The years 1952-57 were crucial for India-Pakistan relations. The Security Council mediators reluctantly accepted their failure to bring about an agreement between the parties to the dispute and urged direct negotiations for the settlement of the Kashmir issue. Thus the Security Council, which was unable to break the dead-lock over demilitarization, allowed the parties to take over the initiative. But it was interesting to find that while the direct negotiations between India and Pakistan were limping and faltering, the big powers did not keep idle; they waited anxiously for a chance to influence the external policies of the two neighbours for their own benefit.

The first occasion for an Indo-Pakistan talks came when the Prime Ministers of both the countries met in London for the Commonwealth Conference in June, 1953. They discussed problems connected with Kashmir, evacuee property, minorities etc.; but the "nature of the discussion was very preliminary, which was mainly for preparing the ground for further talks in Karachi". It was at the London meeting that Mohammad Ali suggested a policy of "joint defence" to which Nehru's reaction was unfavourable. His objection to the common defence was that

1. For the relations of India with the Western bloc see J.C. Kundra, INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY, Bombay, (1960) and for Pakistan's relations with the big powers, Keith Callard, PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY, London (1957).
2. HINDU (Madras), May 24, 1953.
it would depend upon a common foreign policy which might lead to military pacts involving us in commitment, going against our basic policy. Subsequently, the Prime Ministers' conference at Karachi was held in an atmosphere of "tremendous popular enthusiasm and friendliness". But the conference failed to find any solution to any of the outstanding problems between the two neighbouring countries. While Pakistan was greatly disappointed, the Indian Prime Minister said that the talks greatly helped towards understanding each other's position and attitude.

ARREST OF ABDULLAH:

The Karachi Conference was followed up by another series of talks in New Delhi between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan. The Prime Ministers' Conference of August 1953 was held in New Delhi under conditions of political tensions caused by the arrest of Sheikh Abdullah. Abdullah was described as the accredited leader of the people of Kashmir and for that reason he was deputed to represent the State's case in the Security Council during the early days of the Kashmir debate.


4. That explains India's illusion about satisfying her neighbour; whereas, Pakistan's disappointment led her to make far-reaching commitments to the Western bloc.

5. The role played by Sheikh Abdullah at the United Nations was disliked by both India and Pakistan. India felt disappointed that instead of presenting India's case, the Kashmir leader was concerned with "projecting his own personality," Vide B.L. Sharma op.cit.; p.84. Pakistan disliked him because he indulged in "all sorts of provocative attacks on Pakistan and its founder"; Sarwar Hassan, op.cit.; p.46.
On August 8, 1953 Sheikh Abdullah, who was until then the Prime Minister of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, was arrested and his government dismissed. In his place, his deputy, Bakshi Gulam Mohammad, was appointed as Prime Minister. In an elaborate statement, the Head of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, Dr. Karam Singh explained the reasons for the dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah and the subsequent steps he had taken to restore normalcy in the State. Some sections of political opinion in India believed that Sheikh Abdullah was involved in a plan to set up an independent Kashmir.

The idea of an independent Kashmir was often circulated in the Western press. As far back as 1948 Mr. Arce of Argentina pointed out in the course of his speech in the Security Council: "The fact that should be borne in mind is that Kashmiri people may well decide not to accede to India or Pakistan but to be independent." Dr. T.C. Spear also elaborated point in the course of a speech in London; according to him "the Vale of Kashmir should be turned into an independent State, an Asiatic Switzerland". Even Adlai Stevenson showed certain interest.

7. See KASHMIR, Current Affairs Publication, New Delhi (1953); p. 9.
in visiting Kashmir and had discussions with Sheikh Abdullah. Even though Sheikh Abdullah showed no sympathy towards Pakistan, his arrest in August 1953 created resentment in Pakistan. Pakistani Press and public opinion took a hostile posture against India; people were urged to get ready to liberate Kashmir. The Prime Ministers Conference held in Delhi between 16th August and 20th August, 1953 under such circumstances did not solve any issue.

DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS: PAKISTAN'S INITIATIVE:

In the wake of political uncertainty after the arrest of Sheikh Abdullah, the Pakistan Prime Minister, Mohammad Ali visited New Delhi to confer with his Indian counterpart. The meeting of the two Prime Ministers resulted in a communique which stressed the following points: (1) It was their firm opinion that this dispute would be settled in accordance with the wishes of the people; (2) The Plebiscite Administrator should be appointed before the end of April 1954; (3) All preliminary issues regarding the implementation of the Plebiscite should be decided by them only; (4) progress in this direction could be made "in an atmosphere of peace and cooperation between the two countries".

11. 'Ibid.' pp. 208-212.
The significance of the Prime Ministers' Conference and the subsequent Joint Communiqué was that it looked as if the initiative to solve the India-Pakistan problems had come back to the parties themselves. It also laid down definite policies for solving the Kashmir problem. While on the one hand Pakistan was satisfied that India had agreed to the appointment of a Plebiscite Administrator within a certain period, India on the other hand was satisfied that the administrator would not be from the United States of America or from any other big power. Pakistani Press interpreted the proposal as an Indian trap and as an attempt to "drive a wedge between Pakistan and U.S.A." That led to a bitter controversy between the two countries, and the possibility of a speedy solution to the Kashmir problem disappeared.

The Delhi meeting was followed by lengthy correspondence between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan. The letters reflected "deep-rooted suspicions" and "mounting disagreements between the two countries" over the nature of settlement of the Kashmir issue. Mohammad Ali was disappointed over the references made by Nehru that "one cannot go by the results of the plebiscite completely because some absurd results might follow." Nehru also referred to the "military and geographical factors" in fixing an international boundary between two

15. DAWN, August 27, 1953, cited Sisir Gupta; p. 272.
Mohammad Ali soon became disillusioned about his efforts for a peaceful settlement and felt that "Nehru's real reason for the talks was to tide over the popular uprisings following the arrest of Sheikh Abdullah". In the meantime, Abdullah's successor, Bakshi Gulam Mohammad was reported to have said that the plebiscite administrator would never be installed, and that Kashmir's "accession" to India was ratified by the Constituent Assembly. The Prime Minister of Pakistan referred to this statement in his letter and requested Nehru to repudiate it, and to reaffirm the earlier decision "to solve the dispute in accordance with the commitments". On March 5, 1954 Prime Minister Nehru replied in his letter that India could not take risks and must keep troops in Kashmir. He also reiterated that as the "accession of Kashmir to India was legally and constitutionally completed in October 1947, there was no question of confirming or ratifying it". With the hardening of Indian attitude towards the Kashmir issue, the India-Pakistan negotiations also reached their dead-end.


18. 'Ibid.' p.126.

The failure of the direct negotiations had far-reaching impact on the foreign policies of both the neighbouring countries. With the cold-war raging South East Asia in the wake of the Korean conflict, the Indian sub-continent acquired a special significance. In the development of distinct foreign policy of Pakistan, the years 1953-54 constitute the most significant period. It was during this period that she gradually abandoned non-alignment and started leaning more and more towards the United States. "The quest for security, the search for friends and allies, and the anxiety to maintain territorial integrity, led Pakistan to pursue a policy of alliance with the West, particularly with the United States".

Pakistan thought that the Commonwealth, to which both India and Pakistan belong, would be useful in solving the inter-state problems with her neighbour. But the cautious policies of Britain and her refusal to "offend" India disappointed the Pakistani leaders. As Keith B. Callard has pointed out, the foreign policy of Pakistan "begins at the Indian border." In other words, she wanted her friends to commit themselves clearly in her disputes with India. When in 1953 the hopes of a negotiated

20. Mushtaq Ahmad said, "The only guarantee of survival was military aid from United States". Also see G.W. Choudhury, op. cit. p.231.

settlement of the Kashmir issue receded, she turned to the United States for economic and military aid. As far as the U.S.-Pakistan relations were concerned, the change came from both sides.

The nature of international politics during the period necessitated United States to develop a world-wide network of military pacts. It was the immediate consequence of the United States failure in mainland China as well as the stalemate in Korea. There was widespread disillusionment with the collective security arrangements through the United Nations. Alarmed at the prospects of international communism, in the fifties, NATO and the OAS were supplemented by the SEATO and CENTO and by numerous bilateral accords. Thus in the world wide contest for power the United States exploited the anti-Indian feelings in Pakistan to safeguard her global interests through security pacts. On the other hand, Soviet Union in the post-Stalin period started "cultivating" India and the relationship between the two countries became "cordial" by 1955.

COLD WAR AND THE INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS:

Most of the nations which get liberated during the cold-war years, instinctively desired to keep aloof from the big-power


entanglements. In other words, non-alignment became the cardinal principle of foreign policy for most of the newly independent nations of Asia. It was significant that both India and Pakistan started their independent careers with non-aligned foreign policies. The foreign policy of a country is determined mainly by its geographic location, historical factors, demographic and economic factors and also by the political leadership of the country. In India, for example, Pandit Nehru was "the philosopher, the architect, the engineer and the voice of his country's policy towards the outside world." Pakistan, on the other hand, suffered from unstable governments. She was territorially separated by the Indian land-mass and her foreign policy was dominated by the fear of an Indian attack.

25. See citation 31 (foot note) below.
26. K.M. Panikkar, "The policy of a State is determined by its geographical position, the object of all policy is territorial security, and this is governed predominantly by geographical factors;" THE BASIS OF INDO-BRITISH TREATY, London p. 35.
27. George Modelski declared in an axiomatic language, "foreign policy, like other forms of human activity, takes place in a continuum in which present actions project their effects on the future and in which the past casts its shadow on the present," A THEORY OF FOREIGN POLICY, London (1962); p. 10.
29. Sharif al-Mujahid, "India-Pakistan Relations" in PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY, Karachi, (1964); p. 35.
Ideology had played a decisive role not only in the evolution of Pakistan nation-hood, but also in her foreign policy decision. The stress on ideology (e.g. Islam) was influenced profoundly by the fact that Muslims all over the world have a common cultural outlook and a common cultural heritage which bind them together. Pakistan wanted to forge friendly relations with all states, especially with the Islamic states. But according to her former Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakistan started her independent career without any narrow and special commitments and without any prejudice in the international sphere.

In the history of Pakistan's foreign relations, the policy of non-alignment was short-lived. Pakistani policy was guided by national and ideological interests. In understanding the national interests, her leaders often looked up to the history of the Pakistan movement; this brought to light the bitter conflict that existed between the Indian and Pakistani leaders. To quote Dr. J.B. Das Gupta, "the strong conviction that Pakistan, as a political entity, owes its birth to the unbending determination of the Muslim masses and that it had to be wrested from the unwilling hands of Hindus, made a deep impression on the Pakistanis - the interpretation often given that India's

ultimate objective is the destruction of Pakistan is further reinforced by the evidence of occasional demands of the Hindu communists in India to "reunify the motherland". It was her attitude towards India which was essentially responsible for discarding the non-aligned foreign policy and to adopt a pro-west policy in the fifties.

Pakistan, which was weak and divided, compared to a strong and unified neighbour, wanted economic and military assistance to improve her standard of living and to develop her military forces. She was urgently in need of a "patron" who could not only give monetary help but also "support her in the diplomatic disputes with India". The search for a 'patron' first made her "turn to the Commonwealth, then to the Muslim states and finally, after being cold-shouldered by both, to the United States". It was interesting that Pakistan's anxiety coincided with the American desire to have an ally in Asia; the desire was necessitated by the "exigencies of the cold-war", which had been shifted from Europe to Asia after the defeat of American policies in mainland China. The internal difficulties during the period and the failure of direct negotiations with India in 1953, hastened her policy of unqualified alignment with the United States under the Republican administration.

India, on the other hand, pursued the policy of non-alignment; in the context of the cold-war situation in international politics, India found that non-alignment was the suitable foreign policy. India believed in international peace; but the pursuit of peace was not through alignment with any power-bloc but by strengthening the United Nations and by reserving an independent approach to world problems. The non-alignment or "independent policy" of India was in the main to avoid any big-power entanglement and to preserve an area of peace in that part of the world.

During the early years of the post-war period, the cold-war among the super-powers was mainly confined to Europe; India with her post-Independence problems, was not a factor in the foreign policy of the big-powers. But in the fifties, tensions travelled from Europe to Asia and then to Africa also. It happened after mainland China became communist; subsequently, the Korean episode highlighted the trial of strength between the Western and the Communist blocs. India refused to see the East-west struggle in terms of communism and anti-Communism, one evil and the other virtuous. India vigorously adhered to non-alignment, and after the Korean war,

became highly critical about the Western policies in Asia and elsewhere.

Under the policy of "containment of Communism" the United States wanted to maintain the Western dominance; she did by direct involvement in the military and economic policies of weak nations and by taking over the British responsibilities and commitments in Asia. Thus with the gradual withdrawal of Britain from the big-power status and from effective control of Asian affairs, it became incumbent on the United States to shoulder greater responsibilities. Following the success of the North Atlantic Organization in the West, the United States was anxious to have world-wide net-work of defence pacts and military alignments to stem the tide of communism. In Asia, when India refused to co-operate with the policies of United States, she began to "cultivate" Pakistan. In their quarrel with India, the leaders of Pakistan were only too willing to join the Western alliance and get benefitted by their economic and military assistance. It was interesting to find that "the United States was never interested in Pakistan per se but only as a potentially useful instrument in meeting the Communist challenge". On the

42. Ibid.; The "United States did not wrest her primacy from Britain. It passed to her unopposed because Britain was no longer equipped to lead the West," p.9.
43. B.N. Chakravarthy, "There was a power vacuum in the area caused by the withdrawal of the British from India. Since India would not agree, Pakistan was the obvious choice to fill up this vacuum," INDIA SPEAKS TO AMERICA, p.130.
other hand, Pakistan aligned herself with the West primarily with a view to improving her overall position against India.

The years of collaboration between United States and Pakistan were also a period of deteriorating Indo-American relations. But it was also the period of cordial Indo-Soviet and Sino-Indian relations, epitomized by the Sino-Indian agreement on Tibet in April 1954, which contained the famous "Five Principles" of Panchashila. In the following year the Soviet leaders visited India and made several policy statements, including that on Kashmir. The Soviet leaders recognized "neutralism" as an honourable foreign policy and emphasized the policy of coexistence in international relations. On the Indo-Pakistan issues, the Soviet leaders recognized that "the problem of Kashmir was created by the imperialists and kept alive as an issue of vigorous contention and acute dispute between India and Pakistan. After long years of disinterestedness in the discussion in the Security Council, the Soviet Union for the first time used its veto in 1957 in the Kashmir case.

46. Khrushchev declared that the question of Kashmir as one of the States of the Republic of India has already been decided by the people of Kashmir.
47. Cited; A.S.R. Chari, "KASHMIR PROBLEM", Delhi; p.69.
48. On February 20, 1957, the Soviet Union exercised her seventy-ninth veto, but the first one cast by any power on the Kashmir question.
As the dimensions of cold-war grew more complicated in the early fifties, the scope of foreign aid expanded, and assistance went to ever more allies and non-committed countries. Pragmatically viewed, "foreign aid is an instrument of foreign policy". Because, according to Prof. George Liska, "foreign aid is inseparable from the problem of power; and where there is power, politics is the governing factor".

At the end of the war, as the United States became an active participant in "Realpolitik", she reversed her historic rejection of alliances and entered into them as a deterrent to Soviet expansion. Under such a policy of effective alliance, she used the instrument of foreign aid to win friends and allies all over the world. Under the foreign aid programme, while India accepted only economic aid with "reservations", Pakistan received both economic and military aid from the United States. The Indo-Pakistan talks of 1953 suffered a set-back because of the report of large scale economic and military aid to Pakistan from the United States. Subsequently, she joined the military pacts sponsored by the West and "accepted new international commitments which dramatically re-defined her position in world affairs".

49. George Liska, "THE NEW STATECRAFT", University of Chicago, (1960); p.15.
As a result of American military aid to Pakistan not only the India-Pakistan relations but the U.S.-India relations also suffered. Nehru pointed out that an expansion "of Pakistan's war resources with the help of the United States of America can only be looked upon as an unfriendly act in India and one that is fraught with danger". Pakistan's leaders brushed aside Nehru's views and said that India's real objection was borne out by her antagonism to Pakistan. According to them "Pandit Nehru was anxious to maintain the disparity between the military strengths of the two countries". Thus it was in an atmosphere of recrimination and tension between the two countries that the Security Council took up the Kashmir issue once again in 1957.

In a communication to the Security Council dated January 2, 1957, Sir Feroz Khan Noon, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan reported that the direct negotiations initiated on the suggestion of the US Mediator did not bring about the desired result. He complained of an "intransigent attitude" on the part of India and pointed out that India had failed to honour her international agreements. According to a commentator on India-Pakistan relations, "Pakistan was observing a Kashmir Day and the entire sub-continent was full of tension when the Council met on 16 January, 1957 to discuss the letter."

52. C.W. Choudhury pointed out that India herself received massive military aid from Western nations, op. cit., p.234-36.
The Foreign Minister of Pakistan said in his opening speech, "the Government of India is taking steps to integrate the State of Jammu and Kashmir into the Indian Union, in defiance of the Security Council's clear directives and of its own freely accepted international obligation that the question of accession shall be decided by a free and impartial plebiscite". Noon contended that the issue of military aid to Pakistan or her joining defence pacts were beside the point. These issues cannot alter the basic fact of India's commitments and could in no way affect the right of "self-determination" of the people. He also recalled the assurances given by India that the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir did not possess the right to take any decision about accession. He quoted extensively from letters and speeches of Kashmiri leaders to bring home the idea that "the occupied Kashmir today is virtually an armed camp with some 82,000 Indian soldiers there". Finally, he called upon the Security Council to issue a directive to India not to go ahead with the integration; and secondly, the Council "under Article 57, para 2 of the Charter, spell out the obligations of the parties, under the terms of the international agreement for a plebiscite as embodied in the UN resolutions".

56. Reference to Beneraul Rau's speech, in which he said, "the Constituent Assembly is not intended to prejudice the issues before the S. Council," 533rd meeting, 1 March 51.
Indian representative V.K. Krishna Menon prefaced his lengthy speech as follows: "we came here eight and one half years ago with a complaint of naked aggression against our territory, and we shall ask the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, to order the cessation of this aggression. There have grown many trees in the discussion that nobody sees the wood". He contended that there was no international agreement involved in the acceptance of the UNCIP resolutions. There was only an understanding reached that when suitable conditions were created "negotiations would start" to settle the problem in accordance with the wishes of the people. He said that implementation of Part II was a condition to "start negotiations to complete Part III of the resolution dealing with plebiscite". "If number two does not happen, number three is out of court."

He denied 'intransigence on the part of India' and said it was Pakistan which sabotaged the US plans of plebiscite by refusing to create favourable conditions for it. Mr. Menon rejected the "two-nation" theory and declared that India is a secular state where religion is only a private affair. On the other hand, "India also claims Islam as one of the Indian religions."


59. See Rahmatullah Khan; according to him it is a misreading of the competence of the Security Council, in the field of dispute - settlement no resolution is binding; "KASHMIR AND THE UNITED NATIONS", Delhi; 1969; p.135.

60. Krishna Menon maintained that the "problem of plebiscite has bogged down under the conditions of plebiscite"; and, Pakistan had consistently refused to create the conditions by withdrawing her troops - P.V./S.C.O.K., 785th meeting, 24th January, 57.
Just as it does Christianity or any other. Therefore, we refuse to accept the thesis that because the population of a particular area is of one religion, some political issue is involved". Menon said that time was an important factor and that the future of a state cannot be allowed to hang in balance for an indefinite period.

JARRING MEDIATION:

Even before the Indian representative had completed his speech, a draft resolution was sponsored by five members of the Security Council. Mr. Menon wanted to go on record that the resolution was mooted even before one party could complete their statement. Under the five power resolution, the Security Council recalled the previous Council resolutions and UNCGIF resolutions and reminded that the Kashmir problem should be settled "in accordance with the will of the people expressed through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations." It further reaffirmed the March 30, 1951 resolution, and said that "it decides to continue its consideration of the dispute".

61. Five powers were Australia, Cuba, Colombia, U.K. and U.S.A., all were members of SEATO, and were Pakistan's military allies.
The Soviet delegate Mr. Sobolev expressed strong opposition to the resolution because it had not taken into consideration the changed situation and that "the question had already been settled in accordance with the expressed wishes of the people of Kashmir". He also objected to the reference to the March 30, 1951 resolution, "which was from the start unacceptable to one party to the dispute". In spite of Indian rejection and Soviet objection, the draft resolution was passed which contained two significant features: First, a new mediator was appointed to negotiate a settlement between the parties; secondly, the recommendation for the use of UN force to assist in the demilitarization and plebiscite.

The resolution was clearly in favour of Pakistan; not only there was an unusual haste but there was the open reference to UN troops, which Pakistan had mooted several times before. Mr. Noon paid glowing tributes to the U.K. representative Sir Pearson Dixon and said that he had rendered "great assistance to Pakistan. India, on the other hand was very critical. Mr. Menon said that India would not refuse hospitality to Jarring, the new UN Mediator; but the Council "dare not ask us to accept the introduction of foreign troops on our sacred territory". It was interesting to find that contrary to several other members, the Colombian delegate Mr. Urrutia said that the Council cannot forget the fact of aggression and that the promise of a plebiscite will not hold good for all time to come. He also pointed out that

65. 765th meeting, 24 January 1957.
for introducing UN troops into Kashmir, the consent of India was necessary.

Once again, at the 770th meeting the Soviet delegate Mr. Sobolev spoke on the amendments brought out by him and said that the Soviet Union would vote against the resolution "as it did not correspond to the true situation in Kashmir". Accordingly, on 20 February, the Soviet Union voted against the resolution, while there were nine votes in favour and Sweden abstaining.

Since the negative vote of the Soviet Russia amounted to a veto, the resolution was rejected. Subsequently a simplified resolution was passed by the Council which "requested the President of the Council and representative of Sweden to visit the sub-continent and conduct talks which are likely to contribute towards the settlement of the dispute". Speaking after the adoption of the resolution, Krishna Menon said, "the territorial integrity of Kashmir was inviolable. Subject to this consideration, India's hospitality and courtesy would be extended to the UN representative, although it might not be possible to consider matters of high policy till the elections were over in India".

66. 768 meeting, 15 February, 1957.
67. S/3789.
68. The Soviet Union came out with complete support to India while the Anglo-American powers supported Pakistan. The cold-war within the Council was complete. Russia also agreed with India that plebiscite would no longer be feasible in Kashmir.
69. The simplified resolution was moved by U.K., U.S.A. and Australia.
70. F.V./S.C./K., 774th meeting.
Mr. Gunnar Jarring conducted negotiations with the Indian and Pakistani leaders during March and April 1957 and submitted his report to the Security Council on 29 April, 1957. India urged that before any dialogue could start on the issue of plebiscite, Parts I and II of the August resolution of UNCIP should be implemented. Furthermore, India brought a complaint of aggression committed by Pakistan and that it was "incumbent on Pakistan to vacate aggression". Jarring pointed out that the Council had "taken cognizance of the Indian complaint" and that he was not in any way authorized to make any statement on the question.

Regarding the implementation of Part I of the August resolution, Pakistan maintained that "it had been implemented in good faith and in full, and that the time had come to proceed to the implementation of Part II. The United Nations representative, when confronted with a conflict in interpretation of the previous resolution, suggested that the matter be referred to arbitration. While Pakistan accepted the suggestion, India rejected arbitration. Thus Mr. Jarring also failed to break the deadlock and finally referred the issue back to the Security Council without making any concrete proposals for settlement.

The UN representative, even though he did not make any proposal for settlement, he did point out the political conditions in the sub-continent and the difficulties of an
over-all plebiscite under such conditions. His concluding remarks were: "In dealing with the problem, I could not fail to take note of the concern expressed in connection with the changing political, economic and strategic factors surrounding the whole of the Kashmir question, together with the changing pattern of power relations in West and South Asia". He also pointed out that even though he could not break the deadlock, "both parties are still desirous of finding a solution" and that too "in a peaceful manner".

About five months after the submission of the Report, the Security Council met on September 24, 1957 to discuss the Report. The Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Noon accused India for not carrying out the international obligations and not co-operating with the UN mediators. He said that too much importance should not be attached to the reference to "the changed conditions", because it referred only to the "changed attitude of India". Regarding the allegation of aggression he said that even the members of the Security Council did not take the Indian complaint seriously. Mr. Noon rejected India's objections to the military build-up as outside the purview of the UNCIP resolutions. He also narrated the steps taken by India to integrate the State of Kashmir with the help of the "bogus" Constituent Assembly. The Pakistani representative said finally, "India was defying not only the will of the people of Kashmir but also world opinion; it was the Security

73. *Ibid*, para 20
Councill's duty to make India vacate this blatant aggression".

On October 9, 1957 the India representative made his observation on the Jarring Report; he reiterated India's stand and said that Pakistan had not only manifested the conditions for a plebiscite, but increased her military might during the last few years. He dwelt at length on the "changed conditions" to which Mr. Jarring had made a reference in his report. He rejected the suggestions of arbitration and UN force as unacceptable to India. Soviet Union supported the Indian stand on the impracticability of a plebiscite under the changed conditions. Mr. Sobolev further said: "any sort of proposal to send international troops to Kashmir or to refer the question to arbitrators and mediators primarily represents a blatant attempt to exert pressure on India".

On November 16, a draft resolution was moved by United Kingdom and supported by Australia, Colombia, Philippines and United States. The resolution sought to give another chance to Dr. Graham for implementing the UNCIP resolutions, particularly for the reduction of forces on either side of the cease-fire line. It requested the parties to maintain peaceful atmosphere in order to facilitate the final "settlement.

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75. 795th meeting, 9 October,1957.
76. 799th meeting, 12 October,1957. The pressure tactics of the Western powers against India have become open within the Security Council. Vide B.L.Sharma,op.cit.p.48.
of the dispute". The UN representative was urged "to make any recommendations for further appropriate action with a view to making progress toward the implementation of the resolutions of the UNCSIP of 13th August, 1948 and 5th January, 1949 and towards a peaceful settlement". An amended resolution was finally adopted by the Council on December 2, 1957 because the Soviet Union threatened to use her vote on the original one. Even at the amended stage, India was not in a position to accept the resolution; however, she agreed to confer with the UN mediator, Dr. Graham for finding a solution to the Kashmir problem.

FAILURE OF GRAHAM MISSION AGAIN:

Dr. Graham's renewed efforts failed to bring about the desired settlement. He visited the two countries, India and Pakistan, toured extensively between January 12 and February 15, 1958; on 18th March, in a lengthy report to the Security Council, he reported failure of his mission. He undertook his mission at a time when the relations between the two countries were far from cordial. There were reservations on both sides regarding his power and nature of mediation under the terms of the resolution of December 2, 1957. In India it was an election year, while Pakistan was on the verge of a political upheaval. Within six months after the departure of Dr. Graham from the sub-continent, the Prime Minister, Noon was dismissed, Constitution was abrogated and a military regime was installed.

78. 305th Meeting, 21st November, 1967.
Dr. Graham began his negotiations on the basis of the UNCIP resolutions because both the Governments of India and Pakistan "affirmed that they continued to be engaged by these resolutions". But soon he found that conditions had changed radically during those ten years and rendered settlement difficult. Even though there was the provision for the withdrawal of Pakistani troops, there was no machinery to effect the withdrawal. Similarly, the phrase "under the surveillance" evaded an acceptable interpretation; the determination as to who were the "local authorities" under the resolution was also not possible. To meet the Pakistani objection of creating a vacuum by withdrawing Pakistani troops, he suggested that UN troops be stationed in the evacuated territory. He wanted an early agreement between India and Pakistan on the interpretation of the plebiscite provisions in the UNCIP resolutions. Dr. Graham also suggested a conference of the Prime Ministers under the auspices of the United Nations.

The Report said that "Pakistan had agreed to these recommendations in principle". Pakistan was willing to withdraw her troops along with the bulk of the Indian troops. She was also agreeable to the suggestion of introducing the UN troops. Lastly, the Government of Pakistan agreed to the proposal for a conference of the Prime Ministers. But India, on the other hand "declared themselves unable to agree to the recommendations". The US mediator pointed out, "in their view, that territory was an integral part of the Union of India, while the recommendation
was based on the misconception that Jammu and Kashmir was a no-man's land. India could not accept the proposals because "the aggressor and the aggressed were placed on the same footing". Thus a conference at the Prime Minister's level could not be held because of the preliminary disagreements over primary issues. As the proposals of Dr. Graham were completely unacceptable to one party, his mediation efforts came to nought once again.

Throughout the discussions on the Kashmir question in 1957 India was accused in the Council for not implementing the Security Council resolutions of previous years. Not only the Pakistani delegate but a number of other delegates also spoke about Indian "intransigence". Noon said that India's action in Kashmir was "in defiance of the Security Council's clear directives and its own freely accepted international obligation that the question of the accession shall be decided by the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite". The Cuban representative in the Council said that India's attempt to integrate the State with her territory was contrary to the Council's resolutions. Similarly, Urritia of Colombia said that the Security Council's resolution of 30th March 1951 was binding on India and that she had not fulfilled her obligations. Iraq and China also supported Feroz Noon's argument in the Council.

On the other hand, Indian representative said that there was no question of obligations on her because firstly, the resolution

81. Since then, not only the Pakistani Press but the Western Press also accused India for not cooperating with the UN mediators. The New York Times said, "India's intransigence is no longer directed against Pakistan. It is directed against the United Nations itself"; April 15, 1958.

of 30 March, 1951 was not accepted by India; secondly, necessary conditions were not created for conducting the plebiscite. The crux of the matter was that the "original sin of Pakistan had vitiated the conciliatory efforts".

After the failure of the Graham Mission for the second time and with the change of government in Pakistan, the Indo-Pakistan relations began to deteriorate. Prime Minister Noon's conciliatory approach to Indo-Pakistan problems proved to be short-lived. The new supreme leader of Pakistan, President Ayub Khan declared in October, 1958: "No Pakistani can forget Kashmir. We in the army feel it more because we recognize the significance of the problem". A few days later, the President said at a news conference in Decca, "the first thing to note about Kashmir is that, apart from any other consideration, from the purely military and security point of view we have to continue the struggle for the liberation of the State of Kashmir. In no circumstances can we give up the struggle ...... We shall be definitely glad to have a settlement through peaceful means. But if we are forced to adopt means other than peaceful, the blame will surely lie at the door-step of India".

One of the consequences of the UN failure to find a solution to the Kashmir problem was the growing shift in Pakistan's foreign policy. Towards the sixties, she started cultivating

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83. See, Rahmatullah Khan, op. cit.; p. 105.
China through border agreements. India's estrangement with China over the Tibet issue brought China and Pakistan closer. As a corollary, Pakistan began to rely less on the Western bloc thereafter. It was significant that Pakistan's foreign policy was always shifting in relation to the changing nature of international politics.

As a result of a thaw in the East-West relations in the sixties, the global commitments of the super-powers have undergone radical changes. Under the changing situation, even the strategic location of the Kashmir territory did not mean much to the Western powers. On the other hand, the Communist China has become a power to reckon with. To the West, India became an important factor in their policy of containment of China; the military bases in Pakistan have become less important, thanks to the development of ICBM and other modern military innovations. As a corollary, Soviet Russia too changed her policy of antagonism towards Pakistan to "mutual friendship" in recent times. However, for Pakistan, Kashmir is still the touchstone of her foreign relations: "The alternations in the degree of friendliness of Pakistan's relations with the United States, Soviet Union and China reflect this single-minded approach to foreign affairs."