Chapter-2

AUSTRALIA’S DEFENCE AND SECURITY POLICY
IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

The post-Cold War era has brought profound changes in world’s political scenario. Though the fear of a major war is reduced the unpredictability of the security scenario is remarkably felt by the states. While the Cold War period was Eurocentric, today it is more of Asia-Pacific Centric. In this ‘Pacific Era’, Australia is in the hub of activities, being sandwiched in between Asia and the Pacific and trying to balance between its ‘history’ and its ‘geography’. Though the Labour government chose to be more inclined towards the geographic aspect of security, the Conservative Party showed its inclination to the ‘historic’ aspect, its western ideals and values. The Liberal-National Country party, under Howard’s government followed the later path and turned towards militarism. A ‘new militaristic regime’ emerged which would be made clear by its defence policy in the consecutive pages.

Defence policy, like any other policy, is made through a range of considerations and settings including internal institutional and political bureaucratic factors, national historical traditions, domestic political and
popular cultures and the changing international environment. Defence policy is one of the aspects of the policy-making devices of the country, but it is the mainstay on which the country's foreign relations as well as simple diplomatic relations depend. Each and every decision the government takes as well as the broader aspects of political and social affairs influence the decision-making continuously. Conventionally, the defence policy has been determined through four categories.

(i) *External*; the international scene, where a country seeks security from attack; this involves both the military aspects of security concerns as well as the foreign policy objectives.

(ii) *Internal*; the society from where the armed forces are made and the changes in society will also lead to changes in the military establishments, which in turn will effect the defence policy;

(iii) *Institutional*; which is found in the defence establishment itself; i.e., through the Department of Defence and the defence community comprising of administrators, secretaries, journalists and academicians.

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(iv) *Economy*; which today has gained tremendous importance, which led the Australian government to bring the trade affairs into the foreign affairs department and calling it the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT).

All these points through its intensive and extensive study helped making the defence policy. Each determinant penetrates the other and also affects it. Australia's Defence Force (ADF) has a dual responsibility for maintaining a force-in-being as well as a core force capable of providing a frame work for expansion to meet a range of contingencies.³

Australia's defence and security posture is unique in its own way. Though being an island continent, with a negligible population at its northern coast, facing the Asian giants and the disturbed Pacific Island Countries (PIC's), it has achieved the middle power status. On the basis of this, Australia's defence policy is determined through its commitment to the allys and friends, its pressure on regional security terms, its fear of China; a comparatively new security concern; becoming a major power in the region and its uncertainty over the security of the northern and north western part of Australia.

Before going through the policies of Australian defence and security perspective, it would be worth while to note the various issues involved in

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³ Ibid, p 2.
making the defence and security structure. The issues involved in the
defense policy making were:

(i) Post World War II situation;
(ii) Fear-psycosis in the northern coast.
(iii) China factor
(iv) Problems in Policy making

(i) Post World War II Situation

John Hirst, Sir Aurthur Tange and many others felt the irrelevance of
Australian military history to contemporary defence questions\(^4\). Hirst further
said that ‘self-reliance’ is novel, the prior history of Australian Defence
Planning was irrelevant to its subsequent evolution\(^5\). But then, self-reliance
did not emerge all of a sudden into the minds of the policy makers but
slowly evolved from the various changes in the Asia-Pacific region’s power
equations; firstly the Vietnam War and America’s defeat in the Asian main
land, which is too close to Australia, secondly, the Guam Doctrine brought
out by President Nixon and thirdly, Australia’s geography which forced
Australian government to think in terms of immediate defence in the alien
region.

\(^4\) Michael Evans, “From Defence to Security: Continuity and Change in Australian Strategic
Planning in the 20\(^{th}\) century”, in Peter Dennies and Jeffrey Grey’s(ed), “Serving Vital Interests:
Australia’s Strategic Planning in Peace and War”, (Proceedings of the 1996 Australian Army
History Conference held at the Australian War Memorial, 30\(^{th}\) September 1996, Pub. DARA,
Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA) 1996 p 117.
\(^5\) Ibid., p 117.
The elements which dominated the immediate situation of post World War II were bipolarity, ideological conflict and the nuclear revolution, each being unfamiliar led to a pre-sentiment of profound insecurity⁶. Australia, like Canada, comprises of British population (apart from the aboriginals who are less in number at present) and under the British government for long, wanted in turn to preserve the whiteness and Britishness rather than risk loss of identity in some kind of ‘frighteningly inconceivable society open to non-white neighbours’⁷. Australia seems to be a ‘frightened country’⁸ as said by Alan Renouf. Australia came to accept that its vast coastline and small population cannot lead to self-sufficiency (which it doesn’t even want) and its dependence on the ‘great and powerful friends’, as Menzies termed, gives an impression of an ‘anxious country’, being and feeling vulnerable to everything non-white.

The government’s review of Australia’s post World War II situation emphasises that the basic ingredient of Australia’s defence must be ‘Empire cooperation’. Since the size of the country demands for its defence, armed forces and an industrial capacity quite beyond its present capacity. Till 1970’s, an independent strategic concept, policy or structure was not made.

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⁸ Ibid., p260.
The Australian Defence Force (ADF) was basically prepared and used to support Britain and later the American ‘militaristic adventures’ all over the world. Australia’s defence policy was reduced to that of ‘Pax Britanica’ and then as an ‘American lake’. Its main policy stance of ‘Forward Defence’ remained relatively impervious to change. As a matter of fact, this was the basic Australian strategic culture. Australian armed forces had to run along the line, where either the British or the Americans had declared war, like in France and Belgium, then in Germany (Pre WWII), in Malaysian ‘emergency’, Indonesian ‘Konfrontasi’ with UK and with US in Korea, Vietnam and Gulf etc in Post World War II.

In the Cold War days, Australia’s major policy aim was containment of communism and during 1950 and 1970, Australia fought along with Britain and America four major wars in Asia, in Korea, Malaya, Borneo and Vietnam. It also took guarantee of US help of ‘direct defence’, through the signing of ANZUS in 1951 and hosting US bases in 1960’s at North West Cape, Pine Gap and Nurrungar⁹, which is being extended every ten years. This forward defence policy was going on for a long time in Australian policy structure, untill the disastrous end of the Vietnam war; though it didn’t erase totally from the face of the defence policy makers till today. The Defence White Paper of 1976, for the first time talked about self-reliance, in

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theory. It came into actual practise with the coming of the Dibb Review in 1986 and Defence White Paper of 1987 and then 1994 and Australia’s Strategic Policy (ASP’97). It is especially due to the Guam Doctrine, the posture of self-reliance among the allies of US became prominent, which thoroughly embarrassed its allies\textsuperscript{10}. But Australia feels that though US couldn’t be Australia’s ‘immediate’ guarantor of security it would always be the ‘ultimate’ guarantor.

The major emphasis was felt on strengthening capabilities, since ‘there is a possibility that a conflict threatening Australia’s vital interests could develop quite quickly, and certainly more quickly than it could develop its forces to meet it’\textsuperscript{11}. In spite of no immediate threat, the possibility of a low level threat is not totally ruled out. In order to prepare for a low level threat, there is a need for planning and developing proper force projection. In order to make this a success, new planning concepts and methodologies had to be developed, new policy-making structures, command and control arrangements and joint service machinery instituted, credible contingencies postulated, areas of operations in northern Australia and the ‘sea-air’ gap exploited, and the criteria for the development of


Australia's defence force capabilities explicited. In a way one could say that the Vietnam war and the consecutive Guam Doctrine were the eye-openers for Australia's new and comparatively independent defence policy. This made Australia to confront with the need to reassess stereotypes per capita and rethink established policies.

(ii) Fear – psychosis in the northern coast

The fear of an unguarded north and the north-western region had always been in the minds of Australian strategists. In 1954, a geographer and historian, Granfell Price, asked “can we develop our dangerously empty north to meet the external challenges of a hungry, prolific and hard-working Asia?” Australia's major concern with this largest unguarded coast in the world is that it lies at the foot of South-east Asia or say Asia, where China, Japan and India looms large as potential threats. Lying at the foot of Asia, 'an empty continent inhabited by a bare 17 million, badly governed people whose population in 1993 had the lowest rate of growth for 18 years'. This is the major reason, a vast continent being turned as a single country with a negligible British or white population in the midst of the 'hungry, prolific' Asia whose culture is so alien and mystified that it better remain unknown

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15 Ibid., p 168.
and unexplored. Another reason of concern is that the northern part is having, no urban development, no cities and so a negligible population. The army camps near Darwin, Wyndham, Derby, Broome, Port Hedland etc. are being developed as cities for some years. Apart from these reasons and close proximity to south-east Asian countries, the Defence White Paper also notes that, the sea lanes off Australia’s west coast are treacherous and in some parts unchartered, leaving exposed enemy convoys, devoid of organic air powers, vulnerable to interception. In the east coast of Queensland as well there is shallow waters surrounded by the Great Barrier Reef\textsuperscript{16}. These geographic attributes fall short, says John Lonehardt, of actually channelising hostile forces into areas of preferred conflict but they make the prospect of attending Australia’s major economic, political and population centers a risky and costly military undertaking. Nevertheless, Australia presumes South-east Asia, the countries bordering on this troubled area to be significant for the defence of Australia and they act as a ‘surveillance umbrella.’ Australia would be able to detect by intelligence assets well before within range of the mainland\textsuperscript{17}. Thirdly, maintenance of fleet at these areas is very expensive.

The northern Australian ‘frontier’ has been divided into four parts.


\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
(i) The north-east Asia; where the American presence is felt necessary.

(ii) Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore; where Australia had taken considerable initiative to extend its friendship and defence cooperation through the recent Agreement on Mutual Security (AMS) and many others; and the FPDA with Malaysia and Singapore is revived.

(iii) Papua New Guinea (PNG), with which it has a wide range of pacts starting from defence to economic aid to educational and cultural help.

(iv) Within the region; the northern Australia itself.

As Dibb's review argued that the northern part is the region from which military attack is possible, i.e., in the northern part of the main land, its maritime approaches or offshore territories. While, the Indonesian archipelago and PNG form a protective barrier, it is from or through this area that military threat would almost certainly be posed. The recently published 'Force Structure Review', listed one of the three key principles emphasising on the northern region suggests "meeting the strategic focus on northern and western operation by extending western basing for the Navy

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and northern basing for further Army units, and enhancing the forward deployment capacity of the Air Force".\(^1\)

To keep northern Australia a threat free zone, the defence policy has maintained many bases, the most important being at Darwin equipped with F-111’s and F/A 18’s. What Australia would like in this area is to make a substantial military contribution in many different possible circumstances\(^2\).

The new sophisticated equipments like Over The Horizon Radars (OTHR) and Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft have also been deployed in there. Apart from the military side, the Australian government is slowly coming to realise this region’s importance from the economic angle and its perception has been comparatively modified from yester years. The north is ‘now presented as a spring board for Australia’s economic enmeshments with Asia, channeling exports into the region and absorbing Asian immigrant’s.\(^3\)

(iii) China Factor

There is a stark difference of opinion over China being a threat, among the policy makers on the one side and the academia on the other.

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\(^3\) Lachlan Strahan, Op.cit.no 14, p 168.
While the academician like Stuart Harris say that China could not be a threat since it has no history of aggression.\(^{22}\) The policy makers like Paul Dibb is of a realistic opinion\(^{23}\), where the idea of the world being in an anarchic state is believed. So from the realist point of view, China does pose a threat, showing its aggressiveness in South China Sea and a possibility of the same in Taiwan. Moreover, China's territorial claims, its lack of commitment to international security regimes, its growing strategic ambition\(^{24}\) and the speed at which China is developing its force projection were reasons enough for concern among its neighbours and also the other countries nearer to it. The other reasons were China's relation with US and its relation with Japan are not all that friendly, which does pose an imbalance regarding the balance of power in the region. Australia's attempt to develop defence cooperation with the South-east Asian countries implies that Australia is trying to have these countries at its side if crisis occurs. As Greg Fry, said that to some extent, Australian defence policy is provocative to China.\(^{25}\) Australia Maintained defence relations with South-east Asia and its alliance with US. The Howard's government has made it clear by its militaristic stand and its to support western ideals and values when and where necessary.

\(^{22}\) Stuart Harris in a personal interview on 18\(^{th}\) December said China doesn't pose a threat to Australia, but India does since it has a history of aggression.

\(^{23}\) Paul Dibb in a personal interview on 22\(^{nd}\) December, said that idealists or liberalists are different from the policy makers. Since the real world is in no uncertain terms an anarchic one.


\(^{25}\) Greg Fry in a personal interview on 18\(^{th}\) December, 1998 said that the Australian Defence Policy is slightly provocative to China.
(iv) Problems of Policy-Making

Another issue involved, while dealing with defence policy is the elements that have to be considered before making the policy. As defence policy is understood in conventionally military terms; as a plan to manage the strategic environment, i.e., the defence policy is a ‘strategy to secure the inherently insecure terrain of illusive assurance’26. Though keeping the situation under consideration that in a critical situation the whole array of procedures will be changed because of makes policy international ambiguous threats limited knowledge. National security policy making is necessarily a highly imperfect act”27. Policy can be and often is, little more than an interim position or a broad contingency guide, which is often abandoned in the face of reality or through political pragmatism.28 In spite of that, defence and security policy is made by proper planning discussion and foresight.

Gareth Evans, in a ministerial statement on Australia’s regional security pointed out different instruments of policy required to protect Australia’s security like (a) military capability, (b) politico-military capability, (c) diplomacy, (d) economic links, (e) development assistance, (f)

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non-military threat assistance and (g) exchange of peoples and ideas\textsuperscript{29}. These are the issues on which a defence and security policy has to be maintained, to gain a self-reliant posture. For the insecure north, the factors involved in planning process are (i) early warning, (ii) surveillance (iii) interdiction and (iv) ground mobility\textsuperscript{30}. These steps would be helpful in making the ADF alert even at a slight disturbance, especially in the sea and air approaches. This has been supported by joint force operation with major infrastructure and logistics. The purpose does not end here, its aim is broader not only a secure country but also a secure region providing a ‘secure south’ for south-east Asians and a ‘secure west’ for the south pacific nations\textsuperscript{31}.

Australia, having a dependent history never felt the need to formulate its own independent policy, in the area of defence and security. Today, with the ebbing of Cold War, to likeliness of a slight disturbance in any part of the world taking the shape of a global war is very much in the minds of the strategists, which led Australia not only to make a defence policy supporting self-reliance but also in improvising its capabilities which had been the only possible way to go for balance of power strategy with the nations. With the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) etc. the nuclear

\textsuperscript{29} Gareth Evans, Op.cit. no. 17, p 1.
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid, p 16.
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid, p 17.
wars possibility has been deleted (?) but the possibility of other types of conflicts is still prevalent.

As defence and security policy is based on Australia’s location on the globe. Australia’s strategic interests continue to include obviously, the countries closest to Australia, the inner arc of islands from Indonesia in the west to PNG, the Solomon islands and the rest of nearby PIC’s. The key elements which led to the making of a security policy were, according to the “In the national interest”, the White Paper of Foreign and Trade Policy, were ‘the centrality of the Asia-pacific region to Australia’s security, the significance of economic growth in the East Asia to Australia’s strategic environment and the challenge of new power relations effecting this growth, the special importance of relationship among China, Japan and the US for the security of the whole region, the unique place of Indonesia in shaping Australia’s strategic environment, a strategic posture which includes both the maintenance of effective defence capabilities and the maintenance of active involvement in regional strategic affairs. The new realization of challenges to Australia has been from the regional side; which has an important and direct consequence for the development of Australia’s defence policy.

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The security policy of Australia is multidimensional, where the military capability is placed as one among many instruments of policy. With the changed and complex strategic environment, Australia is forced to think of security in regional terms, which was supported by early Laborites in the Australian government and secondly, due to the economic growth and expanding military capabilities throughout Asia would need to make ADF also be equipped with the modern improved equipments for the coming years. The security policy is maintained through the cultivation of alliances and friendships, managing bilateral relationships and in promoting an international environment at both the global and regional levels, in which the use of force is discouraged

From this vast and varied security policy emerged the amalgamation of issues into four major categories shown in its Defence Policy White Papers. It brought the whole gamut of foreign diplomatic, economic and strategic and security policies. These four parts were self reliance, regional engagement, alliance and global security.

**Self-Reliance**

Today's volatile situation, its complexity and uncertainty, both 'within' and 'outside' the region, makes a country realise that having the minimum capacity to depend itself is undoubtedly crucial. Though Australia

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is a major and an important ally of US and the later being the only super power left which is also questionable as Paul Kennedy’s words are worth remembering “how long can a great power be great both at home and abroad.”\textsuperscript{34} Moreover, the present US domestic and international scene is quite depressing and it casts serious doubts whether to depend on such a diminishing power in the dynamic Asia-Pacific region. The ANZUS treaty had clearly emphasised that it would help Australia only when its interests are affected in the region. The Defence White Paper’94 mentions that “Australia’s security is not so vital to other nations that it could assume others would commit substantial forces to our defence.”\textsuperscript{35} It emphasises that alliances with US and regional cooperation though necessary and helpful self-reliance is essential to be able to defend Australia on its own. As is understood, self-reliant defence is not only for a country’s security, but also to enhance its national independence, international standing and self respect.\textsuperscript{36} It will be based on a realistic assessment of Australia’s strength and is a rigorous appraisal of its weaknesses and deficiencies. It draws on the skillful mobilisation of Australia’s resources physical, financial and human. Self-reliance needs both a coherent defence strategy and an enhanced defence capacity. In case of Australia the task is exhausting, due to


\textsuperscript{36} Ibid.
the vastness and harshness of the territory, length of the coastline, the size of its fishing and resource zones, the distance from the mainland to off shore territories, the great expanse of water that surrounds it and to top it all the remarkable disproportionate size of its population vis-a-vis its land area.

In order to maintain self-reliance four factors were raised. Firstly, the strategic denial of the ‘sea-air’ gaps to the potential adversaries. Secondly, self-reliance means ‘defence-in-depth’. It gives priority in meeting credible levels of threat by preventing an adversary with a comprehensive array of military capabilities, capable of independent defensive and offensive operations in the sea-air gap to its north and throughout Australia’s territory. It also requires a coordinated, flexible and measured application of defence capabilities. Its objective could be to terminate the conflict promptly and to prevent an enemy, in the Area of its Direct Military Interest (ADMI). The capabilities it has to develop to include in the area of defence mine counter measures and the protection of coastal trade. Thirdly, self-reliance would mean to have the ability to meet the mutual obligations with its chief allies, the US and New Zealand. The defence self-reliance must be set firmly within the framework of its alliance and regional associations. Lastly, the aim of self-reliance is to enhance its ability and as a member of the western

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38 Ibid
association of nation, to contribute in strategic stability at the global level\textsuperscript{41}. In order to maintain a self-reliant defence posture, a country requires a force-in-being to defeat any challenge to its sovereignty.

The last two points were quite contradictory to the actual meaning of self-reliance. Self-reliance is not cooperation, it means independence in defending its country. Cooperation is the next stage of defence strategy, where self-reliance is no more of help. Self reliance is one aspect, alliance is another, both are interdependent but not complementary to each other. The last aim, which points out Australia to be a member of the western state being in an eastern region of the globe; seems ironic and paradoxical.

The major breakthrough in Australia's defence policy was that Dibb established the principle that Australia should plan on developing force-in-being up to the level of regional capabilities that could be realistically projected against it\textsuperscript{42}. The 'Area of Direct Military Interest' (ADMI) stretches over 4000 kilometers from the Cocos Island to New Zealand and the Islands of the South west Pacific and over 3,000 kilometers from the archipelago and island chains in the north to the southern ocean\textsuperscript{43}. With a small population defending such a vast area needs tremendous effort.

\textsuperscript{41} Ibid, p 2.
\textsuperscript{43} Dibb’s Review, p23
The limited population can always be compensated by highly sophisticated naval and air defence capabilities.

Another point made very clear by the defence policy makers is that self-reliance does not mean isolationism\textsuperscript{44} neither does it mean self-sufficiency\textsuperscript{45}. Isolationism is not possible in today's interdependent world. And complete self-sufficiency is neither feasible nor logical as it would direct resources at the expense of capability. So defence has to manage two different interests, Australia's desire to achieve the most efficient supply of goods and services and Australia's interest in a more self-reliant defence\textsuperscript{46}. Self-reliance implies a relative emphasis rather than an absolute ideal. David Lee further said that fundamental to this policy was building a defence industrial base in Australia\textsuperscript{47}. The Defence community had released a policy paper titled "Defence: Our Priorities" which talked of the ADF being more reliant on its own industry in order to maximise Australia's military capabilities, it needs to support and operate its forces cost-effectively" opines the defence executives\textsuperscript{48}. This brings into discussion, Australia's policy over the development of its capabilities, which would be dealt later in the same chapter.

\textsuperscript{44} ASP 97, Op. cit. no. 19, p 30.
\textsuperscript{45} Dibb in a personal interview on 22\textsuperscript{nd} Dec. 1998, said self-suffering is not what we would like to achieve and moreover its not possible to achieve today.
\textsuperscript{46} Strategic Review '93, Op. cit. no. 38, p 53.
\textsuperscript{47} David Lee, Op. cit. no.41, p 29.
Alliances

One of the key elements of Australian defence policy is maintaining alliance relations. Its major allies are USA, New Zealand and PNG.

Alliance with US is seen as absolutely necessary for Australia's strategic concerns. After the end of Cold War, US became the more powerful and the strong military power in the world with the most sophisticated military technology and Australia feels confident in the region being one of the closest of the world's strongest nations. Australia has built up the strongest network of bilateral defence relationships than any other country, over the years. The collective security in the Pacific is preeminently an American system. US will be influencing the security of Asia and the Pacific and have a central place in multilateral security arrangements in the negotiations and implementation of arms control and disarmament measures.

The alliance with the US is basically a bilateral arrangement, involving a vast web of day-to-day bilateral cooperation in the maintenance and development of its military capabilities, including intelligence and cooperation, access to some of the most advanced military technologies and intense service-to-service contact through training exercises and visits. The

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manifested American connection with Australia is felt from the various defence communications, intelligence and scientific installations maintained on Australian territory\textsuperscript{52}. US is the central component of Australia's defence and continues to be beneficial in giving access to technology, military equipment, intelligence and information which are fundamental for maintaining defence capabilities.

The mainstay of the alliance is ANZUS which was extracted by Australia for its support to the Japanese peace treaty and is not a very comfortable document showing elasticity of US help which could be achieved in total if there is a nuclear attack and if US' interests are affected. Though ANZUS focuses on regional security, Australia would need to maintain an independent relation with its neighbours. But the pact with US is so important that the ASP97 terms that it is necessary to retain US interest in the Asia-Pacific region and also specifies that the relation with US should not go sour\textsuperscript{53}. Australia needs to have a proper alliance management including sustenance of military capability in order to operate with US in necessary systems and exploring new forms of practical cooperation; for e.g. in the collaborative development of new systems and platforms\textsuperscript{54}. This over indulgence with a 'great and powerful friend' shows that whatever US may

\textsuperscript{53} ASP 97, Op.cit.no 20, p 19.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid.
feel about this arrangement, it is an asset for Australia, through and through; not only because of its significance to the defence of Australia, but also the fact that it (the alliance) strengthens US' strategic engagement in the region; an engagement which has underwritten the regional stability on which the East Asian economic miracle has been built.

Though the White Papers of 87 and 94 under Hawke-Keating governments had considerably emphasised on the US alliance. The Howard government has upgraded the alliance relationship and blatantly put in words that it would support western ideals and values without any regard to geographical locations. The recently concluded AUSMIN'98 (Australia-US Ministerial Talks) confirmed the strength and vitality of the alliance relationship and its great value to Australia's defence and foreign policies. AUSMIN 98 emphasised on two issues (i) the consequent need to forge closer security ties with the US (though the AUSMIN) and (ii) an improved ADF capability to participate in coalition expedition to defend common 'western' interest without strict geographic limitations. It is further felt that the most important aspect of AUSMIN 98 is that, both the countries signalled that bilateral security and defence relationship remained central to both countries, because it reflected fundamental shared interests and

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55 In the National Interest” no. 32, p 58.
objectives. This increased relation is seen from the increased defence exercises between the two countries.

**Exercises**

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<th>Exercises</th>
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<td>Air combat/strike training involving RAAF and US MC.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pitch Black 96, 13th July – 3 August 1996</td>
<td>Air defence exercise involving RAAF, and USAF held in Australia.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pacific Bond, Pacific Look, October 1996</td>
<td>Army exchange</td>
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<td>Lungfish 96, October 1996</td>
<td>Maritime exercises held in Australia involving RAN, USA and RAAF.</td>
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<td>Dugong 96, November 1966</td>
<td>Mining and explosive ordnance disposal exercise held in Australia involving RAN and USN.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tandem Thrust 97, 10-22 March 1997</td>
<td>A large joint exercise intended to test inter operability and combined operations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tamex 97, March 1997</td>
<td>Anti-submarine warfare exercise.</td>
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It is with the US where defence cooperation is maximum next in the line comes Indonesia with nearly seven exercises in between 1996-1997.

Still how far US would help Australia in a crisis is yet to be seen. Australia’s strategic conviction that “US is the ultimate security guarantor, regional balancer and as the linch-pin of regional security” is yet to be

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58 Ibid p 60.
proved in the practical circumstances. Mohan Malik feels “what Australia needs is to transform alliances into ‘order-oriented’ relationships and supplement existing bilateral security ties with dialogue processes and new networks of bilateral and multilateral security cooperative arrangements”\(^6\).

Another alliance of importance is New Zealand. Sharing the similar historical background and strategic conditions cultural and geographical conditions, both the countries are seen as twin states. There is an intention among Australians to merge New Zealand with Australia; but the ultimate decision lies with New Zealand. The ANZUS treaty embodies formal commitments and reciprocal obligations between Australia and New Zealand which endure despite the US’ suspicion of security obligation to New Zealand\(^6\). The alliance is supported by the 1991 Closer Defence Relations (CDR) agreement which aims to foster closer consultation of defence planning between Australia and New Zealand; including force structure development and operational capability of the respective defence forces\(^6\); and a high degree of interoperability between the two defence forces\(^6\). The defence relationship include activities such as cooperative defence equipment projects, a squadron of NZDF A4 aircraft based at Nowra, a wide programme of exercises and exchange and closer and regular

\(^6\) Ibid, p 68.
contact between policy makers\textsuperscript{65}. Moreover, Australia could benefit from NZ's capabilities for closer air support operations.

The other ally of importance is Papua New Guinea. It is something which is forced on Australia, due to geographical reasons. The ASP 97 spells out that its relation with PNG is \textit{compelling} because of its size, proximity and existing military infrastructure. Something that is forced is always done half heartedly. Australia wants to maintain its 'position' (an autocratic statement) as PNG's key defence partner, which is strengthened by its Joint Declaration of Principles (JDP), which points out that Australia would be prepared to commit forces to resist any external aggression against PNG. The Pacific Petrol Boat programme is one of the most successful in the region as a whole surrounding nearly all the PIC's (Pacific Island Countries). These countries (US, NZ, PNG) have been important allys of Australia while the countries like Indonesia and other South-east Asian countries are regional friends but not \textit{allys}.

\textbf{Regional Engagement}

Today, Australia has to forgo the age old 'Continental Defence' and also the attitude of 'Fortressing Australia' and encompass the whole region in its strategic dealings. The basis of defence policy on international dimension reflects regional engagement. In order to foster the activities with

\textsuperscript{65} ASP 97, Op. cit. no. 20, p 20.
regional countries, Australia aims at bilateral programmes in cooperating, developing defence capabilities and professional standards appropriate to the legitimate defence needs of the countries concerned. This will reflect Australia's commitment, shared increasingly by its neighbours to transparency in defence policy development and force planning. Australia's aim is to be a secure country within a secure region. The Asia-Pacific region is broad and diverse, the various sub-regions engaged Australia's strategic interests in different ways, may be this is the reason why the Defence White Paper of 1994 emphasised more on multilateral relations. Australia has pinpointed its commitment in the region by using different rhetorics like its approach in 90's should be based on 'strategic partnership' with south-east Asia, 'strategic commitment' with south-west pacific and 'constructive contact' with the major Asian powers.

The countries of immediate strategic concern to Australia are Indonesia; with which it has strong defence and trade relations, Malaysia and Singapore with which it have good defence relations not only though the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA) but also bilaterally. In the south-west pacific, it is PNG, Solomon island, Vanuatu, Fiji and other PIC's, with whom it has not only defence arrangements but also economic and trade and cultural and educational cooperation.

66 Ibid,
67 Ibid, P iii, (statement by Ian McLachlan, Minister for Defence).
68 Strategic Review 93,Op.cit.no38,p21
Australia has been involved with the region ever since 1976, when the labour government of Whitlam proposed a South Pacific Forum, engaging the major countries of the region. Though the Asian countries did not give it, the foundation stone was laid. In the recent past, with the economic boom in the region, these countries gained tremendous importance in the eyes of the Australians. Both the *strategic review 93* and the *Defending Australia*, Defence White Paper 1994, reflects the government’s wide-ranging programme of enmeshment with Asia. Asia, a big market has been considered a vital part of the nation’s destiny. So Australia feels that security will be achieved with Asia and not against it. Different vistas of educational, cultural, political, economical and military links bind Australia with Asia Paul keating, was one of the labour leader, who pronounced Australia within the Asian boundary.69

South-east Asia’s strategic importance is understood quite well by Australian strategists. In 1994, B.A. Santamaria wrote, “Australia lies at the foot of South-east Asia an empty continent inhabited by a bare 17 million badly governed people whose population (1993) last year had the lowest rate of growth for 18 years”70. The *strategic review 93* describes Malaysia,
Singapore and Indonesia as a strategic triangle that provides stability across the most likely approaches to Australia’s north\(^\text{71}\) in the post-Cold War era.

Australia is seeking strategic partnership with South-east Asia, involving increased bilateral cooperation, ‘especially in strategic planning exchanges industry and science.’ It is an attempt to reduce the animosities of the past to a minimum level. Australia’s regional engagement is further enhanced with the US presence in the area. The ‘Defending Australia’ suggested multi lateral dealings with the South-east Asian countries through ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Council for Cooperation & Security in the Asia-Pacific (CSPAC) etc. The different documents of Australian government pronounced Australia’s relations with US to be basically bilateral while its relation with the regional countries could not be called typically bilateral. Apart from this point, the policy of regional engagement is not uniformly applied across the Asia-pacific region\(^\text{72}\). As Strahan says, the contemporary Australia’s security perception of Asia remains far from unambiguous and Australia’s images of northern Australia remain contradictory and uncertain\(^\text{73}\) (Apart from its relation with Indonesia and with Malaysia and Singapore other countries in the South-east Asian region share a defence relation with Australia of no much importance. Apart from this fragile and complex relation with the

\(^{71}\) Ibid, p 171.

\(^{72}\) Graeme Cheeseman”. In Graeme Cheeseman and Robert Bruce’s (ed) Op.cit. no. 6, p 254.

regional countries the White Paper rules out the establishment of formal multilateral security arrangements in which regional strategic concerns could be discussed\textsuperscript{74}.

Along with the economic boom, the arms acquisition by the ASEAN countries also became an area of concern. Canberra pointed out in the \textit{strategic review} \textsuperscript{93} that its relation with South-east Asia is now one of partnership rather than ‘donar-recipieent’, which the ‘defence aid’ to those countries indicates and supports\textsuperscript{75}. The importance of a safe region was understood from the Ministerial statement on ‘Regional Security’ given by Gareth Evans, “that the protection of Australia’s security, has more than one dimension. In specifically military terms it involves the capability to deter ......, in broad external terms, it involves acting through many different policy instruments to maintain a positive security and strategic environment in our own region\textsuperscript{76}. In order to maintain proper relations within the region the Australian governments have been enthusiastically participating in many ways, economically it has increased its trade relations and militarily through defence cooperation with ASEAN, apart from maintaining defence aid it started projects based on personnel-based activities, such as training and combined exercises\textsuperscript{77}. In the south Pacific, it focused on the developments

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{74} Graeme Cheeseman, Op.cit.no 71, p 252.
\item \textsuperscript{75} Pauline Kerr and Desmond Ball,Op.cit. no. 12, p 55.
\item \textsuperscript{76} “Australia's Regional Security”,Op.cit. no 17, p 15.
\item \textsuperscript{77} Ibid, p 19.
\end{itemize}
of effective para-military and maritime surveillance capabilities\textsuperscript{78}. The Pacific Patrol Boat project is central to the military arrangements, which currently engulfs eight PICs, operating a total of 15 boats\textsuperscript{79}.

In maintaining regional security, Australia has been enthusiastic about ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), through which it would like to deal with South-east Asia. It points out that defence will play a major role in activities relating to that forum as it directs its attention to issues such as transparency and confidence building among defence forces in the region\textsuperscript{80}. The ASP\textsuperscript{97} points out that its active participation in the ARF enables Australia to demonstrate its engagement with the region and its commitment to regional security\textsuperscript{81}.

The Howard government’s adoption of regional defence posture or defence self-reliance in the regional context is appalling. What the labour called ‘regional engagement’ the coalition called ‘forward cooperation’\textsuperscript{82}. As the Minister of Defence, Ian Mclachlan pointed out that the regional engagement has three objectives. (i) to influence regional attitudes and intentions in ways which enhance our security, (ii) to enhance ADF

\textsuperscript{78} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{79} Desmond Ball and Pauline Kerr, Op.cit. no 12, p 12.
\textsuperscript{81} ASP 97 no 20, p 25.
\textsuperscript{82} Mohan Malik, Op.cit. no. 60, p 70.
operational capabilities with in and with the region; and (iii) to develop regional capabilities in support of Australian interests 83.

This means as Mohan Malik maintained that Australian government is building up "regional resilience" so as to maintain 'regional security' by establishing strong bilateral strategic equations with Asia's major players 84. Just the way its self-reliance posture had turned militaristic, the regional engagement has come to mean the same. Thus, David lee and Steward Woodman view that Australia's defence policy in the present times and also in the near future will be a mixture of two strategies 'self-reliance' and 'forward defence' 85. It is also confirmed by the frontier metaphor used by Lachlan Strahan, arguing that "South-east Asia became a vast frontier zone between Australia and 'Red China', a battle ground between Cold War forces and different races 86, the area where Australia projects its forward defence policy.

Global Security

Instability in one part of the world would/could lead to anxiety and instability in the whole world. In order to achieve peace and stability, a

84 Mohan Malik, Op.cit. no. 60, p 70.
country has not only to develop its defence and trade and other related faculties but also has to have the basic human character, humanitarianism and support or rather promote peace internationally by supporting the infamous league called UNO. Australia has been participating in many UN involved peace enforcement projects, where Australia has no strategic interest.

Australia has been quite supportive to the UN in its primary function of resisting aggression around the world. It points out that its national interest is served both by conflict prevention, management and resolution through UN's mechanism and by the UN playing an active role in alleviating international disasters caused by natural conditions, political turmoil and war. In order to promote global security a country needs to develop its capabilities by providing contingents and support to the UN and other peace operations, and by supporting efforts to implement arms control and disarmament agreements. Australia carried out many humanitarian efforts across borders to the distant lands in the Gulf (1990-91), Cambodian settlement (1991-93), Somalia (93-94), Rwanda (94) to name just a few. Australia has been active in other organisations apart from the UN, for

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88 Ibid.
example; in Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai, the South Pacific Peace Keeping Force in Bougainville crisis\textsuperscript{89}.

The White Paper points out that the policing and budgeting for peace operations before hand is difficult. So a midway is taken up where, while defence meets the costs of relatively minor UN deployments the government would supplement the defence budget for the costs of larger peace operations\textsuperscript{90}. The best preparation for peacekeeping is conventional military capabilities and training, supplemented by specific familiarization with the tasks required in individual operations\textsuperscript{91}. Australia has been a responsible international player and also supports NPT, MTCR and other international regimes. It was the sole country which has been openly local against the nuclear tests taken up by France in Murrurua Atol in South-west Pacific Island.

Capabilities

To make self-reliance a success, a country needs to emphasise on its defence capabilities. The ‘Defending Australia’, Defence White Paper 1994, states that Australia’s planning focuses on capabilities rather than threats, especially due to the possibility of a short-warning conflict, whose scale and intensity could range from small raids to large and protracted operations, the

\textsuperscript{89} Ibid., p 107.
\textsuperscript{90} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{91} ‘ASP 97’, Op.cit no 20, p 34.
wide availability of sophisticated military equipments. The ‘vision statement’ as pointed in “Serving Australia: The Australian Defence Force in the 21st century’, is that it will have a through understanding of its strategic circumstances and their implications through quality intelligence collection and assessment of sound policy advice. It will have commitment to self-reliance, sound regional defence relationships, strong alliances and global security and the operational forces, equipped with high technology weapons and modern facilities, will be supported by effective and efficient c^3 (command, control and communications), scientific advice acquisition, logistics and administrative systems which will exploit military, civilian and industries capabilities. The aim of the defence policy is to develop the forces in such a way, which most cost-effectively provides the government with the widest range of options to undertake the kinds of operations as the situation demands. Defence needs capabilities to undertake a number of roles, for example; information collection and management, maritime control and dominance, strike and land warfare. Capability development is to maximise effectiveness of a country, cost-effectively. The force development is essential for the strategic environment, of new technological opportunities and strategic geography.

93 ‘ASP 97’ Op cit. no 20, p 56.
To maintain defence self-reliance, Australian government has furthered an appropriately structured defence policy for industries, which would maintain operational effectiveness and adaptability of the ADF in the changing circumstances. Australian government’s major capital investment will be on defence requirements on industry, especially from the projects like coastal mine-hunters ANZAC frigates and collins class submarines\(^94\). The Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) provided life support for the Oberon class submarines. The Defence R&D is essential for the development of towed acoustic arrays for surveillance, airborne lasers for hydrographic surveys and the NULKA expendable decoy. Australian industry is contributing to the development of composite bounded aircraft repairs used on aircraft such as F-111, C-130, Marchi MB 326 H and P3C, and airframe fatigue testing of F/A-18 and PC 9 and methods to repair guided-missile frigates (FFGs) have underpinned important defence equipment life extension programme\(^95\).

The government has also acquired certain equipments through cooperation with allys. With US collaboration it developed the NULKA antiship missile decoy and collaborating with New Zealand built the ANZAC frigates\(^96\). With South-east Asia, the opportunity for mature

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\(^{94}\) "Defending Australia", Op cit. no 35, p 122.

\(^{95}\) Ibid, p 128.

\(^{96}\) Ibid, p 122
cooperation and defence exports have enhanced\textsuperscript{97}. Hence it can be said that mutual cooperation is also beneficial for developing a country's capabilities.

Another issue pointed out by the Defence White Paper 1994, is that it wants to diversify its industry and support base from its traditional centre in South-east of Australia i.e. Sydney and take it to the threat prone area of northern Australia to Darwin, Townsvilli, Nurringar etc. Though the "Report on the Defence Efficiency Review" points out that there is a broad disposition of its armed forces from two the ocean basing at Sydney in the Pacific and at Perth in the Indian Ocean\textsuperscript{98}. It is more reasonable to build a strong Darwin to accommodate larger vessels as a transit or forward operating base\textsuperscript{99}. The government has tried to follow the path to encourage the geographic diversification of the national support bases through defence industry decisions. The northern Australia needs more attention, not only due to its facing to the major powers of Asia but also due to the sparseness of its population and surveillance facilities in the north. In north Queensland, the northern territory and western Australia, the growing defence pressure is providing opportunities for growth in the local civil support bases. The governments efforts in diversification could be seen in its developing the major army base near Palmerston the Air Force base at Tindal in the northern territory, Jindalee Operational Radar Network installation in remote

\textsuperscript{97} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{98} "Further Directions for the Management of Australia’s Defence” Op.cit. no 11. p 41.
\textsuperscript{99} Ibid.
parts of Australia and major investment programme such as construction of submarines in Adelaide, patrol boats in Perth and minehunters in New Castle, together with munitions manufacture in Benalla.

The coalition government has declared in no uncertain terms to participate in the defence of western ideals and interests, irrespective of their locations. On this pretext, Australia accepted the concept of Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), in order to enable it to defend the northern Australia as well as for power projection operation. Related to the RMA is the issue of future coalition warfare. The US-Australia connection is getting stronger and becoming trustworthier and so ADF is introducing interoperable RMA technologies, concepts and organisational structure. Moreover, since ADF has revived US capabilities would in turn like greater cooperation and assistance. The report “The Army in the 21st century” (A-21 or Army21) provided the basis for the subsequent plant called “Restructuring of the Australian Army” (RTA). The government further endorsed the reorganisation of the regular and reserve elements of the army with a view towards improving its combat capability and ability to deploy within and outside of Australia.

102 Ibid, p 64.
103 Ibid, p 58.
The ASP 97, had given emphasis to ‘Dibb’s Review’ for Australia’s ADMI. He argues that the defence strategy was to deny the sea-air gap which meant to prevent an enemy with a series of interlocking barriers to an attack on Australia. It is a beautifully layered strategy, which will be explained, in the following lines. The first in this layer is the ‘knowledge edge’ i.e. acquiring knowledge of the adversary with an extremely high quality and comprehensive intelligence system. It involves integrating C³I (Command, Communication, Control & Intelligence) and enhance surveillance of the maritime area by (i) Improving access to capabilities in space based surveillance. (ii) Acquiring long endurance UAV’s (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles), with a variety of sensor pay loads. (iii) Bringing into service a fully operational Over The Horizon Radar (OTHR) system (iv) Integrating all surveillance mechanisms into a single system and (v) Acquiring Air Borne Early Warning & Control (AEW&C) aircraft with extended reach and endurance\textsuperscript{104}. This knowledge edge is an effective exploitation of information warfare capabilities. The AUSMIN ’98 also supports the emphasis on ‘knowledge edge’. This agreement builds a long term partnership in the field of wide-area surveillance, which involves projects like AEW&C aircraft and Jindalee Operational Radar Network (JORN project) and to further the objective of interoperability, the

\textsuperscript{104} ‘ASP 97’, Op cit. no.20, p60.
agreement talked of developing relationship between the ADF and the US Central Command and Atlantic Command. The second priority is defeating the adversary in maritime approaches. This needs air, surface and subsurface capabilities. The only and the best way to achieve domination in maritime approaches is air superiority. For this purpose Australia has maintained 71 F/A-18 aircraft’s which could be operated best when supported by a well equipped and secure operational airbases in northern Australia, air to air refueling to extend their range and AEW&C aircraft’s. Secondly, apart from air superiority, defeating ships in a most cost-effective way is with air to surface anti-ship missile (ASM’s) launched from aircrafts including the Harpoons. Australia is planning to invest substantially in helicopters, Harpoon missiles, ASM devices and other upgrades for the FFG’s and ANZAC’s. The Fermantle class patrol boats are used by ADF for patrolling and enforcement operations, whose replacement would be necessary within two to three years. The governments investment involvement on six Collins class submarines will help along with the 6 Oberon class boats. These will provide a substantial capacity for taking different roles in maritime patrol and response and strike. The document says that the most potent anti-

105 "AUSMIN 98 Enhances Defendence Cooperation" no. 55.
106 ASP 97 Op.cit. no. 20, p 60.
108 Ibid.
shipping capability in a wide range of strategic circumstances including regional conflicts suggests that there could be substantial benefit in expanding its capability further.\textsuperscript{110}

The third priority in force structure development is given to the striking capability, i.e. to attack targets in an adversary's own territory. This would help reduce substantially the forces available for operation against Australia. This purpose is met by the F-111 aircraft, unique in the region for its long range and high payload.\textsuperscript{111} The government is planning to acquire long-range stand-off strike weapons for the F-111's, like Tomahawk land attack cruise missiles.\textsuperscript{112}

The priority four is for defeating hostile land forces in Australian territory. If the country is strong in the first three priorities the attack on its territory is impossible. Still there is a possibility of an adversary to attempt covert infiltration of small numbers by a variety of means, in terrorist style and harassment operations.\textsuperscript{113} Surveillance of land target particularly at the coastal areas is prioritised, which would be undertaken to protect key facilities and include regional force surveillance units fixed wing aircraft, unattended ground sensors and possibly UAV's\textsuperscript{114} especially in the northern Australia.

\textsuperscript{110} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{111} Ibid p 63.
\textsuperscript{112} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid,p64
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid p65
reconnaissance and troop lift capability, the development of highly mobile joint task force and limited amphibious capabilities.

The government has not only to maintain the sophisticated equipments but also has plan of the proper replacement of all those equipments which are going to be obsolescent after some time. For example by 2010 AD the major equipments like F-111, P 3C and F/A-18’s will become obsolete which have to be replaced and the timely upgrading of certain equipments like Jindalee Operational Radar Network, Collins Class Submarines and ANZAC frigates is also to be seen. This involves gigantic costs which has to be maintained in the budget. The major Navy, Army and Airforce assets are shown in the tables below, which enhances ADF’s capabilities till 1994.

MAJOR NAVY OPERATIONAL ELEMENTS

II destroyers and frigates [3 DDGs (a), 6 FFGs (b) and 2 River class destroyer escorts].
- 4 modern class conventional submarines(c)
- 15 Fremantle class patrol craft
- 7 mine countermeasures vessels (2 inshore minehunters and 5 minesweeper auxiliaries)
- 1 heavy landing ship and 5 heavy landing craft
- 2 under way replenishment ships
- 16 S70B2 Seahawk multi – role helicopters
- 7 Sea King medium utility helicopters
- 6 AS350B Squirrel and 3Bell 206B Kiowa light utility helicopters
- 2 HS748 electronic warfare training aircraft
- 2 hydrographic survey ship, 4 survey motor launches and 1 F27
- 1 Hydrographic survey aircraft
- 2 Clearance diving teams
- 8 ANZAC frigates (d)
- 6 Huon class costal minehunters.
MAJOR ARMY OPERATIONAL ASSETS - II

103 Leopard IA3 tanks
771 M113 armoured vehicles
15 LAV-25 armoured vehicles (e)
246 M2A2 L5 105mm Howitzers
104 Hamel 105mm Howitzers
33 M-198 155mm medium guns
31 Rapier surface-to-air missile systems
19 RBS – 70 surface to air missiles
22 N22 and N 24 Nomad light transport aircraft
38 S70A 9 Blackhawk helicopters
45 Bell 2068 B Kiowa helicopters
25 Bell UH-IH Iroquois helicopters
18 AS-350 B Squirrel helicopters
4 CH 47-D Chinook helicopters
15 Medium Landing Craft

MAJOR ARMY OPERATIONAL ELEMENTS

Regular
• 1 Divisional and 2 Brigade Headquarters
• 1 Amoured Regiment Headquarters and 1 Leopard Tank Squadron
• 1 Reconnaissance Regiment with M113 and LAV-25 armoured vehicles
• 1 Amoured Personnel Carrier Squadron with M113 armoured vehicles
• 1 Field Artillery Regiment with 105mm Howitzers
• 1 Medium Artillery Regiment with 155mm guns
• 1 Divisional Locating Battery (Integrated with General Reserves)
• 1 Air Defence regiment (Integrated with Ready Reserves) with Rapier surface-to-air missiles
• 1 Air Defence Battery (Integrated with Ready Reserves) with RBS70 surface-to-air missiles
• 2 Combat Engineer Regiments and Workshops
• 2 Construction Squadrons
• 4 Signals Regiments
• 8 Independent Signals Squadrons
• 4 Infantry Battalions
• 1 Special Air Service Regiment
• 1 Aviation Regiment with Iroquois, Kiowa and Nomad aircraft
• 1 Aviation regiment with Blackhawk, Iroquois and Chinook aircraft
• 1 Army Survey Regiment

Ready Reserve
• 1 Brigade Headquarters
• 2 Ground Reconnaissance Squadron with M113 armoured vehicles
• 1 Tank Squadron with Leopard Tanks
• 1 Field Artillery regiment with 105mm Howitzers
• 1 Combat Engineer Regiment and Workshop
• 1 Independent Signals Squadron
• 3 Infantry Battalions

**General Reserve**
• 1 Divisional and 7 Brigade Headquarters
• 1 Tank Squadron with Leopard Tanks
• 2 Reconnaissance Regiments with M113 armoured vehicles
• 1 Reconnaissance/APC Regiment with M113 armoured vehicles
• 1 APC Regiment with M113 armoured vehicles
• 1 Reconnaissance Squadron with M113 armoured vehicles
• 2 APC Squadrons with M113 armoured vehicles
• 3 Fields Artillery Regiments with 105 mm Howitzers
• 4 Independent Field Artillery Batteries with 105 mm Howitzers
• 1 Medium Artillery Regiment with 155 mm guns
• 1 Field Engineer Regiment and 1 Engineer Support Regiment
• 2 Construction Regiments
• 3 Field Engineer Squadrons and 1 Divisional Engineer Support Squadron
• 1 Signals Regiment
• 5 Independent Signals Squadrons
• 14 Infantry Battalions
• 3 Regional Force Surveillance Units
• 1 Commando Regiment

**MAJOR AIRFORCE OPERATIONAL ELEMENTS**

**Tactical Fighter Group**
• 3 Tactical Fighter Squadrons with 52 F/A – 18 aircraft’s (f)
• 1 Tactical Fighter Operational Conversion Unit with 18 F/A – 18 aircraft
• 1 Lead in Fighter Training Squadron with 16 Macchi MB326H and 2 PC9A aircraft
• 1 Conversion Training Squadron with 14 Macchi aircraft
• 1 Air Defence Radar Wing
• 1 Aircraft Maintenance Wing

**Strike /Reconnaissance Group**
• 2 Strike/Reconnaissance Squadrons with 17 F-111C, 15 F-111G and 4 RF-111C aircraft, including operational level maintenance.

**Maritime Patrol Group**
• 2 Maritime Patrol Squadrons and 1 Maritime Patrol Training Squadron with 19 P3C aircraft.
• 1 Aircraft Maintenance Squadron
AirLift Group
- 1 Long-range Transport/In-flight Refuelling squadron with 5 Boeing 707 aircraft
- 2 Medium-range Transport Squadrons with 12 C130 E and 12 C130H Hercules aircraft
- 2 Special Transport Squadrons with 5 Dassault 900 Falcon and 10 HS 748 aircraft
- 2 Tactical Transport Squadrons with 14 CC08 Caribou aircraft
- 1 Aircraft Maintenance Squadron

Operational Support Group
- 2 Airfield Defence Squadrons
- 1 Operational Support Unit
- 1 Air Transportable Telecommunications Unit


(a) 3 DDG's guided missile destroyers, whose armament includes: 40 standard anti-craft missiles, 6 MK-48 torpedoes, 2 Ikara anti-submarine Missile systems, 127 mm guns.
(b) 6 FFGs guided missile frigates, whose armament includes: 40 missile mixture of standard and Harpoon missile, 6 HK-48 torpedoes, 2 sea king anti-submarine helicopters, a phalanx close in weapons system, a 76 mm guns.
(c) 6 oberon-class submarine to be phased out in favour of new 6 collin class submarines, whose armaments, includes: Harpoon anti-ship missiles HK-48 torpedos.
(d) 8 ANZAC frigates, which are under construction would include Sea Hawk anti-submarine helicopter sea Sparrow MK-41 anti-missile / anti-aircraft missile system, 6 MK-48 torpedoes a 76 or 127 mm guns.
(e) By 1997, 112 LAV-25's and LAV Bisons will be delivered replanning variants of the M 113 A1.
(f) 75 F/A-18 fighters whose armament includes side winder and sparrow anti-aircraft missiles, machine guns.
(g) 20 P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft whose armament includes: Harpoon anti-ship missile, anti-submarine torpedoes, sea mines.


The defence policy under Hawke-Keating labour governments was milder than the present government has shown the path towards "New militaristic Australia." Apart from this aspect these is considerable ambiguity in its policy. As Lim and Mclellan points out the labour's emphasis on "self-reliance in side the framework of alliances," is a policy of
conscious ambiguity, which leads to undefined strategic guidance and inadequate strategic planning\textsuperscript{115}. Michael Evans further says that Australia’s defence planning has always been ‘Janus-faced,’ looking to both East and West. On the one hand Australia faces regional security through defence cooperation, Confidence-Building Measures (CBM’s) more transparency and on the other hand it says security can only be achieved through the development of strong defence capabilities within the country and maintenance of strong alliances.

The defence policy has not been of great change apart from Militaristic attitude and increased US cooperation. It is not an articulated set of new policies for the new era of world polity but how Cold War assumptions underpin a 'confused rhetoric' on strategic engagement with South-east Asia and regional defence cooperation\textsuperscript{116}. The threats and in securities; the policy makers dwell with are not absolute and mere possibilities. They reflect the particular priorities and concerns of the framers. The documents are as much constitutive as they are descriptive privileging certain ideas and beliefs and projecting its own value preferences onto the behaviour and intention of others\textsuperscript{117}. As the frames of defence and security policy of Australia portrays themselves it seems that the ‘White

\textsuperscript{115} Michael Evans, Op.cit.no.4,p119
\textsuperscript{116} David Sullivan, "Sipping the Thin Gruel: Academic and Policy Closure in Australia’s Defence and Security Discourse" in Graeme Cheeseman and Bruce Grant’s (ed), Op.cit.no.6,p55.
\textsuperscript{117} Graeme Cheeseman, "Back to Forward Defence....." Op.cit.no.6,p271
Australia Policy’ hasn’t yet erased from the face of earth and obviously not from Australia. Graeme cheeseman and others conclude that a new form of militarism permeates Australia’s foreign policy and defence thinking in the 1990’s for all the neo-realist affiliation of ‘cooperating for peace’\textsuperscript{118}. 

\textsuperscript{118} Jim George, "Quo Vadis Australia?Framing the Defence and security Debate beyond the Cold War ",in Graeme Cheeseman and Bruce Grant’s (ed),Op.cit.no.6,p44