Chapter II

THE EMERGENCE OF THE WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION
The Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) is really the product of the cold war. The process of establishment of the Warsaw Pact unfolded itself as the international environment after the Second World War moved towards cold war. In other words, the actual ground reality of international politics appears to be the crucial factor in the emergence of the Warsaw Pact. It is therefore, logical for us to look at its historical background and then focus attention on the actual process of its establishment in the mid-fifties. However, before going into the historical background it is appropriate here to have a brief discussion on the Western perception of the Soviet state. Such an exercise will help us to understand as to how this shaped the cold war and eventually gave birth to NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

Soviet State and Its Post-War Western Perception

The October Revolution of 1917 not only caused a historical breach with the past; but also enunciated a "paradigmatic change"; symbolised by an "epistemological rupture". This was believed to be far more comprehensive and encompassing than any heretofore social, political or scientific change.1 Thus, it was logical that the new

1. Such a view can be found in: Thomas S.Kuhn, Structure of Scientific Revolution (Chicago, 1970); Thomas S.Kuhn The Copernican Revolution: Planetary Astronomy in the Development of Western Thought (Cambridge, 1957); A.R.Hall, The Scientific Revolution 1500-1800 (London, 1954); Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds., Criticism
Soviet state altered the foundations of the Tsarist state and evolved its own domestic and external policies.

It is, however, unfortunate that most of the Western writings on the Soviet Union and its foreign policy simply did not recognise the epoch-making character of the October Revolution. For these scholars, analysts and commentators, the Soviet state ever since 1917 was nothing but a continuation of the totalitarian Tsarist state prior to the revolution and as such thus its foreign policy was also a continuation of the imperialist expansionist policies of the Tsarist state. Most of their works attempt to explain Soviet foreign policy in terms of historical variables like the "Great Russian imperialism and expansionism", its "authoritarian bureaucratic and fossilised tyranny", its "Byzantine traditions", its "constant geo-political hunger", its "Russian nationalism" blended with the "Russian Orthodox Church". That the

Marxist philosophy simply reinforced these determinants. The so-called "Rational Policy Model", "Organisational Model" and "Bureaucratic Politics Model" simply sought to analyse the authoritarian nature of the Soviet state much to the exclusion of its organic composition. The logic was presented in a marvellous teleological sense. It was argued also that it was the strategic superiority of the United States which simply held the Russian expansionist drives in check. Even the so-called realist writers maintained the same "expansionist view" of the Soviet Union, according to this "axiomatic understanding", its the Russian expansionist drives which caused the cold


war not only bringing to a grinding halt the inter-war cooperation.\textsuperscript{5} It is significant to note that many Western writings helped form enemy-like images of the USSR and the West.\textsuperscript{6} However, it is a fact that "revisionist"

5. This is indeed quite in contrast with many of the works produced by the third world scholars who have made quite objective analyses of the Soviet foreign policy after the October Revolution. Among these scholars, Prof. Zafar Imam's works stand out as pioneering and representative. His "Third Approach" to the study of international relations, more so foreign policy avoids the pitfalls of doctrinaire Marxism and pro-Western model building and attempts to explain Soviet foreign policy from a third world perspective. His important works are the following ones:

- Zafar Imam, Colonialism in East-West Relations: A Study of Soviet Policy Towards India and Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917-47 (New Delhi, 1969);
- Soviet View of India 1957-75 (Delhi, 1977);
- Towards a Model Relationship: A Study of Soviet Treaties with India and Other Third World Countries (New Delhi, 1983);
- USSR: Sixty Years: Economic, Social and Political Development (New Delhi, 1981);
- Zafar Imam, ed., Restructuring Soviet Society (New Delhi, 1987);
- Zafar Imam and Andras Balogh, Political History of National Liberation Movements in Asia and Africa 1914-85 (New Delhi, 1988);

6. See for a cross section of views,
- Herbert Fleis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought (Princeton, N.J., 1957);
- William MacNeill, America, Britain and Russia: Their Cooperation and Conflict 1941-1946 (London, 1953);
- Norman Graebner, Cold War Diplomacy 1945-1960 (Princeton, 1962);
- Louis B. Halle, The Cold War As History (New York, 1967);
- M.F. Hertz, Beginning of the Cold War (Bloomington, 1966).
historians have partly apportioned the blame for starting the cold war on the United States of America. In the end, however, what counted in policy-making were the words of President Truman, Clark Clifford and George Kennan. The "Kennan Telegram", the "Clifford Report", the American Atomic test wrote the "Cold War Script". It should, however, be noted that most of these cold war historians and writers simply do not recognise that "the October Revolution of 1917 in any way gave rise to a new state with its characteristic domestic and external policies".

Not only that, this perception of threat from the Soviet Union has also exercised a fundamental referential influence on American policy-making to such an extent that it has created an entire "discourse" for itself serving as a rallying point for all anti-Soviet forces. Rightly Michael Foucault describes discourses as much more than linguistic exercises; they mediate relations of power, formulating rules, codes, norms to establish a particular set of understandings by attempting to construct a particular kind of knowledge within the given normative

framework". Thus an entire discourse that dominated the post-war scene in the US were characterised by "Containment", "Roll Back Communism", "Bolshevik Menace", "Deterrence" concerns for "National Security" and "Realist Construction of Geopolitics". The discourse drew on the "geopolitical scripts" of Mackinder and Spykman to provide a totalitarian interpretation of Sovietology, largely utilizing exclusively a "Determinist interpretation" of Tsarist history and its Soviet appendage to rule out any international coexistence. Geopolitics understood as military control over territory in dialectical convergence with the Bolshevik threat virtually inflated the "Other" to gigantic proportions to draw on an "epochal anti-Soviet script" to resolve its own "existential-ideological dilemmas" almost to the extent of what R.D.Laing calls, the "ontological insecurity".


geographical occupation of the Mackinderian heartland of Asia and the potential Soviet domination of the Euroasian landmass are consistent themes in the American geopolitical discourse. Thus the Soviet Union comes to be perceived as the "Other" not only territorially but also politically. As Edward Said has analysed, "Territory is no doubt a geographical notion but it is first of all a juridico-political one: the area controlled by a certain kind of power".

Some scholars like Charles E. Nathanson argue that in the immediate post-war years when the Truman administration was vacillating between threatening and conciliating the Soviets, George Kennan's secret cable from Moscow in 22 February 1946 and the arrival of the atomic bomb laid the foundation for a new "realist script".

After its use in Japan, the atomic bomb generated institutional ambitions in the foreign policy circles and came to be coterminously identified with national


security. Though retiring Secretary of War, Henry Stimson's memorandum to President Truman urged him to share the atomic information directly with the Soviet Union, it could not get through the administration. The bomb had increased national virility tremendously.

Our discussion above amply underlines how a characteristic self-imposed Western image of Soviet state and society provided an inflammable material for a confrontationist international politics of the time. Let us now turn to an analysis of international politics of the first decade of post-Second World War years as well as Soviet security perception. It is only in this perspective that we can historically situate the Warsaw Pact. The cold war politics of the first decade as it was viewed by the Soviet policy makers through the prism of its theory of war and peace provided the obvious material for establishing a socialist alliance system. And this is what is now the subject of our analysis.


Emerging Problems of Soviet Security

During the first decade of post-Second World War years, the basic issue of security for the Soviet Union and the European socialist countries was related to:

(1) The German Question;
(2) The territorial status quo and stability of the socialist countries of Europe;
(3) The US atomic test in 1945; and
(4) The extension of US hegemony over Europe as the leader of the West.

The German Question

The fear of a rearmed Germany is crucial to any understanding of Soviet foreign policy after the Second World War. For a thousand years the Germans had pursued their "Drang nach Osten" of recurrent war and colonisation against the Slavs. A.J.P.Taylor wrote: "From Charlemagne to Hitler, the Germans have been converting the Slavs, from paganism, from Orthodox Christianity, from Bolshevism, from being Slavs". 16

After the war Stalin did not underestimate the threat that the 'fascist revival' in Germany posed. One of the fundamental objectives of the Soviet foreign policy after the war, according to a Soviet publication, was the

settlement of the German question in a way that would strengthen international security, meet the interests of the nations, including the German people and would be in accordance with the agreements reached between the allies in the anti-Hitler coalition. "The Soviet proposal envisaged the creation of unified peaceful Germany, a democratic republic with a parliament consisting of two chambers and a central government". 17 However, the US, British and French representatives were opposed to the creation of a central German parliament and a central government. 18 The Soviets claimed that their policy was supported by the progressive forces of the German people and the People's Democratic Governments of the Central and South-East European states who shared a deep interest in the remoulding of life in Germany on democratic principles to prevent the revival of fascist militarism in Germany. 19 The position of these countries was reflected in the 1948 Warsaw meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the USSR and Yugoslavia, on the German Question. This Warsaw


meeting condemned the separate decisions which had been
taken shortly before at the meeting of the representatives
of the USA, Britain, France, Belgium, Holland, and
Luxembourg in London on the formation of the Federal
Republic of Germany. These decisions went against the
resolution of the Berlin conference and other agreements
worked out by the USSR, the USA and Britain during the
war.

The Western states, led by the USA, were deliber-
rately planning to divide Germany and install a regime of
its liking so that remilitarization could proceed
smoothly. And this kind of a policy finally led
to the 'blockade' which began on 20 March 1948 and
then to the final division of Germany.

Territorial Status and East Europe

After the war the West tried its best to install
reactionary puppet regimes in the East European states but
miserably failed, since very soon socialist governments
came to power in these states. Understandably this
process created controversy. One biased author says:

20. "The Truth About Western Policy on the German Ques-
tion," Historical Survey (Moscow), 1959, p.25 (in
Russian). See also, A Decade of American Foreign
Policy: Basic Documents 1941-49 (Washington, 1950),
p.603.

21. Germany 1947-49: The Story in Documents (Washington,
1950), p.70.
"The Soviets played an essentially opportunistic non-ideological role in Eastern Europe's initial developments. They cared little about the previous policies or the ideology of the men in power in the coalition governments so long as they were not anti-Soviets." 22 Another observer said of Stalin, "As a result of his ideology and methods, his personal experience and historical heritage, he trusted nothing but what he held in his fist and every one beyond the control of his police was a potential enemy". 23 Such misunderstandings are rightly contravened by Soviet authors, Leonoid Yagodovsky and Iger Chelyahev when they say: "One of the major outcomes of this historical process were the victorious socialist revolutions in a number of countries of Europe and Asia and the formation of a world socialist system as a socio-economic and political community of countries advancing towards socialism". 24 Enhanced revolutionary activity of the broad popular masses in these countries in the mid and late 1940s led by the communist and workers' parties brought into existence socialist states. In Poland for instance,


Britain and the USA sought to establish reactionary governments made up of the representatives of the bourgeois emigre government in London. On 28 June 1945 following the talks in Moscow, the representatives of the Krajana Rada Nasodawn (KRN) which was Poland's supreme organ of power, a number of emigre political figures, constituted a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. After the defeat of the Polish reactionary forces, Soviet-Polish relations got improved. The new Polish-German border was established along the Oder-Neisse Line at the Berlin Conference. Besides, Poland's primordial territory west of Konisberg was returned to her. And after the Berlin Conference, a Soviet-Polish Treaty was concluded.25 Strategically of course, Poland was important to the Soviet Union as Stalin said at Yalta, "For the Russian people the question of Poland is not only a question of honour but also a question of security.... Since in the past 30 years our enemies, the Germans have passed into Russia (through Poland)".26 It is in this sense that Stalin had an interest in the Polish Communist Movement which later on established the government.

25. Collection of Operating Treaties, Agreements and Conventions Concluded by the USSR with Foreign Countries, issue 12 (Moscow, 1956), pp.336-42 (in Russian)
During the Second World War itself, the USSR had already developed friendly relations with resistance movements in Czechoslovakia, Poland and Yugoslavia. Similarly, the Kasia Programme for the development of new Czechoslovakia which was made public by the government of the National Front of the Czechs and Slovaks on 5 April 1945 declared as a basic principle the desire for a lasting alliance and cooperation with the USSR in the military, political, economic and cultural fields.27 Here again, the efforts to bring Czechoslovakia to the Western fold was decisively foiled by the struggle of the working class, the efforts of the Communist Party and by the support lent by the USSR.28

Similar developments were seen in other parts of East Europe, as Soviet authors asserted.

Cooperation between the socialist forces in Yugoslavia and the USSR had developed during the war. The support of the USSR went a long way in foiling the plans of internal and external reactionary forces to establish a puppet reactionary regime. The Communists dominated the Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation formed in March 1945.29

29. Ibid.
In the early post-war period relations between the USSR, on the one hand, and between Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, on the other was largely of military and political nature. However, soon economic relations got established. In 1944-1945 the first and second Soviet Polish economic agreements were signed. The USSR agreed to supply fuel, raw materials, transportation and other goods which included armaments and ammunition.30

The USSR extended the help of 40 million roubles to Czechoslovakia in 1945 and 600,000 tonnes of grain during the 1947 drought.31

Contractual economic relations were established between the USSR and Yugoslavia in 1945. On 15 December 1945, according to Soviet Bulgarian Agreement 30,000 tonnes of corn and 20,000 tonnes of wheat were sold to Bulgaria.32 In 1945, Romania received 300,000 tonnes of Soviet grain credit. According to agreement signed with Poland in 1948, it received $100 million for the period 1948-52. A large role was played by the CMEA (Council of


Mutual Economic Assistance) established in 1949 by the representatives of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and USSR in Moscow.33

The Soviet Union actively supported the measures of a democratic, anti-fascist nature in all countries whose reactionary governments had sided with Nazi Germany during the war. In Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania where the Soviet troops were stationed, the Soviet Union facilitated the steady implementation of the agreements signed between the members of the anti-Hitler coalition on the extirpation of the vestiges of former fascist regimes. The progressive anti-fascist forces in those countries had a loyal ally in the person of the USSR which reliably safeguarded them against direct interference by outside imperialist forces and also against international reaction-unleashing a civil war.

Likewise, extensive help was accorded by the USSR to the People's Republic of Albania.

In 1948, the USSR signed treaties of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance with Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria.35 The East European socialist countries on their part concluded treaties of mutual assistance with each other - in 1946 treaties were signed between Poland and Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia and Albania,


34. Editorial Board, n.24, p.104.

in 1947 between Poland and Czechoslovakia, Albania and Bulgaria, in 1948 treaties were signed between Bulgaria and Romania, Hungary and Romania, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Poland, Hungary and Poland, Bulgaria and Hungary, Romania and Czechoslovakia, in 1949, Poland and Romania and Hungary and Czechoslovakia. In all, those countries along with the USSR signed 35 bilateral agreements with each other in the late forties. It ensured them peace and security, on the path of socialist construction under the leading role of the USSR. They were of great importance not only for the security of these countries but also for the security of the Soviet Union.

On 7 October 1949, the German Democratic Republic was formed and was recognised by the USSR and other socialist countries.36 This became an out-post of the socialist system, nearer to the West.

In 1949, Stalin proposed the creation of a unified Germany which would be neutralised and disarmed. This proposal was rejected by the West even though it was popular in many quarters on the ground that it was a Soviet device to drive a wedge between the Western allies and the German people. It would have prevented the

re-emergence of German threat and would have created a large buffer zone between Soviet and Western territory. 37

Churchill's Fulton speech on 5 March 1946, in which he described Russia's hold on Eastern Europe as an 'iron curtain' gave the green light to the cold war. From Potsdam onwards, East-West relations soured. Certain things had been decided - the zones of Germany and Austria and the sectors of Berlin and Vienna and some issues were ducked, the peace treaties and reparation, while some issues concerning Poland and the UNO idea had been partially resolved. Moscow wanted the recognition by the West of the crystallization of the socialist bloc along with the East European socialist states. A Churchill's confidant wrote: "Stalin's tenacity and obstinacy have no counterpart on our side. He knows exactly what he wants and he does not mind how he gets it. He is very patient too and never loses his temper". 38 Stalin was disappointed over reparations and the USA and UK refused to break off relations with Franco's Spain or grant the USSR a trusteeship of Italy's colony, Libya.

US Atomic Test and US Hegemony Over Europe

The successful atomic test on 16 July 1945, the day after the Potsdam Conference opened up the world's first nuclear device at Alemgordo, New Mexico added to the complexities of the straining relations. It added to Stalin's fears and suspicions and drove a rift at the Potsdam.

Adding to this, the US Lend-Lease Shipments to USSR were suspended on 8 May 1945, by Truman. Stalin felt that it had been ended "in a scornful and abrupt manner" and as a means of showing American displeasure with the USSR."40

But one of the most important issues which was much dear to the Russians and highly misunderstood by the West, was the issue of reparations. Daniel Yergin writers, "The Americans could never comprehend the emotional intensity the Russians attached to reparations. Reparations may well have been a "test case" for the Russians as East Europe was to become for the Americans".41 On the other hand, the West continued to misunderstand the Russians. Truman wrote that he had realised at Potsdam that "the


Russians were planning world conquest". In fact, facts belied this kind of an understanding. Stalin's pronouncements never gave any inkling of this kind. The Red Army was demobilised rapidly from a peak of 11,365,000 in May 1945 to 2,884,000 by early 1948. And moreover, the sixty Red Army divisions in Eastern Europe were performing merely police roles and were not deployed as spearheads against the West.

Lots of efforts were undertaken to bridge the nuclear gap. However, even if the Americans had the nuclear monopoly till the USSR exploded its first atom-bomb in 1949, it was of little military value. The only instance in which the Americans used nuclear diplomacy against the Soviets in the 1940s was in July 1948 when at the start of the Berlin blockade, B-29 atomic bombers minus bombs were moved to the UK, although this had no discernible effect on the crisis. And to bridge this 'nuclear gap', Stalin wanted to build his own bomb: that is the reason why he rejected the Baruch Plan which he thought to be discriminatory.

43. Joyce Kolko and Gabriel Kolko, n.22, p.33.
The Russian drive for security for itself and the socialist system has been highly misunderstood by some as ultrapatriotism, ultranationalism and ultraslavophilism. Historian Konstantin F. Scheteppa said, "a new Slavophilism negating Western influence extolled Chernyshevskii, Lenin and Stalin at the expense of Marx himself", 46 has developed. And this kind of an analysis has been further extended. Karen Dawisha writes, "The Soviet conception of Europe is contradictory. The source of that contradiction is deeply embedded both in Soviet history and Soviet ideology. Dating from 1836 with the publication by Peter Chaadeyev of the "First Letter", Russian political life was divided into the two schools of 'Slavophilles' and 'Westernisers'. 47 And of course Marxism could not remove the 'Slavophilism'. Trying for security for itself and its fraternal allies was nothing but an expression of Slavophilism. This only befogs the strategic needs of the Soviet Union in the post-war scenario. However, by 1947, East-West relations were really getting strained.

The Cold War: The First Decade

The Truman doctrine, the Marshal Plan, the European Defence Community Project, the remilitarisation of Germany

crystallised the cold war. These exercised negative paradigmatic influences on East-West relations. Hence, we discuss as to how the cold war unfolded gradually.

In 1947, the Truman doctrine was proclaimed and the Marshall Plan was launched with the desired intention to rehabilitate West Europe and turn it into a major bastion of their political and military strategy - to split Germany and turn its western segment into a bridgehead in the fight against the USSR. The Truman doctrine provided for military aid to Turkey and Greece and support for the reactionary forces the world over through military and economic aid. Walter Lippman wrote that, in proclaiming the Truman doctrine the USA targeted its policy on Greece and Turkey not because they really wanted its assistance, but because they provided it with a strategic gateway to the Black Sea.

In January 1949, leaders of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the USSR met in Moscow, discussed the forms of cooperation for economic development. To facilitate such a task it was decided to set up the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA)


49. See Western Europe: Militarism and Disarmament (Moscow, 1966), pp.8-9.
with the object of exchanging economic experience, providing each other with technical aid and mutual help with raw materials, foodstuffs and equipment. Albania joined the CMEA in February 1949 and the GDR in September 1950.

The establishment of the world's first multilateral organisation of the socialist nations on economic cooperation led to the beginning of a new stage in building international relations of a new type based on the principles of internationalism. The work of CMEA, has been built on the Leninist principles of equality, respect for the sovereignty and national interest of its members, mutual benefit and comradely assistance. One of the organisations' basic goal has been to promote genuine cooperation between peoples and strengthen peace and friendship and to ensure the security of the socialist countries.

The formation of the CMEA strengthened the positions of the peace forces in Europe while its further development and expansion of cooperation between its member states and the growth of their economies favourably influenced the international situation in Europe and throughout the world.50 The struggle waged by the Soviet

Union and the People's Democracies of Central and South East Europe against the threat of a new world war became even more meaningful." 51

The economic resurgence of Western Europe and moves towards integration in the European Coal and Steel Community in 1950, coupled with the political confidence of the region brought about by America's new found commitment to the defence of the West in the North Atlantic Treaty posed serious challenges to the Russian policy planners. NATO provided a framework within which Western military might could grow under the US nuclear umbrella and moreover American troops returned in strength to Europe. 52

The move to rearm West Germany, enshrined in the European Defence Community idea first originated in the French National Assembly on 24 October 1950. 53 John Foster Dulles's "Doctrine of roll-back" which argued that a forceful American foreign policy might help the East Europeans to roll-back the occupying Russians and thereby dismantle the Iron Curtain, and his belief in 'Brinkmanship' the ability to get to the verge of war without getting into war in his dealings with Moscow - coupled

52. Sanakoyev, n.28, pp.72-110.
53. Mooney, n.37, p.103.
with the plan of rearming West Germany and simultaneously increasing the strength of the NATO posed serious threats to the security of the socialist countries. The decision reached at Potsdam in 1945 to demilitarise and democratise Germany was disparaged by the West. It partitioned Germany by forming Bizonia and Trizontia and finally in 1949, formed a Bonn state deriving its sustenance from monopoly capital and clerical support. The refusal of the West to sign a collective treaty as proposed by the Soviet Union and its going ahead with German militarization and its integration into the NATO system posed severe threats to the security of the USSR and other socialist countries.

The British Chancellor of the Exchequer said: "The rearmament programme unprecedented in times of peace imposed a heavy additional strain on the economy". The direct military expenditure of the fourteen NATO countries in 1952-53 totalled 75,000 million dollars and more than four-fold increase compared with 1958. Nearly ten percent of the US budget was meant for armaments and maintenance of armed forces. There was a deliberate

54. See John Foster Dulles, War or Peace (New York, 1957), p.103.


conspiracy to restore the regime of the Junkers and Ruhr industrialists in Germany to prevent any of the social reforms long over due in Germany and there was a conspiracy to prepare Germany for a future base of aggression against the Soviet Union. 57

The boosting of the West German rearmament, the plan to make it the chieftains of "Little Europe" belied the myth of Soviet menace. The Soviet government had already proposed the peaceful use of atomic energy in industry, agriculture, medicine, technology etc. It said: "The countries party to the agreement guided by the desire to lessen international tension shall give a solemn and unconditional undertaking not to employ atomic, hydrogen or any other weapon of mass destruction. 58

The European Army Project - the idea of European Defence Community were promoted in the face of supposed Soviet threat. Adenaur told in Paris: "A defence community would make war between two or more of its members impossible for all time. That indeed is the principal aim of the European Defence Community; to make war between the European states, particularly between France and Germany permanently impossible." 59

57. Wilfred, G. Burghett, Cold War in Germany (Melbourne, 1950), p.10.
58. Ibid., p.20.
59. Ibid., p.15.
Rightly wrote Drew Middleton, the Chief of the European Bureau of the New York Times: "The US wants to fight the Russians and will use the Europeans as cannon fodder and Europe as a battle ground." 60

The defence expenditure of the European NATO nations (excluding Greece and Turkey) in the year ending 30 June, 1955, was estimated at $12.3 billion a year, which was double of what it had been in 1950. In the beginning of 1955, the NATO powers had the capacity to raise 100 divisions by way of total mobilisation and possessed more than 6000 planes, an eight fold and fifteen fold increase respectively over the 1949 figures. Whereas in 1951, the NATO had only 10 air fields capable of handling jets and not more than 21 aerodromes, by 1952, the US could now make use of the 142 air fields in any emergency." 61

The signing of the Paris Agreement in October 1954, was a major step in consolidating NATO. Adenaur observed, "The basic idea was that the anti-German character of the Brussels Treaty should be abandoned and that the Treaty should be extended by the admission of Germany and Italy." 62

61. Burghett, n.57, p.15.
By 1955, the US had succeeded in forging other multilateral military alliance such as the SEATO and the Baghdad Pact (later CENTO) and in concluding bilateral pacts with Japan, Korea and the Republic of China. By 30 June 1955, the US had shipped $11.4 billion worth of military equipments to bolster up the defence efforts of more than 35 friendly countries. Of this sum $8 billion went to its European allies.63

Thus, remilitarisation and war hysteria kept increasing in crescendo. General Gruenther, NATO Supreme Commander said: "In the next three or four years we will have the potential for launching an attack by long and short range aircrafts, by guided missiles and by artillery I am talking about atomic weapons."64

The Bonn and Paris Treaties were signed. The American plan basically involved the building up of a "Franco-German war machine" against Moscow. According to the Paris Treaty, the armed forces of the six European states would be under American command. The Russian proposal for collective efforts at solving the German problem was not acceptable to the western nations. They were not interested in solving the German problem but

64. New Times (Moscow), 20 March 1959, p.5.
managed to continue the partition and thereby continued remilitarisation. They did not trust the German democratic forces.65.

The West German army, was to have an initial strength of 550,000 but with an understanding that the number would be raised to 2,000,000 within a very short period. Moreover, 100,000 former Nazi officers were included in the Register.

According to the Mutual Security Act of 1951, the US government was allocated 100 million dollars for every species of sabotage and subversion in the Soviet Union Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Albania and in the Soviet zones of Germany and Austria.66

The Tripartite Declaration made by USA, France and Britain on 27 May 1952, published in connection with the signing of the Paris Agreement said: "If any action from whatever quarter threatens the integrity and unity of the community, Britain and the United States will regard this as a threat to their own security and will act in accordance with Article 4 of the Atlantic Treaty."67

65. See Documents on Germany, 1944-61, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, December 1961 (Washington, 1961).


67. Ibid.
In Berlin, the Soviet Union proposed the creation of a General European System of Collective Security with measures which would neutralise Germany. V.M. Molotov suggested the following agenda for the Berlin Conference:

1. Measures for lessening international tension and the convening of a conference of Foreign Ministers of France, Great Britain, the USA, the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic.

2. The German Question and safeguarding the European Security.

3. The Austrian State Treaty, Molotov continued: "The Berlin meeting is for our four countries to desist from attempts to pit themselves against one another at least as far as the interests of peace, the interests of European security are concerned. A way out will not be difficult to find if we all agree that the resurgence of German militarism must not be allowed."

The West did not pay any attention to the Soviet proposal to demilitarise Germany. The German Wehrmacht continued. The Reynolds News of 17 January wrote: "There are to be twelve divisions in the New German Army. Backed by the power of the Ruhr, it will be the most powerful

69. Ibid.
single fighting force in Western Europe. The history of this century teaches that when the Germans are strong they use their strength to aggrandise German power. In all our lifetime, Germany's conception of good Europe has been a Europe with Germany at the top.\textsuperscript{70} Lord Ismay had labelled the Soviet proposal as "mockery" of western ideals. Speaking before the Royal United Service Institution he denied that Stalin's death had removed the military threat from the East.\textsuperscript{71}

Harrison Salisbury of \textit{New York Times} wrote, "that the whole pattern of Soviet proposal for a 29 November General European Conference resembles one of Pavlov's famous conditioned reflexes. It has all been gone through before every time some step is taken in the west which appears to bring a German military contribution one step closer to fulfilment, the conventional counter response of the Soviet foreign office has been to propose a conference just as the Russian scientist's dog salivated automatically at the sound of the feeding."\textsuperscript{72}

The tests at the Bikini atoll further deteriorated East-West relations. The Washington Post wrote on 28 March

\textsuperscript{70. Ibid.}


\textsuperscript{72. New York Times, 21 November 1954.}
1954: "The poisoning of fish in the Pacific by the Bikini explosion gives every sign of poisoning American relations with unnumbered potential friends in Asia and indeed throughout the world." 73

The Czech Rud-Pravo wrote: "A meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers, as proposed by the Soviet government in its statement of 4 August, might undoubtedly pave the way for a broader conference of all the countries interested in collective security. An exchange of opinions on the German Question at the proposed meeting of the four ministers would be only natural, since the German Question and the question of European collective security are so closely interconnected that it is impossible to explore a solution to the problem of collective security without striving at the same time to find ways and means for reaching agreement on individual aspects of the German problem.

The Western countries did not take into account the Soviet suggestion to institute a four power commission to investigate the conditions in West Germany whether the conditions for a free all German election existed at that time. 74 Rather they were more interested in promoting the German wehrmacht.


After the French disagreement over the European Defence Community Project the foreign ministers of USA, UK, France, Italy, Canada, West Germany and other Benelux countries met in London on 28 September 1954. The American proposal was interpreted by the Observer, London: "West Germany is to start rearming unilaterally with tacit American blessings and support even before there is agreement on her admission to either the NATO or the Brussels Pact". 75

The formation of the Western European Union took place in the London Nine Power Conference: It was hailed as a great event, a great coalition of free nations which disguised the fact that it was in fact a bullwork of anti-communist hysteria.

Rightly, J.P.Jain says: "The fear of West Germany's remilitarisation was indeed real for the Soviet rulers. They were aware of the fact that there was no Atlantic between the Soviet Union and Germany, not even a channel, and memories of the German invasion, when a nation of eight million attacked a nation of sixty million, devasted its western provinces and almost reached its capital, were still fresh in the minds of the Soviet leaders". 76

75. The Observer (London), 29 September 1954.
A note sent by the Soviet Government to the governments of Europe and the USA on 13 November 1954, mentioned the threat posed by the rearmament. It said: "An armed force is to be created in West Germany which in the very near future will number 500,000-520,000 men and will possess large air and tank units and have its own military staffs.... The West German army is to be formed under the direction of German Generals who commanded the Nazi army in the Second World War and who were accomplices in the fascist aggression and in establishing Hitler's ferocious "New Order", in European countries. The London and Paris agreements would also give the West German militarists and revanchists a free hand for unlimited armament production. The West German armed forces will likewise be allowed to possess atomic weapons which will greatly enhance a destructive atomic war in Europe."  

The above discussion highlights the hawkish policies followed by the Western governments which ruled out the possibility of a general European collective settlement of the major issues like the German Question. This forced East-West relations to the point of no return. The Soviet Union and the East European socialist countries had exhausted their efforts towards peaceful negotiations. So, as a last alternative these countries met at the

Moscow Conference to discuss the varied aspects of European security. But as things would have it, it ultimately led to the Warsaw Conference in 1955 in which the Warsaw Treaty was signed. Below we discuss the Moscow Conference and the Warsaw Conferences.

Establishment of the Warsaw Pact

A Conference of European countries on safeguarding European peace and security opened at 3 p.m. on 29 November 1954, in Moscow. 78

The Moscow Conference was attended by delegates from the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, and a representative from China attended as an observer. In it, the head of the Soviet delegation V. M. Molotov said: "The fact should not be lost sight of that the aggressive elements in certain countries well known to all, are resorting to every means of pressure to expedite the remilitarisation of West Germany and its inclusion in their imperialist military alignments.... Krupp, Abs, Zangan, Dinkelbach and other West German monopolists who were among the chief organisers of the militarisation of the German economy on the eve of the

Second World War, are already playing a leading role in the remilitarisation of West Germany". 79

The Czech delegation represented by the Prime Minister William Siroki said: "The Paris guarantees" against the menace created by the reemergence of German militarism are actually no guarantee at all. The only guarantee is not to allow it to re-emerge to prevent the remilitarisation of Germany. That is the only possible way of assuring that the security of European nations will not be threatened by German militarism which has always been the ineverate enemy of their liberty and independence. 80

Otto Gotewohl, the Prime Minister of the German Democratic Republic declared that the aggressive German militarists believe that a West German Wehrmacht, coupled with a policy of strength, would enable them to bring the German Democratic Republic and the East European countries under their domination. They were only emulating Hitler's policy of setting up a "new order in Europe". 81

The Conference declared: "It should provide for consultation whenever, in the opinion of any of the parties the danger of an armed attack should arise in Europe, in order to take effective measures to remove the

80. Ibid., pp.30-33.
81. Ibid.
danger. To be effective, this system must provide that an attack on one or several states in Europe shall be regarded as an attack on all the parties to the General European Treaty, and that each party shall assist the state attacked with all the means at its disposal including the use of armed force, for the purpose of re-establishing and maintaining peace and security in Europe.

It would, in a large measure, facilitate the settlement of the German problem since, it would rule out the conversion of West Germany into a militarist state and would create favourable conditions for the restoration of Germany's unity...." 82

As a follow-up measure, on 14 May 1955, the Warsaw Conference of European Countries on Safeguarding European Peace and Security was called upon in which Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, GDR, Poland, Romania, the USSR and Czechoslovakia participated.

In the Conference, Bulganin made it clear that 'in the new situation' created by the ratification of the Paris Agreements and the "activisation of the aggressive forces" throughout the world the bilateral treaties were considered to be no longer enough. 83 The need was felt to

82. Ibid., pp.64-65.

take effective measures to unite their forces and further strengthen their ties of friendship and cooperation. He talked of not only German militarism, encouraged by the US and its threat to European peace and security, he also talked of similar threats posed by the US and its allies in the Middle East in the Far East, and in the South East Asia. The proposed treaty as he said, would define obligations of joint defence in the event of an armed attack on any of its parties. If such an attack should take place each of the parties to the Treaty in the exercise of its right to individual or collective self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter, shall immediately, either individually or in agreement with the other parties come to the assistance of the state or states attacked, with such means as it deems necessary including armed force. In such an event the parties to the Treaty should immediately consult as to the measures to be taken by them jointly in order to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Thus, it provided for the establishment of a "Joint Command" of the armed forces. It was also envisaged that the parties to the Treaty would adopt other coordinated measures necessary to strengthen their defensive

84. Ibid.
85. Ibid.
power in order to guarantee the inviolability of their frontiers and territories and so provide defence against possible aggression.

Further, it provided for mutual consultations among the parties on the important international issues affecting common interests. And more significantly, cooperation was not limited to defence only, but also it embraced the development and expansion of their economic and cultural relations.

Thus the Warsaw Pact came into existence as a socialist alliance system unprecedented in history. It intended basically to preserve the security of the socialist countries in the face of mounting western threat. It filled indeed a huge long felt "security void" that had arisen as a result of NATO's emergence and growth. Henceforth, European security came to be perceived in a bloc-wise manner. The Warsaw Pact provided enough strength to both the small and big socialist states who no longer perceived themselves as the would be victims of the western threat and German ravanchism. Let us see what the leaders of these countries said on the occasion of the signing of the treaty.

The Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia William Siroki, voiced serious concern over the remilitarisation of West Germany. 86

The Prime Minister of Poland Jozef Cyrankiunic said: "The Paris agreements are the most striking manifestation of the so-called 'position of strength' policy a policy aimed at war... where do the Paris agreements lead? The militarist forces are being recreated, a neo-Hitlerite Wehremacht is being build-up which from the very start will have over 500,000 effectives, in addition to the internal security and police forces."\(^{87}\)

The Treaty was in accordance with the UN Charter. Moreover, attempts were to be further made for a general European collective security treaty. Rather than being aggressive the Treaty had the most basic task of defence—against the aggressive designs of the western countries.

The Polish Premier rightly believed that the Treaty would ensure the security of Poland, the Polish boundary on the Oder and Neisse by the help of the joint Command supported by the mighty Soviet forces.

Otto Grotewohl, the Prime Minister of the German Democratic Republic said in the conference; "By resorting to diverse manoeuvres, the American and German militarists have managed to bludgeon the Bonn Bundestag into endorsing the Paris agreements. This represents a further step in

deepening the division of Germany and converting her western part into a war base and strategic vantage ground of American and German imperialism." 88

Andnas Hegedus, the Hungarian Prime Minister proclaimed: "Of all the aggressive natures of the western powers, the most dangerous to the peace and security of the nations is the resurrection of German militarism." 89

Mhemet Shehu, the Prime Minister of the people's Republic of Albania said that German imperialism always looked upon the Balkan peninsula as an important objective of its Drang nach osten - that Albania was committed to, honourably discharge the obligations following from the Treaty.

Gheorghe Gheorghiu Dej, Prime Minister of Romanian People's Republic said: "The conclusion of a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance by the nations represented at this conference and the organisation of a joint command will serve to enhance cooperation between our eight countries in every field, will strengthen their international position and will create the confidence that they will not be taken unawares by an aggressor." 90

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Vylko Chervenkov, the Prime Minister of Bulgaria said that the rebirth of German militarism had led to intense activities by the aggressive forces all over the world. He said "We do not want military blocs; we do not want to see one group of states pitted against another, we want peaceful co-existence, regardless of the difference in social systems.... The Treaty which we shall sign here on behalf of our government will serve the cause of peace." 91

Our investigation of the process of the emergence of the Warsaw Pact clearly brings out the fact that it was the logical result of the cold war. It signified formal institutional division of Europe into two well defined socio-economic formations poised for an eye-to-eye confrontation. Two specific issues of post-Second World War Europe were to become decisive factors, the emergence of a nuclear armed West Germany and the traditional haunting fear of the security of the Soviet Union and its allies. Besides, the leaders of the Western democracies were certainly in no mood to take cognition of the traditional fear of security for the Soviet state and its allies among the Soviet leadership.

For the new generation of post-Stalin leadership headed by N.S. Khrushchev it was certainly a reluctant decision to establish the Warsaw Pact. This certainly

showed acute awareness of the economic consequences of arming the Warsaw Treaty Organisation matchingly with NATO. Besides, it foreclosed their option to get out of the Stalinist syndrome.

In the final analysis the emergence of the Warsaw Pact qualitatively transformed the international system. It began desperately to look for a way out in an ironical manner thus the Non-Aligned Movement of the new emergent countries of Asia and Africa provided a ray of hope. Hence, inspite of US Secretary of state Dulles, Khrushchev began to quote the Non-aligned Movement and thus helped in transforming international politics from Euro-centrism into a global process. It was indeed logical therefore to see the very growth and development of the WTO as conditioned by the emerging ground realities of the international system. Meanwhile peace in Europe indeed all over the world was preciously held.