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**CHAPTER IV**

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**Introduction**

When one approaches the phenomenological philosophy of Edmund Husserl from the outside as it were, in the context of other contemporary philosophical movements, particularly of analytic philosophy, a certain general contrast appears obvious and compelling. The two philosophical orientations seem to be radically opposed to each other in a number of ways. The most obvious and general dimensions of this contrast between phenomenology on the one hand and analytic philosophy on the other can be developed in the context of three problematic issues.

Husserl, in the *Logical Investigations* approaches the problem of linguistic meaning from the point of view of a prior more fundamental analysis of intentional consciousness. For Husserl an intentional act is directed towards a certain sense or meaning which he calls the noema of that act. It is in this sense that intentional acts are said to be meaning giving. But it is important to note that Husserl's conception of meaning in the sense of noema of an act is pre-linguistic. It is when such an intensive act is formulated in language
that we have a meaningful sentence with its own proper sense. The sense of a linguistic expression which Husserl calls 'Bedeutung' therefore, is not a point of departure for the analysis of consciousness. On the contrary, it is the result of that analysis, for Husserl claims that linguistic meaning is the expression at the level of language of the noema of the intenive act. In this sense the problem of meaning is explained on the basis of a more ultimate theory of consciousness as intentional. But in the domain of analytic philosophy the meaningfulness or significance of mental acts such as the acts of perception, of memory, etc., are explained in terms of the use of language in particular context. This is the basic idea of the Wittgensteinian metaphor of language-games. Each type of experience is distinguished by the particular use of the language in the context, hence to understand the nature of perception or the nature of memory, etc., we must consider how language is used in such context. At a more general level as we shall see, Chisholm seeks to show that the nature of intentions as mental acts could be clarified by the analysis of intensional sentences. Hence analytic philosophy and phenomenology appear to approach the problem of meaning from opposite points of views as it were; the one seeks to clarify language on the basis of experience and the other to clarify experience on the basis of language.
Connected with this is also the second dimension of contrast. For all his criticisms of Descartes in the Cartesian Meditations and elsewhere, Husserl never regards the Cartesian standpoint as erroneous or misplaced. In fact the point of his criticism of Descartes was that he was not true to his own insights and relapsed into a dogmatic ontology of two substances. What Husserl strove for throughout his career was a radicalization of the Cartesian point of departure. For him every genuine philosophy must be a first person philosophy in the sense of a careful description and accounting of what is given in my consciousness as my experience. However, for a linguistic philosopher it is precisely the first person standpoint which is the source of confusion and paradoxes. Norman Malcolm in his review of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations has particularly emphasised the inadequacies of first person standpoint as leading to solipsism and scepticism. In a more polemical level, Gilbert Ryle in his influential Concept of Mind regards the Cartesian point of departure as based on category mistake. In a more subtle manner Wittgenstein himself seems to advise us against the dangers of the first person point of departure in philosophical thinking. His rejection of his own earlier Tractatus in the Philosophical Investigations among other things seems to
suggest this criticism, for being looked at from the point of view of the *Philosophical Investigations*, the *Tractatus* appears to be philosophizing from the first person standpoint and the *Philosophical Investigations* reject this on the ground that the first person standpoint involves the absurdity of a private language. Apart from particular authors the rejection of the Cartesian legacy within the analytic orientation is a pervasive feature and in a more subtle or gross form it is found in almost every analytic thinker. In fact, one of the primary difficulties in the way of reception of phenomenology within analytic philosophy is connected with the Cartesian legacy of phenomenology.

A third theme of opposition between the two is connected with their respective attitude to psychology. Analytic philosophy has always emphasised the irrelevance of psychology in the context of philosophical investigations. In this matter it has been decisively influenced by Frege's criticism of psychologism. Here, again, the rejection of psychologism is found in different levels in different analytic thinkers, for instance, in the case of A.J. Ayer and Gilbert Ryle the rejection is emphatic and unmistakable. For Ayer the essential defect of Locke's and Hume's empiricism is precisely that classical empiricism did not make a clear
demarcation between conceptual analysis and psychological description. Similarly Stuart Hampshire and Hamlyn reject Piaget's genetic epistemology on the ground that it mixes up epistemology and psychology in an impermissible manner. In a different way Strawson also rejects the pertinence of psychology in the context of philosophical analysis and lastly in Wittgenstein himself there is a more subtle and profound critique of psychology. When we look at Husserl's attitude to psychology from the point of view of analytic philosophy the situation is more complex. From one point of view Husserl shares the same distrust and suspicion of psychology. His refutation of psychologism in Logical Investigations-I is a formulation which an analytic philosopher would wholly endorse but as we saw in Chapter III, in Logical Investigations-II Husserl seems to reintroduce psychological considerations and in the Crisis he actually claims that without a proper psychology, phenomenology as a transcendental philosophy is bound to be ineffective. This claim would appear totally alien and unacceptable to an analytic philosopher, who at the most can accept that the concepts and method of psychology may become the objects of a philosophical analysis. But Husserl is not merely claiming that psychology is a proper domain for phenomenological
analysis, he is claiming further that phenomenology itself depends upon psychological foundations. It is, of course, true that what he means by psychology here is different from the natural science of psychology and even the descriptive psychology of Brentano and Dilthey. But yet it is a science of mind which is now regarded as a prerequisite for the phenomenological clarification of consciousness.

Given these fundamental contrasts, the two orientations appear polar opposites and hence incommensurable with each other. Yet what is surprising is that inspite of the differences there are also most implicit complementarities and parallelisms between the two. These similarities hidden by the more obvious contrasts require to be particularly identified and described before we can suggest any fruitful dialogue between these two philosophies.

The necessity as well as the profitability of such a dialogue between phenomenology and analytic philosophy is being recognised increasingly from both the camps. On the side of analytic philosophy there has been a recognition that inspite of the seeming contrast there could be a vigorous and interesting dialogue between the two e.g. the studies collected in a recent anthology, Analytic Philosophy.
and Phenomenology suggests the possibility of dialogue at a
general as well as at more specific and concrete levels. On
the side of phenomenology also the studies of David Carr
among other recognises that there is a sort of convergence
in phenomenology with some of the theses of analytic philoso-
phy; but perhaps it is in the work of Paul Ricoeur that this
convergence between Analytic philosophy and phenomenology is
most clearly seen and argued for. It is also recognised that
in its own way there has been a linguistic turn within pheno-
menology. The theme of language has been, in one sense, a
fundamental concern of Husserl even as early as the Logical
Investigations where Husserl was searching for a theory of
pure grammar. But in his later works, especially in the
Crisis the recognition of language is not merely an important
object of study; in the Crisis the fundamental theme of the
Life-world presupposes an intersubjectively understood and
interpreted language. Hence we may say that in the Crisis
language is not merely an object of philosophical reflection,
but in an important sense, is the medium of such reflections.
Although Experience and Judgement in one context argues for
the basis of predication on a pre-predicative experience, yet
as it has been pointed out by commentators the pre-predicative
experience is not to be understood in the positivistic sense
as mere sense perception. The pre-predicative experience of
Experience and Judgement is another name for the life-world of the Crisis and as such it is constituted by language. With this recognition, phenomenology itself undergoes a linguistic turn comparable to that of analytic philosophy. It is, therefore, now possible after the Crisis and Experience and Judgement to have a deeper insight into the similarities and not merely the differences between the two philosophical positions. But the purpose of this chapter is not merely to record such similarities and affinities, rather the philosophical purpose of this chapter is to suggest that the two orientations may reinforce each other such that some of the problems and difficulties of one position may be solved or at least our effort to solve them may be strengthened by the insight of the other. Not only could there be a dialogue between the two but they could achieve a certain reciprocity between themselves. But before such a complementarity could be argued for, first of all, it is necessary to suggest a certain commensurability between them. By this I mean that for some of the major theses and claims of the one orientation there could be corresponding or parallel formulations in the other. We shall propose three contexts for such commensurable similarities, namely, (a) the theses of intentionality and intensionality; Husserl and Chisholm, (b) the duality of sense and reference; Husserl and Frege, and (c) the
life world and forms of life; Husserl and Wittgenstein.

SECTION I: (a) INTENTIONALITY AND INTENSIONALITY: HUSSERL AND CHISHOLM

Language is the medium through which our experience becomes available for philosophical examination. Hence any philosophical inquiry must start with an analysis of language. Roughly, this would be the line of argument of an analytic philosopher in defence of his enterprise. But for a phenomenological philosopher like Husserl, language is the expression of meaning and meaning is the function of conscious intentional acts. Linguistic meaning, therefore, presupposes experiential meaning and hence philosophical inquiry must start with the analysis of conscious experience. However, the outcome of both the analytic and phenomenological analyses are the same. This claim can be justified on the basis of the fact that Chisholm's analysis of intensionality matches with that of Husserl's analysis of intentionality.

Chisholm, inheriting the concept of intentionality from Brentano reformulates it in his own unique style and hence there is a great difference in their respective treatments of this concept. For Brentano, intentionality is the essential characteristic of psychic phenomena and accordingly
it is indispensable in dealing with any such phenomena. But for Chisholm, the logical properties of sentences about psychic phenomena are more important and hence, accordingly, he questions whether such sentences are dispensable or indispensable particularly in psychology and generally in philosophy of mind. Despite this difference between Brentano and Chisholm, astonishingly enough, we find a number of parallels in their respective treatments of intentionality which is more clear in Husserl's original introduction and elaboration of it in his Logical Investigations.¹³

Like Chisholm, Husserl also borrows the concept of intentionality from Brentano, but he introduces it with a different interest i.e., for the purpose of epistemology. Neither is he too concerned with distinguishing the psychical from the physical (as in the case of Brentano) nor is he claiming that sentences about the psychic phenomena are intentional (as in the case of Chisholm).¹⁴

However, for Brentano, as we pointed out (a) all mental states are intentional and for Chisholm (b) all sentences about the mental are 'intensional'. Following Quine's notion of semantic ascent and Carnap's distinction between the material mode and the formal mode we can say
that (a) is in the material mode – it is about something which is non-linguistic; it uses words but does not mention them, whereas (b) is in the formal mode – it is a characterization of a certain class of sentences. In order to clearly distinguish between (a) and (b) we can say that they are intentional and intensional sentences respectively. Thus we get a class of sentences which we may call 'intensional'. If we describe the logical features or criteria of use of such intensional sentences, we would have to give an analysis of intensionality. But, is it also the analysis of intentionality? One can answer this question in the affirmative provided one establishes the relationship of equivalence between intentionality and intensionality. But any attempt to establish such a relationship between the two may give rise to certain difficulties e.g. (a) if certain descriptions are intensional in the sense that they fulfil the criteria of the use of intensional language but they are not about the mental events, then in such a circumstance we can retain the equivalence and given up the claim that intentionality only characterizes mind. Or (b) we can have an act which appears to be intentional, but whose description may not be an intensional sentence i.e. it may not conform to the criteria e.g. the act of knowing i.e. "I know P". If this sentence does not seem to be an inten-
obvious way out would be to maintain the equivalence thesis by denying that knowing is an act at all. In this context it is important to note that Chisholm develops the notion of intensional sentences and the criteria we use for them in his "Sentences about believing". Chisholm's concern, here, is the linguistic level i.e. he is dealing with the intensional sentences and his main purpose is to formulate their logical characteristics. He is concerned with the criteria of intensionality whereas Husserl is concerned with the expressions, not with the linguistic descriptions. But over and above this seeming difference between Husserl and Chisholm, there are certain points of convergence between the two in the sense that we can recognise a certain equivalence between the results of their respective analyses which suggest that they have the same concept. Before we enter into the details let us make note of another crucial point of difference between the two at the methodological level. After working out the characteristics of intensional sentences the question which remained unsolved for Chisholm is whether such intensional sentences are indispensable for philosophy of mind and for psychology. In phenomenology this problem arises in a different way i.e. granted that intentionality is indispensable for psychology, how can we build an intentional or
phenomenological psychology and what would be its scope. This suggests that there are two important points of difference between Husserl and Chisholm i.e. (a) Chisholm's analysis of intensionality belongs to a meta-level and (b) he is not particularly concerned with the consideration of an intentional psychological theory. But, as we have seen in the last chapter, Husserl carries over the theme of intentionality into the theoretical structure of psychology itself. In this sense he is concerned with first order theory formation within psychology.

Chisholm claims that intentionality is the mark of psychological phenomena and in describing a psychological phenomena we need the intentional use of language. The sentence which is used in the intentional context to describe psychological phenomena is an intensional sentence. Accordingly, Chisholm introduces three criteria for the identification of such intensional sentences which are as follows:

a) A simple declarative sentence is intentional, if it uses a substantial expression like a name or a description - in such a way that neither the sentence nor its contradictory implies that either there is or there is not anything to which the substantial expression truly applies.
b) Such a declarative sentence is intentional if neither the sentence nor its contradictory imply either that the phrase following the principal verb is true or that it is false.

c) A simple declarative sentence is intentional if it contains a name (or description) which has an indirect reference in that sense.

Translating the first criterion in the material mode we find that the existence of the occurrence of a psychic phenomenon like thinking, hoping, imagining, wishing etc. although is necessarily about something, it implies neither the existence nor the non-existence of that thing. Similarly the second criterion can be translated in material terms too i.e., a claim, an assertion or a supposition about something implies neither that it is not is not the case. The third criterion of Chisholm in one sense introduces the idea of Frege's 'indirect reference' which is also known as 'referential opacity' i.e., "A name (or description) of a certain thing has indirect reference in a sentence if its replacement by a different name (or description) of that thing results in a sentence whose truth value may differ from the original sentence". For Chisholm this third criterion helps one in considering certain cognitive verbs like 'know',
'remember', 'perceive', 'doubt', etc. which do not fall within the scope of the first and the second criteria. In this way Chisholm attempts to show the intentional use of language by introducing these three criteria.

Now, translating all these three criteria into non-linguistic terms we find them almost similar with the phenomenological concept of intentionality, e.g. Husserl says that the existence of an intentional reference to an object does not imply the existence of that object, just as the reference to a state of affairs does not imply that the state obtains. Again, if we observe closely Husserl's distinction between 'the object as it is intended' and 'the object which is intended' we will notice its similarity with Chisholm's third criterion. To quote his own example "The idea of the German emperor, and as the emperor of Germany the man himself is the son of Emperor Frederick III, the grand son of Queen Victoria and has many other properties neither named nor presented".

However, a very important problem which is left totally unnoticed in Brentano's thesis as well as in Chisholm's reformulation of it, is about the status of the intentional object. In fact Brentano himself has offered the status of 'mental inexistence' and 'immanent objectivity'
to intentional objects and even Meinong names them as 'beyond being' (ausser-seiern). But the acceptance of any of these two alternatives raises serious difficulties, specifically, with reference to ordinary existing objects. Here the distinction between 'the analogical status' of the intentional objects and 'the mark of psychological' becomes invariably important which is not worked out in Husserl. At this point, again, we can ask whether in introducing the concept of intentionality Husserl was interested like Brentano and Chisholm in dealing with 'the mark of the psychological?'. Is it, for Husserl, that all psychic phenomena are intentional? Obviously we get a negative reply to this question. For Husserl not all psychic phenomena 'in the sense of a possible definition of psychology are intentional'. It is only a sharply defined class of experience (Erlebnisse) which has the unique feature of intentionality. Similarly Chisholm too discusses the question whether 'only' psychic phenomena are intentional. He comes across certain examples, which satisfy his criteria for the intentional use of language but are not intentional at all. Thus, he notices that same sentences about non-psychological matters share certain logical features with those about the psychic. Since here the question of difference between the linguistic and non-linguistic approaches becomes crucial and since
Husserl does not make a shift from the psychic to the sentences about the psychic he could not discover the fact which Chisholm could. Even if he had accidentally discovered this he might have remained indifferent towards it for his interest is vested in the nature of certain experiences not in the features of sentences. Nonetheless this problem is very important from the point of view of the validity of the intentionality thesis, but Husserl does not deal with it at all, and this is so, perhaps because Husserl's purpose was not to differentiate the domain of psychology from other disciplines. His purpose, as he says, is to provide an understanding of pure logic from the perspective of a critique of knowledge.

As we have already observed elsewhere, in *Logical Investigations* Husserl's main purpose was to refute psychologism and for this instead of advancing any hitherto existing arguments like reductionism, relativism, etc., he chose an altogether different path. For him in the examination of mental processes of thinking, judging etc., one can see that these processes must be separated from their logical contents and these contents cannot be dealt with on the level of the former. More positively he suggests that in the context of a theory of knowledge logical concepts and laws can be related with mental processes. In fact, in
Logical Investigations he suggests that logical concepts and laws enter into mental life primarily in the knowing situation. For him the aspects of psychic life that "enjoy mental conscious existence in a certain pregnant sense of these words, are intentional". Understood in this way, Husserl's interest in the intentional (as distinct from Brentano's) appears to be very close to Chisholm's. Chisholm speaks of intentionality as the mark of the mental. Here the term 'mental' as usual refers precisely to cognitive and related phenomena. The reference, here, is not necessarily to everything that belongs to the domain of psychology. And it is in Husserl that we find this demarcation in a more clear manner, we can conclude this discussion with a note that the analytic philosophers like the phenomenologists are interested in intentionality only as referring to the philosophy of mind or epistemology, not as the distinctive feature of all phenomena considered by psychology.

SECTION I : (b) HUSSERL AND FREGE

In the Logical Investigations, Husserl, under the influence of Frege's review, abandoned the identification of meanings with mental events on one hand and objective events on the other. Meanings are abstract entities. For
Frege, thoughts are neither the things of the outer world nor are they ideas - they belong to the third realm. But granted that meanings are ideal entities what kind of entities are they? In the *Logical Investigations* Husserl identified meanings with essence of acts. Here meanings are not essences, neither essence of acts nor essence of objects. Linguistic meanings are the expressions of noema of acts. Here, noema are ideal or abstract, but they are not essences - they are correlated with acts, but are not instantiated by the acts. Understood in this sense, noema are sui-generies, a special sort of abstract particular.

In the semantic tradition of Carnap meanings are called intentions. Different theories choose different kinds of entities as intentions. But for Frege, (i) meanings are abstract entities and (ii) they mediate reference. This is very close to Husserl's position, according to whom (i) noema are abstract entities and (ii) they mediate intentions. Since, for Husserl, linguistic meanings are only expressions of underlying act - meanings, the way noema determines intentionality is also the way meaning determines reference i.e. in Husserl, the theory of intentionality is equivalent to a theory of reference.
At the semantic level, both Husserl and Frege share the same theory, namely, meaning determines reference. But in Husserl, the theory of reference is based on the theory of intentionality. In other words, in Husserl, the semantic theory of reference is grounded on a phenomenological theory. But, in Frege, there is an implicit element of phenomenology in so far as he holds that language is an expression of thought. Thus phenomenology in Frege is very implicit and rudimentary. From this point of view we can argue that Husserl's theory of Intentionality is equivalent to Frege's theory of reference i.e. Husserl's noema is Frege's sinne. But before launching the programme, let us briefly discuss the salient features of Frege's theory of meaning and reference.

According to Frege there is a fundamental distinction between intentions of meaning and extensions or referents of expressions. In his essay 'On Sense and Reference' Frege holds that meaningfulness of referring expressions is to be distinguished from their having reference. An expression is meaningful if and only if it expresses something as its sense i.e. for any term t and for any person p, there is a sense s such that p understand t if and only if p attaches s to t.
For Michael Dummett too, a term has reference if and only if it stands for something as its bedeutung. The sense of an expression is always distinct from its reference. The distinction between sense and reference can be applied to other types of expressions also, which are not usually thought of as referring expressions. Thus, Frege holds that the bedeutung of a one-place predicate is a concept and a many-place predicate is a relation. Frege does not give details about the different kinds of entities that could serve as the senses of different kinds of expressions.

The distinction between sense and reference is used by Frege to clarify three features of the use of the referring expressions, which are as follows:

1. Meaningfulness of expressions which have no referent; an expression, like 'Pegasus' has no referent and hence its meaningfulness is dependent upon having a referent, the sentence "Pegasus is a winged horse" would be meaningless which is obviously not so. Hence the meaning of the sentence as a whole cannot be a function of the reference of its parts, but a function of their senses.
2. Significant identity - $A = B$ i.e. "The morning star is the evening star" is an identity statement because both expressions have one and the same referent. But this identity is different from the statement "The morning star is the morning star". We can explain this by saying that although the referents of 'morning star' and 'evening star' are the same, their senses are different.

3. The failure of the logical principle of substitutivity in intentional contexts - the principle of substitutivity holds that if two experiences such as $e^1$ and $e^2$ have the same reference i.e. if they are extensionally equivalent, we can substitute either of them in place of the other without changing the truth value of the sentence. Thus, 'the victor of Jena and 'the vanquished of Waterloo' have the same referent i.e. Napoleon. Hence we can substitute 'the vanquished of Waterloo' in the following sentence $S^1$: "The victor of Jena was a narrow and haughty Frenchman" and get $S^2$ i.e. "The vanquished of Waterloo was a narrow and haughty Frenchman". $S^1$ and $S^2$ both have the same truth value, but in intentional contexts such a substitution seems to fail, for if we have $S^1$: $P$ believes that the victor of Jena was a narrow and haughty Frenchman, by substituting we get $S^2$ i.e. $P$
believes that the Vanquished of Waterloo was a narrow and haughty Frenchman, then $S^2$ may be false even when $S^1$ is true, for $P$ may not know that the victor of Jena and the Vanquished of Waterloo are one and the same person. Here the principle of substitution seems to break-down. But the use of Frege's distinction between sense and reference (of course, among other things) preserved the principle of substitutivity in intentional contexts. What Frege proposed was that (a) in $S^1$ and $S^2$ the referent is not the same object for (b) in an intentional context such as 'P believes that', 'P knows that' etc. the expressions "the Victor of Jena" and "the Vanquished of Waterloo" do not have their ordinary referents, (c) but in such intensional contexts, the expressions refer to their customary senses, (d) the sense or meaning of "the Victor of Jena" and "the Vanquished of Waterloo" are different. (e) So, the expressions in an intentional context have different referents also and (f) the principle of substitution is not really violated.

4. Saving the role of existential generalization - from "The Neighbour's dog bit Jones" we can infer that "there is something which is a dog and which bit Jones". But from "Jones is looking for the golden mountain in Mexico" we cannot infer that "there is something which is a golden
mountain and Jones is looking for it in Mexico". Again, here Frege's distinction between Sense and Reference comes to the rescue, for as we saw above Frege holds that in intentional contexts expressions do not have their customary referents, but they refer to their customary senses. Hence, we cannot infer from the truth of "Jones is looking for a golden mountain" that "there is something which is a golden mountain and Jones is looking for it" because in the intentional contexts the expression "the golden mountain" does not have its customary referent (in fact, it has no referent at all), but it refers to its customary sense. Hence Frege holds that sense and reference are distinct, but nevertheless, they are also intimately related. For Frege, sense determines reference, for the sense of an expression illuminates all aspects of the referent. Hence, different expressions with different senses may yet refer to the same object; each sense presents the object in a certain way. From this point of view, a sense may be described as a mode of presentation of the object.

In the light of the above discussion we can summarize the salient features of Frege's theory as follows:
1. The sense of an expression is always distinct from its referent.

2. To each sense there corresponds only one referent.

3. An expression can express a sense and thus be meaningful although it has no such referent.

4. The sense of an expression determines the way in which the expression refers to its referent.

5. Different senses can determine the same entity.

Again, coming back to Husserl, for him, noema are ideal contents of acts. Husserl's term for the meaning component of noema is 'Sinne' and for him, the sinne or the meaning component of the noema determines the object to which the act is directed. However, 'Sinne' in German ordinarily means sense or meaning. Frege uses the term 'Sinne' for the sense or the meaning of a linguistic expression. In other words, in Frege, sinne is linguistic meaning, but for Husserl, sinne is the meaning component of an intentional act - it is act-meaning i.e. non-linguistic meaning. But like Frege, for Husserl also, meanings or sinne are abstract entities. Moreover, for Husserl, linguistic meanings are noematic sinne. Words give expression to the
underlying act meanings. Husserl's term for linguistic meaning is 'bedeutung'. In ordinary sense 'bedeutung' means meaning or significance. But Frege uses the word in a special and technical sense. For him 'bedeutung' is the object for which an expression stands i.e. referent.

Thus, in Frege,

Sinne = linguistic meaning or sense
Bedeutung = reference of an expression

But, in Husserl

Sinne = meaning of an intentional act i.e. noema
Bedeutung = linguistic meaning - this is the noema expressed in language.

Therefore, Sinne = bedeutung.

The fundamental similarity between Frege and Husserl is that for both of them Sinne or meanings are abstract entities which are neither mental nor physical and secondly, for both of them again, reference i.e. the relation of an expression to the object for which it stands is a function of the sense of the expression. In other words, meanings or senses mediate reference. These are the two fundamental points of similarity between Frege and Husserl which suggests that the correlation between them can be developed
further in a more systematic way as follows:

1. The meaning and referent of an expression are always distinct.

2. The reference of an expression is determined by its meaning i.e. meaning mediates reference.

3. Each meaning determines at the most one referent.

4. But different meanings may determine the same referent in different ways.

5. An expression is meaningful even if there exists no entity to which it refers.

These are the five possible points of correlation between Frege and Husserl. But with regard to (5), noticeably, there seems to be a little difference between them. Frege seems to be saying that an expression may be meaningful even if it has no reference at all. But Husserl seems to be saying something stranger, namely, when an expression has a meaning it can be used to refer even though the entity to which it refers does not exist. This could be taken as suggesting that an expression does have a referent only, it need not be an existent object. This seems to be very close to Meinong's conception of non-
existent objects. Thus, for Husserl, linguistic meanings are the expressions of the noema of acts. Now let us attempt to explore this aspect of the problem more closely.

According to Husserl, to say that a person expresses some meaning implies that a certain act of his consciousness confers upon his words their meanings (sinne). These acts are meaning-giving acts and precisely because of such meaning-giving acts the expression is not merely a sound but something more than it i.e., it means something. By this, Husserl seems to be suggesting the parallelism between act meanings and linguistic meanings i.e., the concept of meaning which is first given in the linguistic context may be extended to the level of acts. If so, then we can say that act meaning is a declarative of linguistic meaning. Of course, Husserl himself comprehends the difference between the two. In Logical Investigations he takes the example of perceptual act meanings and linguistic meanings. Here Husserl says that the phenomenon of a meaningful expression is the function of a certain vehicle i.e., a sound pattern is perceived as an object - this formation of the vehicle is the result of a perceptual act. The pattern of sound becomes a word with the meaning because the noema of a simultaneous act of thinking is bent towards the act of speech. Therefore,
now, we can say that the linguistic meaning is due to a double intentionality. In this way, there is a parallelism between mental acts and speech which is very important from the point of view of generalising the notion of meaning in both the levels of expressions as well as in the level of mental acts. This extension of the concept of meaning to the level of mental acts makes it appear as if Husserl relapses into psychologism. But according to Husserl the noema is not a neutral state or process. In fact, he claims that the noema is grasped only after we have performed the act of reduction and it is noematic meaning which is expressed as linguistic meaning, but the former is independent of the latter. Likewise, even Frege too holds that senses are independent of whether they are expressed or not, but at the same time he holds that it is only through words that we can grasp a sense. Thus, language is indispensable for meaning. Since for Husserl, linguistic meanings are the expressions of noematic meanings, it would follow that every noematic meaning, in principle, is expressible in language.

SECTION I : (C) LIFE-WORLD AND FOCUS OF LIFE : HUSSERL AND WITTGENSTEIN

In the preceding discussions we have attempted to
explore a convergence between phenomenology and analytic philosophy at the methodological level. But such methodological affinities by themselves may not amount to anything significant unless it is possible to suggest that such convergences at the level of method flow from a deeper affinity in terms of underlying philosophical motivations. It is to this task of an explanatory consideration of the motivations and presuppositions of the two styles of philosophizing, the analytical and phenomenological, that I wish to turn now.

Basically, in the brief argument that I seek to develop is the suggestion that the thematic of the life-world in Husserlian phenomenology has more or less similar philosophical functions within the tradition of phenomenology as the concept of 'forms of life' has in the philosophy of the later Wittgenstein.

In Husserlian studies - as in Wittgensteinian studies - it is sometimes said that there is a radical break or rupture in the development of Husserl's phenomenology marked by the appearance of the Crisis. There have been different interpretations of the supposed rupture in the development of both Wittgenstein and Husserl, but all such interpretations also directly or indirectly make a similar point. In
the case of Wittgenstein it is said that the basic difference between the earlier orientation of the *Tractatus* and the later perspective of the *Philosophical Investigations* is that whereas in the *Tractatus* there is a monolithic concept of language in the form of one pure or ideal form of linguistic representation; in the *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein recognises a plurality of modes of meaning called language games and each such pattern of use of language is said to be an expression of a specific form of life. Hence it is the concept of form of life which is said to distinguish the orientation of *Tractatus* from that of the *Philosophical Investigations*. Similarly in Husserl's studies also it is said that the problematic of the life-world is what distinguishes the later phenomenology of *Crisis* from the earlier orientation of the *Ideas*. Not only commentators and interpreters but also phenomenologists like M. Mearleau Ponty see the concept of the life-world as marking a new threshold in the development of Phenomenology. However, what is interesting and also instructive is that this thesis of discontinuity in development has been recognised to be over simplified and exaggerated in the case of both Husserl and Wittgenstein.

When we compare the formulation of the problem of the
natural standpoint in the *Ideas* with the new thematic of the life-world in the *Crisis*. One sees that there is a difference in the surface level of the two discussions, which, however, does not negate a fundamental continuity at a deeper level. Since I wish to argue that there is an element of difference and continuity, I would like to state Husserl's description of the natural standpoint in some detail for the two comments I would like to make, can be appreciated only if one has the full-description of the natural standpoint in the *Ideas*. "I am conscious of a world endlessly spread out in space, endlessly becoming and having endlessly become in time. I am conscious of it: that signifies, above all, that intuitively I find it immediately, that I experience it. By my seeing, touching, hearing and so forth, and in the different modes of sensuous perception, corporeal physical things with some spatial distribution or other are simply there for me, 'on hand' in the literal or the figurative sense, whether or not I am particularly heedful of them and busied with them in my considering, thinking, feeling or willing.Animate beings too - human beings, let us say - are immediately there for me; I look up; I see them; I hear their approach; I grasp their hands, talking with them I understand immediately what they objectivate and
think, what feelings stir within them, what they wish or
will. They are also present as activities in my field of
intuition even when I do not heed them. But it is not
necessary that they, and likewise that other objects, be
found directly in my field of perception. Along with the
ones now perceived, other actual objects are there for me
as determinate, as more or less well known, without being
themselves perceived or, indeed, present in any other mode
of intuition. I can let my attention wander away from the
writing table which was just now seen and noticed, out
through the unseen parts of the room which are behind my
back, to the verandah, into the garden, to the children
in the arbor, etc., to all the objects I directly 'know of'
as being there and here in the surroundings of which there
is also consciousness - a 'knowing of them' which involves
no conceptual thinking and which changes into a clear
intuiting only with the advertence of attention, and even
then only partially and for the very most part imperfectly...

...In my waking consciousness I find myself in this manner
at all times, and without ever being able to alter the fact,
in relation to the world which remains one and the same,
though changing with respect to the composition of its
contents. It is continually 'on hand' for me and I myself am a member of it. Moreover, this world is there for me not only as a world of mere things, but also with the same immediacy as a world of objects with values, a world of goods, a practical world. I simply find the physical things in front of me furnished not only with merely material determinations but also with value-characteristics, as beautiful and ugly, pleasant and unpleasant, agreeable and disagreeable and the like. Immediately, physical things stand there as objects of use, the 'table' with its 'books', the 'drinking glass', the 'vase', the 'piano', etc. These value characteristics and practical characteristics also belong constitutively to the objects 'on hand' as objects, regardless of whether or not I turn to such characteristics and the objects. Naturally this applies not only in the case of the 'mere physical things', but also in the case of the humans and brute animals belonging to my surroundings. They are my 'friends' or 'enemies', my 'servants' or 'superiors', 'strangers' or 'relatives' etc.

When we place the above description in the context of the description of the life-world in the Crisis two things may be noted. In the formulation of the Ideas the above
description is followed in section 31 abruptly by a seeming rejection of the above for Husserl begins section 31 by stating that instead of remaining in this attitude he proposes to alter it radically and he goes on to argue that such a radical alteration of natural standpoint is both possible and in fact necessary for the phenomenological standpoint. Much later in the Ideas Husserl in fact develops more elaborately the contrast between the natural standpoint and the phenomenological standpoint. This radical controversy of two styles of thinking and experience seems to suggest that the phenomenological experience as well as phenomenological reflection depend upon the overcoming of the earlier standpoint. Superficially, the Crisis seems to be saying exactly the opposite for there repeatedly we are enjoined to recover the sense of the life-world; we are told to return to the pre-theoretical life-world from all the objectifications and constructions of thought. Hence one might begin to misunderstand the contrast between the Ideas and the Crisis by holding that the Ideas move away from what later on, Husserl would call the life-world and hence it is precisely this movement of transcendence what is the distinguishing feature of the transcendental phenomenology of the Ideas. In such a spirit, the re-opening of the theme of
the life-world would appear to be an expression of failure to carry through the programme of transcendental philosophy; the return to the life-world, therefore, would be understood as a fresh beginning after the unsurmountable problems in the way of the earlier programme of the Ideas. It is in some such spirit Mearleau-Ponty and others look upon the Crisis as making a new beginning on the part of Husserl. But what complicates such an interpretation is the repeated claim of Husserl that the discovery of the life-world specifically and the Crisis in general is itself a way into transcenden-
tal phenomenology. Husserl does not give the impression of giving up the transcendental programme or even the necessity of the transcendental reduction. On this point, if any thing, the Crisis is even more emphatic than the Ideas. Therefore, we must see the difference between the formulations in the Ideas and the Crisis in a more sensitive manner. For this purpose I want to make two suggestions. One must distinguish between the immediately given natural world and the natural stand point or the thesis about it. The former is what is described in the passage above quoted. But the thesis about the natural stand point is a certain way of understanding one's own position in the natural world and it is this attitude that is to be overcome. In the thesis of the
natural standpoint a consciousness regards itself as an entity among other entities, as a part of the objective world and is determined by it. The inadequacies of this improperly reflective attitude is two fold. On the one hand it misunderstands the nature of consciousness itself as the attribute of a psycho-physical organism. More importantly for our purpose it also falls short of the proper accounting of the natural world itself. In the above description Husserl emphasises two features of the natural world; that in it I perceive objects which have aspects and attributes not given in my particular acts of perception. In terms of the language of the chapter I of the present thesis, physical objects are perceived as transcendent. Not only physical objects but also ideal objectivities such as logical and mathematical entities, values, etc. are transcendent in the Husserlian sense. These objectivities are given in different complexes of intentional acts. But while experiences in which these are given are many yet in the manifold of such experiences these objects are perceived as identical e.g. everytime I enunciate a statement, it is the same statement that is given in all different acts. This objectivity of entities is what marks the world as a world. Secondly, in the natural world I also perceive the other as a fellow subject and not simply as an
object like other objects. The other too is transcendent but its transcendency is that of an alter ego and not that of an object. It is because of this that the natural world is an inter-subjective or shared world and the passage quoted above strongly emphasises this feature of the natural world. Given these two characteristics of the natural world any conception of consciousness as an entity within the natural world would prove itself inadequate to the very comprehension of what is given in the natural world. It is this realization that motivates Husserl in section 31 to alter the thesis of the natural standpoint. The motivation here is not to deny or cancel the world of immediate experience but on the contrary, to understand the transcendency of the objects. Understood in this sense, the passage in the Ideas suggests that the real task of phenomenology is not to go beyond the natural world but to understand it. This is precisely the underlying motivation of the Crisis also. However, still there is a problem. Although in the above line of argument I have, more or less, followed David Carr's suggestion regarding the continuity between the Ideas and the Crisis, yet there is also a further point which unfortunately David Carr does not explore further. Granted that there is a continuity between the Ideas and the Crisis, the new question
would be what then is the difference?

An attempt to compare the treatment of the life-world in the Crisis with that of the Ideas brings to our notice two important points of difference between the two. In the Ideas the focus falls in the natural attitude or the thesis which human subjects have spontaneously adopted about their position in the natural everyday world whereas in the Crisis the major concern is with the description of the structures of the life-world, itself. In the Ideas Husserl tells us that human subjects misperceive themselves as entities in the world of objects and hence spontaneously hold a certain attitude of a thesis about consciousness and its relation to the world. It is this thesis which Husserl describes as the natural standpoint, the essence of the thesis is a belief in the independent and absolute existence of objects relative to which consciousness or subjectivity is taken to be dependent. In the Crisis the description is more positive and is concerned with the structure and order of the world of pre-theoretical immediate life. Here the emphasis falls on how in natural life objects are experienced in their typical forms of spatial, temporal and causal connections and how within this pre-theoretical world forms strata of physical objects,
animate organisms, the psychic world and the inter-subjective world of sociality and culture are experienced before the objectifications of the various sciences. Since the Ideas is concerned primarily with the correction of a false or mistaken conception of consciousness, the orientation of the description of the natural world is more towards a critical replacement of a mistaken view of consciousness. It is this critical intention of overcoming the natural standpoint which seems to suggest that in the Ideas the natural world itself is to be replaced by transcendental phenomenology. In the Crisis, however, the description of the life-world serves a more positive purpose of discovering a prior and more fundamental activity of consciousness which is the foundation for all other constitutive acts. It is this intention of opening up a more original achievement of the constitution of the pre-theoretical life-world itself which is the basic aim of the exploration in the Crisis. Connected with this there is also another important difference. In the Ideas the way into transcendental phenomenology is essentially by way of the sciences and the main intention, here, is to provide a phenomenological clarification of the foundations of scientific knowledge. In this sense, the Ideas is in a way closer to the transcendentalism of Kant, than the Crisis, for in
this text Husserl is concerned with the problem which is similar to the Kantian enterprise of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Like Kant Husserl also is concerned with the exploration of the conditions of the possibility of scientific knowledge and hence the theme of natural world is not central to his concerns in the *Ideas*. The natural world is essentially in relation to the project of scientific knowledge and it is upon the latter rather than upon the former that the main concentration falls. Just as Kant also begins with the natural perception of the objects but, however, is basically concerned not with this but with the philosophical clarification of the objective knowledge of sciences so also Husserl, although he begins with natural standpoint, is yet more concerned with the phenomenological clarification of the grounds of scientific knowledge. In the *Crisis*, however, Husserl develops an altogether different approach to the problem of scientific conceptualization. Unlike Kant, Husserl, now, is developing a theme of *Crisis* in sciences. His idea is that in the course of its abstract theorizing the sciences of nature represented by the Galilean tradition have obscured their own foundations in a pre-theoretical immediate experience of the world and hence lost sight of their own grounds. It is this concealment of their own origins that has led to the *Crisis*
of the sciences and also to the Crisis of general human culture. The overcoming of the crisis is predicated upon the return to the life-world setting aside all the abstractions, mathematizations and idealizations involved in the scientific project. Therefore, the new theme of the life-world is much more central and salient in the Crisis than it was in the Ideas. In fact, in the Crisis Husserl tells us that a phenomenology of the life-world is in itself an important and urgent task of phenomenology and requires to be perceived independently of a phenomenological theory of science. Unlike Kant's transcendental philosophy the Crisis is concerned with an issue which cannot be described as a mere prolegomena to a theory of science. The life-world becomes a genuine and important topic of phenomenology by itself and not merely a prelude to the sciences. This carries with it another fundamental difference between the Ideas and the Crisis. In the Ideas the natural world is described in terms of natural stand point. This approach to the life-world in terms of a stand point or a perspective has certain limitations because a stand point or an orientation is governed by a certain interest. Given the language of stand points it seems natural to compare and contrast the world as experienced from the natural stand point with the world as understood from the
scientific stand point and also from the stand point of
transcendental philosophy itself. Each one of these perspec­tive is governed by certain interests and presents the world
from the point of view of that controlling interest. But in
the Crisis the life-world is prior and more original than all
perspectives and interests. All particular interests, the
scientific as well as the philosophical, are possible only
on the basis of the all embracing life-world itself. The life
world itself is not one perspective among others rather it
is that which grounds all perspectives and all interests and
even when we for a time being occupy a certain vocation or
have a certain interest we as human beings live in the life­
world and we return necessarily to the life-world. Husserl
clearly emphasises that the scientist also belongs to the
life-world and it is because of this that he can function as
a scientist, what is equally necessary is to note that same
consideration applies to philosophy also for even the articu­
lations of philosophy are possible only as a vocation and
among others, it cannot, therefore, displace the primacy of
the life-world. Now, the contrast between the Ideas and the
Crisis could become clearer, for in the former the ultimate
stratum appears to be that of philosophy in the form of
transcendental phenomenology. The Ideas seems to describe the
movement from the natural stand point to the phenomenological
stand point as irreversible namely, once after undergoing the discipline of the eidetic and the transcendental reduction we reach at the level of transcendental subjectivity. We, as it were, have reached the ultimate. The Ideas is concerned with the enormous difficulties of the journey, but not with the ultimacy of the terminus of the journey. Transcendental phenomenology is the resting place of our investigations. But in the Crisis the phenomenologist does not find the position of transcendental philosophy as his final resting place. Being human he is necessarily involved in the life-world and it is this participation in the life-world which makes even his philosophical vocation possible. So, in a sense, if one could say that the phenomenology of the life-world cannot be identified with philosophy in the sense of the Ideas; if in the Ideas the description of the natural world appeared relative as one possible mode of experience compared with others, namely, that of science and philosophy, in the Crisis the life-world is absolute and the others are related to it. It can, therefore, be said by way of an intermediate conclusion that there is a certain continuity between the Ideas and the Crisis with regard to the theme of life-world, but yet in the Crisis the life-world thematic acquires a deeper and more primordial significance.
However, the discussion of the life-world problem in the *Crisis* is faced with an ambiguity. As David Carr has shown, in the *Crisis* there are two senses of the life-world. In one sense, by the life-world Husserl seems to be meaning the world, as disclosed in primary perception. This may be called the perceptual life-world. But in other contexts where Husserl talks of ideas and principles entering into the life-world as a cultural life-world. It is in this sense that Husserl talks of the life-world of different societies and different periods. This ambiguity is cleared up in *Experience and Judgement* which explicitly makes the distinction between the perceptual and cultural senses of the life-world. The perceptual sense of the life-world, in that text, is related to the analyses of logical judgements. In this respect the life-world problematic is a new and an important addition to Husserl's investigations of logic which go back as early as the *Logical Investigations*. In the *Logical Investigations* especially in Part II Husserl has introduced the phenomenological contribution to logic as revealing the particular types of intentional constitution through which logical entities are given to us. This idea was taken up further for detailed clarification in the *Formal and Transcendental Logic* which explicitly talks of a two sidedness of logic. On the objective side the investiga-
tions of logical principles and logical methods deal with their objective nature and validity. This noematic analysis of logic in turn is distinguished by Husserl into formal logic and formal ontology. But the noetic aspect of logic is concerned with the analysis of the acts of consciousness through which such logical objectivities and validities are recognised. It is this phenomenological analyses of the forms of intentional consciousness which give typical logical validities and truths that Husserl calls transcendental logic in Formal and Transcendental Logic. To this entire discussion of the phenomenology of logic Experience and Judgement adds a completing foundation, for here Husserl intends to show that even the most abstract and formal judgements of logic are grounded in the presentation of the objects, in the form of a primordial pre-predicative experience. Husserl is not developing an empiricist's thesis that all judgements including the formal ones presuppose perceptual experience rather what he is suggesting is that pre-predicative experience, in which the objects are given, is itself grounded in a more ultimate horizon which is the experience of the life-world. Objects as objects are themselves possible only on the basis of the life-world. This was the essential teaching of the Crisis and Experience and Judgement shows that this thesis
is valid not only for the sciences of nature but also for formal logic. In this sense the *Experience and Judgement* is a culmination of the argument concerning the ultimacy of the life-world. But in another sense *Experience and Judgement* also problematizes the topic of the life-world, for here Husserl is raising a very serious question concerning the possibility of reflective contact with the life-world for it shows that ideas and abstractions of various sciences which are founded upon the life-world flow back into it. This is what he calls the sedimentation of the life-world. If the constructions and idealizations of theorizing conceal the life-world then there is a question i.e. whether merely by an act of reflection we can overcome the sedimentations and recover the primordial pre-theoretical life-world itself. In other words it appears that an act of phenomenological reflection by itself may not overcome the encrustations and concealments to which the life-world has been subjected. This raises the problem of the access to the life-world, for if transcendental consciousness is itself incapable of removing these layers of sedimentations then what other modes of appropriation of the life-world do we have? It might be remarked that the same problem of access has already risen for Husserl in a narrower context.
in the *Cartesian Meditations*. There, the problem was how in my consciousness I also perceive the other as a co-subject. It is to this problem that Husserl brings the techniques of appresentation and analogy. The point to note is these methods of appresentation and analogy are taken from perceptual experience and Husserl attempts to use these techniques to clarify the inter-subjectivity. In the *Crisis* Husserl clearly recognises that the life-world is a common inter-subjective life-world. So now we have a double problem of access, namely, access to the life-world itself and access to the inter-subjectivity of the life-world. It is to this final issue that the theme of language may have some relevance, for it could be suggested that on the one hand the understanding of language is not a perceptual experience, on the other hand, it is in and through language that both a common world and another subject are given. As Wittgenstein would put it: *language is itself an access to a common public inter-subjective world*. Hence a true phenomenology of the life-world has to be mediated by way of a clarification of language. It is at this point that Wittgenstein may be highly relevant to the concerns of Husserl. Therefore we shall briefly explore the Wittgensteinian clarification of forms of life as grounding language.
Like in the case of Husserl, in the case of Wittgenstein also there is a complex relation of continuity in difference between the earlier and the later stages of his reflections regarding the relationship between the language and the world. There have been oversimplified and unacceptable interpretations of the *Tractatus* especially by certain hostile critics who have held that in the *Tractatus* language is the only reality recognised and that Wittgenstein replaces philosophy by linguistic analysis. However, this would be an absurd interpretation of the chief concerns of the *Tractatus* for it is now obvious that the central insight of the *Tractatus* is the relationship between language and the world. This relationship, Wittgenstein sees under the form of the pictorial relation; an elementary sentence, in his sense, is said to represent a state of affairs by its very form of representation. In it the expressions are combined in a certain form and it is this form of combinations in the elementary sentence which is said to represent the combinations of objects in the fact. This correspondence between the form of an elementary sentence and the form of the fact represented by it, is said to be the pictorial relation. However, the picture theory of the *Tractatus* is the clue to the whole structure, for on the one hand it leads to a certain conception of language and on the other to a certain
conception of the world. Meaningful language is based on elementary sentences and the truth-functional possibilities—it is in this sense that Wittgenstein claims that the limits of my language are the limits of the world which I could understand. On the other hand the picture theory also leads to a certain conception of the world as a combination of objects in his sense. The difference between the Tractatus and the Philosophical Investigations is not in terms of the idea of a relationship between language and reality but in terms of different formulations of this relationship. The Tractatus saw this relationship in a narrow manner as a pictorial relationship, but in the Philosophical Investigations besides the pictorial relation there are other ways in which our language is connected with the world. Wittgenstein does not so much deny the pictorial relation, rather he holds that the pictorial relation is only one possible relation among a multiplicity of others. These various forms of language in which meaning and understanding are possible. Wittgenstein now calls language games. A language game is a certain use of language which is natural to human beings in their various activities and which involves both linguistic and non-linguistic components. Also a language game is essentially a form of communication and mutual understanding between subjects who are
partners in a certain on-going activity. There are different language games, each with its own particular mode of meaning and involving particular uses of language and in each such language game, there is a specific type of inter-subjective relation. The logical representation of facts by descriptive propositions recognised by the conception of language in the Tractatus is only one such language game beside which there are other modes of meaning also. These different language games express what Wittgenstein now calls forms of life. The conception of a form of life as it were a construction and further extension of the concept of reality or the world in the Tractatus. In the Tractatus since only one mode of language, namely, the representative use of language was recognized, the constitution of the world also was restricted to a certain type. But now just as the conception of language, so also the conception of reality is 'pluralized'. Just as there are different language games so also there are different orders of reality now called forms of life and the relationship between the two is one of expression. A form of life is understood by way of the language game which is its natural expression. This is what is meant by saying that to understand a language is to understand a form of life.

If one approaches the Wittgensteinian idea of forms of
life from the broader perspective of husserlian phenomenology one might begin to explore certain broad affinities between
the two. The most important feature that they have in common
is that the world which is revealed in a form of life by way
of its proper language game is the world as lived by subjects
in their natural context. It is not the world of an abstract
contemplative ontology or metaphysics rather it is the imme­
diate pre-theoretical world of natural life. Putting it in
Husserlian forms the different language games give expres­
sions to the different aspects of the life-world. Secondly
the understanding of these forms of life requires that we
describe them as they are given in our natural experience
without the theoretical and abstract conceptualizations of
sciences or even of philosophy. The forms of life require a
phenomenological rather than an abstract mode of description.
In Husserlian terms the forms of life are accessible only
after the technique of reduction. Thirdly, in a form of life
there is necessarily a form of inter-subjectivity. Each one
of these forms of life is a representation of a particular
type of inter-subjective association. In this way the
Wittgensteinian conception of forms of life seems very close
to that of the life-world of the Crisis. By bringing these two
concepts nearer each other there could be mutual advantages
for phenomenology and analytic orientations. From the point of view of phenomenology, as we have seen, one of the problems which Husserl faces after the argument in the Experience and Judgement regarding the thesis of the sedimentation of the life-world and the consequent limits of reflection is precisely the question how one could make contact with the life-world if our reflective consciousness itself is necessarily shaped by the later interpretations and conceptualizations imposed upon the original life-world. Husserl recognizes that a transcendental phenomenology has to begin from the description of the life-world but yet in the Experience and Judgement it is precisely this point of departure which seems to be blocked. Here the Wittgensteinian insight that it is through an understanding of language we can understand a form of life is of great help, for understanding a language is not merely a private act of reflection. Language is not merely a personal, phenomenological and pre-linguistic intentionality rather it is in language that we understand ourselves as human subjects and at the same time we also understand the world in which we are such subjects. Language clarifies precisely our presence in the world as subjects and it also clarifies the presence of other subjects as co-subjects. Hence language may become the vehicle through
which the understanding of the life-world becomes possible beyond the limits of a mere reflective consciousness. Wittgenstein's philosophy helps us in this context in two ways.

On the one hand Wittgenstein's complicated and subtle argumentations to show that meaning is not merely a private mental event and that we do not understand sentences merely as copies of mental occurrences shows that the phenomenon of language cannot be explained purely in terms of a cartesian first person philosophy. In this sense the critique of a private language hypothesis is also a warning to the cartesian temptations of transcendental phenomenology. On the other hand the philosophy of Wittgenstein also shows that in understanding a form of language we are, in fact, understanding a form of life. We do not have to infer from language to life but since the relation between language and the life-world is one of expression, to understand one is to understand the other. Another advantage of approaching the thematic of the life-world from the perspective of Wittgenstein's later philosophy is a certain clarification of the problem of inter-subjectivity which Husserl faces in the Cartesian Meditations. In the Cartesian Meditations Husserl describes how there is a reciprocity between ego and alter
ego; the other is presented to me as an object but while being so presented I also recognise that I am an object to the alter. It is this reciprocity or reversibility of stand points that makes the other a co-subject, for in the case of an object simpliciter while the ego has a perspective on the object, the object, in turn, does not have a perspective on the ego. It is the noema of the consciousness other than itself. But the alter ego is both the noema and the noesis. One of the formidable problems arising from the Cartesian meditations is precisely a description of this experience of reversibility between ego and alter. But if we approach the inter-subjective situation in terms of language games it may be somewhat easier to conceptualize the reversibility of perspectives. One of the language games or rather an aspect which is practically involved in every language game is the use of language to formulate questions and answers. The very formulation of a question presupposes that it is a question not only to me, the ego, but also would be recognised as a question by the alter and also his answer to the question would be an answer which I can recognise. If there could be a language game of questions and answers the subjects who are involved in this game must be capable of exchanging places. The questioner must also be a potential answerer in order
even to be a questioner and vice-versa. Hence the activity of question and answer is intelligible only on the conditions of reversibility of standpoint. Therefore the language game involved in questions and answers is a reflection of precisely the kind of inter-subjectivity which Husserl was attempting to describe. But it was problematic in the case of Husserl because he was attempting to describe this situation in terms of a monological paradigm of reflection.

If the resources of Wittgenstein's conceptualization might help the phenomenological articulation it is equally clear that the phenomenological orientation might give a dimension of depth to the Wittgensteinian perspective. One of the difficulties of the later Wittgensteinian position is the recognition of plurality of language games. Each form of life seems to be thought of as a monad by itself and so also each language game seems to be isolated from others. But obviously these different forms of life themselves are inter-related so that one cannot understand a form of life unless one also understands its place vis-a-vis the others. This unity of the different forms of life itself cannot be regarded as one more form of life rather the unity of all forms of life must be seen as the source or matrix out of which all the other forms of life emerge and make sense. If so, the description of the
source of all forms of life cannot itself be a language game among others. Each form of life is constituted by one attitude and its appropriate interests. The categories and their distinctions of a language game is guided by these regulative interests and attitudes of that form of life. But the source of all forms of life is itself the source of all attitudes and interests. This source is what Husserl calls in the *Crisis* the life-world. The life-world itself is not a form of life but that which makes all forms of life possible. From this point of view it can be said that the life-world is the condition of the possibility of forms of life and hence the description of the life-world is not equivalent to a description of any particular form of life, rather it is relative to the description of life-world as their source must be a description of their transcendental grounds.

Putting the same thing on the side of language the description of life-world is not itself a particular language game but rather it is a description of that aspect of language which is the source of all language games. Hence the transcendental phenomenology of the life-world is the ground for the Wittgensteinian conception of forms of life and language games. In Husserlian terms the proper relationship between language and the world requires the perspective of transcendental phenomenology.
SECTION II: CONCLUDING REMARKS

In the present section we shall make certain concluding remarks on this issue.

David Carr and other recent commentators on Husserl's phenomenology, have remarked upon what they call the linguistic turn in Phenomenology. The notion of a linguistic turn in general, was advanced by thinkers like Richard Rorty in connection with the development of the analytic tradition of philosophy. As Rorty and others understand it, the linguistic turn is mere reformulation and redescription of the fundamental philosophical problems, rather than solutions to them. The idea here is that with the linguistic turn, the basic problems of philosophy now appear as problems connected with our understanding of nature and functions of language. It is the suggestion of David Carr that a similar development within Phenomenology also can be observed so much so that we can, with justification, speak of a linguistic turn within phenomenology. It is because of this similarity that it is possible to speak of a dialogue between the analytical and phenomenological points of view and in the previous discussions we have been concerned with some of the areas in which such dialogues would take place and the resulting clarifications. But the linguistic turn is not merely useful in the context of the relation of
phenomenology to other philosophies but it may be useful in a more internal manner as a way of addressing in a new fashion to some of the important issues of the phenomenological tradition itself. It is to this internal functions of the linguistic turn that we shall keep in mind in this concluding reflections.

As a brief preparatory to this objective, one may attempt at the formulation of the characteristic claims or presuppositions of the phenomenological approach to language.

Fundamentally, both phenomenology and analytic philosophy look upon language in its performatic or communicational aspect. It is not language as a system or structure, but language as used in speech that is the focus here. Hence, broadly speaking, if one were to describe the basic approach of the phenomenological presuppositions on language, one must see it in terms of a communicational paradigm. Given this framework then, the major claims of the phenomenology of language, can be described as below: (a) a linguistic expression is to be regarded as the objectification of an intentional act. (b) It is this intuitive act which endorses meaning or sense upon the linguistic expression. (c) The sense of a linguistic expression, therefore, presupposes a subject which is able to constitute it as meaningful. (d) The subject uses the sense of
the expression as a way of identifying and referring to objects, it is, therefore, necessary to distinguish between sense and reference of speech acts. (e) Although, reference is not to be identified with sense, yet the referent is known or apprehended only by way of the sense. In Phenomenological terms the object is constituted by the intentional act of the subject. (f) This constitutive sense, however, is also a sense which is communicable and shareable with other similar constitutive co-subjects. (g) This inter-subjective sharing is possible, because both the ego and the other have a common life world. (h) But this shared life world itself, in its own way, is constituted. (i) We must, therefore, distinguish between a primordial constitution which makes the life-world accessible and secondary constitutions, which build upon the primary pre-theoretical life world.

Given these fundamental characteristics of a phenomenological perspective on language, one may begin with a remark as to how the communicational paradigm relates as it were metaphorically the two philosophical traditions. Since every communicative act is addressed to the other, one can always distinguish between the position of the speaker and that of the hearer within a communicative model. It is interesting to note that in terms of these metaphors of speaker and hearer,
the role of the phenomenologists would be under the form of speaker in the sense that the focus of phenomenology is upon how the intentional acts of consciousness get objectified in the form of linguistic expression whereas the focus of the analytic philosopher would be how an understanding of experience is made possible by understanding of language. To that extent, the metaphor for the analytic philosopher would be that of the hearer in a communicative transaction. But what is really important to note here is that a communicative transaction is possible only on the basis of both. To that extent one would hold that the reciprocity between the two is necessary for each.

As we suggested earlier, the metaphor of 'speaker' in the above communicative paradigm can be taken as the position of phenomenological philosophy according to which language is based on pre-theoretical rather on pre-predicative experience. For Husserl, language demands an underlying theory of experience, which at its rock-bottom, can be described as pre-predicative or pre-linguistic - this experience is a 'direct relation to the individual' and is rooted in simple sensuous awareness. This experience only provides the primitive building stones of all subsequent human cognitive activity and hence we can say that pre-predicative experience is the experience of pure universal nature - which is the pure 'life-world' before it is filled
with the idealizations provided by science. However, from our point of view, it is sufficient to note that pre-predicative experience provides the foundation of particular predications as such and in turn, from this, by isolating the forms of judgements as acts of consciousness or ego from the data of self-given experience, we arrive at the general classification of judgements purely at a conceptual level in which objects are apprehended.

For the Analytic Philosophy (the metaphor of 'hearer' in the communicative paradigm), language in general (and meaning in particular) has more significance than experience. Experience or mental acts like perception, memory etc. are explained in terms of language. In other words, for analytic philosophy, language clarifies experience.

Summing up the respective trends in one sentence we can say that in Husserlian phenomenology, there is a clarification of language on the basis of experience (primacy of experience) and in analytic tradition, there is a clarification of experience on the basis of language (primacy of linguistic). This way of articulation makes one obviously feel that both the positions are, as it were, so diametrically opposed to each other that they cannot have any affinities at
any point. But we would attempt to show that for phenomenological philosophy, the suggestion from the camp of analytic philosophers, viz., primacy of language, is highly useful, for this linguistic turn at least, illuminates certain problematics in phenomenology itself. For example, in *Experience and Judgement*, Husserl exhibits the pre-predicative conditions of predication. In other words, pre-predicative experience is the substrata for all subsequent levels of cognitions. But what happens to the pre-predicative experience when we stretch it to its utmost possible extent? True, that such experiences meet their corresponding correlative objects, which are 'given themselves there' as correlates of experience. The problem, now, is being pre-linguistic, these objects are, in one sense, sterile - sterile of any further activities - they are not prescriptive and simultaneously they have their senses rooted in language. In other words, whatever is prelinguistic and objective, belong to language and they are met in the horizon of linguistic, only, what is suggested here is that, pre-predicative experience is in need and necessity of a linguistic horizon. Here, to say that, phenomenology is vitiated with the problem of circularity, would be totally absurd rather with the linguistic turn, we can respond to the present problem in an altogether different way, we can say that the necessity of a linguistic horizon is quite obvious, for 'language' is not met at a particular spatio-temporal
limitation, what we mean to say is that, language is a continuous evolving process - in flux, not static at all. If so, it is always possible for human consciousness to have a linguistic horizon - a common world of meaning against the background of which, completely new experiences can evolve out.

In conclusion, however, we may note that the linguistic turn promises a possibility of reformulation of some of the most difficult and problematical issues within classical phenomenology; in particular the three issues which appear in a new form after the linguistic turns are (a) the problem of the reduction, (b) the constitution of the life-world and (c) the problem of transcendental intersubjectivity.

In classical formulation of phenomenology the reduction appears paradoxically as both necessary and impossible. It was necessary because it was the means by which the intentionality of consciousness itself can be apprehended and it was impossible because with the reduction it appeared that phenomenology would end up with some kind of solipsism, what the linguistic turn does for this is to remove this paradoxical characterization of reduction. The distinction between sense and reference is precisely the linguistic correlate of the reduction, for with this distinction one is concerned with how a communicative act intends a certain meaning or sense and to understand the communicative act is to understand the sense
expressed in it. In so far as consciousness expresses itself in communication, one might say that the sense and reference distinction provides a framework by which we can understand the intentionality of consciousness apart from its reference to objects. To understand a meaning is not the same as understanding the object meant. To this extent, the significance of reduction is retained without its paradoxical formulation.

With regard to the notion of life-world Husserl in the Crisis seeks to defend two claims - (a) life-world is the pre-theoretical basis for all the constructions and characterizations of idealizations of the sciences and (b) the life-world itself is not merely given, but constituted by transcendental subjectivity. One of the most difficult problems posed by this formulation is to understand the primordial constitution of the life-world. As Dorion Cairns and Eugen Fink have described, this is the most important legacy of the problems coming from Husserl's Crisis and the suggestion which can be made here is that the introduction of the problematics of language allows us a possible way of responding to this problem. Language by its categorizations of things, qualities, attributes, spatial, temporal and causal relations given in pre-theoretical everyday speech is a way of giving structure to the world of experience. One could say that ordinary
language is not merely a reflection of the world experience, but a formulation and constitution of it. Hence to understand ordinary language is to understand the formation of common intersubjective life-world.

Regarding the third problem of transcendental intersubjectivity, the very possibility of communication presupposes a common language. Hence the other is given in every act of communication.

It is in this sense, one may perhaps suggest that the linguistic turn within a phenomenology, may provide the possibility of a new response to the basic issues of phenomenology itself.