CHAPTER - 1

PROLIFERATION AND RESPONSE: THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is today conceivably the most successful security organization in the world. No like organization can match its military might, technological prowess, and it's geographical reach. During the cold war, it presented a united front against the Soviet threat, even if within NATO councils members often were pitted against each other in defense of narrow national interests. With the end of the cold war, and the receding of its former enemy the Soviet Union, it appears that after a period of acrimony and debate on the continued relevance of the Alliance, it has since adjusted to the new realities of the post cold war world. This it has done in a variety of ways. A day before the Commonwealth of Independent States was declared, the Foreign Ministers of the Alliance, as well as Baltic, Czech, Slovak and a representative of the Soviet Union gathered at Brussels for the inaugural session of the North Atlantic Council for Cooperation (NACC)\(^1\) which was formed primarily to deal with the residual problem of the nuclear weapons still on the territory of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine\(^2\). In a second move, NATO countries in 1994,

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\(^1\) The first inaugural meeting of NACC was held on 10 December 1991. On 21 December the Commonwealth of Independent States was set up marking the effective end of the USSR. On 25 December Soviet President Gorbachev announced his resignation as President and relinquished his function as Supreme Commander of the Soviet forces. For chronology of events see NATO Handbook (NATO Office of Information and Press: Brussels, 1992)

\(^2\) The communique noted that "Authorities in the Soviet Union have confirmed their intention to ensure the safe, responsible, and reliable control of (these) weapons under a single unified authority." North
announced the formation of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) with a framework agreement \(^3\) which noted that the Partnership was aimed at various tasks including over the long term, facilitating members to be better able to operate with the Alliance, as well as peacekeeping training and other tasks aimed at facilitating the above objective. On 27th May 1997, history was made as NATO moved cautiously to engage Russia in a new relationship who’s parameters were laid by the “Founding Act”, and on the fiftieth anniversary of the Washington Treaty, the Alliance welcomed three new states to the NATO fold – Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary – within its organization, even as it noted that more would be included at a later date. While all these signified systemic changes in the security structures of Europe, what was by far the most significant even was the formal “out of area” role that NATO took upon itself at the Washington Summit in April 1999, noting that NATO should be prepared to take up non Article – 5 operations with NATO partners, as well as cooperate with international organizations as well as the UN. This last reference to the UN seemed to little more than a sop, since by the time of the Summit, NATO’s existing peacekeeping and peacemaking activities in the former Yugoslavia\(^4\) had been expanded to include the “coercion” of an elected government in Serbia. The bombing of Kosovo signifies the end of

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\(^4\) This was formally agreed to by the North Atlantic Council (hereafter NAC) to “make available Alliance resources in support of UN, SCCE and EC efforts to bring about peace in the former Yugoslavia.” *NAC Communiqué, Brussels, 2 September 1991.*
a fractious relationship with the UN, with the organization choosing to operate independently of even UN sanction. Thus both the nature and role of NATO is being re-written. Clearly, NATO is more than simply an alliance of collective defense, nor is its role limited to spreading the message of “stability” as is often pointed out.

As this study focuses on the role of NATO in combating missile proliferation, it is as well to begin with a clear idea of just what constitutes NATO. What are the basic and continuing realities that underpin the Alliance? Looking into the past, what lessons can be learned from the handling of crises where missiles and nuclear weapons dominated the security calculus, are some of the questions that will be addressed. Such an exercise will provide the context within which the new roles and actions can be evaluated, and assessed.

What is NATO? : Enduring Interests and Realities.

The factors that led to the creation of the North Atlantic Organization are diverse. Firstly, towards the end of the war it was obvious that Europe was exhausted by the ravages of war, and in no small measure divided within itself. Germany was still looked upon with suspicion, while France and the UK were often at variance with each other, in deciding the future course for Europe. Secondly, well before the end of the war, the tensions between the erstwhile allies led to the Soviets being regarded as a dominant force that had hostile intentions, a fact recognized in March 1947, by the Truman doctrine which announced “support for all free people in
their struggle against communism. This formalized the growing antipathy between the erstwhile allies. In his famous article "the sources of Soviet Conduct" George Kennan was the first to outline the need for "Firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies. By June 1947 American aid in the form of the Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of Europe underlined the economic dominance of the US, just as the August explosion of the bomb at Hiroshima had emphasised it's military dominance.

Secretary of War Henry L Stimson observes that Russian hostility was not a little due to this atomic monopoly. He noted "relations may be perhaps irretrievably embittered by the way in which we approach the solution of the bomb with Russia. For if we fail to approach them now and merely continue to negotiate with them, having the weapons rather ostentatiously on our hip, their suspicions and their distrust of our purposes and motives will increase." This warning however was ignored, and attempts to cooperate with the Soviet Union was abandoned, as Soviet intentions in Poland became clear, and Czechoslovakia fell under communist rule by February 1948. The influential Washington Post was


7 Quoted in McGeorge Bundy, "Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty years", (New Delhi: East West Press, 1989) p.139.

already urging that in the face of a mounting Soviet threat, the free nations of the world should lose no time in concluding a pact of defence.

Ernest Bevin, Foreign Minister of the UK had already broached the subject to the French as well as the Americans, and the initial proposal had been received favourably, though the State Department was undeniably cautious. However, the US was keen to see the Europeans themselves come up with some formal organization on their own, before Washington could present this controversial subject to Congress. On 17 March of the same year, Foreign Ministers of Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom signed a Brussels Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self Defense.

In July talks began in Washington between the US, Canada and the Brussels Treaty powers. Divergent views had to be brought into consonance. For instance, France at first was adamantly opposed to Italy joining the Alliance on the grounds that this would be mean a defense of the Mediterranean⁹. This was abandoned later, as France realized that this would be an advantage for her insistent request that the Algerian departments be brought into the Treaty area. The US was more concerned with the security of Greenland and Iceland than of certain European countries, while the British were simply anxious for any arrangement that would tie in Canada and the Us in a collective self defence Treaty. The US

⁹ For a study of the debates and preferences that marked the founding of NATO see Sir Nicholas Henderson, The Birth of NATO, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982)
understandably remained adamant on two points. Firstly, they were uncomfortable with language that would have automacity in US response. No war could be considered whatever the threat without a vote from Congress. Secondly, they were opposed to the creation of any machinery (like a Defence Council) that would divest the US chiefs of Staff of their responsibility for safeguarding the security of the United States\(^\text{10}\).

More interesting was the question of legality of the Alliance. Initially the French had suggested that the Preamble of the Treaty might refer to Chapter 8 of the Charter of the United Nations which provided for regional arrangements. However the British felt that this would be seen as a justification for asking for Security Council agreement for any “enforcement” act of the Alliance. (Article 54, Chapter 8 notes that all activities taken under regional arrangement must be reported to the Security Council). The British preferred Article 51 which allowed members the right to collective self defence, which were primarily designed to protect members against external aggression in the event of failure of the Security Council to act in time. Moreover “enforcement” was not envisaged in an alliance that was built for self defense, and this was perceived to be less dangerous than a Security Council veto power. In the end the treaty text merely reaffirmed its faith in the UN Charter without going into details.

The Treaty text itself was kept simple. The first Article sought to address Europe’s “propensity to war that was symptomatic of the

\(^{10}\) Ibid. p.37.
reactionary and decadent elite's and imperialistic ambitions\textsuperscript{11}. Thus it behoved all signatories to address their problems by peaceful means. Article 4, merely called for "consultation" between members should the danger of war arise. This apparently weak clause of self defense at the time catered to the American dislike of getting involved in conflicts that Europeans may involved themselves in, a cautiousness that was furthered by Article 6 which limits Treaty areas to the territory of the signatories, and excluding (under considerable heated debate) all colonial possessions\textsuperscript{12} except the Algerian Departments of France, the territory of Turkey, and any islands north of the Tropic of Cancer.

However what was vital to the future actions of the Alliance was the Agreed Minutes of interpretation. These interpretations were incorporated into the minutes of the eighteenth meeting which noted \textit{Article 4 is applicable in the event of a threat in any part of the world, to the security of any of the Parties, including a threat to the security of their overseas territories} (italics mine)\textsuperscript{13}. This as will be seen, was often used to allow alliance members considerable freedom in intervening outside Treaty area, often using NATO infrastructure or support in other areas.

It is also worth noting that while collective defence was apparently the dominant rationale of NATO, states chose to interpret this concept in different ways. For instance, a NATO ally Norway chose to defer having


\textsuperscript{12} NATO Handbook (NATO Office of Information, Brussels, 1982)

\textsuperscript{13} Henderson, note 9. p.103
permanently deployed foreign troops on its soil due to differing political and security imperatives, while Germany opted and indeed insisted on the presence of a massive permanent peacetime presence of foreign troops, that was occasioned equally by geography as well as political considerations. Similarly security guarantees being unstated, have been implemented in different ways as many be seen from the occasions when NATO has had to react to a threat to West Germany, Norway, or Turkey, and neither was stationing of nuclear weapons and dual key systems a uniform process. In short, the security guarantee, being unstated, has always worked at different levels for different states. This is vital when considering the expansion of NATO and its rationale.

On April 4, 1949, the negotiating powers then invited Denmark Iceland, Italy Norway and Portugal to join the negotiations, and the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington. In May 1954 the USSR made a bid to join NATO, and this was rejected peremptorily by the powers, upon which Moscow turned to its own security organization the Warsaw Treaty Organization (14 May 1955). With her own nuclear explosion in 1949, the Americans made a commitment to Europe’s defense - given at a time of nuclear monopoly – and destined to remain in doubt until the end of the cold war, spawning the most amazing doctrines, and the largest stockpiles of weapons in human history.

The US, as the primary provider or both aid and security was soon engaged in ensuring that while Europe should be encouraged to unite and
provide more for her own defence, it would be as well is the nuclear genie, if not coaxed back into the bottle, should at least not be permitted to roam further. Thus even as the Soviet Union and the US proceeded on the nuclear path, the formation of NATO ensured that Europe did not need, and indeed would not, proceed along that same path.

**NATO as an Instrument of Non Proliferation**

Therefore, by its very nature, NATO also functioned as an instrument of non proliferation within Europe and later outside it. The American two track policy of stationing nuclear weapons in Europe with attendant security guarantees on the one hand was one facet of this strategy, while a permissive export control policy even to allies made proliferation a primary sin on the other.

Indeed, were it not for the establishment of NATO on April 4, 1949, a great many more nuclear capable states would have come up in the Europe of the 1950’s. This fact is now well known that Switzerland, Italy, Sweden, and the Federal Republic of Germany were all interested in acquiring their own weapons, and this was hardly considered unusual within the state policy making structures. The case of “nuclear flirtation” of

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14 The paper quotes from a detailed account by senior historian of the Swiss Government Jurg Stussi. It says that Switzerland ran a clandestine nuclear bomb programme with plans to produce 400 nuclear warhead for aircraft, artillery and guided missile systems. The programme was initiated in response to Swiss fears about Germany developing nuclear weapons. The programme ran from 1945-1989, that is, 19 years after the country had signed the Non Proliferation Treaty. Robert Uhlig” Swiss kept nuclear arms secret for 43 years” *Telegraph* (London) May 23, 1996.

the early 1950's, remains still something of a mystery, especially the intentions of the Germans. Defense Minister Strauss has been quoted as on the one hand denying that Germany had any interest in acquiring nuclear weapons, but he equally warned that this state could not continue indefinitely, especially if other states produced their own\textsuperscript{16}. As early as 1955, France had approached Germany regarding possible collaboration on the construction of an isotope separation plant to produce enriched uranium, which has both civilian and military applications. In 1957, rumors circulated that French, Italian and German Defense Ministers had talks on the issue of cooperation, which was followed by visits to French rocket establishments, and a series of accords which set up a permanent expert committee to oversee such matters as the "right of recourse" to Germans to French military research. Quotable quotes only referred to a "research pool" and in January 1958, an agreement on "common development, production and standardization of weapons" was announced with the approval of NATO allies. The extreme secrecy which attended all further talks inhibits the reading of exact intentions, but sources quoted revealed that an accord had already been signed on extensive cooperation under which Germany agreed to invest several million deutsche marks in the military research. Interestingly, the emphasis on cooperation with Italy and Germany was in the area of short range rocket systems and other

\textsuperscript{16} This has been quoted in the relevant newspaper accounts of the time like the \textit{Daily Mirror}, April 2, 1958. See \textit{Germany between two worlds} (Harcourt Brace: New York, 1981)
vehicles\textsuperscript{17}. In the event De Gaulle ended these discussions as soon as he came to power, and the US is understood to have had a quiet talk with German leadership.

Meanwhile other allies were attempting their own nuclear programmes, but found themselves up against extreme American disapproval and a tight export control policy. The British first decided on a "go it alone" programme and declined the initial American interest in a joint venture, (rejected, for reasons that the British would soon be finding used against them namely, lack of adequate security etc) but this decision was soon reversed simply because war time scenarios demanded that the first separation plant would have to be constructed in the US or Canada.

While Churchill got President Roosevelt to agree to cooperation, (Quebec Agreement 1943) such a desire was remarkably absent in the American scientific bureaucracy. Now partly under military authority, the whole programme was consistently targeted at making the bomb, and other tempting scientific fields were firmly set aside. The Americans, were trying all three routes - electromagnetic, separation and gaseous diffusion, while the British only worked on the last. The former suspected that the British were more interested in the post war commercial benefits - namely patents on atomic energy - rather than the immediate task. In July 1946 the US Congress passed the McMahon Act, which legalized the already restricted information flow, - indeed it made a flat prohibition on the delivery to any

foreign nation of information on the production of fissionable materials or nuclear weapons. This Act (also called the Atomic Energy Act) disregarded, apparently due to complete ignorance, the previous liabilities (the Quebec agreement) that the US had entered into. Senator McMahon, the chairman of the powerful Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, regretted later that due to a “series of unfortunate circumstances” the nature of the previous agreements had not been disclosed. Later, as American dependency on outside sources of uranium grew, an arrangement was made to get these supplies from the British half of the Belgian Congo deposits. A subsequent Hyde Park Aide Memoire (26 November 1947) terminated the previous agreement and replaced it with a fresh arrangement that once again reduced the restrictions on cooperation. (Britain also revoked the 1943 clause of not using the atomic bomb without each other’s consent - now changed to consultation - and the US waiving the restriction on atomic energy for commercial and industrial purposes.) At the end of 1949 with the formation of NATO negotiation carried on with the British exploring the possibility of “x” number of bombs to be put under British custody, in return for giving up the independent program. However, the Americans saw little use for cooperation in which they perceived they got nothing.

What was seen as American duplicity after the McMahon Act, would seem to have been a contributory and important factor in the decision to

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18 Andrew J. Pierre *Nuclear Politics*, (Oxford University Press, 1972)
make the bomb (with some even alleging that "threat" of the Soviet Union hardly figured at all\textsuperscript{19})... In January 1947 a Defence Sub committee of the cabinet made the decision to manufacture the bomb, pushed in part also by the fact that momentum of the Atomic Energy programme with the Canadians (Anglo-American collaboration at Atomic Energy Research at Chalk River in Canada) was going well. The first British nuclear device was exploded off the Montebello island in 3 October 1952. The search for a test site had not been an easy one. Initial reception in the US was cool, with strings attached to any use of the site on the condition that she provide all details of the test, and not exceed 25KT. This led the British back to the Australians, and the Monte Bello test site. However, the US and the UK cooperated in sampling the test clouds of each other's tests.

From this point developed the "independence and interdependence "debate. In other words the establishment of NATO and the recognition of "deterrence dependence" upon the United States led to the desire to be independent from America. Apart from these considerations was also an additional fact as brought out in the 1957 White Paper. This underlined the dire necessity of reducing defence costs - a need carried out by drastic cuts in manpower, and cancellation of a bomber programme - which led the British surely to the same considerations that the Americans had propounded in 1954 by the "New Look" policy of Eisenhower. The 1957 paper squarely shifted strategy to a reliance on the "cheap"

alternative of nuclear weapons, and more important missile delivery. Indeed, it was maintained that the necessity for drastic cuts practically forced this strategy. The demonstrated capability of the UK led to an increased interest in the US to share information.

The MacMahon Act was amended to allow the sharing of data on the external characteristics of nuclear weapons (size, weight, shape, yield effect) but still withheld information on the design and fabrication of its components. Following this, two bilateral agreements were signed on 15 June 1955, which led to the transfer of data on nuclear ship propulsion reactors, and later the stationing of 60 Thor IRBM's under the "dual key" system (the UK had already agreed to provide air bases for the Strategic Air command). In 1958 the Atomic energy act was amended again to give the UK even more preferential treatment permitting the exchange of information on design and production of warheads, and the transfer of fissile materials (though not actual supply of completed nuclear weapons). The May 1957 thermonuclear explosion furthered this cooperation.

However, even as this capability grew, the weakness lay in an adequate delivery vehicle. In fact, as developmental efforts went forward, the hollowness of the "cheap alternative" was exposed by rising defence expenditures. Following the 1957 decision to cancel the supersonic bomber program, the development of an IRBM (the Blue Streak) was given

prominence. Liquid fuelled, and capable of being launched from underground sites, it was propounded as the test bed of "the British independent deterrent" until it was revealed that the rocket engine and the guidance system were being manufactured under American license, and was based on the Atlas. The "Blue Streak" was overtaken by technology, as the superpowers made the transition to solid fuels, and faced with rising costs the missile was canceled. (after expending nearly 600 million pounds). The Skybolt which would have given the British a long range missile (1000 nm at 80,000 feet, Mach 3) was to be bought off the US with the provision that the warheads would be of British make to give the British an "independent option". At Camp David in March 1960, Macmillan obtained an agreement that the Skybolt would be given to the British as soon as it reached production. (an "understood" move allowed the stationing of Polaris submarines at Scotland in a quid pro quo.) The poor chances of the Skybolt ever reaching production stage appears to have been conveyed to the British, but whatever the case the almost casual cancellation by McNamara provoked a political storm. McNamara's Ann Arbor speech denigrating independent nuclear arsenals and outlining the controlled response strategy, was seen as an exercise to deny the British nuclear independence. At Nassau, a damage limitation exercise had President Kennedy offering the Polaris though on slightly different terms. The submarines would have to be "irrevocably "committed to a NATO

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21 Bundy, note 7, p.140-165
mission. British opposition led to the crafting of a somewhat vague document that allowed the transfer of ‘Polaris’ where Britain would construct the submarine, and the warhead, but not the missile. From then on the wording was muddled. In short, Britain remained tied to the US for nuclear testing, and even more dependant for carrier capability. In spite of insertions of “ultimate national interest” in the use of the British nuclear force, it is questionable how “independent” this deterrent was. The extent of dependence of UK missilery on the US was demonstrated years later, when denied the Poseidon, the British decided to refit the Polaris with a new front end (warhead reentry system and penetration systems) and then discovered that the technological capability required would “(push) the state of the art beyond limits already explored in the UK”

The French found the Americans even more unreceptive. In 1958 De Gaulle raised the question of assistance to the French program. That episode is narrated by Premier Georges Pompidou who had been present who bitterly remarked that “I came away with the conviction.... that never would the American leaders ever permit the subject to be raised” In July 1958 the US Congress approved the supply of enriched uranium for a French prototype submarine reactor, which was several steps back from previous offers (Eisenhower in 1957, and Dulles in 1958) for the development of a nuclear submarine. A French request to purchase an

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23 Kohl, note 17, p.67.
American power plant, and receive classified data was refused, - this in contrast with the now much more open policy that was being followed with the British. In the US meanwhile personalities like Admiral Rickover were warning that America's most sensitive technology - that of nuclear submarines - should not be transferred to any other country other than Great Britain, while the State department and the Joint Commission for Atomic Energy (JCAE) remained adamant about any more sharing out of nuclear information to yet another country. In June 1959 France refused to accept NATO atomic stockpiles without control over use of the weapons. On February 13, 1960 France exploded her first atomic bomb at Reggane test centre in the Sahara, and became a member of the nuclear club in her own estimation if not in that of others. As De Gaulle notes "It was with a certain degree of irony that we absorbed this coalition of alarm on the part of so many states which had watched without the slightest indignation while the Americans, the British and the Soviets had exploded some 200 atomic devices."

Across the Atlantic, the JCAE averred that the McMahon Act could not apply to France until she had shown more progress, and developed a diversity of weapons. However, in 1961 France agreed to the stationing of tactical nuclear weapons. This was possible under (Under Section 91.c of the amended Atomic Energy Act of 1954 which emphasized

that such transfers should not "contribute significantly" to France's nuclear weapons design, development or fabrication capability.\textsuperscript{26}

With the Kennedy Administration, such cooperation as existed before was curtailed even further. Albert Wohlstetter in early 1961 in an article in \textit{Foreign Affairs}, ridiculed the need or effectiveness of "independent" nuclear arsenals, a sentiment that became the official policy after the Ann Arbor speech of MacNamara where after formally inaugurating a counterforce doctrine, (Flexible Response) he went on to disparage lesser nuclear forces by pointing out that such forces would invite retaliation, rather than function as a deterrent.\textsuperscript{27} In short then, limited nuclear capabilities, operating independently, are dangerous, expensive, prone to obsolescence, and lacking in credibility as a deterrent.\textsuperscript{27} Later (January 1963) he added to this when he said "If our European partners wish to create a European strategic nuclear force, we certainly should have no objections. But we should insist that that force be closely integrated with our own so that it could be jointly targeted, and directed in a coordinated fashion. Furthermore we are convinced that such a force could be built only as a collective European undertaking.\textsuperscript{28} That speech led on eventually to the proposal of the MLF (Multilateral Force) which will be dealt with below.


\textsuperscript{27} See W. Kaufman "The MacNamara Strategy" (Harper and Row: London 1964.

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid.p.124.
In the case of missiles, France started with the *Veronique* program had important inputs from the Germans and was derived from the V-2 design, with German rocket specialists including Eugene Saenger and Wolfgang Pilz. French engineers hoped to skip the evolutionary liquid fuel stage by accessing US missile expertise. In 1950 the US was approached, for licensing privileges of both Minuteman and Polaris. This was refused, and the first stage (or boost stage) missile remained liquid fueled, (the Emraude/Saphir) which was derived from earlier Veronique designs. This led to an independent missile capability, that in turn led to France selling its expertise to other countries. US interference continued, in that US prohibited French military aircraft from flying over or landing in the US if their destination was the Pacific test centre, prohibited high performance computers, and other technology denials. In spite of this French assessments drew the conclusion that technicians were able to reduce the gap, from 5 to 8 years in 1959 to less than 50% of that by 1963.

Thus, if France and the UK managed to acquire nuclear technology in spite of the best efforts of the US, the latter continued to be tied to the US for her testing and missile technology, while the former opted to stay

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29 It was reported that in 1940’s the missile program employed over a thousand engineers. Of these at least 40 were Germans who had worked at Peenumunde. The program itself suffered due to funding, as interest in nuclear warhead and the Mirage configuration for delivery increased. *The Diffusion of Combat Aircraft, Missile and their Supporting Technologies*, For the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defence (International Security Affairs), Browne and Shaw Research Corporation, 1966;

30 Ibid Section C-36.
out of the military structure of NATO with her own nuclear arsenal that, at least on paper and public policy remained outside NATO calculations.

**NATO as an Instrument of Geographical and Horizontal Proliferation**

The 1954 Radford Plan to deploy vast numbers of tactical nuclear weapons - artillery, short range missiles) in Europe, leading to a number of "Crypto-nuclear" states who though not in ownership of the weapons nonetheless blurred the difference between nuclear and non nuclear state. These weapons lay at the heart of deterrence strategy (see below). From then on NATO's nuclear posture was tailored to give a guarantee of American aid in case of aggression as well as to keep the Europeans non nuclear. However, it also needed to give the Europeans a status of seeming equality, without at all reducing American control over the weapons. These controls were tightened over the years, after a study group in the 1960's found that weapons were for all intents and purposes in the hands of allied commanders.

The control over the nuclear weapons themselves was a ticklish one. At first, initiatives like the Multilateral Nuclear Force and the British inspired repartee the Atlantic Nuclear Force came on the bargaining

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32 Freedman, Note 11, p.252.

table, and when these collapsed, it was as much due to intra European fears, as a dislike in the US State Department non proliferation pundits to at all loosening proliferation controls anywhere in the world.

In 1960, the State Department, wary of national nuclear forces, fearful of German nuclear ambitions, and committed to European unification produced a report proposing what was later called the "Multilateral Nuclear Force" consisting basically of a submarine force manned by crew from UK, France and Germany, and headed by US forces. The idea found favour with the Kennedy Administration, which felt the need to give the Polaris to ally UK (the Macmillan administration was now fully committed domestically for such an “independent” deterrent) while at the same time mollifying NATO members. Thus the Polaris was to be given provided that it was "made available" to the MLF, with a similar proposal to the French as well. This was a peculiar offer, in that the French were in no position to develop submarines capable of fielding the Polaris. Moreover anything that gave the Germans a quasi-nuclear equality was anathema to the French. The British (being against any sharing of the Polaris) countered this an alternative proposal of an Atlantic Nuclear force (ANF) which would consist of the British V-bomber force, the Polaris, an equal number (or more) of American submarines, any French forces that they

34 Bundy note p.489.

35 While the control of the ANF would be entrusted to some form of single authority “linked to NATO” the Polaris submarines would remain British manned (nationally owned and manned contingent) that would revert to Britain in the case of supreme national interest which would emanate obviously only if NATO broke down. Andrew Pierre Nuclear Politics:
might like to subscribe, and some kind of a multi-manned and jointly owned element in which the existing non nuclear powers could take part.\textsuperscript{36} By giving a large portion of the forces, Britain hoped to dominate the ANF, as well as fulfill the Labor election pledge not to have an “independent” nuclear force.

In Germany, confidence in the US nuclear reliability had diminished since the late 1950’s. Adenauer and his Defense Minister Joseph Strauss, viewed the MLF as an opportunity for West Germany to have a strong influence in nuclear deterrence decision. But more important was the fact that is would be a way to effectively hold on to the Americans. Consequently they agreed to share in 75% of the total costs and to furnish 40% of manpower. But as a huge domestic debate began, the world situation was already changing. Following the 1962 Cuban missile crisis and China’s sudden and dramatic announcement of its successful nuclear explosion in October 1964, the superpowers were forced to close ranks to concentrate on their common overriding issue: the danger of horizontal proliferation. The proposed MLF was the first victim, as the Soviet’s worst nightmare emanated from any German participation in nuclear matters. The USSR made the abandonment of the MLF as a precondition to the Non Proliferation Treaty. With President Johnson’s own ambivalence towards

the proposal, and the additional salvo of the ANF all talk of the MLF came to an end.

Europeans however insisted on some measure of control over nuclear policy if not the weapons themselves, a demand which escalated after the precipice diplomacy that characterized the Cuban missile crisis. Thus while the December 1962 communiqué declared "unity of purpose in a spirit of interdependence" and lauded the "firmness and restraint" of the United States, they did call for greater consultation, that emerged four years later in the form of two permanent bodies - the Nuclear Defence Affairs Committee and subordinate to it, the Nuclear Planning Group to handle the detailed work.

These concessions were wrested by the Europeans as Washington appeared to be cooperating with its rival the Soviet Union in bringing about further non proliferation measures.

The negotiation of the NPT between 1965 and 1968 was even more illustrative of the European attitude to non proliferation. As Muller notes "They came together not for the purpose of setting common rules in the field of nuclear exports, but rather to protect themselves against the clauses of the new treaty". Some of the main points relevant here. For one, all were intent on safeguarding the civil use of nuclear power.

Second, Germany after a long domestic discussion submitted 2 documents, which *inter alia* stated that the security of the FRG should continue to be assured by NATO or an equivalent security system. Dissolution of the NATO would be cause for the FRG to withdraw from the NPT. Also, in the event of an *independent ABM defence* it would withdraw from the Treaty (italics author's) 39. It was the Federal Republic which proposed that the NPT be in force for a period of 25 years after which a conference should decide whether the treaty would continue indefinitely for an additional fixed period or periods. It also left open the possibility of a European deterrent (that is, that nothing in the Treaty would prevent a future European Union from inheriting one or several member states nuclear weapons40). The Articles I and II were formulated in such a way so as to allow the stationing of nuclear weapons in non nuclear states. Fourth, while Italy and Belgium were somewhat sympathetic to the MLF, the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway (like neutral Ireland) gave non proliferation a superior priority. The three small NATO countries preferred the system of nuclear bipolarity to complications introduced by additional decision making centres.

The rather differing security perceptions of the Europeans, and their still ambiguous stance on proliferation overall become important when considering a "NATO view" on proliferation, which under the studied


40 For a German view see Mathias Dembinski " *NATO and Non Proliferation: A Critical Appraisal*" (Peace Research Institute Report No 33, Frankfurt, April 1994)
consensus statements of the NPG hid many divergent motives and perceptions. Indeed that there was hardly any such view was apparent as Germany cooperated with first Egypt, Iraq, Argentina, Brazil and other countries to produce their own nuclear or missile programmes, while France was equally helpful to India and Pakistan and Israel, in their nascent space programmes. The statement may be made with a fair degree of certainty that without this crucial input from European countries, few of the Third World countries would have been able to kick start their own programmes. While exports were crucial to the maintenance of French defense and nuclear capability, so were the exports of Germany who kept her own capability honed so much so that today most analysts will agree that Germany can (technically speaking) "go nuclear" any time it wishes. Thus to a large extent, the clamp that was put on European non-proliferation through NATO resulted in these countries (especially France) began selling their technology to fund their own independent efforts.

The “Out of Area” Problem and Member State Interests

It must be noted that even after the formation of NATO, the real and immediate dangers that were confronted by the bloc was not in Europe but in Asia and other theatres, as Korea erupted, and partisan wars continued in China and Vietnam. Before the US took over the job, the present NATO area was the basic pool for European and North American support for the French in Indochina, and it helped Portugal retain its colonies - the buffer zones of South Africa - a facet of NATO that was rarely ever mentioned.
Tension between the constituents of NATO was hardly unusual, since each country naturally put its own interests first over alliance interests. When NATO was formed, there was naturally a concerted attempt by the former colonial powers to include their “areas of interest” within NATO boundaries. The US however opposed such inclusion and convinced other potential members to accept the Tropic of Cancer as a southern boundary\(^{41}\). However an attack against territory of members (including Algeria, Turkey and islands north of the Tropic of Cancer) was deemed as an armed attack on one or more of the members. With this Art 4 noted “The parties will consult together whenever in the opinion of any of them the territorial integrity political independence or security of any of the parties is threatened”. The treaty was also careful to omit any clause which might provide for one of more states preventing others from taking action outside the European theatre. Thus although a Treaty area was not defined, adequate scope and flexibility was built in, so as not to preclude operations outside this area. This approach was typified in the reaction to the Anglo-French intervention during the Suez crisis of 1957. This sally into the Middle East, without any warning to the US, led to the stern warning by from the NAC and the Committee of the so called “Three wise men” of “dangerous parochial interests”. However, it also noted that NATO’s “influence is not confined to the area covered by the Treaty”\(^{42}\)

\(^{41}\) France did succeed in including its Algerian departments. See text of NATO Treaty in NATO Handbook 1983.

\(^{42}\) Text of the Committee of the Three on non–military cooperation, para 32. Annexure to the Communiqué of the North Atlantic Council. 11-14 December 1956.
There were however a few important results of this operation. As Bundy notes, the Soviets did rattle its rockets, causing some alarm. But the British were the final gainers (at least in the short term). As a result of the crisis and anxious not to lose an important ally, President Eisenhower recommended and Congress accepted an amendment to the Mac Mahon Act permitting exchange of information on design and production of warheads and the transfer of fissionable material. While this is seen as a "triumph" for Britain by Bundy, it was also the one sure way to tie the British newly acquired thermonuclear capability into the American programme, a process which has not changed to date. In France it had the reverse effect. Deserted by the British, the French under Prime Minister Guy Mollet decided that independence hinged on the acquisition of the bomb. The program, which had been going on in an uncoordinated way received official backing when on April 11, 1958, Premier Felix Gaillard signed the official order authorizing the manufacture of an atomic bomb and preparations for the first atomic tests in the spring of 1960. Any out of area operation would thereafter be decided by the French President, an attitude that once again continues to date.

By the mid 1960s' policy on out of area operations began to change. America began to get more involved as a "Global power" even as Europe began its pull out from former colonies. Soon the French began to defense

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43 Bundy, Note 7, p.471.
a strict adherence to NATO boundaries, in deference to projecting itself as a defender of the Third World and a dislike of getting involved in disputes over which it had no interest. US involvement in Vietnam was discussed in detail in NATO Councils, and if outright military combined operations were not expected, the US did expect political support and limited military aid from individual allies. Significantly, this provoked the first NATO “crises” when Alliance bickering led to Henry Kissinger questioning the basic lack of agreement of a “troubled Alliance”\textsuperscript{45}.

The second NATO crises began to evolve in the 1970’s. The period of détente in Europe was however marked by increasing Soviet activity in the Third World. As the United States waxed eloquent on the devious ways of the Soviets, Europeans felt that the actual extent of the Soviet responsibility for the West’s troubles in various parts of the world were being exaggerated. The debate turned often into acrimony as Europe was accused of being a parochial regional power, vis a vis the global power that was the USA. These disagreements came to a head in 1973, when during the Arab – Israeli war, America’s massive airlift to Israel raised the question for refueling and overflight rights over Europe. This was refused by all except Portugal. Tensions exploded when German discovered that German facilities had been used to supply the Israelis without their consent\textsuperscript{46}. The war also raised the question of deployment of US forces


from Europe into the Middle East, with some within the U.S Administration pointing out that this did not need NATO approval. As Cuban troops entered Angola, and then Ethiopia, the Shah of Iran fell to the groundswell of public opinion, western anxiety increased. This brought to a boil the extent to which NATO should accept that its security could be jeopardized by events taking place outside the NATO area as much as within it, and the consequent necessity to develop joint plans and allocate forces to such "out of area" contingencies. Once again, while the French and British attitude favoured limited intervention by small national forces, the point was made that there was really no clear demarcation that fell conveniently under the term "western interests". As one analyst noted, very few such were actually "vital", and even those that could be classified as such would be subject to fluctuations over time. For instance, "oil" – which was the subject to of much heartburn and inter-Alliance tensions in the mid 1970's, was no longer a factor – instead was the phenomenon of falling prices and dissent among the producers. A Chatham House study of the time warned "western security interests in the Third World should not be interpreted in purely or even primarily military terms"\(^47\). However, the "out of area" debate was to once again surface as the Soviet moved into Afghanistan.

Once again, the reaction in Europe was not in any way as panic stricken as that of the US where the President felt compelled to propound the "Carter doctrine". Any attempt by any outside force to gain control of

\(^47\) Peter Foot, "Western Security Interests and the Third World" in Freedman (ed) note 46.
the Persian Gulf will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United State of American and such an assault will be repelled by any mean necessary, including military force.\textsuperscript{48} While the British offered support, the French outfight rejected any western collective action. Germany with a $5 billion trade relationship with the Soviet Union likewise was reluctant. The United States, now committed to the deployment of the Rapid Reaction Force (RDF) and presented as a fait accompli to the Europeans, demanded that firstly Europeans supplement the troop reserves in Europe, that they facilitate the transport of American personnel across the Atlantic, and employ their naval and air forces to increase surveillance in the Atlantic, Mediterranean and Indian Ocean. The Defense Planning Committee put this on the agenda and agreed to the "crucial importance" of South West Asia. and admitted that "countries in a position to do so should use their best efforts to achieving peace and stability in South West Asia".\textsuperscript{49} By 1982, Washington had toned down its demands, and the Europeans had agreed to provide up to 600 ships and 50 aircraft to facilitate the movement of US troops across the Atlantic. Simultaneously, Germany, France and Britain offered reservists to release US troops in Europe. The NAC again noted in a landmark admission"Those allies in a position to do so will be ready to take steps outside the Treaty area to deter aggression and to respond to requests by sovereign nations for help in resisting threats to their security.

\textsuperscript{48} State of the Union Address January 23, 1980. Documents related to the Cold War http://www.defenselink

or independence. \(^{50}\) By the time of the Bonn Summit in June 1982, the members had identified three crucial measures: all members must consult with allies fully on any issue that affect NATO security; efforts must be made by all members to compensate for the diversion of U.S troops to regions outside NATO area; Europeans must be prepared to facilitate the movement of US troops outside the NATO area\(^{51}\). These recommendations were however not always followed. An Atlantic Council working Group paper of the early 1980's confirms in a rather eerie and almost complete replica of what was to come more than a decade later that "A combination of old dangers with new one now faces the Atlantic Alliance, with a much more complex, interwoven, multifaceted sobering and potentially dangerous set of problems .......(and) there are increasingly divergent perceptions of the threat and even more of importantly of how to go about responding to it among the allies. The United States tends to emphasize the importance of military power; the other allies, to emphasize political and economic solutions"\(^{52}\)

Over the years, the term "out of area", in the words of one prominent analyst writing in the late 1980's had come to mean "those locales and activities where common agreement does not exist among the allies that


\(^{51}\) Kupchan, note 46, p.187.

the treaty can or should be invoked. Sometimes an ally asked for help or forbearance from NATO allies, where such action was projected as in the larger security interests of the alliance. On the one hand Britain, while it did not formally apply to the North Atlantic Council or to any of the joint military commands for assistance during the Falklands war, did seek bilateral help from the US, and diplomatic support from allies, and their "forbearance" in assisting Argentina (some of them were important military suppliers to that country) and Washington offered facilitation support. London allowed US F-111's to operate out of British airfields in the attack against Tripoli (April 1986), in an action against what was perceived as Libyan sponsored terrorism. Coordination was apparent between the US and European peacekeepers in Beirut during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. However France has largely tended to ignore these directives on cooperation, while Washington saw no need to "consult" before the invasion of Grenada.

Meanwhile the other side of the relationship between Europe and Asian and African countries involved close relationships in arms and technology supply. It is worth noting here that French assistance to the Israeli nuclear programme began after 1957, when France herself was looking for not just strategic alliances as also the wherewithal to fund her own developmental programmes. Military and technological aid from European countries began to flow into third world countries. Both Iraq and


Iran were major recipients of such aid, (in the latter case until the revolution) while Libya, Nigeria and Algeria had French and German weapons systems. Egypt was one of the earliest to start a missile project with German assistance, while Iraq was to benefit the most. Over this period therefore, arms industries in these countries began to grow as well as their arsenals, that included ballistic missiles. But till the mid 1980’s, this growth was hardly noticed by anyone, least of all the governments concerned with arms supplies.

NATO’s primary function - Deterrence and the Doctrine of the Offense

*Nuclear doctrines and the principles of Offense*

During World War II, the main interest was in the development of short range missiles with proximity fuses, able to intercept incoming aircraft. Air defenses made great leaps, and seemed set to tilt the cycle towards the defense. As aircraft began to carry nuclear weapons, the demands on defense became much higher. Where earlier a 10 per cent attrition rate would have been acceptable, now even if a couple of aircraft got through defense would have failed. The shift away from aircraft to missiles occurred as it became clear that aircraft themselves were vulnerable to the short range missiles that were initially developed. Keeping aircraft constantly on the alert was a costly, and now a risky "guarantee".

55 For an account of European assistance to countries of the Middle East and South America see William C. Potter & Harlan W. Jencks, *The International Missile Bazaar*, (Boulder: Westview 1994).
The progress to a the mainly missile based deterrent grew from the Truman period. Air deliverable weapons of tremendous capacity had been earmarked by Strategic Air Command, and the strategic arsenal expanded dramatically from 5,000(MT) in 1955 to 14,000 by 1956 and almost 20,000 by 1960. This was accompanied by a greater attention to the development of a "triad" of nuclear weapons, with the Polaris going to the Navy. The structure inherited by later Presidents was only modified, and this triad remained the bedrock of US policy. Under Eisenhower the Technological Capabilities Panel (TCP) was created to study the requirement of a true nuclear deterrent. The reports which was called "Meeting the threat of Surprise Attack" was brought out in 1955, and is one of the most influential in the history of American nuclear policy. The TCP report decisively accelerated the development of ballistic missiles and early warning systems not just for bombers but also for missiles. The till then uncertain fate of missiles was rescued by Trevor Gardner, (secretary of the Air force) who realized the implications of a light weight thermonuclear warhead. The following Missiles Evaluation Committee strongly called for the development of an intercontinental range missile, something that the fliers had consistently opposed. Recommendations for the development of a shorter range missile for both land and ship basing was also made. By December 1955, Eisenhower had accorded the highest priority to no less than four missile programs - the ICBM Atlas and

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56 Bundy, note 9, p.120.
57 Ibid, p.325.
Titan, and two IRBM's. The navy led by Admiral Burke selected the Polaris missile as their choice. (as also to prevent a monopoly by the Air Force). Development was amazingly fast. Less than two years later (1960), the Polaris was operational. In the same year, the SIOP (Single Integrated Operational Plan) was unveiled, which called for a single overwhelming attack on the USSR, on Eastern Europe, and on China, using many thousand of megatons\textsuperscript{58}. Thus from the beginning, nuclear weapons and missiles were hardly relegated to a Soviet threat against Europe, though this was the main plank of American armament in public.

The Soviets meanwhile had not been idle. After the testing of its first ICBM in August 1957, it followed this up with the first launching of a satellite the "Sputnik" (4 October 1957) the Americans were alarmed about the supposed "missile gap" and the danger to American territory. Thus they pressed Europeans into accepting the IRBM's (Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles). The "Jupiter", a product of Redstone Arsenal where ex-German teams had been working, with a range of 3180km was deployed by 1958, while Thor with a similar range but a fixed base missile.

By the 1960's both sides introduced ICBM's, and by 1965 the USSR had a total of 224 to 854 of the US. The latter however was far ahead in another "leg" of the now growing "Triad" of nuclear weapons. The submarine launched ballistic missile had entered service by this period, and she had a total of 496 missiles of this sea based leg. A mere five years

\textsuperscript{58} Bundy, note 9, p.323.
later, this increased to 1510 ICBM’s and 280 SLBM’s with the USSR and 1054 and 656 respectively with the US⁵⁹.

The sheer tonnage of destruction that was deliverable by missile, was matched by technological strides, as the search for the ultimate “deterrent” took the missile from the air deliverable role to the land and sea based, with each of these being further refined to avoid detection. Thus the launch tubes on submarines increased, while research went on to make the land based missile road mobile. The ultimate promise seemed however to lie in “Pen aids” (penetration aids of various kinds including multiple independent reentry vehicle’s). Research had also begun early on in the 1950’s on cruise technology – subsonic missiles that would essentially evade enemy defences and deliver a warhead with considerably greater accuracy.

The following table is illustrative of the links between missile capability and doctrine

⁵⁹ Freedman.n.11.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945-1949</td>
<td>The period of monopoly – formation of NATO and concept of extended deterrence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>America achieves nuclear capability on 16 July 1945. First nuclear bomb is dropped over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. US moves from medium range bomber force to first heavy long range bombers (B-50's). Bases obtained in England and Far East.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949-1962</td>
<td>Doctrine of massive retaliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>USSR explodes first nuclear weapon (August 1949)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>USA already had a stockpile of a new hundred with a total yield of about 10 megatons. High performance B-47 jet bombers enter service. US achieves first thermonuclear capability. World wide network of bases by 1953, as also achieves a refuelling capability. Nuclear artillery, Honest John, Redstone deployed in Europe (unguided short range missiles)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>USSR achieves thermonuclear capability in August 1953.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>Truman orders intensive deployment of long range strategic missiles. Atlas (ICBM) Titan (ICBM) Thor (IRBM) and Jupiter (IRBM) initiated in 1955. Minuteman (ICBM) in 1957; and Polaris (SLBM in 1958)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>USSR achieves first long range ICBM flight and launches satellite into space (weight 83 kg), Sputnik II carries a dog (508 kg) Sputnik III (1,326.5 kg)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>USA launches first and second satellites (14 kg) Atlas-A liquid propelled ICBM flight tested.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Deployment of Thor and Jupiter in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>USSR SS-4 MRBM in service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>USA launches first solid propellant missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962-1979</td>
<td>Retreat of massive retaliation, Doctrine of Flexible response, Europe offered MLF, France leaves NATO military command, first ABM Deployment. The 35 nation CSCE talks begin</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1961- USSR deployed SS-5 (2000nm), SS-7 (1080nm) and AA-n-4 (300nm) on diesel submarines

US Titan liquid propellant ICBM enters service (6,255nm)

Minuteman solid propellant enters service (6, 520nm)

US IRBM's withdrawn from Europe

Polaris A-3 with MIRV enters service (3 MIRV)

Development of US Poseidon with MIRV (14 MIRV)


US decision to proceed with limited ABM Deployment

USSR achieves MIRV capability. Soviet ABM System around Moscow becomes operational

1972 – ABM Treaty limiting such systems signed.

1979 – SALT II signed


/USSR deploys world largest ICBM SS – 18 with MIRV’s. SS-19 equivalent to MX missiles. Generally replacement of old missiles with more accurate, mobile missiles

1980’s – deployment of road mobile, highly accurate SS-20’s begins

US threatens deployment of Perishing and GLCM’s in Europe – Offers arms control


The sheer destructive power of these missiles led to the search for a strategy that would provide them with some military rationale. With the August 1949 detonation of a nuclear weapon by the Soviets, the arms race was well and truly set in stone. The Europeans were left with little to
contribute except to periodically call for disarmament and proposals for a fissile material cut off, cessation of nuclear tests, and other such initiatives followed. 60

Initially the complete monopoly of the United States (prior to 1950) led her to provide security guarantees to Europe, a guarantee which came under severe pressure once the Soviet Union caught up. With the two like “scorpions in a bottle” (to use Robert Oppenheimer’s analogy) the need for deterrence was paramount. As Winston Churchill who was one of the first to recognize this noted: “It may well be that we shall by a process of sublime irony have reached a stage in the story where safety will be the study child of terror and the twin brother of annihilation.” 61 The search for a suitable doctrine, that would reassure both Europeans and the American public led to various theories that seemed to be logical given the realities of the time.

After the Soviet explosion, the Truman administration had set in motion a huge increase in defense expenditure (National Security Council Memorandum – 68) which had offered a posit of almost endless East–West antipathy. It was also assumed that the Soviets operated on a calculation of risks, and there was little there of deterrence. Rather it was a

60 See for instance Final Communiqué North Atlantic Council, 16-19th December, 1957. Which calls for a cessation of all testing, a fissile material cut off, reduction of existing stocks, conventional reductions, and measures to guard against the risk of surprise attack.

61 Quoted in Lawrence Freedman “Global Strategy: War and Peace in the Nuclear Age” (London: Macmillan, 1985)
warning of the danger of a totalitarian regime, bent on destruction. Though the NSC rejected the notion of "no first use" it did call for a huge increase in conventional capability which would prevent a slide into the nuclear war. The Korean war pushed the entire NSC militarisation programme into operational status, and in September 1950 the President announced substantial increase in forces stationed in Europe, even as the Germans were brought into NATO. This was assumed by most Senators to be a temporary insertion, until some agreement could be reached. But the troops, once in, stayed there. NSC – 68 was meant therefore to discourage the Soviet Union or unruly allies like North Korea from grabbing what they could. The result was a strong "forward strategy", and thereafter the Lisbon goals were framed for a total of 96 divisions for Europe, against what was perceived as an overwhelming Russian strength.

This meant expectedly not only an economic price, but also a military irrationality since it assumed a US monopoly. On October 30, 1953 Eisenhower formally approved the following sentence as part of the basic national security policy of the United States. "In the event of hostilities, the United States will consider nuclear weapons to be as available for use as other munitions". This "New Look" was born as much out of economic reasons, the conventional disparity on the ground\textsuperscript{62}, as well as the conviction of the President that there would never again be another

\textsuperscript{62} General Mathew Ridgeway is quoted as noting that the Soviets had 175 division in Europe at all times whereas the United States had twenty division, of which only five were in Europe. Bundy, p.248
conventional war. Any large scale attack on Europe would be met with a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. However, this rather blanket statement was sought to be honed by Secretary of State Dulles. NSC-162/2 was announced in a form which became known as the doctrine of "massive retaliation".

According to respected columnists massive retaliation meant "as clearly as Governments say these things, that in the event of another proxy war or bushfire in Korea, Indochina, Iran or anywhere else, the United States might retaliate instantly with atomic weapons against the USSR or Red China". The doctrine of Massive Retaliation rationalized as to how war was to be fought (in Europe) and codified the principle that the West could never hope to match the Warsaw Pact in conventional forces, and American troops were not simply a defense but a "tripwire" in demonstrating American commitment to Europe. And clearly the "new Look" was a policy of the offense, and seemed to rest on "Seizing the initiative". But as explained by John Foster Dulles in an article for Foreign Affairs, the stress was not on an overwhelming response to any attack, but a strategy of ambiguity coupled with the fact that the enemy would know that the choice as to the precise military action would be that of the US.

Between 1949 and 1953 there had already begun a fierce debate on tactical nuclear weapons. Defense planners argued that even if bombers of the Strategic Air command destroyed major targets, the defense of Europe would still require utilization of tactical nuclear weapons that could quickly restrain any local probes and thrusts from escalation. Dulles appeared to support their deployment, and argued in *Foreign Affairs* \(^{65}\) that possession of low yield weapons would mean less reliance on massive retaliation. The strategy was adopted by the NATO Council in December 1954, authorising the use of tactical weapons whether the aggressor used them or not.\(^66\)

The immediate effect on NATO planning was the enunciation of the Radford Plan marked the formal abandonment of the conventional defense of Europe by lowering the force goals from 96 divisions in Europe (as had been decided in Lisbon in 1952) and allowed for only 30 divisions. As a result large numbers of tactical nuclear weapons were to be placed in Europe under the "dual key" system. The first missiles to be deployed was the 'Honest John", a simple spin stabilized rocket without guidance and was placed not only in Europe, but also in South Korea and Turkey.

As noted earlier, this doctrine began to receive a set back as the USSR achieved a ICBM capability (May 1957) and MRBM deployment began early in 1959 (SS-4). The Soviet Union could now target America, leading to a search for a genuine and believable policy of extended

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\(^{65}\) *Foreign Affairs* October 1957.

deterrence one the one hand, and homeland defense of the country on the other.

By the time the Kennedy Administration took office, it had become clear as crises after crises passed, that a new doctrine and new weapons were required that would allow a response other than instant retaliation with nuclear weapons. Critics of the massive retaliation strategy were those like Henry Kissinger, Robert E. Osgood, Rand Corporation analysts like Albert Wohlstetter, and Bernard Brodie. Wohlstetter and Brodie seemed to share the view that the credibility of deterrence depended on a strong retaliatory force to be organized under three strategies. They were counterforce (targeting the enemies strategic forces) counter economy (striking the enemy's industrial heartland) and counter city (hitting the people). All three could, according to Brodie, could be part of US planning.

Osgood similarly pointed out that massive retaliation was effective in a general war but not in situations short of such a general war. Former chief of Staff General Maxwell Taylor proposed that massive retaliation be replaced by a strategy of "flexible response". This name suggests the need for a capability to react across the entire spectrum of possible challenge, for coping with anything from general Atomic was to infiltration and

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aggression such as threatened Laos and Berlin in 1959. Bernard Brodie was noting "whether or not we can relinquish strategic bombing as a way of war, we can hardly afford to abjure tactical use of such weapons without dooming ourselves and allies to a permanent inferiority to the Soviet and satellite armies in Europe". 

In his State of The Union address of January 1962 President Kennedy proclaimed the adoption of the strategy of "Flexible Response" which demanded the capability of direct defense for any level of attack and the capacity to escalate if necessary, in order to convince the attacker that his aggression could not succeed. "WE intend to have at all times the capacity to resist non-nuclear or limited attack – as a complement to our nuclear capacity- not as a substitute. We have rejected any all-or-nothing posture which would leave no choice but inglorious retreat or unlimited retaliation" Secretary of Defense McNamara explained "Our new policy gives us the flexibility to choose among several operational plans, but does not require that we make any advance commitment with respect to doctrine or targets" The strategy also offered "assured destruction capability" that guaranteed a capability to cause the enemy...

69 Berbard Brodie quoted in Freedman, note 11, p.107.
70 See W. Kaufmann "The McNamara Strategy" (New York: Harper and Row, 1964)
71 President Kennedy quoted in C.Raj note 68.
unacceptable damage even if he struck first (thus eliminating the possibility of a disarming first strike). He summed it up effectively by noting “one cannot fashion a credible deterrent out of an incredible action”. Conventional forces had to be strengthened as a effective “fire break”, with tactical nuclear weapons also playing a role. The latter however was seen as too vulnerable, and in a follow on of this decided that European independent forces were not only irrelevant but also dangerous. Europe was to concentrate on building its conventional capability.

The Europeans were hardly happy with a state of affairs where neither were they consulted, nor did they have any control over when the US would decide that a show of a “credible deterrent” was feasible. The Cuban missile crisis led to greater insistence on some control over nuclear weapon decision making leading, as noted earlier, the creation of the NPG. In effect the doctrine of flexible response removed the automatic nuclear response, and raised the first clear debates on the value of the deterrent. Even as a debate ensued on the credibility of the deterrent a shift was taking place as the US administration once again began the search for a defense against ballistic missiles.

The strategy of counterinsurgency which had been part of flexible response was found to be unsatisfactory, even as US military expenditure increased substantially. Moral condemnation at home and abroad began to increase, and this period saw strategic shifts in the US. The Nixon administration in a search for a strategy of peace, enunciated a policy of
"realistic deterrence" which echoed the basic principles of "flexible response" but a shift was that while in deterring strategic nuclear war, the US would rely on its own strategic forces, while in a European theatre, the US would expect the European to share the responsibility by virtue of their own nuclear capabilities, and in deterring conventional war, their own conventional capabilities. In deterring local or sub theatre war, the ally threatened would share the primary burden. Thus "realistic deterrence" essentially sought to spread the burden. This was also a time of a sea change in American policy, with a strategic shift towards rapprochement with China, a move to share missile technology with partners, and the signing of SALT I of the ABM Treaty in 1972, which sought to stabilize deterrence, and evade another debilitating arms race.

Curtailment of the Defense: The ABM Treaty

The search for the ultimate countermeasure against ballistic missiles – the search for a ballistic missile defence (BMD) which would provide a cover against incoming missiles (see chapter – for early BMD research) focussed in the 1950's. Research into this aspect of anti ballistic missile defences grew out of air defence technology which appeared set to promise more than it eventually delivered. Programmes continued well into the 1960s with the Soviet Union – a land power with a near obsession with defense – continuing the search beyond this period. In the end this effort

was limited by Treaty since for one thing, the technology required was not yet available: second, the development of MIRV'ed missiles pointed the way towards an easy erosion of any such defence, and third and most important it was seen to be corrosive to deterrence – the one doctrine that was seen to have a measure of stability, even as both sides searched for a scenario where nuclear weapons would indeed be a war winning weapons.

However, in the logic of the time, Stability lay in the offense, in the first strike, and it was to stay there for more than a decade. In the event the ABM Treaty came into existence in 1972, due primarily on the US side, of a desire to stop another arms race, while the Soviet Union acknowledged the capacity of the US to create and sustain such a race. It allowed deployment in one site around the national capital and one around an ICBM launcher deployment area, (in 1974 this was reduced to one site) with each deployment areas holding not more than 100 ABM launchers and 100 interceptors. Radar were also limited. (see ABM text) More pertinent to the present is that Art VI blocks circumvention of the Treaty by means of non ABM technologies. The Parties undertook not to give non-ABM missile launchers or radar capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missile or their elements and agreed not to test such equipment “in an ABM mode”. They also agreed not to deploy strategic early warning radar in the future except along the periphery of national territory, orientated outward. AS a further measure against proliferation of ABM technologies it also prohibited transfer of ABM systems outside national territory, and an agreed Statement (g) further bans the transfer to third parties of “technical
descriptions or blueprints of ABM system or components. An Agreed Statement (taken with Art 2, which defines an ABM system) also prohibited components based on other physical principles that are capable of substituting for the traditional components. What it did not do was to exempt air defence and anti tactical ballistic missile systems as long as they were not tested in an "ABM mode" or given capabilities against "strategic" delivery vehicles. This was never defined explicitly and was to lead to friction more two decades later.

To many, the ABM Treaty was central to the whole deterrence system that had been so carefully set in place, and that was so delicately balanced and tuned. Even more difficult to calculate was the extended guarantee that lay at the heart of NATO strategy and non proliferation in Europe. The extreme fragility of this guarantee became clear when the Soviet Union finally reached parity with the United States, and deployed long range, accurate and difficult to detect missiles against Europe.

**Testing the Guarantee- the Euromissile Crises**

In the early 1970's the USSR began developing its new range of intermediate and short range missiles. These replacements of the SS-21 with a range of 120km began to replace the FROG (Fired Rocket over ground) in the GDR in late 1981. The improved SS-20 soon followed, and it was suddenly clear that these mobile missiles, could provide very little warning time and besides which it could target the rear areas of NATO central region. The question of these so called "Euromissiles" provoked
some of the bitterest debates on American commitment on the one hand (with the Carter Administration seen as a “weak” one) and American desire to see a war fought over Europe on the other (the Reagan administration seen as a dangerously unilateralist) was one which saw Europe pitted against America fuelled equally by the strong anti-nuclear protests on the streets.

The strangeness of the debate on these “Euromissiles” –touted in public as missiles that were targeted exclusively at Europe- can be gauged from the fact that Western Europe indeed had been under the shadow of Soviet log range theatre nuclear forces for more than 20 years. While waiting for their own intercontinental missiles, Western Europe had been held hostage by the Soviet Union with SS-3’s (1,200km) and SS-4’s (1,800km). However, once the ICBM fleets were fully operational on both sides, the longer range signified American commitment to come in early enough, and not to fight the war over European heads. The debate therefore hinged on the tension between European doctrines – which demanded that longer range weapons should be able to inflict direct damage on the aggressor rather than target East European states, and American policy (and indeed Soviet policy as well) the disinclination to do so. This raised the question of the credibility of the nuclear umbrella, one which de Gaulle had abandoned as unbelievable, once the Soviets achieved a second strike capability. Analysts noted “Soviet LRNTF’s in
particular the SS-20's have created a sense of inferiority and insecurity in Europe and may be used for purposes of intimidation and blackmail.\textsuperscript{74}

This perception was, on one level, a prescient one. The Soviets were estimated to have a 2:1 superiority in theatre forces, and this was reinforced by their doctrine which called for a deep strike into rear logistical bases. On the other hand was the reality that Moscow now faced increasing numbers of threats to the heart of Soviet territory. French, British and Chinese forces were growing, with the former two concentrating on their submarine missile modernization. Besides, the modernization of the Soviet LRNTF (Long Rang Theatre Nuclear Forces) fleet was widely expected by the military and intelligence community, since the SS-4&5 were overdue for retirement. The SS-20 which emerged in 1969/70 were the result of this need, as well as a mix of development paths and arms control (The SS-20 consisted of the first two stages of the SS-16 banned by SALT). The deployments therefore presented no significant shift in doctrine, but did represent a missile with greater accuracy and more important one which was more difficult to detect. Being road mobile and thus capable of rapid redeployment it increased tensions at a time when they were already high.

On 12 December 1979, NATO decided to deploy the long range GLCM's and Perishing -11A's as a counter to this perceived threat. The

\textsuperscript{74} Sverre Lodgaard and Per Berg "Long Range Theatre Nuclear Forces in Europe" in SIPRI Yearbook 1982 pp 3-12. See also Thomas E. Halverston "The last Great Nuclear Debate" (London: St Martin's Press, 1995)
NATO Special meeting of Foreign and Defense Ministers called noted that while Soviet LRNTF had increased, NATO's like forces had remained static. The Soviets had finally achieved parity with the US, and potentially this could undermine stability, and cast doubt on the Alliance's deterrent strategy. It thus called for the "dual strategy" of Theatre Force modernization and arms control. Thus the existing 108 Perishing 1A's were replaced in the same number, while 464 GLCM's were to be deployed. In keeping the numbers of warheads static, it implied a shift away from short range missiles to the theatre forces. It also called for the inclusion of intermediate nuclear forces into the talks on arms control, and appointed a special consultative body to support the US efforts in this area. In July 1980, Presidential Directive -59 had taken place in parallel to this process, and this enunciated the "countervailing strategy". It required that US forces not only maintain the capability for assured destruction of the Soviet Union, but also have the "capability for flexible, controlled retaliation against a full range of targets for any attack at any level" (a strategy which made the GLCM's and Perishing the ideal weapons) The relationship between the two events was never made public, - that is whether the American process pushed the deployment or vice versa.

75 Communiqué of the Special Meeting of the Foreign and Defense Ministers, Brussels, 12 December 1979.

In American eyes this was the ultimate commitment by the US to guarding the gates of Europe, but the end effect was that Europeans were left mulling over a weapon that was undeniably “All-European”. That is, the battle ground for Soviet American conflict anywhere in the world (even if Europe was not directly involved) could well be East and West Europe. Europe, now economically stronger, though still lacking anything of a “European concept of defense” (the lack of which was now keenly felt, as against the earlier period when such a view was seen as harmful to the Alliance) put forward their own very decided views on such a scenario and a large arms control constituency began to develop in Europe as also a decided push to improve East-West relations, that focussed on Eastern Europe. Soon, a flood of literature began to appear that questioned or outright dismissed the validity of the American deterrent. As one analyst observed" The defense of Western Europe with nuclear weapons or the threat of nuclear retaliation makes as little sense in a European theatre as it does in a purely US –Soviet strategic context. It suffers from the same pitfalls as the deterrence theory that informs it" "and again “Western Europe threatens the ultimate response for the smallest contingency – the concept that the United States has been trying to improve or, if not abandon, since the late 1950’s. How can this threat by NATO be credible?"77. Others noted, that even with the introduction of the LRNTF’s “

77 Regina Cowen et al., " SDI And European Security", (Boulder: East-West Monograph Series No 5, 1987)
The postulated coupling effect basically appears to be a myth. The deterrent therefore remained shaky, and in the face of these accurate missiles seemed to collapse altogether.

These combined perceptions led to different reactions. First, as mentioned, the path of arms control was adopted as a "second track". Second, the Americans in particular began to adopt "conventional war doctrines, that would push the nuclear threshold as far away as possible. Third, they began again the search for a credible missile defense. And Fourth, growing out of this last move, the concept of missile defense against conventionally tipped missiles was pushed through in Europe. This marked a definite turn towards the next cycle of defense.

The triumph of the "Defense": SDI and ATBM

Beginning in the 1970's parts of the defense community had already begun to revive the idea of a missile defense. Analysts note that these proponents could be divided into five distinct groups. First were those who dismayed by a national security policy based on destruction, and thus backed an active defense, which would alleviate the moral burden of threatening a nuclear strike. Second were those who were primarily concerned with ICBM vulnerability and wanted some limited form of defense to bolster deterrence. Third, were those who saw BMD as actually operationalizing flexible response. Fourth, were those who saw it simply as

78 Lodgaard and Berg note 24.
a question of strategic superiority, and fifth were those who felt that this strategic superiority was essential to extended deterrence\(^79\).

There was yet another argument advanced in favour of the SDI, which had nothing to do with military policy. In this view SDI could sustain the third wave of pumping in substantial amounts of money into industrial R&D programs under government determined national security guidelines. After the Manhattan project and the NASA Apollo program, investment in (and around) the SDI would give a new impulse to the most energetic high tech sector of US industry, especially since the scale of what was sought to be achieved was far ahead of the previous projects. As American competitiveness decreased vis à vis Europe and Japanese goods, a growing consensus emerged for a “reindustrialization” which would concentrate public R&D efforts precisely on those areas which would give America an edge. The US could strengthen its lead position within the western alliance as well by bringing American industrial technology at least one generation forward by raising the economy to a new level, but curtailing the flow of new technology to foreign countries, and by involving West European and Japanese researchers in SDI and therefore in the

development of the American economy. These ideas culminated during the time of Reagan for a number of different reasons.

Firstly, the US worried about the highly destructive force of Soviet SS-18's and SS-19's that was thought to have the capability to take out US land nuclear forces. The Scowcroft Commission noted that "more than half the Soviet ICBM's ... have been deployed since the last U.S ICBM was deployed. Second, this was the high noon of "linkage politics" in arms control. US foreign policy during this time was linked in turn to the START and INF negotiations. The emergence of the SDI had not a little to do with this search for a new chip. Third, by the time of the 1982 elections the previously dormant question of deterrence became a major election issue, and the administrations lost 26 seats in Congress and consequently its working majority in the House of Representatives. The National Conference of Catholic Bishops issues a pastoral letter that came near to repudiating the morality even of maintaining an American nuclear deterrent, not to speak of using it even against Soviet aggression. Fourth, Congress then rejected the dense pack basing mode of the new MX ICBM, and it began to be feared that modernization of the arsenal would be rejected as well. By this time also the recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission had

82 Retired USAF Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft was asked to form a blue ribbon committee to examine the administrations strategic force modernisation program and arms control programme. It's report was released on 6 April 1983 and had a major effect on US policy. Snyder and Brown. Note 25.
been accepted and the US was in a strong position to make its next move. On March 23, 1983, President Reagan outlined his vision of SDI (Strategic Defence Initiative) which promised to make nuclear weapons obsolete. The centre piece of the strategic concept was strategic defense: that is, to intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached out own soil or that of our allies. This on the one hand reassured the Europeans that they would not be left out of this “grand strategy” and on the other domestically the President succeeded in eroding both the platform of the right (which maintained that American technology in space would free the world from fear) and the Democratic left (which maintained that the Soviets was no longer a threat to freedom.) In the next elections (1984) Reagan was reelected in a landslide, and Gorbachev emerged as the leader of the Soviet Union.

Linkage politics continued and in January 1985 Secretary of State George Schultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko agreed to separate but parallel negotiations on INF, START, and defense and space issues as part of a new bilateral forum called the Nuclear and Space Talks. Needless to add, it was assumed that the European would be “spoken for” by the US.

**Missile Defense Comes to Europe**

With billions of dollars in the kitty for defence related expenditure, it was not long before the question of ballistic missile defences reached Europe. The Hoffman Panel advising on the security implications of
strategic defenses, proposed that the “step by step” approach should begin in Europe using available technologies against both nuclear and conventional missiles. The 1986 award of contracts to European companies not only spread the net of research, but provided a backing the political survival of the SDI in the US itself. But the technical hurdles were immense in the case of a defense against nuclear weapons, but less so in the context of conventional missiles. The question of missile defense in Europe therefore took a rather different path, hedged not only by the available technologies, as also the greater thrust towards conventional war fighting doctrines that now lay at the heart of NATO and of the Soviet strategy. Meanwhile other allies like Israel began to show a cautious interest in ATBM’s, noting however that any dilution of the deterrent would nullify the relationship. Germany at the epicenter of a future conflict, though initially enthusiastic about the SDI, soon began to distance itself from any possibility of setting another arms race in motion. As the arms control agenda began to move forward, the essential European dilemma of defense or offense (notwithstanding the first use clause which had anyway been openly rejected by Henry Kissinger in 1979 when he warned the Europeans not to expect the United States to inflict strategic destruction on the Soviet Union in the even of aggression against West Europe\textsuperscript{83}) emerged anew.

\textsuperscript{83} Opening address at the Conference on "NATO, The Next Thirty Years" Brussels, 1-3 September 1979.
The End of The Cold War and the Fears of Europe

In the event, political considerations apart, the INF Treaty sidelined the question of an TMD for Europe by simply eliminating an entire class of weapons. The INF Treaty designated missile with ranges between 1,000 and 5,500 km as Intermediate range, while those with ranges between 500-1,000 km were classed as “shorter range” missiles. In effect by the agreement, NATO gave up some 430 missiles and the plan for a further 140 intermediate missiles. This in fact reinforced the Montebello decision (1983) to make way in NATO for longer range missile forces. Less noticeably the aging nuclear Nike Hercules was shifted out to make way for the conventional Patriot. What remained were the tactical weapons systems like the SS-21 and follow on to the Lance, as well as artillery and Multiple Rocket Launchers. It also strengthened the air and sea launched leg of the triad since it remained untouched.

Decision makers were by and large caught unprepared, as the INF Treaty was signed, and disarmament was suddenly in the air. In France, the INF Treaty had been viewed with considerable suspicion, with Jacques Chirac flying to Washington, London, Bonn and Moscow, emerging at the end of it all, even more set against the Treaty, though Mitterand himself remained somewhat hamstrung as the French franc came under pressure, and the friendship of the US and Germany became critical. A debilitating debate on modernization of short range forces underlined the rift between nuclear and
non nuclear powers in Europe, with Germany particularly bitter about French and British inconsistency (more especially Margaret Thatcher's' lofty observation that the Germans should not be allowed to determine Allied strategy,) all of which contributed upsetting what had till then been a relatively stable apple cart. Under the guidance of President Mitterand, a series of moves began to dilute the "absolutism" of French defence policy, and cooperate more with European powers in a situation where the interests of all concerned seemed to be in danger.

A series of moves began to consolidate the British and French nuclear forces. Firstly, France moved to reinvigorate the 1963 agreement on Franco-German cooperation, and creating the FAR (Force Action Rapide) thus finally committing French forces (unofficially) to the defense of Germany. Secondly, France and UK began a series of talks on defence cooperation. Under threat, the two nuclear states opted to begin a careful exploration of each other's nuclear and defence infrastructure and doctrine, even as both leaders stood shoulder to shoulder in decrying any attempts to draw their weapons into the arms control and disarmament talks. The sneaking sympathy for the Soviet position from others like the US, and Italy (where Italian leaders observed "they are not on the moon" ) led to a greater willingness to set up a structure for defence cooperation at the 1982 84

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84 See Halverston, note 74.
85 For a cautious exploration of the issue see Yves Boyer, Pierre Lellouche, John Roper "Franco-British Defence Co-operation" (Royal Institute of International Affairs, L'Institut Francais des relations Internationales, Routledge: 1988)
Franco-British summit. Here it was decided that regular meetings between top civil servants were to be more frequent, and foreign and defence ministers were to meet twice a year. Following summit meetings (1984) decided that neither country was to embark up on armaments programmes without consulting the other. The frequency of the Strategic Studies Group was doubled and informal contacts increased. The visit by David Owen and David Steel to Paris in September 1986 was made much of, and out of this emerged the decision for a joint requirement for a cruise missiles to replace the planned Trident II D-5. Ideas for a minimum nuclear deterrent are also said to have been aired.

While all these possibilities were being explored, the most practical cooperation was at Geneva, where both powers continued to espouse the value of nuclear deterrence. START negotiations resumed in 1985, where Mitterand declared that the French tactical weapons as "pre-strategic" - thus delinking in from the pressure of disarmament on "battlefield" weapons, and thus reinforcing the Gaullist concept of deterrence. The French Defence Minister also began to increase the pressure for a separate European defence identity should move towards formulating a straightforward deterrence principle that would be aimed at war prevention, rather than "winning" a war (as implicit in flexible response). Earlier statements had implied that France's air breathing deterrent could by it's
flexibility and range could contribute to the emergence of a European defence concept\textsuperscript{86}.

At the UN General Assembly, France continued to veto calls to convert the Partial Test Ban into a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and noted that it had no intention of getting itself mired into the START negotiations, since her deterrent force were minimal, and essentially had a political and stabilizing role \textsuperscript{87}. To France's dismay, it seemed that the superpowers were preparing to go further. President Gorbachev in his speech of 15 January 1986, outlined the prospect of a nuclear weapon free world by the year 2000, and continued to maintain a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. French analysts however continued to refer to the value of nuclear weapons to maintain peace in Europe.

Less than three years later, it was obvious that further reduction were on the cards, as an apparently inspired leadership in Moscow allowed the treaty reducing conventional forces in Europe, (1990) while it was clear that considerable changes were in the wind. In 1989, the Soviets had pulled out from Afghanistan and Moscow began to seriously negotiate on the START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty). On the 17 July, the "Two plus Four talks concluded in Paris on the unification of Germany, marking a new chapter in history. Barely two weeks later, Iraq had invaded Kuwait, focussing attention on a new threat to the "security " of the Alliance. A year


\textsuperscript{87} Jean Pierre Chevenement, interview in NATO's Sixteen Nations October 1989. p.19
later, the Soviet Union itself was no more, but as the old enemy passed into history, a new one was making itself evident. As the threat of chemical weapons attack on Israel and on US forces was faced, the issue of missile proliferation once again came centre stage.

A review of the past as the framework for further analysis, reveals some important notations which need to be flagged as relevant when assessing the question as to “what is NATO?” Clearly, the assumptions made at the beginning of this study appear to be justified. NATO served many a function other than a simple defence against the Soviet threat. It’s non proliferation role in built into it, and is built into the concept of extended deterrence. As long as the US nuclear weapons remain in defence of NATO, this non proliferation role is implicit. This role is apparent in a collective (though perhaps not always individual) hostility to any other state producing or attempting to produce a nuclear/biological/chemical weapons which remains as a “given” in NATO’s relations with the rest of the world. Second, it is also apparent, that with nuclear weapons guaranteeing US dominance even over its allies, the European powers are unlikely to give up their weapons even in the complete absence of a threat. This reinforces the argument that nuclear weapons are essentially a “currency of power” which derives from the ability of that state to wield power on a level higher than a non nuclear state. Third, NATO’s out of area role in the past been a flexible one, where the political backing for a formal out of area role was prevented not just due to the Soviet threat (which admittedly prevented the removal of large numbers of troops from the Central theatre) but equally
the resistance of a still weakened Europe to US adventurism, once their own interests in keeping their colonial areas had waned. However, this did not prevent NATO assets from being used to protect members interests well “out of area” though the NATO flag did not fly over the operation.

During the cold war, the key fact emerges that nuclear doctrine was decided in the United States, with the Europeans at best able to moderate the language, or to insist on arms control and a reduction of tension. That their efforts met with success was as much due to the internal weakness of the Soviet Union and its built in contradictions, as well as American agreement with the idea.

Another key fact that emerges is that the cycle of technology was initially favourable to the offense. Nuclear weapons were seen as the ultimate weapon of consequence, thus allowing the US to offer extended deterrence and “Massive retaliation”. Once this dominance was gone, there was a continuing search for a doctrine that would at once allow Americans flexibility as well as inspire confidence in Europe. That the two were inherently contradictory was never officially accepted, but the continuance of the arms race led finally to a fall back upon a search for a defense. The SDI was undoubtedly to be a final and expensive search for that flexibility, but more than that it was a historical input in the flow of American development. After the Manhattan project, and the NASA Apollo Space programme, investment in SDI technologies was one that was clearly seen as vital to American economic, political and military security by at least the
military industrial complex. In a sense, the SDI was not simply a "Defense" but another prong in the search for strategic superiority. Thus the "offense" and the "defense" were twin track policies that reflected enduring interests for "the ultimate security" rather than peace.

All of these basic interests – the quest for non-proliferation and a retention of the "super status" vis a vis other states, the desire for economic and military preeminence, and the protection of global or regional interest by NATO, were all independent of the Soviet threat, and existed as a "given" in NATO vital interests. Thus not unnaturally these interests continued well into the post cold war period, and thus began to shape the international debate, the role of NATO, and indeed the nature of the threat itself. This will be examined in the following chapters, as also the new "values" that are pertinent to deterrence and the new arguments in the debate.