CONCLUSION
In this final section of the thesis, we would like to highlight certain conclusions that emerged during the course of our discussions. The preceding chapters are referred to, only briefly, in this re-statement.

Firstly, we noticed the interesting fact that even from the early days of philosophical thinking, the thinkers had identified language as a significant area of exploration, which might provide answers to the philosophical problems. The ancient Greek concept of 'Logos' stood for the faculties of thinking and speech, thus establishing, undoubtedly, a close affinity between the two. Aristotelian syllogism was a mode of perfecting a language so as to utter thoughts with clarity and precision. The ancient Egyptians, Indians and Islamic thinkers were all convinced of the centrality of the institution of language in the human affairs. Ludwig Wittgenstein, accepting this traditional legacy, accentuated its importance by erasing the distinction between language and thinking. He held that all the traditional problems of philosophy arise due to an erroneous understanding of the functioning of our language. We have scanned the various assumptions about the nature and functioning of language in the linguistic theories of past, some of them being similar to the position of earlier Wittgenstein. It
is by partaking in this historical tradition of linguistic research and in the history of European thinking in general, that Wittgenstein could give a 'linguistic turn' to the contemporary western philosophy.

Wittgenstein's stylistic mode of writing, which is an internal development of his nature of thinking and practice of philosophy, is an intentional choice made by him. It is a rarity in the history of philosophical discourse, after Nietzsche. His aphoristic, loosely connected writings, goes along his basic tenor of anti-theoretical thinking and the belief that philosophy is a mode of writing, a mode of discourse. Writing in short, numbered propositions so as to show the emphasis laid upon them in his exposition prevented him from giving adequate explanations of many of his technical terms and theories and making his works more difficult to understand and to interpret. It is noticed that in spite of his accuracy, his obscurity and lack of explicit argument in his writings is seen as a defect by some. It becomes closer to the mystical and prophetic forms of expression. We reached to the point that, Wittgenstein's language, gives the impression of ahistoricity by denying the 'Author' who exists in a particular time.

In his early period, Wittgenstein argued that language could express only the world of facts. The higher realms of values and spiritual life are
unutterable, about which one could only be silent. A clarification of this language, which pictures the existing state of affairs, is the only function of philosophy. In the later period language is relatively free in its expressive potential. Though, even in this period the higher realm of values was conceived as unutterable. Multiple methodological and socio-political compulsions can be seen as influencing this change. An interesting thing is that during both the periods the realm of silence is left to the free choice of the moral agent. A linkage can be perceived between the un-utterablity of metaphysics and the particular style of his writing. Behind the apparent radicalism of style and mode of thinking lurks the shadows of age-old dualism like phenomenon and noumenon. For Wittgenstein metaphysics is not amenable to reason and language, but it opens up a realm of wordless faith of the mystics.

Wittgenstein’s search for the ‘logical forms’ constitutes his foundation of logic and language in *Tractatus*. Without rejecting the ordinary language, he tries to discover the logical structure of language beneath its superficial grammatical appearance. But the central doctrine of *Tractatus* is concerned with the logically perfect language and demands for the employment of symbolism. This is an attempt to satisfy incompatible demands, which leads to incompatibility in *Tractatus*. 
Denouncing scepticism as a palpable nonsense, the answer to the relativism and radical Humeanism of the time, is given by Wittgenstein, not only in *Tractatus* but also in his later works. Picture theory and consequently the relation between language as a pure syntax and reality is justified only insofar as the later is logically definable. Thus keeping a clear distance from the logical positivists on the one hand and denying any kind of psychological link between language and the world on the other.

One interesting point, which came during the discussion, is about the ‘thesis’ which divides Wittgenstein’s philosophy into irreconcilable halves. This thesis of strict incompatibility and discontinuity between the early and the later Wittgenstein is incorrect, especially when both halves are in some agreement. It is worth remarking incidentally that his own self-criticism often provides the necessary key to his earlier views. In spite of this disagreement regarding the methods adopted in both the period, there is continuity of the conception of the nature and task of philosophy in his later writings. So later Wittgenstein’s rejection of the picture theory of language is the rejection of the atomism of the *Tractatus* not the logical aspect, which was never repudiated.
Wittgenstein may be credited for articulating in the *Tractatus* a number of the major issues which concern us today, such as for putting the problem of the harmony between language and reality onto the philosophical map, or for recognising the need for an explanation of the fact that language speakers are able, equipped as they are with finite minds and vocabularies, to understand an infinity of sentences. But the actual solutions, which he proposes, have long since been consigned to the archives of history of ideas.

This conception of language and reality shows the strains of ahistoricity where reality is considered to be made up of irreducible facts, stands motionless before thought. The historico-social dimension is completely neglected and any reference to the notion of development is avoided. But this need not eclipse the valuable contribution of Wittgensteinian approach as a therapeutic moment in the history of western thought.