INTRODUCTION
The present thesis, entitled "Language, Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity in Edmund Husserl: A Critical Study", is a continuation of my preoccupation with the phenomenological philosophy of Edmund Husserl, a concern which started when I was working on my dissertation for the M.Phil. degree. That dissertation was dedicated to the problem of intentionality. But while working on that issue, I became conscious of the fact that the thesis of intentionality has ramifications into every aspect of Husserlian phenomenology. It is the usual procedure in Husserlian studies to look at other doctrines of phenomenology from the point of view of intentionality. While I am aware of the reasonableness and practicality of this perspective, yet I was obscurely aware of certain dissatisfaction with it, for such an approach seems to take intentionality as a point of departure. While this is so, it is equally also true that the thesis of intentionality itself is modified and transformed by the various changes and developments which phenomenology has undergone in the different stages of Husserlian development. Thus, there are significant and philosophically important differences between the principle of intentionality as we find it in Logical Investigations and as we find it in Experience and Judgment and the Crisis. One way of giving further precision to this idea is to say that a complete understanding of the nature
and role of intentionality in Husserl can be understood only if one places it in the context of the fundamental problematics of Husserl. If this is so, then it appears to me that one must first delineate the nature of these problematics, reasons or considerations behind their emergence and also Husserl's responses to them at different stages. Beyond this sort of internal conceptual clarifications, one must also relate these problem areas systematically to each other, and only then one might be able to understand the genuine place of the thesis of Intentionality. With this presupposition in mind, I began to plan for my Ph.D. thesis and the first decision I had to take, was to identify these constitutive problematics, which may be said to have influenced the transformations of phenomenological philosophy in general and of the doctrine of intentionality in particular. A clue to the identification of these problems, I thought, would be provided by a close study of major formative texts of Husserl. It further appeared to me, that four such texts could be identified, namely, the Ideas, the Cartesian Meditations, Lectures on Phenomenological Philosophy and the Crisis. Each one of these texts, I have felt, revolved around the basic thematic principles of the problems. Thus, for my purpose, what was most significant and important about the Ideas was its transcendentalism, similarly, what made the
Cartesian meditations relevant is the problem of transcendental intersubjectivity and the Lectures on Phenomenological Psychology resonates to the problem of subjectivity and the Crisis to the thematic of the life-world.

Therefore, I decided to concentrate on these four problem areas. The second decision, I had to take, was to provide for myself a perspective on the understanding of the development of phenomenology in and through these major texts. Here, taking a clue from the suggestions of David Carr and others, I began to think in terms of the entry of the problematics of language into the landscape of phenomenology; I began to think of these problems as connected with what may be called the linguistic turn in phenomenology. It is in some such manner that the present thesis took shape as an investigation of language, subjectivity and inter-subjectivity.

In the following part, I shall briefly indicate the specific orientation of the chapters taken one by one.

The first chapter of the present thesis, attempts an investigation into the problematics of the relationship between phenomenology and transcendental philosophy. Husserl's phenomenology is a transcendental enterprise in two different senses. (a) Firstly, as he himself claims any philosophy worthy its
name, must be transcendental in nature and his phenomenology is transcendental for it is the philosophy proper. (b) Secondly, from our point of view, we can say that transcendental analysis (whatever historically goes by its name) forms an indispensable part of Husserl’s philosophy. We can develop this second point a bit more for the clarity of our understanding. But before that, as an appendix to the first point, we can say that when Husserl claims that his phenomenology is a transcendental philosophical discipline, his is sufficiently different from that of Kantian transcendental philosophy - where we find certain recognizable conceptions of 'transcendentalism' as such. Nonetheless he himself confesses, that he has borrowed the transcendental terminology from Kant only. However, Husserl makes use of the transcendental terminology in his Ideas very systematically for the explication of his phenomenological philosophy; but it is conspicuously absent in his Logical Investigations. Perhaps it is because of this reason that certain commentators claim that transcendentalism is a later development of Husserl’s philosophy. But this is a very misleading, rather erroneous reading of Husserl, for he himself in Crisis, says that although there is no explicit use of transcendental terminology, in Logical Investigations, it was very much implicit in it. After Ideas, the next important
text, in which transcendental analysis is systematically used, is *Cartesian Meditations* - which can be looked upon as a further extension of a problem posed in the *Ideas*, namely, the problem of constitution of the other subjects. The question of transcendental analysis, finds its culminating point in his *Crisis*, in which almost all the earlier investigations are generalized and brought into some kind of unified perspective in it.

The second chapter of the thesis, undertakes a discussion on the problem of intersubjectivity in the Husserlian perspective because a transcendental phenomenology by its own nature, has to account for transcendental intersubjectivity. The basic reason for such a claim is that one of the fundamental tasks of phenomenology is to account for the objective validity of our cognition and that the notion of objective validity presupposes the availability of other subjects. In other words, intersubjective accessibility is a necessary condition of the objectivity of knowledge. Hence any phenomenological analysis of our epistemic claim must be grounded on an a-priori clarification of intersubjectivity, for the other which is the necessary condition of the objectivity of cognition, is not merely an empirical object but a constitu-
ting alter ego.

But a mere presentation of objectivity, without a correlate analysis of the subjective forms, in which such objectivity is given, would reduce phenomenology to a mere fictionalism or constructivism for without such a subjective analysis, objectivity in its various types, would appear to be mere arbitrary logical constructions. (In fact, basically, this was Husserl's criticism of Kant in his *Critik*). Hence, apart from an account of objectivity in terms of an analysis of intersubjectivity, a correlational subjective analysis is a must, to be undertaken and accordingly, in the third chapter, we study in detail, the problematics of subjectivity, as is founded on Husserlian phenomenological psychology, for according to Husserl, phenomenological psychology, provides the foundation for his phenomenology.

In the fourth and final chapter of the present thesis, we make an attempt to situate the phenomenological philosophy of Edmund Husserl in the context of other contemporary philosophical movements, particularly, of analytic philosophy. By this, immediately it appears that both the philosophical orientations are radically opposed to each other in various ways. Accordingly, in the first section of this chapter, we
prepare a comparative study of both the traditions, mainly in three contexts, namely, (i) Intentionality and Intensionality: Husserl and Chisholm; (ii) Sense and Reference: Husserl and Frege and (iii) Life-world and forms of life: Husserl and Wittgenstein. But apart from recording the similarities and affinities, the philosophical purpose, which this section serves, is to suggest that the two orientations of phenomenology and analytic philosophy may reinforce each other such that some of the problems and difficulties of one position may be strengthened by the insight of the other, i.e. not only could there be a dialogue between the two, but they could achieve a certain reciprocity between themselves. The second section, in the form of concluding remarks on the present investigations, following the lead advanced by David Carr and others, attempts to show that as in the case of the analytic philosophy, so in the classical Husserlian phenomenology, there is also a linguistic turn, and how this linguistic turn, is not only helpful in the context of the relation of phenomenology with analytic philosophy, but also how in a novel manner, it helps in addressing some of the internal problems of phenomenology itself.