Chapter VI

EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND THE WARSAW PACT: PROBLEM OF
EUROPEAN SECURITY AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT
East West relations is a vast and complex subject to deal with. This certainly is beyond the scope of our present study. However, East-West relations cannot be totally ignored when we are concerned with the functioning of the WTO. Admittedly, the WTO was conceived as a structured military alliance yet it became one of the tools of the diplomacy of the European socialist states, above all, the Soviet Union. The role of the WTO vis-a-vis East-West relations was primarily articulated in dealing with problems of European security and reduction of arms, both nuclear and conventional in Europe. Hence, it is logical for us to look at this specific aspect of the WTO vis-a-vis East-West relation right from mid-fifties onwards. However, we must make it quite clear at the very outset that we are not concerned here, with the entire gambit of East-West relations as this is beyond the scope of our study.

Let us begin here by looking at the perception of the Soviet union of the functioning of WTO vis-a-vis East-West relations on the specific problems of security and reduction of conventional and nuclear weapons in Europe. This we propose to do in a historical sequence.

Later we follow this up by an examination of certain landmarks in East-West relations in those problems like the MBFR talks, SALT negotiations, and the Helsinki Conference and other related issues.
However, before we attempt to understand the role of WTO vis-a-vis the East West relations, it is important to make it clear that in most of the cases, the WTO policies mean the policies of the Soviet Union. This is because, the Soviet Union is the dominant partner of the alliance which is responsible for originating, guiding and shaping its policies. This however, does not mean that the East European members of the WTO have always accepted the Soviet policies. There have been instances of disparagement and dissidence. But in general, it is a fact that the Soviet policies have shaped the contours of the WTO policies. Moreover, the WTO came into existence only in 1955 whereas, the Soviet Union had embarked on a policy of peaceful coexistence and proletarian internationalism from 1917 onwards. And these policies have guided the policy postures of the WTO over the decades. Moreover, during our analyses in the earlier chapters we saw that the Soviet Union has played a predominant role whether in formulating the security and military doctrine, meeting defence expenditures providing forces and equipments etc. It is this overall predominance of the Soviet Union which had led its larger influences in shaping WTO policies with respect to the East West scenario. Whether it is the issue of peaceful coexistence, European security, disarmament, strategic arms control, detente etc. in every thing the Soviet Union
has been the main architect of the WTO policy postures. This, however, does not underwrite the views and postures of the East European countries. It is in this perspective in analysing the WTO's policies and roles, we actually start with the policies of the Soviet Union in a historical setting.

Soviet Union and European Security

The establishment of a European security system has been one of the most important foreign policy goals of the Soviet Union ever since the end of the Second World War. It centers on putting an end to arms race, deeper political detente and relaxation of military tension, East-West cooperation in the field of economics, culture and human rights, science and technology overcoming the division of Europe, protection of environment. The socialist countries proceed from the idea that the European relations that took shape during the Cold War have been restructured on radical lines. In their concept of European security, the socialist countries are thus shifting the accent to the continued deepening of detente to disarmament to the normalisation of the international climate, to the restructuring of the entire system of international relations on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence. Brezhnev in this context had said, "Today detente is neither a theory, nor a slogan, nor wishful thinking. It has a record of fine achievements,
perfectly concrete and tangible. In Europe, it is the basis of relations among states and had embraced different aspects of their life."¹

Lenin emphasized that peaceful coexistence between states with different socio-economic systems was inevitable. While pointing out this way back in 1920 he said that, the policies of the Western countries constituted a major obstacle to the growth of allround cooperation among nations.² Lenin had said that the problem of war and peace has a special place on the concept of peaceful coexistence; it is pivotal to the policies of any country, a question of life and death for millions upon millions of people.³ The importance of peace and detente has been consistently felt among Soviet policy-makers. Underlying its importance Brezhnev had said in the Helsinki Conference: "They will contribute to improving the life of people, providing them with work and expanding educational opportunities. They are concerned with care for health, in short with many things affecting individuals, families, youth and different groups of society."⁴

1. Parvda (Moscow) 26 April 1978.
3. Ibid., p.55.
4. L.I. Brezhnev, Following Lenin's Course (Moscow, 1975), p. 582.
European detente has proceeded on the one hand under the influence of the sum total of the contradictions between states belonging to different social systems and on the other, the requirements stemming from common interests and need for cooperation. In fact, the complex interplay of various tendencies make the advancement of detente a difficult process. The principle of proletarian internationalism, dialectically tied in with the peaceful coexistence principle, determines many aspects and possibilities of the policy of peace and international detente, helping to take account the allround interests of the socialist countries, all the democratic forces and all the peoples of Europe. It is indeed pertinent in this connection to note the views of the Soviet Union on the proceedings of the Helsinki Conference. It said, "The accords reached as a result of the Conference are well in line with Lenin's principles of peaceful coexistence, international cooperation, peace and freedom of the nations which the Soviet state has championed along with whole of the historical way." 5

It was in the Genoa Conference in 1920, that the Soviet Union through its representative, G.V. Chicherin had first talked of European security, international cooperation, disarmament and the use of new political methods to ensure peace and also the concept of an European and an international security system, the peaceful

settlement of disputes. Chicherin had said, "Peace is the pivotal idea of our policy."  

During the inter-war years, despite the capitalist encirclement and consequent interventions by the Western countries the Soviet Union adhered to a policy of peaceful coexistence. In fact peace was the cornerstone of its policies.

The post-Second World War period saw an end to the "imperialist encirclement" of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the socialist bloc. The constant threat to the security of the Soviet Union as was marked during the period of capitalist encirclement was replaced by a kind of mutual rivalry which was dubbed by Walter Lippman as "Cold War." However, if the nature of threat changed, it was not of insignificant proportions. But the emergence of a host of socialist countries strengthened the security of the Soviet Union in providing, physical, ideological and moral support. This had been dealt with at great length in the first chapter as to how, these developments had led to the emergence of the Warsaw Pact in 1955. By that time, the Cold War had come full scale. The USA and its allies then were talking of "rolling back communism," "positions of strength", "massive retaliation." The West German rearmament, the

Marshal Plan, the Truman Doctrine, had consolidated the Cold War.

Hence it is important to analyse broadly the various measures which the Soviet Union undertook towards European peace and security.

**Various Measures of the Socialist Countries Towards European Security**

It was only when the Soviet Union acquired strategic parity that the West took seriously its attempts towards international peace and security. The 1962 Berlin blockade demonstrated quite categorically the Soviet resolve to face Western threat squarely. The 23rd Congress of the CPSU in March-April 1966, proclaimed the need to begin negotiating on the whole package of European security questions including the problems of an European peace settlement for Germany.

The Political Consultative Committee meeting of the WTO in Bucharest in 1966 adopted a declaration on strengthening peace and security in Europe. It called for the simultaneous dissolution of the two military alliances. The issues were further taken up in the Karlovy Vary Conference in 1967 of 24 European Communist and Workers' Parties. It urged the recognition of existing European boundaries, the Oder - Neisse borderline and that between the FRG and the GDR, renunciation of the FRG's claims to represent the whole of Germany, recognition of the Munich Agreement as, invalid from the beginning. It called for
an all-European Conference on Security and Cooperation. The Soviet-US strategic nuclear parity which took place in the early 70s tilted the correlation of forces in favour of the socialist countries. The report of the US President to the Congress in 1970 took note of this fundamental changes. It underlined the balance of forces shifting in favour of the Soviet Union. 7


The International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow on 17 June 1969 talked of the significance of European security in the minds of European peoples.

The principles of cooperation between USSR and France signed in Paris on 30 October 1971 further contributed to the relaxation of tension in Europe. The treaty between the Soviet Union and the FRG signed in 12 August 1970 was another significant step towards detente. The Parties pledged to settle their disputes "exclusively by peaceful means and to refrain from the threat or use of force in matters bearing on European and international

security. They pledged not to encroach on each others' frontiers. 8

This was followed by treaties concluded between USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the GDR's universal recognition as an equal sovereign state, the four power Berlin Agreement further led to the growth of detente. This had culminated in the 1975 Helsinki Conference which was indeed a great milestone towards European security. Addressing the Conference Brezhnev said, "The Soviet Union soberly assessing the correlation and dynamics of the various political forces in Europe and in the world firmly believes that the powerful currents of detente and cooperation on the basis of equality, which in recent years have increasingly determined the course of European and world politics, will gain, thanks to the conference and its results, new strength and greater scope." 9 Brezhnev's visit to FRG on 4-7 May 1978 marked a new stage in the development of detente. All this indeed anti-climaxed in 1979 with the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and again another period of Cold War ensued between the super powers which greatly vitiated the East-West relation.

World Correlation of Forces

Having discussed the various measures which the Soviet Union took towards European Security, it is important to analyse the concept of "correlation of forces" and how it impinges on the Soviet concept of peace and security.

The Soviet concept of the correlation of forces lies at the root of all their thinking in international affairs - this is also true of disarmament. In order to change the balance of forces in the world in its favour it attempts to draw together the peace loving forces of the world. In this attempt the Warsaw Treat Organisation, the Council of Mutual Assistance, the international workers movement, the national liberation movements have indeed come quite handy. As the Soviet encyclopedia puts it, "Despite the efforts of Cold war warriers to prevent the implementation of any measures designed to limit or abolish armaments, the change in the world correlation of forces in favour of socialism and peace has created real possibilities for the gradual solution of the problems of disarmament." 10

The 17th Party Congress in 1934 (during the time when Soviet Union was still weak) did express quite categorically that the world correlation of forces would change in favour of socialism.

In 1959 during Khruschev's days it was argued that when the Soviet Union becomes the leading industrial power in the world, when China becomes an important industrial power and the socialist bloc as a whole accounts for over half the world's industrial output, then the new correlation of forces will become so obvious that even the stupidest imperialist will realise how helpless it would be to start a new war against socialism.

In 1961, Khruschev in the changed international atmosphere quite confidently declared that the West could start a new war only at the risk of their own downfall.\textsuperscript{11}

The Brezhnev period found the world correlation of forces much to their favour and thus the Soviets believed that in such a favourable situation disarmament proposals appeared quite attainable. In 1976 Gromyko said that the forces of socialism were now being transformed into something capable of exercising a decisive influence on the whole of world politics; that this success inspired him with a feeling of optimism; and that he looked forward with confidence to other successes in the field of Soviet foreign policy making.\textsuperscript{12} At this stage the West also gave up its policy of nuclear blackmail given the massive build-up of Soviet forces, both conventional and nuclear.

\textsuperscript{11} Documents on Disarmament, (Washington DC), 1978, p. 344.
\textsuperscript{12} Kommunist (Moscow), no. 14, 1976.
Thus Brezhnev's view that the "correlation of forces continues to change" proved later quite prophetic for Soviet policy-makers.

Having dealt with the correlation of forces, we should have to discuss the issue of disarmament in the Soviet scheme. This will provide greater insight into Soviet peace and security policy.

The Issue of Disarmament

Khruschev said, "The fight for disarmament is an active fight against imperialism." Disarmament in the Soviet paradigm was supposed to subserve its grand strategy: thus in the realm of international affairs it was to destroy imperialism prevent new world war, strengthen socialism.

In the Soviet thinking the cause of arms race is militarism which is a product of capitalism-imperialism. Thus if one wants to put a stop to arms race, he should try to find some measures of slowing it down.

Brezhnev expressed similar sentiments when he said that the time has arrived for halting the arms race.

In the Soviet thinking disarmament meant general and complete disarmament - partial disarmament and

14. V.I. Skopin, Militarism (Moscow, 1956).
qualitative disarmament.\textsuperscript{16} The Soviets have preferred not to use the American term "arms control;" rather have made use of the term "arms limitation." This is indeed quite contrary to earlier Marxist view on the subject which conceived of disarmament as prejudicial to revolution: thus believed in arming the proletariat to defeat the bourgeoisie.\textsuperscript{17} This was quite in tune with the necessities of the times. General and complete disarmament would have further weakened the weak Soviet state facing "capitalist encirclement." Thus the Soviet policymakers at that time were more interested in partial disarmament.

Between 1917 and 1939 the Soviet Union on four principal occasions put forward proposals for complete and general disarmament. This is because it believed that disarmament in the true sense was not so much of a possibility given the nature of capitalism. This is indeed evident when they say that true disarmament is only possible when the socialist revolution is victorious through out the world.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{16} See \textit{Diplomatischeskii Slovar}, 3rd edn. (Moscow,1971); See also \textit{ Bolshaya Sovetshkaya Entsiklopaedia} (Moscow, 1977), vol.16, p.256.

\textsuperscript{17} See Lenin, vol.42, n.2, p.105.

\textsuperscript{18} \textit{Documents on Disarmaments} (Moscow), 1960, p.128.
In the post-Second World War period, the attitude of the Soviet government towards disarmament underwent a sea change. This is because, from the Second World War it has emerged stronger with the emergence of the group of socialist countries. Moreover, it had exploded an atomic device in 1949 breaking the monopoly of the Americans, though until 1958 she did not possess the means of delivering nuclear warheads to American cities.

Thus in the post-war period, the Soviet Union not only talked of general and complete disarmament, but also talked of nuclear armament. The reasons are obvious. The advantages accruing from such measures appeared quite significant than the disadvantages. One of them was the saving on resources. Deriving propagandistic advantages was also another important reason. The Soviet policy-makers however did not disparage the earlier thesis that no ultimate disarmament is possible until capitalism-imperialism survives with its attendant mode of production. Khruschev consistently struck to this point; so also Brezhnev and Kosygin.19

Though the USSR tabled suggestions for nuclear disarmament as early as 1948, it did not table any proposal for general and complete disarmament until 1959.

It is here important to note that even in the post-Second World War period inspite of acquiring significant military strength, it emphasised more on nuclear disarmament than on general and complete disarmament. This is the reason it walked out of the 1960 Geneva Conference and it did not show any interest in the disarmament proposals of the West in 1962 and 1965.

In its disarmament proposals the Soviet Union has always insisted on banning the nuclear weapons, destruction of the delivery systems and the abandonment of foreign bases. About 1964, it included also the destruction of the bombers.

The 1959 Soviet proposal of general and complete disarmament outlined that in the first stage there would be a reduction of the forces of the USA, USSR, China to 1,700,000 a piece and those of UK and France to 650,000 men. The second stage did include the abolishing of foreign bases. The Soviets however, were themselves not quite serious about this proposal, nor did they expect the west to take it seriously. The propaganda advantage of this proposal was a major consideration among the policy-makers. In fact, it is believed that the Soviets did not even wish the west to take it seriously.

The proposals was presented to the 14th General Assembly in New York on 18 September 1959; it read, "The confrontation of power groups, within which tens of
states are linked by mutual military commitments and the
dramatic advance of military technology—all this requires
bold and far reaching decisions to ensure peace.... Any
inequality of terms and the possibility of creating
any military advantages for a group of countries are
totally ruled out in the implementation of general
and complete disarmament." 20

The Soviet Union proposed the abolition of armies,
navies and airforces, the dismantling of general head
quarters and military schools so that countries would only
have the minimum internal defence contingents equipped
with small arms designated for the maintenance of domestic
law and order. It also called for the destruction of all
existing atomic and hydrogen bombs, military missiles of
every range, and also all means of chemical and bacteria-
logical warfare; poison and asphyxiating substances,
artificially developed bacteria. It also called for the
peaceful use of nuclear energy.

The Warsaw Treaty countries agreed with the Soviet
proposal: it stated in a declaration, "The disarmament
proposal submitted by the Soviet government to the United
Nations Organisation expresses the common stand of the
Warsaw Treaty countries of all socialist states." 21

After the Western reluctance to go ahead with the
Soviet proposal in the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee,

20. Izvestia (Moscow) 19 September 1959.
the Soviet Union produced further proposals on 2 June 1960.  

Later on the Soviet Union and the socialist countries suspended their participation in the committee.

The Soviet Union again submitted elaborate proposal called, "Basic principles of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament" on 23 September 1960. It was rather a modified version of the earlier proposal and was presented to the 15th UN General Assembly. The Soviet Union kept complaining that the west was unenthusiastic about this proposal.

At the 16th General Assembly on 26 September 1961 the USSR presented a memorandum on nuclear weapons tests and another calling for relaxation of international tension. They together called for moratorium on military budgets, renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons, prohibition of war propaganda, conclusion of a non-aggression Pact between NATO and WTO, withdrawal of troops from foreign territories, creation of nuclear free zones and steps to halt proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The Soviet proposal for General and Complete Disarmament at the Eighteen-Nation Committee in March 1962 called for, general and complete disarmament within four years, in three phases. The first phase would see

the elimination of all means of delivery of atomic and hydrogen weapons, the dismantling of foreign bases. The measures would be implemented under strict and dependable international inspection.

The Central Committee of the CPSU in its report outlined the need for an end to arms race both in nuclear and conventional weapons and emphasised that general and complete disarmament would continue to be the leitmatif of Soviet foreign policy.

There is indeed a fundamental difference in the attitudes of the East and West over disarmament proposals. The west has believed over the years that the balance of terror has worked well and therefore any reductions in the armed forces should aim to preserve the balance at every stage of reduction. The method of disarming seems to be fair in the sense it does not give any advantage to either party - reduction should take place across the board. This has never found favour among the Soviet policy-makers. This is the reason they have again and again rejected the western proposals - one example being the rejection of the US proposal on 17 August 1965.

Though a set of "Agreed Principles" for the bringing about of general and complete disarmament was

27. Brezhnev, n.4, p.353.
evolved and signed by the Soviets and the Americans in 1961, it could not be implemented because of disagreements over control clauses. The Soviets have never come to terms with these clauses in the past occasions also because of their innate reluctance to accept the presence of foreign inspectors on their territory.

Except in those occasions, before 1939 when the USSR had shown interest in partial disarmament i.e., 1922 Moscow Conference, 1928 Preparatory Commission meeting for Disarmament Conference in Geneva and 1932 Disarmament Conference the USSR had in general shown no interest in partial disarmament, since it would have been quite disadvantageous to the USSR. It would have little preventive effect on any probable capitalist invasion against the USSR. Moreover, it would have little propaganda value. However, in the post-Second World War period, the Soviet Union displayed great deal of enthusiasm towards partial disarmament. One of the most fundamental reasons was that it did in no way contradicted the central Marxist-Leninist thesis that disarmament is simply not possible so long as capitalism survives. Thus the Soviet Union kept harping on partial disarmament to gain as much advantages as possible in the post-war period. Which resulted in the signing such milestone agreements like the Limited Test Ban Treaty 1963, Sea Bed Arms Control Treaty 1917, the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty

Another important reason for the Soviet enthusiasm for partial disarmament measures was its realization that its earlier proposals on general and complete disarmament, had failed to evoke interest in the West. Since, it thought that the partial disarmament measures are more attainable than the predecessors, it championed its cause in a big way. Thus, it led the Soviet Union to get interested in partial disarmament and more so in nuclear disarmament. An analysis of the Soviet proposals on partial disarmament between 1946 and 1970 shows that most of them were concerned with atomic and nuclear weapons whereas, others concerned with withdrawal of troops, reduction of defence expenditure, non-aggression pacts, demilitarisation of different zones, banning war propaganda, chemical and bacteriological warfare. The proposals concerning atomic and nuclear weapons referred to banning of the use of such weapons, banning their production, destruction of existing talks, cessation of testing, banning of installation and means of delivery of nuclear missiles etc.

However, towards the 70s the Soviet Union was a little disenchanted with partial disarmament and had
developed interest in "arms limitation." This was because it must have found the west not so inclined toward any significant partial disarmament measure. Moreover, by that time it had developed a new nuclear capability which it did not want to bargain away. It is also significant to note that by that time the world became a little unfavourable to such disarmament talks since, trouble broke out in Vietnam, Cuba, Iraq and the U2 incident had vitiated the international atmosphere.

After having broadly discussed the various measures towards European security taken by the Soviet Union, its approach to the idea of correlation of forces and the issue of disarmament, it is appropriate to discuss how the Soviet Union and the West have reacted towards the issue of European security over the decades.

Soviet Union, European Security and the West

In the first chapter we have analysed as to how the German rearmament, the Western military build-up and Germany's entry into NATO derailed the talks between the Soviet Union and the West and thus the Soviet Union and East European countries were forced to conclude the Warsaw Pact. In July 1955, at the Geneva Four Powers Summit Conference, N.A. Bulganin, the head of the Soviet delegation, again reiterated the Soviet desire for a system of collective security wherein gradually the NATO
and the WTO would wither away. It also submitted a draft to this effect. However, it fell into deaf ears. But the Soviet proposal was accepted by the WTO members in the Bucharest meeting of the WTO Political Consultative Committee meeting (PCC)\(^\text{28}\)

Khruschev's policy of peaceful coexistence enunciated at the 20th Congress of the CPSU was a great landmark in the efforts to improve East-West relations.\(^\text{29}\) The report criticised the hawkish policy of the USA directed against the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Government Declaration dated 30 October 1956 called the "Development and Further Strengthening of Friendship and Cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Socialist States" emphasised on the principles of equality, territorial integrity, national sovereignty, inter-dependence among nations.\(^\text{30}\)

Though this was not heeded to, the Soviet Union kept its efforts on to find reasonable solutions to the problems of European security.

The WTO PCC meeting held in Moscow on 24 May 1958 had called for a non-aggression pact between the NATO and

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the WTO apart from suggesting several measures to ease European tension. And it was followed by the Soviet notes sent to European countries and the USA on 15 July 1958 which called for peaceful settlement of all disputes, reduction of forces on German territory, establishment of de-nuclearised zone in the Central Europe. 31

The Soviet Government's proposal on March 1959 also called for a treaty between the NATO and WTO. 32 This was further reiterated in its memorandum in Spetember 1961; while the Soviet Union was busy in its endeavours to achieve disarmament the NATO countries were engaged in creating the NATO multilateral force. 33

The Soviet government in 1966 had called upon the West for a European Security Conference.

On 5 July 1966, the WTO PCC in its Bucharest meeting adopted the "Declaration on strengthening Peace and Security in Europe." 34 It highlighted the policy of militarisation followed by the west and called for dissolution of the alliance and repeated the Soviet stand on disarmament, peaceful settlement of disputes etc. It also called for a collective security conference in Europe.

32. Izvestia, 29 March 1959.
34. Pravda, 9 July 1966.
It is indeed a tragedy of history that while the Soviet Union once and again expressed its sincere desire for peace and security and Europe, the West went on amassing armaments. The Harmel Report brought out in 1967 by the North Atlantic Council was a clear example of it. It believed that "Military security and a policy of detente are not contradictory but complementary." Thus it vindicated increasing military strength, in every form.

The Soviet Union criticised the Harmel Report and the doctrine of flexible response as not conducive to detente. Gromyko had maintained that the Bucharest and the Karlovy Vary proposals on European Security still remained in force, and that it must be followed up.

The launch of Sputnik in October 1957 shook America's confidence in its ability to maintain a technological edge over the Soviet Union, an ability that had smugly been taken for granted before the launch. There was widespread agreement in Washington on the need for some kind of initiative to counteract the negative effect of these events. Thus in 1958, the Thor and the Jupiter IRBM missiles were brought to Europe.

At the NATO ministerial meeting held in Paris in December 1960, outgoing Secretary of State Christian A. Herter made a proposal that gave birth to the NATO Multilateral Force (MLF).

Herter was responding to European desires for control over strategic forces. He expressed America's willingness to assign NATO five Polaris missile submarines and 100 US built MRBMS. It was believed that in some specific conditions the NATO Council could use these missiles. It also embodied the idea of truly multilateral sea based strategic nuclear force. The MLF was also designed to pacify the political insecurities of Bonn, London and Paris.38

The flexible response strategy extended the search for options to the strategic nuclear level. It was assured that the President should have the option of executing a strategic retaliation against enemy military forces (Counterforce), holding enough strategic reserve to threaten enemy urban industrial centres (countervalue). Sparing enemy cities would create incentives for the Soviets to spare western cities; holding enemy cities hostage in this way would also give the west political leverage to bring the enemy to favourable terms. Underlying these ideas was the assumption, suggested by studies made in the late 1950s and early 1960s, that

counterforce targeting by both sides could, under certain circumstances, lead to substantially fewer casualties on both sides.

Regarding US strategic nuclear posture, many studies between 1957 and 1960 found that the US strategic deployment had problems, such as the vulnerability of the aging bomber forces, lack of progress on ballistic missile technology, weaknesses in command and control and lack of appropriate civil defense measures. Some studies like the so-called Gaither Report, remained secret but were leaked to the press, others like the Rockefeller Report, were public and attracted much attention. Thus the US administration gradually moved away from the positions of "massive retaliation." 39

In fact, in 1957 John Foster Dulles suggested that the defense of Europe might be possible on a local basis with the help of few, "small" nuclear weapons to compensate for conventional inferiority. 40

The doctrine of flexible response thus basically outlined a policy for the real use of nuclear weapons in the European theatre.


In the meantime in 1968 the Soviet Union intervened in Czechoslovakia. This further vitiated the East-West relations. However, in the March 1969 WTO PCC Meeting at Budapest, an appeal was issued to "cooperate in convening the European Conference on Security." The Budapest appeal also harped on the dissolution of NATO and WTO.\textsuperscript{41}

Having discussed broadly the issue of European security and disarmament, now we should turn to the specifics. Here we shall take up Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT).

**SALT-I and SALT-II**

The SALT negotiations had started in November 1969. The Soviets had taken it seriously. Andrei Gromyko then Foreign Minister had mentioned after the signing of the SALT-II Agreement that it was not only too important but also too complex.\textsuperscript{42} The Soviet leaders had believed that SALT was a means of limiting the arms race and had the potential to move towards genuine disarmament. The Americans had perceived the genuine Soviet desire for SALT as nothing but their ambition to be treated as an equal partner. The Soviets had stressed on "equality and equal security." However, the Americans had stretched it a little far. The Soviet leaders had then believed that

\textsuperscript{41} Pravda, 18 March 1969.

\textsuperscript{42} Pravda, 26 June 1979.
both the SALT agreements were fairly balanced and did not provide any military advantage to either side. 43

SALT-I concerned intercontinental ballistic missiles and ballistic missiles in submarines and the treaty signed was the ABM Treaty which to the Soviets was too dear. 44 This is because, they were apprehensive that the American ABM program might leave their own far behind technologically.

The Soviets were quite clever to increase the number of missile launchers during the time of negotiation and the actual signing of the treaty whereas the Americans cleverly got exempted their nuclear weapons based in Europe, from the SALT-1 framework.

Whereas the SALT-1 was limited to two components, the SALT-2 concerned all the three components, that is, intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine launched ballistic missiles, and the bombers. 45 The Soviet bombers were at the time not good for flying beyond the 600 km range. Moreover, they had about 600 less than the American's.


45. Pravda, 26 June 1979; see also G.M. Korninenko, ed., O Problemakh Razoruzheniya (Moscow, 1980).
The Vladivostok Accord of 1974 between General Secretary Brezhnev and President Ford, which had set an approximate limit of 2400 strategic delivery vehicles and 1320 MIRV systems, had greatly influenced the SALT-2 Treaty. This treaty also prohibited development of new type of ICBMs and development of rapid reloading launchers for increasing the number of reentry vehicles. This accorded well with the Soviet calculations since they knew very well that they were behind western technology in several areas.

SALT was possible simply because Americans for the first time accorded an equal status to the Soviets. This indeed proved the strength of the Warsaw Pact vis-a-vis the NATO.

Thus we found that the Soviet Union and the socialist countries were quite keen on disarmament talks and it is because of their sincere desire that the agreements could proceed. Here it is important to see how they have responded to the conventional force reduction talks.

Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR)

By 1959 the Soviet Union acquired the capacity to deliver nuclear weapons unto American territory something

which though did not unnerve the Americans obviously posed great challenges. The American preponderent lead in nuclear technology provided a sense of relief. However, after ten years when the Soviets acquired "nuclear parity," the Pentagon came to its senses and seriously thought over the various issues of detente including conventional arms control. It was then that conventional force reductions became a matter of debate in American foreign policy circles. In this the foreign exchange crunch was also an important consideration. In an atmosphere of improved East-West relations and repeated Soviet assertion that the Red Army would not cross the Elbe, the Americans started thinking of withdrawing American forces from Europe.\(^\text{47}\) The issue of burden sharing between the allies was also nagging. The Americans also believed that conventional force reductions on the Soviet side would give them some lost grounds in overall strategic considerations. And thus the talks began on 30 December 1973. The Russians always kept on demanding equal reductions and not asymmetric reductions.\(^\text{48}\) Since they had the overall superiority in conventional sector, their not agreeing to asymmetric reductions impeded the talks. The issue of equal reductions was a bit complicated and was bound to

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\(^{48}\) See G.M. Korninenko, ed., O Problemakh Razoruzheniya (Moscow, 1980).
further increase the Russian superiority. The West also kept on harping on the fact that there is no Atlantic between the Soviet Union and Europe. This makes it very comfortable for Soviets to walk over the central front, something which poses great logistical problems to the American forces.

Since, the talks began, the Soviets tabled various sets of proposals outlining the reductions. The issues however got every time bogged down because the Soviets would not accept assymetric reductions. Another important reason that seriously impeded talks was the Soviet secrecy over data. It was only in 1976 that they made public their data on forces and this was also too much underestimated, something which has also continued in the perestroika days though not in so glaring form. Thus in an atmosphere of mutual suspician the Vienna Talks floundered till Mikhail Gorbachev came to the scene. The Soviets also had never agreed to verification clauses something which the west found unacceptable.

In the June 1978 proposal, in which the Soviets called for a ceiling of 900,000 men (of these 70,000 were to be ground forces), the Soviets again demanded equal reductions. Thus reaching a common ceiling through equal reductions in an imbalanced situation proved to be too

much of a task and the talks continued. Despite the structural impediments in negotiations, the talks have proved to be quite beneficial in encouraging East-West dialogue over security issues, bringing the positions of each side close to each other and highlighting the Warsaw Pact's massive superiority in conventional forces. The Military Balance wrote in 1983, "The numerical balance over the last twenty years has slowly but steadily moved in favour of the East."  

Table 6.1

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<th></th>
<th>NATO Estimate for WTO Forces</th>
<th>Western Estimate for NATO Forces</th>
<th>Disparity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ground</td>
<td>960,000</td>
<td>790,000</td>
<td>170,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air</td>
<td>230,000</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,190,000</td>
<td>990,000</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Here also we found that the socialist countries were quite seriously interested in the disarmament talks. In fact they have emphasised on military disarmament and advocated serious proposals towards detente and European security. Here we proceed to discuss their approach to the Helsinki process.

Table 6.2

According to Warsaw Pact Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Eastern Estimate for WTO Forces</th>
<th>Western Estimate for NATO Forces</th>
<th>Disparity Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ground</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>790,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air</td>
<td>180,000</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>980,000</td>
<td>990,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Helsinki Conference

The Bucharest and the Karleby Vary Conference's proposals did not take off. The Czechoslovak crisis of 1968 deteriorated East-West relations. The West kept emphasising on the Harmel Report issued by the North Atlantic Council in 1967 which focussed on the complimentary nature of detente and security. In such situation in March 1969 the WTO PCC in its Budapest meeting called for an all European Conference to issues pertaining to European security.51

The Finish government issued a memorandum on 24 November 1970 which called for an all European Conference in Finland, and this was revived with the positive notes 51. Pravda, 18 March 1969.
by both the WTO and NATO countries. The NATO Council meeting of August 1970 positively took note of the proposal but emphasised on renunciation of force as a major principle.52

The WTO PCC meeting in Moscow in August 1970 welcomed the proposal of all European security conference and also appreciated the USSR-West Germany Treaty of 1970. In the meantime the SALT-1 also further improved East-West Relations. Thus 32 European countries with the USA and Canada participated in a preparatory conference in Dipöi near Helsinki on 22 November 1972. It discussed the issues of European security, confidence building measure, extension of economic, cultural and scientific ties etc.53 The first stage of the Conference on Security and Cooperations in Europe was convened in Helsinki from 3-7 July 1973 at the level of foreign ministers of 33 states.

The Soviet Union proposed the following items as agenda for the final Conference.54

1. Establishing mechanism for European security and establishing principles of relations among the countries.
2. Conducting commercial, economic, scientific, relations.

52. NATO Review (Brussels), August 1970.
3. Extending cultural contacts.

4. Provision for a Consultative Committee on questions of security.

The Preparatory Conference adopted the "Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations." It was almost similar to the Soviet proposal except the addition of "cooperation in humanitarian and other fields."

The final stage of the Conference was held from 30 July 1975 to 1 August 1975 and was attended by thirty three European states and USA and Canada.

The Political Consultative Committee meeting of the Warsaw Pact states in April 1974 had already noted the significance of the Conference. 55

The first section of the Final Act dealt with questions relating to security in Europe and opened with a "Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States" and emphasised on the significance of detente.

The second part of the Final Act was entitled "Cooperation in the Fields of Economics, Sciences, Technology and Environment." The third part was the most controversial and was called "Cooperation in Humanitarian and other Fields." The last part dealt with the follow-up of the conference. The three parts were called respectively Basket 1, Basket 2 and Basket 3.

had four sub-divisions: (1) human contacts (2) information (3) cooperation and exchange in the field of culture and (4) cooperation and exchange in the field of education.

The question of security was a vexed problem since the days the cold war had begun. The Helsinki Conference by establishing the reality of the blocs resolved that issue. 56

The principle of non-violability of frontiers and territorial integrity of states further established in reality the post-war European boundaries. The principle of confidence building measures was aimed at further promoting détente. The Conference had its own weaknesses. For instance, it had no legal sanction and thus was not binding in nature. It did not deal with the issue of disarmament and force reductions. Moreover, the same old ideological struggle continued - that is what the Soviet Union emphasised. However, the Final Act did recognise the indivisibility of security in Europe and the world as a whole.

The Final Act also contained a legitimation of the role of the united States as a constituent part of European security. It contained no proposal for an integrative reorganisation of the whole of Europe. It did not preempt any change in the political status quo.

However, it offered an agreed consensus on a measure by which to judge the behaviour of the CSCE participants in matters of detente and cooperation. All the rules of behaviour contained in the Final Act were aimed at reducing ambivalence and insecurity in the expectations of East and West. In the short term however, it had only a marginal effect on East-West economic relations; though the East allowed the basing of representatives of the western companies. The CSCE process however, did signify that European detente is possible if only superpower detente proceeds.

In the long run, East-West trade increased specifically between Eastern Europe and Western Europe though the imbalance persisted. East European countries primarily imported investment goods from the west while the west imported fuels and other raw materials. The contribution of exports to the East was one per cent of the entire GNP of the western countries while the contribution of exports to the West was 2-4 per cent for East European countries. The proportion of trade with the East of total exports and imports accounted for only 4.3 per cent for western Europe and 2.6 and 0.9 per cent for the USA. While the figures for East Europe were 26.2 and 36.8 per cent.

East-West economic relations had already began from in 1972 and 1974 before the Helsinki Final Act came to force. It is believed that the countries of the
Table 6.3
East-West Trade and Economic Development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic Development of OECD Countries GDP</td>
<td>-3.0</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>-3.1</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Production</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-7.9</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export from OECD Countries to CMEA states (at constant prices)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-13</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports to CECD to CMEA states at Constants Prices</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-12</td>
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<td>7.5</td>
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<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Changes (Percentage)

East were never interested in stabilising East-West economic relations. If economic relations helped promote detente, likewise, political tension had also regressive effect on economic relations.

Belgrade Meeting

The First follow-up meeting of the Helsinki Conference was held in Belgrade from 4 October 1977 to 9 March 1978. It is here that the USSR and the East European countries put forth their proposals with emphasis on military detente and called for convening a World Disarmament Conference. It also called for serious implementation of confidence building measures. Moreover, they called for banning propaganda or threat or use of force. It is important that the west was not interested in the proposals of the East. However, other issues, pertaining to culture, energy, transport, environment received proper attention. Difference in ideological orientations again were sharply visible in this conference. Though experts committees were constituted to broaden areas of economic and scientific cooperation and working for peaceful settlement of disputes, it can be said that, Belgrade was almost a flop.

Madrid Meeting

The Madrid meeting was held from 11 November 1980 to 6 September 1983 in the background of several important
events. Brezhnev had visited the Federal Republic of Germany in 1978, President Valery Giscard d' Estang of France visited the USSR in 1979 and Brezhnev had met President Jimmy Carter in Vienna in June 1979. Moreover, the Warsaw Treaty States in their Political Consultative Committee meeting in 14-15 May 1980 had emphasised the importance of military detente and achieving overall security in Europe. It had called for a conference on detente and disarmament whose first stage itself was to be negotiated at Madrid. It was in this perspective that the 32nd UN General Assembly had adopted a "Declaration on Deepening and Strengthening Detente."

The Madrid Meeting discussed issues relating to security, economics, science and technology, environment, humanitarian and related issues. If the Soviet Union and the socialist countries emphasised on "military detente," the Western countries emphasised on human rights and Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. These contradictory approaches virtually foiled the meeting. The West was hellbent on raising the issue of human rights violations in socialist countries. Moreover, the Soviet intervention in Afganistan drew lot of fire from the West. Doubts were expressed as to whether detente would swim through such troubled waters. The meeting however, accepted the Soviet suggestion, of holding a conference on confidence and security building measures and disarmament in Europe.
The decision of the NATO countries to deploy Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBM) in Europe around mid-December 1979 and the entry of Soviet troops to Afghanistan by the end of 1979 created immense structural bottlenecks for detente. These events also greatly influenced the proceedings of the Madrid Meeting. The West had boycotted the 1980 Moscow Olympics, which was followed by technology and grain embargo. By 1 January 1980 more than 30,000 Soviet troops were in Afghanistan. 57 By the end of January it was increased upto 80,000 troops. 58

The Soviet theory of intervention by invitation was not accepted by the west. Members of the Warsaw Pact except Romania extended full support to the Soviet intervention. Moreover, the Communist Parties except that of China, supported the Soviet Union. The US State Department said, "It appears that the Soviets are crossing a new threshold in their military deployment into Afghanistan." 59 Most Western countries like Germany, Britain etc. condemned the act in strongest possible language. The NATO Ministers in a joint communique issued on 5 March 1980 demanded that "Soviet forces must be withdrawn and a political settlement found enabling the


Afghan people to exercise fully their rights of independence and self-determination and permitting the two million refugees to return to their homes". 60

Thus the Afghan crisis strained international relations and detente became the casualty.

Brezhnev accused the US President of freezing the SALT-II treaty on the pretext of the Afghan intervention. 61

Brzezinski spoke of the possibility of escalation of the arms race, 62 because of the deterioration in East-West relations resulting from the Afghan intervention. The NATO countries increased their military expenditure 3 per cent annually. 63

The Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation met on 14-15 May 1980, in Warsaw in celebration of the 25th anniversary of the WTO. 64 It suggested many proposals to preserve world peace and security, like;

1. No increase in the size of the armed forces of the European countries;
2. Observe all the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act;

60. The Times, 6 March, 1980.
3. Prepare consensus for the Madrid follow-up meeting;
4. Accelerate preparations for a conference on military detente and disarmament in Europe;
5. Reach accords on arms control like SALT-II, chemical weapons etc.;
6. A world treaty to be signed on the non-use of force;
7. Disarmament should also cover oceans.

It is interesting to note that the PCC did not talk about the Afghan crisis though it was in currency at the time.

Thus by 1979-80, the overall East-West relation had been back to the square one. In such a situation the Warsaw pact further braced up itself with respect to NATO's militaristic moves. After 1980, a new cold war began to emerge until Mikhail Gorbachev came to the scene and again the Soviet Union and the United States extended olive branches to each other. However, since we are not concerned with this period, therefore, we shall stop here.

Thus, in this chapter, we discussed the problems of European security and found that the Soviet Union and the East European countries have expressed their desires consistently towards European peace and security. Their efforts were not however, properly responded to by the Western countries. The Soviet Union has, throughout followed a policy of peace since the days of Lenin.
Lenin himself was the architect of this policy. He had elaborated upon the concept of peaceful coexistence which has been carried forward till now.

After discussing the various measures which the Soviet Union and the socialist countries took towards European security, we discussed the Soviet concept of "World Correlation of Forces" which is of fundamental importance to the Soviet approach to foreign policy.

Then we discussed the problems of both partial and general nuclear disarmament. In this, we analysed the attitudes of the successive Soviet government's towards nuclear disarmament and found that the Soviet Union has been consistently interested in nuclear disarmament. While discussing strategic arms talks and conventional force reduction talks, we found that the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries have been reluctant supporters of these talks. However, there have been structural impediments also; for instance, the Soviet reluctance to agree for assymetric reductions. In discussing the Helsinki process also we discovered the positive attitudes of the Soviet Union and the East European countries in carrying forward detente. Whether in Karlov Vary, Bucharest or the Budapest meetings these countries displayed sincere desire for relaxation of tension and improve East-West relation. In the same way, even in the
Belgrade and Madrid follow-up meetings the West virtually ignored the proposals of the socialist bloc regarding the military aspect of detente. And then we found that the development of the neutron bomb by the US and the formulation of the "limited war concept" by the Pentagon vitiated the East-West relations. All these was further compounded by the Strategic Defence initiative (SDI) - the Star Wars Programme of the US. Then came the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan which was like an anti-climax to the improving East-West detente. This punctured the relationship between the two blocs. The United States started the grain embargo and technology embargo against the Soviet Union while the SALT-II was frozen. This was followed by other Western countries. Thus, it gave birth to another phase of cold war till Gorbachev came to the scene and again relations improved.