Chapter V

THE WARSAW PACT AND THE INTER-ALLIANCE BEHAVIOUR
A study of the genesis of the Warsaw Pact must necessarily encompass also its functional and behavioural patterns. Broadly speaking, these patterns have two aspects, the one, within the alliance-relationship among the members of the Pact, and the other, in East-West relations and in the crucial issues arising out of them.

Inter-alliance relationship really revolves around the policies of the dominant member of the Pact, the USSR as well as its performance-record on important issues concerning other members individually and collectively. On the other hand, their response-patterns to Soviet behaviour have also to be taken into account. We shall now take up the inter-alliance relationship in this chapter, while the other aspects, mentioned above, will be focussed in the following chapter.

We shall begin here by analysing Soviet policy towards the Pact mainly in the context of inter-alliance relationship within the Warsaw Pact. An examination of the performance-record of the Soviet Union vis-a-vis East Europe and Warsaw Pact will follow thereafter. We may, however, clarify at the outset that our discussion here is only focussed on the Warsaw Pact and not on the entire gambit of Soviet relations with Eastern Europe. Since the Warsaw Pact was established after Stalin's death, the policies of the successor Soviet leadership also have to be focussed.
Soviet Policy Under Khruschev

After Stalin, the Soviet leadership reassessed the Soviet policy towards Eastern Europe. Malcolm Mackintosh, an authority on Warsaw Pact says, "However, authoritarian Stalin's successors may have been they could not fail to realise in 1953 when Stalin died, that Eastern and Central Europe were politically, economically, militarily, wasting assets - little more than a secret policeman's paradise."\(^1\) Stalin had followed an autocratic and awe inspiring personal rule whereas his successors wanted a different system of control. One of their major tasks was the revival of the region economically and politically. It may even be argued that the Warsaw Pact was conceived as an organisation through which they could continue to transmit directives to the East European allies and organise East European support for Soviet policies.

Besides, Stalin's policy towards defence and security of the Soviet Union had become wasteful and obsolete. After his death the defence policy and requirements had to be redefined in the light of nuclear weapons and post-war improvements in means of delivery, transport and speed of movement for the ground forces.\(^2\) As far as

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2. Ibid.
the European theatre of operations was concerned the new Soviet military doctrine required. Soviet and East European forces to play a part in the defence of the Soviet Union's open western frontier by manning the buffer zone between the frontier and the west.

Ideologically, Lenin's concept of communism by example replaced Stalin's concept of war as a means of spreading Soviet type revolution. In general, there was a relaxation of Soviet control over Eastern Europe - Stalin's radical "shock brigade" idea was given up leading to popular front cooperation between the non-communist socialists and the communists both in the capitalist and the colonial countries. Khruschev said, "You cannot drive people to participate with a club or drive them to communism by means of war; when people realise that communism alone will give them a truly happy life they will come running of their own freewill."3

After Stalin, during the Khruschev period, peaceful coexistence replaced the fatal inevitability of war and the atomic policy was outlined by "the biggest bang for the smallest number of roubles invested." It is in this atmosphere that the Warsaw Pact was constructed.

However, Khrushchev also displayed ideological ambiguities and this contributed to revolts in Poland and Hungary. In 1958 when he realised that his hopes to bring the Yugoslavs back into "socialist camp" would not come true he condemned the new Yugoslav constitution. After a more conservative XXI Party Congress (1959) he resumed his criticism of Stalin at the XXI Congress in 1961. Khrushchev's ideological instability indeed enhanced destabilisation all over Eastern Europe. His economic reformism beginning with administrative changes of 1957 in the Soviet Union and leading to debate in which the liberal views of economics like Evsei Liberman were elicited, was more or less echoed in other communist countries (e.g. the New Economic System in the GDR). His crude proposal to introduce supranational planning encountered unsurmountable resistance from the Romanians and others.

Khrushchev introduced the concept of "socialist commonwealth" conceding that national conditions could differ on the road to socialism as long as essential Leninist principles were preserved. The Soviet Union never accepted the concept of multiple centres of authority as ideology and doctrine and asserted the right to determine which policies were correct and which were revisionist.


5. Ibid.
It was this that sealed Yugoslavia's exclusion from the socialist camp, or expressed differently its choice for independence.

To support the necessary unity of the bloc the Soviet Union attempted to strengthen the network of military and economic ties in the Warsaw Pact and the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). However, Khruschev's flexibility did allow Gomulka to keep the gains of Polish October (except some, like intellectual freedom) and Janos Kadar of Hungary to carry on with "Goulash Communism." Albania left the bloc quietly without inviting any action and Gheorghiu-Dej of Romania rejected Khruschev's plan for integrated development through CMEA and asserted independence in foreign policy.

Changes under Khruschev however, did not go quite far in the military sphere. Soviet ground forces deployed in Eastern Europe was never reduced to less than 26 divisions—Soviet military circles never could accept anything less than this. Nor did they accept that the improved calibre of indigenous Eastern European forces might justify a reduction in their own theatre force requirements. Moreover, they continued to assume that in war time the other Pact would be subordinated to directed Soviet Command.  

However, Khruschev's so-called liberalisation suffered a terrible setback by the rebellions in Hungary and Poland in the fall of 1956, even though these events could be interpreted as delayed reactions to Stalin's repressive legacy. The crushing of the Hungarian rebellion by the Soviet army in fact not only tarnished the image of a socialist military alliance based on common goals but also left room for friction and disagreement as to how far a treaty ostensibly meant to counter NATO might be stretched to cover Soviet policing actions in Eastern Europe.7

Following these events, Khruschev had to mend some fences within and around the Warsaw Pact. He convened a "Unity" meeting of East European communist leaders in Budapest in January 1957, promoted a series of discussions with East European delegations in Moscow and concluded new bilateral agreements between the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact allies that included "economic concessions as well as status of forces agreements aimed at blunting East European resentment of the Soviet military presence in the area."8 Khruschev may have hoped that cultivation of such joint agreements in the military sphere would

7. See, Ibid.
accomplish what the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) had not. The CMFA was set up to counter the Marshall plan in 1949 and was reactivated after the disruptive events of the fall of 1956 had failed to draw the bloc closer together. His accent on closer economic and military integration apparently was meant to convey a political image of Soviet bloc solidarity and to promote greater cohesion within the Warsaw Pact. It was all being done in the face of "Polycentric" trends that had become increasingly manifest in Eastern Europe by the early sixties. Evidently Khruschev saw in the Warsaw Pact a potentially useful organisational instrument through which to offset such tendencies and to help maintain discipline and political unity within the Soviet bloc. Khruschev may never have intended to foster more than a semblance of independence in Eastern Europe. However, he did much to create a situation in which Eastern European leaderships, the composition of several of which he helped to change, developed some degree of autonomy and even bargaining leverage in their relations with the Soviet Union. As a result, the Warsaw Pact began to assume some of the features of stress, strain and bargaining that have characterised traditional alliances throughout history.

9. Ibid., p.333.
Soviet Policy Under Brezhnev

The Brezhnev and Kosygin period did not bring any substantial change in policy towards Eastern Europe. The growing Sino-Soviet conflict had its impact also in Eastern Europe. China's cultivation of Romania and Albania proved irritating for Moscow. However, the main challenge in the 1960s came from Czechoslovakia. Moscow got wary of Alendander Dubcek's liberalising efforts, the relaxation of censorship, the democratisation of the Communist Party. Finally, being intolerant of the Czech policies the Soviet Union invaded the country in 1968.

In the post-Khruschev era the following changes were marked about in the inter-alliance behaviour.

(1) Soviet repudiation of Khruschev's preference for nuclear (as opposed to conventional) forces marked the main line of thinking. However, this did not undermine the importance of nuclear weapons in a scenario in which the possibilities for conventional warefare or the threat of it in Europe had increased. This was accompanied by the Soviet commitment to programmes geared towards improving the offensive capabilities of Pact ground forces. 10

(2) Modernization of indigenous Eastern European forces and numerical increases in strength within the area especially following the Pact's invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the subsequent retention of five extra Soviet divisions there.

(3) Renewed emphasis upon earlier Soviet calls for an all European security conference and general disarmament.

(4) Acceptance of a 1972 Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin.

(5) Agreement to participate in the Mutul and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks in Vienna and to discuss lowering the levels of forces confronting each other in Central Europe.

(6) Realisation of the opening in 1973 of East-West negotiations on security and cooperation in Europe and signature of the CSCE Final Act at the Helsinki Summit in 1975.

(7) Repeated overtures to the West for additional trade, credits, loans and other forms of increased but relative economic interchange.

The changes which occurred in the internal relationship were mainly focussed on the following.

(i) Reemphasis on pro-Soviet cohesion as the primary objective in intra-alliance relations - particularly in

11. Ibid.
connection with and as a result of the Czech crisis of 1968 and effective demonstration of the Pact's continuing ability to limit deviationism. 12

(ii) Attempts to restore the semblance of ideological and political orthodoxy both within and beyond the Warsaw Pact. These included steady pressures on Romania as well as an other European Communist Parties to recognise the hegemony of the Soviet Union in the ranks of international communism; convocation in 1976 of an often postponed Congress of European Communist Parties; and further elaboration of the Pact's political consultative mechanisms for coordination of views on matters of foreign policy. 13

(iii) Employment of Soviet economic resources to reinforce dependence and maintain compliance with the broader objectives of the Soviet Union.

Thus we find that the post-Khruschev leadership emphasised on orthodoxy in internal relationships whereas in the external relationship it emphasised on conventional forces and East-West dialogue. Emphasis on orthodoxy and cohesion was a response to crisis like Czechoslovakia in 1968. Moreover, the Soviet leadership was also reacting to the "one variant nuclear war concept" of Khruschev.

12. Ibid., p.74.
Thus if the post-Khruschev leadership was interested in improving East-West relations in both political and economic spheres as well as in the sphere of disarmament it also increased conventional force postures in the East European theatre. However, it is a fact that the Czech crisis of 1968 had great bearings in increasing conventional forces so as to maintain alliance cohesion in the faces of increasing Western pressures. In this though nuclear weapons acquired a prominent place, they did not carry an overdetermining policy guidance as during Khruschev's time, ideological monolithism and political orthodoxy became the corner stones of a policy of further alliance cohesion. Moscow was particularly conscious of the Romanian wavering and declared its intention for further delineation of the functions of the Political Consultative Committee in order to coordinate alliance grievances. This however, went hand in hand with inducing further economic dyrendence into alliance relationship no part of an attempt to increase Pact cohesion.

Thus cohesion reasserted itself as a central objective in the post-Khruschev era. The Prague Spring of 1968, the Soviet led invasion of Czechoslovakia the following summer, and the Brezhnev Doctrine spawned by these events confirmed one anticipated outcome of Khruschev's emphasis on increasing viability within the Pact. Khruschev's successors could blame the Czech crisis
on existing policies largely attributable to Khruschev with same manner as Khruschev had been able to attribute the Hungarian uprising to the legacy of Stalin. Moving after 1968 as Khruschev had after 1956 but in a different direction, the Brezhnev leadership fashioned new military, political and economic policies within the Pact aimed at preventing further rebellion against and promoting greater compliance with the objectives of the Soviet Union. The qualities of a genuine alliance which the Warsaw Pact had seemed to be acquiring began to fade.

The pact has come a long way from Western perceptions of it in the early 1960s as an unsophisticated assemblage armed with masses of rugged, easily maintained but simple weapons.\textsuperscript{14} Pact ground forces and to some extent air forces have been steadily improving in quality.\textsuperscript{15} According to the annual report of the US Secretary of Defense to Congress for fiscal year 1979, the Soviets have considerably expanded the structure of their tank and materised rifle divisions (of which there are 31 in Eastern Europe) "most notably in the 20 divisions of the Group of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG) that directly confront the NATO allies. It reads, "Since the 1960s, about 1000 men have been added to each of the tank


\textsuperscript{15} Pravda (Mocow), 23 February 1963.
divisions and approximately 2500 to each of the motorised rifle divisions. At least in the GSFG, modern tanks, self-propelled artillery, new anti-tank guided missiles, armoured personnel carriers, attack helicopters (including the heavily armed MI-24 HIND and MI-8 HIP), and organic air defenses have been provided in quantity.\textsuperscript{16}

By 1980s the Warsaw pact was characterised by more extensive reliance ever before on the capabilities of non-Soviet forces to deal with the outbreak of a conventional war in Europe. In the 60s the Soviets were expected the bear the brunt of any fighting against the West and to acquire for that purpose prior reinforcements of their forces deployed in Eastern Europe from the USSR.\textsuperscript{17} By the 80s it was possible to achieve its initial objectives on the ground in Europe without reinforcement in advance from the Soviet Union. Thus the Warsaw Pact presented much of a united front in such regional negotiating forums as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the Vienna talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) as does NATO. The Pact has its troublesome renegade, Romania, while NATO has France as well as Greece. Expanded


\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
mechanisms and procedures for consultation and advice are now available to Pact members. However, unlike the numerous institutions within NATO where views are exchanged on an equal basis, "advice" in the WTO tends to originate with the Soviets and to flow in one direction to the other member states.

The Political Consultative Meetings (PCC)

In order to understand the inter-alliance relationship in the Warsaw Pact, better, here we provide a brief summary of the meetings of the Political Consultative Committee (PCC) of the Warsaw Pact held during the period under study. The Political Consultative Committee is the most seminal organisation of the WTO, therefore any analysis of the WTO must highlight the performance of the PCC. These can be seen from an analysis of the several meetings of the PCC.

The 1956 Prague meeting of the PCC adopted a Declaration of European Security and International Problems to halt arms race and prevent atomic war.18 This meeting was another move Moscow's campaign to formalise the division of Germany.19 The Committee accepted East German participation in the Joint Command and gave


the GDR equal status with the other East European member states by allowing the East German Minister of Defense to serve as one of the Deputy-Commanders-in-Chief of the United Arms Forces.

The PCC meeting in May 1958 in Moscow decided to reduce Eastern European armies by 119000 men in addition to the 300,000 cut in Soviet forces already indicated in January brought the total announced reductions since 1955 to 2,596,000 men. 20 Of this total 2,140,000 had been Soviet troops. It endorsed the Soviet version of the Polish-Rapacki Plan for an atom free zone in Central Europe and the East German proposal for confederation between the two Germanies. It also gave approval to the forthcoming force withdrawal of Soviet troops from Romania (completed in July 1958) and of one division from Hungary. It also declared that certain organisational problems had been solved (unspecified). It also resolved to discuss with NATO a non-aggression pact. The proposal also included ending any type of nuclear test and naval arms race. It also proposed to make Europe free of any nuclear arms.

The PCC meeting in April 1959 did little more than upheld Soviet policy on Germany and on relations with the United States.

20. Ibid.
The PCC meeting in February 1960 in Moscow discussed the contemporary international situation, total disarmament, a peace pact with Germany, one sided Soviet proposal to give up nuclear test with an intention that European states will follow suit.21

The PCC meeting in May 1961 discussed the idea of further strengthening the armed forces of the socialist bloc for defense and peace.22

The June 1962 PCC meeting again put forth a proposal to solve the German problem.23

The January 1965 PCC meeting was concerned with the implications of the NATO Multilateral Force and the sharing of decision making on nuclear matters within NATO. Romania's talk of enthusiasm for the Soviet interpretation of the Pact’s role was also discussed in the meeting. This meeting also expressed grave concern about the increasing arms buildup by the NATO nations.24

The PCC meeting in July 1968 in Bucharest issued a Declaration of Peace and Security in Europe which emphasized on the necessity of having peaceful relation with the European States.25

21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
In this meeting there were serious disagreements between the foreign ministers of the member countries. And it is understood that Romania had asked for the meeting to air her views on the domination of the Warsaw Pact by the Soviet Union, the absence of consultation procedures on the use of nuclear weapons and financial contributions to the upkeep of Soviet troops stationed in member's territories abroad etc.

It is also believed that later on General Vaclav Prichlik the Chief of the Political Commission of the Czechoslovak army had also voiced grievances on the monopolisation of all top posts in the WTO by the Soviet Union. He had urged that the PCC should be a systematic working body which should not entirely dependent on being occasionally convoked.26

The PCC in its Sofia meeting on 6 and 7 March 1968 took note of the aggressive and adventurist policy of the USA in Vietnam and unanimously condemned the actions of the American imperialists. They also expressed grave concern about the effect of American policy on international peace. They also considered the constitution of further bodies to create the conditions for the more objective discussion of all important problems of common defence.

26. Ibid.
In the Budapest PCC meeting of the WTO held in March 1969, a call was given for a General European Conference to discuss security and cooperation. It also condemned the actions of some European countries to further militarise Europe and thereby endanger peace and security. The meeting declared that one of the main preconditions of European security was the inviolability of the existing frontiers on the Oder and Neisse and also the frontiers between the GDR and the FRG and the recognition of their existence.27

The Moscow PCC meeting of the WTO held on 20 August 1970 discussed the existing international situation and pointed out that the signing of the treaty between the USSR and the Federal Republic of Germany on 12 August 1970 was a major step towards relaxation of tension and normalisation of situation in Europe. It also reiterated its call for a General European Conference on Peace and Security.

The Berlin PCC meeting of December 1970 supported the peace policy of GDR for lasting peace in Europe. This also supported the Czech stand not to accept and recognise the Munich Pact of 1938. It also discussed the problems of Indo-China and Middle East.28

27. Ibid., see also A.C. Bakhov, Organisation of the Warsaw Pact, (Moscow, 1971).

28. Ibid., see also Bakhov, n.27.
The PCC meeting on 25 and 26 January 1972, in Prague issued a Declaration of Peace, Security and Cooperation in Europe. This also issued a statement condemning the continuation of US aggression in Indo-China. The communique issued at the end of the meeting declared that they were fully determined to work for peace and security in Europe. They also reiterated the call for All-European Conference on Peace and Security. These proposals are contained in the Bucharest Declaration of 1966, in the Budapest address of 1969 and the Berlin statement of 1970. The meeting also took note of the importance of the principles of cooperation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and France. It also took note of the positive significance of the Four Power agreement on 3 September 1971 on questions relating to West Berlin. It stressed on inviolability of frontiers, renunciation of the use of force and peaceful coexistence, good neighbourly and mutually beneficial relations among states, disarmament and support for the United Nations.

The Committee of Defence Ministers met in Berlin 1972 and discussed the political situation and arms race in Europe.

The Defence Ministers of the WTO met in 1975 in Moscow and discussed about implementing the previous

29. Ibid.
decisions and the strengthen their armed forces to improve military technology and strive for peaceful coexistence among states. 30

On 26 May 1977, foreign ministers of the WTO states discussed about the current problems of peace and security specifically emphasised on the peace prospects of the Helsinki agreement.

As it appears from the PCC meetings, the WTO definitely quite vaciferously declared its intentions of peace and security in Europe. However, so far the internal functioning and the management of bloc affairs are concerned it failed to function as a true collective alliance system. Probably it was overdominated by the Soviet Union much to the resentment of the alliance partners. In crucial decision making the partners often complained of their exclusion. It served the interests of Soviet Union much to the disdainful neglect of the East European countries. It is one thing to say that the Soviet union as a big brother did always try to ensure the safety and security of the East European countries and it is another to say that in its so called brotherly attitudes it did treat these countries as no more than strategic variables in its quest for security.


31. See Mackintosh, n.1, p.6.
As has been said in the outset the PCC met very irregularly. In fact, this only, shows had its importance was undermined gradually. When it was structured, it was supposed to be the most crucial decision making body but it later on became just an umbrella body for decisions already arrived at. A review of the PCC meetings shows that while it was consistently functional so far as issues of European peace and security were concerned, issues pertaining to the internal management of bloc affairs were hardly discussed. By the second decade of its existence, alliance partners started voicing concern about their non-involvement in the management of the Pact. An important complaint was the monopoltisation of top posts by the Soviets. Other grievances centred on absence of consultative procedures and the virtual non-functioning of the PCC in a regular manner. Such consistent friction arising out of grievances led ultimately to souring of relations, among alliance partners. Other issues that exacerbated friction related to financial contribution and absence of proper modalities towards the use of nuclear weapons.

Having a brief idea of the issues with which the PCC of the WTO have been concerned, we move on to analyse some important events which took place during 1955 and 1979 and how the WTO responded to it.
At this stage let us now examine the behaviour-pattern of the Soviet Union. On some crucial issues that came up before the WTO concerning its other members individually or collectively.

The Polish October, 1956

Khruschev's speech at the Twentieth CPSU Congress infused some kind of liberal ambience into Eastern Europe. In Poznan (Poland), a protest by industrial workers ever economic grievances on 28 June, 1956 turned violent. Indeed the protest was also partly the result of conflicts between the reformers and the conservatives known as the Natolin faction. Whereas the reformers justified it, the Natolin faction blamed the uprising on "imperialist provocateurs" and the Soviet Union rehashed the Natolin argument. When Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin and defence minister Marshal Zhukhov visited Poland they severely criticised the Poznan uprising.

During the late summer, the struggle between the two factions centred on the question of Gomulka's reinstatement as a party member. The reformers led by Edward Ochab wanted to make Gomulka the Party Secretary to which the other faction was opposed. Meanwhile, when things did not improve, Khruschev, Molotov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich and

high ranking Soviet generals arrived uninvited at Warsaw on 19 October.\textsuperscript{33} Khruschev on seeing Gomulka got irritated and is supposed to have said, "We shed blood for this country and they are trying to sell it out to the Americans and the Zionists".\textsuperscript{34} Simultaneously, Soviet troops stationed in Poland under post-war agreements and the Warsaw Treaty began to move towards the Polish capital at a time when there was no declared state of emergency requiring the use of Soviet troops.\textsuperscript{35} The Polish leaders had discussions with the Russians and it was described as "party like and friendly".\textsuperscript{36}

According to Adam Ulam, on 19 October, Khruschev faced the prospect of another Russo-Polish war\textsuperscript{37} which would have lasted long and strongly resisted by the 25 million Poles. Adam Bromke also says that at the time Poland was 'on the verge of a bloodbath'. Moreover, any such event would have disastrous impact on other East European countries. Moreover, Marshal Rokossovsky, the Polish defence minister conveyed to Khruschev that the

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\textsuperscript{33} Pravda, 19 October, 1956.
\textsuperscript{34} Konrad Syrop, Spring in October: The Polish Revolution of 1956 (London, 1957), p.84; see also Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence (New York, 1968).
\textsuperscript{35} New York Times, 28 October, 1956.
\textsuperscript{36} Pravda, 21 October, 1965.
\textsuperscript{37} See Ulam, n.34, pp.51-94.
\end{flushleft}
Polish troops under his command were not reliable. The above reasons dissuaded Khruschev to go for military action.

After Gomulka's election as the First Party Secretary on 21 October by the Central Committee and the ousting of Rokossovsky from the Polish Politburo, on 23 October, Khrushchev in a telephonic message to Gomulka from Moscow said that the Soviet troops on manoeuvre would return to their bases in Silesia and East Germany. Two weeks later Rokossovsky resigned and returned to Moscow.

During the Polish crisis the Soviets did not take into confidence their Warsaw Pact partners in undertaking their intervention, neither they activised the WTO as a multilateral alliance to take stock of the situation. The Soviet action did make it clear to the East Europeans that they should not take ideological liberalism too far.

The Political Consultative Committee was not activated to discuss the Polish crisis. The Polish October was mainly the result of economic grievances of the Polish workers. The misperception of the issue led to such emergency action. The workers uprising was misconstrued as ideological heresay and as a dangerous trend affecting alliance cohesion. The fact is entire Soviet effort was to preserve alliance integration
by whatever means possible. The incident however generated ill feelings among the partners. Even when one looks at from the cold war perspective the Soviet response appears a little exaggerated that too without any organisational sanction.

The Hungarian Uprising, 1956

The economic crisis in Hungary and the Soviet concessions to Polish autonomy produced the Hungarian uprising. Before that the Soviet Union had suggested a 'New Course' which called for de-emphasising heavy industry and improving the living conditions to the Hungarian leaders. In this Soviet leaders appointed Imre Nagy as the Prime Minister to carry out the task. Matyas Rokosi was the First Secretary of the Party. Rokosi did not like it and expelled Nagy in November 1955. However, Nagy with his reformist zeal had created a constituency among party workers, students and intellectuals. In the mean time, Nagy in his works called for avoidance of membership in any power bloc and the freedom to define one's own socialist development. He was condemned by the Soviet Union as 'Nationalistic' and anti-Soviet. After the visit of Anastas Mikoyan to Budapest Rokosi resigned in favour of Erno Gero. However, this did not satisfy the students and workers (striking) through Nagy was reinstated as a party member. When the Hungarian
police could not control the swelling crowd in Budapest, Soviet troops were called. Ultimately, on 24 October, Nagi was reinstated as Premier. After the visit of Mikoyan to Budapest, Soviet Union decided to bring in Nagy. Gero was retired and replaced by Janos kadar as the First Secretary. The Soviet Government Declaration on the Principles of Development and further Strengthening of Friendship and Cooperation between the Soviet Union and other Socialist Countries referred to 'serious mistakes of the Hungarian communists'. It declared that it was "ready to review its relations of mutual security with other socialist countries" and also the question of stationing of troops in their countries to be done 'by agreement among all its members of the WTO' and only with the consent of the receiving country. In fact, the Soviet Union here was giving a different interpretation to the Warsaw Treaty. It is important to note here that the WTO PCC meeting which took place only in January 1956 in its communique did not outline any proposal that the withdrawal of Soviet troops would be done on the basis of

38. Pravda, 28 October 1956. See also Paul E.Zinner, Revolution in Hungary (New York, 1962); Paul Kuskemeti The Unexpected Revolution (Stanford, California, 1961)


40. Pravda, 4 November 1956.
collective agreement.\footnote{It is important to note here that the four bilateral treaties signed between the Soviet Union, GDR, Poland, Romania and Hungary regulated the number of Soviet troops, their location and consent of the receiving country for troop manoeuvre. The first such treaty was signed with Poland on 18 December, 1956, then with GDR, on 12 March, 1957, Romania, on 15 April 1957 and Hungary, on 27 May, 1957.} Article V of the Warsaw Pact states that only when a member-country attacked by another country it calls for military aid. Therefore, the Soviet action was unjustified for many East European countries. The argument that the Warsaw Pact was a mere 'collective self-defence agreement' fell to pieces.

Nagy however, blamed the Soviet Union for violating the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet Union did not consult the WTO allies undertaking the intervention. The WTO did not act on the issue.

The 1 November, 1956 decision of Nagy to withdraw from the WTO did provoke Moscow but his decision to give up communist supremacy in the coalition government did enrage the Soviets to a great extent and a second intervention took place\footnote{Pravda, 5 November, 1956.} on 4 November, 1956 after which Nagy was replaced by Janos Kadar. Nagy was executed by a Soviet firing squad on 16 June, 1958.

During the Hungarian crisis also, the Political Consultative Committee did not discuss the issue. It was
unilateral Soviet decision. What concerned the Soviet Union most was the alliance cohesion. Other things were subsidiary to it - even national sovereignties. Preserving and protecting socialism in an erring state was the obligation of the Pater Familias. Hungary's decision to charter its own course away from the WTO posed serious challenge to the very basis of the organisation and could have led to alliance disintegration. So Moscow used the ideological barrier to bring Hungary to the socialist track.

The Albanian Crisis, 1961

Khruschev's de-Stalinisation programme in 1956 prompted a section of the Albanian party to overthrow Enver Hoxha with Soviet support. In 1960 Khruschev tried to force Hoxha to give up Albania's close ties with China. By 1960 there were barrages of polemics directed against each other. Mostly it centred an ideological question like the nature of imperialism, the possibility of war, nature of Stalinism etc. In the 1960 PCC meeting there was no public accusation; however, in the November 1960 Conference of the Communist Parties, the Albanians were condemned for anti-Soviet policies and Hoxha in turn attacked Khruschev and Marshal Malinovsky of trying to interfere in Albania's internal affairs. Whereas

Khruschev and Suslov publicly condemned Hoxha of perpetuating personality cult, Hoxha went on questioning the Soviet leaders' right to interfere in the internal affairs of Albania.

Virtual exclusion of Albania from Warsaw Treaty consultation followed. There was no public Soviet response to the Albanian declarations. Albania did not attend the WTO defence ministers meeting in 1961 and the Albanian troops did not take part in the WTO manoeuvres.

In the 22nd CPSU Congress in 1961 Khruschev attacked Hoxha for his personality cult, revisionism and nationalism and called for punishment of the Albanian leadership for Stalinist crimes.44

Albania was excluded from attending the PCC meeting of June 1962.45 Albania protested saying that the meeting was illegal. The Soviet Union kept attacking Albania at a series of European Communist Party Congresses in 1962 and 1963. However, Albania was never formally expelled from the WTO and the Soviet Albanian relationship remained frozen till 1968, when Albania left the WTO protesting against the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Here again in dealing with Albania, Soviet Union did not take into confidence the WTO allies.

44. Pravda, 18 and 21 October, 1961.
The Albanian crisis did not bother the Soviet leadership too much though it was also an irritant. Apart from ideological barrages no severe action was taken against it for deviationism. Its not too significant position allowed it to get away with non-compliance with Moscow's ideological prescriptions. The Soviet Union did not consider its errant behaviour as any way dangerous to alliance integration and cohesion. Its absence from the PCC meetings or from the WTO joint exercises hardly caused any consternation in the Soviet leadership circles.

The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962

The Soviet explanation of the Cuban missile crisis states that the victory of revolution in Cuba provoked the imperialist circles to export counter revolution to it. It states: "United States policy vis-a-vis Cuba is and most unbridled, reactionary policy. To declared that Cuba threatens America, or any other country was on this plea to usurp a special right to act against Cuba is monstrous."

Thus a large scale military invasion of Cuba was launched - about 100,000 men, 183 warships with 85,000 naval personnel were bent on attacking Cuba backed by NATO

forces. In the face of it, Cuba requested Khruschev to help defend itself and Khruschev agreed. Thus a score of Soviet IRBMs were taken to Cuba with no other intention than protecting Cuba from the imperialist quarantine. During this period both the Soviet and WTO forces were alerted.

Khruschev wrote later, "The main thing was that the installation of our missiles in Cuba would, I thought restrain the United States from precipitative militarisation against Castro's government.... In addition to protecting Cuba our missiles would have equalised what the West likes to call the 'balance of power'.... The Americans had surrounded our country with military bases and threatened us with nuclear weapons and now they would learn just what feels like to have enemy missiles pointing at you". 47

The Western logic goes that the Americans could have invaded Cuba if it would have been necessary and Khruschev did recognise that he could not defend the island with strategic missiles. 48 Khruschev, on the other hand, reported that since the desired goal of preventing American invasion of Cuba was achieved by the American

47. Ibid.

promise not to invade, there was no question of capitula-
ting before the imperialists show of strength and thus he
defended the withdrawal of the missiles from Cuba. And
therefore this did not undermine the position of the
USSR or the socialist bloc.

Kennedy in his interview with Izvestia (Moscow) on
4 December 1961 had categorically stated, "It would be
helpful if NATO and the Warsaw Pact engaged in a commitment
to live in peace with each other." 49

The Soviet Union did welcome Kennedy's statement.
In fact this was in line with the oft repeated Soviet
proposal of a non-aggression Pact between the NATO and
the Warsaw Pact states which would considerably normalise
the European situation. V.A. Zorin of the USSR repeated
this in the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference in
Geneva in March 1962. He said, "The conclusion of
a non-aggression treaty between the NATO countries and the
Warsaw Treaty states would be an expression of the
fact that the state members of the two blocs have no
aggressive designs. It would contribute to greatly
improving the situation not only in Europe but in the
whole world." The Soviet Union then had proposed the
following things:

49. Izvestia (Moscow), 4 December 1961.
1. De-nuclearised zones around the world.
2. Non-aggression treaties and agreements.
3. Prohibition of war propaganda.

The Cuban missile crisis was indeed a test case for the socialist bloc. It displayed the strength and tenacity of bloc to face the western threat quite resolutely. Though Cuba was not a member of the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union expanded all possible help when the Cuban revolution was at its most perilous hour, Khruschev's action was exemplary. Soviet Union showed it to the world that it could also engage in brinkmanship. When NATO was busy in increasing forces in Europe and inducting nuclear warheads into Poseidon submarines, the socialist bloc made a real show of strength and extended its solidarity to another socialist country.

The Berlin Crisis, 1961

The German question had remained unsettled. As a prelude to German unification Otto Gretewohl of GDR proposed:

(1) Outlawing the distribution and manufacture of atomic bombs and weapons on German territory and an agreement on outlawing atomic war propaganda.

(2) Withdrawal of the German states from NATO and the Warsaw Pact, abolition of conscription and agreement on the number of troops which each side would maintain.
Joint or separate requests to the four powers to gradually withdraw their forces from the whole of Germany in the near future.\footnote{Current Digest of the Soviet Press (Ann Arbor), vol.9, no.32, 18 September, 1957, pp.18-19.}

The Soviet Union also proposed the liquidation of foreign bases, withdrawal of foreign troops from other countries and conclusion of a treaty between NATO and the Warsaw Pact members binding them not to resort to force along with an agreement on disarmament, all these aimed at promoting European Collective Security.

However, situations deteriorated. In July 1961, 30,000 citizens of the GDR fled to the West which shocked the Ulbricht regime. On 12 August, the Warsaw Treaty countries published a statement relating to the Berlin crisis. It said, "The Western powers far from having made any efforts to normalise the situation in West Berlin, on the contrary continue to use it intensively as a centre of subversive activities against the German Democratic Republic and all other countries of the socialist commonwealth. In no other part of the world, are so many espionage and subversion centres of foreign states to be found as in the West Berlin and nowhere else can they act with such impunity. These numerous subversion centres are smuggling their agents into the German Democratic Republic for all kinds of subversion, recruiting
spies and inviting hostile elements to organise sabotage and provoke disturbances in the German Democratic Republic. And thus the Berlin Wall went up in August 1961.

In the PCC meetings of the Warsaw Pact held in 1959, 1960, 1961, the German question was thoroughly discussed; the socialist countries had repeated their proposals for direct consultation between NATO and WTO to conclude a general European treaty. The West was however, busy in encouraging all kinds of subversive activities in East Germany which ultimately resulted in the fleeing of thousands of East Germans towards the West. The Berlin crisis is also one example in which the socialist countries kept up their solidarity and cohesion and faced the challenge. In the end, the socialist bloc had no alternative other than erecting the Berlin wall which stood as the emblem of cold war till 1990.

The Czechoslovak Crisis, 1968

On 20 August, 1968 with 'a solemn commitment to stand up in the defense of the gains of socialism' about half a million Soviet troops, 50,000 Polish troops, 20,000 East German troops, 20,000 Hungarian troops and 10,000 Bulgarian troops marched into Czechoslovakia.


Pravda in Moscow justified it as 'Defense of Socialism is the Highest International Duty'. It was considered that 'the defense of socialism in Czechoslovakia is not only the internal affair of that country's people but also a problem of defending the positions of world socialism.

The political objective of the entire operation was to install a pro-Soviet regime and arrest the renegade leaders. Indeed like Imre Nagy, four Czech leaders were arrested and taken to Legnica in Poland – they were Alexander Dubcek, Smrkovsky, Kriegel, Spacek. Alois Indra was asked to head a new government in Prague.

The Czechs simply failed to deter the Soviets as the Poles had done under Gomulka and the Yugoslavs had done under Tito.

Unlike the other crises, the Czech one that is, the Prague Spring had some intellectual air about it.

The "Gottwald Memorandum", the "Two Thousand Words Manifesto", Lieutenant General Vaclav Prchlik's attempt to reformulate the Czech military doctrine and the self-immolation of Jan Palach a young university student and the massive popular demonstrations in Prague had

indeed made the Prague Spring\textsuperscript{55} somewhat romantic which soon turned ugly and pathetic.

The ten page Gottwald memorandum\textsuperscript{56} written by Vojtech Menel, rector of the Gottwald Academy and others called for a nationalist military strategy for Czechoslovakia, talked of the possibility of neutrality and an extent in Central Europe without ideological bearings. This indeed had irritated the Soviets to such an extent that Marshal Iakubovskii, the Chief of the WTO forces was immediately sent to Czechoslovakia to extract an assurance of loyalty. Lt. General Vaclav Prchlik with the backdrop of the Gottwald Memorandum called for a Romania type military doctrine of territorial defense. He also criticized the Soviet monopoly of all top posts of the WTO and called for democratising the WTO bodies.

Ludvik Vaculik, in the "Two Thousands Words Manifesto"\textsuperscript{57} in June 1968 condemned the foreign forces which were trying to interfere in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia.

Here it is appropriate to discuss first the Brezhnev doctrine. Then we shall analyse the Czech crisis in the perspective of the Brezhnev doctrine.

\textsuperscript{55} A letter from Alexander Soltzhenitsyn to the Soviet Writer's Union was read in the Czech Writers Congress around June 1967. This had also irritated the Soviets greatly.

\textsuperscript{56} Czechoslovak Press Survey (New York), 2272, 18 November 1969

\textsuperscript{57} See Remington, n.52, p.20.
The Brezhnev Doctrine

The sovereignty of individual socialist countries could not be counterposed to the interests of world socialism and the world revolutionary movement, so said S. Kovalev in his famous Pravda article and advocated a concept of 'limited sovereignty' which formed the basis of the Brezhnev Doctrine. He continued, "...individual countries that have their own well defined state boundaries and develops with regard for the specific attributes of each country. And no one interferes with concrete measures to perfect socialism. But matters change radically when a danger to socialism itself arises in a country. World socialism as a social system is the common achievement of the working people of all countries, it is indivisible and its defense is the common cause of all communists and all progressive people on earth, first and foremost of the working people of the socialist countries". 59

Brezhnev in his Warsaw speech drawing on Kovalev's theme said, "It is common knowledge that the Soviet Union has really done a good deal to strengthen the sovereignty and autonomy of the socialist countries... But it is well known comrades that there are common natural laws of socialist construction, deviation form

58. Pravda, 26 September, 1968.
59. Ibid.
which could lead to deviation from socialism as such. And when external and internal forces hostile to socialism try to turn the development of a given socialist country in the direction of restoration of the capitalist system, when a threat arises to the cause of socialism in that country - a threat to the security of the socialist common wealth as a whole - this is no longer merely a problem for that country's people but a common problem - the concern of all socialist countries. 60

And so it was the concern of the Soviet led Warsaw Pact forces to restore socialism in Czechoslovakia.

The October 1968 Treaty between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia legitimised Soviet troops remaining in Czechoslovakia. Unlike the treaty with Hungary which contained a provision that troop movements would be subject to mutual agreement, there was no such provision in this treaty.

It is interesting to note that in the WTO Political Consultative Committee meeting held in Budapest on 17 March, 1969, Dubcek served as Chairman. 61 It was hardly a meeting in the sense that neither the Czech invasion, nor the Brezhnev doctrine nor the Sino-Soviet border clash were mentioned and talked about. The Soviet Union chose to ignore these issues in the Pact meeting.


This was indeed quite in contrast with the Dresden meeting of the Warsaw Pact leaders on 23 March, 1968 in which Czechoslovakia was censured and was asked to assure that there would not be any violation of "socialist construction". One has here to note that Czechoslovakia was economically hardpressed, thus it very sincerely wanted economic reforms on the Yugoslav pattern which combined a socialist market economy with Western technological aid. This also was the cause of internal party struggle and gave ample reason to the WTO leaders to view with concern the Czech developments. On 11 July, 1968 Pravda for the first time linked Czechoslovakia with the "Counter revolutionary elements in Hungary". After a spate of visits by Alexy Kosygin, Marshal Grechko, Marshal Ivan Iakubovskii and after the Bratsilava meeting on 3 August, 1968, it was believed that the crisis had passed over but seventeen days after the inevitable happened.

As has been pointed out in the preceding pages, Pravda justified the invasion on the grounds of situations of disarray, vacillation and uncertainty the "existence of reactionary, anti-socialist forces which relied on world imperialism for support". Dubcek was taken forcibly to Moscow but was spared the fate of Imre nagy.

When the invasion was condemned by the Romanians,

Yugoslavs, Albanians, Chinese, French, Italian and Spanish Communist Parties, Pravda wrote, "Does this not show that some of our friends abroad obviously misled by imperialist propaganda have failed to understand the essence of the prevailing situation and are hastily expressing their disagreement with the actions of the socialist countries which are fulfilling the commitments undertaken by them in Bratislava". 64

Whereas Hungary, Poland, East Germany, Bulgaria positively commented on the Soviet action, Romania even refused to consure Czechoslovakia keeping in view its 1964 declaration of independence, its rapprochement with the Federal Republic of Germany in January 1967 and its diplomatic activity with Israel, Arabs, China, USA and France. On the other hand Ceausescu wrote, "The military cooperation of the socialist countries has been and is directed against the danger of an imperialist aggression from ourside.... There cannot exist any justification for admitting in any way the use of the armed forces in the internal affairs of a country which is a member of the Warsaw Pact. The solving of domestic problems belong exclusively to the Party and people of each country, and interference cannot but harm the cause of socialism". 65

64. Pravda, 23 August 1968.

As we came across our analysis, the Czech invasion was unwarranted so far as the treaty provisions of the WTO were concerned. The crisis was never discussed in its PCC. Even after the crisis, it was not discussed in the WTO PCC. The Romanian criticism was quite vehement. The WTO failed to act as a collective body but acted on Soviet instructions. Polish, East German and Bulgarian forces did participate but hardly there was any collective decision prior to the invasion. The Brezhnev doctrine provided the ideological rational for it. Was it an aberration? We shall take this up after discussing the Romanian crisis.

Romania - The Rebel Within

Romania has been indeed the Enfant Terrible for the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.

If in the late forties and early fifties the Romanian Communist Party (RCP) was dependent on the Soviet Union for its survival and growth by the early sixties it had grown itself from the parenting of the Soviet party. The Hungarian and Polish crisis of 1956 gave the Romanian leadership necessary lessons as to how to maintain independent stand vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Ghearghiu Dej the Romanian leader in this virtually followed the Stalinist foot steps. He exercised tight control over the party, fostered anti-Russian nationalist
feelings and started faster economic development and attempted to maintain distance from WTO as much as possible.

After the Hungarian and Polish crisis it is believed that Gheorghiu-Dej persuaded Khruschev to withdraw troops from south eastern Europe to provide greater popular legitimacy to the regimes in these countries. Thus after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Romania in 1958, Dej developed a "territorial defense system" between 1958 and 1964. By 1960 Romania stopped sending officers to Soviet military academies and thereby stopped the military indoctrination by Soviet officers of the Romanian military. By 1964 Romania did not allow the conduct of WTO joint exercises in the Romanian territory. After 1964 Romania sent only token forces for WTO joint exercises outside the Romanian territory. In 1964 Dej abolished the Romanian Main Political Administration and thus severed links with the Soviet Main Political Administration and in place established a network of party committees.

In 1964, the Romanian Central Committee virtually issued a declaration of independence from the Soviet Union.

66. Ibid.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid. See also, Pages from History of the Romanian Army (Bucharest, 1975).
which said, "We stand for the abolition of all military blocs, as a transitional measure in this direction, we declare ourselves in favour of a non-aggression pact between the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, 69 and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. The statement was quite critical of Soviet interference in the domestic affairs of the national Communist Parties both in the Comintern (1919-43) and Cominform (1947-53) phases. In continued, "Interference in the domestic affairs of the Communist Parties went as far as the removal and replacement of leading party cadres and even of entire Central Committees as far as the imposing from without of leaders, the suppression of distinguished leading cadres of various parties.... There does not and cannot exist a 'Parent' party and a "Son" party, or "superior" parties and "subordinate" parties.... No party is allowed to go over the heads of the party leaders of one country or another and even less to launch appeals for the removal or change, of the leadership of a party". The declaration strongly rejected economic integration mechanism contained in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) framework and Khruschevian "supranational planning". 70 It said, "The state plan is one and indivisible; no parts or sections can be separated from it in order to be transferred outside the state. The management of the national


70. Ibid.
economy as a whole is not possible if the questions of managing some branches or enterprises are taken away from the competence of the party and government of the respective country and transferred to extrastate bodies".71 However, this does not mean that Romanian-Soviet and CMEA economic relations continued to strain only by 1964. On the other hand it had already started by 1953.72

During the Hungarian crisis if the Romanian troops had participated with the Soviet one, later on they also provided medical and economic assistance to Hungary. In his election speech of 2 February, 1957 while Dej pledged friendship with the Soviet Union, he also talked of friendship with China and other socialist countries.73 In the 1957 Moscow meeting of the Communist Parties, the Romanian delegation abstained from dinners, receptions, memorials and other cultural programmes.74 In March 1958, a Romanian delegation consisting of Prime Minister Chivu Stoica, defense minister and the minister of foreign affairs visited China. The Sino-Romanian joint statement in this occasion called for abolition of blocs.75

71. Ibid.


73. Pravda, 3 February, 1957.

74. Pravda, 7 November, 1957.

also praised Chinese troop withdrawal from North Korea. And these got a low-key coverage in Pravda. The 1958 WTO Political Consultative Committee (PCC) meeting decided on the troop withdrawal from Romania.

Before the PCC meeting the first of the Warsaw Pact Communist Parties had decided on further integration within the CMEA framework which obviously had annoyed the Romanians. They were also annoyed because of Khruschev's statement that "question of borders between socialist countries will be a pointless one". 76

The Sixteenth CMEA Council Plenum in December 1961, which recommended the principles of the International Socialist Division of Labour, was indeed quite acrimonious. The Poles, the Hungarians, the Romanians argued that the time was not yet ripe for such transitions, though Fadayev, the CMEA Secretary kept assuaging their anxieties that the CMEA was not assuming supranational authority. 77

The June 1962 statement of Khruschev on "Vital questions of Development of World Socialist System" further irritated the Romanians. Khruschev wrote, "The socialist world system is now at a stage when it is no longer possible correctly to chart its development by merely adding up the national economies. The task is to... advance towards

that single world wide organism... and calls for planning ...on the scale of the entire commonwealth". 78

The polemics between the Romanian leaders and the Soviet leaders continued till Khruschev's fall on 16 October, 1964. The Brezhnev and Kosygin leadership attempted to recast the Soviet-Romanian relationship by criticising the Khruschevian leadership of impeding the industrialisation of Romania by its insistence on agricultural growth and development as a specialised activity for Romania. Hence on the arrival of the new leadership there followed mutual understanding. 79 Thus the 1965 WTO PCC meeting in Warsaw which was attended by Romania declared, "Complete unity and solidarity in the face of the imperialist threat". 80 Moreover, there was complete unity of views on all questions discussed in Warsaw. 81

However, Romanians did not attend the March 1965 meeting of Communist Parties. Thus, during the tenth anniversary celebration of WTO, the Soviet leadership including Marshal Grechko displayed further conciliatory

78. Ibid.  
79. See Pravda, 18 and 28 October, 1964.  
81. Pravda, 6 February 1965.
gestures leading to the visit of a top level Romanian delegation to Moscow since 1961. 82 This took place on the background of the death of Gheorghiu Dej. In the meantime Soviets started emphasising on the military aspect of the WTO. It is in this context that Brezhnev issued a statement which called for "further perfecting the WTO" to face the intrigues of the imperialist aggressions. 83 Then again in March 1966 at the 23rd CPSU Congress Brezhnev talked of "improving the mechanism of the Warsaw Pact" in defense of the socialist system. 84

In May 1966 Nikolai Ceauasescu - the leader during the 45th anniversary of the Romanian Communist Party (RCP) called for abolition of military blocs and military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from countries. He referred to "the dictates of Vienna" which was imposed on Romania with respect to Transylvania which was sliced away from Romania and merged with Hungary. He said, "Nevertheless, foreign domination did not succeed in smothering the people's desire for freedom and in changing its strong wish for unity". 85

The July 1966 Bucharest meeting of the WTO PCC which lasted for twelve days was quite acrimonious. After

82. Pravda, 11 September 1965.
83. Pravda, 16 September 1965.
mutual bickering between Brezhnev, Kosygin and Ceausescu, the Soviet leadership warned not to endanger socialist interests by nationalism and chauvinism. However, the Soviets refrained from harping on 'perfecting the WTO'.

Romanian recognition of West Germany in 1967 further deteriorated the relationship though in the Soviet Union did not attack the Romanian leadership directly; it only said that conditions were not appropriate.

In the April 1967 Karlovy Vary Conference of European Communist Parties, Brezhnev again called for strengthening the WTO. However, it was not attended by Romania. Likewise when Marshal I.I.Iakubovskyi called a meeting of WTO defense ministers (after being the Commander-in-Chief of WTO forces) in 1967 the Romanian defense minister Ion Ionita did not participate.

However, relations again improved by the summer and Romania took part in the joint exercises for the first time in three years.

As has been pointed out in the preceding pages, Romania did not censure Czechoslovakia nor did it support the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. However,

87. Pravda, 8 February 1967.
89. Scienteia (Bucharest), 26 July, 1967.
by 1968 the Romanians strongly consolidated their territorial defense system comprising of 520,000 troops and 700,000 members of the Patriotic Guards. The Romanian Defense Law of 1972 constituted a charter for the "War of the Entire People" concept. It seeks to expunge the legal basis for collaboration between Romanian citizens and occupation force. It is also important to note that since 1960 the Romanian defense spending has steadily increased.

As it is clear from the foregoing analysis Romania has hardly toed the Soviet line. Its assertion of independence so far as foreign policy operations were concerned, caused considerable consternation among Soviet policy makers. Its distantiation from the WTO functioning and sticking to its national military doctrine of territorial defense posed great challenges to the WTO's block solidarity and unity. The Romanian behaviour has led the Soviet Union often to think of it as an unreliable ally. Its errant behaviour so far as Albania, China and the West were concerned, kept worrying not only the Soviet Union but also its other WTO partners. Unlike Hungary and Czechoslovakia, Romania played its cards vis-a-vis the

90. Patriotic Guards in Romania constitute Paramilitary forces.


Soviet Union quite skilfully, from the beginning not to allow any thing like a repeat of the Hungarian situation or the Prague spring. Its "nationalist deviation" from the WTO's military framework often threatened to create deep fissures in the Warsaw Pact.

Now we move on to a general analysis of the issues discussed above.

The analysis of different crises thus show that the Soviet Union has not used the Warsaw Pact as a true multilateral alliance but used it as an instrument to preserve alliance, solidarity and cohesion by whatever means possible. The WTO was not operationalised as a collective alliance system during the crises rather undertook unilateral decisions. Eberhard Sohultz says, "In sum one can maintain that as a rule it is not in the multilateral scene that important political problems are decided. Issues of crucial significance are tackled in bilateral talks with the Kremlin. The multilateral activities of the bloc countries are devoid of political substance and remain primarily ceremonial performances in a Byzantine style".93 This, however, does not undermine the efforts of the Soviet Union and the bloc countries together to preserve stability during the first

decade of the Pact's existence. Given the chaotic situation during the 1956, the pace at which they managed control was remarkable. The Soviet aim was two fold (1) to assert firmly the pre- eminent position of the Soviet Union among the socialist states, (2) to effect a blockwise rejection of revisionism. Except for some temporary resistance on the part of Gomulka the Soviet Union had no real difficulty in making its position accepted which resulted in the statement of the "Twelve Ruling Communist Parties" issued in Moscow in November 1957. This document identified the USSR as the first and the mightiest member of the socialist camp and singled out revisionism as a greater danger to the communist movement rather than Stalinist dogma.

Moscow was indeed extremely cautious in dealing with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). However, it did permit Prague and Warsaw to send signals to the FRG which resulted in the visit of Chancellor of the FRG, Konard Adenauer to Moscow in September 1955 after the proclamation of the "Hallstein Doctrine" which forbade not just the acceptance of a second German state but also the establishment of diplomatic relations with the East European countries which had recognised the GDR.94

Indeed Moscow has pursued two major goals towards East Germany in the post-war era, one connected to its

94. Ibid.
policy toward Eastern Europe (Blokpolitik) and the other to its policy toward the western alliance (Westpolitik). The GDR's role in Soviet blocpolitik remains predominant although its significance has grown remarkably. With the emergence of FRG's overtures to the East things changed dramatically. It seemed to:

(1) Sanction Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe and thereby satisfy Kremlin.

(2) Eventually to settle the territorial disputes with Poland and Czechoslovakia thus making them less dependent on the Soviet Union.

(3) To recognise the GDR as a separate state.

(4) To eliminate the Berlin question as a stumbling bloc to practical politics.

(5) To clear the way for East-West cooperation.

It was the last consideration which had appealed to Brezhnev too much. He started thinking in terms of American, Japanese and West German investments in Siberia and procure Western and Japanese technology to modernise Soviet economy. This had irritated Walter Ulbricht and the first rift between GDR and Moscow surfaced in March 1969. Political Consultative Committee meeting in


96. Schultz, n.93, p.55.
Budapest where the USSR revived its proposal for a European Security Conference and where the communique was notable for its mild language toward Bonn. Again in April 1969, in the fifteenth anniversary celebration of the Comintern, both Mikhail Suslov and Boris Ponomarev disparaged the Stalinist understanding of social democracy as the main enemy of communism. It is significant to note that in the same meeting Ulbricht had defended the Stalinist thesis. The USSR was also thinking at that time that detente would benefit the GDR. Thus the Soviet West German Treaty was signed in August 1970 inspite of the Ulbricht Doctrine - the opposite of the Hallestein doctrine. However, this does not mean that the Soviet Union completely reconciled with the FRG and dismissed all the fears of German revanchism. Quite the contrary, the ambivalent policy continued. Rightly had written Mikhail Bakunin the Russian anarchist, "I say, as Voltaire said of God, that if there were no Germans we should have to invent them, since nothing so successfully unites the Slavs as a rooted hatred of Germans". 97

Military and strategic considerations have been upper most in the Soviet thinking than political or economic. Certain amount of obsession with security concerns have always been there since, "Russia has always felt vulnerable to military pressure ever since its people

97. Ibid., p.33.
tried to set up a national state in the vast plains of the northern parts of the Eurasian land mass. Lacking natural defences, the Russians found their territory overrun by Tartars and Mongols from the east, by Turks from the south and attacked by Poles, Swedes, French and Germans from the west. This experience fostered in the Russian a deep sense of the need to amass military power and to entrust their survival exclusively to their own military effort. 98 In the post-Second World War era the Soviets thus created a buffer zone institutionalising a security mechanism in the form of the Warsaw Pact to fulfil their long cherished goals. Mackintosh says, "The role of a buffer zone is Soviet political and military thinking is on the whole a fairly straightforward one". 99 The military-strategic considerations have thus predominated over politico-economic ones. And in the military strategic sphere as has been analysed in chapter three, Moscow has always retained an extremely dominant position. And this is reflected in the military functioning of the Warsaw Pact. The military headquarter of the Pact has no operational capability, no logistic branch during peacetime. These are provided by the Soviet Ministry of Defence. During war time, the military headquarter of the

98. Malcolm Mackintosh, "Military Considerations in Soviet East European Relations," in Dawisha and Hanson, eds., n.93, p.133.

99. Ibid., p.136.
Pact, whatever little role it has, will be taken over by the Soviet Ministry of Defence. Some analysis like Richard E. Darilek think that the Warsaw Pact more accurately resembles a joint stock corporation controlled by a major shareholder, in this case the Soviet Union.  

One of the most significant achievements of the Warsaw Pact has been the building up the East European forces in a massive way and enriched by Soviet equipments like T-72, BMP Combat Vehicle, MIG-25s and other aircrafts, new artillery pieces, rocket launchers, mobile air defense weapons. Moreover with the deployment of the SS-21 in the GDR territory, a new generation of theatre nuclear missiles was located in Eastern Europe underlying the value of the area to Soviet strategic planning. The remarkable stability of the Brezhnev leadership between 1964 and 1982 further added to the growth of the Pact both as a political and military organisation. This in turn helped preserve European security and detente which went into a blind alley after the Soviet intervention of Afghanistan in 1979. It is during this period with the prospering of detente, also grew East-West trade significantly.

East-West detente which had taken an upward swing after the 1962 Cuban missile crisis and had flowered into

100. Ibid., p.139.
101. Darilek, n.10, p.75.
the Helsinki Conference in 1975. However it nosedived in 1979 after the Soviet intervention of Afghanistan. It was indeed a steady period for the Soviet Union except the intervening events like the Czech crisis of 1968, the Romanian rebellion which spanned from 1958 onwards perpetually, the Solidarity movement in Poland in the eighties. However, if these constituted the "fault lines" the WTO could manage them successfully. And the Warsaw pact continued to exist as militarily strong as its counterpart the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, though the Soviet menolithic dominance continued.

Poland indeed was a sad case for the Soviet Union. In 1974, Moscow had recognised Poland as one of the countries on the verge of entering the stage of "developed socialism"; in the eighties it accused the Polish Party of "revisionism" and the spectre of the Brezhnev doctrine kept haunting Poland, after large scale economic chaos, and the emergence of Solidarity as an organised force. After several trips of Marshal V.G.Kulikov, Chief of the WTO forces, to Warsaw and WTO manoeuvres it was already becoming apparent that the Soviet invasion was imminent. However, the Soviet Union went for "invasion by proxy", when the Polish regime imposed martial law. Such incidents only created bitterness among alliance partners.

Thus in this chapter we examined the inter-alliance relationship among the members of the Pact as part of our effort to understand the functional and behavioural aspect of the Warsaw Pact. We also analysed as to how the Warsaw Pact responded to different internal crisis situations which affected the Pact and found in all cases that the Pact almost acted on Soviet policy directives rather than on the basis of collective consensus. The Political Consultative Committee (PCC), the seminal institution of the act hardly deliberated on the crises or took note of the situations. The Soviet government did consult allied partners but definitely not within the WTO framework. This created lot of bitterness among allied partners. Soviet unilateral decisions with respect to Hungary Czechoslovakia and other important issues often threatened to create deep fissures in the Warsaw Pact. This revealed the shortcomings of the Warsaw Pact as a multinational socialist alliance system. Domestic issues which were not under purview of the WTO as per treaty provisions came to be the target area of its operation. However, so far as other issues are concerned the PCC was quite thoroughly active and involved. We saw that though the functioning of the Pact changed significantly in the detente period, we did not find any slackening in the military preparedness; rather forces and equipments were increasingly dumped into Eastern Europe. This, however,
does not belittle the significance of the WTO as a multi-
lateral alliance system. So far as issues of European
peace and security are concerned, the WTO was quite
seriously concerned and at every stage, expressed its
readiness to go for an all European system of collective
security and disband the alliances. It is indeed impor-
tant that the West has remained quite suspicious of
the Soviet and WTO proposals all throughout.

Having discussed the inter-alliance behaviour, we
now proceed in the next chapter to discuss East-West
relations and the crucial issues arising out of it.