CHAPTER VI

RELATIONS: VATTINITYAKARA AND VATTIKARITICKARA

Before I proceed further with the theories of relations let me make it clear that the format of Indian or rather the Nyaya Logic is based on two basic principles (i) Adhara-Adheya Dhava and (ii)samadhikaranysa. For, Nyaya Logicians cannot think of Logic without taking for granted the basic principle of Adhara Adheya Dhava or the substratum-superstratum relation. The notion of Samadhikaranysa constitutes the relation of identity, which we have already considered while discussing the relation of Evanesca.

According to Nyaya metaphysical theory Bravya or substance is the most important concept which is the substratum of all other concepts except Atyantadhava. For Nyaya Logicians all other concepts like Guna (quality), karma (action), Samanya etc., are dependent on Bravya for their existence. Bravya alone can exist in its own right. Bravya acts as the substratum of Adhara or Adhikaranysa of all others like Guna, Karma, Samanya, Visesha, and Samavaya.

So whenever we consider a relation between Bravya and Guna or Karma etc., it is always the relation between a substratum and its dependent.
Now we have already seen that the relation between Bravya and Samanya or Bravya and Visesa and the relation between Bravya and Samavaya are not one and the same, e.g. the relation between Bravya and Samanya or Visesa is Samavaya. But the relation between Bravya and Samavaya is Svarupa.

Though the relation is not the same, something is common in these two relations i.e. that both are the relations between substance or substratum and something depending on it.

On the other hand there are certain relations which are not necessarily concerned with the concepts like Adhara and Adheya or substratum and superstratum. In between two such relates there is no Adhara-Adheya Shava or substratum-superstratum relation. There we cannot say which one is substratum and which one is superstratum and dependent on the substratum. For example, if we take an example of a conjunction between two palms held together vertically, we cannot say that one palm is dependent on the other or there is Adhara-Adheya Shava.

Nayya Logicians distinguish two kinds of relations on the basis of the notions of Adhara or Adhikarana and Adheya. They are (i) Vrttiniyamsaka relation and (ii) Vrtyaniyamsaka relation.

Vrttiniyamsaka relation is a relation determined by
the substratum. It is described in terms of substratum and
superstratum or Adhara and Adheya. For example, if we say
Bhutala Ghatah or the pot is on the floor, here the relation
which exists between Ghatah and Bhutala is classified under
Vrttiniyamaka type of relations. Here Bhutala is
Adhara or substratum and Ghatah is Adheya or superstratum.
Here we know there exists the relation of conjunction or
Samyoga between Bhutala and Ghatah. Even in the case of
Ghatah and Chatatva also there is Vrttiniyamaka relation only.
In this case Ghatah is a substratum and Chatatva is a
dependent. Here there exists the relation of Samsaya between
Ghatah and Chatatva.

Vrtti means Adheya or a thing related with the
substratum. This whole theory about Adhara-Adheya Samsaya
goes well with the general viewpoint of Nyaya Logicians.
It especially goes well with their ontology. According to
them, to say that particular thing is related to any other
particular thing by the relation of substratum-superstratum
is quite different from saying that two things are just
related to each other. The first one they will call
Vrttiniyamaka and other as Vrtyaniyamaka relation.

Going further we may get the other possibility of
this Vrttiniyamaka relation. We can imagine two things
having one common substratum as we see it in the common
case of fire and smoke, both having one common substratum,
either mountain or a kitchen. Though both of them are related to their substratum by conjunction of Āyoga, they are related to each other by Vyapti relation. Here both of them are having Samanadhikaranya relation with each other. They have the same common substratum or Adhikarana. Here the relation of Vyapti is established only because there is Samanadhikaranya between those two.

Samanadhikaranya can be established between two things related to one substratum by Samavaya relation also. When, e.g., we take, say, Hitā Ghatā here Hitatva or blueness, and Ghatatva or potness both exist on Ghatā by Samavaya relation. Both are related to each other by Samanadhikaranya relation. The notion of Samanadhikaranya plays a very important role in the sphere of relations in Indian Logic. The relation like inference or causal relation is completely based on this very notion.

Gangesopadhyaya defines Vrttiniyamaka relation in

"अंकरत्वप्रत्यय्यवित्तमिति: वित्तेषस्य नयो यत्वेवस्य नयो नित्वेषस्य प्रक्ष्येत: भवति यत्र अर्थम्यान्तिविदित्तमिति: नित्तेक्षेतः समासोः प्रत्यय्यवित्तमाः: न "

(सतसीतलम् ।)
According to Gangesopadhyaya the Vrttiniyamaka relation is either determined by Adhara, i.e., substratum or Adheya, i.e., superstratum. Of course, it will be always the relation between Adhara and Adheya only, though it is determined by Adhara or Adheya. Because the term Adhara always takes for granted the term Adheya and Adheya also is meaningless without Adhara. He takes the same example of Ghata and Bhutala, where there is Sanyoga relation like that Ghata depends on Bhutala. In the same way he also tells that the relation between Gavya and Guna, Aritya etc., are also Vrttiniyamaka.

This classification does not work on the level of ontology only. Even we can apply the same model of Adhara and Adheya on the level of expression. When we try to consider the proposition, which has argument and its function, as its constituents. We can say argument is Adhara and the function is Adheya. When, e.g., we take a proposition like 'Table is black' 'is black' is Adheya. But if we take 'This table is black' then 'This' will be Adhara and 'table is black' will be its Adheya. In the same way, if we take it in a sentence form the subject will be Adhara and predicate its Adheya.

From all this discussions if we try to find out some Vrttiniyamaka relation, we can easily say that no Vrttiniyamaka relation can be symmetrical. It is always asymmetrical because
Both relations cannot be interchanged. That is in the above mentioned case Chata is not related to Bhutala same way Bhutala is related to Chata. Here Chata is dependent on Bhutala and Bhutala is Achara or substratum of Chata.

Secondly it is obviously not reflexive. Thirdly, it is sometimes transitive and some times intransitive e.g., if we say Bhutala Chatah and Chate Patah then Bhutala is Achara of Chata will be Achara of Pata also, which is Achaya of Chata. But if we say Bhutala Chatah and Chate Chattvam, I do not think Bhutala can be Achara of Chattvam.

On the basis of these characteristics we can somehow find out whether certain relations can be considered as Vrttiniyamaka relations or they are Vrtvaniyamaka relations.

On the level of things it is quite possible to make the distinction between Vrttiniyamaka and Vrtvaniyamaka relations easily. Even on the level of language it is very clearly mentioned which are Vrttiniyamakas and which are Vrtvaniyamakas.

But in the case of knowledge situation it becomes slightly complicated. when a thing is known to a person, the knowledge of a thing is related to both the sides. On the one hand it is related to the knower or a person who knows and on the other hand it is related to a thing. Now
knowledge is accepted as a Gunas and is related to Atman by Samavaya relation. And as Atman is Dravya it is Drhara of knowledge which is Gunas or quality. But knowledge of a thing is also related to a thing. But it is not related to the thing or object as a quality is related to a thing. Though the knowledge of thing is determined by a thing, it is different from a thing. And this knowledge is not entirely dependent on the object. There cannot be Drhara-drhaya-bhava or substratum dependent relation. The Nyaya philosophers thus give another name to 'the object and knowledge relation'. They call it Visaya-Visayā-bhava. For this object is Visaya and knowledge of the object is Visayā. Though it is an asymmetrical relation it is Vṛttanīyāmaka and not Vṛttinīyāmaka. Vṛttanīyāmaka relation can be both, sometimes asymmetrical and sometimes asymmetrical.

Even in the case of Upadhi like Karyata, Karayata Netu, Sādhvata etc., though it appears like Adhara-Adheya-bhava, because we use the preposition 'in', Nyaya logicians do not accept the Vṛttinīyāmaka relation between Netu and Netu or Karya and Karyata etc. Such pairs, therefore, are related according to Naiyayikas by Svarupa relation.

The other pair of relations, which could not be fit in the model of Adhara-Adheya-bhava is Nirūpya Nirūpaka Nambandha. The events such as cause and effect of Adheya-bhava

...
"Ahikaranata when expressed in language, the correlation in language is called Mirupa-Nirupaka-Bhava between two Nirupitas. Nirupitas are those which are described in terms of one another. The description acts as the adjective of other Nirupita. Now, e.g., if we want to describe the Banda as cause of the Karya Ghat, we will describe it as

कथित वाचन विशेषता भर्तर वर्ण

It refers to Karanata which is described by the Karya which exists in the Karya Ghat. In the same way we can describe Karya in terms of Karanata, i.e., कथित वाचन विशेषता सूचना वर्ण

In the same way we can also describe the situation of मुक्तिनाथविभावनेत्र वर्ण or पर्वतवहनविभावनेत्र वर्ण.

In this connection we can say that it is a one whole only imagined as two for linguistic convenience. If we want to draw a diagram it will be like this

[Diagram showing two circles labeled X and Y with a relation R between them]

X, and Y two Nirupitas and a is a relation of Mirupa-nirupaka-Bhava.
This relation as being symmetrical could not be explained in terms of Ādhere-Ādheya Dhava. The relations like these will come under Vṛttaniyamaka only. Thus we cannot draw a single watertight rule about which relations are Vṛttiniyamaka and which are Vṛttyaniyamaka. It generally depends on the context.