CHAPTER - 3
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE
NATO MOVES TO MEET THE THREAT

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was obviously the first “victim” of changed strategic conditions that marked the end of the cold war. Questioning as to the continued relevance of NATO began towards the end of the 1980’s, and it was only after a confused and often acerbic debate that NATO was once again seen as a vehicle for trans Atlantic security. This meant not only that NATO had to expand, but it also meant that it had to go out of its secure and untroubled area to be relevant. It also meant that countries within NATO had to synchronize their security concerns – not an easy prospect since with the disappearance of a common threat, each tended to have different perspectives of what constituted security and as to which direction the threats came from. Thus while Germany looked to the east and nervously eyed Russian instability, France and the southern countries were more concerned with stabilizing the Maghreb. The US naturally had a global view of security, which began to align with the European concerns about the Eurasian and African continents. Missile proliferation was a commonality in most or all of these areas. Moreover the Gulf War brought home the realization that these threats were closer home than realized. Thus NATO countries honed past capabilities towards the new threat – nuclear forces continued to be central to NATO doctrine, even as they moved to take on new capabilities towards
the defense. This chapter looks at these moves to change the one and acquire the other. The offense was retained, while the prospective for a defense were enhanced.

**NATO and the new world order- irrelevance or revival?**

Between 1989 and 1990, Europe was faced with a virtual whirlwind of change. The opening of the Berlin Wall between the eight and ninth November of 1989 was quickly followed by a realization that the division of Germany had to end, and the two plus Four negotiations began a month later. In Romania the repressive Ceausescu regime fell even as the Bulgarian government abolished the communist party. Clearly stirring changes were taking place as the NATO Nuclear Planning Group met to discuss the implications of clearly loosening Soviet control. By 1990, the debates on the relevance of NATO and it’s core function in a world without apparent threats began to come to the fore and questions were being asked by prominent analysts on whether NATO was still in Europe’s interest. Michael Sturmer noted “What has changed is the form and complexity of the threat, not the threat itself” (noting the changes of perestroika and glasnost) and asking “Is NATO slowly going out of fashion, a historical monument in search of political purpose?”.

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Warnke clearly asked "As that threat (the Soviet Union) is perceived to be receding, two major questions arise. The first is whether NATO can survive. The second is whether NATO should survive." Though subsequently in the same article he did "enthusiastically" answer his own question with an affirmative, this was based on the certainty that the Soviet Union would continue to exist, albeit in a less threatening form. Stephen Walt warned "if resent trends continue, a significant decrease in alliance cohesion and a lessening of the Western military effort is likely" though again this analysis was tempered by the sureness that the threat would continue. Questions as to what precisely constituted NATO "area" also began to be debated in the same period, and there was little warning that these debates would have to be met head on before the year was out.

The London Declaration of the NATO Heads of State and Governments tried to keep up with swiftly moving events, and outlined proposals for developing political and military cooperation with countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The pace of change caught many a national leader unprepared. This was apparent, for instance, when the French President had an official visit to East Germany and reaffirmed his support for the East German state. Uneasiness was worsened by what was seen

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4 President Mitterand made his official visit in December 1989.
as a US "politicization" of NATO in the aftermath of the cold war, but analysts were looking well into the future. A prominent French analyst pointed out that NATO would survive as an effective military alliance, and become an effective instrument for a concerted Western diplomacy as well, if and only if, it were allowed to bypass the narrow limits of Article 5 defensive missions and encouraged to assume new security functions whose geographic scope would extend beyond its Article 6 boundaries. Certainly such a strategy was already implicit in Secretary James Bakers declarations in the fall of 1989, and soon spelled out by the Secretary General of NATO, Manfred Worner. The directions in thinking were apparent when the London Summit set the basis for the reorganization of NATO forces with the emphasis on mobility and projection capabilities, with the focus on the creation of a Rapid Reaction Corps in Allied command Europe.

By the end of 1990, these trends in NATO were to be furthered as a real threat to the free flow of oil emerged, and Iraq invaded Kuwait in a blatant disregard for international law.

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6 For instance, see Speech by Secretary of State James Baker at the Berlin Press Club. 12 December 1989.

NATO and the Gulf War

On 2 August 1990, President Saddam Hussein of Iraq invaded Kuwait. The conduct of operations in that conflict have been covered elsewhere, and do not form part of this study, while the missile defense and Scud hunts are covered in detail elsewhere in this study (Chapter -4) However it is worth noting that while the NATO flag did not fly over operation, "Desert Storm “ the past practise of "consultation” and cooperation was what made it possible for the US and its allies to do what they did. It did involve NATO in many ways, and more important set a precedent for future actions. It is also important to see the reactions of individual partners and the extent of burden sharing.

Here it is worth noting that according to the agreed understanding of Article 4, NATO members would consult on any threat to security to themselves anywhere in the world. This consulting was done regularly before "Desert Storm”, through the Foreign Ministers (political) and Defence Planning Councils. For instance, strong appeals for contributions of mechanized armour at a crucial juncture were made by US Secretary of State James Baker on September 10 at the Foreign Ministers meeting. Secondly, NATO members were at the most useful in providing political backing. Thus the US was assured of French and British support at the Security Council. Thirdly, members like France, UK and Germany were quick to apply sanctions at various levels to pressure Iraq. As will be
seen, though Alliance members had differences on policy based on their own interests, nonetheless at the military and political level, NATO countries managed to paper over these differences, which led to the level of cooperation that allowed combined operations. Each had it's own interests in "consulting" with each other, which they did, and frequently and moderately efficiently.

Britain though not dependant on Iraqi oil (since she had her own North Sea oil fields) would however have been quickly hit had Iraq's control of world oil reserves gone from 1- to 19% (Kuwaiti) or even to 44% (if he controlled Saudi oil). Apart from this, analysts note that Britain was anxious to reinstate the "special relationship" which seemed to be under threat under President George Bush (who had offered Germany "a partnership in leadership") under the influence of a more relaxed security environment, and the rising power of Germany. Moreover, as noted earlier, the UK had received considerable military aid from the United States during the Falklands war, and therefore felt it necessary to respond likewise. In addition, the British are understood to have projected a historical responsibility for Kuwait. Not mentioned in official dispatches was that the Arab world was a prime importer of British military equipment, while British oil companies continued to be heavily involved in Saudi Arabia. In 1990, 80% of British arms exports were to nine Middle Eastern countries, with the most important being the AL-Yamamah

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agreement with the Saudis, and exports to this country accounting for a full two thirds of British exports to the developing world.\textsuperscript{9}

Whitehall eventually committed $4 million to aid foreign workers, while she herself was reimbursed by Germany and Japan for her military contributions. The country deployed 45,000 troops, about 160 warplanes and helicopters, and 37 combat and support ships. This constituted the largest military contribution from a European country, and was Britain's largest foreign military deployment since World War II\textsuperscript{10} accounting for some 23\% of its ground forces, and more than half the size of its army on the Rhine. When in November 1990 President Bush announced a doubling of strength so did Britain. British support also helped Bush sell his policies to Congress and to the American public. Finally, Britain was willing to allow her forces to operate under General Schwarzkopf's operational command, and were able to arm twist alliance partners for monetary and military help.\textsuperscript{11} However it is worth noting that the deployments left British troops in Germany with "barely enough men to guard their own installations let alone any training."\textsuperscript{12} Thus the demise of the cold war, and German tying in to NATO, as well as NATO manpower itself that maintained the Alliance

\textsuperscript{9} Martin Navias, "Going Ballistic: The Build up of Missiles in the Middle East" (London: Brassey's, 1993)p.73.


\textsuperscript{11} Ibid. p. 74.

\textsuperscript{12} John E. Peters, Howard Deshong, "Out of Area or Out of Reach?"(Santa Monica: Rand, 1995) MR 629-OSD.
was a valuable input into British effort. Britain also had a problem with being able to deploy enough professional soldiers (a roulement would have been impossible), and faced continuous resistance from Whitehall.

**French participation** in the war had two facets to it. On the one hand, she was the second largest contributor to the Gulf. She also supported all major Security Council resolutions. It also quickly set in place sanctions – freezing Iraqi assets as early as August 2, 1990 and imposed restrictions on the movement of diplomats and suspended all arms aid. Agreed to a European community embargo, and voted in favour of Resolution 661 which imposed an economic and trade boycott on Iraq. On the other hand, this was not done without hesitations, delays, contradictory statements, and often uncertain military alignments.

This was due to France's traditional friendship with the Arab world (which dates back to the early 1960's) her "independent" policies in this area. However, concern about oil, and the effects instability in these countries would have on the 1 million Muslim immigrants living in France may have contributed to her agreement to participate. President Mitterand was often against the Qui D' Orsay's Arab lobby, and according to analysts had learnt not to assume that the systemic changes occurring around France could be slowed down (as he had tried to do in the case of Germany and Russia, where he had been on the side of the status quo).

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Sensing the relative rise in American power, he chose to follow US leadership in the hope of influencing events during and after the war. Reports also seem to indicate that Mitterand even provided the US with detailed information about earlier French weapons deliveries to Kuwait, while one observer notes that Mitterand considered it essential to keep the United States in Europe “to balance the Soviet Union militarily and Germany politically.”

The fact that Iraq bought over $4.2 billion worth of arms in 1987 (for which is had yet to pay) was possibly another factor that influenced French decision making, in spite of considerable political opposition.

By the start of Operation Desert Storm, France had 13,500 troops and almost 70 planes in theatre. More than 6,800 naval personnel and 34 ships participated (about 10% of the navy). All of the soldiers were professionals, the President having decided not to ask for conscripts.

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16 Political opposition was foremost by Defense Minister Chevenement (socialist) who had been the founding member of the Iraqi-French Friendship society, as well as Mitterand’s own desire to see through a European defense identity led to an French forces being placed under US command only at a late stage in the crisis. Other voices against this were heard. Philippe Seguin, a prominent member of the Opposition RPR (Reassemblémen Pour la Republique)said after Parliament had voted on French participation “This war is a stupidity. It is absurd. France has everything to lose by it. We are giving the U.S tremendous power and leeway without knowing where it will lead us. . . . Josette Alia and Christine Clerc La Guerre de Mitterand: la derièr grand illusion (Paris: Orban, 1991).
17 French conscripts although not required to serve outside metropolitan France, could have been sent overseas under Presidential direction under the 1971 conscription law. See David Yost “France and the Gulf War of 1990-91” Political and Military Lessons Learned” The Journal of Strategic Studies,(No 16, September 1993)
French forces were deployed far from coalition bases. After the resignation of Chevenement however, many of these ambiguities were removed\(^{18}\). France was better prepared to operate in the desert, (with much of the equipment deployed having been designed with the deserts of Chad in mind) but France was woefully dependant on the US for intelligence and satellite assets, which somewhat affected her independent decision making capability.

**Germany** was hesitant to involve herself in the war firstly because, the formal end to the unification process, did not come until nearly two months after the Iraqi invasion, and it was firm German policy to do nothing to agitate the Soviet Union. After this, the country was predictably caught up in the difficulties of absorbing the east, which as it turned out was nowhere near being the “showcase” of the Soviet ideology as it had been trumped up to be. Third, German troops were barred by her *Grundgesetz* (Basic Law) from military operations outside NATO area.

However it is often ignored that Germany assisted the Alliance operations with elaborate organizational support. As the site for US military headquarters in Europe it was the main point of strategic support for US troops in Europe and was involved in the allied strategy throughout the war. The *Bundeswehr* and other German institutions supported the US military in all issues such as logistics, transportation, this efficiency and

\(^{18}\) Peters and Deshong note.12, p.16.
support being particularly vital when the numbers of US troops were doubled. The entire VII Corps of the US had to be transferred from Germany to Saudi Arabia at very short notice\textsuperscript{19}. This logistical support was also made available for other members of the Alliance, though there was little publicity given to this.

Also often forgotten is that Germany sent 19 ships to the entrance of the Mediterranean to protect the entrance to the Suez Canal, strictly as part of its commitment to NATO\textsuperscript{20}. Thus the NATO flag flew in support operations, if not in actual fighting. After the Gulf War, and the subsequent accusations of "cheque book diplomacy" by Germany, a bitter and often acrimonious debate led to the change in constitution which then lifted the ban on German troops operating alongside NATO allies.

In addition to these individual commitments by allies, some additional points are worth noting.

- The Gulf War marked the first deployment in history of the ACE (Allied Command Europe) Mobile Force – which was moved to Turkey
- Additional air defence missiles (Patriots) also deployed
- Three quarters of a million men and women were deployed by the coalition (with the US contributing 70\%) and this deployment was supported by NATO infrastructure. This included transportation.

\textsuperscript{19} Wolfgang F. Danspeckgruber, Charles R.H. Tripp, "The Iraqi Aggression against Kuwait: Strategic Lessons and Implications for Europe", (Boulder : Westview, 1996)

landing rights, refueling, ground movements, port facilities, ammunition transfers, air traffic control, repair, parts, and medical support. It may safely said that the war could not have been carried out without this input.

- European allies contributed 75,000 personnel
- Starting on 2 August, NATO Ambassadors, foreign ministers, defence ministers and military and civilian officials were kept continuously in the picture, ensuring a continuous inputs into the war effort.

- NATO’s Defence Planning Committee remained in permanent session to facilitate consultation and cooperation.

- Despite the absence of the NATO military command, ground, air and sea and Air forces fought together under a unified command. As the US permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council notes, "The military coalition that trained together in Europe put its training to work in the Gulf."

The “lessons” learned were many in operational terms — including that Europe should evolve a new body that would be able to deploy side by side with American forces in future conflicts. Another lesson learnt was that the Alliances’ forces structure needed to change with the emergence of these new threats and situations. The Planning which had begun after the London Conference was carried forward, even as NATO members

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began to adjust their own policies and armed forces structures to the "new threat".

Restructuring and change: NATO confronts the threat

With the change in international relations clearly perceptible, NATO put forward a strategic review which resulted in the Alliance’s new Strategic Concept in November 1991. The inadequacy of the review just a year down the road – with the Soviet Union finally collapsing in disarray - underlined the dynamism and the swiftness of change in international relations. This uncertainty is immediately apparent in the language of the text, which while applauding the improved security environment, nevertheless did not make any drastic or even any significant changes in the NATO defence policy. Nuclear weapons remained central to security, and the stress was on the continuing validity of the Alliance.

The main threats to NATO  

22 at the end of 1991 were identified as multifaceted and multi-directional in nature, making it difficult to assess and guard against. The predominant risks were that of

- Ethnic and territorial disputes in the former Warsaw Pact countries.

- Instability accompanying change in the Soviet Union

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- The proliferation of weapons technologies in the Middle East, including WMD, and ballistic missile capable of reaching the territory of some Member states of the Alliance

- (Arising from the above) the Alliance reaffirmed that any armed attack on the territory of the Allies would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty.

The most significant inclusion was what gave the Alliance a "global" role that it had never aspired to (formally) before. The Strategic Concept noted that "Alliance security interests can be affected by risks of a wider nature including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and disruption of the flow of vital resources, and actions of terrorism and sabotage. (italics mine) Arrangement for consultation among the Allies under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty and where appropriate co-ordination of their efforts including their response to such risks."

In the light of these risks and threats, Force Posture reflected a continued though reduced reliance on nuclear weapons, a move away from linear defense in the Central region and the creation of Immediate and Rapid Reaction forces. In evolving an appropriate Force Structure, emphasis for all arms was on flexibility and mobility, and to this end it called for long distance airlift and air refueling capabilities, including modern communications and controls systems to insure a secure air defence environment. The Strategy cautioned against proliferation of ballistic missile

and WMD, against which a solution would require a complementary approach "including export controls and missile defences.24"

General John R. Galvin, (Supreme Allied Commander) was more explicit, in that he underlined the danger of WMD in the Middle East and North Africa, and the possibility of another war which would threatened vulnerable lines of sea and air communication, and the threat against the "free access of raw material and economic strength.25". The principle of "Flexible Response" now included a variety of postures to an evolving threat, that in the General's opinion would require "Force multipliers like the Patriot air defence missile system".26

The Alliance paper therefore already had the seeds of its future "out of area" missions, in identifying an expanded notion of security, as well as refining it's force structure to reflect an ability to move to crisis areas (obviously not within the Alliance) with smaller forces, that were to take into account the possibility that the enemy would be armed with WMD and missiles.

24 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
A new "role" and a new area.

However the fact remained that filling the threat blank, and clearly enunciating a new role for NATO was not easy. This was apparent in the flood of literature that began to appear that questioned the need for NATO or alternatively pressed the Alliance to go "out of area or out of business". Even as conflict in the former Yugoslavia began to heat up, and the demand for peacekeeping forces was rife, it was not clearly simply enough to justify the continuance of the largest security organization in the world. As one important analyst noted "(Peacekeeping) cannot become the sole justification for the existence of the Alliance. This leaves it one final but essential role - the security of its member nations. This is the original role, which, as the threat that brought the organization into being had disappeared, may now seem redundant. But other criteria exists". In noting the demographic explosion in the underdeveloped half of the world, and a volatile brew of religious fanaticism, envy and need" he warned "in any case friction is bound to occur, and if combined with the proliferation of means of mass destruction, and their delivery, may produce a security problem of vast dimensions". He also warned that an Alliance that was unused or kept in suspended animation would "wither away and die...."

28 Fredrick Bonnart, "The Future Alliance", in NATO's Sixteen Nations ,No 2, 1993 p.3.
Other commentaries appeared to agree on the content, though it looked unfavorably on the unity of vision. The *Le Monde* commented wryly "Deprived of an enemy in the East due to the collapse of the communist bloc, the Atlantic Alliance and its military organization have been looking for a new role for the last five years" and "Europe is less threatened by a massive attack of armoured vehicles on the central plains than by mushrooming regional conflicts and the emergence on its periphery of regimes taking inspiration from Islamic fundamentalism. These two reasons - expansion of its vocation and the shifting of risks - explain why NATO has been looking toward the South for several months". It also noted the dissonance within NATO commenting that France had been contributing "a Mediterranean sensibility - alongside Spain, Portugal and Italy - which is lacking in its northern allies...".

This vision of emerging risks was apparent in the debate on NATO expansion. While this is not directly relevant here, it is important to note a

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few facts. The official study on NATO Enlargement\textsuperscript{31} took up as its theme "enhancing security and stability" in the Euro-Atlantic area, (a role that others felt was better done by existing EC organizations\textsuperscript{32}) and one that has been dominant in all NATO communiqués. A closer look at arguments (especially in the US) reveals slightly different perceptions. For instance, President Clinton noted in calling for NATO expansion, that "as we look toward the 21\textsuperscript{st} century, we're looking at other new security challenges as well- the spread of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile technology, terrorism and the potential for high tech attacks on our information system. NATO must be prepared to meet and defeat this new generation of threats, to act flexibly and decisively under American leadership. With three new members in our ranks, NATO will be better able to meet those goals as well"\textsuperscript{33} (in this speech, "stability is only the last named quality). 

At the other end of the spectrum were those who argued (in a return to the debates on burden sharing and alliance role in the 1980's) that while the US had made its strategic U-turn more or less gracefully by refocusing its defense plans on "major regional contingencies", Europe had failed to do so. David Gompert and Richard Kugler noted ". It need not continue.

\textsuperscript{32} For example see Michael E. Browne, " The flawed Logic of NATO Expansion" Survival, spring 1995, Vol. 37, No1, pp 34-52.
\textsuperscript{33} Remarks by the President on the National Interest for Enlarging NATO", Office of the Press Secretary, March 20, 1998.
Using NATO as the vehicle for organizing the defense of the West's interests – an old idea with a new focus – the United States can get its allies to become partners in power projection. Doing so would improve security in key theatres (The Persian Gulf and Eastern Europe), rejuvenate the Alliance, reduce the US defence budget, and avoid a revolt by the American people against international duties that fall too heavily on them alone.

Criticizing the slow efforts of NATO to create a power projection force, he calls for a 10 division NATO power projection forces, with 10 air wings, and associated lift, logistics, naval forces, C3I. "Such a force should be able to prevail in a major conflict anywhere western interests might be challenged". Most notable is his observation that the original idea of the alliance was wider than simply being anti-Russian. "In addition to providing for the mandatory defense of allied territory, the NATO Treaty stipulates that the alliance may act if its members interests are threatened anywhere, without obligating all allies to do so". Thus he calls for interventions by coalitions by the willing, in fact a more selective a la carte use of NATO. Clearly this called for a NATO that was willing to move out of its "traditional" area, with a clear commitment to defending its interests anywhere – in Europe or outside.

It may be noticed that NATO has followed an incremental process in outlining its "out of area" role. This slow expansion had begun from the

early 1990's with the creation of a number of "interlocking institutions" that had membership largely from "The Vancouver to Vladivostok. 36" These fulfil various roles, and not all are outlined here. But it is worth noting that the ones examined have all potential to be used (or misused) as an "instrument". The United Nations, dominated in the Security Council by the US, and with two other NATO members was at first the chosen vehicle, with NATO designating its role through the framework of the OSCE (Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe) which in its capacity as a "regional organization " tasked NATO with its first role in the former Yugoslavia. (The UN Charter allows such an organization to take measures to enforce peace within its area, while keeping the Security Council informed at all times). The second important instrument that emerged as a well of manpower, and an instrument that allowed for staging bases was the Partnership for Peace (PfP).

The PfP was created in 1994 in response to the rising demand by CEE (Central and East European states) for inclusion into NATO. At first the PfP appeared to offer little, but simply served as a waiting room for NATO. However some points in this are worth noting. Firstly, the charter of the PfP clearly states that all PFP countries would have direct access to the North Atlantic Council (the most powerful body in the Alliance) and could "Consult with NATO in the event of a "direct threat to its territorial

36 For instance, the Partnership for Peace which includes all the NATO countries, the countries of the former Soviet Union and Russia.
integrity, political independence, or security"\textsuperscript{37}. The language of Art 4 of NATO is therefore virtually extended to the PfP countries, with the cautionary insertion of the term "consult" in keeping with what NATO had found useful in the past. As one US official puts it, "The partnership for peace proposal was a very skilful compromise between people who said we should do nothing to offend the Russians and people who said we should let the Eastern Europeans in now. ... The beauty of the proposal is that it's a frame on whose canvas we can paint whatever we want"\textsuperscript{38}. As President Clinton notes, the NATO operation in Bosnia would have proved difficult in the extreme were it not for the involvement of Hungary (then only a PfP member) who allowed her territory to be used for the largest single operational deployment of American troops in Europe since World War II\textsuperscript{39}. Polish, Czechs and Hungarian soldiers served alongside, testifying to the potential strengths of the PfP.

The actual first tentative step outwards was when the Council declared on 4\textsuperscript{th} June in Oslo that it would support OSCE peacekeeping activities, while later (17 December 1992) it confirmed that NATO was ready to support "on a case by case basis" peacekeeping operations under the authority of the UN Security Council, which had the "primary"

\textsuperscript{37} "Declaration of the Heads of State and government" Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, NATO Headquarters, Brussels. 11 January 1994. Press Communiqué M-1(94)3


\textsuperscript{39} Remarks by the President on the National Interest for Enlarging NATO", Office of the Press Secretary, March 20, 1998.
responsibility for PSO (peace support operations). The communique noted "for the first time in its history, the Alliance is taking part in UN peacekeeping and sanctions enforcement operations." This first effort consisted mainly of ships in the Adriatic to monitor the arms embargo and economic sanctions, while NATO airborne early warning aircraft - AWACS - were used to monitor the UN mandated no fly zone over Bosnia.

In 1993 (August) a further broadening was apparent when NATO allowed the use of air power to enforce the UN mandate on the ground. This was backed by UN Security Council Resolution 836, which under Chapter VII of the UN Charter authorized member states "acting nationally or through regional organizations" to take under the authority of the Security Council, an subject to close coordination with the Secretary General and UNPROFOR. All necessary measures, through the use of air power, in and around the safe areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to support UNPROFOR in the performance of its mandate.

In 1994 January NATO aircraft began to be used more extensively. NATO declared "We reaffirm our readiness, under the authority of the United Nations Security council and in accordance with alliance decisions

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41 This was a ban on military flights only. Resolution 781 of 9 October 1992, Resolution 786 of 19 November 1992, and Resolution 816 of 31 March 1993.

of 2 and 9 August 1993, to carry out air strikes in order to prevent the strangulation of Sarajevo, the safe areas and other threatened areas.\textsuperscript{43} As the UN mandated "safe areas"\textsuperscript{44} came under attack, and UN personnel were kidnapped, the attack increased.

By 1995, NATO was well and truly involved. "Operation Deliberate Force" launched over 3,500 air sorties to counter the military threat against Sarajevo, and other safe areas. Operation Deny Flight had done almost 100,000 sorties, while Operation Sharpguard (enforcing the embargo in the Adriatic) had challenged almost 65,000 ships and boarded nearly 5,000\textsuperscript{45}.

By the end of 1995, NATO was learning the lessons of "Deliberate Force". The first parting of ways was apparent when the NATO Secretary General noted the "impossibility of deploying neutral peacekeepers in a civil war, and the impossibility of combining a peacekeeping efforts on the ground with a peace enforcement mission in the air, the need for a clear and attainable mandate from the UN, as well as a sounder relationship between the two organizations, and the need for "unity of command"\textsuperscript{46}.

Immediately after "Operation Deliberate Force" which led directly to the Dayton Peace Agreements, NATO's marked the next "first". This was


\textsuperscript{44} UN Security Council Resolution No 814(1993)


\textsuperscript{46} Speech by NATO Secretary General Wily Claes at the 41st Annual Session of the North Atlantic Assembly, Turin, Italy, October 9th, 1995.
the deployment of IFOR (Implementation Force) with a force of 60,000 and "robust" rules of engagement, which took over from UNPROFOR in December 1995. This marked the first time in the Alliance's 47 year old history that ground troops had been deployed in an "out of area" operations. Another first was that it had personnel from 32 countries including the PfP states operating alongside. Yet another first was hardly noticed. SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) and major subordinate commanders were able to quickly augment AFSOUTH to provide a command centre for IFOR. Thus the theory that had been discussed in 1991 – the ability to respond quickly and flexibly to crisis - was actually enforced in 1995.

By October 1998, world attention has shifted to Kosovo (which had been in danger since the beginning of the war in 1991) and charges of ethnic cleansing were leveled against Belgrade. In June, the North Atlantic Council in a Defense Ministers Session, directed NATO military authorities to conduct an "air exercise" over the area (with Macedonian, and Albanian governmental clearance) and also directed that a full range of operation for a mission of halting or disrupting a systematic campaign of violence repression and expulsion in Kosovo." By October, the British Broadcasting Service was reporting that senior NATO sources were contemplating carrying out a military action, if necessary without US

sanction — since Russia would certainly veto it. The NATO Secretary General was quoted as saying (in response to a question on the UN agreement) said "NATO takes decisions on its own". By March 1999, peace talks had broken down, and NATO has started a deliberate bombing campaign without recourse to the UN Security Council or even with scant regard for the OSCE verification force which had been inducted. Drawing upon the past, this was sanctioned on the basis that the Kosovo conflict constituted a threat to the security and stability of Europe (only thus could a "regional organization" take enforcement action)

The "out of area" role was formally adopted (though in typical NATO speak) at the Annual summit Meeting in Washington, where members declared the new Strategic Concept, and identified NATO as the key security instrument for a "Euro-Atlantic area". It also notes in maintaining the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic areas, the Alliance would have to keep risks "at a distance" by dealing with potential crises at an early stage. Moreover, military forces may also be used for the preservation of international peace and security by conducting operations in support of other international organizations. This could be the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, or the United Nations.

The most vital clause is in the attached "Defence Capabilities Initiative" which notes that "potential threat to Alliance security are more likely to result from regional conflicts, ethnic strife or other crises beyond Alliance territory, as well as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery". And "Future alliance operations, including non Article-5 crisis response operations, .....may take place concurrently with other Alliance operations. In many cases, non Article 5 operations will include forces contributions from Partners and possibly other non-Allied nations. Operations outside Alliance territory may need to be undertaken with on, or only limited access to existing NATO infrastructure. Thus defence capabilities initiative lays heavy stress on interoperability so that all nations are able to make a fair contribution to the "full spectrum of Alliance missions regardless of differences in national defense structures". It is as well to note here that NATO has a ongoing "NATO-Japan Security conference" which was first started in 1990. The meeting in March 1997, noted that "the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction poses a danger and concerns us all".

Even more clear is the supporting logistics network (which interestingly was put out two years earlier in 1997). The handbook for logistics noted that new PSO's - which may include non NATO countries-

50 Ibid.
51 Keynote Speech by the Deputy Secretary General, Fourth NATO-Japan Security Conference, Tokyo, 18 March, 1997.
involved a daunting task, especially since it was liable to occur anywhere in the world. In Planning for logistic support world wide, the document also notes the importance of Host nation support, which is vital to such operations. Most interestingly, it notes "NATO may operate beyond its areas of responsibility, and/or in a situation where the Host Nation administration is either incompetent or hostile.\(^{52}\) Japan has a clear concern about the proliferation in East Asia, which is publicly articulated only against the North Korean threat.

Further flexibility is given by the creation of the CJTF (Combined Joint Task Forces). This followed more than two years of wrangling over its exact status. First suggested in January 1996 by the Americans (in a bid to end the insistent demand for a Europe only defence identity) by offering the command to the Europeans, and access to all NATO infrastructure. With the agreement of the North Atlantic Council it may operate well beyond European borders, and its tasks could include peacekeeping, or peace enforcement. Structured on a multinational, and inter-service force package it can operate independently with non-NATO members, with clear lines of political and military control.\(^{53}\) While the exact shape of the CJTF is not yet clear, it is apparent that it is meant to operate when the US wishes to distance itself from a conflict, or alternatively when it needs to operate


\(^{53}\) NATO, CJTF’s and IFOR Strategic Comments International Institute of Strategic Studies, Vol. No 2, No 5, (June 1996)
with a partner (like Japan who is an observer at the OSCE) well beyond its borders.

As the Supreme Allied Commander for the Atlantic notes, "NATO envisions a CJTF as an ad hoc organization built from an existing fixed headquarter, to perform a specific mission. Sufficient equipment, personnel, logistics support and related assets are assembled to conduct the operation and are dissolved when the operation is complete.\(^{54}\) Significantly, one of the first exercises of the new command structure was "Strong Resolve South" which employed more than 50,000 people, and had the CJTF headquartered at sea (thus requiring no host nation support). This used the assets of ACLANT and was a peace support operation in a fictional country.

With the slowly expanding role and area, what was left to define more clearly was the apparent threat. The following paragraphs examines specific policy initiatives in this direction.

**Missile Proliferation – the way beyond**

As is usual, the language used by NATO communiqués lays considerable stress of the priority that is given to political and diplomatic initiatives before the military. However, as a Senior Planning Officer within the Political Affairs Division of NATO notes that while such diplomatic and

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political means are essential, the political "mileage" for NATO will come from its defense related contribution, in a situation where traditional non proliferation mechanisms have failed, rather than from a new arms export proposal tabled at the CSCE. In short, as a defense alliance, NATO would need to focus on military considerations, not on reinforcing existing political/diplomatic mechanisms.

In October 1993, the North Atlantic Assembly formally studied the problem of "Ballistic missile proliferation". The document addressed the motivations of states in acquiring ballistic missiles, the proliferation aspects and the impact of proliferation on the west. It's central theme was that existing measures like the MTCR could delay proliferation and not prevent it (with the export of cryogenic engines to India cited as a primary example) and that more robust measures were needed. It noted "Missile proliferation is already a significant threat and it can only grow worse..., if the West wishes to continue to have the freedom to defend itself and its allies interests on a global level (Italics mine) it will need the wherewithal to defend its forces and perhaps its own territory against ballistic missiles." This is also one of the few NATO documents that specifically defines China as a proliferation threat.

Following up on the Strategic Concept, the Brussels meet of the Heads of State (January 1994) took the issue further. The “counterproliferation” agenda had already been discussed at the Defence Ministers meet at Travemunde earlier. This eight point agenda was rejected by most countries, since it was perceived as one that supported preemptive strikes and reliance on theater missile defenses. Nonetheless, the Summit put out the following communiqué that asserted that the "proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means constitutes a threat to international security, and is a matter of concern to NATO. We have decided to intensify and expand NATO’s political and defence efforts against proliferation, taking into account the work already underway in other international fora and institution. In this regard we direct that work begin immediately in appropriate fora of the Alliance to develop an overall policy framework to consider how to reinforce ongoing prevention efforts and how to reduce the proliferation threat and protect against it. (1)

In June 1994, the Alliance policy Framework on Weapons of Mass destruction was formally adopted at the Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Istanbul. The sources of Alliance risk were identified as follows

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• From states who have not complied with, and even willfully disregarded their international non proliferation commitment, in particular those stemming from membership of the NPT.

• Potential proliferation implications of the major and continuing political changes following the break up of the Soviet Union

• From states on the periphery of the Alliance who continue to develop, or illegally acquire WMD.

• The acquisition of WMD by non state actors

• The increasing trade in dual use commodities

• The growth of indigenously developed WMD related technology making proliferation difficult to control

• The trade in WMD and their delivery means for political benefit or profit by states well beyond the Alliance periphery resulting in a threat to the Alliance from such acquisition by neighbors.58

This paper identified a political and defence dimension to the problem of proliferation. In the political dimension it identified NATO's role as preventing proliferation in the first place, and should it occur59, to reverse it through diplomatic means. While the main focus of non proliferation efforts remains other international fora or regimes, the alliance


59 Some preventive diplomacy suggested (and implemented through NACC) includes promoting democratic control over armed forces, transparency in defense planning and procurement. As noted by one author, "the alliance is moving from a largely passive provider of deterrence to an instrument of shaping the political evolution of an undivided Europe". Ruhle. Note 55.
could through its consultations exchange views in the situation, including development in areas beyond NATO's periphery, and thus coordinate diplomatic or technical measures for dealing with that development.

Moving out of the traditional (US) framework, the SPG also tried to identify the political, security, economic, and other factors that drives proliferation in the developing world. Instruments used by NATO should, it concluded include those that would discourage these motivations. It advised "security guarantees" as one incentive, since it was basically this clause that had successfully prevented proliferation in Europe.

In the "Defence Dimension" the most significant observation was that in spite of "international norms and agreements" proliferation still could occur as in the case of Iraq and North Korea. A certain caution was apparent in that the communique only asked for a detailed examination of the proliferation risks, and it's implications, with improved defense capabilities "if necessary.60. Subsequently two expert Working groups were established. The first, the Senior Politico-Military Group on Proliferation (SGP) chaired by the NATO Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs, focused on the political and preventative aspects of NATO's approach to dealing with proliferation (comprised of political officers of their respective legations). The second, the Senior Defence Groups on Proliferation co-chaired by a European and North American

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60 Alliance Policy Framework. Note 58.
nations, (in 1993 the US Secretary of Defence and his equivalent in France) was responsible for considering how NATO's Defence posture could support non proliferation efforts, and also provide protection should these efforts fail. Thus the defence group was given greater weightage, and importance in national capitals. Both reported to the North Atlantic Council through the Joint committee on Proliferation (JCP).

The French chairing of the DGP and it's full involvement marked the beginning of French reengagement into Alliance defence planning. The first task of the DGP was risk assessment. This classified assessment drew upon existing NATO intelligence estimates and new intelligence from member states. While the contents are not known, it appears to have validated the growing concern of NATO countries and spelled out the risks due to indigenous production, the supply of WMD technologies from distant states, and illicit transfer. The Risk Assessment considered technological trends to the year 2010, and the links between supplier and client and supplier states in the trade of materials, technologies, and expertise needed to acquire NBC weapons and delivery capabilities. In particular it noted that many relationships between suppliers and clients are already

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61 Gregory L. Schulte, (Director, Nuclear Planning) "Responding to proliferation -NATO's role" in NATO Review, July 1995, p.15.


63 Ibid.
mature and underlined how rapid transfer of technology could significantly affect the risks facing NATO. The conclusion was that NBC proliferation constituted a direct military threat to the Alliance.

After this assessment, the DGP examined the implications of these findings on revamping NATO’s defense posture, including the Alliance’s ability to protect both populations and forced deployed abroad in joint operations. This was completed by the Spring of 1995. According to the DGP, the nature of the threat was analyzed as the following:

• Nuclear weapons appear as the most preferred option by proliferant states, placing considerable value on even a few crude weapons. Such a capability would (presumably) be used to coerce neighbouring states and deter non regional states from responding to aggression - this by holding the population in the region hostage or alternatively threatening the intervening state’s homeland. In this latter calculation may lie the answer to the search for longer and longer range missiles. At the minimum, such a capability would cause problems in coalition building both within and outside the region of conflict.

• Biological weapons although often considered less threatening than nuclear weapons have emerged as a key threat. Technical advances including micro-encapsulation to produce more stable agents for use over longer periods, have undermined many of the previous assumptions about the military utility of BW agents. This could be the cheaper route to follow, and small quantities may be used tactically in the battle field in multi delivery modes, or against naval task forces, ports and airfields.
- Chemical weapons are clearly seen by proliferant states as an effective military tool, and more importantly as a weapon of terror. NATO countries have had experience of both use and retaliation in kind, and the fact remains that even with effective defences, the use of CW would have a dramatic effect of troop performance and morale. Although use of CW to cause massive civilian casualties would be less effective than BW, chemicals could be used for psychological and political impact.

In addition the DGP risk assessment came to the following conclusions regarding the "enemy".

- An NBC armed adversary would react and respond completely differently from the Soviet Union.
- His strategic profile would be more dangerous than those of Warsaw Pact states.
- He would be less likely to act according to the fundamental rules of deterrence.
- He would be more likely to take risks in order to advance the interests of the leadership.
- Such states would be less likely to have effective command and control, raising the risks of accidental launch or unauthorized use.
- Employment concepts would be radically different that assumed in the East-West context. In this context, chemical and biological weapons would be used selectively for a particular advantage, and in this sense they would not be weapons of last resort, but battlefield weapons,
employed early in a conflict in a manner that would create significant, possibly crippling political and military problems. (Emphasis added)

By February 1998, the CIA was predicting that in 2010, the greatest threat to NATO would be the prospect of hostile states, terrorist groups, fanatic religious cult or any other extremist groups that would use, or threaten to use, WMD weapons against coalition forces or civilians. Potentially it identified the Russians, Iraq, Libya, Iran and Syria as examples of such "future" threats, and noted that new NATO roles would require then to face "inadvertent exposure" to WMD. It noted" NATO superiority may have actually increased the threat of WMD use, since less developed countries or extremist groups may feel driven to develop and use WMD to achieve the desired impact, deter conflict or prevent retaliation.

Force capability requirements

Based on the intelligence estimates put together in the first phase, the DPG identified a range of capabilities necessary to support NATO's overall political -military objectives for dealing with proliferation, discouraging the acquisition of NBC weapons and related delivery systems, deterring the threat or use of such weapons, and to protect NATO forces and territory from NBC attack. Capabilities in a number of key


65 Winston Wiley , Associate Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, at the 1998 European Symposium, National Defense University, 10 February 1998.
areas like active and passive defence, counter force (referred to cautiously as response capabilities) intelligence and command and control were identified, and include the following 66:-

Significantly, the response in active defense will result in a “balanced capability” to protect against aircraft, and tactical missiles - both cruise and ballistic. For the near term, emphasis is on a robust point defence (limited geographical areas like airfields and ports) regional contingencies, and specially to the planned improvements of the Integrated air Defence programme and to upgrades to ATBM systems like the Patriot. For the longer term, the DGP also recognizes the advantages of a multi tiered capability to intercept longer range missiles at a greater height and range.

Considerable emphasis has been placed on Passive defences, and operational capability in a NBC environment. These would include capability to detect and identify NBC agents from a distance.

In response or counter-force category, the DGP assessment emphasized the need to possess a range of military capability to deny an enemy the ability to strike at NATO forces with NBC weapons. The identified capabilities to project a credible deterrent posture included the ability to conduct strikes against hardened and underground NBC targets.

66 Ibid. p.124.
This would require enhanced penetration capabilities and the ability to contain collateral effects. Also considered critical was the ability to conduct operations against mobile targets (emphasis added).

Regarding intelligence capabilities, the DGP assessment emphasized the central need for reliable and timely strategic and operational intelligence to ensure the effectiveness of NATO's defences. Improved strategic intelligence - focusing on the "strategic personalities" or the strategic signatures of particular countries indigenous NBC capabilities and external supply relationships, as well as its employment doctrine and command and control vulnerabilities - could be used as an effective tool in both preventing and protecting against NBC proliferation. On the battlefield, accurate and timely operational intelligence, especially wide area surveillance, was considered vital to locating targets and providing sufficient warning of attack.

In battle management, the emphasis was on an effective systems architecture for command and control from timely political consultations, to combat situations. An advanced survivable Alliance capability to coordinate and integrate NATO military operations, from active and passive defences to the execution of response options to counter the proliferation threat.

The report also stressed that these core capabilities would have to be integrated for maximum effectiveness, and called for the proliferation
threat to be reflected down the way to include doctrine, training, and planning. This would lay the basis for continuing improvements in NATO capabilities and threat assessment. Findings also gave approval to existing programmes - such as layered TMD - and also suggested supplementing these efforts with further initiatives. Alliance Defence and Foreign Ministers accepted the DGP’s findings and reaffirmed several key principles. In particular they underlined that Defence Posture should provide for Alliance cohesion, project reassurance in crisis, and protect NATO’s freedom of action in the face of a growing proliferation threat.

Following the enunciation of the Strategic Concept of 1999, it is clear that these efforts have been strengthened. The document notes the launching of a new WMD initiative that builds upon work since the Brussels Summit to improve overall Alliance political and military efforts in this area.

"" The WMD Initiative will:

- Ensure a more vigorous, structured debate at NATO leading to strengthened common understanding among Allies on WMD issues and how to respond to them;

- Improve the quality and quantity of intelligence and information-sharing among Allies on proliferation issues; support the development of a public information strategy by Allies to increase awareness of proliferation issues and Allies’ efforts to support non-proliferation efforts;

- Enhance existing Allied programmes which increase military readiness to operate in a WMD environment and to counter WMD threats;
strengthen the process of information exchange about Allies' national programmes of bilateral WMD destruction and assistance;

- Enhance the possibilities for Allies to assist one another in the protection of their civil populations against WMD risks;

- Create a WMD Centre within the International Staff at NATO to support these efforts. The WMD initiative will therefore integrate political and military aspects of Alliance work in responding to proliferation, arms control, and disarmament.

Shades of the past were apparent when the U.S Secretary of Defense read a lecture to NATO allies on the need to shore up their defense budgets, R&D and force projection capability. As he pointed out, NATO would be "increasingly be called upon to promote regional stability, prevent conflict, reduce threats, and deter aggression and coercion beyond our borders" Europeans were spending $11 billion collectively on research and development, while the US was spending close to $33 billion. Warning that if defense budgets continued to decline, "It will be the peace and not the dividend that will increasingly be at risk". The blunt message was, that if Europeans wanted a greater say in world affairs, it needed to commit the resources, more especially to counter the threat from WMD. In countering the threat therefore, the various options identified revolved around coordinating the response of member countries. The message was, as a analyst noted, political leaders needed to think differently about the

proliferation threat. "The views of the national leadership in several key allied areas are not well defined. The argument that traditional non-proliferation approaches are sufficient to meet the challenge may prevail in some capitals, especially when decision makers are confronted with hard policy or fiscal choices."\(^{68}\)

The US shift into a greater stress of expanding the role of nuclear weapons has already been outlined. How this is written into NATO doctrine is less easy to fathom, given that "consensus" underlies all NATO formal communications. The following paragraphs outlines the NATO posture, as well as the doctrines of the most important member countries in response to the threat.

**Countering the Threat**

*Centrality of nuclear weapons*

What is unequivocal is the continued reliance on nuclear weapons as a strategic underpinning of the Alliance's Force Posture. The *Strategic concept* interestingly, while reaffirming that nuclear weapons were meant to demonstrate that aggression "of any kind" was not a rational option, also affirmed that in addition to providing the supreme guarantee of the Alliance by the coupling with the strategic forces of the US, also noted that the "independent nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which

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have a deterrent role of their own "which contributed to the overall
deterrence and security of the Alliance.". This removed those forces out of
the START process, as separate forces to be counted up, and tied them to
the overall NATO Framework. Curiously, it also noted that while
substrategic forces could be reduced, these will not only be the essential
link with strategic forces of the US, but also that while only nuclear
capable aircraft remained, but it would if necessarily be supplemented by
off shore systems. US nuclear weapons would continue to remain in
Europe even as the "No First Use" was not adopted.

The area of tactical nuclear weapons remains, as before, one where
little information is available, and it's rationale in operational terms had
always been less cogently argued, in spite of the various gradations of
deterrence that had once formed the cornerstone of deterrence. Given the
weakness of Soviet conventional forces, the Canberra commission had
noted that the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact Treaty Organization
removed whatever rationale there had ever been in deploying tactical
nukes. Analysts have observed that withdrawing tactical weapons from
Europe would reinforce deterrence by removing a provocative category of
weapons, and thus not only raise the firebreak between conventional and
nuclear responses, but also prevent "potential proliferation" as a
consequence of NATO expansion.
Today there is very little information on how much of this stockpile on both sides has actually been destroyed. According to some analysts, the eventual US tactical arsenal will consist of 600 B61 bombs, and 350 sea launched cruise missiles. Russia's pre 1991 tactical arsenal is understood to reach the end of their design lives by 2003, while the post 1991 is unknown and depends on production capability. As of now the US is understood to have 500 in Europe and around 7,000 in storage while Russia may have between 6-13,000 warheads (some put this at nearly double this figure).

Nuclear strategy was further explained on June 3rd 1996 when NATO's new military strategy MC400/1 was approved at the North Atlantic Council meeting which committed the Alliance to maintaining a reduced, but more flexible nuclear posture, retaining however the doctrine of 'first use'. Nuclear weapons are said to have a "stabilizing" influence in Europe, guarding against uncertainties (like WMD proliferation). And serving as a hedge (here echoing US policy) in case a substantial threat reemerges. In the case of sub strategic weapons, while the number of dual capable aircraft (kept on alert) are reduced, they will however be given the capability to re-deploy rapidly from one command to another. This is

71 The figure generally given by Russian military figures is that the "non strategic component forms 40% of the total stockpile. See Krasnaya Zvezda, 5 December 1996.
reinforced by the continuation of a parallel modernization programme for
"Weapons Storage and Security Systems " (WS3) This had been initiated
in 1987, and allows the storage of nuclear warheads under the concrete
hardened shelters where aircraft are housed. Though the numbers have
since been reduced, these vault systems will become operational in five
countries -- Germany, Belgium , Netherlands, Belgium , and most lately
Italy. Italy has come into prominence following the shift to the south that
was apparent in the restructuring that had been set in train in 1991.
Following the outbreak of the Yugoslav crises and the formal involvement
of NATO , AFSOUTH has gained in importance, to become one of the
primary commands of NATO. 72 . Italy 's Aviano airbase received its first
WS3 Greece will also host nuclear weapons at Araxos airbase. Turkey will
receive nuclear weapons storage vaults at three airbases, with Incirlik
possibly likely to receive the most73.

The nuclear B-61 free fall bomb is the only type of US tactical
weapons still deployed in European soil , and is one that is said to be of
great tactical flexibility. The yeild as well as the time and type of detonation
can be chose in flight. The weapons can be used by aircraft flying in
altitudes as low as 15 metres. In Europe, Tornados, F-16's and F-15E's are

72 AFNORTHWEST was commanded by a British four star general, while AFCENT was
commanded by a German four star general, and AFSOUTH by an American four star
admiral.

73 US-Nuclear NATO Arsenals 1996-97, A British American Security and Information
Organization- Berlin Information Centre for Transatlantic Security Research Note,
February 1997.
among the aircraft certified to carry this weapons. The secret modernization of the B-61 has already been referred to in earlier chapters. This is an earth penetrating weapons and can be used in striking deeply buried underground installations.

Planning at the strategic level (as before) echoes the US "Living SIOP" and flexible targeting options that is inherent to the new targeting scenario. In NATO it emerges as "Adaptive targeting capability" allowing major NATO commanders to develop target and nuclear weapons employment plans for short notice during contingency or crisis from pre-developed data bases about possible targets. In addition to the national nuclear forces of France, Britain and the US, there are still NATO specific forces, based all over Europe and with widespread participation.

The continuing reliance on nuclear weapons was apparent during the talks on expansion to the east. The agreement saw NATO admitting to "the three no's" (no intention, no plans and no reason) to deploy nuclear forces on the territory of new member states, no creating of new dumps for nuclear weapons and not to re-equip the old Soviet era ones with weapons. According to Alliance sources, it also reserved the right to use existing military infrastructure in new member countries integrating it into NATO air defence and military communications systems. As for the

74 This exact dimensions of the weapon is available on the web site of the Federation of American Scientists, and the site maintained by the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists http://www.bullet-atom.com
development of new infrastructure, if significant combat forces are not stationed there on a permanent basis, there would be no need to add new infrastructure. However NATO reserved the right to station forces there in the event of an Art 5 situation of a peacekeeping scenario\(^\text{75}\). Moreover, in spite of Soviet insistence, NATO refused to make this a legal obligation, preferring therefore to keep its options open. The fact that all military airfields are at any rate open to NATO aircraft, and the impossibility of monitoring the movement of dual capable aircraft, at any rate makes these negative assurances a sham.

Table 3.1

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\(^{75}\) Interfax in SWB/SU/2921 B/10, 17 May 1997.
Conventional Force Posture

NATO conventional forces structure will consist of Main Defense Forces, Reaction Forces, Augmentation Forces, including multinational forces of all types – land, air, maritime. The Rapid Reaction Forces will themselves be divided into Immediate and Rapid Reaction forces, comprising contributions that will include national and multinational forces. The command of the prestigious Rapid Reaction force for ACE (Allied Command Europe) went to the UK, which would be the node for a flexible deployment of a range of forces. Main Defence Forces which would form the bulk of the forces, would remain to ensure traditional functions of the Alliance while Augmentation forces would be called up in a crisis situation. The core is obviously the two Rapid and Immediate action forces, which would provide the Alliance with a wide range of employment options. The emphasis on further restructuring was to reflect the threat, which would be of a range, variety and unpredictability – thus the interregional reinforcement, the Air command Control systems, and armaments cooperation was to be enhanced by the Conventional Armaments Planning Systems (CAPS) and logistics support arrangements.

Apart from this, the main thrust of reorganization is around multinational forces. For instance, the Franco-German Corps, and the German-Polish–Italian division. This had meant that the forces of Germany have been effectively distributed throughout Europe, as well as allowed foreign forces to operate in Germany—particularly the French. The key words of restructuring are flexibility, sustainability, reinforcement, mobility and a high level of C3I.

The Strategic Concept of 1991 had laid down the basics for the massive reorganization that led to the three major commands being reduced to two—The Supreme Allied Commanders for Europe and the Atlantic—and with three subordinate commands under Allied command Europe. The shift as it progressed was inevitably to the Southern command, with the once prestigious Central command being reduced (with five subordinate commands merged into two)\textsuperscript{77}. The headquarters of the Southern Region (AFSOUTH) is located in Bagnoli near Naples, Italy, and was naturally the main staging area for the deployments to the Gulf, and following the restructuring, it became the most prestigious command in the NATO area. The command in surface area is one of the largest of NATO’s regions, with axes of over 2,000 km and 3,600 km (N-S, and E-W

\textsuperscript{77} Final Communiqué, Defence Planning Committee, Brussels, 12-13 December 1991.
respectively) encompassing over two thirds of the total NATO European land area and crossing four time zones. 78

Once the Balkans began to exhibit increasing instability, the Command progressed from being the Southern Region to southern front, and then the southern flash point. Its naval forces (Standing Force-Mediterranean) under the command of Commander Naval Forces Southern Europe (COMNAVSOUTH) were activated. Comprising units from eight NATO nations, it was called into action barely two and a half months later to assist in implementing US Security Council Resolution 713 and 757 which called for sanctions and enforcement. Subsequently, AFSOUTH became the nerve centre for the UN mandated "no fly zone" over Bosnia, and later the "Sky Monitor" which had Early Warning aircraft flown by aircrew from eleven NATO nations monitoring the embargo.

In December 1992, the Defense Planning Committee approved the establishment of a new land headquarters (LAND-SOUTHCENT) and air headquarters in Greece. A new multinational division was also raised as its contribution to the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps. This brought together Greece, Turkey, and Italy.

Restructuring national forces for “force projection”

These changes and shifts are also incorporated into the doctrines of the main nuclear weapon states in Europe.\textsuperscript{79} It is important to note here the new Strategic Concept of 1999, states that in the interests of interoperability and adapting to the diverse challenges of the new security environment, “Increased attention must be paid to human factors (such as common approaches to doctrine, training and operations procedures) and standardization”. Thus the NATO concept called upon “fair contributions to the full spectrum of Alliance missions”. This clearly required that major nations restructure their forces in keeping with the Alliance requirement of flexibility, swift deployment, and adhere to the principles of the alliance in maintaining non proliferation objectives. Therefore, the doctrines of the important states in the Alliance is required to be in harmony with that of the Alliance as a whole.

In France, the end of the cold war had seen the freezing of new programmes like the Hades, even as a moratorium on nuclear testing was announced. The Chirac group backed discreetly by defense industries opposed all these measures on the grounds that they were reducing France’s capability to address the “new threats” from WMD and missile

\textsuperscript{79} For a commentary see \textit{Le Monde}, 27 February 1995.p.3.
proliferation. The presentation of these new threats were done ably by France's premier strategist Francois de Rose who in *Le Monde* of 9 November 1990, pointed to the danger from WMD proliferation from the south, while Pierre Lellouche, councillor to Jacques Chirac was observing in *Foreign Affairs* that an aging 500 million Europeans would be confronted by some 4 billion people suffering from a volatile admixture of acute poverty and demographic explosion, not to mention religious fundamentalism. “New” dangers posed to the developed world included the proliferation of WMD in the hands of these unreliable actors in an arc from “Algeria to Pakistan”81, with European capitals very soon being potential targets for these weapons. The message was clear - France had to co-operate with the US in non-proliferation measures, even while maintaining a “state of the art, safe and effective nuclear deterrent” (which meant continued testing) and developing with the Americans, a missile defense system that would effectively provide a shield from these uncertain threats82. Rather later than in most countries, the missile proliferation threat had however arrived with renewed vigour in French defense and budget debates.

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80 It is worth noting that proliferation issues had not previously had much of a following within France, but since recently various writings have examined the problem in detail, including a comprehensive atlas on civil and military nuclear programmes. For more details see Tara Kartha "French Strategic Doctrines" Delhi Paper No 7, Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, 1998.


82 Ibid.
This led to a division among strategists on the future role of nuclear weapons, with the military, defense industry and strategic experts (mainly identified with the Gaulists) arguing as Yost notes, for a more "operational" arsenal, which included developing nuclear forces capable of being used if necessary, with control and discrimination particularly in countries of the "South" that would field WMD. Among those arguing for a more flexible capability was General Vincent Lanata (then Chief of Staff of the Air Force) who called for variable yield weapons for a new missile, and Admiral Lanxade who tilted towards a resumption of testing - the debate after all was linked at most levels (unsurprisingly) to the need to stay out of the CTBT process. On the other hand supporters of the "less operational" approach - notably among the Socialists, were more traditional in their approach, and preferred the path via the CTBT and a greater supervision of transfers of fissile material to achieve the goal of non-proliferation.

More seriously, the issue of proliferation was taken up as the foremost threat scenario by the "White Paper". Prior to this, and suggestive of the trends in the debate is an unusual report published by the National Assembly which notes the relative banalization of civilian nuclear technologies and their diffusion in countries like Pakistan, Israel, South Africa and India, and notes the role of the Chinese in assisting proliferation.

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84 Ibid.
It also noted that should diplomatic efforts fail, the country "should not neglect the means to prevent them militarily."

However, unlike the US, even those tending towards the more "usable deterrent" were rather more cautious about the actual scenario of use, preferring to talk of a capability to evolve new forms of deterrence in the new environment, rather than endorsement of a doctrine that would allow operational employment. While the word "counter proliferation" is anathema in French circles, - bringing with it as it does an erosion of the traditional notions of deterrence - it is however an implicit part of the new White Paper, albeit in a somewhat hazy form.

Table – 3.2
French Nuclear Forces - 1998

<table>
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<td>Super Etendard</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>SLBM's</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>6000</td>
<td>6x150kt</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M4A/B</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M45</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>6000</td>
<td>6x100kt</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


On 5 September 1995, France broke a unilateral moratorium and resumed underground nuclear testing with the first of eight tests, which was to allow the country to go in for laboratory testing, and secondly, to complete the certification of the TN75 warhead. Though the TN-75 warhead had been sanctioned in 1984-85 by Defence Minister Quilès who tasked the Commission for Atomic Energy to design a miniaturized nuclear warhead (which was eventually tested 22 times, and pronounced as virtually invisible to radar\(^{86}\)) the fear that the French were moving towards a usable deterrent, (or mini nukes) was enough to raise a storm of international protest (from which the British and German voices were noticeably missing) which may have been a factor in eventually stopping tests at six. At the end of the tests, France announced several policy reversals (some of which had already been in the pipeline from at least 1992), but had undoubtedly achieved her objectives. These objectives on a broader national security canvas were more clearly outlined in the White Paper that was presented by the Chirac government.

The 1994 *White Paper* – the first strategic review in over 22 years - identifies French interests as “global” rather than a patrimonial character\(^{87}\).

The threat scenario is predictably vague, and after noting uncertainty in the FSU, identifies the “proliferation threat “ as a priority, noting that


\(^{87}\) More practically, the White Paper noted that with 82% of imports and 56% of its exports outside the community being transported by sea, the importance of keeping sea lanes open was a vital interest to the country
rudimentary fission arms can be produced without any testing whatsoever. The milestone report said that "proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical mass destruction weapons, whether or not connected with ballistic vectors, sets new problem, to French defence system, both for the protection of territory and for that of the French forces deployed abroad. This challenge moreover concerns most European countries of the Atlantic Alliance."

Defense policy outlined six possible scenarios where French forces might need to be involved with the most significant being a regional war where the enemy might use the threat of WMD to ward off intervention by NATO forces. These threats could emanate from the territory of the former Soviet Union or at a later date from the southern arc of Africa (especially Algeria). This type of conflict was considered to be more likely in the short and medium term, and may entail the use of missiles in "reprisal" attacks. In another scenario, France might act to defend vital interests in case of a nuclear threat to Europe, and by extension to France. Such a conflict could again involve Europe, or in the longer time frame (more than 10 years) could include the Mediterranean countries, and the Near and the Middle East. Implementation of bilateral defence treaties, peacekeeping operations, and the resurgence of Russian power were the other threat scenarios advanced though at lower levels of probability.

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Notably, the most probable missions all identified the incidence of missile capability in the hands of an enemy - largely NBC but also nuclear armed 89. Weapon proliferation was a key dynamic shaping the security environment, and it was within this that French forces would be called upon to act, either unilaterally, or in conjunction with international or Alliance members. In response to missile proliferation, the White paper notes the necessity of missile defences, which will be given priority.

France embarked on an exercise to give her forces a credible force projection capability. Key programmes are tied to force projection were carried forward in spite of a defence crunch. Procurement of four new generation SSBN's to be equipped with M45 MIRV'ed missiles will continue, while the Rafale will be fitted out in a nuclear role to replace the Mirage 2000. A further procurement of two new missiles - the air to ground "enhanced ASMP" and the M51 SLBM makes for a significant increase in long range assets. The most significant increases are in space and intelligence assets, with spending on space raised (by 11.7% to FFr 4.5bn)

As the new Military Programme Law (Loi de Militaire) is implemented French forces in the next century will essentially be along the following lines.

89 Ibid.
• French strategic nuclear forces will essentially shift to the sea, with the air component a vital input into the navy’s force projection capability. This would possibly have a "pre strategic" quality, thus giving added flexibility to operations far away from home territory.

• The Sea based element will consist of four SSBN's (Triomphant class), carrying TN75 stealthy warheads on the M45 missiles (which is reported to have a range of 6,000km). In 2010 this will be replaced by a new missiles the M51 with possibly a new warhead called the TNN. One or two submarines would be at sea at all times, and a third during a crises.

• The air component presently dominated by the Mirage 2000, would be replaced by the Rafale. At the end of the life of the ASMP, it will be replaced by the enhanced ASMP.

• Aircraft refueling capacity will be increased from 11 to 14 in 2002, with a possible 16 later, and four Astarte airborne command posts.

• The army will also come down as the decision to end conscription will mean a 36% cut in the Army, 24% for the Air Force and 19.2% for the Navy.

• In terms of equipment, the army shifts to a more light and projectable force, while the navy will retain its nuclear attack submarines as before, and in the light of the slow pace of the Future Large Aircraft, will possibly also retain 2 aircraft carriers.

_The United Kingdom_ like France, has its own nuclear forces (tied to the US) and has extant overseas territories – some 14 at present – and a number of foreign policy commitment which demand a certain freedom of maneuver. It is generally accepted by renowned British analysts that wars
will no longer be wars of survival but "wars of discretion"\textsuperscript{90}. Small such conflagrations are expected to erupt in Europe along the Russian periphery, and in the Southern rim of NATO. It is accepted that British forces could be deployed more and more for peacekeeping/enforcement operations. This was underlined by as a study done for the British House of Commons Foreign Affairs committee which viewed NBC and missile proliferation as a serious security threat directly or more likely to the British Expeditionary Forces. The Committee identified the counterproliferation debate as comprising two aspects\textsuperscript{91}. Firstly the defensive, which would mean the development of systems of anti ballistic missiles and secondly, the offensive - the preemptive use of military force against a suspected site of WMD development. With regard to defensive measures, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office stated that "The UK's first priority must be to continue and strengthen cooperative efforts to prevent proliferation or, if it occurs to reverse it through diplomatic means. But His Majesty's Government recognizes that these efforts may not always be successful. We have therefore encouraged agreement within NATO, endorsed at the recent Summit, to develop an overall Alliance policy framework which will examine the implications of proliferation for the defense planning and capabilities of NATO and consider what additional capabilities may be


needed 92. In assessing offensive action against a proliferant, the Foreign Secretary stated that "I would not exclude that as a possibility. It is a last resort action but clearly one cannot exclude it" However the Committee noted that it was unlikely that a high degree of consensus would ever be gathered for such a course of action. Besides this, the committee recommended that such action should be treated with the utmost circumspection. While the Treaty based regime approach was considered the most effective approach , nonetheless in the light of limitations to that approach, the Committee called for other means to buttress the non proliferation treaty regimes by action short of military intervention 93

Defense Secretary Malcolm Rifkind even while halving the WE-177 stockpile, (all short range weapons) however kept nuclear weapons central to British Defence Policy. He does not see this as any way contributing to proliferation world wide, which according to him is motivated by regional issues. Analysts cite that few are willing to bank on the fact that Japan or Germany would remain non nuclear, in the event of an American withdrawal or reduction of commitment 94. The UK has been careful to disassociate British nuclear weapons from any extra -European rationale, even while calling for "other tools and policies - from strategies of denial to direct defenses...". British nuclear weapons find their rationale in a

92 Ibid,
93 Ibid p.xxxviii
European context, and to further this a Franco-British Joint Commission on Nuclear Policy and Doctrine was established to carry out a comparison of the two countries' approaches to nuclear deterrence, doctrines and anti-missile defences. This is the hub around which a new European nuclear policy will emerge.

The consensus demanded by the NATO Framework Policy is apparent in the new Strategic Defence Review (SDR) initiated by the Labour Party – (who has since moved away from its position on disarmament and the no first use clause). This moved the UK firmly to a force capable of power projection in Europe or anywhere else. The Strategic Review noted the new realities that included not only instability inside Europe (Kosovo) but also the "dangerous regimes" armed with conventional weapons as well as ballistic missiles and WMD capabilities. The Paper notes that British vital interests were not confined to Europe. Vital interests demanded protection to international trade. Exports formed a higher proportion of GDP than either US, Japan, Germany or Japan. It also noted that the post cold war security environment had seen a higher commitment of British troops on operations in various cases including Northern Ireland and the Gulf War.

British conventional forces are slated to be readily available for "out of area" operations in regional crises. As the Review notes "Our future

military capability will be built around a pool of powerful and versatile units from all three services which would be available for operations at short notice (The Joint Rapid Reaction Forces) .. from these we will put together the best force packages- with real punch and protection – for particular circumstances. To make this work we will also need to improve our strategic transport, operational logistics, ... and our deployable command and control arrangements96 Two deployable divisions – one based in the UK and one in Germany would be available for these operations. As one commentator noted that British forces would be able to deal with two separate foreign crises simultaneously, a “middle power strategy- aimed at dissuading one dictator from taking aggressive action because Western troops were tied up elsewhere 97.

On nuclear issues it finally decided to follow the same path as previous governments in spite of claims of having reduced operationally available warheads were to be reduced from 300 to 200. In 1996 it has been declared that the UK's arsenal would include "less than 300 operationally available "warheads, and the following year that 65 Trident missiles would be bought from the US. The SDR opted to reduce this to 58 missiles to be bought. IT also fulfilled the pledge that the Trident would note deploy more warheads than the Polaris, but as an analyst notes, this fell short of the freeze that had been promised. In effect, the new

96 "Strategic Defense Review" Chapter Five, Ministry of Defense, United Kingdom.
deployment of 48 warheads per SSBN actually exceeded the Polaris later deployed warheads of only two per missile which would mean a 32 warhead force. The equality only exists when the original deployment of three warheads a missile are taken into account - which means a 48 per SSBN\textsuperscript{98}. In essence the following is apparent

- An exclusively sea based deterrent posture
- No consideration of a "no first use" doctrine.
- Conventional forces are slated to be built solely for power projection and reaction in regional crises
- Emphasis on defences against the proliferation threat.

Table – 3.3
British Nuclear Forces 1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Designation</th>
<th>No Deployed</th>
<th>Year deployed</th>
<th>Range (km)</th>
<th>Warheads X yield</th>
<th>Warheads</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>Tornado</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1300</td>
<td>1-2x200 - 400kt</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR-1/1A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSBN/SLBM</td>
<td>Trident</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>7400</td>
<td>4-6 x 100kt</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Germany’s interests were best outlined by the White Paper of 1994, and the clear priority given by the Defense Minister to European integration, and within this context the stabilization of Easter European and

\textsuperscript{98} Bruno Tertrais” Nuclear Policies in Europe” Adelphi Paper 327, IISS, London.
Russia. The Minister also noted that while the preservation of the transatlantic relationship was a priority, it had to be ranked behind the primary goal of integration. Thus missile proliferation was not a high security issue for the new Germany, with a host of issues like refugees, migration, conflict and economic stagnation taking priority.

However the criticism leveled at the country on its non participation in "Desert Storm " (as fighting cadres) has led to a reassessment of it's foreign policy and a realignment of priorities. In 1992, the Chief of Staff of the Bundeswehr in an interview identified "the very unstable situation along the southern rim of the Mediterranean down to the critical zone of the Persian Gulf, compounded by fermentation in the southern part of the Former Soviet Union". The German BND (Budesnachrichtendienst) the intelligence agency, had identified that states to the southern rim of NATO would have delivery systems with a range of 1000km within eight to ten years. The threat is the possible fall out from an attack on the southern allies, since a direct attack is unfeasible. However, the threat from a disruption of oil supplies from the Middle East is seen as a serious threat.

The German *White Paper (1994)* recognizes the new larger role for Germany in the new context of both the unification and the end of the bipolar world. It notes "it is imperative that we cooperate with our partners and friends to counter new types of risk..." and further identified possible military measures not only within the Atlantic Alliance but also as a member of the United Nations. It noted that "The rise of continuing proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles makes stronger multilateral and world wide cooperation imperative."101 As a global and regional threat, it would require an all embracing approach from classic on proliferation and disarmament through development aid to politico military measures. Following the July 1994 Constitution Court clearance to Bundeswehr troops to operate in out of area missions, the possibility that these troops may come under missile threat would obviously weigh with Germany.

*Italy* has been increasingly assertive in fashioning her own initiatives independent of US policy, with the Sigonella incident in 1985 – when US forces were not permitted to seize the *Achille Lauro’s* terrorists, whose plane the Americans had forced to land in a Sicilian air base. Italy has since made significant initiatives in looking after her own interests in former Yugoslavia, and had a clear Mediterranean and Middle East policy. While this has since dulled due to quick change of governments, the awareness of what constitutes Italian national interest is discussed keenly

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by analysts. Analysts have pointed to a “arc of instability” stretching from the Balkans to the Middle East (around NATO’s southern rim) and a 1993 survey appears to point towards the general acceptance of such a theory. Asked to identify the most important threat to Italian security, members of the House and Senate defence committees ranked Islamic fundamentalism as the priority threat (50%) second instability in the Mediterranean (36 %) and only 20% identified the Balkans (then referred to as the powder keg of Europe) as a serious issue\textsuperscript{102}. In 1995, this perception of fundamentalism as a threat had grown with over 90% polled seeing it as a serious issue\textsuperscript{103}. Military experts have however been hesitant to openly identify a threat from the south, with at least one pointing out that no country other than Israel was capable of launching substantial operations against Italy\textsuperscript{104}. As noted earlier, Italy has since become the nodal centre for the most “operational” command – AFSOUTH. This means that Italy has been drawn into the out of area operations, and is also the most logical vantage point to keep an eye on the Mediterranean and well as the Middle East.

The "Defence" : "Extended" Air Defence

Extended Air Defence is a concept that has been familiar to NATO policy makers struggling to find a solution to the then growing Russian

\textsuperscript{102} Mario Zucconi gives these assessments in Michael Brenner (ed.), “ NATO and Collective Security” (Houndmills : Macmillan, 1998).

\textsuperscript{103} Ibid p.123.

\textsuperscript{104} Ibid p.123
capability in conventionally armed TBM's. This term implying a defence against elements from the air, rather than a dedicated missile defence scenario was always a more politically acceptable term, at first due to a fear of hurting Soviet sensitivities and later to a dislike of putting up a hostile wall against the Club-Med countries, who were the main trading partners and energy suppliers for European countries.

The Extended Air Defense concept grew out of fears of the threat from Soviet conventional missiles like the SS-21's with a range of 120km, the SS-23's with a range of 500km and the SS-12/22 with a range of 900 km. It was felt that these missiles would form part of the Soviet conventional attack, used in tandem or preceding a massive air strike by Soviet aircraft. Such a scenario was considered eminently possibly, since these missiles, though conventionally tipped, would derive their lethality from increased accuracy and speed. In 1983, these missiles were deployed in Czechoslovakia and East Germany, along with Scud-B's, FROG's and their associated radars. Active Defense against ballistic missiles was also considered during NATO's "Counter air" discussion in 1982 - 83. In 1983 the Military Committee assigned AGARD to investigate "ATBM concepts:. The resulting study, had important political repercussions since it provided decision makers with the first tentative guidance as to which ATBM Approach would be pursued.
The debate began around the fall of 1985, when the then German Defense Minister Manfred Worner began to argue for a "Extended Air Defense System" that would be a fitting response against the conventional TBM threat. Worner argued that the Alliance was bound to consider how a strictly non nuclear defensive system against conventional TBM's - cruise missiles, and aircraft equipped with stand off missiles - could be developed, with the goal being a point defense of militarily important NATO assess and not an area defense or a large scale protection of the population. This was an implicit admission that conventionally armed TBM simply could not carry the tonnage to pose a significant threat to population centres, and thus did not required the technology that was required when countering nuclear tipped missiles. The debate was supported from the outside by US Senator Pete Wilson an ardent votary of the SDI and Under Secretary of Defense Fred Ikle (a strong proponent of the need for " Euromissiles") who warned about " a conventional strike capability that could destroy a significant part of NATO's military capability.... they could launch devastating attacks on major military installations, such as airfields , command and control nodes, air defense installations, targets that heretofore could be attacked in a surprise attack only by crossing the nuclear threshold. In 1987, a British Statement on Defence Estimates


106 Testimony before the U.S Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic and Theatre Nuclear Forces, 24 April, 1986.
noted that the Soviet Union had a 8:1 superiority in short range missile launchers, stressing again the considerable superiority of Soviet *conventional forces*. Worner's initiative was endorsed by NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington, SACEUR General Rogers, and US Secretary of Defense Weinberger, Dutch Defense Ministers de Ruiter, during the meeting of the Defense Planning Committee in May 1986. For the first time, the concept of TMD (tactical missile Defense) was included in a ministerial communiqué and the NATO Air Defense Committee was assigned the task of leading further studies. Various possibilities of enhancing NATO's integrated air defense to enable it to deal with the full spectrum of air threat were to be investigated. Simultaneously the U.S Army Strategic Defense Command awarded multiple contracts for Theatre Missile Defense Architecture to European firms. In effect, the basic attempt was to "sell" SDI to the European threat, and thus undercut the growing opposition to SDI.

However opposition to this linking of a TMD to SDI, as well as the whole concept itself emerged with a RAND study which while demolishing the Soviet conventional threat in terms of tactical missiles, noted that TMD was simultaneously too demanding for SDI and paradoxically not demanding enough. It was too demanding in the sense that the trajectories for these missiles and the flight times, were too low and too short for most of the exotic, space based, boost phase mid course phase BMD technology. Moreover, while the concept of air defense was popular in
NATO, SDI was not. It also recommended that NATO should consider an "evolutionary approach" (improvements to air defense and passive air defense) to a problem that had yet to be clearly defined. In short, ATBM’s could not serve NATO’s needs as well as advance the SDI program\textsuperscript{107}. Thus the early debate was motivated by fears of a conventional attack alone, and not a nuclear attack, and secondly it was "sold" by those anxious to push the SDI framework to Allies. Difficult to evaluate here, but clearly visible was the interest in sharing R&D benefits.

Worth noting here are the reactions to the debate elsewhere. Israeli analysts naturally were against any system that would reduce the sanctity of nuclear deterrence and the hostage relationship. On the other hand they expressed an interest in the development of upgraded air defense systems like the Patriot showing a special interest in the German sponsored European Defense Initiative (EDI) which was aimed against aircraft, cruise missiles and short and long range theatre ballistic missiles\textsuperscript{108}.

China, busy with it’s four modernizations and in the throes of cutting its armed forces by one quarter remained disinterested in the ATBM debate, especially after arms control processes removed large numbers of troops from the border (100,000 by the Chinese and around

\textsuperscript{107}David Rubenson, James Bonomo "NATO’s Anti Tactical Ballistic Missile Requirements and their relationship to the SDI" \textit{Rand}, R-3533-AF.

80-90,000 by the Soviet Union). One analyst noted that even if China wanted to defend against SS-20's, it is not in the technological league to do so.\(^{109}\) Japan tended not to draw fine distinctions between nuclear and conventional attack (that was inherent to the ATBM debate) and simply relied on the nuclear umbrella. Paradoxically, Japan deep abhorrence of nuclear war made it one of the strongest supporters of pure deterrence by punishment. The rejection of any war-fighting strategy was apparent in the poor state of Japanese air defense and the fact that is armed forces were equipped with less than the latest hardware.\(^{110}\)

In the 1990's the terms "Extended Air Defence" has again assumed prominence, and, as brought out, is part of the recommendations of the Alliance Policy Framework on Proliferation. Repeating history are those programmes which encourage the tying in of European industry to the new research effort. However at present, Allied Co-operation is still shaky. The proposed MEADS (Medium Extended Air Defence System) has been facing fire. Touted by BMDO (the successor to SDI) as the symbol of Euro-Atlantic cooperation, it was to replace the Patriot in the next century, and was to be a cooperative programme with the US, Germany, France and Italy. Funding was to be in the ratio of 50:20:20:10 per cent. But in May 1996 the French President Chirac announced French withdrawal from the programme. This was less due to budgetary constraints than political

\(^{109}\) Gerald Segal, "China, Japan and ATBM's" in Hafner & Roper. Note .33.

\(^{110}\) Ibid. p.276.
reasons (the French were not happy, among other things, that the Southern Command was not given to a French General, nor were they satisfied with the structure of the CJTF)

The US, Germany and Italy went ahead and signed a MOU with effect from May 28, 1996 formally establishing the MEADS programme and governing its definition-Validation phase. But the US Congress began to back away from funding the additional 20 per cent that was now in the bill after the French withdrawal. However, other projects are in the wind, and European firms are still eager to share in the research.

French Defense industry have long been projecting the ASTER range of missiles as a Europe wide Air defense weapon, and it remains one of the largest military projects, followed by Rafale and Eurofighter. In the competition is the American Corps SAM, which is being pushed by the US for German deployment. France would infinitely prefer a European effort where the Corps SAM would be the centre piece. But equally there have been voices (usually out of government) who argue for a trans-Atlantic approach. The former Defense Minister Leotard argued that “such an effort can only be western. I do not even say European, because it presupposes a satellite network, a network of radar and types of weapons that are beyond the reach of individual states....It is necessary to work on it, but we will not be able to do it alone”

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Germany has a separate programme the TLVS, which was initiated in 1987 to replace the Hawk air defense systems. The staff target had called for a highly mobile, all weather capable system with high ECM resistance to be used against fighter aircraft as well as the entire air breathing spectrum. Given decreasing personnel strengths, it was also demanded that it should be able to operate with fewer personnel. The system is not unlike the Patriot but with a larger "footprint". The whole can be moved by C-160 aircraft, and initial studies have shown a high capability against shorter range tactical missiles. Germany does not enter the debate on missile defences, but the fact that it continues to place a priority on both domestic production as well as trans-Atlantic cooperation shows a certain consistency in thinking. However, Germans are usually under pressure from the US to "support" US research.

Britain is most supportive of TMD. In May 1997, a UK Ministry of Defence report was quoted as saying that Britain should begin developing a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system, including early warning satellites as well as ship- and airborne interceptors. The report, written by Bruce Mann, head of Whitehall's defense policy staff, was circulated to British defense chiefs. British officials noted that the report recommends that Britain should consider working with various systems.


(like the Airborne Laser system being developed by the Seattle-based firm Boeing) Unsurprisingly, the report was based on an intensive pre-feasibility study conducted by an international consortium led by British Aerospace. Its objective in the words of the 1995 Statement of Defense Estimates "to identify practical defensive architectures against a range of scenarios, taking account of costs, risks and time scales as well as technical and industrial consideration...also (to) take account of current and past American and British research in this area." Data from the report was used to generate several possible BMD architectures for defending the UK mainland and British forces based overseas. The report emphasized the close working relationship between the UK and the US in the missile-defense field and highlighted the UK's active participation in formulating NATO's response to ballistic missile threats. The MoD stressed the political and economic need for collaboration with Europe and the US.

Nonetheless, government officials remain hesitant on cooperation in TMD. However there are clearly interest groups. The Minister for Defence Procurement, the Rt.Hon. Roger Freeman in his June 1995 interview with The Times shortly before his appointment to the cabinet noted "I think there is a prima facie case for having a ballistic missile defence system."

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115 Research is already being conducted on the use of the British-designed, long-range, phased-array, multifunction electronically scanned antenna radar (MESAR), which will be installed on the UK's Horizon frigates. MESAR can track missiles "at tremendous range and with great accuracy." MESAR could be used in conjunction with an anti-missile system such as the US Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system.
The threat comes from the Cub Mad countries (in North Africa, and the Middle East including Libya and Iran) ... We have a ten year window before the UK effectively could be targeted from the Mediterranean and the Gulf. Government officials said British military commanders also want immediate action to be taken in order to counter future missile threats to British forces that are increasingly being deployed overseas on humanitarian missions.

In 1996, the Secretary of State for Defence, the Rt.Hon.Michael Portillo presented a strong case for the deployment of defences against ballistic missiles, noting that "none of use will want to deploy forces within range of hostile ballistic missile without affording them the best possible protection. Thus we need ballistic missile defence and we need to develop it jointly in NATO, with Europeans and Americans deciding together how best to respond to threats to our shared security interests". Shortly after this the UK government went on to announce officially its decision on the follow up to the pre-feasibility studies that had been conducted earlier. Shortly afterwards Admiral Abott, UK Command -in -Chief, fleet, NATO's C-in-c, Eastern Atlantic, noted "we need to address the awful truth that someone who cannot be coerced or dissuaded by diplomatic or economic means may one day wish to threaten and possibly use force against our


people", Abbot was also a votary of counterforce preemptive strikes against chemical facilities in Libya or Iraq and later warned that the Mediterranean areas were particularly under risk.\footnote{Defense News, October, 28-November 3, 1996, pp. 3, 32.}

However Mediterranean countries are rather more cautious in their assessments. At a WEU Assembly meeting in Brussels, Italy, which has been at the forefront in calling for missile defenses, demonstrated considerable caution. The Italian representative mooted the idea of including other non-European countries in the anti-missile system so as to stave off a fear that an “all NATO defence system would be used as a means of aggression and coercion.”\footnote{Mr Ando, Defence Minister of Italy, Ibid., pp. 35-36.} However, since then Italy is eager to take part in trans-Atlantic development programmes, as testified to by its inclusion in MEADS. Meanwhile NATO Exercises have been concentrating on the TBM threat. In 1994, Exercise “Dynamic Guard” in Turkey and the 1995 Exercise “Roving Sands” in the US, explored new avenues for BMD, and a thrust towards making counter force strategies more effective. Old technologies were put to new use – for instance aerostats were found to useful in providing early warning data for the low observable threat. Another important input was that co-location of defensive and offensive BMD elements in a single headquarters, and a Tactical Operations Centre, to allow an integrated response to attacks by the speedy distribution and analysis of intelligence information. Intensive use was made of electronic...
data links to allow intelligence and targeting information to be passed instantaneously between Patriot ATBM missile batteries, reconnaissance platforms, command headquarters, and strike platforms. F-15E strike aircraft were fitted with data links to allow them to receive targeting data in flight in digital form with co-ordinates of simulated Scud launchers passed to aircraft in 10 minutes. Also increased use was made of sensors, such as unmanned aerial vehicles, JSTARS and U-2R aircraft and intelligence satellites.\textsuperscript{120}

The recent air operations in Bosnia had added to this ability to bring together diverse platforms to synergise information. All NATO aircraft, satellite, and AWACS were coordinated from the 5\textsuperscript{th} allied Tactical Air forces Combined Air Operations Centre based at Italy. By 1996, the centre had already brought together a large investment in C3I technology that allowed imagery from UAV's, U-2R's, P-3 Orions fitted with video cameras projected onto large wall sized displays in the war room. The main limiting factor was the size of the area needing surveillance and relative scarcity of surveillance assets. Although there was never a requirement in the Bosnian scenario for Scud hunts, Serbian air defences proved remarkably effective, and counter force operations benefited from this synergisation.\textsuperscript{121}

\textsuperscript{120} http://www.cdiss.org.
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid.
Clearly, there was a clear shift of interests even before 1990 to the highlighting of the new threat. This chapter brought out the motivations towards this, which are complex - the continuance of the Alliance, the influence of the US, the interest of industry, and the undoubted fact that missiles of considerable potential lethality had been used in the Gulf War. However, the progress of events clearly points towards the fact that the "threat" is now well established, and is being acted upon by the most important members of NATO countries, especially those with their own nuclear forces to protect - and which are now being put forward as the "European guarantee" as well as a final national deterrent against the use of missiles and WMD by rogue states. A related response is that of missile defense, which once again appears to flow from that direction of US policy in this area. Missile defence clearly has more implications for Europe than the US, and though there is no immediate question of a Europe wide defense, the present thrust of research is towards theatre defense, and protection of troops in the field. Given that the "response" is clear, it now remains to assess the threat as seen from NATO, and review the nature and extent of proliferation in the world outside the walls of NATO. The next chapter therefore presents the threat as seen from America and the capitals of the west.