CHAPTER V

THE SOVIET CENTRAL ASIAN EXPERIENCE OF THE WORKING OF THE PRINCIPLES OF SOVIET FEDERALISM AND NATIONAL AUTONOMY UNDER CONDITIONS OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION
CHAPTER - V

Soviet Central Asian Experience of the working of the Principles of Soviet Federalism under Conditions of Socialist Construction

A close look into the Constitution of the USSR revealed that the various constitutional measures and provisions on federalism preserved multi-national state structure and was a major instrument of regionalisation of the socio-economic levels of the backward nationality. Since Lenin's time the solution to nationality problem has been sought primarily through the equalisation of socio-economic conditions among republics. The goal was reiterated in the resolutions of every party Congress from the 1920s to the end of Stalin era. It was again reiterated in the CPSU programme adopted at the Twenty Second Congress in 1961. At the Twenty third Congress (1966) Brezhnev declared: 'In recent years much has been done so that the political equality of Union Republics and the friendship of the People of USSR are reinforced by an equalisation of the levels of their economic development'.

In his report on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the formation of the USSR in 1972, Brezhnev again reported: 'The goal of equalisation of levels of economic development of national republics has been essentially attained'.

The Twenty Fifth Party Congress (1976) declared that 'On the basis of the unity of planned socialist economy and the broad initiative of the republics... the further equalisation of levels of economic development would continue'.

The Concept of Development

The core concept of the equalisation is that the economies of backward republics should be raised to the level of more developed one. The Soviet Economic Encyclopaedia defines the 'levels of economic development' as the 'condition of the economy (Social Production) of a country (or group of countries or economic region) at a given historical point. The level of economic development is a general concept and is

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characterised by several set of indices: the production of the aggregate social product, material prosperities, per capita national income, the structure of social production (respective shares of industry and agriculture in the national economy, the share of production of the means of production, the share, volume, and rate of development of advanced sectors of industry), by the quantitative and qualitative level of employment of the population, level of exploitation of natural resources, by the organisation and efficiency of social production. A small country may possess a small economic potential yet, at the same time have a high level of economic development.  

Economic Development in Soviet Central Asia

In this analysis of the economic dimensions of Soviet Federalism, it is proposed to examine subsidies, revenues and transfer payment from the centre to assess the nature of relationship between the Centre and Repub-lican Government in the Soviet Federal System.

Before the October Revolution, Soviet Central Asia was a purely agrarian and cattle breeding area, with few cotton-ginning and silk spinning mills.⁵ Since the October Revolution, its economy and society has made considerable progress under Soviet rule. Soviet Central Asian people were assisted in many ways by the Central Government to achieve various goals of development.

Subsidies and Revenue

The Centre's initial move for development was to provide central subsidies to the republics. But the local leaders instead of exploiting their own sources of revenue relied more on subsidies, which affected the central budgetary income. So this system was abandoned and tax sharing system was introduced, under which the republican and the local governments were given a fraction of the national tax revenues collected in their territories. This system prompted the local officers

to see that the national revenues were collected efficiently. Yet, the revenue collections remained inefficient in the republics. The factors responsible for this problem were: there were too many taxes to be monitored as there were series of new taxes on agriculture, industry etc; the responsibility of revenue collection went to the Commissariat of Finance, which lacked proper organisation in the republics, and the officials in Turkestan failed to find enough qualified people to staff local finance departments and Soviet accounts complain of corruption and disorganisation. By 1928 when the first five year plan was introduced, the disarray increased in the budgetary expenditure. However, the revenue collections remained very slow to meet the challenges which proved very costly. This led to centralisation of the tax system in 1930. And since then the Central government has retained jurisdiction over most of the industries, agriculture, trade, transport and communications. Regional and local governments were no longer given the responsibility of the revenue system.

The national commissariat (Ministry) of Finance was required now to monitor the taxes. But the Finance Commissariat simply could not keep adequate and timely account of tax obligation of all the enterprises and ministries. These difficulties prompted further reforms in 1931. The republics were not assigned to collect the turnover tax (main source of income) and allocated of the receipts collected with their borders a percentage provided the means of balancing the republic's budget. The percentage retained in each region was recalculated in each year to narrow the gap between the expenditures planned for the republic and the locally generated revenue sources. The highest deductions went to the least developed republics, where other taxes such as agriculture and personal income taxes yielded too little to cover spending needs. As table 5.1 shows that the Soviet Central Asian Republics kept most 100% of the turnover tax revenues they collected, while more industrialised region as the RSFSR, the Ukraine, Latvia handed over roughly half of their turnover tax receipts to the all union budget.

7. Ibid., p. 55.

8. Bahry, n. 6, p. 56.
Table 5.1

Share of Turnover Taxes Retained by Republic Governments

Selected Years* (in per cent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Republic</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RSFSR</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>32.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>27.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirghizia</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>93.4</td>
<td>78.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadjikistan</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>80.1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenia</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>99.8</td>
<td>98.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Share of all turnover taxes collected in the territory of a republic. Percentages are from proposed budgets.
In fact, the tax served as a major device for redistributing revenues and financing economic development in less advanced regions.

**Inter-Government Transfers**

The subsidies and transfers had become a permanent feature of the Soviet federal structure. The low level of republics' share in the revenue has necessitated the centre to provide subsidies and transfers to the republics.

In the Soviet federal system three types of transfers were used to meet the expenditure needs at the republic level: "Subventions" or "grants in aid", "categorical or additional grants and means".

(a) **Subventions or Grants in Aid**

Subventions or grants in aid meant to cover operating expenditures and was chiefly used during the 1920's and 1930's to cover expenditures in less developed regions where local revenues were so limited that
even 100% deductions from all union revenues were inadequate to balance the budget. In the mid 1920's republic budgets in Turkmenia and Uzbekistan were all covered by subsidies from the centre.

(b) **Additional Grants**

Additional Grants were also used in 1920's and 1930's to help supplement regional budgets providing capital for duly planned investment projects in outlying regions.

(c) **Means**

It included some adhoc subsidies to cover emergencies such as a revenue shortfall caused by a bad harvest not anticipated in the annual plan or budget. It also covered finances for some joint activities of union and republics. 8

After examining the above variables it appears that Soviet subsidies to the Central Asian Republics

have stimulated greater economic growth. However, in terms of fiscal responsibility it has certain implications. This mode of aid made republics more dependent on the centre for getting larger subsidies rather than exploiting their own sources of revenue. The tax sharing systems provide republics proper incentive to be fiscally responsible. The greater the local industry, the more turnover taxes and profits potentially available for republic budgets. Federal units have not been utilising their productive channels efficiently. That's why they are facing the problem of low level of revenue share in the federal system.

Capital Accumulation

One important source of accumulation of capital was the abolition of feudal rent, abolition of the practice of sale and purchase of land (land ceased to be a commodity for private ownership), abolition of the payment of interest for the producer's credit and so on. Over 20 per cent of the value of agricultural production amounting to above 67 million roubles was thus saved per year which was sufficient to irrigate about 5,00,000 desyatin of land while the Tsarism during
the last 50 years of its rule did not irrigate more than 45,000 desyatin of land. 10

Through land-water-reforms of 1925-1928, both colonial feudal land relations were abolished and paved the way for redistribution of resources in favour of small farmers. Part of the surplus product could now be used by farmers for production directly. However, the major contribution for investment in agriculture came from the Soviet Government. For instance, during 1925-28 out of total expenditure on irrigation facility amounting to 29.8 million roubles 79.4 per cent came from central budget, 6.8 per cent from long-term credit and only 13.6 per cent from the budget of Uzbek SSR and from the republic. As many as 123 agricultural machines were brought to Uzbekistan in 1922 and by 1928 the number increased to 19.8 thousand. 11

Another method by which the Soviet leaders promoted capital accumulation in Central Asia was the


11. Ibid., p. 168.
continuous increase in purchase prices of cotton produced in Central Asia, index of which increased steadily to 122.18 in 1928-29 as against the price level of 1913. It was significant that the income the Uzbekistan received from the sale of cotton to the Soviet state was 6.5 million roubles in 1922-23 which was about 2 million roubles more than the income received at the prevailing international market price for cotton. This method of capital accumulation had beneficial effects on the development process in Soviet Central Asian Republics.

**Industrial Development**

As already mentioned, before the Revolution, in Central Asia, Industry was very much underdeveloped. It was during the first two five year plans that the first important stage of industrialisation began in Central Asia. Moreover, it was precisely in this period that serious attention was paid to the development of backward regions. The first two plans (and especially the Second Five Year Plan) built the initial plants for the cotton processing industry and its infrastructure.

12. Ibid.
One of the important objects of this plan was the attainment of self-sufficiency in cotton for the textile industry of the USSR. Secondly, it emphasized on the creation of a metallurgical industry in Central Asia. Other industries connected with the processing of agricultural products were also given attention. The growth was so rapid that the value of gross production in the food industry increased by 2-3 times, textiles industry 5-6 times, and the silk industry 5.4 times in 1923.13

Capital Investment on Industrial Development

One of the major factors enabling Soviet Central Asia to develop at a rapid rate has been the large amount of investment made every year. Since 1928, in Central Asia, as elsewhere in the USSR, a large share of national income was invested in industrial development. After


13a. About 90% of the output in Uzbekistan and 97% in Tadzikistan in 1937 was contributed by enterprises built or fully reconstructed during the first five year plan period, which shows the rate at which industry developed in Central Asia since 1928. M. Gafurov, "Social & Cultural Progress", in G. Abramov and M. Goncharuk (eds.), The Soviet Union: A Community of Fraternal Peoples, 1922-72, (Moscow, 1972), p. 108.
that industries developed very fast in Central Asia to some extent at a faster rate than the average for the whole country. The Centre's contribution formed a major portion of the investment during the First Five Year Plan as is shown in the following table. 14

Table - 5.2

Capital Investment in the First Five Year Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Investment in Thousand Roubles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power development</td>
<td>36254.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metal working industry</td>
<td>33724.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building materials industry</td>
<td>21288.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil industry</td>
<td>25145.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical industry</td>
<td>17415.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textile industry</td>
<td>25210.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leather footwear industry</td>
<td>6097.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Printing, Publishing &amp; Paper industry</td>
<td>3995.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food industry</td>
<td>42672.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton processing industry</td>
<td>37621.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The spurt in industrial production had been extraordinary. Gross industrial production increased by 422% in Uzbekistan and 780% in Tadjikistan between 1928-1940. In quantitative forms, the volume of industrial production multiplied so rapidly that in republics like Tadjikistan, where the initial level at the time of revolution was negligible, the growth was hundred times more than in 1913. In 1937, industry constituted 77% of the economy of the USSR and by 1942 industry was approximately at the same level in Uzbekistan (75 per cent). This was extraordinary in view of the fact that the disparity between the relative shares of industry in the USSR and in Uzbekistan was quite pronounced at the beginning of the Soviet period. The most important aspect of this development was thus the qualitative change in the structure of the industry. In place of the usual and traditional cotton textile pattern, new industrial enterprises came into being. The table 5.3 is self-explanatory both in terms of level of the output of Central Asian industry, and the structural changes brought about in this period (1929-40).

15. Ibid., p. 224.
Table - 5.3

Structure of Central Asian Industry in 1940

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Unit of Measurement</th>
<th>1913</th>
<th>1940</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mineral Fertiliser</td>
<td>Thousand tons</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>Thousand tons</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>1685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>Thousand tone</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gas</td>
<td>Million cubic meters</td>
<td></td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electric energy</td>
<td>Million Kilowatts</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>678.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultivators Tractors</td>
<td>Thousand pieces</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seed Tractors</td>
<td>Pieces</td>
<td></td>
<td>507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper</td>
<td>Tons</td>
<td></td>
<td>1903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cement</td>
<td>Thousand tons</td>
<td></td>
<td>267.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bricks</td>
<td>Million pieces</td>
<td>78.7</td>
<td>495.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glass</td>
<td>Thousand cubic meters</td>
<td></td>
<td>2237.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton fibre</td>
<td>Thousand tons</td>
<td>196.5</td>
<td>698.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton yarn</td>
<td>Thousand tons</td>
<td></td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton fabric</td>
<td>Thousand linear meters</td>
<td></td>
<td>117.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silk fabric</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td></td>
<td>6305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stocking socks</td>
<td>Million pairs</td>
<td></td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leather footwear</td>
<td>Million pairs</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>Thousand tons</td>
<td></td>
<td>65.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conserved food</td>
<td>Million tins</td>
<td></td>
<td>61.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
One of the major constraints for the industrial development of Central Asian region was the shortage of electric power. Soviet planners decided to give priority to the development of power generation.

Besides undertaking expansion of capacities in existing power stations, the task of building hydroelectric and thermal station was taken up. In 1923, the Fergana and Ashkhabad stations were commissioned and the Chirchik Electro Chemical and the construction of the Boasui hydroelectric station near Tashkent under the Goelro Plan was put into operation in 1926.18

The task of industrial development was facilitated by increased electric power generation. At the end of the Second Five Year Plan period, the Central Asian republics were generating a little less than 400 million kilowatts electric power. The total power capacity of the Central Asian republics at the time of initiation of the Third Five Year Plan was estimated at nearly 4 per cent of the total Soviet power production capacity.19 It was obvious that the huge deficits

in the budgets of Central Asian republics due to the large investments envisaged in the First and the Second Five Year Plans were beyond their capacity and resources.

The deficit in the budget of the Uzbek SSR in 1926-27, i.e., the year on the eve of the first plan was 30 million roubles. During 1924-28 more than 100 million roubles were advanced to the Uzbek SSR, 70 million roubles to the Turkmen SSR and more than 30 million roubles to Kirghizia from the USSR Sovnarkhoz fund to meet budget deficits.\(^{20}\) In the first two years of the Second Five Year Plan, the capital investment for industrial development amounted to 237 million roubles which is almost the same amount as was actually invested during the whole period of the First Five Year Plan. The total investment envisaged was 2455 million roubles out of which 6,40,900 roubles were required to be invested in the agricultural development, 1,048,500 roubles in industry, 3,47,800 roubles in transport etc. and 3,14,200 roubles for cultural development.\(^{21}\)


But according to Gosplan (Vol. II, p. 230) the total investment was 2078 million roubles (which included an investment of 132.7 million roubles in the development of the oil industry of Uzbekistan, Kirghizia and Tadjikistan), out of which 17.6 per cent were invested in the heavy industries and nearly 15 per cent on light industries. In the Second and Third Five Year Plans, the share of the republics and local councils increased to 1/3 of the total capital expenditure. A large portion of the all union funds for industrial development of Uzbekistan was directed to heavy industries. In 1934-35 the entire investment for oil, chemical and non-ferrous industries was made from the All Union budget, in energy sector 95-98 per cent, in metal working industry 87-92 per cent and for geological prospecting 77-90 per cent. While the increase in the value of industrial production for the whole of the USSR for the second plan period was 220.6 per cent, for the RSFSR it was 220.5 per cent, for the Uzbek SSR

22. Ibid.

it was 243.0 per cent and Tadjikistan 355.7 per cent.²⁴

In general, the rate of capital investment was also higher in the Central Asian republics than in the USSR. During the second plan, in the USSR capital investment increased by 2.8 times whereas in the Uzbek SSR it was 3.8 times.²⁵ The levelling off the role of the industry was made possible by an uneven pace of industrialization that favoured the Central Asian regions.

The pace of economic development increased during and after second world war. By that time all the Central Asian Republics had switched over to the rapid priority development of the heavy industry. Condition for more intensive expansion of heavy industry matured precisely in this period. However, diversification was still largely related to the main branch of specialisation, i.e. cotton industries. This could be classified as those relying directly on cotton and other agricultural commodities for raw materials, machinery, fertilizer etc. and finally those engaged in mining

²⁵. Ibid.
and mineral works. In this period, the region acquired heavy industry through the evacuation (especially to Uzbekistan) or many industrial enterprises from the European part of the USSR. The equipment from more than 100 industrial plants (in toto or in part) was shipped to Uzbekistan alone: coal industry, machine building and others. In Uzbekistan, this equipment provided the basis for 47 new industrial enterprises established during the inter-war period, more than half of which were located in Tashkent or its environs.26

By 1950s, the Soviet Central Asia was transformed from an agrarian and cattle breeding area to an agro-industrial region. This is reflected in the data on Central Asia, according to which during 1929-40 the annual compound rates of growth of industrial production in Uzbekistan, Tadjikistan and USSR were 5.9 per cent, 8.4 per cent and 7.9 per cent respectively. During 1941-50, the mean growth rates of gross industrial

output in the above two republics and the USSR were 6.2 per cent, 4.2 per cent and 5.5 per cent respectively.\textsuperscript{27}

The point that, however, needs to be emphasised is that much of their industrial development, especially before 1955, was financed directly by the union (rather than the local republic budgets).\textsuperscript{28} Almost all the capital goods imported into Soviet Central Asia during the period of industrialisation were brought from the European part of the USSR, through allocations from the central plan, in order to develop this region. Alec Nove and Newth concluded that this capital flow, coming in the main from Russia proper, represented a net gain to the republics, after making all allowances for off-setting factors.\textsuperscript{29}

As far the industrial sectors in Central Asia


are concerned all the investments had been made by the state through budgetary grants. Though this mode of investment had certain implications in terms of efficiency, nevertheless the fact is that it had laid a base for industrial development. In the first post-war plans the process of industrialisation and economic development was facilitated by the centralised disposal of economic resources. The third upsurge of industrialisation in Central Asia occurred in the early 1960s. The primary impetus was Khruschev's new system of Sovnarkhoz for territorial economic administration (1957-65). This was the only interval in Soviet history when territorial planning achieved an equal footing with branch planning. These changes in federal organisation provided the Soviet Republics a real opportunity to control their own economies. This brought the transformation of all union-ministries into union-republic or republic ones, and the devolution of programs and funds in everything from ferrous metallurgy, coal and oil to machine building from central to republic administration.

Khruschev's leadership also reduced some of the central control over republic expenditures enhancing
the republics' role in decision making process. As of May 1955, Centre was to approve only the total budget for major spending categories in republic budgets, leaving the republic governments to decide how funds were to be distributed within categories and within the republics. The republics were also granted the right to retain any of the plan revenues, which they may generate, to determine how revenues and expenditure would be divided among localities, and to set administrative boundaries for local government under their jurisdiction.30

Besides, the reforms under Khruschev included several other major changes in planning and budgeting. The regime cut back on the number of indicators to be included in national economic plans and simplified procedures for planning with regard to both costs and labour: Centre also raised the cutoff points for investment projects. Before 1953, any new project of 1.5-10 million roubles or more (the exact limit depended on sector involved) required specific approval from the Centre. Under Khruschev's regime, the limits were raised to 5-25 million roubles.31

30. Bahry, n. 6, p. 47.
31. Ibid.
These changes in federal structure contributed to the establishment of many new industrial enterprises, reinforcement of the infrastructure and construction industries, and expansion of the raw material and energy base.

Although initially each Central Asian republic had its own Sovnarkhoz in 1962, however, these were combined to form a single Sovnarkhoz for the region that contributed to the integration of the republican economy into a unified economic system. The distribution of investment within this territory was now governed not by Gosplan and ministries at the Centre, but predominantly by the Central Asian Sovnarkhoz. Although the centre still exercised its overall control, the Sovnarkhoz independently managed many spheres of economic activities and used its new authority to expand the region's industrial base. 32

The Sovnarkhoz laid the foundation for new branches of industry (for example chemicals) and

32. Rumer, n. 26, p. 56.
expanded industrial capacity for construction materials and machine building. The greatest attention was given to the chemical industry (on the basis of oil and gas treatment and processing) and non-ferrous metallurgy, which emerged as the dominant sector of heavy industry in Central Asia. These branches began to play a greater role in the region's industrial production. The investment quota allocated for Central Asia has undergone considerable change, as the data in the table 5.4 indicates.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1921-28</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928/29-32</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933-37</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938 June 1945</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941-45</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946-50</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951-55</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956-60</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-65</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-70</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-75</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-80</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


33. The main product of the chemical industry was mineral fertilisers production of synthetic fibres, plastics and other products from oil and natural gas was also started in the Sovnarkhoz era. Ibid.

34. Ibid.
For the entire period of Khruschev's experiment with Sovnarkhoz, Central Asia's share in Soviet investment remained in the range of 3.6 to 4.1 per cent. Then came the dramatic spurt in the 1960s. That increase can be explained in terms of increasing investment activity by the Sovnarkhoz, which gained control over the distribution of investments within their territories. The growth of the late 1960s (after the abolition of Sovnarkhoz) resulted from the heavy investment supplements made to increase the construction capacities of the region, which encouraged a number of production-branch ministries at the centre to favour further investments in Central Asia. This is the reason why the region's investment quota did not fail in later years. Nevertheless, it ceased to rise for the last four five year plans (1966-85). Consequently, the period of the Sovnarkhoz formed an important stage in the industrial development of Central Asia and the momentum gained in these years had an impact in later, post Sovnarkhoz years as well.

35. Ibid., pp. 36-7.
But the five year plan that followed the abolition of the Sovnarkhoz (1966-70) was a strong blow for the region's economy as the centre completely reversed its policy, returned to centralised planning and management and denounced Sovnarkhoz policy as narrow-minded localism (Mesnichestvo). This went a long way in curtailing the powers of the union republics. This was an 'ill conceived decision' and was much resented in the Soviet republics. The leading academicians and intellectuals severely criticised this centralised model, arguing that "any infringement on the right of nations would ultimately adversely affect the unionwide economy". The new policy, inevitably had a negative effect on the industrial growth of Central Asia in the second half of the 1960s. But, because construction and initiation are a protracted process (normally from five to ten years), the full impact of Sovnarkhoz did not come until the early 1970s. As a result, the rate of industrial growth


continued to rise until the mid 1970s. During 1959-65, the share of industry and agriculture in the capital investment was 34% and 25% in Uzbekistan and 34% and 23% in Tadjikistan respectively. Similarly, during 1966-69, the respective shares for industry and agriculture were 28% and 24% in Uzbekistan and 34% and 23% in Tadjikistan.\(^{38}\)

**Industry's Contribution to the Gross Social Production**

Due to higher share of capital investment in industry by the end of 1960s industries dominated the economic structure of the Central Asian republics. Industry's contribution to the gross social production was much higher and also its share in the national income as compared to other sectors like agriculture and construction etc.\(^{39}\)

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Table - 5.5

Structure of Gross Social Production, 1969 in %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Agriculture</th>
<th>Construction</th>
<th>Other Branches</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>64.9</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadjikistan</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table - 5.6

Structure of the National Income, 1969 in %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Agriculture</th>
<th>Construction</th>
<th>Other Branches</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadjikistan</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

40. Ibid.
Since 1960's the Central Asian republics benefitted from the inter-republic redistribution of national income disproportionate to their contribution. Since the mid 1960's, the total volume of used national income has exceeded produced national income on a level well above the average in the USSR. The ratio of used national income to produce national income for Uzbekistan in 1986 was 1.10, in 1969 the ratio was 1.18 and in 1974 it was 1.04. In Latvia, the ratios were, 90, 95 and 94 respectively. Ukraine and other Baltic republics had similar ratio as Latvia had. In 1966, Uzbekistan's import surplus (the difference between produced and used national income) was about 4 times higher than the USSR average. 41

Though in per capita terms, the level of growth suffered heavily, this per capita variation is largely owing to the much higher percentage of children among the Asian nationalities than among the European nationalities. The natural rate of increase

for the USSR as a whole was 85 per 1000 in 1977, that
for the Baltic States was less than 5 per 1000 and
for the Central Asian Republics it was 26.6 per 1000
(Uzbek SSR), 22.0 per 1000 (Kirghiz SSR), 27.7 per
1000 (Tadzhik SSR) and 26.5 per 1000 (Turkmen SSR). 42

Despite the high percentage rise in most eco-

nomic indicators, economic development in per capita
terms in Uzbekistan has actually slowed. Between 1971-
75 for example, the average annual rate of growth of
the national income for the USSR as a whole was 5.7%
as compared to Uzbekistan where it stood at 6.9%.
In per capita terms, however, rates were
reversed: in 1966 per capita national income in Uzbeki-
stan was at a level about 63 per cent of the all-Union
average; by 1970 according to some estimates it may
have been as low as 54 or 58% and by 1975 as low as
51 per cent. 43 Between 1960-75 retail sales capita
decreased from a level 74% of the all Union average to
63% and savings deposits per capita from 45% of the
national average to 35 per cent. 44

42. D.M. Nachane, 'Regional Planning in the USSR: A
Case Study of Soviet Central Asia', in R.G. Gidadhu-
blt (eds.), Socio-economic transformation of Soviet
Central Asia, p. 146.
43. Lubin, n. 41, p. 50.
44. Cited in Lubin, n. 41, p. 51.
In spite of great constraints on capital formation in per capita terms, it is remarkable that industrial development has made great progress in Central Asia. The share of industry in the structure of the economy has been rising steadily, as also capital intensity in heavy industry.

Soviet Central Asia's Share in the USSR Economy

Soviet Central Asia's share in the USSR economy continued to rise in key indices like industrial employment, total investment and completion of new plants. According to some estimate between 1960-69, Central Asia's share in the USSR economy went up from 2.76 to 3.14 per cent in industrial employment, from 4.97 per cent to 5.47 per cent in total investment and from 3.82% to 6.14% in completion of new plants. The growth of aggregate volume of industrial production continued to be very fast in Uzbekistan and Tadjikistan. Between 1940-75, the growth in Uzbekistan was 13 times

and in Tadjikistan 14 times. In terms of mean growth rates of gross industrial output, not only was the gap between the USSR average and Central Asia narrowing down, but in some cases like that of Tadjikistan the growth rate exceeded the USSR average.

Table 5.7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Republic</th>
<th>1950-60</th>
<th>1961-70</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Asia</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadjikistan</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

47. Imshchenetskiy, n. 45, p. 708.
Diversification in Industry

The low level of industrialization in Central Asia might account for its faster rate of growth in the initial years of industrialisation. Heavy industry since the mid 1970's has become more diversified with the development of chemical and petro-chemical production and non-ferrous metallurgy. While the mean annual rate of growth of industrial production as a whole was 6.3 per cent between 1966-70 in Uzbekistan, the rate of growth of production was 11.5 per cent in electric power, 13.1 per cent in gas, 13.7 per cent in economic power, 13.7 per cent in petroleum refinery, 12.7 per cent in chemicals, which shows the increasing importance of these branches in the industrial production structure. 48 Light industry no longer remained the single most dominating branch, nor did it define the character of Uzbek industry. Between 1966-70, the share of light industry declined from 54 per cent to 38 per cent. 49


49. Ibid., p. 87.
In the 1960's branches like electric energy, mechanical engineering, construction material and fuel came to have a larger share in the industrial fixed capital than light or food industry. The shifts in the branch structure of the republics' industry may be traced from the table 5.8.

Table - 5.8

Distribution of Industrial Fixed Capital According to Branches of Industry 1968, % of total

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
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<td>duc.</td>
<td>Met.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Engg.</td>
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<td>Heat</td>
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<td>Ener-</td>
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<td></td>
<td>ing</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Uzbek | 20.5 | 11.6 | 0.6 | 9.9 | 13.9 | 12.1 | 10.9 | 6.4 | 14.1 |
| SSR   |      |      |     |     |      |      |      |     |      |
| Tadjik| 29.0 | 3.9  | 5.4 | 5.4 | 8.9  | 12.7 | 19.4 | 12.2| 8.5  |

Since the 1960s all the Central Asian Republic had switched over to the rapid priority development of the heavy industry and was characterised by high capital intensity. Conditions for mere intensive expansion of heavy industry matured precisely in this period. Power development became one of the main trends of the further industrialisation especially in Tadjikistan. For example, Tadjikistan had about half the hydro-power resources in Central Asia.\(^{51}\) This change over to the practical use of huge hydro-power resources accelerated the pace of the development of heavy industry in Central Asia.\(^{52}\)

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52. Средне Азиатский Экономический Район, p. 16.
### Table - 5.9

**INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE IN CENTRAL AISA IN %**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Branch of Industry</th>
<th>Gross Production</th>
<th>No. of Workers</th>
<th>Value of Plant &amp; Equipment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Key Branches of Heavy Industry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light and Food Industry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Branches</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>30.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>59.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In 1977, Central Asia produced almost 85 billion Cubic meters of natural gas out of the USSR total of 264 billion. The Central Asian production was higher than in any other economic region.\textsuperscript{53} Between 1960-75, Central Asia had the highest investment growth in the country after Belorussia and Moldavia. During the period, this region experienced a higher rate of industrial growth than the rest of the country. The output and fixed capital grew at a much faster rate between 1960-75 than the growth rate of labour, thus indicating the growing capital intensity of industry during this period.\textsuperscript{54}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Growth Rate of Output, Labour and Fixed Capital in Industry in 1960-1975}
\begin{tabular}{lccc}
\hline
 & Output & Labour & Fixed Capital \\
\hline
USSR & 9.0 & 2.8 & 9.6 \\
Uzbekistan & 10.0 & 4.3 & 12.0 \\
Tadjikistan & 13.8 & 4.9 & 13.1 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{53} Nachane, n. 42, p. 152.

\textsuperscript{54} In terms of factor income share in industry in 1970 the share of labour and capital respectively were 66\% & 34\% in the USSR, 60.2\% & 39.8\% in Uzbekistan, 64\% & 36\% in Tadjikistan. I.S. Koropeckyj, "Growth and Productivity", in Koropeckyj and Shroedr (eds.), \textit{Economics of Soviet Regions}, (New York, 1981), pp. 98, 99, 105.
Growth rate of capital investments was ensured not only on the basis of each union republic's own income, but also through subsidies from the budget of the USSR as well as by deductions from the turnover tax which accounts for a large share of total accumulation as mentioned earlier.

It is to be noted here that Central Asian Republics had been able to achieve high level of growth rates in a region where agriculture played such a significant role in the economy and lives of the people and where the demographic process was characterised by a high rate of population growth.

In the process, the Central bodies had played a leading role in rendering economic and political assistance in shaping the region's socialist economies and its socialist political structure. However, this aid was accompanied by the mechanical transference of the ways and means of building socialism in the industrially developed regions (that, by the way, were far from perfect) to areas characterised by pre-capitalistic and even pre-feudal socio-economic relations.
The intensity of formation of socialist property relations reflected neither the starting point of socialist development of these regions and specific character of class structure, nor the sectoral structure of industry, geographic environment, traditions and origins of local population.  

This had far reaching implication for regional economic development. The creation of new industry and the renovation of the old ones was based on advanced machinery and up-to-date technological lines. This constantly raised the demands for higher skills of industrial workforce. In this context, it is necessary to mention about the incompleteness of cultural revolution in the region. Instead of mass training of high qualified specialists from the indigenous nationalities, what was sought to be done was to push in qualified workers from various regions of RSFSR and other European republics.

56. Ibid., p. 113.
According to some data in 1973, more than 700 workers and specialists were sent from the RSFSR to the Novoi Chemical Combine. In order to construct Tashkent Metro in the early 1970s about 900 skilled workers and specialists came from other European republics.  

The lack of sufficient indigenous cadres with necessary qualification led to an influx of Russians. This can be seen in the census results which show that between 1959 and 1970 the Russian population of Bukhara Oblast (exploitation of natural gas and gas deposits) increased by 60,000 or 124% of Kzyl-orda Oblast (the Tinuratam Space Complex) by 42,000 or 83 per cent and of Gurier Oblast (Mangyshlak Oil) by 77,000 or 128 per cent. Moreover, the increase in the number of Ukrainians in these oblasts over the same period was proportionately even more dramatic. In industrial and technical sectors the share of Uzbeks lagged behind the

57. Lubin, n. 41, pp. 92-4.

growth of the labour forces as a whole. For example, Uzbeks comprised 52% of the total number of workers and employees in all sectors of the economy, but comprised only about 36% of the total number of workers in 1973. Similarly, among specialists their share was disproportionate to their share in the total population of the republic. In 1973, Uzbek comprised 44.9 percent of all employed specialists with higher and secondary education in Uzbekistan as opposed to 26.9% for Russians and Central Asian specialists, workers intelligentsia are concentrated in the non-industrial sectors. As table 5.11 indicates, the Uzbek intelligentsia in Uzbekistan in 1970 was overwhelmingly concentrated in the 'mass' professions (defined as teachers cultural workers etc.) and otherwise comprised the majority in the administrative, scientific and artistic professions; Uzbeks comprised less than one third of the intelligentsia in the productive sphere. This


60. Ibid., p. 92.

61. Ibid.
ly contrasts strikingly with the Russian intelligentsia in the USSR, among whom by far the highest proportion was in the productive sphere. In Uzbekistan, in 1970, the level of the Uzbek intelligentsia in the 'mass' professions was twice that of the level in the productive spheres; among Russians in the USSR as a whole, precisely the opposite was the case.
Table - 5.11

Structure of the Intelligentsia among Uzbeks and Russians, USSR, 1939-70 (per 10,000 gainfully occupied people of given nationality).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uzbek</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>641</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>1241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>1160</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>1091</td>
<td>2175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total USSR</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>973</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>625</td>
<td>1007</td>
<td>1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbek level as % age of Russian level 1970 as % of 1939</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to Vahidov and Umarov, this developmental strategy was not scientifically productive. In social as well as political and economic respect it had proved its complete insolvency. Regardless of the aims of its creators, this approach gradually confirmed the anti-Marxist idea of the importance of the local population to work in technically advanced industries. It gave a fillip to natural pre-disposition of Uzbeks, Tadjiks and other local nationalities of agricultural pursuits. This approach found its way in the very low specific representation of the local population of Central Asia in certain sectors such as machine building, chemical and gas industry and in construction.  

Uzbekistan in 1976 had just about the lowest proportion of its labour resources employed in industry relative to the USSR as a whole. Only 22% of all workers and employees were employed in industry against an all union average of 35%, only Turkmenistan, with

---

20 per cent of its workers and employees in industry, had a lower level. According to Maksakova, there is a shortage of skilled labour in almost all the republics leading industrial enterprises and in construction organisations. The shortage of industrial production personnel or of personnel employed in construction assembly work constitutes 5-10%, and in some leading enterprises it was significantly higher. The ministry of light industry in Uzbekistan was able to fill its plan for hiring new workers by 95% in 1969 and by only 86.3% in 1971. In the ministry of construction, the corresponding proportions were 94% and 85%. In 1975, Ubaidullah noted the shortage of labour in Uzbekistan's industrial sectors was about 5,28,600 people.

In the service sectors a mixed picture emerged. Uzbekistan service sector consumed a high degree of manpower relative to the needs of industry. Between 1959 and 1973, the proportion of labour resources in

63. Lubin, n. 41, p. 106.
64. Ibid., p. 106.
65. Ibid., p. 106.
Uzbekistan's industrial sectors rose by 64 per cent, whereas in the service sector the growth was 81 per cent and that too from a high starting point. The proportion of personnel in the non-productive sphere rose by 26 per cent of all personnel employed in the state sector in 1960 to about 3 per cent in 1975. Several Soviet writers have cited large reserves in the use of working time in the service sectors and high rates of turnover in Uzbekistan's service enterprises. 66

The top-sided development of heavy industry has also led to a shortage of local employment for women. Women of the indigenous nationalities were mostly concentrated in agriculture and service sectors. They predominated the lower skilled and manual jobs. In 1975, for example, women comprised 42% of all workers and employees in Uzbekistan's economy. But of these, more than two thirds were employed in state agriculture or the service sectors, within the service sectors, the vast majority were concentrated in health and social security (comprising 73% of all workers and employed in that sector in 1975 and education and culture comprising 55% of the total in 1975) as data in table 5.12 reveals. 67

67. Lubin, n. 41, p. 95.
Table - 5.12

Percentage women in the total number of workers and employees by branch of the economy, Uzbekistan, 1975:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total women workers &amp; employees in the national economy</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In industry (industrial production personnel)</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In State farms, subsidiary and other agriculture enterprises</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
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<td>48.2</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Construction-installation work</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade, Public Catering, Material, Tech., Supply &amp; Sales &amp; procurement</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing-Communal economy &amp; services</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health services, Physical Culture &amp; Social security</td>
<td>73.1</td>
<td>73.7</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>72.1</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education &amp; Culture</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science &amp; Scientific services</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit &amp; State insurance</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>61.6</td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt. Administration &amp; Admin. of Cooperative &amp; social organization</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

30%
Urbanisation

The same cluster of policy inputs were responsible for the lack of urbanisation and demographic explosion in the region which affected the inter-ethnic relation. There was an irrational specialisation of local and non-native nationality in their respective spheres of activities and places of residence. The representatives of non-native nationalities were generally employed in industry, transport, communications, administration, etc. They lived mainly in the cities, some deformations in structural policy contributed to this fact. The intensive development of the various branches of heavy industry in the 50's, the 60's and the 70's led to the development of new cities and towns. The majority of the population of such settlement was non-local. Such a structure of urbanisation was non-productive mainly from the standpoint of inter-ethnic relation. This approach was one of the most significant reasons leading to the process of deepening of differences between city and village in Central Asian region. The rural population was deprived of the possibility of migration, owing to the limited social and economic avenues available in the town settlements. The net effect in terms of population, as Lubin points out, has been that there was spatial
imbalance in the redistribution of the ethnic population, while the industrially developed centres were dominated by Europeans. The old smaller cities were overwhelmingly Central Asian in their ethnic composition, as is shown in the table 5.13. 68

Table - 5.13

Selected Economic and Nationality Indicators by Type of City, Uzbekistan, 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>New Small &amp; Medium cities with developed heavy industry</th>
<th>Old Large cities multisector-industry</th>
<th>Old Small Cities main industry the primary processing of agricultural raw materials</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Per cent of total number of cities</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per cent of total urban population</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous nationalities as per cent of population</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per cent of labour resources employed in social production</td>
<td>72.1</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>73.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per cent of employed population in industry, construction &amp; transport</td>
<td>70.4</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>46.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This imbalance, according to Lubin, is due to the emphasis placed on the economies of construction for location of industry and not due to the presence or absence of labour resources. This led to difficulties in staffing the labour force in many instances by the indigenous population. To overcome difficulties the industrial enterprises were staffed by in-migrants from outside. Lubin concludes that the population pressures and traditional governmental priorities in heavy industry were intensifying the division between Central Asians and Europeans rather than diminishing them. According to her, differences in growth rates of employment by sectors led to increasing labour surplus in agriculture and shortage in industry. Differences in population growth led to growing labour surplus in rural areas and old, small towns and to potential shortages in new industrial cities and large urban centres.69

Major structural mistakes were made in developing and location of the various sectors of the economy

69. Lubin, n. 41, pp. 100-2; Ann Sheehy, n. 58, p. 559.
in this region. Priority was given to the industries linked with extraction and primary processing of raw materials. Very little attention was paid to creating technology and labour intensive industries for the manufacture of finished goods possessing a complete technological cycle of processing. Thus only about 8-10 per cent of the cotton produced was processed in Uzbekistan and 3 per cent in Turkmenia, while the other technological processes (in the chain raw material - finished goods) were done outside the region, thereby depriving the major sector of their economy from making any significant contribution to the national income generated in the region. 70

This administrative-command style of managing economy led to the emergence of cotton "cult". As a result of this, among Central Asian Republics, Uzbekistan is facing the worst crisis. The whole economy of the region was made to revolve around cultivation of cotton.

70. Tahir Asghar, "Regional Economic Development and Centralism", (Unpublished paper 1990 presented in the Seminar on "Socio-economic Transformation of Soviet Central Asia", in the Centre for Soviet & East European Studies, SIS, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi).
On the other hand, cotton processing textile and garment industry was not given due importance and other type of agricultural production was ignored. Excessive emphasis on this type of economic development created the illusion of the necessity of maintaining a large and high proportion of rural population thus creating further disincentive for manufacturing ministries to move into the region, all of which put together acted as serious constraint for a balanced economic development of the region.\textsuperscript{71}

Excessive specialisation in producing only one or the other type of products created the so-called "mono culture" regional economy (especially in Uzbekistan) which, apparently had an inbuilt propensity to discourage other types of productive activities by ignoring opportunity cost and higher economic returns offered by the later. For example, intensive horticulture on the same land which under cotton is highly unproductive would give 10-15 times higher returns for other production.\textsuperscript{72}

\textsuperscript{71} Asghar, n. 70, pp. 4-5.

\textsuperscript{72} Shakarat\textquotesingle an, O., etc. o\textquotesingle i Biurokratcheskov Tsentralisma K ekonomicheskoi integratsii. Suverennikh Respublic Kommunist, No. 15, (1988); cited in Asghar, n. 70, p. 5.
The dilemma of an optimal balance between the labour intensive and capital intensive branches of industry has been reflected in various debates between Central Asian experts. Ziiadullaev, former Chairman of the State Planning Commission of Uzbekistan, and Kurbanov, former Chairman of the Council of Ministers, were advocating for the rapid expansion of light industry in the republic. Kurbanov argued for the rapid construction of new enterprises in light and electronic and radio-electronic industries so that full employment of the labour-resources of the republic would be possible. Ziiadullaev argued for the full capacity, primary processing of the republic's cotton, expansion of the light industry to provide 80 per cent of the republic's consumer needs, a long-term preferential rate of growth for light industry state economic protection to promote light industry in some of the less industrialised areas like Khorezm, Surkhandar, Kashkadar Oblasts and Karakalpak ASSR. 73

The argument in favour of light industry was

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refuted by arguments for greater regional self-reliance and in favour of more diversification to alter the existing high degree of specialisation of light industry in Central Asian Republics. For example, Gillula was arguing that diversified development of industry would make it possible to expand the employment level of the labour surplus Central Asian Republics at a capital cost per worker that would even lower than the light industry averages in these republics. The Tadjik economist Rustom Mirzoev has pointed out that one of the most important ways to solve the social economic task of the region was to create labour intensive, but not capital intensive branches of material production (primarily in industry).

But Umarov and Vahidov emphasized two main things when developing such a concept of labour intensive enterprises. First, labour consuming enterprises must be characterised by higher technological and economic

indices in comparison to presently existing working plan. In other words, along with labour capacity they must be characterised by a higher level of scientific capacity. Secondly, in creating new production systems priority must be given to the regions' bio climatic potential. The inclusion of this potential into the economic turnover contributes to more successful solution of the food programme on a countrywide scale. This potential comprises recreational resources of mountainous regions as well. These resources are being used quite insufficiently. Their intensive use will lead not only to fast increase of financial incomes of the population, but also to the national income of the Tajik, Uzbek and Kirghiz republics. It will assist in successful solution of the problem of employment and higher educational level of the population. 76

Therefore, we can conclude from the above analysis that there exist serious conflicts and

76. Umarov and Vahidov, n. 55, p. 124.
contradictions between the interests of the various sectors of the economy and the interests of the republics. The reason leading to the emergence of such a situation can be found in "Upsurpation" of the powers by the central ministries who had managed to monopolise the decision making process and absence of an effective regulatory mechanism to resolve this conflict.

If we look at the planning system closely, it may be seen that Gosplan and Central ministries had only slight contact with the republic Gosplans. Inevitably, the Central Gosplan machinery took the base figures on production and distributed all union goals across the USSR without serious attention to the conditions of specific local needs of its population on its demographic peculiarities.\textsuperscript{77}

The Central ministries tended to concentrate industrial production in areas with well developed infrastructure where capacity could be increased to the

\textsuperscript{77} Rumer, n. 26, p. 160.
optimum at nominal expense. This accelerated rapid industrialisation in Central Asian Republics with the help of workers from other republics. These economic development in the form of industrialisation was given priority over socio-cultural development.

Legal Implications

This absolute control of production branch administration and economic planning is analysed here in terms of the confrontation between centre and the republics over the latter's participation in decision making for their economies. This confrontation has had a significant legal implication since the inception of the Soviet constitutions, for example, Article 77 of the 1977 Constitution had a formula on the "complex economic and social development" of union republics. This text is full of ambiguity in

78. The Union republics provide for the complex economic and social development in their territories assist in the realisation of all union directives in their territories, and implement the decisions of the higher organs for state authority and administration of the USSR. With respect to questions in its purview, the union republic coordinates and supervises the activity of enterprises, institutions and organisation subordinate to the Union.
the sense that while it upholds the republican governments authority over the economic and social sphere, it emphasizes and enforces the republics to implement the Centre's decision. In other words, it has no clause accommodating the differences arising out of the divergent viewpoint of the Centre and State over certain issues, as was the usual case.

Moreover, the constitution declares that a republic's authority over "all union enterprises" is restricted to the sphere pertinent to their competence. But the area of competence is not clearly mentioned. The formulation in article 77 allows each side in the conflict to interpret the passage in as many ways as one wants. Thus it leaves enough scope for Gosplan and the union ministries to maintain their command position over the republics' economies.

Another factor which led to the emergence of such situation was that some leaders of the republics or subregions selected the ruling personnel on the basis of personal devotion. These methods of selection and disposition of the personnel were duplicated at the lower levels of districts etc. This led to the
emergence of a special type of leaders and mode of behaviour who had a peculiar psychology known as 'mankurts'. They specialised in servility-implicit obedience to higher authority and blind execution of all directives. The domination of the regional administrative heirarchy by 'mankurt' psychological type was the main reason for the absence of a more viable strategy and tactics. The general trait of this redtape social stratum was to display their private interests as state interests. Their interests concurred with those of departmental interest of all-union ministries. The latter, using those leaders, were mainly pre-occupied with the realisation of such projects which were incompatible and sometimes conflicting with both regional and all-union interests. In this context it is worth mentioning that these ruling personnel neglected the recommendations of scientists on the urgent need to re-orient the socio-economic strategy of development of the region and its possible consequences. 79

These shortcomings have exercised negative

influences on the process of building the federative state and management of a unified economic system because there is a close inter-connection between the Soviet political system and Soviet economy which is one of the traditional distinctive hallmarks of the Soviet society. From this specific standpoint, if there was an effective and appropriate mechanism of representing the interest of the union republics, autonomous republics, autonomous regions and districts at the union level, fully capable of countering the pressure of over-centralisation and departmental influences, the removal of unevenness between regions and their over all economic development could have been effectively undertaken.

Education and Cultural Development

In any multinational state the language and content of elementary and secondary education are liable to become controversial political issues. While the dedicated nationalist will be concerned about safeguarding the purity of his people's heritage, others want their children to achieve responsible position that call for higher education. Equal access to universities
and technical institutes by students of all nationalities then becomes touchstone of equitable educational policy.  

Seeing the plight of various ethnic, cultural and racial minorities in the sphere of education and culture, Lenin had worked out a solution even before the October Revolution. He pointed out, "there must be no compulsory official language, the population must be provided with schools where teaching will be carried out in all the local languages, a basic law must be introduced in the constitution declaring invalid all privileges of any one nation and all violations of the rights of national minorities".  

This formula was adopted by the Soviet government after the revolution. Lenin considered it necessary to develop the national cultures on the basis of native languages, provided, however, that is what the people wanted. At the same time, he rejected any attempt to impose the languages of some people on others.  


Immediately, after the revolution, the Soviet Union started preparing the conditions for developing national cultures on the basis of native languages, as stipulated by Lenin's nationalities policy. This proved to be a difficult task as a vast majority of Soviet people like the Tadjiks and Uzbeks did not have written languages and many nationalities, specially the Central Asian ones were most backward educationally.

Education had been a relatively neglected area in Russia before the revolution. Before 1917, there were only 285 nursery schools in the Russian empire with a maximum enrolment of five thousand.

According to the first all-Russia census conducted in 1897, only 21.1 per cent of the population of whole Russia were literate, while only 24 per cent of the population over 9 years could read and write.

83. Ibid., pp. 137-40.
84. Cited in Bilinsky, n. 80, p. 413.
85. Azimov and Desheriev, n. 82, p. 134.
any language. The situation was even worse in the Central Asian region where people were most backward, compared to other regions. According to the census of 1987, the literacy rate in the Central Asian region (i.e. the Turkestan region) was only 1-2 per cent. In 1906, the increase in literacy of the population averaged 0.4 per cent in Central Asia against 4.2 per cent in European Russia, 1.1 per cent in Caucasus, and 1.3 per cent in Siberia.

As far as higher education is concerned, in 1913, there were 95 institutions throughout the Russian empire. Out of them 9 were universities. In 1914, the total enrolment was 1,27,000 students. The only Academy of Science was located in St. Petersburg. The unequal distribution of higher education facilities was primarily due to the location of these institutions. Out of the nine universities, four existed in Russia,

86. Tsentral'noe upravlenie narodnokhoziaistvennogo Ucheta Gosplana SSSR, Kul'turnoe stroitel'stvo SSSR: Statis-ticheskii sbornik, (Moscow & Leningrad, 1940), p. 7. Bilinsky, n.80, p. 413 (Figures refer to the territory of USSR as of January 17, 1939.

87. Azimov and Desheriev, n. 82, p. 134.

three in Ukraine and one each in Lithuania and Estonia.\textsuperscript{89} There was no University in the Central Asian region.

Thus the Central Asian region was most neglected and backward in terms of education. Even in 1920s, the proportion of people who could neither read nor write reached 90 to 96 per cent in Central Asian republics and 82 per cent in Kazakhstan.\textsuperscript{90} With this background, a drive to eliminate illiteracy was formally introduced by the Decree of December 26, 1919 to stamp out illiteracy among the population of the RSFSR. It stated that all citizens of the republic from eight to fifty years of age who could neither read nor write were to learn to do both either in their native language or in Russian, according to their own choice.\textsuperscript{91}

The tenth congress of the Communist Party (1921) adopted a programme for raising the cultural level of the backward peoples of Russia, for developing

\textsuperscript{89} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{91} Ibid.
their cultures and languages. The party's task, according to the congress decision was to help people: (i) to develop and consolidate the Soviet statehood in their lands in conformity with their national and domestic conditions; (ii) to develop their own courts of law, administration, economic bodies and organs of government operating in their native languages and comprising local people who know the life and psychology of the local populations; (iii) to develop their own press, schools, theatrical and club activities and cultural and educational institutions in their native languages; and (iv) to lay and develop a broad network of courses for general education as well as vocational training in their native languages. By adopting this resolution the party Congress granted more autonomy to the republics and regions in the sphere of education and related matters. Education was treated as a major instrument of social-economic mobility. A fundamental problem that must be faced in the economic development of a backward region is the typically low educational

level of the population, lack of technicians and persons able to read any language at all.

The literacy drive in the Soviet Central Asia was a great success. This was due to a strongly developed compulsory school system, and also to the mass campaign launched against adult illiteracy. The following table shows the increase in adult literacy in the Soviet Central Asian Republics between 1897 and 1959 (selected years).

Table - 5.14

Adult Literacy in Soviet Central Asia: Ages, 9-49

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Republic</th>
<th>1897</th>
<th>1926</th>
<th>1939</th>
<th>1959</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>78.7</td>
<td>98.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>83.6</td>
<td>96.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirgizia</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>79.8</td>
<td>98.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadjikistan</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>82.8</td>
<td>96.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>77.7</td>
<td>95.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
However, these statistics cover only up to the age 49. Therefore, the adult literacy rate was less than whatever is shown. In 1959, the total adult literacy rate for Central Asia was 86.9 per cent which is still a remarkable increase over the 1926 rate of 16.1 per cent. The very large investments in education were the primary reason for the success in eliminating illiteracy.

The Soviet government in an attempt to implement the decision taken in the congress of Communist Party extended elementary and secondary education to non-Russian people on a more equal basis. At the same time, the government took all possible initiatives in providing large scale education in native languages. The Korenizatsiia programme yielded positive results during 1920s and early 1930s. A 1927 study shows that a high percentage of non-Russian pupils received education in their respective native languages in the non-Russian republics. In Ukraine 93 per cent Ukrainian pupils received elementary education in Ukrainian.

The corresponding figure in Belorussia and Georgian republics were 90.2 and 98.1 per cent respectively. However, Central Asia republics showed a comparatively low figure. For example, in Tadjikistan, the figure was 74.1 per cent. For a backward region like the Central Asia, this figure is no less significant. On the secondary level (grades 6-9) the percentage spread between pupils of different nationalities living in their own republics and being taught in their native language was much more pronounced. Among the major Central Asian republics the corresponding figures were - 49-21, 53-99 and 94-57 per cent in Kazhakstan, Tadjikistan and Uzbekistan respectively. These figures were very low compared to those of the European Soviet republics. In other words, except for most Central Asian nationalities, all were able to send their children to national language secondary schools.

By 1926, only 3.8 per cent of the people in Tadjikistan, 18.6 per cent of those in Uzbekistan, 14.0 per cent of those in Turkmenistan and 16.5 per cent of

95. Ibid., p. 418.
those in Kirghizia were literate. Among them, a high proportion of literate were Russian immigrants. By the end of 1930s, most of the people in USSR were literates and by the end of 1950s literacy was virtually universal. In 1959, the literacy percentage in the Central Asian republics were 96.9 in Kazakhstan, 98.0 in Kirghizia, 96.2 in Tadjikistan, 95.4 in Turkmenia and 98.1 in Uzbekistan while the literacy percentage in the USSR in 1959 was 98.5. The achievement in the Soviet Central Asian republics was particularly noteworthy among girls and women, who in this predominantly muslim populated area, were traditionally confined to home. The literacy percentage among women in the USSR, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Tadjikistan, Turkmenia and Uzbekistan in 1926 were 47.7, 14.5, 8.4, 0.9, 8.8 and 7.3 respectively. The corresponding figures in 1959 were - 97.8, 95.1, 97.0, 94.6, 93.4 and 97.3. 

In the 1920s, the Soviet government showed great concern for the educational development in the

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96. Szymanski, n. 28, pp. 46-7.
Central Asian and Eastern republics. In 1929, the drive for illiteracy acquired wide scope after the Central Committee of the CPSU (Bolshevik) adopted its decision on work to eliminate illiteracy, which said in part: "The almost general illiteracy of population of some Eastern republics and region, as well as among some minorities, makes elimination of illiteracy the main and most important objective of the entire culture work there". The RSFSR and other republics extended constant aid to the Central Asian republics, which used to be culturally and educationally most backward areas of Soviet Union. In 1925, the USSR allocated Kirghizia an additional 3,00,000 roubles including 1,00,000 for the needs of public education from the federal budget. During 1925 and 1935, more than 400 schools were built in Kirghizia only, while allocations for education were stepped up from 5,92,500 to 28,581,200 roubles.

The Soviet government granted a number of privileges to aboriginal candidates wishing to enrol at school.

98. Ibid.
Upto 1934, there had been in effect a special system under which members of the culturally retarded/backward people had a definite number of places reserved to them at schools in the RSFSR and other republics and enjoyed different exemptions from the general rule.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 162-3.}

By the end of 1930s, the number of persons who received primary education was high, but as far as the receipt of secondary education (at least 7 years of schooling) was concerned, their number was low. For example, in 1939, only 2.2 per cent of Kazakhs, 1.5 per cent of Uzbeks, 1.4 per cent of Turkmens, 1.2 per cent of Tadjiks and 0.9 per cent of Kirghizs received secondary education. The corresponding average of the USSR during the period was 8.3 per cent.\footnote{Szymanski, n. 96, p. 46.} Thus, in the 1930s, Central Asian republics were far behind in secondary education, even though by this time, they have achieved a very high degree of literacy.

In the 1930s, the situation changed in disfavour of the non-Russian nationalities. At the seventeenth
party congress in early 1934, Stalin declared that non-Russian nationalism now constituted a greater danger than "Great Russian Chauvinism." This declaration was to be followed soon by action. By 1937, the last Ukrainian language schools in the Russian republic were closed down despite existence of a compact Ukrainian minority. Subsequently, since 1938, the study of Russian has been strongly emphasised by the centre in all republics and much more emphasis was given on Russian language than ever, after the world war II, when through the process of economic reconstruction the centre assumed more economic and political powers. Under Khruschev, after a brief interlude, this trend was once again resumed in mid 1958 and got entrenched in the party programme of 1961. Moreover, by the mid 1930s, the Soviet authorities also stopped releasing data on the number of pupils of a given nationality who were taught in their native language, henceforth only the number of schools and the number of students using


a certain language of instruction were given. Even these incomplete data were withheld between 1940 and 1956. Since then information has been issued in a more abbreviated form only to be stopped around 1958, except for a few republics. Higher education assumes great importance in Soviet Union. Therefore, an equitable distribution of college admission becomes necessary, in order to level the economic standards between republics and peoples. During the 1920s and 1930s much efforts were put to allow less well developed nationalities to catch up on higher education. But in 1950s and 1960s, the drive was reversed. In its place a new concept planned inter republican exchange of 'cadres' of different nationalities was introduced. This was done, in order to ensure that the republics cooperate and assist one another in training personnel. Consequently a fairly large number of places at colleges and universities in some republics were systematically reserved for young people from other republics. In 1964, a new form of mutual assistance was brought into practice - the training of graduate experts on a cooperative basis. This scheme was developed on the basis of previously


104. Ibid., pp. 165-6.
agreed proposals submitted by the ministries of education of Union Republics.105

The plan was extended to Central Asian republics with immediate effect. Under the cooperative training plan during 1966-77, the higher schools of these republics took care of 3701 such students.106

This planned interrepublican exchange of 'Cadre' of different nationalities was bound to result in relative neglect of the socio-economically weaker people (i.e. those who have to rely on outside personnel) and relative favouritism towards the stronger nations. In so far as many of the imported professionals were Russians, the new policy also amounted to a thinly disguised socio-economic and demographic Russification.107

In 1927, there were only seven Tadjhik college students anywhere in the USSR (constituting 0.01 per cent of the total), 13 Turkmen (0.01 per cent), 97 Kirghiz (0.06 per cent) and 184 Uzbeks (0.11 per cent). In

105. Shevtsov, n. 90, pp. 165-6
106. Ibid.
other words, the representation of these nationalities were far below in comparison to their share of population. This gap was narrowed considerably by 1965. In 1959, the Uzbeks, Kirghizs, Tadjiks and Turkmens had a population share of 2.88 per cent, 0.46 per cent, 0.67 per cent and 0.48 per cent of total population of the USSR, respectively. But by 1965-66 they contributed 2.48 per cent, 0.42 per cent, 0.45 per cent and 0.40 per cent among the students in higher education in the USSR. This is slightly below the percentage of their share of population and the gap is negligible. But compared to other nationalities, the Central Asian nationalities had a low share. Most of the European nationalities had more number of students in higher education in proportion to their population. 108

Compared to USSR, the educational attainment level of the Soviet Central population is low at both the levels - secondary and higher education. The following table gives details about educational attainment levels of the USSR and Soviet Central Asia between 1929 and 1959. 109

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108. Ibid., pp. 426-8.
## Table 5.15

Educational Attainment Levels in Soviet Central Asia & the USSR: 1939 and 1959

| Number of Persons with specified level of education | Place of Residence | | | | | |
|-----------------------------------------------------|-------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|                                                    | USSR              | Soviet Central Asia |
|                                                    | Urban  | Rural  | Total | Urban  | Rural  | Total |
| 1                                                   |        |        |       |        |        |       |
| Secondary Education: No. of Persons (1,000) - 1939  | 9,806  | 4,883  | 14,689| 467    | 289    | 756   |
| - 1959                                             | 34,458 | 20,472 | 54,930| 2641   | 2,755  | 53,966|
| Per 1,000 Population-1939                         | 162    | 37     | 77    | 114    | 23     | 45    |
| - 1959                                             | 344    | 188    | 263   | 299    | 195    | 235   |
| 1959 as per cent of 1939                          | 212    | 508    | 342   | 262    | 848    | 522   |
| Higher Education: No. of Persons (1,000) - 1939    | 956    | 221    | 1,177 | 40     | 17     | 57    |
| - 1959                                             | 3,169  | 608    | 3,777 | 214    | 73     | 287   |
| Per 1,000 Population-1939                         | 16     | 2      | 6     | 10     | 1      | 3     |
| - 1959                                             | 32     | 6      | 18    | 24     | 5      | 13    |
| 1959 as per cent of 1939                          | 200    | 300    | 249   | 249    | 364    | 357   |
While in 1939 the number of students who had received secondary education, per 1000 population in the USSR was 77, Soviet Central Asia had only 45, the corresponding figure in 1959 were 263 and 235. However, the number of students who received higher education per 1000 population in the USSR was 6 in 1939, while Central Sia had only 3 such students. In 1959, the corresponding figures were 18 and 13. In higher education, by 1970-71, six nationalities (Jews 2.60, Georgians 1.43, Armenians 1.34, Russians 1.12 and Azerbaidzani 1.04) had a higher students/population ratio than the national average i.e. 1.00. No Central Asian republic had a higher ratio than the national average. In 1970-71, students per 1000 population of nationality in the USSR Kirghiz, Uzbeks, Turkmen and Tadjiks were 18.95, 18.18, 16.39, 14.75 and 13.16 respectively, where as their representation index was 1.00, 0.97, 0.87, 0.78 and 0.69. However, in comparison to certain European nationalities like Ukrainians and Latvians, the representation of Central Asian nationalities was better.

110. Wilber, n° 93, p. 163.

The Soviet Union's expenditure per capita on education in the Central Asian republics has been consistently higher than the national average. For example, in 1955, annual expenditure per capita in Turkmenistan was 1.30 times of the USSR average; in Tadjikistan 1.27 times; in Kirghiz 1.15 times and Uzbekistan 1.00 times the USSR average. This is because of the higher birth rates in Central Asia. In 1955, the Central Asian and Transcausian republics had 15 per cent of the population but 18 per cent of the school children and 18 per cent of the teachers.112

112. Szymanski, n. 28, p. 48.
### Table 5.16

**Educational Statistics for Soviet Central Asia: Selected Years, 1914 to 1962**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Number of Students in all levels (thousands)</td>
<td>137.1</td>
<td>523.9</td>
<td>3487.3</td>
<td>3907.1</td>
<td>5880.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per cent of population</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>3.85</td>
<td>20.98</td>
<td>18.69</td>
<td>22.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students in Secondary &amp; Higher Educational Establishments</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>278.1</td>
<td>1140.5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per cent of Population</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>5.46</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students in Higher Educational Establishments</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>154.9</td>
<td>255.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per cent of Population</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>.98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

113. Wilber, n. 93, p. 160.
The educational reforms of 1966, was a further step towards centralisation in the sphere of education. In August 1966, the union republican Ministry of Education was set up in Moscow. Earlier, the primary and secondary education had been under the jurisdiction of the republican ministries of education. But these ministries now formally converted to de facto branch offices of the Ministry at the Centre.\footnote{114}

In September 1966, the Party Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers issued a decree, which among other things, subordinated a number of institutions of higher education in republics direct to Union republican Ministry of higher and specialised secondary education in Moscow.\footnote{115} In November 1966, the Party Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers passed another decree, which standardised the curricula of elementary and secondary schools throughout Soviet Union.\footnote{116} In this reform republics lost its administrative authority they had retained earlier. This law

\footnote{114}{Bilinsky, n. 80, p. 435.}

\footnote{115}{Ibid., p. 435.}

\footnote{116}{Ibid.}
centralised all higher education in all aspects. This process affected the cultural autonomy of the republics.

A well-compatible language policy is a prerequisite for the success of federal form of government where the country is a multilingual and multi-national one like Soviet Union. Looking only at the population of each nationality residing within its respective national republic, 98.9 per cent or more population claimed the national language as native language, while 87.0 per cent of the entire non-Russian population of the Soviet Union claimed their national language as native.117

The Central Asian population project a low level of adoption of Russian as a native language. They also have a low level of fluency in Russian as the second language. This low level of linguistic Russification of the Soviet Central Asian republics is attributed to a relatively limited contact with Russians or a comparatively low level of urbanisation and educational attainment.118


118. Ibid., p. 410.
The Soviet Central Asian republics are predominantly Muslim populated regions. Their attachment to traditional languages is strong and they lag behind others in switching to Russian as an indigenous language. 119

The primary objectives of language policy of the USSR are - free growth of vernacular languages, and extension of Russian as the international language of the Soviet people. 120 But available data shows that the expansion of Russian as a primary language has been slow. However, Russian as a second language among some Central Asian nationalities is gradually increasing. For example, in 1970, 14.5 per cent of Uzbeks, 15.4 per cent of Tadjiks and 19.1 per cent of Turkmen opted for Russian as a second language. The corresponding figures in 1979 were 49.3, 29.6 and 29.4 per cent. 121

This spectacular increase in the number of

119. Ibid.
120. Shevtsov, n. 90, p. 178.
persons adopting Russian as second language is attributed to migration of these people to fill the labour shortage in the European parts of the USSR. On the other hand, adherence to the native language is almost 100 per cent among these nationalities. 122

Although high levels of inter-ethnic contact between Russians and the Central Asian people are associated with the increased adoption of Russian as both a second and a native language, the rate in which Central Asians shift to Russian as a native language is much lower than the rate among other nationalities. They project a strong sense of cultural distinctiveness from the Russians.

Under such circumstances, bilingualism may well represent an enduring linguistic compromise rather than a mere transition phase in a process of complete Russification. 123 Bilingualism in the USSR has another aspect, which often goes against the Central Asian population. In most of the Soviet establishments, Russian is used as the official language. For recruitment in these offices

122. Ibid., p. 121.
123. Silver, n. 117, p. 411.
fluency in Russian is a pre-condition. For example, Russian is the exclusive official language of the Soviet military. Substantial encouragement and pressure are exerted to bring non-Russian recruits to a workable level of understanding Russian. 124

The level of fluency in Russian is low among the Central Asian population. For their poor knowledge of Russian, they are frequently denied entrance into certain sectors. 125 The aim of Soviet educational and cultural programme during the period was, to make possible the introduction of a more advanced technology and a new political doctrine, while simultaneously countering the local anti-Russian feelings. The problems met were principally those of insufficient material and trained personnel. The methods used to overcome these difficulties appear to have been the stimulation of local initiative while maintaining a strict centralised control. 126

125. Lubin, n. 41, p. 151.
While concluding the discussion, it is worth-mentioning that the adequate indicators of the level of general development of the population has been achieved in Central Asian Republics and to some extent they were even higher in Uzbekistan. However, the qualitative indicators of development like - technical education and special training of local population of Central Asia are lower in comparison to other republics. Same situation is reflected in the level of professional competence of the candidates. The economic and cultural objectives of the Soviet nationalities policy, viz., the elimination of the economic disparity between the Central Asian region and other well developed regions of Russia has not been realized till then. This was primarily due to the development of the republics which was largely in the functional framework of high handed over centralised administrative management. This was supplemented by a number of other factors of purely regional character. They are both economic and non-economic in nature, such as tradition, custom survivals insufficient employment of local population in industry etc.

Consequently, this affected the relations between
the Centre and the republics. Most of the times, it proved to be too difficult to resolve these contradictions to the mutual benefit of centre and the republics. This is basically due to absence of an effective regulatory mechanism. Along with this, there are no safeguards for the sovereignty of the republics against the arbitrariness of the Central ministries and departments regarding location of productive capacities or management of the economy as a whole. The Central ministries impose its policies on the republics in the economic sphere regardless of both the interests of the republics and the danger posed to the environment. Another problem of the existing system of regulation is that there is no clear cut segregation of authority between the Centre and the Republics in the most significant branches of the economy. The existing mechanisms of interaction between the Central bodies of management and its members are not effective because they undermine the participation of the representatives of the republics in the meeting of the Central bodies (Council of Ministers, Gosplan). All these considerably limit the powers of the republics and exert negative influence on the economic condition of the region.