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3.0. INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, I shall attempt an exploration of the terrain of everyday life. This terrain as such is a theoretical non-entity within mainstream Historical Materialism. The early Marxist theoretician-revolutionaries have hardly dealt with it. The only person who seems to have paid some attention to everyday life is Leon Trotsky. Before I begin a brief exposition of his writings, let me make three clarificatory remarks. To begin with, this chapter will attempt at 'deconstructing' the concepts of 'base and superstructure' and 'civil society'. By doing so, I open up the social terrain for a process of re-naming. What I mean by this is that, having constructed a different ontological category i.e. individual-in-relations, I am attempting to take a view of the social from this vantage point. On doing this, I 'see' a whole set of new (or non-class) 'realities' hitherto submerged in Marxist theory or conflated with others more explicitly stated ones. Since the ontological category individual-in-relations offers me a new perspective, I will have to name what I see. Thus, this chapter involves the important process of naming. Since I have drawn upon the insight of many to execute the process of naming it is inevitably exposed to the threat of eclecticism.
Second, I am looking at the social from the perspective of the emancipatory subject as I understand it. As I have stated earlier, the contemporary emancipatory experience is a very complex one. However, I believe (and I hope to demonstrate later in this chapter) that the basis of the complex emancipatory experience is also the basis of everyday life experiences. And this basis is nothing but the ontological category, individual-in-relations. Thus what constitutes the emancipatory subject also constitutes (or produces) everyday life. What this means is that the experiences of the emancipatory subject must be analytically coterminous with the experiences of everyday life (though there may be a historical disjunction between these two forms of experiences since domination and non-dialogical situations are still aspects of social life). If this is so, then we need to look at everyday life experiences carefully. We need to 'deconstruct' it in order to identify the social structural components and relationships that constitute it. Ultimately the individual-in-relations must be seen as the ground from which these social structural components emerged and constitute the emancipatory subject and everyday life.

I have identified and named five structures that constitute (and are constituted by) everyday life experiences. By doing this, we can indirectly uncover the structural sources of the emancipatory experience which is today part of the working class, feminist, ethno-communal/national and ecological movements.
Third, I have allowed for a more active place for non-class agents. I want to understand the structural processes that constitute (and are constituted by) non-class agents. With this aim in mind, I have identified three broad structural relationships/‘movements’ constituted from the five structures that I have identified. By doing this I am theoretically able to hold the tendencies of universalism, segmentation and dialogical pluralism (or dialogism) together. The process of universalism throws up class agents. The process of segmentation throws up non-class agents. The process of dialogical pluralism (or dialogism) allows the coexistence of social segments.

Let us now return to Leon Trotsky. The writings of Leon Trotsky in the summers of 1922 and 1923 in the Pravda on various aspects of manners and morals in the daily life of the post-revolutionary Soviet society have come to us as his contribution to how everyday life acted against the general drift of the first socialist society.

The elements of distractions, pleasure, and amusement play a large part in church rites. By theatrical methods the church works on the sight, the sense of smell (through incense), and through them on the imagination. Man’s desire for the theatrical, a desire to see and hear the unusual, the striking, a desire for a break in the ordinary monotony of life, is great and ineradicable; it persists from early childhood to advanced old age. In order to liberate the common masses from ritual and ecclesiasticism acquired by habit, anti-religious propaganda alone is not enough.¹

Meaningful ritual, which lies on the consciousness like an inert burden, cannot be destroyed by criticism alone; it can be supplanted by new forms of life, new amusements, new and more cultured theatres.\(^2\)

Trotsky realized that the existing everyday life activities/experiences were an obstacle to socialist reconstruction.

Daily life, i.e. conditions and customs, are, more than economics, 'evolved behind men's back', in the words of Marx. Conscious creativeness in the domain of custom and habit occupies but a negligible place in the history of man. Custom is accumulated from the elemental experience of men, it is transformed in the same elemental way under the pressure of technical progress or the occasional stimulus of revolutionary struggle. But in the main, it reflects more of the past of human society than of its present.\(^3\)

For many Marxists, the 'rehabilitation' of everyday life i.e. the removal of 'traditional/feudal' elements in everyday life would follow the deconstitution of class practices in society. 'Living' socialist societies have amply shown this to be untrue.\(^4\) What we need is therefore to attempt a more

\(^2\) Ibid., pp.34-35.
\(^3\) Ibid., p.25. 'Habit and Custom', Published on 11th July 1923.
\(^4\) I disregard the criticism or the denial of 'living' socialist societies as really socialist societies. I think demonstrating this is really difficult. The more sympathetic approach, I believe, would be to look at the problem of contextualisation and indigenisation of Marxist theory. I use living socialist society

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careful understanding of everyday life. By this I mean, a theoretical understanding of it. But why do we need to understand everyday life? That need arises from Marxism’s tendency to appropriate and contain all relationships (and consequently, all practices) within the confines of class practices. This kind of theorizing seems to imply that

(i) the entire range of human experience is grounded in class practices;

(ii) there is an instrumental relationship between class and non-class practices;

(iii) class practices contain/colonize/choreograph all other practices; and


See particularly chapter 1: The Abolition of Private Property and the Practice of Actually Existing Socialism, pp.17-48. Bahro believes that the ‘essence of actually existing socialism [is] one of socialization in the alienated form of stratification, this being based on a traditional division of labour which has not yet been driven to the critical point at which it topples over’. In addition to this fact, it must also be kept in mind that religion has not vanished in actually existing socialist societies. Nor has the subordination of women. The subjugation of ethno-communities has also not ceased in most socialist societies. It is also a fact that the extent of environmental degradation is alarming in a number of socialist societies.
(iv) differences in human experience/practices can be overcome by transforming them into distinctions of the Same (social universality) in an emancipated future.

Though there is some truth in the above statements, there are problems that need to be attended to. It is the confrontation with these problems that has led to this exploration of the submerged aspects of both everyday life and the structures that shape it. The aim of this exploration is to salvage non-class practices.

3.1. IS THERE A 'SUBMERGED REALITY' IN MARXIST THEORY?

Here I shall present three arguments that point to the neglected realities of everyday life.

3.1.1. Reproduction and Transformation

In Marxist theory, unlike many other theories, the survival of society is seen in terms of social reproduction. When we say that a formation is being reproduced, it means that the relations of production and the appropriation of surplus are not disrupted but are maintained. On the other hand, if these processes face problems in their reproduction, a structural crisis ensues and the entire formation is pushed...
towards qualitative change i.e. change in the relations of production. This is, of course, a simple presentation but it captures the important aspects.

Marx placed great emphasis on transformative processes. His interest is obvious to most of us - to explore the movement of societies. He was not really interested in the subtle processes or dimensions of reproduction. These aspects acquired a strong presence in Marxist theory only with Gramsci, who tried to understand the reasons behind the absence of a socialist revolution in the more developed societies of Europe.

The point is this: over-emphasis on transform-ation and on analysis directed to serve this 'meta-narrative', as it were, of Marxist theory simply occluded complex aspects of everyday life. Some of the neglected areas figure at the level of social reproduction. Take for instance the following observation:

We are less concerned with the production-related aspects of contemporary capitalism. Instead, our emphasis is on what is commonly regarded as the realm of social reproduction. In this, we include concerns of gender, family, education, culture and tradition, race and ethnicity. A large and significant proportion of everyday life is engaged in the reproduction sphere.  

Directing our attention to the reproductive aspects of society simply pushes us in the direction of realities not explored in Marxist theory. These are submerged aspects/practices of Marxist theory that need articulation. But the forceful insertion of non-class practices into Marxist theory would obviously pose challenges for the theory.

3.1.2. Commonality

This aspect has already been developed in the earlier chapter. But let us recall the key aspects of the argument presented in the earlier chapter. We said that for something to be common across both classes would imply the incorporation of one group by another, usually the dominated by the dominant. We argued that this way of thinking about commonality is faulty and pointed out that we can think about commonality more productively in terms of the following two inter-related aspects:

(i) property, and
(ii) use.

It is argued that property may be common across the two classes but their appropriation, use and articulation may

6. See section 2.3 (Commonality) in chapter two.
be totally different. What this implies is that across the classes there exist 'resources' that are the common property of the classes. This commonality, as it were, pointed in the direction of resources/practices that are non-class in nature. These are of course 'silent areas' in Marxist theory. They are submerged realities not areas left unarticulated and need only further elaboration.

Though it must be taken with a little caution, the spirit in which Raymond Williams writes is an important consideration for the idea of 'commonality':

A good community, a living culture, will, because of this, not only make room for but actively encourage all and any who can contribute to the advance in consciousness which is the common need. Wherever we have started from, we need to listen to others who started from a different position. We need to consider every attachment, every value, with our whole attention; for we do not know the future, we can never be certain of what may enrich it; we can only, now, listen to and consider whatever may be offered and take up what we can.  

3.1.3. Ahistoricity, Transhistoricity and 'Transformationability'

3.1.3.1. Ahistoricity

Let us assume that there is a social institution X. We have to imagine the survival of the institution in a number of

historic periods which we shall mark as \( S_1, S_2 \) and \( S_3 \). It undergoes no change, inspite of the fact that other institutions in \( S_1, S_2 \) and \( S_3 \) undergo change. This has a number of implications:

(i) \( X \) is effectively outside the impact of historical forces;

(ii) \( X \) is identical in all historical periods. We can expect it to remain identical for any number of future periods;

(iii) \( X \) is in a way separate from other institutions since it seems to be unaffected by other institutional processes; and

(iv) \( X \)'s relation to other elements is external and their relationship is of a particular kind in which \( X \) remains unaffected while the other factors are.

Such a conception of anything social i.e. a conception in terms of ahistoricity seems so removed from everyday experience of the social. However, there is a level which we can assign to ahistoricity i.e. a level linked to the environment of the body. What we need is a different sort of argument, an argument that retains the 'persistence' of an institution and one that is sensitive to historicity. I think we can think about this in terms of two concepts i.e.,
3.1.3.2. Transhistoricity and
3.1.3.3. Transformationability

3.1.3.2. Transhistoricity

Let us take a social institution X. Further, we will assume that X as an institution is found in a number of historically evolving formations, $S_1$, $S_2$ and $S_3$. On a closer look at X, it seems that X as an institution is preserved but it undergoes marked changes. Hence, one can say that in $S_1$, $S_2$ and $S_3$ one observes that X survives not identically but in terms of changes as $X_1$, $X_2$ and $X_3$. This does not indicate ahistoricity. X is 'acted upon' by $S_1$, $S_2$ and $S_3$ and undergoes changes. It is a transhistorical change; X is a transhistorical phenomena.

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8. I am not suggesting that X is the Weberian ideal type of the empirical phenomena of $X_1$, $X_2$ and $X_3$ unfolding in the social formation of $S_1$, $S_2$ and $S_3$. Such a position would mean one is arguing for ahistoricity. X is a 'real' historical resource appropriated and transformed by $S_1$ into $X_1$. $S_2$ works on $X_1$ and transforms it into $X_2$. The Weberian ideal type would see X in $X_1$ and $X_2$ as same, ahistorically. In reality $X_1$ will have its own ideal type and so will $X_2$. This would seem to keep the concept and historical reality significantly related. Max Weber's ideal type makes an unwarranted separation of ideal type construction and historical realities. Broadly, if we remove this unwarranted separation, we get a transhistorical conception of a numbers of phenomena. For Max Weber on ideal type, see Max Weber, The Methodology of the Social Science, translated and edited by Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch (New York: The Free Press, 1949), pp.91-103.
3.1.3.3. ‘Transformationability’

Transformational changes can be distinguished into two types:

(i) Qualitative transformational changes, and

(ii) non-qualitative transformational changes.

Transformation can be understood in three senses. In one sense, it is used as 'transformation'. In this sense, a social formation comes into being by the unfolding of its essential structure. Thus, in Marxist theory, the mode of production produces a complex social formation. Transformation in this sense means that one social formation is replaced by another by a change in the essential structure i.e., mode of production. In another sense, the essential structure can be taken as 'deep structure' and the instantiation of this structure can be taken as 'surface structure'. These instantiations can be taken as 'transformations' of the deep structure. The second sense is close to the type of conception put forward by Noam Chomsky.


The second sense of the notion of transformation is also similar to the way Claude Levi-Strauss uses it to understand realities like myth and Kinship. 'Transformationability' is an attempt at a third sense. I would like to point out that certain realities, like, for instance, the relation between the sexes, have been with us through epochal changes. They have not vanished. The content of the relationship has changed through time. Thus 'transformationability' refers to those aspects of the social reality that are transhistorical. Used in this way, the self-and-the-other-as-distinction allows a space for transformation i.e., transformation in the first sense, and the self-and-the-other-as-difference allows for 'transhistorical transformation', i.e., transformation in the third sense. The second sense is useful in understanding the changes in the content.
When we talk of 'qualitative transformation' we are, if we are to be understood, talking of it within the Marxian paradigm. 'Qualitative transformation' would imply the change of mode of production or more accurately changes in the forces and relations of production. It is, therefore, a change in the nature of the social formation. However, we do not mean to engage with this kind of change when we talk of non-qualitative transformation i.e. the phenomenon of transformationability. This must also be distinguished from 'incremental changes' occurring within a formation.  

Let me cite an important example. In a society going through historical stages $s_1$, $s_2$ and $s_3$, a language $L$ is the medium of signification/communication. By itself the institution $L$ does not remain the same through the stages.

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10. Consider Marx's polemic:

"Undoubtedly," it will be said, "religious, moral, philosophical and juridical ideas have been modified in the course of historical development. But religion, morality, philosophy, political science, and law, constantly survived this change"'. (p.103) Of course, Marx goes on to 'speculate' that these realities survived because of the class nature of society and that they would disappear once class is deconstituted. I would like to maintain the idea that some realities 'survive' across modes of production while undergoing significant transformation in the various modes of production.

It undergoes change. But such changes do not destroy L but instead 'transform' (develop) it. Thus, L is sensitive to historical forces but at the same time also undergoes changes. It is therefore possible for us to delineate a whole set of social institutions or processes that can be viewed as transhistorical and transformational.\footnote{This conception was inspired by Angela P. Cheater. See Angela P. Cheater, Social Anthropology: An Alternative Introduction (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), pp.178,182 and 185. She uses the notions of 'transformational gender' and 'transformational ethnicity'.} This reality points in the direction of non-class practices.

3.1.4. Production-in-General

Above, I have presented three sets of arguments that point in the direction of a submerged reality in Marxist theory. To strengthen these arguments, it would be extremely relevant to present Marx's attempt to grapple with reality. Let us explore Marx's writings on the issue.

In his early writings, particularly in The German Ideology, Marx conflates 'class' and 'division of labour'. As a result, he makes the following claim:

For as soon as the division of labour comes into being, each man has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon him and from which he cannot escape. He is a hunter, a
fisherman, shepherd, or a critical critic, and must remain so if he does not want to lose his means of livelihood; whereas in communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow...12

The disappearance of 'division of labour' with the disappearance of 'class' is not something Marx does not 'reconsider'. That he does, is well established by an important work by Ali Rattansi.13 The dismantling of the conflation of class and division of labour implies that even in post-revolutionary society and in the communist society there could be a form of division of labour quite different from what it is in the capitalist society. This 'uncoupling' comes about in Marx's writing as he begins to write about 'production-in-general'.14 It is to this that we will now turn. I shall not only try to understand the concept but also reconstruct (redefine) it to suit my present theoretical needs.

What is 'production-in-general'? Marx writes that

...all epochs of production have certain common traits, common characteristics. Production in general is an abstraction, but a rational abstraction in so far as it really brings out and fixes the common element and thus saves us repetition. Still, this general category, this common element sifted out by comparison, is itself segmented many times over and split into different determinations. Some determinations belong to all epochs, others only to a few. (Some) determination will be shared by the most modern epoch and the most ancient. No production will be thinkable without them; however, even though the most developed languages have laws and characteristics in common with the least developed, nevertheless, just those things which determine their development, i.e. the elements which are not general and common, must be separated out from the determinations valid for production as such, so that in their unity -- which arises already from the identity of the subject, humanity, and of the subject, nature -- their essential difference is not forgotten.  

Marx further adds:

There are characteristics which all stages of production have in common, and which are established as general ones by the mind; but the so-called general preconditions of all production are nothing more than these abstract moments with which no real historical stage of production can be grasped.

Elsewhere, Marx writes assertively that

...there are categories which are common to all stages of production and are established by


16. Ibid., p.88.
reasoning as general categories; the so-called general conditions of all and any production, however, are nothing but abstract conceptions which do not define any of the actual historical stages of production.17

From the above extracts we can make the following observations:

(i) There is a separation of specific production regimes and production-in-general;
(ii) Production-in-general constitutes a 'determination' that belongs to all epochs;
(iii) Production-in-general constitutes the general conditions of production applicable to all epochs;
(iv) Production-in-general is an abstract category for it is only 'immanently' present; and
(v) Production-in-general relates to only general conditions directly related to production.

It is understandable why Marx could make a separation between class and division of labour once he analytically achieved (i). It was possible to conceive of division of labour at a level different from that of class. The shape of the division of labour that Marx saw and experienced was

the result of the interaction between these two levels. Once the separation was achieved it was also possible to conceive of division of labour existing in some particular non-alienating shape in a social formation in which class has disappeared.

Let me pursue a little further with this notion of production-in-general. I have made five observations about production-in-general. Let us think about these observations a little bit more closely. Hopefully this will help us in reconsidering the way production-in-general has been thought about by Marx.

Marx takes production-in-general to be an abstract category immanently present in specific production regimes. It has, therefore, no 'real' existence. It is an abstract set of pre-conditions of production i.e. no specific production regime is possible without these pre-conditions. How then do we think about it?

(i) **Deep Structure**

It can be thought of as a 'deep structure'. It is non-visible. It has no separate existence. Yet there is the instantiation of this 'deep structure' in different concrete social forms.
(ii) **The Digital Watch Model**

A modified version of the above can be elaborated with the help of a digital watch. The numbers (0) to (9) are made possible by a kind of a 'deep structure' i.e. by the figure (8). The instantiation of (0) to (9) is made possible by this structure (8) i.e. a figure 8-lookalike. It is the various combinations of the lines that make-up the figure that results in the digital watch's capability of indicating time.

The figure is not abstract. Perhaps we can imagine production-in-general as the structure (8). Though by itself the structure (or deep structure) is not useful in telling time, it is impossible to indicate time without it in a digital watch. If we separate two levels of reality and give them 'relative autonomy' then one can say the following: That one level of reality (the level of 'real' time) 'choreographs' the 'existential preconditions' that exist at another level. In this sense we can think of (8) as a transhistorical category. This takes us to the third point.

(iii) **Transhistoricity and Transformationability**

It is possible for us to conceive of two levels of reality: one class and the other non-class. Class practice 'choreographs' non-class practices to put it
metaphorically. However, the shape of the final social formation is also affected by non-class practices. When I write non-class level and practices I am also proposing to go beyond the fifth observation stated above regarding production-in-general. What do I mean by 'going beyond'? Marx believed that the general conditions of production only related to class practices. But I believe that this is merely one set of practices and that there are many sets of practices which must co-exist as pre-conditions for the possibility of society and production.

Important among these are gender and kinship practices, ethno-communal and cultural practices and juridico-administrative/social organizational practices. These different sets of practices must be placed as constituting production-in-general. If this sounds reasonable and non-antagonistic to the general analytic power of Marxist theory then we can proceed now to claim that significant practices at the level of production-in-general are transhistorical in nature and are 'normally' transformable. Its continued 'choreographed' existence in its interaction with class gives it
specific concrete manifestation as it influences articulation of class in a specific form. The idea of transhistoricity and transformationability have been clarified above. The distinction can therefore be applied here.

In effect, I shall propose/claim that production-in-general allows us to move to a terrain submerged in Marxist theory and through this theoretical journey recover the non-class terrain for theory to appropriate and understand.

3.1.5. Material Production

To substantiate what we have tried to develop above, let us look at the notion of material production in Marx. Marx makes a distinction between 'production of capital' and 'material process of production'.

Capital becomes the process of production through the incorporation of labour into capital; initially however, it becomes the material process of production; the process of production in general, so that the process of the production of capital is not distinct from the material process of production as such.18

The 'as suchness' follows from Marx's unwillingness, for good theoretical reasons, to assign concrete existence to production-in-general. But what is the specific difference between the two conceptions of production cited in the text

i.e. 'production of capital' and 'material process of production'?

The real or material process of production is the transformation of nature into use-values. It is an activity of life stemming from need and directed toward making everything homogeneous with this need. This real process of production has existed since the dawn of history; it is the transcendental condition of its possibility and its reality, and this is why it is immanent to history and reappears in each of its stages.19 (underscoring mine.)

A further observation can be added to the above.

...the real process of production is present within capitalism, the latter is by no means reduced to the former; instead it differs from it in an essential way, to the extent that it superimposes on this initial process something quite different from it, an economic process. The real process produces real objects, use-values. The economic process produces exchange-values, it produces value as such and for itself.20

This distinction between 'production of capital' and 'material process of production', between 'real process of production' and 'economic process of production' again allows us to move to a terrain constituted significantly by non-class practices. It is impossible to conceive of the terrain of material production without non-class practices.


20. Ibid., p. 215.
I have made a case above for the 'presence', albeit a 'masked', 'submerged' one, of a terrain of non-class practices. This conception thus breaks social reality into two levels, linked together in definite and complex ways. These levels are a 'greater' concretization of the brute social space proposed by the self-and-other-as-distinction and self-and-other-as-difference. It will be my aim in the rest of the chapter to explore these two levels and to understand their relationship sociologically. For the moment I want to set the ground for such an exploration. I shall do this by looking at everyday life and structure.

3.2. EVERYDAY LIFE

Before I proceed, it is important that my attempts to understand everyday life must be taken received an open mind and previous association with the notion should be 'bracketed' away. I do not mean by everyday life merely an interactional order in an empiricist sense. This is to say that society does not appear when people interact and disappear when they don't.21 I do not also mean to emphasize the 'life-world', or understand everyday life

21. In reaction to Talcott Parsons, Harold Garfinkel, a student of Parsons, problematizes the pre-givenness of shared understanding among actors for the basis of
merely in terms of consciousness. In order to make my own distinctions, I shall propose the following:

social order. By doing so, i.e., by questioning the pre-givenness of shared understanding, Garfinkel moves out of a system point of view and proposes an actor point of view. Founding ethnomethodology, he articulates the individualist truth that society is an achievement of individual actors who interact in everyday life. Garfinkel does not deny that there is an objective reality, a 'known-in-common environment' (p.54) but considers the actor's understanding of this environment as foundational to the production of society. By posing it in this way, a similar situation he saw in Parson's system point of view is precipitated. Since Garfinkel does not deny the existence of the objective reality, one is obliged to ask 'what is it that the actors understand as "fixed", "required", "normal", "proper", or "typical", to produce the social?' One may as well problematize this aspect in Garfinkel. Thus, if we assume that society appears when people interact in everyday life and disappears when they don't, we put ourselves in the midst of the structure-agency controversy: taking an either/or stand on this issue presents only a partial view. In the next section in the chapter I have discussed an alternative notion of the structure-agency relationship that will be used in this work. This alternative conception will maintain the individualist truth and the importance of structures.

See Chapter Two: Studies on the Routine Grounds of Everyday Activities, pp.35-75.

22. The phenomenologist claim that everyday life-world is primarily an experiential domain has influenced my understanding of everyday life though not in all its specificities. In fact, it is the complex, multi-layered experiential domain of everyday life that I have attempted to understand by directing enquiry at the class and non-class structures that shape it. Specifically, I am not examining 'that province of reality which the wide-awake adult simply takes for
Everyday Life is the primary experienced social reality constituted by labour both in its universalizing and its existential and 'contingent' capacities.

Everyday Life is thus a social space-time construct born out of class and non-class practices. (Class practices may be understood as the ruptural trans-formational sphere and non-class practices as the transhistorical transformational sphere.)

Everyday Life's outer limit is not instrumentally determined by class practices. Not only is the 'structure of everyday life' a much more elaborate and complex social specie but also its outer limit (boundary) is 'porous'.23 Everyday life takes

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granted in the attitude of common sense'. (p.3). I am trying to understand how everyday life is produced and how it produces structures. Thus, I do not see everyday life as 'taken for granted' reality but as a reality that is produced or achieved. 'Taking for grantedness' is only a part of this broader understanding. See Alfred Schutz and Thomas Luckmann, *The Structures of the Life-world*, translated by Richard M. Zaner and H. Tristram Engelhardt (London: Heinemann, 1974).

Let me add another cautionary remark. I am also not using everyday life in a Heideggerian sense. I do not consider that everyday life is absolutely 'inauthentic existence'.

account of the reality that we have tried to salvage in the above section.

(iv) The category of everyday life brings alive the practices we call non-class practices and consequently demands the need to appropriate these practices for theoretical understanding.

Having elaborated the concept of everyday life, what needs to be done is to understand the structure that shape everyday life. I propose doing this by looking at the experience of everyday life. The following layers are woven into this experience:

(i) the experience of oneness;
(ii) the experience of difference;
(iii) the experience of embodiment.
(iv) the experience of dialogical pluralism (or dialogism); and

Corresponding to these layers, I propose the following structures:

3.4.1. Social Structure of Accumulation;
3.4.2. Social Structure of Universality;
3.4.3. Social Structure of Embodiment;
3.4.4. Social Structure of Segmentation; and
3.4.5. Social Structure of Dialogical Pluralism.
These five structures shape (and are shaped by) everyday life. Perhaps this is the right place to discuss the notion of structure.

3.3. STRUCTURE

The notion of structure has been thought of in many ways. Some of these are:

(i) as historically selected and sedimented rules of behaviour;  
(ii) as summaries/condensations of action/thought (this is closely related to the first); 
(iii) as practices in terms of the 'transformative moment';\textsuperscript{24} and 
(iv) as practices which are a composite of the subjective, intersubjective and objective structures.\textsuperscript{25}

I shall make an attempt at a notion of structure which is productive for our concern through a number of strategic clarifications:


(i) I do not use structure here in a sense in which the agency (individuals, social classes) becomes merely 'bearers' of these structures. On the other hand, I do not want to consider agents acting in a vacuum to create society and social relations. The former is the error of reification and the latter the error of voluntarism. I want to avoid both.  

(ii) The need to avoid the error of voluntarism must not be taken to mean that agents always work with clear-cut, well-defined, structured raw materials whether social or symbolic. There is a tendency to confuse voluntarism with the agent's reproductive or transformative efforts with 'raw materials' that are not well-defined. By doing so, structure-agency is viewed by unproductively opposing reification and voluntarism.  

I believe that there is an area between structure and agency. The agency has two sources to work with in

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27. Bhaskar writes, 'Society does not exist independently of human activity (the error of reification). But it is not the product of it (the error of voluntarism)'. He bases this on two stereotypes (see p. 40).  

Contd/--
terms of its productive capacity. One is the well-defined, settled structures and the other is the unformulated, undifferentiated, unverbalized region which we may name as the 'experiential primitive'. This terrain is lost in the notion of structure and agency. It is a terrain that cannot be conflated with the voluntaristic tendency of the agency as it is a 'social resource' i.e. a pre-symbolic, pre-structured social terrain, a terrain closely linked to the 'position' of the agency in the social landscape.

(iii) Another clarification that is important to keep in mind is the fact that all structures do not have the

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Model I : The Weberian Stereotype (Voluntarism)

Individual

↓

Society

Model II : The Durkheimian Stereotype (Reification)

Society

↓

Individual

28. I have developed this in the section on the 'social structure of embodiment'. The productive capacity as used by Marx is merely related to the tool-making activity. It is indirectly related to the symbols-creating activity. I have used productive capacity to mean both. In this I am following the Russian social psychologist/semiotician Vygotsky. See, for instance, Benjamin Lee, 'Intellectual Origins of Vygotsky's Semiotic Analysis' in James V. Wertsch (ed.), Culture, Communications, and Cognition: Vygotskian Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp.74-76.
same degree of constraint, or conversely, the agency
does not experience the same degree of unfreedom.
This notion therefore introduces a factor of
variability of voluntaristic and deterministic
tendencies.\textsuperscript{29} It therefore, allows us to conceive of
resistance and transformative possibilities at
various levels i.e. from 'everyday forms of
resistance' to 'revolutionary forms'.

(iv) It is also important to keep in mind that there is a
surface structure and a deep structure with varying
degrees of mutual influence. We may think about this
in terms of the 'level of the empirical', the 'level
of the actual' and the 'level of the real'.\textsuperscript{30} It is
important that we maintain some idea of deep
structure for there are definite instances when the
sources of our motivation or behaviour are not all
obvious.

(v) Structure need not always be thought of as a network
of positions in relation to the 'possession' of this
or that 'socio-cultural material'. It is possible to

\textsuperscript{29} See Margaret S. Archer, 'Morphogenesis versus
Structuration': On Combining Structure and Action',
_The British Journal of Sociology_, Vol. 33(4), 1982,
pp.455-483.

\textsuperscript{30} This distinction is used by Roy Bhaskar. See Roy
Bhaskar, _Realist Theory of Science_ (Sussex: Harvester
consider certain 'positions' as generic ones. In the discussion on structures in the next section one can take both the 'social structure of universality' and an aspect of the 'social structure of embodiment' as structures that structure and 'discipline' behaviour through a complex network of generic positions.

(vi) I want to think about structure and agency in the following manner, along the general lines suggested by Roy Bhaskar.31

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**Fig. 10: THE ONTOLOGICAL HIATUS BETWEEN STRUCTURE AND AGENCY AND THE MODE OF CONNECTION BETWEEN THEM**


The figure is based on Bhaskar's figure on p.46.
The one does not collapse into the other. Both are ontological entities and there is therefore an 'ontological hiatus' between them. They are related through a 'mode of connection' and this is reproduction and transformation. Society whether reproduced or transformed is an achieved product. An active agency is therefore conceived.32

(vii) The point of contact between human agency and structure is conceptualized as position-practice i.e., 'positions (places, functions, rules, tasks, duties, rights, etc.) occupied (filled, assumed, erected, etc.) by individuals, and of the practices (activities, etc.) in which, in virtue of their occupancy of these positions (and vice-versa), they engage'.33

(viii) To extend the above, I shall note that all position-practices are either reproductive or transformative in nature. Though I shall develop the conception later, it is power which mediates between position and practice. By placing power in this way, I want to place power at the heart of the process of reproduction and transformation.

32. Ibid., p.46,50.
33. Ibid., p.51.
I think I have made some clarification of the manner in which I intend to consider structure. Before concluding this section, one further observation is necessary. For this let us reconsider figure ten closely.

In this section, my concern is with structure-agency. It therefore must be kept in mind that I am not talking directly about the modes of connection between structure-agency or the point of contact between them as position and practice. In the next chapter, that on power, I shall take up position-practice in the context of two modes of connection by conceptualizing power as a mediating capacity between position and practice.

In this conception of power, I will replace the model of economic base-ideological/political superstructure 'by a
conception of the different ideologies associated with the different practices... Of course, these ideologies will stand in various relations to one another; and sometimes reveal striking homologies and straightforward functionalities'.

I will be more concerned with four position-practices associated with the Self-Other relations in the two relational spheres of self-and-other-as-distinction and self-and-the-other-as-difference'.

3.4. THE SHAPING OF EVERYDAY LIFE

3.4.1. Social Structure of Accumulation

At the outset, let me explicitly state that this is the 'region' of class practices. I shall explore this region in detail to capture its structural characteristics and tendencies. Before I go on, I shall make one observation on the source of the concept: the concept 'social structure of accumulation' will be largely used in the sense the SSA-theorists have used it.

...we explicitly analyze the institutional particularities of the current capitalist epoch by applying the concept of the social structure of accumulation (SSA) as a historically specific expression of the capitalist node of production.

34. Ibid., p.85.
We build, in this respect, upon a model of the rise and demise of successive SSAs. According to this perspective, capitalist economies experience periods of relatively rapid and stable growth once a set of socioeconomic institutions comprising a SSA has been established. But any such SSA is subject both to external shocks and to endogeneously generated stresses. These frictions eventually begin to erode the SSA, usually after a period of several decades, and consequently undermine its effectiveness in promoting profitability, investment and growth. The social order then enters a period of crisis during which political struggles develop over the institutional restructuring necessary to re-establish conditions for successful accumulation. 35

As we go along, I shall attempt to tie up this idea of SSA with the world systemic thesis. 36 An important meeting


The SSA school is a reconstruction of Marxian economics in the US. It is one among three such attempts. See Social Scientist, Vol. 19(1,2), 1991 for the three attempts including the SSA theory. The SSA has a Continental counterpart understood as 'Regulation Theory'. For an elaboration of this see Michel Aglietta, Theory of Capitalist Regulation: The US Experience, translated by David Fernbach (London: NLB, 1979).

My use of the 'social structure of accumulation' is not identical with the SSA theorists. I would like to apply this concept more generally to the movement of class structures. That is, instead of the mega-concept of mode of production, the SSA is used. Thus in principle I would like to extend it even to pre-capitalist formations. A particular mode of production can be imagined to be reproduced by a number of successive SSAs.

36. The reason why the world systemic thesis is considered here is because, as Arun Bose observes, it 'insists

Contd/
place of both these ideas of the world is the concept of accumulation. What is this accumulation? We are in the capitalist epoch, in the era ruled by an impersonal force, capital. Let us expose this impersonal force, for an understanding of it will clarify our understanding of accumulation.

If we consider the process of production from the point of view of the simple labour-process, the labourer stands in relation to the means of production, not in their quality as capital, but as the mere means and material of his own intelligent productive activity. In tanning, e.g., he deals with the skins as his simple object of labour. It is not the capitalist whose skin he tans. But it is different as soon as we deal with the process of production from the point of view of the process of creation of surplus-value. The means of production are at once changed into means for the absorption of the labour of others. It is now no longer the labourer that employs the means of production, but the means of production that employs the labourer. Instead of being consumed that the only "unit of analysis" to be adopted to analyse the conditions in any country in the modern world must be the global world economy, and the world inter-states' system which it has generated'. Though I do not think it is the only unit of analysis, I believe that a unit of analysis that does not incorporate this insight of the world systemic thesis is quite mistaken about the social world.


For a similar theoretical position that I have adopted, see George E. Marcus and Michael M.J. Fisher, Anthropology as Cultural Critique: An Experimental Moment in the Human Sciences (Chicago: The University of Chicago, 1986). See in particular chapter 4.
by him as material elements of his productive activity, they consume him as the ferment necessary to their own life-process, and the life-process of capital consists only in its movement as value constantly expanding constantly multiplying itself.37 (underscoring mine.)


It is important to keep in mind that there are limits to accumulation. Thus Marx writes:

The real barrier of capitalist production is capital itself. It is that capital and its self-expansion appear as the starting and the closing point, the motive and the purpose of production; that production is only production for capital and not vice versa, the means of production are not mere means for a constant expansion of the living process of the society of producers. The limits within which the preservation and self-expansion of the value of capital resting on the expropriation and pauperisation of the great mass of producers can alone move -- these limits come continually into conflict with the methods of production employed by capital for its purposes, which drive towards unlimited extension of production, toward production as an end in itself, towards unconditional development of the social productivity of labour. The means -- unconditional development of the productive forces of society -- comes continually into conflict with the limited purpose, the self expansion of the existing capital. The capitalist mode of production is, for this reason, a historical means of developing the material forces of production and creating an appropriate world-market and is, at the same time, a continual conflict between this its historical task and its own corresponding relations of social production.

Capital produces surplus-value. The reconverting of this surplus value into capital 'is called accumulation of capital'. Marx adds,

Accumulate, accumulate! That is Moses and the prophets! 'Industry furnishes the material which saving accumulates.' Therefore, save, save, i.e., reconvert the greatest possible portion of surplus-value, or surplus-product into capital! Accumulation for accumulation's sake, production for production's sake: by this formula classical economy expressed the historical mission of the bourgeoisie, and did not for a single instant deceive itself over the birth-throes of wealth.

The 'historical mission of the bourgeoisie' involved globalization.

The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connexions everywhere.

Marx and Engels further add that

The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most barbarian, nations into civilization. The cheap prices of its commodities are the heavy artillery with which it batters down all Chinese walls, with which it forces the barbarians' intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners to capitulate. It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode

38. Karl Marx, Capital I, p.543.
39. Ibid., p.558.
of production; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilization into their midst, i.e., to become bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image.41 (underscoring mine.)

The central dynamic element of the bourgeois mode of production, or capitalist mode of production, is capital. And capital is given to self-expansion through accumulation. This is an 'impersonal force' that leads to globalization, to universalization. The capitalist mode of production assumes a world status through the internationalization of capital. Is'nt it therefore absolutely important to understand what accumulation of capital really means?

The accumulation of capital in this way results theoretically and historically in, among other things: the growing concentration of capital; the competitive elimination of small producers and the increasing centralization of capital (the increasing size on the average of the capital owned/controlled by each); the growing proportion of people available to employment by capital, but the decreasing proportion, ceteris paribus, of those so employed by capital-intensifying branches of industry ('surplus' population); a resulting historical/political narrowing of social definitions of the employable and/or of the times of employment, but still increasing unemployment among the lawfully employable segments of national (colonial) populations; a resulting overall downward pressure on real wage-levels (costs of labour), from competition (demand) for employment, but for given (not examined) social and political reasons, a pressure that is unevenly distributed

41. Ibid., p.84.
among a working population's individuals and groups; consequently, a tendency for capital to expand labour-intensive production (countering the tendency for capital-intensive production, indicated above) in order to employ the low-wage segment of the workforce which is continually created by the growing competition for employment (the effect being to depress wage-specific employment but to increase head-count employment); and -- finally for here -- the marked tendency through time for these diverse movements to occur in the form of cycles of expansion and stagnation...42

I shall elaborate further by developing certain features of this global 'social structure of accumulation'. Hopefully, this elaboration will lay the groundwork for a better understanding of the 'social structure of universality' when we take it up for discussion.

An important feature of the global structure is the coming into being of a capitalist 'world market'. Marx notes:

...in its first period -- the manufacturing period -- the modern mode of production [Capitalist mode] developed only where the conditions for it had taken shape within the Middle Ages. Compare, for instance, Holland with Portugal. And when in the 16th, and partially still in the 17th, century the sudden expansion of commerce and emergence of a new world-market overwhelmingly contributed to the fall of the old mode of production and the rise of capitalist production, this was accomplished

conversely on the basis of the already existing capitalist mode of production. The world-market itself forms the basis for this mode of production. On the other hand, the immanent necessity of this mode of production to produce on an ever-enlarged scale tends to extend the world-market continually...43

This importance of the world market has led to the division of the world by big imperialist powers. And this division has now and then led to war.

...the contraction of capitalist competition on the domestic market, led to an intensification of international capitalist competition on the world market, to inter-imperialist rivalry and to the tendency for the world market to be redistributed periodically, including by means of armed force -- in a word, by imperialist wars.44

In the modern world, both production and the market are controlled by multi-national corporations.

The multinational corporation evolved as an effort by capital to take advantage of the opportunities for accumulation, and avoid constraints on that process, that were embodied in [those] various victories of popular forces. In the United States core it could serve as a vehicle for reinvestment, thus enabling capitalists to elude high and expanding labor and taxation costs at home, yet take advantage of increased domestic demand fostered by those wages and the redistributionist policies of the social welfare regime. In the rest of the core and in the semideveloped periphery the multinational corporation enabled metropolitan capitalists to link their investment


abroad to the goals of national reconstruction and national industrialization while, at the same time, gaining access to cheaper labor and large internal markets. Finally, in the least developed parts of the periphery, investments by multinational corporations could allegedly promote capitalist development through primary commodity extraction and, increasingly (as labor costs rose in the core and semiperiphery), promote a kind of industrialization there as well.\textsuperscript{45}

To add a further point,

What is new about the contemporary period, however, is that restructuring 'internal' to the territorial unit has been combined with spatial (both intra- and inter-national) shifts in investment and a massive expansion of the radii of organizational control associated with the growth of transnational corporations. It is precisely this combination of the increased use of space together with the expanded transnationalization of corporate structures that has given the current restructuring process its global character and dynamic.

To starve-off cut-throat competition and generate new accumulation possibilities, core capital, then, has increasingly turned to this 'global option'. The emergence of the global option, however, would have been inconceivable without the development of information technologies, and particularly telecommunications. These technologies have been a major material condition for the emergence of the global option in as far as they have enabled particular labour processes, or sometimes entire production facilities, to be dispersed across the globe...\textsuperscript{46}


At one level, this globalization of production and market resulted in the dissolution of self-contained economic regions into the world economy. Let us take the instance of Punjab.

In their initial colonial tenure -- that is, from annexation in 1849 until the 1890s -- the British successfully harnessed the Punjab's agricultural production and labor to the world system without radical transformation or major capital investment. Late in the nineteenth century, the Punjab, especially the fertile 'central' districts, served British interests by producing wheat for exports to other parts of India and to Britain. By 1881, three distinctive labor and production regions had been fashioned by this colonialism on the cheap. Cultivation in southeastern Punjab characteristically involved non irrigated land (barani) worked either by peasant proprietors or landlords and sharecroppers.47

Fox further adds:

Beginning in the 1880s and continuing into the 1920s the colonial government undertook massive capital investment in raising the agricultural productivity of the Punjab to increase land revenue and export income. This rise in the organic composition of capital took the form of immense irrigation works, which by the 1920s irrigated over 10 million acres of formerly desert lands. Under this emergent state capitalism, the British settled cultivators from the overpopulated central Punjab as tenants of the state on consolidated plots of 25 acres. Larger plots of 50 to several hundred acres were sold to what the British called 'yeomen' and 'capitalists'.48


48. Ibid., pp.116-117.
It is important to keep in mind that the process of accumulation did not lead to even development. Multiple relations of production 'coexisted' within an emerging global structure. What is this 'uneven' development? Trotsky writes that

Unevenness, the most general law of the historic process, reveals itself most sharply and complexly in the destiny of the backward countries. Under the whip of external necessity their backward culture is compelled to make leaps. From the universal law of unevenness thus derives another law which, for the lack of a better name, we may call the law of combined development -- by which we mean a drawing together of the different stages of the journey, a combining of separate steps, an amalgam of archaic with more contemporary forms.49

We have dealt with production and the world market; we need to dwell on one more important feature and that is the international division of labour. One can identify four sequential phases in the development of the international division of labour:

(i) mercantile;
(ii) industrial;

---

(iii) imperial; and
(iv) transnational.50

Cohen explains:

Starting first with the mercantile division of labour, the first element of conscious design on an international scale is revealed. A surplus of particular commodities can be generated simply through the accidents of geography and climate, the particular distribution of flora and fauna, or the spread of natural resources - be these commodities far from Poland, blubber from northern Canada or coal from Newcastle. However, such surplus only become important when they enter the sphere of circulation and when production methods and rhythms alter to try to replicate accidental pattern into permanent structures of advantage.51

He goes on:

...it was under the aegis of merchant capital that labour was commoditized (turned into labour-power) and the beginnings of a global labour market organized. The plantation societies of the New World were established, lands were conquered, local populations decimated, eight million Africans trans-shipped across the Atlantic, and specialist commodities like cotton, coffee, sugar and tobacco planted, harvested and processed.52

There were two features of the mercantile division of labour:

(i) It was 'a combination of metropolitan free and plantation unfree labour in each regional political economy'.

(ii) It was increasingly ethnically diverse.


51. Ibid., p.234.

52. Ibid., p.235.
Thus, 'East Indians were forced to rub shoulders with Africans in the Plantations of Natal, Trinidad and Guyana; Javanese were imported to Surinam; Italians to Brazil; Dutch Burghers to South Africa -- each ethnic group being incorporated into the division of labor with a different status. The present-day consequences of this division of labour are ever-visible in the numerous forms of ethnic and class conflict in former plantation societies'.

The second phase in the development of the international division of labour involves the industrial division of labour. Cohen observes that

the second phase previously identified was the industrial division of labour. Just as the closed circuits of trade gave way to free trade, machinofacture began to replace (but never totally superseded) the production and processing of tropical commodities.

This machinofacture and its spread all over Western Europe gave birth to the industrial division of labour.

The 'imperial division of labour', according to Cohen, was based on 'a racially-based ideological version of an international division of labour'. The transnational

53. Ibid.
54. Ibid., p.236.
55. Ibid., p.238.
division of labour came into being with the collapse of European empires.

The humiliating defeat of the European powers in Asia during the Second World War, the strength of the anti-colonial movements and the growth of competitive capital centred in the US, and later in Japan, hastened the end of the imperial order. The transnational phase left in place some neo-colonial relationships... but also led to a major restructuring of industrial production in the metropoles (allied to the importation of migrant labour), and the further internationalisation of leading fractions of capital, particularly the oil giants, the car companies, and those producing consumer durables, electrical goods and electronic components.\footnote{Ibid., p.240.}

It is out of this development that the 'new international division of labour' has emerged. However, the appellation 'new' has to be taken with a little caution.

...it is more than plausible to argue that the mercantile, industrial and imperial phases have left deep scars on the face of the global population and production facilities. That there are Africans in the Caribbean and the US, Italians in Brazil and Indians in South Africa is a more salient and determinant datum informing the workings of modern capitalism than that export-processing zones have begun to employ Third World labourers.\footnote{Ibid., p.241.}

Hopkins observes that

There is one expanding economy. This conventionally appears to us, however, in the form of various 'national' (and 'colonial') economies
related through 'international' trade. This one world-scale economy, which is progressively more global in scope, has a single or axial division and integration of labor processes ('division of labor'), which is both organized and paralleled by a single set of accumulation-processes, between its always more advanced, historically enlarging, and geographically shifting core and its always less advanced, disproportionately enlarging, and geographically shifting periphery.58

3.4.2. Social Structure of Universality

The 'social structure of universality is being proposed to replace the notion of civil society in Marx and Antonio Gramsci. I am, however, constructing the social structure of universality by a 'synthesis' of the notion of civil society as it is understood by Marx and Gramsci. The differences in their understanding offer me an insight into the social structure of universality. In other words, in what both Marx and Gramsci conceive as civil society, one can identify a level of universality. I want to capture this level. Before I attempt a 'synthesis', let us explore the notion of civil society. In Marx’s language, the civil society is the 'economic society'.

The form of intercourse59 determined by the existing productive forces at all previous


59. This was later conceived as 'relations of production'.
historical stages, and in its turn determining these, is civil society. The latter has as its premise and basis the simple family and the multiple, called the tribe... Already here we see that this civil society is the true focus and theatre of all history, and how absurd is the conception of history held hitherto, which neglects the real relations and confines itself to spectacular historical events.60

If Marx developed it as 'economic society', Antonio Gramsci saw as civil society something entirely different. In his understanding, the civil society mediates between the 'economic society' and the 'political society'. It is a terrain that captures, as it were, the socio-cultural including the ideological aspects.

What we can do...is to fix two major superstructural 'levels': the one that can be called 'civil society', that is the ensemble of organisms commonly called 'private', and that of 'political society' or 'the State'. These two levels correspond on the one hand to the function of 'hegemony' which the dominant group exercises throughout society and on the other hand to that of 'direct domination' or command exercised through the State and 'juridical' government.61

From the above quotes, it can be deduced that both Marx and Gramsci saw civil society very differently. 'Civil

60. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology, pp. 57-58.

society in Gramsci does not belong to the structural sphere, but to the superstructural sphere'. 62 For Gramsci 'civil society comprises not "all material relationships", but all ideological-cultural relations; not "the whole of commercial and industrial life", but the whole of spiritual and intellectual life'. 63 Though Gramsci's conception is more fruitful to my reconstructive efforts, I would at the same time distance myself from it in certain respects. Before I present my theoretical reasons, I would like to introduce Louis Althusser's position briefly.

Althusser, claiming to systematize Gramsci's thoughts on the civil society, introduced the following distinction:

In order to advance the theory of the State it is indispensable to take into account not only the distinction between State power and State apparatus, but also another reality which is clearly on the side of the (repressive) State apparatus, but must not be confused with it. I shall call this reality by its concept: the ideological state apparatuses. 64


63. Ibid., p.83.

What are the ideological state apparatuses (ISAs)? Althusser lists the following: (i) the religious ISA (the system of different Churches), (ii) the educational ISA (the system of the different public and private 'Schools'), (iii) the family ISA, (iv) the legal ISA, (v) the political ISA (the political system, including the different Parties), (vi) the trade-union ISA, (vii) the communication ISA (press, radio and television, etc.), (viii) the cultural ISA (Literature, the Arts, sports, etc.).

The reason I have presented Althusser's view is to show a certain tendency in the Gramscian notion of civil society. It was this tendency, of course, that Althusser detected and developed into a more comprehensive idea. Obviously, there is no reason to believe that Gramsci's notion of civil society and Althusser's notion of ideological state apparatuses are one and the same. That would be to confuse the distinctiveness of each of the notions.

Both in Gramsci and in Althusser, who was inspired by Gramsci, the institutional complex making up the civil society and the ISAs plays a hegemonic role or the role of

65. Ibid., p.143.
constituting the subject.66 That is, it presents a channel by which the dominant class (or a 'consortium' of fractions of a class) articulates its interest as the interest of the whole society. This is in line with Marx's observation:

No class in society can play this role without arousing a moment of enthusiasm in itself and among the masses. It is a moment when the class fraternizes with society in general and dissolves itself into society; it is identified with society and is felt and recognized as society's general representative. Its claims and rights are truly the claims and rights of society itself of which it is the real head and heart. A particular can only vindicate for itself general supremacy in the name of the general rights of society.67

66. The notion of the subject is highly complex. For my purpose here I would like to offer the following clarification. When I use the notion of the subject, I have the following senses in mind:

(i) The subject as entrapped within a socio-cultural/ideological universe (i.e., subject as 'subjected');

(ii) The subject as created within a socio-cultural/ideological universe; and

(iii) The subject as the focal point of historical action.

The emphasis may differ. Thus when considering the emancipatory subject, I am really emphasizing the third sense in the background of the second sense. Althusser to uses it in the first and second sense.


See 'Towards a Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right: Introduction'.
In this sense, civil society captures a terrain of class control and direction. This is not denied. What I shall try to argue for is the fact that civil society is 'really' an emergent 'social structure of universality' (SSU). In effect, what I am proposing is a kind of synthesis of Marx's and Gramsci's positions.

(i) In as much as 'civil society' is the 'economic society', we propose the emergence of a 'supranational organization of production'. Alvin Wolfe proposes the following:

(a) 'What is most significant is not merely that trade has increased, but rather that production is being organized on a worldwide scale'.

(b) 'The system of our concern is different from an international organization and different from a cartel formed by corporations. All these lesser organizations are involved, as subsystems, in a wider system, and some of them are adapting as the control of the wider system comes to be felt'.

(underscoring mine.)


69. Ibid., p. 615.

70. Ibid., p. 617.
(c) 'Most attempts to understand the increasing internationalization of economic activity suffer the defect that they have not sufficiently taken into account that a genuinely new level of integration is being achieved'.71 (underscoring mine.)

(d) 'At the higher levels, however, above the enterprise or group, even the extractive industries lose their hierarchical/centralised/pyramidal structure and adopt an interlocking/overlapping one. This latter structure is more like one of Levi-Strauss's generalized wife-exchange systems, which assure the widest possible integration with no tendency toward centrality, than it is like the ordinary view of monopoly capitalism or even oligopoly. Thus, with special reference to Southern Africa, each major multinational enterprise may be internally centralized -- for example, De Beers group, the Roan group, the Newmont group, the Engelhard group, each a pyramid of functionally differentiated companies. From any apex, however,
one sees a plateau upon which the major companies heading each group are related to one another by interlocking directories, common shareholdings, shared subsidiaries, joint ventures, common management contracts etc. 72

An important aspect of the structure is the market. One way of thinking about market is to think of it as an arrangement in which individual and collective needs are negotiated and satiated. 73 The market mechanism has been rejected as an aspect of socialist society. For it is believed economic crisis is linked to the market. 'The market is subject to crises because it always blindly responds to demand, allocating resources ex post. Within socialism, the problem of economic crises is solved by replacing ex post regulation with planned regulation of resources ex ante; production is

72. Ibid., p.619.

73. The negotiation of collective and individual needs is a serious practical problem. The market in capitalist society offers an institutional arrangement to help negotiate individual and collective interest. However, left to itself, the market is capable of creating tension between the collectivity and the individual. Thus, extra-market institutions may be necessary. A totally bureaucratized society too does not seem to offer us the best way of achieving the negotiation of individual and collective interests.
able to anticipate demand rather than anarchically respond to it.\textsuperscript{74}

The market has been reconsidered and this has led to the emergence of 'Market Socialism'.\textsuperscript{75} The market socialists have two theoretical perspectives which are fruitful for our purpose.

The first is to 'couple' markets and socialism... An important corollary is the 'decoupling' of capitalism and markets. While it may be impossible to have capitalism without markets... it is perfectly possible to have markets without capitalism.\textsuperscript{76}

This conception liberates the market as a distinctly capitalist institution and allows us to place it within the 'social structure of universality'. This is an important step because I accept the market socialists' argument that

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{76} See also the essay by Raymond Plant, 'Socialism, Markets, and End States', pp. 50-77. This essay offers a strong defence/case for market socialism from a philosophical point of view.
  \item \textsuperscript{76} Saul Estrin and Julian Le Grand, 'Market Socialism', ibid., p.1.
\end{itemize}
... socialists have often been careless in distinguishing between ends and means. Socialism has a well-defined set of ends: for example, preventing exploitation of the weak by the powerful, greater equality of income, wealth, status, and power, and the satisfaction of basic needs. But many socialists have conflated these with a particular set of means, such as the state ownership of production or centralized planning of the allocation of resources -- means that have become objectives in their own right. So socialism is identified with, for instance, the attainment of greater equality through planning or the elimination of exploitation through the nationalization of industry... there is no logical reason for these traditional identifications to hold. There is nothing intrinsic in planning that implies equality or in nationalization that eliminates exploitation. Nor, by extension, is there anything intrinsic in markets that prevents them from being used to achieve those ends.77

The market is an important institutional articulation of the universalizing capacity of labour. It does not only help in the act of negotiating individual needs with the collective one but also contributes to the creation of 'empirically concrete universal beings'.

Let us return to our argument. I am trying to flesh out my effort to 'synthesize' Marx's and Gramsci's notions of civil society. The above is the first part of the synthesis. Let me present the second.

77. Ibid., p.2.

For 'socialists' also read Marxists.
(ii) Marx had not conceived of a location for the 'socio-cultural' terrain. The 'ideological' reality that Marx conceived was a part of the superstructure and seemed not to include the whole of the socio-cultural terrain. The conception of this terrain appears in Gramsci's notion of civil society. I think there are two sets of institutions in Gramsci's civil society. One set includes specific socio-cultural institutions, (kinship, cuisine, dressing, etc.) the other includes civil institutions (commonweal institutions). What I am interested in is only the 'civil' of the civil society i.e., only those institutions that have generic universalizing capacity.

To begin with, what is this civility? It 'considers others as fellow-citizens of equal dignity in their rights and obligations as members of civil society; it means regarding other persons, including one's adversaries, as members of the same inclusive collectivity, i.e., as members of the same society, even though they belong to different parties or to different religious communities or to different ethnic groups'.78

Edward Shils goes on further to add that 'Civility is also a mode of political action. It is a mode of political action which postulates that antagonists are also members of the same society, that they participate in the same collective self-consciousness. The individual who acts with civility regards the individuals who are its objects as being one with himself and each other, as being parts of a single entity'.

If the above is a working notion of 'civil' or civil society, then a 'network' of institutions constitutes it as part of the 'social structure of universality'. This network includes the juridico-administrative, communication, educational, sports and leisure institutions among others.

In his early writings, Marx assigned to the 'Press' the role he had assigned to the proletariat in his later writings. In the press, he saw the universalising function. 'It alone can make a particular interest a general one, it alone can make the distressed state of Mosel (a region in the Rhine province where peasants were going through hard times) an object of general attention and general sympathy on the part of the Fatherland, it alone can mitigate the distress

79. Ibid., pp.13-14.

80. This web of institutions can be compared with the list of institutions Althusser has named.
by dividing the feeling of it among all'. The press for Marx does not present its case based on reason only but also on feelings: 'The attitude of the Press to the people's conditions of life in based on reason, but it is equally based on feeling .... The free press, finally, brings the people's need in its real shape, not refracted through any bureaucratic medium to the steps of the throne, to a power before which the difference between rulers and ruled vanishes...'

In the period in which this article was written, Marx had not identified class or its importance in the general movement of societies. However, this fact by itself is no reason not to take his observations on the 'potentiality' of the 'free press' seriously, as something reflecting his immaturity in matters of social analysis. The 'free press' is an instrument of communication. And free communication, i.e., communication without the context of domination but within the context of dialogue, promotes 'shared-ness' and consequently universality.

82. Ibid.
83. This is developed in the section on 'social structure of dialogical pluralism'.
It is also interesting to reconsider Marx’s analysis of law. It is an aspect of the juridico-administrative institutions/practices.

The law against a frame of mind is not a law of the state promulgated for its citizens but the law of one party against another party. The law which punishes tendency abolishes the equality of the citizens before the law. It is a law which divides, not one which unites, and all laws which divide are reactionary. It is not a law, but a privilege.84

Marx here seems to hold an idea that law has a positive role. Of course, the usual argument against this is that he saw, along with Hegel, the positive side of the State. It is common knowledge that later he saw the state as an ‘instrument’ of the ruling class. This criticism of Marx and the shift in Marx’s own thinking notwithstanding, there is an aspect that needs to be considered carefully, that is, the civil nature of juridical/legal institutions. Perhaps that is why Marx writes that ‘law against a frame of mind is not a law of the state promulgated for its citizens, but the law of one party against another party’. This statement implies that there can be a law promulgated for its citizens.

To continue this argument, I shall quote here an observation/assertion on 'The Principle of Legality' made by Salvador Allende at length.

The principle of legality now reigns in Chile. It was imposed after the struggle of many generations against absolutism and the arbitrary use of the power of the state. It is an irreversible triumph as long as no distinction remains between the governing and the governed. It is not the principle of legality which is denounced by popular movements. Our protest is against a legal order whose principles reflect an oppressive social system. Our juridical norms, the techniques which regulate social relations between Chileans, correspond today to the requirements of a capitalist system. In the transition to a socialist regime, the juridical norms will correspond to the necessities of a people's struggle to build a new society. But legality there will be.

Our legal system must be modified. This is the main responsibility of the courts at the present time -- to see that nothing impedes the transformation of our juridical system.

It depends to a great extent on the realistic attitude of Congress whether or not the legal system of capitalism can be succeeded by a socialist legal system, conforming to the socio-economic changes which we are planning, without there being a violent rupture in the juridical system, which could give rise to those arbitrary acts and excesses that we wish to avoid.85

(underscoring mine.)

It is true that the 'legal system...is not a flower which blossoms in the desert... Law always expresses a vision of society'. 86 Yet to transform all law or the legal system into a mere instrument of a class or a class-induced institution would be to turn it into something that has no general or common function. The legal system is born out of a struggle of social forces. It is therefore, an arena of negotiation/contestation; it is hardly an 'instrument' of a particular class. It can also be resorted to by the dominated classes or a 'citizen' (to defend himself/herself). The growing legal activism in India87 simply indicates that there are aspects that are 'detrimental' to the working of the capitalist or patriarchal social order.

Allende’s observation quoted above also presents a tension that needs to be addressed. He makes the following observations:

(i) It is not the principle of legality which is denounced by 'popular' or 'progressive' movements;


87. For a brief but quite comprehensive exposition on legal activism, its history and growth see Anjan Ghosh, 'Civil Liberties, Uncivil State', Seminar, no.355, 1989, pp.34-37.
(ii) The legal system must be modified; and

(iii) The transition from capitalist to socialist regime should proceed without there being a violent rupture in the judicial system which could give rise to those arbitrary acts and excesses that we wish to avoid.

A change in the legal order is proposed. The transition shall observe the 'principle of legality'. And the change should be done without 'there being a violent rupture in the juridical system'. One important implication of the last proposition of Allende is the fact that he had given up the idea of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' which is the instrument to effect changes in the social structure. Whether or not this was a sound strategy is a question we will not go into.88 Having given up this institutional mechanism, Allende resorted to effecting change by popular support changes in the legal system, in the laws.

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88. One of the central issues of the transition to socialism concerns whether 'the dictatorship of the proletariat' is a necessary political instrument to effect transition to socialism or not. The Chilean Road to Socialism suspended it for a peaceful transition. The forces of reaction brought down Allende's government in 1973. Allende was, of course, assassinated in a well-orchestrated military coup sustained by international finance agencies, U.S. multinationals, the U.S. government and local social forces including the military opposed to Allende's socialist programme. For many this coup proved the impossibility

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In the way he proposed to bring about socialist transformation one sees a certain 'continuity' during the transition period -- 'principle of legality', 'modification' and 'without rupture'. 'Modification' is modification of legal resources inherited from a past regime. There are therefore rules that can be sustained that protect the principle of legality. The principle of legality cannot merely be an abstract principle. It is a concrete principle, supported by definite practices and institutions. It was to this that Allende was trying to add a 'socialist vision'.

We have discussed above two regions of the social -- the social structure of accumulation SSA and the social structure of universality SSU. The SSA is the region of class practices. The SSU is a region that belongs to second-order non-class practices. What remains to be discussed now is the region of first order non-class practices. This includes the 'social structure of embodiment', the 'social structure of segmentation' and the 'social structure of dialogical pluralism'.

of a peaceful transition to socialism and the importance of the dictatorship of the proletariat. For an exposition of the arguments on the issue see James F. Petras and Frank T. Fitzgerald, 'Authoritarianism and Democracy in the Transition to Socialism', Latin American Perspectives, vol. 15(1), Issue 56, 1988, pp.93-111. See Also Keith A. Haynes, 'Mass Participation and the Transition to Socialism: A Critique of Petras and Fitzgerald', ibid, pp.112-123.
We may recall that in the earlier chapter an ontological category individual-in-relations was introduced primarily for the purposes of reappropriating the body for Historical Materialism and introducing a notion of positive pluralism. Here we will explore the experience of 'embodiment' a little more in detail. This is an important aspect of the movement of labour in its contingent state: the body takes us right to the contingent state of being-in-the-world. It thrusts upon us our finitude.

Heidegger used the word Dasein for the human being. It literally means 'being there'. The essential structure of the being of Dasein is being-in-the-world. Being in is its formal existential expression. Dasein's facticity is such that its Being-in-the-world has always dispersed itself or even split itself up into definite ways of Being-in. The multiplicity of these ways is indicated by the following examples: 'having to do with something, producing something, attending to something and looking after it, making use of something, giving something up and letting it go, undertaking, accomplishing, evincing, interrogating,'

considering, discussing, determining...⁹⁰ Thus a human being cannot be considered 'except as being in the midst of a world, an existent thing stuck there, so to speak, in the middle of other things'.⁹¹ Though I use the philosophical notion of being-in-the-world much like Heidegger, I also want to suggest that I use the notion in such a way that being-in-ness articulates as self-and-the-other-as-distinction and self-and-the-other-as-difference. Let me now move on to explicate the process of embodiment more directly. I shall begin my discussion by exploring the relationship between the body and religion.

3.4.3.1. Body and Religion

For a perspective on the body, I shall draw considerably from Maurice Merleau-Ponty among others. But before we begin an exposition on the body, I shall attempt an entry into the region of the body through the problem posed by religion to Marxist theory.

The body is implicated in two primary processes that defines the survival of the human species -- production and reproduction. Thus, the body is 'present' at the interface

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⁹⁰. Ibid., p.83.

between 'nature' and 'culture' and in the most intimate aspect of human relationships. This body is exposed to its contingency as a perishable entity, or as an entity that undergoes pain and joy. Birth, pain, procreation, death and decay are generic conditions\(^\text{92}\) of the contingent body, a kind of status everyone is 'assigned'. These are universal existential conditions. We have to keep this in mind while reconsidering Marx's position on religion.

In his understanding of religion, Marx showed both sensitivity to religion as an experience of the body and as a form of consciousness. He wrote that religion was an 'inverted attitude to the world'.\(^\text{93}\) As an experience, he wrote that religious 'suffering [distress] is at the same time an expression of the real suffering [distress] and a protest against real suffering [distress]. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the feeling [sentiment] of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless circumstances'.\(^\text{94}\)

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\(^\text{92}.\) Even in this generic condition there is the difference between the male and the female.


\(^\text{94}.\) Ibid., p.64.

This observation by Marx is very revealing about Marx sensitivity to the body of the person suffering. Note his terms 'suffering (or distress)', 'sigh' and 'sentiment'. All these terms point to the experiencing body. However this is not further developed. There is an overemphasis on religious consciousness.
Marx goes on to say that the 'abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of people, is the demand for their real happiness. The demand to give up the illusions about their condition is a demand to give up the condition that requires illusion'.

Marx's argument can be stated as follows:

(i) There is a real world where people experience real suffering.

(ii) This sympathy is sought to be 'overcome' by theoretical introspection on religious activity without change in practical activity.

(iii) This kind of overcoming is illusory. But why illusory? It is illusory because the real world is organized on a principle that leads to suffering. This real world must be understood and changed. Understanding and changing means a dialectical relationship between theory and practice. In as much as religion remains at the level of theory without understanding the real world in order to change it, in as much as it gives a semblance of change without any real change, it is illusory. It is the opium of the people not only in the sense that it

95. Ibid.
acts like a drug but also in the sense that it articulates an image of a 'just world' which remains at the level of imagination and is not translated into concrete human activity to achieve it. Theory and human practice are at a disjunction.

(iv) The confrontation with real suffering takes place at the theoretical level and remains at that level. The certainty of an abstract just world, the impossibility of its realizability lies at the root of illusion. This illusogenic tendency of religion in its confrontation with real suffering is because the conditions that generate real suffering are not captured in religious ‘theoretical’ activities related to the social world. For only in understanding those conditions can a just world be brought about by human activity. Thus, to abandon religion, according to Marx, is to remove the conditions that require illusions. This is not to say that when everyone gives up religion, a just world would be realized but it is to say that when we actually create a world with a heart and social conditions with a soul, religion would have realized its destiny and would, therefore, be unnecessary. Or, if there is another theory of the 'real' world and 'real' suffering in it and a way to 'really' overcome
this suffering, another theory that offers a 'real' possibility of constructing a just world through critical human activity, religion would be superseded.

(v) There would result the conditions for real human happiness, a condition that does not need illusions. This would mean a self-conscious reality, participative human beings and unmediated human relationships: 'The positive transcendence of private property as the appropriation of human life, is therefore the positive transcendence of all estrangement -- that is to say, the return of man from religion, family, state, etc., to his human, i.e., social, existence'.96 Critical awareness of human reality as human creation and not as the creation of some external principle would in essence be a self-conscious human reality. Thus, Marx writes elsewhere that the 'religious reflex of the world can, in any case, only finally vanish, when the practical relations of everyday life offer to man none but perfectly intelligible and reasonable relations with

96. Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, p.91.
regard to his fellow men and to Nature'. 97

(underscoring mine.)

Thus for Marx, religion will finally disappear. To make this point more sharply, let me quote in length Marx's response to the criticism that religion has been persistent inspite of the change in the modes of production.

'Undoubtedly', it will be said, 'religious, moral, philosophical and juridical ideas have been modified in the course of historical development. But religion, morality, philosophy, political science, and law, constantly survived this change'.

'There are, besides, eternal truths, such as Freedom, Justice, etc., that are common to all states of society. But Communism abolishes eternal truths, it abolishes all religion, and all morality, instead of constituting them on a new basis; it therefore acts in contradiction to all past historical experience'.

What does this accusation reduce itself to? The history of all past society has consisted in the development of class antagonisms, antagonisms that assumed different forms at different epochs.

But whatever form they may have taken, one fact is common to all past ages, viz., the exploitation of one part of society by the other. No wonder, then, that the social consciousness of past ages, despite all the multiplicity and variety it displays, moves within certain common forms, or

general ideas, which cannot completely vanish except with the total disappearance of class antagonisms.98

'Living socialism' has not seen the disappearance of religion. In fact, there is an increasing reassertion of religiosity. In addition, a new phenomenon has emerged in Latin America, but which is quite widespread now, i.e., the radicalization of religion. Marxism and Christianity are undergoing a process of dialogical transaction. Such a transaction is discernible in the passage cited below:

There are million of Christians using marxist analysis as a tool for understanding societal ills. Marxism and Christianity are not the same. Neither are they incompatible. Nothing can serve the cause of empire better than to define socialism as godless. No one has to be a godless socialist. I would like to meet a godly capitalist. Socialism is not going to go away. The world's best scholars and researchers understand that production based on need is superior to the religion of profit. Socialism will not be bombed away; neither will it depart by papal fiat.99 (underscoring mine.)


This is a part of a letter written by the author, who is a lay priest and a UCLA professor, to Pope John Paul II on March 1985 for openly chastising the 'rebel priests' of Nicaragua and Central America and supporting US backed mercenaries who were killing Nicaraguans and destabilising the country.
Marx is being as poorly received by you today as Aquinas was when he wrote. And there is an equal importance in understanding the spirituality of the matter. Marx does not look to having as the road to happiness. For him it is not what we have but what we are that is important. On this spiritual point capitalism is the most materialistic philosophy of the 19th century and marxism the least materialistic.100

When the Sandinistas came to power in Nicaragua, a catholic priest Father Ernesto Cardenal, was appointed the Minister of Culture.101 'Religious-like' behaviour (under the garb of secular rituals) can also be observed in the response of communists to life crises, or to a show of deference.

Given this situation, it is possible to argue that religion may not necessarily disappear with the deconstitution of class structures. In the recent writings on religion by Marxists, one can detect this. Let me explore one productive perspective on religion. There are three perspectives on religion:

100. Ibid., p.17.

101. This was the Catholic Father chastised by Pope John Paul II when he visited Nicaragua. Blase Bonpane writes in his first open letter to Pope John Paul II on March, 1983: 'You visited a family in mourning. That family is called Nicaragua. Some twenty of the finest of Nicaragua's youth had just been murdered by an invasion force which was trained and paid for by the United States. You walked into the home of the deceased, you ignored the bodies in front of you and to the scandal of the faithful, you publicly chastised a prominent hero of the Sandinista revolution, Father Ernesto Cardenal. History will not forget your attack...' Ibid., p.10.
(i) the 'ideological' perspective;\textsuperscript{102}
(ii) the 'superstructural reconstruction' perspective; and\textsuperscript{103}
(iii) the 'body' perspective.\textsuperscript{104}

I shall take up for discussion only the third perspective. The first perspective is a structural-marxist perspective on ideology and religion. The second perspective presents the reconstructive possibilities of the ideological superstructure much like the form of reconstructive transformation that Christianity (Catholicism) underwent in Latin America.

In taking up religion for enquiry, Marx correctly identifies pain and suffering as an important contribution to religious activity. But he conflates again two kinds of suffering operating at two levels, a conflation that is quickly undone.


See also Louis Althusser, 'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, pp. 27-186.


in the revolutionary context that existed in central America: Suffering resulting from the contingent body, a more existential kind of suffering; and one resulting from a social context. The suffering of the former kind was tied to pain and death. The transaction between Marxism and Catholicism took place at the second level, not the first level. Birth, death, pain and suffering cannot be 'overcome' socially, by a social universality. The contingent state of the body, which provided for a universal experience, would remain as an existential condition. If general well-being can overcome the sensitive contact with the contingent body -- its birth, death, pain and suffering -- then one can't really explain why Buddha, a wealthy prince, should be so anguished by those very conditions of human existence. What he made of this contact with the contingent body is another matter.105 As long as human beings are encapsulated within living flesh, and to be human beings they must, it is possible to make a claim that a basic condition for the persistence of religion exists. The religious practices may undergo continuous transformation to keep 'in tune' with the general social philosophy that may come to govern future human lives and society. To make a claim that religion would

105. For details see Ram Sharan Sharma, Material Culture and Social Formations of Ancient India (Delhi: MacMillan, 1983), pp.89-134.
disappear is something difficult to sustain given the fact that an embodied community of believers will still go on through their lives experiencing their contingent bodies. Their helplessness or their joy will be tied to this embodiedness.

I hope I have to some extent made a case to consider the 'body' more seriously. In the next section, I shall take it up more pointedly.

3.4.3.2. The Need to Consider the Body

The social sciences have invented an abstract observer to conduct and pursue the aim of 'objectivity' in order to generate scientific studies. 'This process of detaching and distending knowledge claims about society and culture from both reflexivity and experience suppresses not only the theoretical moment but the reality of membership as well. This suppression is equated with the claim to objectivity found in both scientism and professionalism, whereby objectivity is meant the pose of the disembodied disciplined observer'.

There has been a consistent effort 'to disembody men, women and children from their gender in favour of subordination to a far more rigid system of classification and categorisation based on common properties and homogeneous character'.\textsuperscript{107} (underscoring mine.) In a sense, society 'in its work, labour and occupational sectors, is in fact, unisex in its operation'.\textsuperscript{108} In actual practice, however, it is not.

This tendency towards disembodiment has neglected many areas of our everyday life in which the body is involved. Take for instance, the notion of 'consent'.\textsuperscript{109} The notion of consent cannot be discussed without being sensitive to the fact of the 'material anchoring of consent in the body'.\textsuperscript{110}

Elaine Scarry discusses 'consent' in three separate spheres - medicine, political philosophy and marriage law. The consent of medical treatment or surgery 'takes place or

\textsuperscript{107.} Ibid., p.3.

\textsuperscript{108.} Ibid., p.10.


\textsuperscript{110.} Ibid., p.868.
behalf of the body'. 'The body is, then, the thing protected. But the body is also the lever across which sovereignty is gained, authorization achieved. Discussing political philosophy, Scarry writes that the 'generation of the nation-state and one's political obligation arises from one's sheer bodily presence within the boundaries of a nation-state, one's decision not to travel out of that country that has come to be known by the label "tacit consent through residence".... The phenomenon of consent through residence (like consent in the earlier medical context) makes it clear that what is at stake is not an unanchored notion of autonomy but autonomy-as-grounded-in-the human body'. (underscoring mine.)

We can now enumerate three attributes of the body. Firstly, the body is 'the thing protected by powers of consent'. Secondly, the body is 'the lever across which the ground of self-authorization in brought into being'. And thirdly, the body 'becomes the locus of the act of consent itself. That is, it becomes the site of the performative act'. To these three attributes, Scarry adds a fourth after

111. Ibid., p.871.
112. Ibid., p.874.
113. Ibid., pp.874-875.
discussing 'marriage'. 'Marriage is a reciprocal act of consent'. 'As in the earlier medical and political contexts, consent is here inseparable from the physical body; but now it is the act of lovemaking and procreation, the body in its generative capacity, that is its special province rather than the body in its susceptibility to injury or in its willed options of departure and residence'.114

Through marriage there occurs the 'transfer of rights of the body to the other person'.115 The consummation of mutually consented marriage really means that the body has directly a part in that consent through the act of 'making love'. In American family law, consummation is understood as "ratification" of the marriage contract'.116 Thus, Scarry adds the fourth dimension to the attributes of the body: 'a ratifying power'.

Scarry, in conclusion, makes an important observation. 'Problems in consent will always have to do with the body -- a sodomy law in Georgia, the testing of blood for AIDS in a Texas hospital, the testing for drugs on an Amtrak train, a

114. Ibid., p.884.
115. Ibid., p.885.
116. Ibid., p.886.
defense against rape in a British court, a labour contract regulating hours of employment.' 117

Another important area that we need to discuss before we conclude this section is the area of 'social control'. In Marx, social control is either through the repressive or the ideological apparatuses. In Gramsci, the emphasis is shifted to social-cultural, or hegemonic, control. In Althusser, what was developed in Marx and Gramsci was 'improved' and presented within a 'theory of the state'. The state constitutes two apparatuses, the repressive state apparatuses and the ideological state apparatuses. Though in the final analysis, the target of the repressive state apparatus was the 'body', the social control of the body was never looked at seriously. The analysis never looked at the 'inscription' of power in the body. It was looked at more at the level of deterrence or elimination, 'deterrence' and 'elimination' for the purpose of maintaining the 'boundaries' of a social order.

Thus, by looking at control at these two levels, another form of social control was lost sight of: this is the control at the level of the body. And this was another form

117. Ibid., p. 887.
of subtle control very closely associated with control organized and realized through the above two levels but distinctly different since it was achieved through a process of disciplining.

The classical age discovered the body as object and target of power. It is easy enough to find signs of the attention then paid to the body -- to the body that is manipulated, shaped, trained, which obeys, responds, becomes skilful and increases its forces.¹¹⁸

These [coercive control] methods, which made possible the meticulous control of the operations of the body, which assured the constant subjection of its forces and imposed upon them a relation of docility-utility, might be called 'disciplines'.¹¹⁹

Michel Foucault adds that 'What was then being formed was a policy of coercions that act upon the body, a calculated manipulation of its elements, its gestures, its behaviour. The human body was entering a machinery of power that explores it, breaks it down and rearranges it... A "political anatomy", which was also a "mechanics of power", was being born; it defined how one may have a hold over others' bodies, not only so that they may do what one wishes, but so that they may operate as one wishes, with the


¹¹⁹. Ibid., p.137.
techniques, the speed and efficiency one determines. Thus discipline produces subjected and practised bodies, "docile bodies".120

Such a basic level of control needs to be considered as it is a powerful way in which a status quo can reproduce itself. It must however be kept in mind that the process of 'disciplining' can cut in two ways. Foucault's effort has been to see the 'control' aspect of it only, and he links 'punishment' with it. However, in the process of a body disciplining itself, a form of life can also be created. There is thus a certain 'positive' element/trend we have to consider in the 'general' process of disciplining. As Pierre Bourdieu writes:

If all societies...that seek to produce a new man through a process of 'deculturation' and 'reculturation' set such store on the seemingly most insignificant details of dress, bearing, physical and verbal manners, the reason is that, treating the body as a memory, they entrust to it in abbreviated and practical, i.e. mnemonic, form the fundamental principles of the arbitrary content of culture. The principles em-bodied in this way are placed beyond the grasp of consciousness, and hence cannot be touched by voluntary, deliberate transformation, cannot even be made explicit; nothing seems more ineffable, more incommunicable, more inimitable, and,

120. Ibid., p.138.

See the chapter on 'Docile Bodies for a full description of 'disciplining'.

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therefore, more precious, than the values given to the body, made body by the transubstantiation achieved by the hidden persuasion of an implicit pedagogy, capable of instilling a whole cosmology, an ethic, a metaphysic, a political philosophy, through injunctions as insignificant as 'stand up straight' or 'don't hold your knife in your left hand'.

Having stated the importance of considering the body, we can now move on to consider it as a locus of autonomy and expressivity.

3.4.3.3. The Body as a Locus of Autonomy and Expressivity

(i) The body that we are going to consider is implicated in both the primary processes that create and sustain human life. Thus, it is an important aspect of our being-in-the-world. It can be differentiated from the conception of the body in two philosophical/theoretical traditions.

For the empiricist/behaviourist the notion of the body is predicated on the stimulus-response model. The body reacts to stimuli emerging from the environment. For the rationalist, consciousness is a key concept. In


122. See Bryan S. Turner, Religion and Social Theory, pp.12,13, 237.
this tradition, the body is turned into a slave of the conscious mind, of consciousness. The movement of the body is consequent to us figuring are in our head first what to do and then instructing our body to do it. 'Empiricism and rationalism could only acknowledge an objective body, the body considered as a physical object in the world, made up of flesh, bone and blood'. 123 Both these notions have to be rejected for the notion that is proposed is really more complex.

(ii) I shall propose the body perspective adopted here as one constituting a perspective that captures the body as a 'region' of 'autonomy' and 'expressivity'. These notions are linked closely to a basic level in which there is the involvement of the body i.e. motility. Let us explore these ideas.

Consciousness is in the first place not a matter of 'I think that' but of 'I can'...Sight and movement are specific ways of entering into relationship with objects and if, through all these experiences, some unique function finds its expression, it is the momentum of existence, which does not cancel out the radical diversity of contents, because it links them to each other, not by placing them all under the control of an 'I think', but by guiding them towards the

intersensory unity of a 'world'. Movement is not thought about movement, and body space is not space thought of or represented.124 (underscoring mine.)

In the action of the hand which is raised towards an object is contained a reference to the object, not as an object represented, but as that highly specific thing towards which we project ourselves, near which we are, in anticipation, and which we haunt. Consciousness is being-towards-the-thing through the intermediary of the body. A movement is learned when the body has understood it, that is, when it has incorporated it into its 'world', and to move one's body is to aim at things through it; it is to allow oneself to respond to their call, which is made upon it independently of any representation. Motility, then, is not, as it were, a handmaid of consciousness, transporting the body to that point in space of which we have formed a representation beforehand.125 (underscoring mine.)

In so far as I have a body through which I act in the world, space and time are not, for me, a collection of adjacent points nor are they a limitless number of relations synthesized by my consciousness, and into which it draws my body. I am not in space and time, nor do I conceive space and time; I belong to them, my body combines with them and includes them. The scope of this inclusion is the measure of that of my existence; but in any case it can never be all-embracing. The space and time which I inhabit are always in their different ways indeterminate horizons which contain other points of view. The synthesis of both time and space is a task that always has to be performed afresh. Our bodily experience of movement is not a particular case of knowledge; it


125. Ibid., pp. 138-139.
provides us with a way of access to the world and the object, with a 'praktognosis', which has to be recognized as original and perhaps as primary. My body has its world, or understands its world, without having to make use of my 'symbolic' or 'objectifying function'.126 (underscoring mine.)

The pre-symbolic motility is to be distinguished from 'gestures'.

'Movement' and 'motility' refer to the body's meaningfully organized behaviour, and, except when these terms are explicitly distinguished from 'gesture', they will be understood to include a reference to our gestures, which always involve some sense of movement. When, however, 'movement' and 'motility' are distinguished from 'gesture', then they will refer only to behaviour for which the body in its entirety, and as a physiognomic whole, is mobilized, as in, for example, walking and running. 'Gesture' is also a word for meaning-bearing behaviour, but it must be distinguished from 'movement' and 'motility' in virtue of the fact that it refers to behaviour which (1) is concentrated in, and primarily mobilizes, the upper limbs of the body, the expressiveness of the face, and our organs of speech, and which (2) explicitly expresses, or is intended to communicate, specific figures of meaning.127

Levin offers us an insight that is extremely useful to our elaboration of Historical Materialism:

Now, we will note that our motility takes place in a field of many dimensions. Our existence, as

126. Ibid., pp. 140-141.

beings gifted with the capacity we will call 'motility', is dependent upon this field. Our being is grounded in the openness of this field. Thus, grounded, our being is in a sense co-extensive with, or to-be-identified-with, the open being of the motility field as a whole.128

(underscoring mine.)

We have here underlined the importance of motility to our sense of being 'open' to the world. We need to thrust further into the pre-symbolic nature of this condition of the body. This pre-symbolic condition is not pre-social, for that would indicate the physical realm. In fact, it is the pre-symbolic social aspect of being-in-the world. This is captured by the level of emotions/feeling. I shall dwell on this aspect below.

What comes to light, then, when we focus...on the deepest accessible structure of our motility? Can we contact these structures in process of formation? Can we follow their emergence? I submit that we will eventually contact a sensuous-emotional field of motivating energies, a primordial field of tensions, pulses, and waves of attractions and aversions, whose intertwining intensities manifest a very strong inveterate tendency to constitute bodily centers of ego-logical (subjectively- and objectively-polarized) comportments, centers, that is, of purposive, ego-serving behaviour, while providing, at the very same time, the layout of an opportunity for the development of a Self whose centeredness is achieved, rather, through the openness of its solicitude.129

This analysis is based on the nature of 'interpersonal dimension of our motility'. David M. Levin writes that

128. Ibid., p. 94.

129. Ibid., p. 96.
'According to Heidegger, being-with-others...characterizes an essential dimensions of our openness-to-Being. This suggests that authentic existence calls for the development of our capacity for 'solicitude'...130

Solicitude is a very basic element of our sensuous-emotional being. But there are other emotions and they play an important role in our being-in-the-world. Existential sociology captures this level comprehensively.

Love and hate, ecstasy and agony, pleasure and pain, lust and satiety, hope and despair, satisfaction and frustration, excitement and boredom, sympathy and spite, full and hungry, tasty and foul, comfort and discomfort. These and a vast number of other feelings, named and

130. Ibid.

The notion of 'authentic' existence in Heidegger is complex. I shall cite a revealing passage below.

'The "they" has always kept Dasein from taking hold of [the] possibilities of Being. The "they" even hides the manner in which it has tacitly relieved Dasein of the burden of explicitly choosing these possibilities. It remains indefinite who has "really" done the choosing. So Dasein make no choices, gets carried along by the nobody, and thus ensnares itself in inauthenticity. This process can be reversed only if Dasein specifically brings itself back to itself from its lostness in the "they". But this bringing-back must have that kind of Being by the neglect of which Dasein has lost itself in inauthenticity. When Dasein thus brings itself back [Das Sichzuruckholen] from the "they", the they-self's modified in an existentiell manner so that it becomes authentic Being-one's-self. This must be accomplished by making up for not choosing [Nachholen einer Wahl]. But "making up" for not choosing signifies choosing to make this choice - deciding for a potentiality-for-Being, and making this decision from one's own self.'

Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, pp.312-313.
unnamed, are the core of our being, the stuff of our everyday lives. They are the foundations of all society. They come before symbolic meaning and value, lead us continually to reinterpret, hide from, evade, overthrow, and recreate thoughts and values. Feelings pervade all meanings and values. They inspire our practical uses of rules and they are the reasons behind our reasoned accounts. They are certainly not the whole of life. Without rules and ideas fused with feeling to inspire, shape, and control human passions and lesser feelings, we would not long exist, for social order is necessary to man's existence. But without feeling, without brute being, there would be no use for rules, ideas, or social structures; and there would be none.\textsuperscript{131} (underscoring mine.)

A similar level of being is recognized by Raymond Williams as \textit{structures of feelings}.

... structures of feeling can be defined as social experiences \textit{in solution}, as distinct from other social semantic formations which have been \textit{precipitated} and are more evidently and more immediately available... Yet this specific solution is never mere flux. It is a structured formation which, because it is at the very edge of semantic availability, has many of the characteristics of a pre-formation, until specific articulations -- new semantic figures -- are discovered in material practice: often, as it happens, in relatively isolated ways, which are only later seen to compose a significant (often in fact minority) generation; this often, in turn, the generation that substantially connects to its successors.\textsuperscript{132}

A similar kind of conception is found in the work of Pierre Bourdieu. Bourdieu calls the concept \textit{habitus}.


The structures constitutive of a particular type of environment (e.g. the material conditions of existence characteristic of a class condition) produce habitus, systems of durable, transposable dispositions...¹³³

In a note on disposition, Bourdieu writes

The word disposition seems particularly suited to express what is covered by the concept of habitus (defined as a system of dispositions). It expresses first the result of an organizing action, with a meaning close to that of words such as structure; it also designates a way of being, a habitual state (especially of the body) and, in particular, a predisposition, tendency, propensity, or inclination.¹³⁴

I have taken an excursion in order to identify a level of being that has to be captured when the body is brought into theory.

Let us return to our discussion of emotion. A growing literature on emotion has today dispelled the prejudice that emotion is 'irrational' and that it does not help in social analysis. There are two tendencies discernible from this consideration. One raises emotion to the level of the rational i.e. it considers emotion rational. Thus, for instance, Klaus Scherer argues that 'emotions can be rational' by 'focusing on three possible meanings of rational: (1) rational in the sense of functional, (2) rational in the sense of intellectual, and (3) rational in the sense of reasonable'.¹³⁵

¹³⁴. Ibid., p. 214, Note 1 of Chapter Two.
Another tendency proposes 'a model of the emotional "man" as complement to the models of rational and normative man'. 136 An interesting point that is based on these notions is a typology of action logics along rational, normative and emotional levels. 137 See figure 11.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>RATIONAL*</th>
<th>NORMATIVE</th>
<th>EMOTIONAL**</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Point of Reference</td>
<td>Self</td>
<td>Self or Other</td>
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<td>Freedom to Pursue Desire</td>
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<td>Cost</td>
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<td>Consistency</td>
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<td>Determinacy</td>
<td>Predictable</td>
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* Rational: Classical/Neo-classical
** Emotional: Pure Emotional

Fig. 11: ACTION LOGICS


137. Ibid., p. 42.
A closer look at the 'action logics' would indicate that there is a certain level of action i.e. the emotional level which allows the possibility of 'openness' and 'expressivity'. The 'Cost-obliviousness'/ 'unboundedness'/ 'non-obligatoryness'/ 'unpredictability' all point to the direction of a certain 'openness', anarchic or not. It is important thus to keep in mind that 'it was the development of emotion that freed organisms from rigid stimulus control thus providing for a highly flexible behavioral repertoire and, ultimately, "freedom of will", if that does indeed exit'.\textsuperscript{138} (underscoring mine.)

The body is also an 'expressive space' as Merleau-Ponty puts it:

Now the body is essentially an expressive space. If I want to take hold of an object, already, at a point of space about which I have been quite unmindful, this power of grasping constituted by my hand moves upward towards the thing. I move my legs not as things in space two and a half feet from my head, but as a power of locomotion which extends my motor intention downwards. The main areas of my body are devoted to actions, and participate in their value...\textsuperscript{139}

All this, brings us to an important consideration, namely that what we are dealing with as the body is a complex

\textsuperscript{138} Klaus Scherer, 'Emotions can be Rational', p.332.
\textsuperscript{139} M.Merleau-Ponty, \textit{Phenomenology of Perception}, p.146.
entity which is neither completely social nor biological (in the physical, stimulus-response, sense). It is a complex entity that integrates body, emotions, and thought into body-emotions-thoughts.140

In a natural speech situation a totality is formed of the body postures, hand and head gestures, and facial expressions accompanying utterances and modulating, as well as heightening, their cognitive and emotional content. This total communicative-cum-expressive behaviour cannot be neatly divided into physical, emotional and cognitive aspects...141

Dance is an 'archetypal' human institution that allows this complex body to express itself. For instance, in the discussion on dance, Frederique A. Marglin writes that the 'central term to refer to dance sequences and combination is bhava'. This term 'is used technically in the dance repertory to refer to the total postural and gestural gestalt that accompanies a particular emotional-cum-mental state. These states have been codified into nine major ones (sthayi bhava) and thirty three transitory ones (sancari bhava)...The codification of emotions into a set number goes with a codification of the gestural gestalt appropriate to each emotion, particularly of the facial expressions. This


141. Ibid., p.221.
produces an elaboration, stylization, and stereotypification of the raw material of spontaneous expressions and gestures accompanying emotional and mental states in a communicative manner. It creates a basic dance vocabulary that allows both patterning of emotions in a manner similar to the patterning of sound, rhythm, mood, and thought in poetry and refining of the emotional-cum-mental states in the same manner discussed earlier in the context of postures, gestures, and facial expressions'.

Another set of practices that allow us to bring out the expressivity of the body has been well-expressed by Herbert Marcuse:

...the radical qualities of art, that is to say, its indictment of the established reality and its invocation of the beautiful image of liberation, are grounded precisely in the dimensions where art transcends its social determination and emancipates itself from the given universe of discourse and behavior while preserving its overwhelming presence. Thereby art creates the realm in which the subversion of experience proper to art is recognized as a reality. This experience culminates in extreme situations (of love and death, guilt and failure, but also joy, happiness, and fulfilment) which explode the given reality in the name of a truth normally denied or even unheard.

142. Ibid., p. 222.

We can now move on to the last aspect in our consideration of the body. And this pertains to the idea of body-image.

...my whole body for me is not an assemblage of organs juxtaposed in space. I am in undivided possession of it and I know where each of my limbs is through a body image in which all are included.\textsuperscript{144}

If this is the first aspect of a definition of body-image, the second aspect is that

...it is no longer seen as the straightforward result of association established during experience, but a total awareness of my posture in the intersensory world, a 'form' in the sense used by Gestalt psychology [looking at a person as an organized whole].\textsuperscript{145}

Merleau-Ponty further adds:

Psychologists often say that the body image is dynamic. Brought down to a precise sense, this term means that my body appears to me as an attitude directed towards a certain existing or possible task. And indeed its spatiality is not, like that of external objects or like that of 'spatial sensations', a spatiality of position, but a spatiality of situation. If I stand in front of my desk and lean on it with both hands, only my hands are stressed and the whole of my body trails behind them like the tail of comet. It is not that I am unaware of the whereabouts of my shoulders or back, but these are simply swallowed up in the position of my hands, and my whole posture can be read so, to speak in the pressure they exert on the table.

\textsuperscript{144} M. Merleau-Ponty, \textit{Phenomenology of Perception}, p.98.

\textsuperscript{145} Ibid., pp.99-100.
If I stand holding my pipe in my closed hand, the position of my hand is not determined discursively by the angle which it makes with my forearm, and my forearm with my upper arm, and my upper arm with my trunk, and my trunk with the ground. I know indubitably where my pipe is, and thereby I know where my hand and my body are, as primitive man in the desert is always able to take his bearings immediately without having to cast his mind back, and add up distances covered and deviations made since setting off.146

Besides these aspects of the body image, it is also 'a way of stating that my body is in-the-world'.147 (underscoring mine.)

3.4.3.4. The Body and its Institutions

Building on what I have elaborated above, I can identify various institutions in society directly linked with the body. These institutions include those that engage us in arts, crafts, carvings, wearing ornaments, dressing hair, using cosmetics, bodily mutilations, tattoo, music, dance, drama, poetry, and singing, among others.148 Many of these activities are interwoven. Dance, for example, need not be seen as an activity by itself. It is a part of the initiation ceremony, courtship, war preparation, festive/harvest season celebration and religious ceremony.

146. Ibid., pp. 100.
147. Ibid., p. 101.
The body, therefore, can be implicated in the following institutionalized practices:

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
\text{PUNISHMENT} & \text{EXPRESS} & \text{ION}
\end{array}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
\text{DEFENCE} & \text{CELEBRATION}
\end{array}
\]

Fig. 12: THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE BODY

We have the following institutional regions:

(i) the institutional region of punishment;
(ii) the institutional region of defence;
(iii) the institutional region of expression; and
(iv) the institutional region of celebration.

It is possible to put these under two main categories:

(a) that defining the 'exterior' i.e. (i) and (ii); and
(b) that defining the 'interior' i.e. (iii) and (iv).

(This is the category I will be particularly referring to implicitly in the next chapter i.e., the chapter on Power.)

Both these aspects define the embodied (individual/collective) self (or the individual/collective embodied other). I shall call this level the 'social structure of embodiment'.
3.4.4. Social Structure of Segmentation

Let me explore another level of our discussion on structures. I shall name this level as the 'social structure of segmentation'. There are three processes I shall name and present in order to capture this level and the process of social segmentation.

3.4.4.1. Body Ballet

The 'social structure of embodiment' as we have developed above articulates at two levels, that defining the exterior and that defining the interior. Because these two levels, as it were, define the 'interior' and 'exterior', they 'create' the embodied self (or Self of the Other) and define its boundaries.

Rooted in this terrain is the reality of the body-subject. Before I explore this notion, let me take a diversion and look at the relationship between ecology and social organization very briefly. I think it is plausible to think of human communities as ecological communities in the early stage of its historical being. Human groups that were formed had their own 'ecological riche'.149 Animal ecology

defines niche as 'the place of a group in the total environment, its relations to resources and competitors'.

In passing, it can be mentioned that the Durkhemian/Freudian 'primal horde' missed the ecological nature of our historical being. Any conception of the primal needs to maintain this aspect. Such a primal horde could be imagined to be co-residing on a mosaic principle, i.e. 'many ethnic groups with radically different cultures co-reside in an area in symbiotic relations of variable intimacy'.

150. Ibid., p.3.


Against the conceptions of Freud and Durkheim, the above conception is one that proposes a sensitivity to the ecological context of the evolution of human groups. This conception of the primal horde has a number of advantages. The notion of 'primitive communism' can be conceived in terms of 'ethnicity' and 'ecology'. This reconceptualization of the primal horde can today be supported by the new discipline of ethnic ecology. See, for example, V.I. Kozlov, 'Basic Problems of Ethnic Ecology', Soviet Sociology, vol.22(4), 1984, pp.3-28. Besides these advantages, history can also be conceived of in a more complex way. Thus besides a conception of 'human history', we can also have a conception of 'ecological history'. See Michael Carrithers, 'Why Humans Have Cultures', Man, vol.25(2), 1990. pp.92-93. Carrithers also talks of a 'genetic history.'

152. Fredrik Barth, 'Ecological Relationships of Ethnic Groups in Swat, North Pakistan', p.3.

Barth makes some interesting observations on 'the ecologic factors in the distribution of ethnic groups,'
Group formation in the sub-continent in ancient times could be related to ecological influences. There is evidence to this. Take for example, the Gavlis and Kunbis of the Western Ghats in the Pune district of Maharashtra.

Gavlis live on the upper hill plateaus maintaining a herd of buffaloes and cattle and practising some small scale shifting cultivation. Kunbis occupy the valleys growing paddy supplemented by some shifting cultivation of the lower slopes. Kunbis keep very few animals so that the grazing over the entire terrain is largely available to Gavli animals. On the other hand with their large consumption of buttermilk Gavlis do little hunting of other animals. The hunting of wild animals cultures, or economies, and the problem of "mosaic" co-residence in parts of Asia.

(1) The distribution of ethnic groups is controlled not by objective and fixed 'natural areas' but by the distribution of the specific ecologic niches which the group, with its particular economic and political organisation, is able to exploit. In the present example, what appears as a single natural area to Kohistanis is subdivided as far as Pathans are concerned, and this division is cross-cut with respect to the specific requirements of Gujars.

(2) Different ethnic groups will establish themselves in stable co-residence in an area if they exploit different ecologic niches, and especially if they can thus establish symbiotic economic relations, as those between Pathans and Gujars in Swat.

(3) If different ethnic groups are able to exploit the same niches fully, the militarily more powerful will normally replace the weaker, as Pathans have replaced Kohistanis.

(4) If different ethnic groups exploit the same ecologic niches but the weaker of them is better able to utilise marginal environments, the groups may co-reside in one area, as Gujars and Kohistanis in West Kohistan. (pp.14-15.)
over the entire terrain is largely a monopoly of Kunbis. Gavlis exchange ghee from their livestock for surplus paddy grain of Kunbis.153

In contrast to this, Madhav Gadgil writes that

In the complex multi-caste village societies of the more fertile tracts the partitioning of resources is far less equitable. In the Uttara Kannada district of Karnataka over 40 subgroups use more than 50 species of plants to fabricate 40 odd different articles ranging from brooms and mats, ropes and baskets, fishing and agricultural implements, furniture and spinning wheels, idols and bridal headdresses. The scheduled castes have the monopoly over manufacture of brooms from plants like palmyra palms and baskets from bamboos; their daily income from artisanal activities is rather low. Middle status peasant castes manufacture articles from cane and make simpler implements. Their income from such activities is a little higher. Specialist artisan castes manufacture more sophisticated implements from plant species of greater value. Their income is higher than that of the other two groups. Within each of these categories some subgroups may be more specialized. Thus only Halakki Vakkals weave mats out of Pandanus leaves and Gudiyars make bridal headdresses from Ischioneme.154

The philosophical and sociological dimension of what we are in the process of capturing is well put by Regis Debray:

...it is my belief that we must locate the nation phenomenon within general laws regulating the survival of the human species. This survival is


154. Ibid., pp.3-4.
won against death. Against entropy, that is, against degradation of energy affecting thermal systems as well as human ones. Entropy is chaos, disorder, of which there are two concrete or perceptile aspects: time as the irreversible passage from life into death, as that which never returns; and on the other hand spatial disintegration, the disaggregation of a community and its reversion to an arbitrary state, to determination by mere probability. These are the twin threats of disorder and death. Over against them the human species necessarily sets two anti-death processes which enter into all forms of society, and hence must be considered primary and anthropological determinants.155

Debray identifies the 'two anti-death process' as two 'delimitations' -- 'a delimitation in time' and a 'delimitation with in enclosed space'. The first delimitation assigns origins i.e., a 'society does not derive from an infinite regression of the cause and effect...The zero point or starting point is what allows ritual repetition of memory, celebration, commemoration -- in short, all those forms of magical behaviour signifying defeat of the irreversibility of time'.156 Debray goes on to elaborate the second delimitation.


This is an Interview stimulated by Regis Debray's article in Le Nouvel Observateur on the national question. In the article he had criticised the idea of nation as a historically transitory category and had proposed that 'like language', the nation should be seen as an invariable which cuts across different modes of production.

156. Ibid., p.27.
a collectivity organizes itself into a closed system and builds itself up. Demarcation is in this sense a fundamental act. So much so that Rousseau writes in his Discourse on Inequality: 'the first man who, after enclosing a piece of land, took care to say "This is mine", was the founder of civil society'. It is interesting that he should say 'civil society', not 'the state'. He understood that the concept of enclosure was a basic one. We can also compare this with the significance of enclosure in thermo-dynamics, that is in any general system as such. The return of the entropic river, reversal of the flow from order into disorder, is achieved by enclosure: entropy is closed off by the effect to stem disorder. In other words, human society arises in the first instance against the idea of fundamental chaos, chaos in the etymological sense of lawless scattering, absence of organization.157

Before we return to the body-subject, let me recapitulate some observations made above. The 'primal horde' was made up of a number of human groups each having an ecological niche. To protect themselves from internal disorder and disintegration, they 'enclosed' and organized themselves. To conclude this diversion, a human community is also an ecological community. This existential fact has very significant influence on the organization of space and time and on the response to the natural world. Both the 'influence' and the 'response' are very specific. It is important therefore to understand how this may have


The second law of thermodynamics is essentially the 'evolution law of continuous disorganization i.e., of disappearance of structure'. This is proposed as the 'natural' direction the physical universe will take. The measure of disorganization or chaos is termed entropy. Against this fundamental chaos, society, through a process of socio-cultural enclosure, achieves a local decrease in entropy.
occurred. It is in this context that the notion of body-subject is relevant.

The notion of body-subject was taken from Merleau-Ponty and fruitfully developed by geographers. To begin with, what is the body-subject?

Body-subject is the inherent capacity of the body to direct behaviors of the person intelligently, and thus function as a special kind of subject which expresses itself in a pre-conscious way usually described by such words as 'automatic', 'habitual' 'involuntary', and 'mechanical'.

...the notion of the body-subject calls into question the entire concept of stimulus-response, since body-subject is an intelligent, holistic process which directs, while for the behaviorists, the body is a collection of passive responses that can only react.

David Seamon elaborates on the notion of the body-subject.

Movement, explored phenomenologically, indicates that the body is intelligently active and through this activity efficiently transforms a person's needs into behaviors. If one is to move effectively to meet the requirements of everyday


Also see David Seamon, A Geography of the Lifeworld: Movement, Rest and Encounter (London: Croom Helm, 1979).

159. David Seamon, 'Body-Subject, Time-Space Routines and Place-Ballets'in Anne Buttimer and David Seamon (eds.), The Human Experience of Space and Place, p.156.
living, his body must have within its ken the required habitual behaviors. Without the structure of body-subject, people would be constantly required to plan out every movement anew -- to pay continuous attention to each gesture of the hand, each step of the foot, each start. Because of body-subject, people can manage routine demands automatically and so gain freedom from their everyday spaces and environments. In this way, they rise above such mundane events as getting places, finding things, performing basic gestures, and direct their creative attention to wider, more significant life dimensions.160

Seamon continues:

Body-subject assures that gestures and movements learned in the past will readily continue into the future. It handles the basic behaviors of everyday living... It also houses more complex behaviors extending over time as well as space. One such behavior is what I call body-ballet -- a set of integrated behaviors which sustain a particular task as aim, for instance, washing dishes, plowing, housebuilding, potting, or hunting. Body-ballets are frequently an integral part of a manual skill or artistic sensibility...161

In addition to body-ballet is the notion of time-space routine. A 'time-space routine is a set of habitual bodily behaviours which extends through a considerable portion of time'.162 From the 'fusion' of body-ballet and time-space routines, we get what may be called the place-ballet.

160. Ibid., pp.156-157.
161. Ibid., p.157.
162. Ibid., p.158.
This is 'a fusion of many time-space routines and body-ballets in terms of place'.

The notion of place-ballet has important theoretical and practical implications. 'First, it joins people, time, and place in an organic whole and portrays place as a distinct and authentic entity in its own right. In the past, many approaches to the person-environment relationship have been piece-meal and mechanistic: place is only the sum of the behaviours of its individual human parts. In contrast, place-ballet depicts a whole greater than its elements: place is a dynamic entity with an identity as distinct as the individual people and environmental elements comprising that place. Place-ballet, in other words, is an environmental synergy in which human and material parts unintentionally foster a larger whole with its own special rhythm and character. An outdoor marketplace, for example, may be grounded in economic transaction, but is considerably more than just those transactions. The market takes on an atmosphere of vitality, camaraderie, excitement - even gaiety'.

It is this level of practice that materially grounds the experience of 'space' and transforms it into 'place', a

163. Ibid., p. 159.
164. Ibid., p. 163.
conversion similar to the conversion of 'stone into tool, behavior into conduct, sound into word, and, in a more sweeping way, nature into culture'. \[165\] 'Place' is eventually transformed into 'home', 'home' into 'homeland', 'homeland' into 'nation'. It would be possible, as we have argued above, to make a claim for body-ballet involving gender experience i.e. a gender-ballet. Such an approach offers a way of looking at the emergence and institutionalization of differences. And, consequently, the emergence of segmentary structures.

To conclude this section, let us recall that in the 'social structure of universality', we had separated the socio-cultural institutions and civil institutions in the notion of civil society in Gramsci. It is this socio-cultural terrain that I have sought to address, salvage and name in this section. It is the conceptual apparatus developed in this section that can help us understand the making of a cultural code/pattern. Thus, at one level, body-ballet contributes to the socio-cultural process defining the Self and the Other as different communities.

There are two other aspects of the notion of body-ballet worth considering. I also want to consider these two aspects so that the notion of body-ballet is not confined to the process of the creation of an ethno-community. One aspect deals with the environment/ecology. There is a greater sensitivity to the specific and concrete ways of how an environment influences the Self and the Other. The relationship with the environment is not just related to the process of production. It is a complex relationship in which there is a scope to draw the dialogic process into the relationship between human beings and Nature. The other aspect deals with the grounding and development of differences between the male and the female. Body-ballet allows a more positive acknowledgement of the difference between man and woman and, again, allows space for dialogue between them.

3.4.4.2. Generic, Cultural and the Sexual Divisions of Labour

There is a tendency both in neo-classical and Marxian economics to consider labour in a generic sense. That is, labour power is taken as empty and generic. With the growth and spread of universal rationality, specificities related to labour would be overcome and labour would attain a generic, universal character. This is inherent in both neo-classical and Marxian economics. To reiterate a question
raised in chapter one,\textsuperscript{166} can we think of division of labour purely in this sense?

Let me propose the following way of thinking about division of labour. Labour is irreconciliably ruptured into two intertwined tendencies, one linked to its universalizing capacity and the other to its contingent state. These two tendencies unfold at the material level as international division of labour on the one hand, and cultural and sexual divisions of labour on the other. One is a tendency towards universalization; the other towards segmentation.

The cultural and sexual division of labour segments the labour market on the 'ground' level. For a creative consideration of this level of the material world, it will be fruitful to look at economic theories on segmented labour market. Though I will be dealing with this briefly, my intention is to point to a source that creates and maintains differences and, consequently, to the source that sustains segmentation.

I shall not go into a full discussion of all the segmented labor market theories, for they go by many names and are indeed diverse.\textsuperscript{167} I shall merely present some pertinent

\textsuperscript{166}. See chapter one, p.91.

points that are directly relevant to our elaboration of the 'social structure of segmentation'.

Some of the empirical issues around which controversies had emerged and from which the segmented labor market theories were developed are as follows: (i) The persistence of poverty, (ii) The persistence of income inequality, (iii) The failure of education and training programs, (iv) The use by employers of educational and training criteria for making "irrational" and "discriminatory" hiring decisions, (v) Discrimination in labor markets -- (a) The decline in black male labor force participation rates relative to white males in recent years, even on the part of prime-age males, (b) The near-constant ratio of black-to-white average male income (or earnings, or earnings among full-year, year-around workers) from 1950-1966 or so, (c) A decline in the ratio of black-to-white male income with higher educational attainment, consistently found in cross-section data of the census years, 1940, 1950, 1960, and 1970, (d) The flat age-earnings profile of black males relative to white males as revealed by cross-section surveys, and (e) The stagnant trend in earnings and occupational attainments of women relative to men during recent years, (vi) Levels, trends, and structure of unemployment, (vii) The roles of monopolies, unions, and other sources of "protected" labor markets, and (vii) The alienation of American workers'.

168. Ibid., pp. 1217-1221.
Let me take one theory and pursue the observations/arguments made from it. An observation on modernization -- and an implicit criticism of it -- is useful for us. Modernization attempts to describe the process through which market rationality -- and the social structures and political institutions it determines -- gain ascendancy. It recognizes the existence of early historical periods in which different behavioural patterns prevailed and explains their disappearance in the process of modernization. The expansion of the market, the spread of communication and of transportation, mass education, and the development of the modern state diffuse a set of rational, maximizing behaviors that are essentially the same for all members of society.169

Two departures were made from criticism of earlier theories on the labor market that included the above observation/criticism.

The first departure from the models dominant in our disciplines arises because they do not systematically account for discontinuities in the behavior of individuals or social classes or in their experiences within the system. To put it simply, the models assume that the rational behavior of individuals maximizing their self-interest generates social and economic structures in which distinctions among individuals and among classes of individuals are continuous.170

The second point of departure from conventional assumptions arose from the first. Once radical


170. Ibid.
discontinuities are seen as integral features of advanced industrial societies, then the ‘dualism’ that was thought to characterize underdevelopment becomes a point of similarity rather than a distinguishing difference.171

Ensuing from the first departure, the following important observation has been made, an observation of particular relevance to our elaboration of the segmentation process.

The groups we were examining appeared to differ from each other structurally. By this we mean that various segments of society organize around different rules, processes, and institutions that produce different systems of incentives and disincentives to which individuals respond. These ‘lumps’ or social segments are coherent wholes that derive their unity both from the consistency of their internal rules and organization and the

171. Ibid., pp.2-3.

Early modernization theorists have conceived of the ‘Third World’ societies as having two sectors -- one modern, the other traditional. This dualistic characterization came to be challenged in the early 70s. Andre Gunder Frank writing on Latin America proposed the Development of Underdevelopment thesis. Frank’s argument shifted the focus of attention in the studies of underdevelopment. Development (in the ‘developed’ countries) and underdevelopment (of the ‘Third World’) were dialectically linked: one caused the other. The dualist characterization of ‘Third World’ societies was theoretically overcome. I see the segmented labour market theory extending further this non-dualist conception though on a qualitatively different way. The most productive aspect of this theory is that it allows us a way of thinking about cultural and sexual divisions/segments of labour.


(Chapter 1:The Development of Underdevelopment, pp.3-21. Chapter 14: Dialectic, Not Dual Society, pp.221-231.)
stability of their relationships with other parts of society.172

When we began, we called this pattern of social and economic segmentation dualism, since the notion evoked both the autonomy of each sector and the radical discontinuities that we were discovering. As we proceeded, it became clear that the significance of dualism is not that a society is divided into two autonomous and discontinuous segments but that a society is divided segmentally and not continuously. Whether there are two or more such lumps is not central to our conception, though the number of segments cannot be multiplied indefinitely without restoring the continuum...173

Segmented labour markets are sensitive to differences in the labouring population. It breaks the generic labour markets into segmented ones. Thus, we have what we may call the sexual division of labour and the cultural division of labour and other significant segmentations, which may occur along the lines of skills. Given this situation, we can now see that the original construction of the division of labour as a generic one has to be redefined and this redefinition must incorporate the segmented division of labour. It is therefore important to keep in mind that this model is not altogether dismissive of the generic model. See figure 13.

Figure 13 is a modification of Suzanne Berger and Michael J. Piore's conception of segmented labour market174 and Michael

172. Ibid., p.2.
173. Ibid.
174. Ibid., p.17.
UPPER TIER  
(e.g. professional/managerial)  

LOWER TIER  
(e.g. blue collar / working class)  

GENERIC TENDENCY  

DIVISION OF LABOUR  

SEGMENTARY TENDENCY  

CULTURAL DIVISION OF LABOUR  

SEXUAL DIVISION OF LABOUR  

VERTICAL SEGMENTATION  

HORIZONTAL SEGMENTATION  

(dominant ethno-community)  

(male)  

(female)  

(dominated ethno-communities, minority racial groups, etc)  

FIG.- 13 GENERIC, CULTURAL AND THE SEXUAL DIVISIONS OF LABOUR  

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Hechter's conception of the cultural division of labour. Hechter writes that 'the cultural division of labour had to have at least two separate and independent dimensions: a hierarchical dimension, in which the various groups were vertically distributed in the occupational structure, and a segmental one, in which the groups were occupationally specialized at any level of the structure'. As it stands, this conception makes no room for a sexual division of labour nor for the generic nature of division of labour (on which depends the universalizing capacity of labour and, consequently, the international division of labour). This shortcoming of Hechter's conception is sought to be overcome in figure 13.

We have now explored two sources of the segmentary process. Let us move on to the third.

3.4.4.3. Social and Cultural Pluralism

The literature on pluralism identifies two kinds of pluralism -- political pluralism and social and cultural pluralism. To begin with, we must keep in mind that we


176. The 'rational core' of political pluralism which emphasizes on the importance of autonomous interest groups would indeed be beneficial to the survival of Contd/--
are not talking about political pluralism but social and cultural pluralism.

J.S. Furnivall pioneered the theorising about plural societies. He writes: 'On looking at a plural society in its political aspect one can distinguish three characteristic features: the society as a whole comprises separate racial sections; each section is an aggregate of individuals rather than a corporate or organic whole; and as individuals their social life is incomplete'.177 How is this aggregate brought together? 'In a plural society the sections are not segregated; the members of the several units are intermingled and meet as individuals; the union is not voluntary but is imposed by the colonial power and by the force of economic circumstances...'178 Thus, according to Furnivall, the plural society is a creation of an external force, the colonizer for instance, and the common denominator of such a society is the economic factor.179

different socio-cultural groups. However, the complete realization of the 'rational core' will be impossible with class practices. Blind pluralism legitimizes class oppression and becomes a tool in the hand of the dominating classes. Thus, a complete denial of the possibility of 'destroying classes' is a critical weakness of political pluralism. Political pluralism has the potential to sustain segmentation and promote dialogue between equals.


178. Ibid., p.307.

179. Ibid., pp.308-312.
The opposite of plural society is a homogeneous society. What is the difference between these two forms of society? 'A plural society is broken up into groups of isolated individuals, and the disintegration of social will is reflected in a corresponding disorganization of social demand. Even in a matter so vital to the whole community as defence against aggression, the people are reluctant to pay the necessary price. In religion and the arts, in the graces and ornaments of social life, there are no standards common to all sections of the community, and standards deteriorate to such a level as all have in common'.

Furnivall adds further that in 'a homogeneous society the tension is alleviated by their common citizenship, but in a plural society there is a corresponding cleavage along racial lines.... In a homogeneous society the desire of profit is controlled to some extent by social will, and if anyone makes profit by sharp practice he will offend the social conscience and incur moral, and perhaps legal, penalties.... [but in a plural society] the abnormal activity of economic forces [is] free of social restrictions... [Thus in a colonial situation] economic forces both create a plural society and, because unrestrained by social will, continue to prevail'.

180. Ibid., p.310.
181. Ibid., pp.311-312.
Furnivall conceived of the concept of 'plural society' in the context of colonialism. The concept was further developed to look at societies other than in a colonial context. This conception is of greater use to our endeavour. I shall therefore briefly introduce another theorist, M.G. Smith. For him, pluralism 'is a condition in which members of a common society are internally distinguished by fundamental differences in their institutional practice. Where present, such differences are not distributed at random; they normally cluster, and by their clusters they simultaneously identify institutionally distinct aggregates or groups, and establish deep social divisions between them. The prevalence of such systematic dissociation between the members of institutionally distinct collectivities within a single society constitutes pluralism. Thus pluralism simultaneously connotes a social structure characterized by fundamental discontinuities and cleavages, and a cultural complex based on systematic institutional diversity'.

Smith makes a distinction between heterogeneous and plural societies. Thus he writes: 'The essential criterion of the

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heterogeneous society is that the majority of its members share a common system of basic institutions, together with systematic differentiation at the secondary level of institutional and organizational specialization. In the plural society, a politically autonomous unit ruled by a culturally distinct and politically privileged minority, the sole institutional framework that incorporates the aggregate is government, which normally has the form of a state. Whether it is re-distributive or market-economy, the economy of such a unit includes the population differentially'. 183

The 'State' is an important political institution in a plural society. Smith makes the following important observation on the state. 'In the plural society the state is the representative political organ of the ruling section organized as a corporate group, its exclusive and ultimate instrument for the internal domination and corporate control of the institutionally distinct subject populations, who are simultaneously denied political rights, citizenship, and opportunities for their own organization by prescriptions of state, and are accordingly paralyzed as disunited corporate categories. Thus in the plural society the mass of the people are not citizens but subjects; and the state, instead of being the collective political expression of the

183. Ibid., p.36.
inclusive aggregate, is merely the external political form of the dominant corporate group, the instrumental framework of its domination and the ultimate source and expression of prevailing sectoral inequalities...In place of the systematic congruence of representation, access, and accountability which characterizes the nation-state, within plural society, centralized or acephalous, accessibility, representation, accountability, and power are systematically restricted; and the foundation of the primary feature of the polity is its basic division between the rulers, organized as a corporate group, and the ruled, constituted as a leaderless, disorganized residual corporate category, often segmented by its own deep institutional divisions'.

To recapitulate, let me cite Paul Brass's observation. 'In both Furnivall's and Smith's conceptions of the plural society defined as a social order consisting of institutionally segmented cultural groups living "side by side, yet without mingling in one political unit", one cultural group monopolizes power, controls the state apparatus, and dominates over other cultural groups who are admitted to participation in their own governance in a limited way, if at all. Furnivall, of course, had in mind

184. Ibid., p.33.
colonial societies created by conquest and regulated in the interests of colonial capitalists, which were sharply distinguished from Western democratic societies. Smith, however, who extended the definition of plural societies to both post-colonial and some contemporary industrial societies, saw the form of the state arising not out of conquest but out of the "cultural incompatibility" of its plural parts, which made it impossible for the members of different cultural groups to act as citizens in a common political enterprise and, therefore, inevitable that the stronger group would use the state as an instrument of domination over the others. In fact, the society could be maintained at all only by domination. In short, the political form of the plural society was a "despotism" of one cultural group, usually a minority, over others.185

We have in this section elaborated three interlinked and mutually determining processes of segmentation. Though the effort has been only to show segmentation at the cultural level and, to some extent, at the level of gender, other forms of segmentation exist but are not theoretically excluded here. However, these other forms of segmentation are not of direct interest or relevance to our exposition.

Having to some extent completed this elaboration, what needs to be done is the elaboration of the 'social structure of dialogical pluralism'.

3.4.5. Social Structure of Dialogical Pluralism

In chapter two, we discussed the problem of the Self and the Other. It was claimed that the conception of an active Self overcoming the passive Other and making it a moment of itself is erroneous and that we have to reckon with the fact that there is a need to think about the recalcitrant Other. The relationship of the Self and the Other was reworked using the notions of metaxological intermediation and open self-mediation. This was also done to rethink the notion of the emancipatory subject which I conceived as a multi-self, multi-identity subject. In this section, I will attempt a further elaboration of this, but at the structural level. I shall present this elaboration both at the philosophical and sociological levels.

In a comment on The Architectonics of Answerability,186 Katerina Clark and Michael Holquist write:


The Architectonics of Answerability 'is a treatise on ethics in the world of everyday experience, a kind of Contd/--
Bakhtin conceives of otherness as the ground of all existence and of dialogue as the primal structure of any particular existence, representing a constant exchange between what is already and what is not yet... The self/other distinction is thus the primary opposition on which all other differences are based: the highest structural principle of the actual world of deeds is the concrete architectonic and epistemological opposition between I and the other.

The self/other dichotomy in Bakhtin does not, as in Romantic philosophy, emphasize the self alone... For the same reason the self, as conceived by Bakhtin, is not a presence wherein is lodged the ultimate privilege of the real, the source of sovereign intention and guarantor of unified meaning. The Bakhtinian self is never whole, since it can exist only dialogically. It is not a substance or essence in its own right but exists only in a tensile relationship with all that is other and, most important, with other selves.187

pragmatic axiology'. (p.63) 'The terms "architectonics" and "answerability" best encompass the principal subject of the work, namely the answerability we have for our unique place in existence and the means by which we relate that uniqueness to the rest of the world which is other to it... We must ourselves be responsible, or answerable, for ourselves. Each of us occupies a unique time and place in life, an existence that is conceived not as a passive state but as an activity, an event... Life as event presumes selves that are performers. To be successful, the relation between me and other must be shaped into a coherent performance, and thus the architectonic activity of authorship, which is the building of a text, parallels the activity of human existence, which is the building of a self. And if the activity of being is generated by constant slippage between self and other, then communication -- the never convergent but always reciprocal interdependence of the two -- is of paramount concern' (p.64.) (underscoring mine.)

187. Ibid., p. 65.
Before I proceed, I want to add here a word of caution. The general tenor of Bakhtin's argument about the Self and the Other is, of course, very fruitful to my reconstructive effort.

There is only one serious problem. If in Marx we faced the conception of the Self and the Other in a dialectical sense, in Bakhtin we confront it in a dialogical sense. Therefore, both Marx and Bakhtin offer a limited view of the Self and Other. There is a close affiliation between the 'Bakhtinian self' and the self-and-the-other-as-difference (and therefore Mao's non-antagonistic contradiction). But as we have shown in chapter two, this is merely one significant part of the relationship of the Self and the Other. Thus, by itself, the Bakhtinian self is limited. If 'coupled' with the relationship of the Self and the Other understood in a dialectical sense, I think, we will achieve a fruitful development of Bakhtin's 'dialogic' for our reconstructive effort.

The 'Bakhtinian self' has a history even older than class history, a history linked with the first-order mediation. It is a Self that evolved in the midst of a relation that Marx had called the most intimate of human relationships i.e., the relationship between man and woman. It is a Self that evolved in the cooperative efforts of those who were
involved in the process of production. It is a Self that emerged in non-productive relationship between human beings and between human beings and Nature. It is a Self that is strongly present in our everyday life situations. The 'blooming' of the 'Bakhtinian self' takes place as the 'social structure of universality' takes shape. The blooming of the 'Bakhtinian self' brings forth 'world-historical, empirically universal individuals' belonging to dialogical segments.

With the above word of caution on how I intend to 'appropriate' Bakhtin, let me pursue his notion of dialogism briefly. Bakhtin offers us an extremely important notion of dialogism which is (according to his editors):

the characteristic epistemological mode of the world dominated by heteroglossia. "Everything means, is understood, as a part of a greater whole -- there is a constant interaction between

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188. See glossary, p.428.

'The base condition governing the operation of meaning in any utterance. It is that which insures the primacy of context over text. At any given time, in any given place, there will be a set of conditions -- social, historical, meteorological, physiological -- that will insure that a word uttered in that place and at that time will have a meaning different than it would have under any other conditions; all utterances are heteroglot in that they are functions of a matrix of forces practically impossible to recoup, and therefore impossible to resolve.'
meanings, all of which have the potential of conditioning others. Which will affect the other, how it will do so and in what degree is what is actually settled at the moment of utterance. This dialogic imperative, mandated by the pre-existence of the language world relative to any of its current inhabitants, insures that there can be no actual monologue. One may, like a primitive tribe that knows only its own limits, be deluded into thinking there is one language, or one may, as grammarians, certain political figures and normative framers of "literary languages" do, seek in a sophisticated way to achieve a unitary language. In both cases the unitariness is relative to the overpowering force of heteroglossia, and thus dialogism.189

It is further added that

A word, discourse, language or culture undergoes "dialogization" when it becomes relativised, de-privileged, aware of competing definitions for the same things. Undialogized language is authoritative or absolute.190 (underscoring mine.)

As may be seen from Bakhtin's observations and insights (as rendered by his editors) dialogue is, as Paulo Freire says, 'an existential necessity'.191 By elaborating the concept, Freire opens up another dimension i.e.

the encounter between men, mediated by the world, in order to name the world. Hence, dialogue cannot occur between those who want to name the


190. Ibid., p. 427. [Glossary].

world and those who do not want this naming - between those who deny other men the right to speak their word and those whose right to speak has been denied them.192 (underscoring mine.)

What has been attempted above is to present the importance of dialogue (or dialogism). From the above exposition, it can be seen that the Self and the Other relation has an important component of dialogue. From the reflections quoted above, dialogue can be conceived to have the following dimensions and can be seen to be sensitive to these dimensions. First, in both Bakhtin (according to his editors) and Freire, the Self alone is not the ultimate ground of agency. In both there is a recognition of the recalcitrant Other. Second, undialogised language is authoritative or absolute, and, therefore, an obstacle to democracy. The dialogization of a language de-centres and de-privileges Self, recognizes the selfness of the Other and demands this selfness to be articulated. Third, the dialogization process is seen as one in which the Self and the Other are involved in naming the world, hence, as one which is merely a verbal process, albeit an immensely important one in the constitution of a common world. This dimension figures in Jurgen Habermas and is developed by him in great detail.

192. Ibid.
CULTURE

IDEAL SPEECH ACT

ACEPHALOUS FORM OF GOVERNANCE

POLITICS

FIG. - 14 - IDEAL DIALOGICAL ACT.
Before I proceed to discuss briefly Jurgen Habermas's contribution, I wish to develop a notion that takes into consideration an area that the dialogical theorists seem to have left out by concentrating on language and the verbal interactional milieu. In order to do this, I shall merely propose here the notion of an 'ideal' dialogical act. See figure 14.

The dialogical act is a definite historical resource which is becoming more and more powerfully present with the growth and resolution, in institutional forms, of class relations. The coming-into-being of the dialogical act is structurally constituted by 'ideal speech' conditions and 'acephalous forms of governance'. These are evolving structures. Let me return to Habermas. His notion of the ideal speech act will give us insight into one structuring dimension of the ideal dialogical act.

Habermas's reconstruction of Historical Materialism, which he understands as 'a theory of social evolution', is built on 'a general theory of communication' which Habermas calls 'a universal pragmatics' and 'a general theory of socialization' i.e. 'a theory of the acquisition of communicative competence'.193 For our purpose, let us draw some insights from the general theory of communication. The


See translator's 'Introduction', p.xvii.
Experience - continuum of consciousness

Concept

Sound-image

Continuum of sound produced by voice box

Structure of language

Langue [emphasized by Saussure]

Parole [emphasized and developed by J. Habermas]

Sign

Speech-act

Fig. - 15 Saussurean Langue and Parole

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importance of Habermas's contribution and our theoretical acceptance of the 'non-foundational universalist position' (see chapter two) can be brought into greater relief if we consider Saussurean linguistics briefly.

In the Saussurean semiological understanding what mattered was langue (see figure 15). The parole was considered unimportant for further inquiry. But then, Saussure was confronting a tradition that was too steeped in historical linguistics and empiricism. His opening up of the terrain of structuralism and semiology offered a view of language as 'constructing’ the world (instead of mapping it).194 Thus every language is a structure of signs that 'cut' the continua of human experience and the sound produced by the voice box in a specific way to produce a certain complex of concepts linked with sound-image which are finally 'uttered' in the process of communication.195


'... languages result from the imposition of form on two different kinds of substance: sound and thought. The phonological composition of a word -- what Saussure called the significiant (that which has meaning) -- is a complex of phonemes, each of which, as we have seen, derives its essence and existence from the structure (i.e., form) imposed by that language upon the continuum (i.e., substance) of sound. The meaning of a word -- more precisely that aspect of the meaning of a word which Saussure identified as the signifie (its sense, rather than its denotation or reference) derives from the imposition of structure on the a priori nebulous and inchoate continuum of thought'.
structure of signs will cut experience and sound is historically and culturally specific. They produce different ways of naming the world.

It is obvious that the sound sequences of fleuve and riviere are signifiers of French but not of English, whereas river and stream are English but not French. Less obviously but more significantly, the organization of the conceptual plane is also different in English and French. The signified 'river' is opposed to 'stream' solely in terms of size, whereas a 'fleuve' differs from a 'riviere' not because it is necessarily larger but because it flows into the sea, while a 'riviere' does not. In short, 'fleuve' and 'riviere' are not signifieds or concepts of English. They represent a different articulation of the conceptual plane.196

Left in this way, Saussurean semiology, though sensitive to historical specificities and the specificities in cultural response, offers grounds for anarchic segmentation and unresolvable, conflict-bound pluralism. This is basically the result of looking at merely the langue part. The actual process of communication leading to 'exchange' and 'dialogue' initiated by 'utterance' is neglected. It is to this that, I believe, Habermas paid detailed attention and developed his general theory of communication, which essentially captured the universal aspect of the 'pragmatic dimension of language'.197


What is universal pragmatics? Let me explore some of Habermas's key ideas that will be useful for my endeavour. Habermas's translator writes that 'The idea of universal pragmatics rests on the contention that not only phonetic, syntactic, and semantic features of sentences, but also certain pragmatic features of utterances, not only language but speech, not only linguistic competence but communicative competence, admit of rational reconstruction in universal terms'. Habermas makes a clarification when he writes that

The task of universal pragmatics is to identify and reconstruct universal conditions of possible understanding (Verstandigung). In other contexts one also speaks of 'general presuppositions of communication', but I prefer to speak of general presuppositions of communicative action because I take the type of action aimed at reaching understanding to be fundamental. Thus I start from the assumption (without undertaking to demonstrate it here) that other forms of social action - for example, conflict, competition, strategic action in general - are derivatives of action oriented to reaching understanding (Verständigungs-orientiert). Furthermore, as language is the specific medium of understanding at the sociocultural stage of evolution, I want to go a step further and single out explicit speech actions from other forms of communicative action'.

The insight inherent in the observation above is an important one. The solution of reaching an understanding is

198. Ibid., p. xviii
199. Ibid., p.1
a fundamental one. But Habermas seems to turn the dialogical act into something constituted by merely a cultural form of action. In the process of a dialogue between the Self and the recalcitrant Other, there are, I believe, two conditions that are required: one, communicative competence leading to a state of understanding through active 'negotiation' (which allow for 'contestation') and two, a form of governance in which 'acephalousness' is a prime characteristic. Thus, dialogical coexistence involve not only how the Self and the Other verbally interact to construct a common world but also how they are organized. Acephalousness allows for segmentation which requires a movement towards dialogue and understanding. As indicated above (see figure 14), the 'social structure of dialogical pluralism' is composed of two aspects mentioned above. I am elaborating on the former. Here I have merely indicated the latter. I have, however, developed it further in the next chapter (see section 4.4.1).

Let us return to Habermas. In the process of communication between the Self and the recalcitrant Other, the communicative effort can fall along four dimensions (i) comprehensibility; (ii) truth; (iii) rightness; and (iv) truthfulness.200 Only when participants sustain these four

200 Ibid., p. xx
validity claims can communication oriented towards reaching an understanding be achieved or continued. The aim of the Habermasian theory of communicative action is to finally achieve a social situation of normal, undistorted communication. The 'distortion' in communication is symbolic and historical and not natural. Since it is symbolic and historical, it can be dissolved by intervention by consciously reconstructing the imperceptible process of dialogue that occurs at everyday life level. Thus the

theory of communicative actions shifts the fulcrum of social theory into the now fully dialogical and quintessentially social relationship of two or more speakers and hearers who, reciprocally and simultaneously, profer not one kind of validity claim but three [truth, normative rightness, truthfulness (sincerity)]. This is the core of Habermas's innovation. Communicative interaction is the medium through which speaking and acting subjects interlace their speech-action. It is through this medium and through the ordinary process of reaching an understanding [Verstandigung] that we are bound together -- for the most part gently and imperceptibly -- by the rationally motivating force of our mundane agreements and communicatively formed convictions.

This movement involves the development of species-wide communicative competences.

201. Ibid., p. xviii

Michael Pusey makes the following important observation about communication and the need for normal, undistorted communication along the lines of truth, truthfulness (sincerity) and rightness (normative):

Accordingly, it must be the case that the 'original mode' of communication, the archetypal form of communication, the paradigmatic form of communication, and certainly the most comprehensively rational form of communication...must be action that is oriented to reaching an understanding across all three dimensions [truth, truthfulness (sincerity) and rightness (normative)]. And that indeed is what communicative action means.203

It is only by reaching an understanding along the claims Habermas calls universal validity claims -- of truth, rightness and truthfulness -- that the condition of dialogue can be maintained and developed further in everyday life. Otherwise undistorted, communicative action or 'ideal speech act' will not be possible. This will consequently transform a Self-Other relationship into one of domination and control. It will also feed the segmentary processes in society and disrupt dialogical coexistence.

What is attempted above by Habermas is, I believe, the recovery of the foundations of a major practice in our everyday life. It is the structural dimensions of this fundamental practice that I have explored. A greater

203. Ibid., p.80.
development of this structure shaping everyday life experience will take place as the second structural tendency/‘movement’, i.e., the historical-segmentary/transformation ‘movement’, matures (see below, section 3.5).

The acephalous form of governance is a growing reality also contributing to the strengthening of the dialogic act that is today a marginal practice in important regions of human social life. The central point about acephalous forms of governance is the fact that neither the Self nor the Other have the privilege of organizing society and therefore claiming sole agency. There is crucial principle of decentralization in the notion of the ‘acephalous form of governance’.

The Self and the Other do not meet as only difference; they also meet as distinctions. These two relational spheres thus posit both an ideal speech situation and an acephalous form of governance. Again, this is an everyday life experience that becomes more possible as the second structural tendency/‘movement’ i.e., the historical-segmentation tendency/‘movement’, matures (see section 3.5).

There is, as this structural ‘movement’ matures, a growing possibility of networking and organizational decentering. There is also interest fragmentation and issues assuming local importance. I will take this up for discussion again.
in the next chapter. Suffice it to mention here that there are practices that have built up exchange, communication and dialogue across the Self and the Other.

3.5. THE STRUCTURES OF EVERYDAY LIFE AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP

In the section above, I have briefly (and unevenly) developed the broad dimensions of the five structures. It has largely been an exercise in naming the structures and their internal dimensions. A network of these structures shapes and weaves the everyday life experiences of oneness, difference, embodiment, and dialogical pluralism (or dialogism).

My main aim in the above sub-sections have been to indicate and to briefly elaborate the dimensions of the various structures. As they stand, they do not contribute to a comprehensive understanding of the above dimensions of the experience of everyday life. In order to capture this more comprehensively, let me propose the following structural relationships. These relationships allow certain key social tendencies to emerge. The structures-in-relation 'move' in certain specific directions. I shall for brevity use the following short forms:
Social Structure of Accumulation : SSA
Social Structure of Universality : SSU
Social Structure of Embodiment : SSE
Social Structure of Segmentation : SSS
Social Structure of Dialogical Pluralism : SSDP

There are three important structural relationships (indicating tendencies or 'movements') that actually constitute the complex 'positional' sources of everyday life experience, which is much more complex than experiences merely generated by class practices. These are as follows:

(i) The Historical - Universalist Movement

[SSA] ----> [SSU]

(ii) The Historical - Segmentary/Transformational Movement

(iii) The Historical - Dialogical Movement

Fig. 16 : THREE STRUCTURAL RELATIONSHIPS/‘MOVEMENTS’ THAT SHAPE EVERYDAY LIFE.
The first 'movement' is a universalist one. This is an important movement of labour. However, this is merely one movement of labour. It is this movement of labour that was captured by Marx. This movement involves solely class practices.

The second 'movement' is segmentary (transformational) movement. In this historical movement, the relationship between SSA and SSS is mediated by SSE and SSU. Contrary to modernization theorist and Marxists, universal institutions do not contribute to the destruction of the resources of segmentary structures. In fact, some aspects become more emphasized through a process of reinterpretation/reconstruction. Universal institutions contribute to its development and assertion. In this second movement, labour is present in its existentially contingent aspect i.e. one aspect of being-in-the-world. This historical movement is drawn in two directions i.e. both the aspects/capacities of labour -- the universalist and the existentially contingent aspects -- compete to define the world with the segmentary (labour in its existentially contingent expression) tendency becoming more and more assertive. The second movement is drawn between the universalist and segmentary tendencies. The segmentary tendency is the basis for non-class movements. It must be kept in mind that there is an internal relation between the two tendencies. Diagrammatically the second movement can be shown as follows:
As is obvious in this structural relationship both class and non-class practices are actively present and mutually influence each other.

The third 'movement', the historical-dialogical movement, is historically the final 'movement'. In this relational form, only non-class practices are present. It is a relational form that is in the process of formation and it depends for this on the 'social structure of universality', which is a structure that emerges from class practices. In fact, this relational form is a structure that can sustain a dialogical, deliberative democracy (i.e. the communist future) and that, therefore, can weave the experiences of everyday life together for a conscious and active dialogical co-evolution.

The greater institutionalization of the dialogic process will favour dialogical pluralism (or, dialogism). Dialogical pluralism is inherently anti-totalitarian. The 'social
structure of dialogical pluralism' (SSDP) implies segmentary possibilities i.e. the right to contest and segment. This is reflected in the historical-dialogical structural 'movement'. It is drawn between segmentation and dialogical pluralism (or dialogism). Diagrammatically, this can be shown as:

Before I conclude this section, two points need to be made. First, all the three structural relationships co-exist to structure everyday life experience. However, they do not go on existing indefinitely. In fact, there is a historical movement towards the last structural relationship i.e. the historical-dialogical movement. Secondly, I have placed SSE and SSU to mediate the relationship between SSA, SSS and SSDP. This implies that SSE and SSU are offered as 'generic positional capacities' which can be displaced in any one of the three directions -- universalisation, segmentation and dialogization (dialogical pluralism) -- by class and non-class agents depending on, of course, very specific
situations. In other words, the aspect that will take shape or that will dominate within a (historical) structural 'movement' depends on the social forces and their institutional capacities. Thus, for example, it is possible to think of a situation in which ethno-communities dominate the second relational form. This would mean the process of segmentation is dominant. At a practical level, this may evoke responses/reactions from universalizing forces or from forces that support dialogical pluralism. I shall conclude this section by making one further observation: historical evolution seem to suggest that human society is moving through a universalist phase via a segmentary phase to a dialogical one.

3.6. CONCLUSION

I shall conclude this chapter by taking up the post-modernist conception of the social world. For that, let us look at the third structural relationship.

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{SSE} \\
\text{SSS} \\
\text{SSU} \\
\end{array}
\quad
\begin{array}{c}
\text{SSDP} \\
\end{array}
\]

It is this structure, I believe, that has mobilized a post-modernist view of the world. It has looked at the extremes and overlooked the mediating structures which have a lot to do with class practices. In fact, SSU is a product of class
practices. This has resulted in a (post-modernist) conception that articulates either as 'anarchic segmentation' or as 'dialogism without a (or, with an abstract notion) universalist imagination'. By proposing the third structural relationship, the post-modernist position can be criticized for completely neglecting the mediating structures particularly the 'social structure of universality', and therefore, the reality of class practices.

The structural relationships (ii) and (iii) in their 'transitional form' allow us to ground the multi-self, multi-identity emancipatory subject. To conclude, it is important to keep in mind that a discussion on everyday life was taken up in this chapter basically to explore the structures that shaped it. A closer look at the weave of everyday life experiences of oneness, difference, dialogical pluralism and embodiment demanded a reconceptualization of the structures that shape everyday life. Some of these structures are submerged or conflated with other structures in Marxist theory. The elaboration of the five structures and their relationship was attempted in order to achieve a better understanding of everyday life. For, ultimately, it is our everyday life experience that is the primary reality of our being-in-the-world.