CHAPTER I

PHENOMENOLOGY AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY

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Introduction

Husserl's phenomenology is a transcendental philosophy - 'transcendental' meaning thereby what historically goes by that name. To prove this point it is not necessary to compare Husserl with all those philosophers who have ever adopted the transcendental turn, but it will be satisfactory to offer a brief account of Husserl's philosophy in the light of certain recognisable conceptions of Kantian transcendental philosophy because (i) the latter constitutes the enduring core of the transcendental tradition and (ii) Husserl himself admits that he has borrowed the 'transcendental' terminology from Kant, although his way of using the explicating it apparently differs from that of the latter. Moreover, this sort of exercise would provide us with two advantages, namely, (i) this would link Husserl's phenomenology to a historically very famous and familiar notion i.e. 'transcendentalism' revealing the very essence of phenomenology in its mature form and also (ii) a study of Husserl's conception of transcendental would help us in avoiding certain common misconceptions about his thought.

Historically speaking, the term 'transcendental' has
a scholastic origin. After Saint Thomas, the three fundamental notions i.e. Being, Truth and Goodness are regarded as transcendentals. The attempt, here, is to distinguish between the Aristotelean categories and these three supreme notions which are not categories, but transcendentals. There are two connotations involved here while describing them as transcendentals. (i) These notions are beyond the limits of empirical knowledge and in that sense they cannot be objects of judgements and (ii) although they are beyond experience, it is also suggested that every judgement presupposes the three. Hence, they are the ultimate presuppositions of knowledge. In scholastic philosophy there are two important disputes about the notion of the transcendental.

1. Epistemological - what kind of cognitive awareness can men have of these three transcendentals. On this issue, there are two basic positions.

(a) Thomist - according to which, the human mind can, somehow, in self-reflection, abstractedly grasp these transcendentals which are presupposed in experience and

(b) Augustinian - for whom there is no secular or worldly knowledge of transcendentals. Man has awareness of transcendental because God illuminates the human soul and hence the
knowledge of transcendental is innate.

2. **Ontological** - the problem, here, is whether the three transcendentals are separate or one and the same. Here, the scholastic position is that they are three different modes of one and the same notion, but the unity of the three is super-transcendental and hence in this life man cannot grasp the unity of these three.

In later days we find hardly any important use of the transcendental terminology, except in contemporary philosophical literature where the term transcendental is used in a wide variety of senses. (a) It can characterize a certain kind of philosophy e.g. Husserl's phenomenology is called transcendental phenomenology. (b) It can characterize a certain kind of cognitive judgement or thesis e.g. Kant speaks of cognitive judgements. (c) It can characterize a way of argument as sometimes we speak of transcendental arguments. (d) It can also describe the nature of subject or self as and when Husserl talks of transcendental ego or sometimes pure consciousness itself as transcendental. (e) It can also mean a kind of inter-subjective relation among subjects as in transcendental intersubjectivity. (f) It can mean a certain way of lived experience as in transcendental experience or
transcendental life. (g) More generally, it can also refer
to one of the dominant motivations of western philosophical
developments as and when Husserl describes the whole course
of modern philosophy as a struggle between naturalism and
transcendentalism. (f) Finally, even in a more ultimate
sense transcendental is also regarded as a secret meaning and
goal of philosophy as such.

Although the term 'transcendental' has been used to
categorize different things in western tradition, it has
never been used to characterize any of the following - (a)
any particular object in the world, (b) any relation between
such objects and events in the world and (c) the world as a
whole. Hence, whatever may be the differences, the term
'transcendental' has always been used in the context of subject
and not in the context of object. Sometimes, it is used as
having its own distinct and separate reference, as for
example, the transcendental subject is distinguished from
the empirical subject. But, more often, the term 'transcen-
dental' is used as a description of an aspect rather than of
a separate entity e.g. the transcendental ego is not a
separate ego from the natural one, but is a way of describing
the ego in one of its aspects. Similarly, the transcendental
community is not a separate association but an aspect of
ordinary human society.

However, it is needless to emphasise again that it is Kant and following him Husserl, who makes maximum use of the transcendental terminology. Hence, accordingly what follows in this chapter is a brief discussion of Kantian and Husserlian conception of 'transcendental' as well as possible inter-relations between the two. But not only the basic phenomenological orientation but also his conception of the subject and equally the problem of inter-subjectivity are prefixed by Husserl as transcendental. In fact, Kant contrasts the empirical subject from transcendental subject as well as moral subject. As far as the question of transcendental inter-subjectivity is concerned, Kant, nowhere speaks explicitly about it, but it can be shown that the notion is presupposed in his philosophy. So, to make the discussion more coherent and complete after the discussion on transcendental in Husserl and Kant, in the following two sections we take up the issue of their transcendental orientations in working out the problems of subjectivity and inter-subjectivity, respectively.

SECTION I : (a) 'THE TRANSCENDENTAL' IN KANT

In Kant, the term 'transcendental' is used in so many contexts, the most important of which are as follows:

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(i) in the context of describing the basic orientation of the critical philosophy. Kant describes the nature of his own philosophical investigations as a transcendental turn. (However, in this context, he also uses the metaphor of Copernican revolution). Here, the term 'transcendental' signifies a point of view which is to be adopted consciously and hence is contrasted with the natural point of view which Kant calls the dogmatic. This point of view is a new perspective on human experience and hence it is called a revolution in the sense of a basic transformation. It is also a turn from the objects to the subject, which has the experience of the objects. (ii) Kant also uses the term 'transcendental' as a characterization of certain faculties as well as concepts and notions. For example, the productive imagination which is required to schematize the categories is called a transcendental faculty. Similarly, the forms of sensibility, space and time as well as the categories of understanding are called transcendental notions. (iii) The term 'transcendental' is also used to describe a certain kind of epistemic truth claim e.g. some of the synthetic a-priori propositions such as propositions about space and time and about objects in general are said to be transcendental cognitions. Such claims are said to have universality and strict necessity and yet they are not
merely analytic or tautologuous. The mark of a transcendental claim, therefore, is a kind of necessity which is different from the necessity of logical propositions. This necessity and truth, sometime, is described as transcendental necessity or transcendental truth. (iv) In some other contexts, the **ultimate** presuppositions of all objective experience, namely, self-consciousness itself is called transcendental (i.e. the transcendental unity of apperception). (v) In another context Kant uses the term 'transcendental' in a negative sense, where he speaks of the inevitable and unavoidable illusions of metaphysics e.g. when speculative ideas are taken to be entities, he calls such a mistake a 'transcendental illusion'. (vi) To confuse matters even further the correction of such mistakes is also called transcendental e.g. the critique of speculative metaphysics is called 'transcendental dialectic'. (vii) But what is more important for our purpose is the use of transcendental terminology in the epistemological context. Kant, for the very first time, in *Critique of Pure Reason* speaks about it, i.e. transcendental knowledge deals "not so much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects, in so far as this mode of knowledge is to be possible a priori..." In other words transcendental philosophy is the systematized knowledge of the elements that make possible our way of knowing
objects a priori. Again, Kant says "The word 'transcendental'
... does not signify something passing beyond all experiences,
but something indeed that precedes it i.e. is a-priori, but
whose purpose is nothing more than to make experiential knowl-
dge possible".\(^5\) It is in this context that Kant uses the term
'transcendental' as in contrast with two other terms, namely,
the empirical objective and the speculative transcendent.
Objective judgements depend upon the context of sensibility
and they do not have strict universality or necessity. In
Kantian language, they are all a-posteriori. On the other
hand, transcendental judgements are not themselves objects of
experience, but they are the necessary conditions of the
possibility of experience. As distinguished from transcenden-
tal in this sense, the transcendent is that which has no
connection with possible experience. Speculative entities like
God, freedom and immortality would be transcendent. In other
words, transcendental itself is not empirical but is the
necessary condition of experience and the transcendent can
never be given in experience.

However, this connotation of 'transcendental' i.e.
as distinguished from transcendent on the one hand and empirical
on the other is very crucial, for herein lies the determina-
tion of the exact nature of consciousness i.e., the status of Kantian self or subject. Before we proceed further let us make some observations here. As we have hinted earlier in Kantian critical philosophy, 'transcendental' terminology has manifold connotations. But, nonetheless, there are certain general underlying conceptions, namely, (i) the transcendental is opposed to natural or dogmatic. (ii) Therefore, the transcendental is to be achieved by a self-conscious effort. (iii) Thus self-conscious discipline is necessary not only for philosophy, but also for sciences as well as for human life. It is necessary for philosophy because without the transcendental turn philosophy will be perpetually involved in the unending controversy between dogmatism (represented by rationalism) and scepticism (represented by empiricism). Philosophy is distinct from sciences because it is transcendental and not empirical. (iv) The transcendental turn is also necessary for sciences, for what characterizes a genuine science in the Kantian sense is that it has synthetic a-priori cognitions. Hence, within science itself there is a need for recognising such claims and accounting for their possibilities. In other words, a science to be genuine requires a philosophical critique. (v) It is also necessary for human life because human nature is distinguished from divine nature on the one hand and
animal nature on the other precisely because man can adopt the transcendental point of view. (vi) Furthermore, for Kant the dignity of man consists in the fact that he can recognise a pure moral obligation independently of all desires and impulses. This recognition of the moral law as a categorical imperative is binding and its authority comes from the fact that it has a transcendental necessity.

(b) 'THE TRANSCENDENTAL' IN HUSSERL

Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, quite often, by critics as well as commentators, is regarded as the later development of, what they would call descriptive phenomenology or psychological phenomenology. But the question of transcendental phenomenology has been complicated by Husserl's repeated assertion that it is a transcendental idealism, which is not like that of Kantian type. Hence, to have a clear understanding of the above claim, it is necessary to have a brief consideration of the genesis of Husserl's phenomenology.

Some basic ideas of Husserl's phenomenology like that of constitution, reduction, intentional analysis etc. can be traced back to his Philosophy of Arithmetic. But the dominant
tendency of this text is psychologism, where he attempts to find new ways of psychological investigations other than those which have been found in Brentano and other contemporary psychologists. Psychologism, roughly is the doctrine which emphasises the fact that the science of logic can be ultimately reduced to the psychology of thinking. Husserl's Philosophy of Arithmatic advocates that logic can be ultimately reduced to psychology. Here he emphasises that psychological analysis is a necessary condition for the analysis of mathematical concepts.

However, Frege, in his Foundations of Arithmetic criticises Husserl's position. For him, logic is objective and independent of the thinking mind. Psychologism makes everything subjective and hence destroys truth. As a consequence of the Fregean critique, Husserl prepares a critique of psychologism in the first volume of his Logical Investigations. With full conviction, here, he claims that psychologism cannot only be criticised as Frege does, but can actually be refuted.

Over and above preparing a critique of psychologism, in the Logical Investigations Husserl attempts to show that logical analysis cannot be totally separated from psychology or psychological phenomena. For him, even the ideal logical entities are given to us only in experiences. These experiences
are of special kind, rather they are ideal experiences having ideal logical laws as their correlates. For him, 'phenomenology' now, is nothing but the study of the essences of these experiences and it is only by this that philosophy would, evaluate, epistemologically, our knowledge claims about logical entities. In the second volume of his *Logical Investigations* he takes up this issue in detail. But in the first volume he claims that the sort of exercise in question, i.e. providing an epistemological background as well as evaluation of pure logic is impossible within the domain of empirical or experimental psychology. Even the descriptive psychology of Brentano cannot do it. Although it is not so clear, it looks as if, Husserl, here is making a distinction between empirical psychology, descriptive psychology (of Brentano type) and phenomenological psychology and also he seems to be claiming that phenomenological psychology is the proper discipline which prepares a radical study of human consciousness. This sprouting idea of *Logical Investigations* Husserl carries over to *Ideas-I*. Phenomenological psychology for Husserl, would be an a-priori psychological discipline which is capable of providing a strong and secure basis for empirical psychology. The task of such a psychology would be to systematically examine the types and forms of intentional experiences as
residue after reduction. Reduction, here, has two stages. At the first stage, it suspends the objectifying tendency of the psychic phenomena and at the second stage, it describes the essences of those psychic phenomena as they appear to consciousness. It is only by virtue of reduction phenomenological psychology has the pure intentional experiences as its subject matter. But, for Husserl, in none of these two stages of reduction, consciousness, rather the transcendental consciousness gets purified. The empirical consciousness is given in natural stand-point and is the subject matter of empirical psychology and hence cannot be accepted as the foundation of pure intentional experience. It is transcendental consciousness which is the real subject and the discipline in which it can be studied and examined is, for Husserl, transcendental phenomenology. Moreover, for him, this transcendental phenomenology would be able to give philosophy an absolute foundation by the application of a new way of reduction which Husserl would name as 'Phenomenological reduction'.

In Ideas, Husserl distinguishes between the natural stand-point and the phenomenological stand-point. The former is the stand-point of empirical science and the latter, of philosophy. In natural stand-point knowledge is taken as
straight forwardly given without any question about its presuppositions or conditions of possibility. But philosophically a lot of questions can be asked against the given objects (which are nothing but psychological facts and self-evident) of natural stand-point which may ultimately lead to scepticism. Hence, there is a necessity of finding out accurately the true condition of the possibility of knowledge and its proper relation with objects. For Husserl, this investigation can be carried out successfully in phenomenology by adopting the phenomenological stand-point and adoption of this would involve the suspension of natural stand-point by way of 'Phenomenological reduction'. In other words, phenomenological reduction excludes all the 'givenness' and this presents the phenomena in their intentional character i.e. as noema. After obtaining the phenomena, the next important step, for Husserl is to have or acquire valid universal insight into the structure of such phenomena. For Husserl, they are intentionally related with consciousness, objects which are there, are given to me by various streams of experiences such as perception, memory, imagination etc. These objects are there not in the sense of being there in a repository or receptacle, but for Husserl, they are constituted in consciousness through these experiences.
Thus, in Ideas, Husserl makes a distinction between eidetic reduction and phenomenological or transcendental reduction which suspends the entire thesis of natural standpoint. This, in a sense can be seen as a methodological use of transcendental point of view. Apart from this methodological use, however, Husserl also uses the transcendental terminology as a description of the status of certain phenomenological discovery. For example, the intentionality of consciousness is said to be a transcendental discovery. More importantly, the noema, which is the object as meant, is distinguished from the real object and it is said to be transcendental in the sense that the noema can be grasped only after the transcendental reduction. But more generally, in Ideas, there is also a claim that the transcendental reduction opens the way to a proper understanding of intentional consciousness. It is this connection between the transcendental reduction and subjectivity which gives us the transcendental idealism of the Ideas. Husserl makes yet another use of the transcendental terminology in the Ideas i.e. to describe the main objective of a phenomenological theory of knowledge. Here the argument turns on the thesis that the task of a theory of knowledge is to explain objective judgements. To be a real object, for Husserl, is to have aspects or properties which are not given
as the noema of a particular intensive act. This is what he means by the transcendency of a real object. Here the noema is transcendental, but the real object is transcendental. It is through transcendental analysis of consciousness that the transcendency of a real object can be explicated. Therefore, there is the epistemological claim to explicate, in transcendental terms, the possibility of transcendent objects.

As we observed, in the Ideas, the transcendental reduction has two sides. On the one hand, it is an access to consciousness and on the other hand it is also the ground for the constitution of various kinds of objectivities. For Husserl, the analysis of constitution is a clue by which various types of constituting acts become possible. The object, therefore, is a clue for the analysis of intentional acts. This is formulated by Husserl as a fundamental principle of noetic-noematic correlation. In this way, in Husserl, we find that it is only in Ideas that the transcendental terminology has been used very systematically for the explication of his phenomenological philosophy. As we observed in the beginning, this 'transcendental' terminology is conspicuously absent in his Logical Investigations. Perhaps, it is because of this that some commentators claim that the transcendental orientation is a later development of Husserl's thought. For example, Melvin
Farber contrasts the realism of *Logical Investigations* with the transcendental Idealism of the *Ideas* on this basis only. However, two important points must be taken note of in this regard i.e. firstly, Husserl himself, in his later work, namely, *Crisis* recognises that *Logical Investigations* was implicitly using this notion of transcendental. Secondly, in a similar fashion, other critics like Theodore De Boer and Derrida hold that the *Logical Investigations* prefigure the transcendental point of view although it is not explicitly stated therein.\(^7\)

After *Ideas*, the next important text in which transcendental analysis is systematically used is *Cartesian Meditations*. In a sense, the *Cartesian Meditations* may be looked upon as a further extension of a problem posed in the *Ideas*. In the *Ideas*, as we noticed earlier, Husserl introduces the problem of constitution. But we may distinguish between three different contexts calling for constitutional analysis, namely, (i) the constitution of objects, (ii) the constitution of other subjects, and (iii) the constitution of self. The *Ideas* does not clearly demarcate these three types of constitution. *Cartesian Meditations* elaborates the constitution of other subjects.\(^8\) Hence, here, a new theme which is being
introduced is the notion of transcendental inter-subjectivity. This is a necessary stage in the development of phenomenological analysis, for as the *Ideas* itself points out, to be an object is to be accessible to a consciousness other than my own and hence arises the problem of how in my consciousness I have the idea of another consciousness which is not merely an object, but a co-subject. This problem of inter-subjectivity has two sides to it. (i) I must explain how in my consciousness the other is constituted as an alter ego. (ii) I must also explain, how, to that alter ego, I, myself, am presented as an object. Similarly, the other also in a sense, is an object, although peculiarly, a different kind of object. The *Cartesian Meditations*, by and large, deals with the constitution of the other as an alter ego. But the *Cartesian Meditations* does not deal with the problem of how my consciousness objectifies itself in the form of a psychophysical living body and how this living body is also to be extended to my experience of the other. *Cartesian Meditations* touches upon this idea in the form of apperception, the Leib-Karper distinction and the analogy of recollection. These problems are taken up by Husserl in his *Ideas-III*. "Ideas-III" deals with the constitutional problems of the sciences as well as Husserl's lectures on phenomenological psychology. Here, Husserl is
developing two major lines of thought i.e. (i) how the higher order objectivity, namely, the animate organism, the soul and the other cultural objectivities are founded upon the objectivity given in perception. He describes these various types of objectivities as strata of transcendental constitution where each stratum builds upon the earlier level but is not reducible to it. So each level or stratum must be described in terms of a complex set of intentional acts which alone can present that stratum as noema of these acts. In other words, we must be able to show various syntheses of the acts of consciousness by which we grasp the animate organism, the human soul and other socio-cultural objectivities. All these investigations are transcendental and in this sense that the Ideas III provides the transcendental foundation of the sciences. In 'Lectures on Phenomenological Psychology', Husserl is particularly concerned with the psychological stratum by which the notion of a person is to be founded.

But so far the question of transcendental analysis is concerned, we can regard Husserl's Crisis as its culminating point, for all the above kind of investigations are generalized and brought into some kind of an unified perspective in it. But in the Crisis, we find Husserl's corrections of his earlier views also. From this second point of view Husserl
makes two important corrections, particularly of his results in the Cartesian Meditations. Husserl now believes that the Cartesian Meditations was at fault in two respects. In it, the analysis straight away reached to the level of transcendental ego. But now, he feels that such an immediate access to transcendental ego is not possible, rather we must reach at transcendental subjectivity by way of the analysis of the lifeworld. It is in this context that Crisis introduces the theme of life-world as a way into transcendental phenomenology. At this point, however, it is important to note that many critics seem to hold that the life-world is an alternative to the earlier transcendental subjectivity. The second major failing of Cartesian Meditations is to regard the transcendental subjectivity as purely a doctrine of phenomenological philosophy. But in the Crisis he holds that a purely philosophical doctrine of subjectivity is abstract and empty unless it is founded on a genuine psychology, hence there is a transcendental element in psychology itself and not merely in philosophy. In fact, Husserl even goes to the extent of suggesting that it is precisely because earlier transcendental philosophy did not recognise the need for a genuine psychology that they ended in failure. A transcendental psychology is a necessary condition for a transcendental phenomenology.
In Kant, there is a subtle connection between the transcendental and the subjective. This connection can be seen in two contexts. The necessity of synthetic a-priori propositions is ultimately explained by Kant on the ground that they express the subjective constitution of the mind e.g. it is because the category of cause and effect is a concept of understanding that causal knowledge is possible. Hence wherever there is a synthetic necessity, it is due to the function of the subject. Subjectivity, therefore, is the ground of the possibility of knowledge rather than an elimination of it. It is this aspect which Husserl emphasises throughout, namely, that all objective cognition is founded on subjectivity.

More generally, for Kant, consciousness is object directed. It has a spontaneous tendency towards objects and hence does not understand itself. In Husserl's term consciousness is naive, Kant would call it dogmatic. It is the transcendental (i.e. Copernican) revolution which reveals the true nature of consciousness. Hence the transcendental point of view reveals what man is essentially. Again, for Kant the transcendental turn is a must for philosophy (for sciences as well) because without the transcendental turn philosophy will
be perpetually involved in the unending controversy between dogmatism and scepticism. And also, a genuine science needs a transcendental turn, for according to Kant, a genuine science has synthetic a-priori cognitions. Hence, within science itself there is a need for recognising such claims and how they are possible i.e. a science to be a genuine one requires a philosophical critique. Equally for Husserl also, the transcendental turn in philosophy is a necessity. For him, the whole of modern philosophy can be seen as the expression of the struggle between two forces, namely naturalism (or objectivism) and transcendentalism. In this struggle he further holds that upto the time of his phenomenology transcendental position has been fighting only for its survival. It was not able to dispute its opponent on the contrary, in the very controversy it implicitly accepted the presuppositions of objectivism (Kant is, perhaps, a best example for this). Therefore, modern philosophy was caught in a dilemma. Either it accepts specific objectivism without any question or it questions the validity of science as a kind of fiction. (Hume's scepticism is an example of this). The way out, therefore, is not to question the validity of science but rather to suspend all involvements with scientific truths either positively or negatively. There should be an epoche
of sciences. This, however, does not mean that the truth claims of sciences are denied or doubted, but they are not used at all in one's own philosophizing. But the suspension of sciences makes possible two things (i) to gain access to the pre-theoretical life-world and (ii) to grasp consciousness (or subject) as the ground of life-world itself. Thus, the transcendental turn discovers subjectivity as the ground of life-world. This new understanding of the subjective life Husserl calls 'transcendental psychologism'. In this way, obviously, there are some points of similarity between Kant and Husserl. But there are also certain major differences between the two. 27

Kant, according to Husserl, dogmatically presupposed logic. He did not consider that the objectivity of logic itself is a deep philosophical problem. In technical terms he assumed that his conception of the analytic a-priori is simple and self-evident. He was bothered only about the synthetic a-priori. Husserl claims that logic itself possesses fundamental problems. Here, there is an important confusion to be noted i.e. Kant's remark about logic is termed as 'transcendental logic' by himself. But for Husserl, Kant has really no understanding of transcendental logic.

For Husserl, Kant did not clearly distinguish between the geometrical and mathematical constructions of Newtonian science from the life-world on which they are
constructed. His a-priori, therefore, is only the a-priori of scientific discovery. He does not have any conception of the structures of the life-world. There is no life-world a-priori in Kant. Kant also seems to have believed that the transcendental truths can be attained by analysing the claims of validity of the objective sciences. His formulation of the question namely, "How is pure physics possible?" shows that he does not question the validity of physics. He is asking only for its a-priori presuppositions. In Husserl's terms he commits himself to the truth of the sciences; hence, he is caught in the natural standpoint. He does not have any idea of suspending all the sciences in the form of an eepoche. But for Husserl, without reduction, there is no possibility of understanding the nature of consciousness.

Kant also seems to have believed that the transcendental can only be a postulation of thought and can never be an experience. But for Husserl, what must be shown is the transcendental as experience and not as a postulate. Moreover in his anti-psychologism Kant believes that psychology can exist only, if at all, as an objective science, but for Husserl it is precisely psychology which cannot exist as a genuine science in the objective manner. This is important because unless we have a proper understanding of psychology
as a genuine science i.e. as a science of transcendental subjectivity we cannot have a genuine philosophy also. Therefore, Kant's mistake about psychology makes his own transcendental philosophy vague and mythical.

Thus, with regard to Kant, Husserl's reflections are very critical, for he claims that Kant did not really achieve a genuine transcendental orientation. But within this overall negative judgement Husserl does recognise that the first edition of *Critique* is more genuinely transcendental than the second edition, for in the first edition Kant includes an important psychological dimension. Kant's failure to achieve a genuine transcendental level, according to Husserl, is due to three important limitations. He does not really have an adequate conception of subjectivity. More importantly, Kant takes his point of departure from the sciences and has no conception of the pre-scientific life-world, which is the ground for all scientific constructions. Hence the Kantian a-priori is only a superficial a-priori of the sciences and not the a-priori of life-world. Moreover, Kant seems to have believed that it is proper to accept the validity of sciences and asks for the conditions of their possibility. For Husserl, to accept the validity of a science is by that very fact to
commit oneself to the natural standpoint. This commitment precludes any genuine understanding of consciousness as constituting all objectivity. In other words, Kant lacks any idea of the necessity of a reduction before the transcendental can be grasped.

This is a brief account of Husserl's reflections on Kant's critical philosophy. But generally, we find a very complex relationship between phenomenology and critical philosophy. From the Husserlian point of view, it will not be an exaggeration to claim that Kant also is doing phenomenology, i.e., there is a phenomenological aspect of critical philosophy. The very method of Kantian philosophy is phenomenological. For Kant, there is a turn from objects towards the subject. This Copernican turn is a kind of phenomenology, for phenomenology also envisages a similar turn towards consciousness.

Moreover, in Kant, in the analysis of knowledge there are two aspects which he calls Subjective Deduction and Objective Deduction. In Husserl's language Kant's Objective Deduction is noematic analysis. Kant also turns his investigations to the faculty which can grasp such objective truths as objective knowledge; this is noetic analysis. Hence, like in Husserl, in Kant there are noetic and noematic aspects of phenomenology.
But the differences between Kant and Husserl are more profound than the similarities e.g. although Kant talks of constitution, it is understanding which is constitutive i.e. the constitutive faculty is understanding not sensibility. So, if at all there is a phenomenology in Kant, there is a phenomenology of judgement or understanding not of perception.

Again, Husserl makes a distinction between the empirical subject and transcendental subject and Kant unlike the former has three different conceptions of subject, namely, epistemic self, moral self and transcendental self. For Kant there is a distinction between knowing and thinking. Knowing in the strict sense, for Kant, is possible only when the categories as forms are applied to the matter of knowledge given in sensibility. But in the case of thinking as distinct from knowing there is a kind of empty use of the categories without the content of sensibility. It is because of this that thinking does not amount to knowledge. In this sense, I can think of the epistemic or noumenal self- cannot know it. But Husserl does not make such a distinction. For Kant, myself and the other cannot be given in consciousness. For Kant, no question of autoconstitution or constituting other arises at all. That is why I have no knowledge of the other; but simply I have an awareness of it. In this way there are important points of
difference between Husserl and Kant with regard to their respective conceptions of subjectivity and inter-subjectivity. Accordingly, in the following two sections we will make an attempt for an elaborate presentation of their respective ways of treatment of both the problems.

SECTION III : (a) THE PROBLEM OF TRANSCENDENTAL SUBJECTIVITY IN KANT

In Kant, we can distinguish between three different senses of the subject. These three different senses are, namely, the empirical, the moral and the transcendental. Kant describes them as Personalitas psychologica, Personalitas moralis and Personalitas transcendentalis.

According to Kant there is a distinction between pure self-consciousness and empirical self consciousness i.e. the transcendental ego and the empirical ego. The transcendental ego or the subject is the ego of apperception and the empirical ego is the ego of apprehension. This empirical or psychological ego is an object. An object is that which can be apprehended by experience either by inner sense or by outer sense. But empirical ego is an unique object the knowledge of which is possible by way of both inner as well as outer sense. If it is so, then the empirical subject is a psycho-
physical object which can be the subject of psychology. As in contrast with the empirical subject the transcendental subject is only a subject, not an object at all, for it is the pure self-consciousness. Moreover, Kant describes the transcendental subject as the formal subject, whereas the personalitas psychologica is an empirical subject.

Apart from the conception of subject as empirical for Kant, the second important characterization of the self is the self as moral i.e. the self or subject which is capable of recognizing and obeying the moral law. A human being, as a moral being, has freedom and hence has the capability to act in accordance with the demands of moral law. Sometimes, it may so happen that he has to discard, rather disregard his own desires and inclinations (if they are in conflict with the moral law) out of pure reverence to moral law. In this sense, the categorical imperative does not necessarily fall back upon the desires and inclinations for its implementation, rather it simply does not pay any heed to them. This 'heedlessness' or disregard is not for the disintegration of proper humane feelings, but for the sake of giving rise to a much more profound and a novel feeling i.e. the feeling of respect towards the moral law. This feeling makes the human subject a participant, a subject in the kingdom of ends, for the
feeling of respect is nothing but a feeling of being subjuga-
ted to the moral law.

The third important way in which Kant speaks of the
subject is the subject as transcendental. The transcendental
subject is pure self-consciousness; is not an object as the
empirical ego but is a subject which is the ground of all
possibilities of all experiences i.e. representations. Repre-
sentations, for Kant, is possible by way of the synthetic
unity of apperception. "It must be possible for the 'I think'
to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something
would be represented in me, which could not be thought at
all and that is equivalent to saying that the representations
would be impossible or at least would be nothing to me".32
Again "It is because I ascribe all perceptions to one conscious-
ness.... that I can say of all perceptions that I am conscious
of them".33 And this claim about the awareness of ownership of
one's own experience is the principle of the necessary unity
of apperception. The subject accompanies all its representa-
tions and this is the salient feature of the transcendental
subject. This transcendental subject is not an object like
that of empirical subject, for it, itself, is not a repre-
sentation, rather the basis of all representations. More-
over, objects are knowable by way of categories i.e. they
can be categorized but the transcendental self itself can never be categorized. And hence we cannot know anything about it except simply having an awareness of it.

Thus, in Kant, we find three different meanings of subject i.e. empirical, moral and transcendental. But these three meanings are only three ways of characterizations of the same subject. Although in his first critique i.e. *Critique of Pure Reason* there is no clear way in which we can see the unity of the meanings of the subject; atleast in a passage he mentions that the unity of apperception is nothing but the unity of apprehension - this sufficiently implies that both the transcendental subject and the empirical subject are not different; they are not ontologically different from each other, but two different descriptions of the same subject. His *Critique of Practical Reason* gives us two clues which seemingly posit moral subject as altogether different from the empirical subject. Firstly, for him, the moral subject is a free subject; has freedom to act in reverence to the moral law disregarding the desires and inclinations and is not bound by causality whereas the empirical subject is a natural subject which is governed by the natural, causal laws. Hence both the empirical subject and moral subject are different from each other. Secondly, Kant distinguishes
between holy will and moral will. No conflict arises in the implementation of the holy will, but moral will involves itself in a conflict with the human desires and inclinations. 'Conflict' makes sense when two powers collide and in the present context, they are empirical subject and moral subject and hence both of them are anti-thetical. Thus, both the clues i.e. moral subject not being governed by causality and conflict in the domain of moral will make it appear that both the subjects are different. But we can say that there is an unity between the two and the clue for such an assertion in the respect for the moral law. This 'respect for the moral law' is a moral phenomenon but it can be instantiated only by concrete human actions in the empirical world. In this way, as in the first Critique, we find an unity of meaning between empirical and transcendental subject, in the second critique also we find such an unity between the empirical subject and the moral subject. Kant's third critique i.e. Critique of Judgement suggests the unity of meaning more clearly. For him, here, the transcendental subject is the subject of taste, the subject which is capable of beautiful and delightful experience i.e. capable of aesthetic experience. This means that the transcendental subject is the empirical subject.

If there is a unitary subject i.e. if in Kant all the
three connotations of subject are nothing but three different descriptions of them, then the next problem which demands immediate attention is that how do we get access to the subject at both the levels i.e. at the level of epistemology as well as at the level of moral philosophy? According to Kant, the access to the transcendental subject is possible by way of the teachings of history of philosophy, viz., by the Copernican turn. 'Copernican turn' is the metaphor which Kant uses to characterize his basic orientation of the philosophical investigations. Prior to the Copernican turn, as we have already pointed out on earlier occasions, Philosophy was involved in an unending controversy between dogmatism and scepticism and it is the Copernican turn only which made it clear that the subject to be treated as so must conform to the subject. This turn recognizes the transcendental self and hence shifts the attention from the empirical to the transcendental. In epistemology, therefore, by way of Copernican turn we can gain access to the subject. In the domain of moral philosophy, for Kant, the access is possible by way of the respect for the moral law, for to be human is to revere the moral law which is an unconditional imperative. Reverence to this categorical imperative is a moral experience and this is the clue for the access to the moral subject.
Unlike in Kant, in Husserl, the discussion on empirical subject and transcendental subject is quite clear. For Husserl, both the empirical subject and the transcendental subject are nothing but two ways of description of the same subject. Empirical subject is the subject in natural standpoint. After bracketing the natural standpoint by epanche the true nature of the subject emerges out and it is the transcendental subject. Epoche, in this sense, does not cancel out any thing; it provides a clarification of what transpires the natural standpoint. So, the subject after epanche is the transcendental subject. Apart from this point of view which Husserl presents in his *Ideas*, in *Crisis* also there are certain contexts in which Husserl clearly states that both the empirical and transcendental subject are two ways of expression of one and the same subject. If it is so i.e., if the empirical subject and transcendental subject are same then immediately it follows that there must be same way of access to the transcendental subject. This question of access, for Husserl, takes the form of ways into phenomenology and the talks of number of ways like that of life-world, Cartesian way and possibility of genuine psychology. For Husserl to be an object is to be an object for a subject. It is the intentional
relation between the subject or consciousness with that of
the object which shows that objects are constituted by the
subject. This 'constitution' phenomenon is not at all denied
or denigrated in the life-world context, rather it takes a
different turn and perhaps, therefore, Husserl in Crisis
maintains that life-world is a way of access to phenomenology.
Moreover, Husserl radicalizes the cartesian cogito. For
him, Descartes misconceives the nature of the subject i.e.
as not having intentional relation with the objects, whereas,
really consciousness is intentional. And also for Husserl
unlike Kant, the subject is not part of the world rather the
basis on which the world is constituted. Thirdly for Kant,
psychology is possible only as an objectivistic natural science.
But for Husserl, it is precisely psychology which cannot exist
as a genuine science in the objective manner. This is impor-
tant because unless we have a proper understanding of psycho-
logy as a genuine science i.e. as a science of transcendental
subjectivity we cannot have a genuine philosophy.

SECTION IV : (i) KANT'S PRESUPPOSITIONS OF TRANSCENDENTAL
INTERSUBJECTIVITY

In Kant the problem of knowledge is formulated in
terms of individual subject. However, the intersubjective
classic of cognition is presupposed rather than explicitly
formulated in Kant. This presupposition of intersubjectivity is formal and abstract in the Critique of Pure Reason but becomes more clear in the Critique of Practical Reason and in the Critique of Judgement.

In the analysis of cognition, the distinction between the phenomenal or empirical object and the noumenal or the transcendental object, among other things, is made in terms of the fact that the empirical object is knowable by others whereas the transcendental object is beyond the limits of knowledge altogether. To be objective in the phenomenal sense is to be intersubjectively accessible. To this extent the objectivity which they make possible is an objectivity for all. In the Second Critique the postulate of intersubjectivity takes a more concrete form. The obligatoriness of the moral principle or the moral law is seen in terms of its universalizability. Secondly, the community of moral subjects is also represented under the idea of kingdom of ends. To be a moral subject, therefore, is to recognise others as also ends and not merely as means or instruments. In the Third Critique intersubjectivity involved in aesthetics is represented as a community of taste. When I experience a feeling of disinterested delight in the contemplation of an aesthetic object.
I also assume that all other subjects can and ought to experience the same delight. The shareability of the feeling of delight is necessarily involved in the representation of an object of beauty. A judgement of taste, therefore, is an intersubjective judgement. Hence in Kant, the presupposition of intersubjectivity is found in all the three critiques.

In the epistemological analysis this presupposition takes two forms. Empirical or phenomenal objectivity is defined in terms of intersubjective knowability and the framework of objectivity i.e. the categorial or conceptual framework is valid for all. However, this intersubjectivity in cognitive context is formal because in the First Critique the knowing subject i.e. the transcendental subject is described as a formal subject. In the Second Critique intersubjectivity is seen in terms of the universalizability of the categorical imperative and the recognition of others as moral subjects in the kingdom of ends. In the Third Critique, a judgement of taste has a certain validity for all. Further, the community of taste is represented as the common sense. In one respect in all the three critiques there is a constant element namely, the idea of universal applicability. The categories are
universally applicable, the moral law is universally binding and the disinterested pleasure is also valid for all. But this universalizability is made more concrete in his Second Critique as a community of moral subjects and even more concrete in the Third Critique as a community of feeling and taste. Hence, if we take the development of Kantian philosophy as a whole we may say that there is a tendency towards concretization of intersubjectivity. This has certain similarity with the Husserlian notion of intersubjectivity, which is also not merely a formal but a concrete intersubjectivity.

(ii) **TRANSCENDENTAL INTERSUBJECTIVITY IN HUSSERL**

Being dissatisfied with the traditional approach to the problem of intersubjectivity, Husserl attempts to solve this problem by giving it a phenomenological approach, for phenomenology seeks to be a philosophical description of experience and hence can ably show that there is an experience of the other not merely as an object, but as a co-subject. According to Husserl, since all other objects are given in my consciousness the other also must find a place as given in my consciousness.

Husserl takes up this issue in detail in his
Cartesian Meditations. But prior to this in Ideas he touches upon this problem by way of a distinction between the natural attitude and phenomenological attitude. For him the natural attitude does not give a proper understanding of my own self; at this level my understanding of myself is purely as an empirical organism. Hence, in order to have a proper understanding of my subjectivity I will have to shift to phenomenological attitude by way of the suspension of the natural attitude. It is by this 'suspension' only I get a constitutinal understanding of myself. But, now, the question is how to account for other's givenness, for to know the world is to have the knowledge of the existence of others. Solipsism makes the charge that the world and its objects exist only for me. If at all it can be shown that the world exists not only for me, but for any possible perceiver then only the charges of solipsism can be overcome. Husserl deals with this possible objection in his Cartesian Meditations by maintaining that the world is constituted by a community of human beings, the world is a single 'objective' one for all of us. And, accordingly, for him, phenomenology presupposes not merely intersubjectivity but transcendental intersubjectivity for it proves the existence of the other ego not merely
as an object but as another subject. This programme, as we shall see in the following chapter, Husserl successfully, carries out by way of the analyses of concepts like presentation, recollection, Leib-Körper distinction etc. which have some basis on the first person experience, for the other is a co-constituting subject like that of me.
NOTES AND REFERENCES


4. Ibid.: B.25 (reference to original pagination).


10. Ibid.: p.212.


19. Ibid.: Fifth Meditation.


23. Ibid.: Part III A.

24. For example Maurice Merleau Ponty's "The Philosopher and His Shadow".

25. Husserl, Edmund: *Crisis*, Part III B.
26. Ibid. : P.68.

27. Ricoeur, Paul : *Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology* P.175.


30. Ricoeur, Paul : *Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology* P.175.

31. Martin Heidegger : In his *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (trans. Albert Hofstadter, Indiana University Press, Indiana, 1982) distinguishes between these three different senses of Kantian subject.

32. Smith, Norman K. : *Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* A 122 (reference to original pagination).

33. Ibid. : A 124 (reference to original pagination).

34. Ibid. : B 153 (reference to original pagination).


40. Ibid. : Part III.A.

41. Husserl, Edmund : *Cartesian Meditations - Fifth Meditation*