, or may be dichotomous.73 It is therefore, proposed here to adopt a somewhat wider definition of the concept in this case which includes notion of meaning and direction and which is based on process and action. The discussion, as borrowed from Nettle, itself will make clear just what is intended.

Political mobilization is a form of social mobilization, which corresponds to a particular era, and certain special needs. In a sense “it is historically the last and latest form of mobilization following religious and military mobilizations as potential alternatives or complementarities.”74 This aspect of substitution and complementarity is important, for although the propensity of a society to become mobilized may vary over time, the form such mobilization will take, is perhaps governed by more general factors which are not entirely within the control of each society but correspond to some form of international culture. The historical decline of religious mobilization is too well known to need elaboration. As for military mobilization, though its extent or inclusive range has increased continually through time, its saliency or primacy has not
except temporarily at moments of national crisis or war. “In Europe and America the emphasis, has been on the aspect of a soldiers growing ‘civility’ and professionalization, at least since the First World War.” In other countries, the civilian and military functions have become partially fused, so that army service fulfils essential socialization and value orientation function, as in Switzerland, Israel, Brazil and now increasingly in Arab countries. Part of the ‘missing’ component of political mobilization is thus supplied by remnants of military mobilization serving political functions. At the same time many countries which continue to rely on techniques of military mobilization today do so is highly political, value oriented terms which go well beyond the defence of fatherland. Thus emerging countries found often to fuse military and political mobilization.

Political and religious mobilizations are essentially cleavage mobilizations. As religious cleavages declined in the West after the 17th Century the corresponding form of mobilization also either declined or became transposed into a political version. Politics/collectivities increasingly incorporated the expression of religious cleavage. In fact the attenuated religious cleavage between Protestants and Catholics provides one of the three major bases of political cleavage in many countries of the West. Military mobilization is on a somewhat different dimension, since it does not itself provide a basis of cleavage - except perhaps during the period of the private, almost self-sufficient mercenary army in Europe from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century. It is normally to be viewed as an instrument of mobilization based on the last two hundred years on the ‘ready-made’ international cleavage created by national states. In this sense therefore military mobilization is a crosscutting cleavage to that created by politics. In the West it has often served as a temporary means of overcoming domestic political cleavage in times of crisis or war. Many developing countries also view this similarly. “Political mobilization, then, is to be considered as differential commitment and support for collectivities based on cleavages. Such cleavages obviously very from society to society.”

In England the cleavages of political mobilization date back to the 17th century and
the mobilization connected with them took their reference in the last resort from the Puritan revolution and revolution of 1688. Moreover, the existence of an elected House of Commons, and the process of election to it, provided an initial if mainly symbolic form of mobilization in the 18th Century. Personal interest had thinly disguised as a political issue within a narrow electorate. The English case here is different from the rest of Europe. This is, firstly because the different areas of cleavage have never been very clear cut; secondly the structure of collectivities has tended to dictate the cleavages instead of the more common and probably inverse relationship. And finally because new cleavages like those arising from industrialization has again been aligned with and superimposed upon, older cleavages. “The elitist political culture, moreover, has ensured that this superimposition of cleavages, instead of summing conflict, has in fact helped to reduce it.”

In the rest of Western Europe the cleavages are a much more dominant feature in the structure of political systems. “Instead of being the product of an existing political sub-system within a society, as in England, they in fact helped to create and shape the political sub-system; society itself is in part the product of institutionalized conflict based on such cleavages.” This formal structure of conflict delayed the emergence of groups which, though interest-specific in their orientation, nonetheless avoided the formal political process institutionalized around the competitive electoral system - the plethora of interest and pressure groups as we know them today. In England and America, on the other hand, the cleavages are not directly the product of the political system structure; the historic social cleavages of society failed, therefore, to find full or adequate expression in the form of parties and tended accordingly to become partly institutionalized in the form of groups which did not compete electorally. What are these cleavages? They can be organized under five categories, each corresponding to a major conflict in Europe at a distinct epoch. Each has left a social cleavages of some kind, on to which the next major conflict has then superimposed a new cleavage, so that the political systems of Europe are in effect an accretion of different conflicts, expressed in terms of cleavage collectivities which are structured partly in
accordance with each separate cleavage and partly represent a fusion or summation of conflicts.\textsuperscript{84}

1. **The Reformation Cleavage:** This is essentially a religious conflict that had become transposed into a political cleavage during the first half of the century.

2. **The French Revolution Cleavage:** This is a none diffuse but wider ranging cleavage, finding political expression in terms of Church vs. State, conservative vs. rationalist, private vs. public priorities. This Cleavage has most strongly marked in countries with a strong state tradition.

3. **The Industrialization Cleavage:** This too is a widely extended cleavage, institutionalized as a line up of employers vs. workers, free vs. planned enterprise earned vs. redistributed value etc. It is almost universally reflected in European and American politics, either in relatively distinct structural form or mixed with other cleavage structure.

4. **The Urban-Rural Cleavage:** Antidotes the industrialization cleavage but crosscuts with it in many countries, and largely dominated the latter in pre-war Eastern Europe and Austria.

5. **The Centre-Periphery Cleavage:** This is now only an echo of its former importance. This was once important in countries like Norway and Spain, especially where it was superimposed on a linguistic cleavage. The growth of universalistic perspectives in a national-social framework has to some extent submerged the saliency of such historical cleavages in each society.

It is pertinent here to ask as to what extent the model of political mobilization in developed countries offers useful lessons and techniques to the Third World. Let's first of all locate the main differences in experience and expectations as compared with the West, borrowing from Rustow.\textsuperscript{85}
Most obviously the cleavage bases of the West simply do not exist in the Third World; indeed it is of the essence of political mobilization in most developing countries today that such cleavages as do exist - tribal, ethnic, etc. - should not be allowed to act as a base for mobilization and to develop into specific mobilization structures. The cleavage issue dimension is thus differently organized, its potential existence is recognized as a danger and every effort is made in terms of values, norms and collectivities to prevent its emergence as a historical factor in governing the political process. This means that any model of political process based on cleavages, in which interest articulation predominates will not serve the elite values and goals of developing societies.86

Mobilization is largely from the top downwards in national-institutional forms through a government party. This places a strong accent, in value, and normative terms on authority legitimation. “Mobilization is overt, and every attempt is made to avoid conflict in commitment to party or state either by having only one party, or by identifying the ruling party from among several with the special aura of such fused legitimacy.”87 Hence models, which, though they may fulfil the functional requirements, do not possess the corresponding value emphasis, will not serve, especially where the ideological emphasis is on interest articulation, Britain is a glaring example. An electoral system for deciding between leaders of small groups competing for the institutionalized authority of the crown evolved in the course of the 18th century. The collective behaviours, the extra-institutional mobilization accompanying early industrialization up to the middle of the 19th century helped to bring about the extension of benefit of these electoral techniques to much larger areas of the population.

Political mobilization is focussed on national perspectives in developing countries. “Mobilization is a functional process for the attainment of the goal of national integration; the regained saliency and level of commitment are high.”88 Accordingly no model, which differentiates between cleavage mobilization and national perspectives or whose national integration is the product of a historical transfer of
symbolic sovereignty from rules to people, and thus does not depend on specifically mobilized commitments, can serve as a useful example. This disbars all those Western models, which do not make specific structural provision for national mobilization in term of referenda or referendum type elections in which intra-societal cleavage structure plays only a marginal role. The Soviet Union "obviously an important source of ideas and orientation. The reconstitution of the French Polity in 1958, with the constitutional amendment of 1962, also offers a possible model for developing countries; even though there is specific provision for interest articulating election in which parties are to play their role." 89

Finally developing countries are not dependent on anything like the same degree as the West on historic legitimacy accorded to the result of an election held under formal rules designed, or at least believed, to enforce both a fair and a rational result. 90 Such legitimacy is particularly connected with the interest articulation function. The ideological component is greater here than in the authority legitimation function for which balloting seems in many ways more natural and logical. Developing countries often retain non-electoral means of conferring legitimacy; especially in so far as the question of interest is held to be subsumed under that of authority legitimation. Just as mobilization is overt and manifest, and based on international rather than intra-national cleavages, so must any electoral process be as little manifestly divisive as possible. Since interest is held to be more divisive than roles for individual representatives of identical interests, interest-articulating elections are not likely to comment themselves as models and societies for whom such election are considered to be the essential prism of legitimacy, through which any institutionalized authority must pass in order to obtain acceptance, will not commend themselves as models either. 91
Western political parties, at least those whose goals lie within the area of accepting the basic value system of society tend necessarily to be both authority building and interest articulation instruments. The extreme cases of pure interest articulation and authority legitimation are ideal typical abstractions. But one or other of these divergent functions dominates at any one period. To operate successfully as authority legitimisers, political parties must use the technique of interest articulation forced on them by system of election, which, however they may otherwise vary, all demand some mobilization. Even in those presidential systems where in authority building and interest articulation are structurally and processually separated, the individual to be elected as chief executive still needs the logistic support of party. In a situation of inheritance such rationalised specific possibilities of mobilization do not usually exist and neither therefore does any readily available logistic support; this has usually to be created.

"A long-standing, value-oriented and highly structured movement like Congress in India may seem to approximate it but cannot under the umbrella of overall, often rather simplistic, disassociation values, provide the norm oriented and differentiated infrastructure which makes European parties viable. Whatever the possibility of cleavage mobilization in developing countries and this certainly exists, though it is strongly de-emphasized by the goal formulating elites the issue end of the dimension is largely lacking; as suggested, a spatial model of party competition makes no empirical sense. The dominant single issue countries to be the inheritance national independence and existence."

To this extent political conflict has strongly consummatory overtones; normative orientations tend to be resisted or supported in value-oriented terms and symbols. Thus even where some shared commitment to common values exists, as in India, the
structuring of conflict in norm oriented term is difficult; the search will be for consensus rather than accommodation of conflict which in view of the participants, cannot always be contained. Moreover, the basis of political legitimacy is anchored in inheritance; any challenge to the legitimacy of the ruling party is viewed as a challenge to inheritance itself. This identification of legitimacy with inheritance is highly personal in many developing countries. Commitment to party is either based on communal, religious or racial interest, or a limited transfer to a party structure of the personal legitimacy of a small inheritance elite or a single charismatic leader. (We shall discuss in detail with reference to Gandhi) Where the Indian Congress has developed some of the competitive, issue-oriented features of Western political parties, which it combines with many typical inheritance elements, it is one of the rare cases of such adaptation. In many developing countries the predominance of value oriented mobilization in favour of nation or party and against all manifestations of cleavage, in combination with highly personal, charismatic leadership, prevents the emergence of anything resembling a Western political party. ⁹⁴

Inheritance situations have therefore given rise to political parties of a special type, fulfilling rather special functions in the political system. ⁹⁵

The most important of these is to provide logistic support strong enough (a) to impress the departing colonial power, often oriented to the visible manifestations of mass support as proof of legitimacy, with the strength of the party's claim to become its political successor or alternatively to make the party strong enough to throw the colonial power out of force; (b) to overcome its various social and economic as well as political opponents; (c) to move the country forward up the steep slope demanded by the current, almost universally accepted, developmental goals. This obviously regains a high level of mobilization both in terms of numerical proportion of the politically acculturated and in terms of devotion and compliance within the party. ⁹⁶

On the face of it Western political democracy – which is a compromise fusion of these two functions with a legitimacy base, and a symbolic interest superstructure or
vice-versa has this little to offer except an outward shell of techniques and structural forms. Developing societies adapt and transform these as quickly as possible. Under the cover of an dissociative element an alternative legitimacy structure has often evolved in developing societies (Congress in India, CPP in the Gold Coast, Mapai in Israel) very like the ‘state within the state’ of pre-1914 social democracy in Germany, and of course, the Bolshevik prior to 1917.\(^97\)

This dichotomy between grass roots and centre, which is present to a greater or lesser extent in all but strongly legitimizing political parties everywhere, is one of the significant features of politics in developing countries. In developed countries the patronage or pork barrel interests of party functionaries (Mapai, Italian Christian Democrats, MRP, Austrian parties) or luminaries (French Radical Party, Italian Liberals, German FDP) are generally able to overcome most of the centre periphery difficulties, with some exceptions like Norway.\(^98\) But in developing countries the divergence is different, both in orientation and in kind. For one thing, local politics in tribal or caste societies are almost exactly zero sum games, in which strategy is to a large extent predetermined. For instance, if the Reddi (caste) candidate is a communist; then the Kamma candidate will often automatically be congress.\(^99\)

**NATIONAL INTEGRATION: A FORM OF MOBILIZATION**

National integration is one of the essential forms of Third World mobilization. “Its reference points, symbols and selection of goals, in fact the whole context of modern nationalism, are relevant here only in so far as it is a means of mobilization and/or concern factors of efficiency.”\(^100\)

Firstly, national constitutional mobilization puts emphasis on all the old-fashioned texts of national identity that the West takes largely for granted. There, symbols are needed only for occasional reference. In colonial situations the assertion of national identity, even of national existence, is not so much a matter of desirable future, but a case of asserting historical and abstract rights of which the country concerned has in
the past been deprived by the foreign colonial power. For example, African leaders see evidence of this in the colonial powers' preoccupation with local administration as opposed to central government, and of course in the whole divisive technique of indirect rule. But the basic justification of national existence is not so much history but morality by liberal and Marxist standards. "Thus we have the assertion of a logical legal right in the form of an historical one."102

One of the reasons for this emphasis on legalism is the fact that one of the most successful elementary forms of mobilization of otherwise unadulterated sections of the periphery of society is the claim for the return of rights believed to have been illegally removed or denied. For example, it is noted that preaching the inequity of land distribution, and the resultant glaring discrepancies in social status and economic returns to peasant in North East Brazil, are far less remunerative than the much narrower presentation of ancient legal rights with regard to land and water illegally taken away. This desire for some previous status quo rather than any genuine advance, in combination with the ability to verify rights by learning to read, is the primary moving factor behind much rural discontent in developing countries. This is of course a sectional or class mobilization of a low, often anomie or riotous order.103 The instrumentality of denied rights as a mobilizing factor applies just as strongly to the higher norm and value-oriented mobilizations of assertive nationalism in whole societies. Following inheritance, the rulers find the reassertion of denied or obliterated national rights an effective medium of mobilization.104

In this context, it is pertinent to point out that student community in developing countries is among the most sensitive groups in becoming aware of and asserting allegedly deprived rights. They have played an important role both in providing successful support for mobilizing regimes, as well as in opposing and often overthrowing unsuccessful ones.105 They perceive the value system of national development, which is articulated through symbols, as right. Their access to information probably helps them to scan and evaluate performance more accurately than any other single group of society, except perhaps the ruling elite. It has been
found that students are less willing to accept information dissonance and they require a greater level of information constraint than that at which the ruling elite are accustomed to operate for the benefit of the peripherally mobilized population. Yet students cannot manipulate symbols and assert goals in a manner capable of producing such congruence.\textsuperscript{106} This may hold particularly in those cases where the ruling elite is self-consciously operating at low educational levels.

**LEGITIMACY, MOBILIZATION AND POLITICAL CHANGE**

Beneath the new and adapted means of mobilization in developing countries, both ideological and structural, there lurks a concept of legitimacy substantially different from that of the West. The West postulated a notion of the state or national and its legitimacy embodied in a historical tradition and based on a long period of national development and autonomy which has been internalized by the participants.\textsuperscript{107} In developing countries, however, we must look to a very different source of legitimacy. First, there are aspects of association and dissociation that can be better understood as part of a synthesis with more traditional styles of authority legitimation. These are based on a strong articulation of social distance - not entirely unlike the clothing of legitimate authority with divine sanction that formed the basis of rule in classical Egypt, Mesopotamia, Greece and also Rome. It is not necessary here to investigate too closely the relationship between religious and political components in developing countries. It is sufficient to note that the style of legitimacy sought and accorded tends to accentuate individual supremacy, at least in symbolic terms what has summarily been referred to so far as charisma, but also contains substantial elements of patrimonialism as defined by Weber as part of his concept of *Herrschaft*.\textsuperscript{108}

Such charisma, however, is not only related to a particular person and his standing and achievement, but to a social style and social setting which make the emergence of such leaders probably or even necessary.

But it is not merely a matter of personal leadership whether institutionalized in terms
of office or not. Legitimacy in developing countries is a particular combination of authoritative legitimacy personified by an outstanding leader and a structure or structures through which such charisma is scrutinized. Such structures may be parties, bureaucracies, or both in collaboration or in conflict while, therefore, the various structures appear to suggest some similarity with the authority legitimation parties and state bureaucracies of Western countries, it is the additional presence of the charismatic leader that limits the analogy with the Western case. The mobilization structures do not ultimately derive their legitimacy from elections nor from the accretion of Hegelian legitimacy accorded to a state bureaucracy, but from the values and norms of dissociation emphasized by the structure and personified by the continuative legitimacy taken over by the charismatic leader. Hence, Nettle refers to this type of leadership as that of charismatic arbiter.

There is, of course, a wide range in the relative components of the traditional and the inheritance aspects of such legitimacy on the part of charismatic arbiters. Empirical cases range from a leader of almost purely traditional authority like Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia or the Shah of Persia, both acting in a personally modern role, to the greater emphasis on the arbitration aspect of leadership as in the case of President Sukarno of Indonesia.

Based on a long experience of India in particular and South-East Asia in general, Hugh Tinker has highlighted the dramaturgical basis of legitimacy in these countries, in order to contrast it most firmly with the electoral legitimacy of the West and to emphasize the West's tendency to regard the needs of developing politics exclusively in its own terms. We briefly review the arguments.

Essentially the structure of legitimacy orientations in many traditional as well as developing societies is based on the ability of the ruler to provide a show, whose symbols and processes are held to be in keeping with the ascribed status of legitimate rule. The extent to which such a show maintain the interest and involvement of participating spectators also governs the legitimacy which the ruler will be accorded;
if the show is boring or irrelevant, or the symbols are unsuitable to expectations which themselves may be conservative or changing, legitimacy may begin to be withdrawn. The audience will still attend, but with reduced commitment. Since an actor-audience relationship does not possess a structured means of giving approval to legitimate authority through positive acts like voting, the orientations toward authority are, from an analyst’s point of view, latent or residual. They do not find expression in positive acts of authority. Legitimations but in a latent complex of attitudes towards authority which may become activated only when an if its legitimacy is challenged from outside. Thus the legitimacy of institutionalized authority may erode gradually in the course of time, though there may not be any ready means by which outside observers can assess the erosion. When, however, a challenge arises the latent orientations of the audience will be translated either into willingness to support the regime, passive indifference or possibly hostility responsive to the outside threat.

**Political Participation**

Political participation is the involvement of groups and individuals at various levels in the political system. Involvement expresses itself in various kinds of overt or manifest political activities. Nie and Verba’s definition includes in the orbit of political participation “those legal activities by private citizens which are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or the actions they take.”\(^{112}\) Political participation is a necessary ingredient of every political system. Although political power in every society is monopolized by just a few, “the incumbent of political authority in every system is found to be quite keen on ensuing some amount of political participation by the people.”\(^{113}\) The reason for this is not difficult to understand. By involving the many in the matters of the state. Political participation fosters stability and order by reinforcing the legitimacy of political authority. After all “participation is the principal means by which consent is granted or withdrawn in a democracy and rulers are made accountable to the ruled.”\(^{114}\)
Political participation denotes a series of voluntary activities, which have a bearing on the political process that involves issues like the selection of rulers and the various aspects of the formation of public policy. To be more specific, these activities mainly are:

(i) Voting at the polls

(ii) Supporting possible pressure groups by being a member of from

(iii) Personally communicating directly with legislators

(iv) Participation in political party activity and thus acquiring a claim on legislators and

(v) Engaging in habitual dissemination of political opinions through word of mouth communications to other citizens. ¹¹⁵

Lester Milbrath clubs these activities under the following three categories: gladiatorial activities, transitional activities, and spectator activities.¹¹⁶ Gladiators represent that small number of party activists whose active association with political parties keeps them engaged in a series of direct party activities like holding party offices, attending party meetings, raising party funds, and fighting elections as party candidates. Transitional activities include attending party meetings as party supporters or party sympathizers or just as neutral but attentive listeners, making contributions to the party funds and making contracts with public officials or party personnel. Spectator activities, on the other hand, include voting, influencing others to vote in a particular way making and joining a political discussion, exposing oneself to political stimuli and wearing a button or showing a sticker.¹¹⁷

Milbrath’s classification tends to show that political participation basically is of two types: active and passive. This distinction is a necessary outcome of the most
common fact that political participation in every society has a cost that involves time, energy and resources. Not all people are equally able or even willing to bear these costs and here all are not direct and active participants in every society. Political participation may further be classified in terms of its purpose as instrumental and expressive. Instrumental political participation is essentially directed to the achievement of concrete goals like securing party victory or the passage of a bill or just a rise in one’s status or influence. Expressive political participation on the other hand, does not aim at the realization of any concrete goal; it is concerned with some immediate satisfaction or a mere release of feeling. Thus some vote not because they are really interested in the political results flowing from the elections or in any material gain for themselves, but because they just have a feeling of satisfaction in exercising their voting right. In actual practice, however instrumental participation often gets mixed up with expressive participation. Most of the participants usually take their participation in the light of the outcome to follow from it as well as in terms of its contribution toward the fulfilment of some their personal feelings.

This brings us to the issue of whether we include within the meaning of the term political participation psychological processes leading to it or only the acts as such. Some studies of political participation included in their area of inquiry attitudes or orientations towards participation in addition to the actual political behaviour. Almond and Verba devoted particular attention to psychological or subjective components of political participation. Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee in their study used interest in politics as the sole means of measuring participation beyond the vote. This school treats the process of political participation as the continuation of an earlier process, that of political socialization. Political socialization refers to the process by which an individual becomes acquainted with the political system, which determines his perceptions of politics and his reactions to political phenomena. Political participation on the other hand refers to a process to that phase of citizen behaviour when they become actually involved in the political system. Rush and Altaff argue that the process of political socialization provides the individual with a
perceptual screen through which he receives political stimuli: as a result of these stimuli, individuals involve themselves at various levels in the political system, in the process of political participation.\textsuperscript{123}

The issue of political participation grows complex as we move onto higher form of analysis and includes issues like forms and degree of participation, bases of participation and so on. However, the scope of our study restricts us to touch upon the concept of political participation only broadly. But before we move on to other associated concepts of political mobilization, it is worthwhile taking a note of the common bases of political participation, as suggested by Huntington and Nelson.

(i) Class - individuals of similar social status, income and occupation.

(ii) Communal group - individuals of similar race, religion, language or ethnicity.

(iii) Neighbourhood - individuals residing in geographical proximity to each other.

(iv) Party - individuals who identify with the same formal organization attempting to win over or maintain control of the executive and legislative branches of government, and

(v) Faction - individuals united by sustained or intense personal interaction with each other, one manifestation of which is the patron-client grouping which involves the reciprocal exchange of benefits between individuals of unequal status, wealth and influence.\textsuperscript{124}

Another set of concepts that we must consider for our study is public opinion, political socialization and opinion formation for no mobilization - social or political can be effected without creating a public opinion about issues involved and sensitizing the masses. We take the first one first.
Public Opinion

Public opinion is referred to as “the collection of people's opinions on topic of public interest”. Modern mass media of communication have served to bridge the gap between the rulers and the ruled. Even dictatorships today take note of the prevailing public opinion before taking action. Public opinion, Bailey says, “has a giant's strength and we may use it with frightful effects”.

Some students of public opinion see the public as semi-organized entity that in some way or another moves through stages of initiation and debate, and reach a recognizable collective decision on an issue. To them the public is an organic entity linked together either by means of mass communication or through something like or city state and town hall meeting. This idea can be represented graphically in Figure 1.

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 1**

To Young, “a public is a transitory, amorphous, and relatively unstructured association of individuals with certain interest in common”. However, in a mass
society, there are hardly any questions on which the entire public can have an opinion. But on the other hand, as V.O. Key argues, when public opinion is regarded as those opinions that may influence government, the public does not exist as any specific sort of loosely structured association. On a given question, the operative public may consist of a highly structured association, while on another matter, opinions may be diffused through a wide public that lacks any special organization. On one issue, the public may consist of one sector of the population, on another of a quite different sector. It is often found that sectional or group interests operate independently sometimes and sometimes in close interaction with each other, so there are in fact special publics. The question, however, is as to how the interests of special publics may be reconciled with the idea of public interest or the interest of the general public. Blumer attempts at resolving this problem by stating that public opinion may be “different from the opinion of any of the groups in public”. It can be thought of, perhaps, as a composite opinion formed out of the several opinions that are held in the public, or better, as the central tendency set by the striving of these separate opinions.

Public opinion is thus an aggregation of certain types of attitudes across some kind of affect toward public object of cognition. In this connection, Almond’s distinction between ‘mass public’ and ‘attentive public’ is notable. The mass public informed by the mass media pays heed to the tone of discussion and issues and responds through moods of apprehension or complacency. The attentive public, a far smaller group, follows public issue in an analytical manner, is relatively well informed, and constitutes a critical audience for the discussion of public affairs. However, the size of the attentive public varies from time to time as new issues and problems arise. Again, at times, the attentive public may be large and quickly responsive to events and actions. At other times and on other questions, public discontent may be generated rather slowly. It may require years or decades for a public sentiment to develop. As we will see in the chapter on Gandhi’s strategy of mobilization, how be meticulously planned his campaigns over a period of time, because he understood that
for forming a solid public opinion a good amount of time needs to be devoted.

**POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION AND OPINION FORMATION**

Political socialization as an aspect of communicating attitudes, norms, knowledge, and above all, behaviour pattern is a basic antecedent of opinion formation. Political socialization, according to a survey of the ICSSR, “is concerned with the learning of political response, of absorbing preferences, and in a sense with the wide problems of allegiance to and alienation from the body politic.” 133

Political socialization is an earlier phase of opinion formation - a phase in which individuals acquire knowledge, information, values and attitudes towards the political system. Following this process, individuals develop political preferences and are inducted into citizenship roles and orientations. Rush and Althoff describe it as the process by which an individual become acquainted with the political system and which determines his perceptions of politics and his reactions to political phenomena. 134 Easton and Dennis define it as “those developing processes through which persons acquire political orientations and patterns of behaviour”. 135 The end product of political socialization is a set of attributes - cognition, value standards and feelings - towards the political system, its various roles, and role incumbents. It also includes knowledge of values and feelings affecting the inputs of demands and claims, and the authoritative outputs. 136 Political socialization is also important as a means of inter-generational and inter-continental transmission of culture. It is the way society transmits its political culture from generation to generation and from one continent to another. This process helps societies to achieve cohesion through a shared understanding of values, norms and symbols.

The crucial period of induction into the political culture 137 is said to be during childhood, but in India, early adolescence appears to be the more crucial period in which not only primary socializing institutions like the family, but also secondary groups, tend to transmit cultural. The secondary structures influence individuals as
they grow older, and these seem to be more important in the Indian case.

It is more accurate to say, therefore that political socialization is a lifelong experience. Induction into a new profession, migration to new cultures and social or political upheavals entail the learning of new patterns and norms. This point has been very well brought out by Hyman, in his pioneering work in which he examines both the latent and manifest components of political socialization. The psychologists, psychiatrists and anthropologists stress the latent aspect of socialization. They perceive that people develop their political attitude unconsciously in the family.

But other schools such a national voluntarists and supporters of the enlightenment, and liberalism, emphasize the significance of political and social history as well as formal, educational and propaganda practices in the development of political attitudes and civic norms of nations and peoples. Hyman’s study correctly stresses the importance of both cognition and emotional learning during childhood, and subsequent political indoctrination as elements of political socialization. He studies the influence of both the primary and the secondary groups. We would do well to recollect that Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau and Locke have also emphasized education as an important variable for the training of both the rulers and the ruled.

It is a fact that during adolescence and even later, socializing influences are received and at times they result in marked changes in earlier dispositions. Political systems in their bid to perpetuate their cultures and structures, through time indoctrinate the young to no less extent than the child, and the young in turn transmit it to the child. Both aspects of political socialization are important in that they lead to the formation of attitudes of attachment, allegiance or apathy, and opinions about the political system and its various role takers as well as their activities.

The principal agencies and institutions influential in the formation of attitudes and opinions, or what may also be called political socialization, are the family, the school, the church, the club, occupational unions, and the mass media. In developed
countries, newspapers, radio and television play a tremendous role in influencing public opinion. But in a developing country like India, the influence of mass media is relatively limited. According to an UNESCO survey in the 1970s, for every thousand persons in a developing country, there are fifty radio receivers, twenty cinema seats and hundred newspapers. An attempt is made to bridge this gap in developing countries by organizing mass meetings, public speeches and public demonstrations. Opposition leaders organize mass movements, rallies and demonstrations to highlight their points of view. Through strikes, pressure groups also try to bring their demands to public view. Talking habits and the tradition of long open air conversation to while away the leisure hours also constitute an informal means of communication and political education in India. The fact is that in a society like India, the primary agencies of the family, the caste and the community, cultural associations and ethnic organizations based on regional, religious and linguistic affinities play a dominant role in moulding attitudes and opinions. Informal communication by word of mouth is till the most common and potent channel of communication. Even mass media such as newspapers and radio and television are community affairs. One copy of a newspaper is read by a large number of people and likewise, radio and television programmes are generally shared by the entire neighbourhood. Thus the primary group and neighbourhood contribute to the crystallisation of opinion.

Political socialization and opinion formation induce the individual to act in various ways in the political life and process. Almond describes political socialization as the first important input from the environment into the political system. Certainly, socialization is a necessary precondition not only of public opinion formation, but also of myriad overt societal and political activities and behaviour.

Structural and institutional factors are, however, not to be ignored as important factors in political behaviour, and individuals do interact with those factors almost incessantly. Another crucial question, therefore, is to what extent and in which form the individual’s personality, as opposed to other variables, affects behaviour. One view of political socialization, emanating from Freud and the psychoanalytic tradition,
takes socialization as a process of curbing potentially disruptive drives by channeling them in socially acceptable directions. This view is derived from the Platonic ideal which sees the problem of order as one of devising means whereby a human being's innate drive can be controlled, or from Rousseau's idea that private and personal drives ('particular will') can be transferred to the public will ('general will'). For the psychologist, political involvement is one of the ways in which individuals meet certain drives and release personal tensions. But for political sociologists, the interest does not lie so much in the fact of psychological release. Rather, they bring in other factors such as the environment, personality and response to explain the phenomenon of interaction between personality and politics. These factors characterize the works of Kurt Lewin as well as those of Lasswell and Kaplan who introduced the E-P-R paradigm to explain the basic antecedents of political behaviour.

Political sociologists regard personality as a basic variable, the environment as the next basic variable and political socialization as the product of the interaction of the variables of personality and experience. Their stand is that notwithstanding psychological problems, politicians and political structures are pressurized to behave in ways congruent with social expectations and norms. They take into account the total social, economic and cultural environment, which determine political socialization and political involvement.

Various agents transmit the elements of political socialization through three ways or mechanisms: imitation, instruction and motivation. Robert Le Vine suggest that these are the mechanisms of political socialization in childhood, but Rush and Althoff point out that these mechanisms are applicable to the whole socialization process. Imitation is generally found among children, but in the case adolescents and adults, imitation is mixed up with both instruction and motivation. Vocational training or discussion groups are examples of instruction. Both imitation and instruction are specific types of experience but motivation is most closely identified with experience in general. Motivation is the learning of what Le Vine has called appropriate behaviour, through a process of trial and error. The individual learns directly from his...
experience actions that are most congruent with his attitudes and opinions. The term appropriate refers not to the extent to which the individual is led to conform to some norm of group behaviour (though this may well be the result), but to the process by which the individual relates action to attitudes and opinions formed through experience.

There are two key variables in political socialization, experience and personality. An individual’s politically relevant experience arises out of, and is contributory to, the process of political socialization. The individual’s conception of political problems is seen through the variety of his experiences. If experiences are shared by a number of individuals, they acquire greater significance in the formation of values and attitudes. Group experiences reinforce commonly held values and attitudes, while experiences often assume considerable political significance. Robert Lane notes this point in his famous work: *Political Ideology-Why the American Common Man Believes What He Does* (1962), Glencoe. Widespread economic prosperity or deprivation, the rapidity of social change, frequent violence or prolonged peace, the existence or absence of social tension and so on provide an experiential environment which contributes to the individual’s orientations towards political behaviour.

It is apt to note here that political socialization constitutes an important dimension of opinion formation, particularly in the Indian context, where modernity and tradition coexist, and where agricultural culture is giving way to bureaucratic and industrial culture, creating in effect a transitional culture of ambiguity and even anomie. In urban or cosmopolitan areas, we come across symbols and patterns of behaviour drawn from Western culture. Messages received with an extraordinary rapidity from alien societies and large segments of upper class youth receive such influences directly. Messages are also received at the other end of the pole, that is, the poor semi-literate public with strong muscles, and their behaviour pattern is characterized by political disloyalty and disaffection.
The heading, borrowed from W.H. Morris-Jones, may puzzle us. But in fact, squeezing in a discussion of Jones analysis of three “languages in which political life in India is conducted” into our discourse on political mobilization, will add value to our discussion. For, the metaphor is intended to alert students to the special challenge of understanding the new states, “where political elites were modernizes and the social mass was familiar only with traditional ways and standards”.

Morris-Jones terms the three main languages as modern, traditional, and saintly. The distinction between modern and traditional languages is a contrast between the political institutions of a nation state and the structure of an ancient society and the key to Indian politics today is the meting of these two as strangers.

The language of modern politics is undoubtedly of significance in India. This is less on account of long period of British rule in itself than because of one of its consequences – the existence for nearly a hundred years of an elite steeped in its grammar and masters of its accepts. Members belonging to this elite were not only the agents of much of the administrative and economic development of the country; they also provided the leadership of some of the more important movements of social reform and of the nationalist movement itself. It is true that the complexion of the national movement changed after the arrival of Gandhi in the scene, but it would be a mistake to imagine that Gandhi did not make use of the modern idiom; he combined it with another, but by no means abandoned it or prevented its continuous development. “Gandhi had an uncanny skill to project to Indian masses the many humanistic values of the modern West through traditional cultural symbolism.”

The modern language, argues Morris-Jones, is “so widespread in India that it has seemed possible to give comprehensive accounts of Indian political life without moving outside its terms”. This modern language of politics is the language of the Indian Constitution and the courts; of parliamentary debate; of the higher
administration; of the upper levels of all the main political parties; of the entire English press and much of the Indian language press. It is a language that speaks of policies and interests, programmes and plans. It expresses itself in arguments and representations, discussions and demonstrations, deliberations and decisions.\textsuperscript{152}

The next is the language of traditional politics. Let's list some of the characteristics of this language, as suggested by Morris-Jones. First, it is the language of a host of tiny worlds. \textit{Varna} has all India meaning, but in the little worlds of \textit{jati}; \textit{varna} is only a reference scale relevant in a limited range of relations. The arena under which village and \textit{jati} interact is a microscopic box, in principle sealed away from the other boxes. Second, it is a world in which men have their stations and from these stations in the little society, they derive exclusively their rights and duties, their entire code of behaviour, even their outlook on things. Here opinions and interest alike belong not to persons but to groups. As there can be group mobility, so there can be shifts in opinions and interests, but these will be shifts by groups. Thus an opinion has a bearing on groups of people and political mobilization takes place on the basis of groups and associations.\textsuperscript{153}

Third, it is not a world in which influence and power are absent, but they are present only as attaching to the \textit{jati} groups. For another, in so far as there is any leadership common to the village as a whole, it will be drawn from the ranks of locally dominant caste that will regard themselves, and be regarded as the natural hereditary repositories of such political status.\textsuperscript{154}

But the studies, which have provided the model of \textit{jati} system, have been undertaken at a time when the system is itself undergoing great changes. What is happening to the system of castes understood as \textit{jati}? Is caste becoming more important or otherwise? The generally held view has been that with the growth of industrialization, growth of communications, development of urbanization and spread of education, the strength of caste as a focus of loyalty and determinant of social life has been declining. The social reform movements within Hinduism have been
engaged with some success in modifying ritual excessiveness. Moreover, the national movement itself had impacts in the same direction. It provided a point of attraction independent of caste, and by virtue of Gandhi's own social gospel brought many people to feel ashamed at such aspects of caste system as untouchability. 155

The third language of saintly politics is to be found at the margin of Indian politics. However, this language of politics is important in a different context. It is important as a language of comment rather than of description or practical behaviour. The outstanding figure of national importance in this idiom is Vinoba Bhave, the 'Saint on the March' who tours Indian on foot preaching the path of self-sacrifice and love and polity without power. The direct effects of Bhave are relatively less important than the indirect effects. This language appeals to all sections of the Indian society. For many, this language is identified with the political style of Gandhi. 156

That saintly language of politics is worthy, as a third idiom does not imply that it is wholly unrelated to the other two. In curious ways it takes in much from both; indeed in this lies much of its power. A Bhave talking of the corruption of party politics appeals at once to the modern notions of public spirit and civic conscience and the traditional ideas of non-competitive accepted authority working through a general consensus. Similarly, and even more conspicuously, a man like Jayaprakash Narayan, speaking of public participation in a communitarian democracy, stirs the imagination of the advanced radical and the conservative traditionalist alike. 157

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5. Windlesham, Lord: op.cit.

6. Ibid.


8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.


13. Ibid.


18. Ibid.


1964.


22 Windlesham, Lord: op.cit.


24 Pye, Lucian W.: Communications and Political Development, op.cit.


26 Hyman, H.: op.cit., p. 132.


29 Hyman H., op.cit.


31 Hovland, C. et.al., The Order of Presentation in Persuasion, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1957.

32 Janis, I. and S. Feshback: op.cit.

33 Pye, Lucian W.: op.cit.

34 Hyman, H.: op.cit.

35 Ibid.


37 Hyman, H: op.cit.

Hyman, H.: op.cit.


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Ibid., p. 155.

Ibid., p. 156.

Ibid., p. 157.


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100  Nettle J.P.: op.cit. p. 246.
103  Ibid.
104  Ibid.
106  Ibid.
107  This and all other major arguments presented here are borrowed from J.P. Nettle, except when specified. Nettle, J.P.: Political Mobilization: A Sociological Analysis of Methods and Concepts, Faber and Faber, London, 1967.
110  Ibid.
113  Mukopadhyay A.K.: Political Sociology, K.P. Bagchi & Co., Calcutta, 1977, p.120.

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117 Ibid.
119 Ibid.
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Ibid. p.259.

All the major arguments in this section have been borrowed from Morris-Jones except when otherwise specified.

Morris-Jones: op.cit.


Morris-Jones: op.cit., p.54.
155 Ibid.

156 Ibid.