Chapter-1

INTRODUCTION

The world we are living in today is such an enigma that its definition is itself strewn in absolute mystery. In order to understand this mystery we need to unravel the deep crevices in the basic structure of the society, which logically would mean the policy-making body of a country in question or all the countries put together. The policies of a country shows its attitude, as whether it is leading towards peace or militarism, which usually itches for war. This thesis is an attempt to see how the policies of a state could imply on the nearer region, i.e., the security complex. Australia, like every other country in the Asia-Pacific, is on the throes of a major break through, being in the most volatile of the regions. It is more so due to the ebbing of the Cold War beyond the horizon and also in its policy change from too much dependence on US to a self-reliant posture. Though self-reliance implied a relative emphasis rather than an absolute ideal, it is a fundamental change in Australia’s policy structure. Its defence and security policy is going through a lot of scrutiny in the present times. Australia, whether reaching adolescence or adulthood could be explained in the consecutive chapters elaborately. These chapters will be dealing with the defence and security

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1 David Lee, “Australia’s Defence Policy: A historical overview” in Mohan Malik’s (ed), "Australia’s Security in the 21st Century" (Allen & Unwin), 1998, p 29 in which he says, as self-reliance does not mean self sufficiency, it could only emphasis on this policy in relative terms.
policy of Australia in the post-Cold War era and its economic as well as
defence relations with its nearest neighbours i.e., South-east Asia and then
the implications of Australia's defence policy and its force structure
development over the region.

It is interesting to note that while Cold War period was a period of
contradiction, the post Cold War period is a period of complexity, ambiguity
and confusion. The words we use, the threats we face, the dominance of the
country/s we perceive are behind a misty line of ambiguity. The terms such
as cooperation integration, interdependence, structure, institution, regimes,
even theory itself have different meanings in an economic as against an
international relations context². Even the term 'Cold War' was taken to be as
'cold peace' due to the fact that with the existence of comprehensive and
heightened tension felt in the air, there was an absence of war between them.
It was a time where peace is impossible and war unlikely³ as aptly termed by
Raymond Aron. The end of the Cold War has been taken as the defining
point in the 20th century history. The world is moving slowly but surely
towards multiporality. With US, coupled with domestic economic problems
have led to reduce its defence spending, scale down overseas military

commitments and focus more on domestic issues⁴ and its further changing hands from world’s largest creditor to the world’s largest debtor⁵ is a known fact. But when looked from the politico-diplomatic dimension, US still holds the reigns. It has immense capacity to influence and operate in distant lands. It also has a huge market and is a source of high technology and capital investment. It is but natural, if the world is anxious to see how US will shape its policy and strategy and where it would stand in the international community. This period i.e., 1990 is the landmark in history, where every country has spread its feelers towards US. As Samuel Huntington pointed out that “the 1990 has joined 1815, 1895 and 1945 as the symbolic years of change in the international system and Americas role in it⁶. The role of US is important to understand in the Asia-Pacific region, as US had been quite interested in this trouble shot zone, which was also mostly created by it. Apart from US, Japan’s rising economic power (which became the world’s biggest civilian power) China’s increasing economic and political might budgeted against the region’s power balance and security. India’s aggravating presence felt in the changed political equations, are reasons enough to understand multipolarity. Meanwhile, ‘if and when’ there is Korean unification with nuclear arms from north and economic

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development from south might make another major power in the region to reckon with.

Post-Cold War era is a juxtaposition of military, political and economic dimensions, with economy having the widest wavelength. The world's dealings were changed from geo-political to geo-economical viewpoints. The world has become a small place with increased interdependence, economic liberalization and globalization. The countries which are economically developed are emerging as more powerful than the countries which were having either the largest landmass or population or defence capability. The underlying military and ideological preconception are increasingly superseded by the concerns of trade protectionism, industrial adjustments, technological diffusion and domestic stability. It is an era giving emphasis on socio-economic development rather than politico-military change Raymond Aron predicts the "replacement of a military society by industrial society where the intellectual, technical, economic revolutions, like a cosmic force carries humanity towards an unknown future". Moreover, the pace of technological diffusion across national boundaries has quickened in both the civilian and military sectors.

By the end of Cold War and the developments that occurred aftermath has also helped in changing the immediate security equation for

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all the countries, where the underlying structure of self-perpetuating insecurity remains intact. Without images that connect aspiration to reality, security policy can only steer aimlessly through immediate crisis without any larger sense of direction or purpose. Though today it is felt more and more surely that a major war situation would not arise, this situation has the potential to bring greater disorder as the passions of nationalism, demands of territoriality, ethnic resurgence and religious assertiveness gains new force. This could be seen in the rise of many low key conflicts over Asia, Africa and also in Europe, where internal disturbances caused more security concern than an external aggression. It is like how Sigmund Freud points out that "civilization leads to the aggressive or destructive instinct being turned inwards and transformed into guilt or self-hatred". In order to minimize conflicts and attain peace the world is moving towards diplomatic normalization, political reconciliation and military détente and disengagement.

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8 Ibid, p 735.
Philosophy Behind War and Peace

There is a strong need to emphasis on international community through multi-lateralism and shedding differences, in an attempt to pursue peace rather than letting the world slip in the gloom of war and chaos. When ‘peace’ as such is studied, analysed and adopted by the human psyché as natural then the “superiority of peace would find its expression in that of philosophic life but political life would be that of warriors without war”\(^{13}\). In today’s world of perpetual insecurity, discord and strife, it becomes all the more important to go through the theoretical underpinnings of ‘War’ and that of ‘Peace’. Why the human forces pulls more towards war than towards peace. World history is written in red, torn between ‘war’ and ‘truce’ (temporary or fragile peace) but not peace. Since peace is a term more concrete, more permanent. Being in a ‘state of war’ is the ‘nature of man’ as pointed out by Thomas Hobbes, in his ‘Social Contract Theory’. Indeed, passion and vices, discord and war are the stuffs out of which our culture and history are made, which in the long run ‘might’ lead to the road to morality, concord and to peace\(^{14}\). Barry Buzan has pointed out the world to be in an anarchic state where peace is elusive and war ubiquitous.

Euphemistically speaking due to civilization we termed the mechanism of self-defence as war and its antonym as peace. But peace is not

\(^{13}\) Hassner, Op.cit.no3, p 742.

\(^{14}\) Ibid, p 746.
merely an anti-thesis of war. Since nations can be involved in armed strife and not be subject to the technical status of war, still there is a situation which is not altogether peaceful. Since peace is to be that condition where there is a manifestation of human ideals, where the minds of men are no longer seized with animosity, there is respect for human rights and life is respected and where there is no ideological conflicts and man is united in intellectual and moral strife. Moreover, civilization demands ‘peaceful coexistence’ and belief on the notion of ‘live and let live’. Today’s watchwords like global village, globalization is catching up with the human psyché. The emphasis on internationalism is gaining momentum with the passing of time. A verse from the ancient Indian scriptures would explain internationalism in a most profound manner, i.e., ‘UDARA CHARITAANAM, VASUDEIVA KUTUMBKAM’, meaning, one’s heart should be all encompassive since the whole world is but one family, one entity and not a cluster of different states. We are all emphasizing, in the world conferences of varied kinds, be it on environment or women and child development or diplomacy or armed alliances or Nuclear non-proliferation treaties and conferences, the notion which gained momentum is ‘peace and plenty’.

But still most of us came to accept that war is reality while peace is an utopian thought. We have come to a paradoxical situation where some feel that only war could lead to peace. It is something like what Saddam Hussain once said in a T.V. interview during the Gulf war “that war has not
yet been fought which could bring an end to all wars". This brings one to theories the whole issue, saying that peace is the equilibrium stage, which actually is never achieved. As Emmanuel Kant puts it 'at the degree of education reached by the human race, war is an indispensable means to better it further and is only after the completion (god knows when) of this education, that an eternal peace would be beneficial and peace becomes possible.

The Cold War situation was ‘cold’ without any major war due to the theory of ‘balance of power’ and later ‘the balance of deterrence’. ‘Balance of power’ is followed when a state is dissuaded to go into war with another country as it is known that it is a no-win situation or probably all the states are convinced that its purpose might fail. The ‘balance of deterrence,’ which arose in the late 80’s, corresponds to the current situation of preservation of global peace, the deterrence lying in the possible catastrophic damage that may be wrought by nuclear weapons. It has atleast led to controlling the local conflicts from changing into a global warfare. But then both these theories are not fool proof. In the ‘balance of power’ situation a country can go for war, in order to avoid being confronted by another country affecting its peace and security. While in the ‘balance of deterrence’ situation, peace becomes more endangered through the breeding of tensions, suspicions and fears in measure as this strange rivalry in the multiplication of possibilities of terror becomes more acute. Even though global peace may be preserved

15 Ibid., p 747
through the balance of deterrence, the hostility and antagonism generated by the strategy and counter-strategy of threat can influence the outbreak of 'limited war' or conflicts, in which conventional weapons are used\textsuperscript{16}. When everything fails what could be the weapon for peace? It is probably the people, the masses, the public opinion, the epitome of power in democracy(?).

Defence and Security Dilemma

After saying so much about war and peace, we come to know that all the countries, have accepted 'war' to be a reality, an inevitable evil looming large in the international political agenda. If war is reality then defence capabilities to strengthen the country is a logical development. If a state fails to look after itself, then it is faced with either loss of power initially and ultimately loss of independence. With the technological advancement and the need to fulfil the power balance within and without, a state increases its defence posture. Here arises a situation according to Barry Buzan 'Defence Dilemma' and/or 'Power-Security Dilemma'. Defence Dilemma arises 'because of technological developments which have inflated military mean to such an extent that a general threat of destruction is the only militarily logical means of providing national defence\textsuperscript{17}. He further says that if war is feared as a major threat in its own right, then defence is devalued as a posture, but military security is not eliminated as a problem, which is the


\textsuperscript{17} Barry Buzan, Op.cit.no .9 , p 275
heart of the defence dilemma. It is a durable concept since the end of Cold War showed the permanence of this concept and had emphasised on the fact that there is a primacy of the ‘fear of war’ than the ‘fear of defeat’.

‘Power-security dilemma’ arose from the fear of defeat stimulated by the potential uses of military means in the hands of other actors; i.e., in an anarchy, states have to look after themselves to ensure both their welfare and the continued survival of their political and societal values. Taking measures to prevent this risk/conflict with other states as all jostled together in an unregulated environment seeking their own advantage. This structural imperative lies at the core of power-security dilemma. Furthering this concept, Buzan says that ‘the causes of insecurity are sought in the structural and relational dynamics of states and the system, such as fragmented and incremental decision-making procedures, misunderstandings and misperceptions, arms racing and the then complexity of cross-cutting interests and attitudes in a system of high density interdependence, this he calls the security struggle. This struggle leads to what is called security dilemma; since intentions of a state is calculated from capabilities and the profound ambiguity in military means pushes states towards worst-case assessments of each others behaviour. And because military power is relative, states will be sensitive to

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18 Ibid p 279, Barry Buzan says, the experience in the World War II began to rival fear of war to fear for defeat as the prime concern of national security policy. Since all actors were threatened by the process of war itself, which has become so violent and costly that it could easily destroy or at least damage seriously, the fabric of the state. Moreover, the winners might as well be so badly damaged and depleted as to seriously blur the distinction between victory and defeat.

19 Ibid.p 290

20 Ibid.,p 294

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid, p 295.
changes in the capability of potential rivals\textsuperscript{23}. Both defence dilemma and power-security dilemma are strongly linked to arms dynamics, which is happening in the South-east Asian countries with the withdrawal of bases from Philippines by US following the end of the Cold War. Australia’s defence and security policy makers are realist and do follow the path what is explained by Barry Buzan and Hedley Bull. This realistic attitude in defence policy making is confirmed by Paul Dibb in a personal interview.

**Security Concerns and Threat Perceptions**

The end of Cold War has led the countries to analyse what is that big threat or is there a threat at all\textsuperscript{24}. This unpredictability of international situation led Richard Cohen to say that with the end of the Cold War ‘when the Soviet Union collapsed, we ..... lost more than an enemy. We lost a collaborator in the search for ‘meaning’\textsuperscript{25}. This ambiguity and the ‘search of meaning’ led to arms race what Barry Buzan calls arms dynamics. This arms race, especially in the Asia-Pacific is quite alarming which is shown in the table below showing their military expenditures.

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid p 312.

\textsuperscript{24} Prof Paul Dibb, in a personnel interview on 22\textsuperscript{nd} Dec 1998 said that the policy world is different from the academic (or idealistic) world. We the defence policy makers are realist, so this automatically supports Australia's turning towards militarism.

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This arms race all over Australasia and South-east Asian countries makes one fear how the security dynamics is to be maintained to deter conflict. ‘Security’ as a traditional concept was taken in terms of military deterrence, territorial defence and alliance competition. Following the changes in the world’s political scene, this traditional concept has been questioned with regard to its validity. ‘Security’ is in present times dealt quite broadly engulfing into it the socio-politico-economic as well as environmental issues. But then the use of the term ‘security’ is still done as an ‘underdeveloped concept’.

While dealing with ‘security’ we tend to drift towards debating which one to be more important the ‘absolute security’ or ‘relative security’. Absolute security, like the term peace is supposed to be on the equilibrium stage, a myth almost unattainable. As St John Kettle says ‘the quest for absolute security is a futile diversion from what ever life is all about, as we know we cannot be totally secure’. But then this is a long term perspective. In the long run we would all perceive to have a ‘brave new world’ which is absolutely secure. ‘Relative security’ is a short term pragmatic approach. In this thesis, security is dealt to mean relative security.

26 David Lee, “Search for Security: The Political Economy of Australia’s Post War Foreign and Defence Policy” (Allen and Unwin in Association with the Department of International Relations, RSPAS, The ANU, Canberra. ACT, 1995) p 7, in which he mentioned that the Under Developed Concept; to mean that security is still using the narrow military line of thought, which factually cannot mean something profound in today’s interdependent world.

The threat perception is what the defence policy-makers are concerned about. Though it is realized that the extent of threat could not be ever presumed before hand; a fair guess could be made. 'When the threat that is faced is ambiguous (and to some extent it nearly always is), then it is much safer to be realistically pessimistic in order to avoid a situation of 'absolute gloom'\textsuperscript{28}. With the end of Cold War one can not easily discern what is taking its place. In the present context the different determinants of power and authority system operating within and across borders when the bases of politics and of democratic theory, the meaning and nature of power and authority as well as accountability has to be reexamined. Where the security concerns ends and defence policy begins cannot be adumbrated. A holistic and integrated concept of security is needed to replace the one sided military aspect of security. The people in general demand societal security for all, not class security for the few in power. The actual threat is posed to a country, when it judges the other state to have both the military capability and the potential intact, to threaten the interest of another state. Thus, threat assessments involve a multi-disciplinary analytical process requiring the study of a given states political, military economic and technological capabilities\textsuperscript{29}. However, threat perception of a country depends upon its


development vis-a-vis the country/s which are likely to attack. Depending on this threat a country's defence or foreign or even domestic policies are made.

As threat is hard to comprehend, so is the planning process hard to be framed. As Barry Buzan says threats are so ambiguous, policy-making in that instance by every state is an imperfect act. In order to reduce planning uncertainties, the defence policy-making have to build-up high levels of flexibility and adaptability into the policy structure. Secondly, it is essential to rate potential threats, by measuring the breadth of a country's susceptibilities to particular countries. Thirdly, a country has to segregate the kinds of threats and their intensities.

When threats are considered in specific terms, detailing diplomatic, economic, political and military consequences of particular activities, the need of a strong defence with sophisticated weaponry is needed sometimes at a very short notice. So what a nation needs is a balanced and stable defence policy, which is self-reliant to avert the dependence on a major power. To achieve this, it is not that a country has only to develop its military capability but also has to develop the country's economy and society. Only when the superstructure is made strong with the help of the varied infrastructural facilities, that the country can be called secured, which is of course a long-term perspective.

30 Ross Babbage, "Rethinking Australia's Defence" (Univ. of Queensland Press, Australia, 1980) p. 53.
The superstructure can only be made strong with policy-making structure being organized and well formulated. The policy-making structure of Australia had undergone certain significant changes since 1970’s. The procedure for defence force development and the acquisition of major capabilities and equipments were also received. The policy-making, like in every other country is complex and multi-faceted, which includes a range of considerations and settings including internal institutional and political-bureaucratic factors, national historical traditions, domestic political and popular cultures and the changing international environment\textsuperscript{31}. It is interesting to note that Australia’s policy structure as well as decision-making had undergone a sea change after the Vietnam war and US’ change in strategic policies. Apart from these factors there was a growing realization of ‘reality’ with Asian proximity and the ways that continue to support the maintenance of existing doctrines force structure or power bases\textsuperscript{32}. The changing strategic circumstances made Australia need to adopt more integrated and centrally controlled policy making and command structures.

Defence policy, is institutionalized in the higher defence establishment at Russel Hill in Canberra, headed by Minister for defence; where the defence white paper is made, responsible to the parliament. The whole structure is shown through the help of a diagram given below.

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid p 130
Defence Policy Making

Minister of Defence

Defence Force
The Department of Defence (DOD)

Defence Science & Personnel
Parliamentary Secretary

DSTO
Overseeing the development & implementation of policy on Australia's defence industry and defence.

Chief of Defence Force (CDF)
Secretary to DOD

HQADF
HOAST
VCDF
DER

National Assessment Board

Defence White Papers

Strategic Basis
Defence Committee Cabinet

ADF Operational Concepts
Concepts & Capabilities Committees (CCC)

Defence Force Capabilities Option Papers
Defence Programme Management Committee (DPMC)

Major Capability Submission (MCS's)
Force Structure Policy and Programming Committee (FSPPC)

Equipment Acquisition Strategies (EAS's)
DSDC

Major Equipment Procurement Process
The whole structure is well formed and it is quite difficult to perceive who or what has the highest authority, though the Minister of defence, supported by DoD has the ultimate authority. The CDF pulls all strings. CDF is the chief military adviser to the government and is also responsible for the administration of the ADF. The changes were done in 1970’s in the ‘Tange reorganisation’. There was further reviews from the diarchy shown in the table. The reviews which changed the military side of the structure further were the ‘Utz’ review in 1982, the ‘VCDF’ (Vice-Chief of the Defence Force) review and the ‘Dibb’ review in 1986, the 1984 and 1987 a ‘cross’ reports and 1989 ‘Sanderson’ review. In 1984, the formation of Headquarters Australian Defence Force (HQADF) and in 1987 a three-starver chief of the defence Force (VCDF) to run it (HQADF) on behalf of CDF, was made successful. Secondly by 1996, the operational command structure was replaced by a system of permanent joint force commands, into a single Headquarters, Australian Theater (HQAST), under which came the Maritime Command, Land Command and Air Command. While the Northern Command was handled under a single department, showing its significance in Australia’s strategic policy making; South-east Asian countries the Central focus on its defence policy. By 1997, DER (Defence Efficiency Review) created a single, fully integrated defence staff to advice

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33 Ibid, p 132.
34 Ibid.
the CDF and secretary on strategic planning and policy-making. The overall guidance finally delivered to DoD to refine existing ADF strategic and operational concepts and to prepare a series of so-called Defence Force Capabilities Option Papers (DFCOP’s). These DFCOP’s are used by HQADF and prepares a Ten Year Development Plan (TYDP) leading to FYDP (the Five Year Defence Programme). The force development process is centered around a number of advisory committees. Apart from these there are various other committees which monitor and comment on the policies and activities of the defence establishment and its components, like the Senate and Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, the Senate Estimates Committee, the Public Accounts Committee and the Public Works Committee. Those that have been the promotional groups (like pressure groups in India), concurring exclusively with defence and security issues like the ADA, Armed Neutrality Association, Secure Australia Project, the Navy League, Secure Australia Project, the Navy league etc. Others of the same kind the UN Association of Australia. Medical Association for the Prevention of War, People for Nuclear Disarmament, Women’s International league for Peace and Freedom etc. The academic ‘think tanks’ like ANU’s SDSC, the Australian Defence Studies Center at ADFA and of course, the media. These groups could hardly get a chance to penetrate into the closed structure; which needs

flexibility leading to less militarism. The broadly explained policy structure will be in the second chapter, “Australia’s Defence and Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Era”.

Australia’s Threat Perception

Australia’s problems started from its uniqueness. Being a big continent and manned as a single country, its defence needs to be catered by one government, whose population is also a major source of concern. Apart from this, Australia forms the end of the ‘great land bridge’ from the mainland South-east Asia into the Pacific. It is also the biggest island continent and its elite structure is dominated by the British who landed in Australia in 1788, which was initially the land of the Aborigines. Its identity has become double edged. Its whiteness historically had made Australia to take up wars in Asian mainland with its Pax Britannica and later American Lake policy. Australia is trying to change its image of a young white continent abandoned at the foot of Asia. Australia is located in the South but is always been seen as a part of the North. It is in the eastern hemisphere, but is regarded as a western country. There is a proud westernness in multi-cultural Australia. ‘And not surprisingly on the upside down of western spaces of security, there is a white paper chirping, a

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familiar western ditty of defence\textsuperscript{38}. With the Vietnam war and America's defeat in the Asian mainland, accompanied by the Guam Doctrine of Richard Nixon have made the Australian strategists to realise the importance of Asia for its security. With the changed defence White Papers of 1987 and then 1994 and the present one 1997 has all showed the emphasis layed majorly on its region (South east-Asia and the South-west Pacific). Where the Area of Direct Military Importance (ADMI) and the area of primary strategic concerns are taken up by the \textit{Dibb Review}. Thus, Asia remains for Australia the highest foreign policy priority. Australian policy making shows a stark contradiction between 'self-reliance', which forces itself to become militaristic and 'regional cooperation' which demands the opposite. Australia has to strike a balance in between these two extreme forces. As Steward Woodman says that Australia's defence policy in the future would most probably be a mixture of 'self-reliance and forward defence'\textsuperscript{39}.

Australia's threat looms from the large empty northern and north-western coast facing South-east Asia. The potential threat which is faced by Australia is the likeliness of a low-key conflict which could arise in its northern region. Though there is no major threat, the immediate threat to Australia is hard to analyse which needs a realistic assessment of threat, in


\textsuperscript{39} In a personal interview of Steward Woodman taken on 11th January 1998 he said the above.
terms of its holistic capabilities and intentions is necessary in order to frame an accurate defence policy. In such a volatile situation to take 'a fairly bad case' hypothesis is better than a 'worst case' hypothesis as a basis for its defence policy, since an amount of risk in always involved in political dealings.

The threats can be military and non-military. The non-military threats are of varied kinds which are equally fatal, like which affect the fishing zone, in the vast ocean area surrounding Australia, incursion of foreign mineral and fishing zones, illicit offshore mineral and oceanographic exploration and fishing surveys, coastal landings by individuals carrying contagious diseases, introduction of diseased animals and/or destructive plant parasites, narcotics, bullion and native fauna are of particular concerns. Another form of pressure is the recent economic crisis in South-east Asia which has its rippling effects further ashore to the whole world. Many of Australia's major trading partners are effected. Some industries which depend on international trade becomes vulnerable. In the long run, if the international crisis situation prolongs, then it would hit the living standards of Australian public considerably.

Depending upon the extent of threat, not only the defence policy is made but also the strategy of confrontation or of negotiation is decided. It also leads to diplomatic, economic, cultural, educational or military
exchange programmes or alliances and treaties. Australia needs a strong
defence and security policy to thwart the technical vulnerabilities like its
vast size, uninhabited coastline and the difficulties of maintaining effective
control over activities of remote regions. The possession of military strength,
with a 'technological edge', is one of the effective means of deterring a
prospective rival from escalating a dispute into a higher level of conflict. It
is well termed by the political scientists that the political decision-making
would include military-industrial-scientific complex. How Australia goes
through this policy change vis-a-vis South east Asia will be explained in the
following chapters.

Australia and Regional Security

The end of the Cold War has left the regional strategic environment
in a rather disarrayed position. Australia for a long time had depended on the
superpower backing, but as a sovereign state Australia cannot mortgage her
security concerns to another country, nor can she ignore her basic defence
responsibilities. Moreover, the international situation is always in a flux and
the alliance systems are not permanent. Against such an unpredictable
condition of the international situations, a rigid attitude in respect of no-
threat complacency may prove to be dangerous. So Australia needs defence
capabilities as well as profound regional cooperation agendas.
Australia's regional security system in the Cold War days was based on some military alliances like the ANZUS (which is still maintained with much vigour), SEATO (had gone down and is defunct) and FPDA. In 1973 Whitlam proposed the idea of 'regional security community' the first attempt to bring a concrete agenda. This proposal was the 'Asia-Pacific Forum', comparing itself with the Commonwealth of nations and the organization of American States, which also wanted to include Japan and China, which led to the demise of the whole proposal. The post Cold War regional security agenda is followed multilaterally through ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which has lately decided to take up security issues in its discussions. ARF is helped by another new organization; Council for Security Cooperation in Asia-Pacific (CSCAP). A much more successful organization in the region is the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) which is basically economic. Australia has been actively and enthusiastically participating in these multi-lateral forums showing its seriousness with the region. Its foreign policy makers started defining the new collective 'us' i.e. Australia, South-east Asia, the Pacific Island Countries and 'them' i.e., those outside the region. Gareth Evans said "we

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41 David Horner, in a personal interview on 15th December 1998, talked of these rhetoric which were quite paradoxical if seen from the defence perspective.
are a confident and natural partner and not cultural misfit trapped by geography\textsuperscript{42}.

It would not be difficult for Australia to be an active participant in the ‘Asian drama’ of power-politics tinged with economic advancement since it has supported, way back in 1972 the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality in South-east Asia and also the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace. The strategy taken up by the Australian government to make a success of its regional community is through economic interdependence, regional cooperation, diplomacy and defence cooperation. It has proposed to follow ‘comprehensive engagement’ with the South-east Asian countries and with that of South Pacific Island countries it would follow ‘constructive commitment’. It shows while Australia wants to be a friend to the South-east Asia; with South Pacific it wants to be the benefactor; the God Father.

In short, the Australian defence and security policy would be seen in the liberalist as well as in the realist light, where objectivity could be drawn, which is shown in the chapter V showing the implication of Australia’s policy structure over the South-east Asian states, though they do not depend upon Australia neither for economy nor for security.

\textsuperscript{42} Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Australia’s Regional security” Ministerial Statement by Senator Gareth Evans Q.C. Minister for Foreign Affairs and trade, December 1989, p. 21.