Chapter Two: THE EMANCIPATORY SUBJECT

2.0. Introduction ........................................... 96

2.1. Class and Nation ...................................... 104
   2.1.1. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels ................. 104
   2.1.2. V.I. Lenin .................................... 117
   2.1.3. Rosa Luxemburg ................................ 127
   2.1.4. Stalin ........................................ 130

2.2. The 'Nation' as a Part of a Theory of Proletarian Practice 132

2.3. Commonality .......................................... 133

2.4. Exploring the Relation Between Class and Nation ........... 138

2.5. Dismantling the Primacy of Relations of Production .... 146
   2.5.1. Individual-in-Relations ......................... 147
   2.5.2. Self and the Other ............................ 162

2.6. Primacy and Positive Pluralism ........................ 187
   2.6.1. Non-Foundational Universalism ................. 188
   2.6.2. Primacy and the Emancipatory Subject ........ 194
   2.6.3. The Multi-Self, Multi-Identity Emancipatory Subject 195

2.7. Conclusion ........................................... 205
2.0. INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, I wish to think about the notion of the emancipatory subject in Marxist theory. Marx has not written explicitly on the topic though it is impossible for us to engage ourselves with his work without confronting the idea of emancipation or the emancipatory subject in nearly all his works. Let me quote a revealing passage.

... in the formation of a class with radical chains, a class in civil society that is not a class of civil society, of a social group that is the dissolution of all social groups, of a sphere that has a universal character because of its universal sufferings and lays claim to no particular right, because it is the object of no particular injustice but of injustice in general. This class can no longer lay claim to a historical status, but only to a human one... It is, finally, a sphere that cannot emancipate itself without emancipating itself from all other spheres of society and thereby emancipating these other spheres themselves. In a word, it is the complete loss of humanity and thus can only recover itself by a complete redemption of humanity. This dissolution of society, as a particular class, is the proletariat.1

For Marx, the proletariat was the emancipatory subject. It was a class produced by historical processes to actively intervene in history in order to overcome all historical

forms of domination (including non-class forms such as the domination of women by men). Marx, for very sound theoretical reasons identified the proletariat as the social ground from which would spring forth a humane society. In doing this, however, he neglected or overlooked some very important issues. One of the casualties of this critical theoretical act has been the non-class and existentially contingent aspects of the emancipatory subject. After all an individual proletarian is not an abstract individual. S/he is either a male or a female and a member of either this or that ethno-community. S/he is also a part of an ecology, related to it in very definite and critical ways, ways that may not involve merely production. Thus to propose a subject devoid of this existentially contingent, non-class aspects seems to belittle the complexity of the subject. This becomes even more grave given the reality of other 'global movements' like the feminist, the ethno-communal/national and ecological movements. These movements along with the working class movement have complicated the emancipatory experience.

The complexity of the emancipatory subject is not theoretically ungraspable provided we identify a vantage point. I have done this in this chapter by introducing the notion of the body (not used in a physical sense as the later sections of this chapter and chapter three will soon
demonstrate). I have taken up the notion of the body for some important strategic theoretical reasons. First, it is sensitive to the existentially contingent, non-class aspects of the emancipatory subject. The body allows me to conceptualize the non-class aspects. Second, the notion of the body acts as a corrective to a consciousness-heavy notion of the subject. By this I do not mean to reduce the importance of consciousness or the symbolic activity emerging from it. What I really want to do is to capture the pre-symbolic social and present it as part of the subject. Third, there is a sort of fixation on the 'physical individual' as constituting the emancipatory subject. This is really because, as Marx constructs the emancipatory subject, it is constituted by a single collectivity. This class collectivity becomes universal with the progressive development of the capitalist mode of production. The destruction of this mode produces the ‘world-historical, empirically universal being’ to inhabit an emancipated future. Because the emancipatory subject is constituted with one collectivity in mind, there is a fixation on the physical individual i.e., at a concrete level the emancipatory subject is taken to be bound within the physical boundary of an individual. This also unduly exaggerates the process of universalization. The notion of the body puts a check on these tendencies and allows the
conception of the emancipatory subject as also constituted by the feminist, the ethno-communal/national and ecological movements. The notion of the body proposes a **multi-self, multi-identity emancipatory subject**. By proposing this, I achieve three important results. First, I am able to draw into Historical Materialism a neglected reality, the **dialogic process**. The multi-self, multi-identity emancipatory subject sustains the process of universalization and at the same time **recovers** the process of dialogization [used here in the Bakhtinian sense (see chapter three, section 3.4.5)], which is part of our everyday life experience. Second, by bringing in dialogism as one of the central features, I want to be able to sustain a critical form of pluralism. I shall merely state the third point for I have elaborated on this in chapter four. It relates to the notion of the subject. The subject is not merely the focal point of agency that intervenes in historical processes to overcome historical forms of domination. In a related but distinctly different sense, the subject is also constituted in the context of power taking the form of the political and the cultural.

Before I resume the exposition, I would like to make two clarifications which are important for this and subsequent elaborations.
There has been a tendency to separate Marx and Engels, and the aim of this separation has been to remove the positivist tendency in Historical Materialism usually assigned to Engels. The positivist tendency developed, it is argued, because of Engels' extension of the dialectics to Nature, with the writing of the *Dialectics of Nature*\(^2\). This, it is argued, has resulted in all the ills of Marxism and of socialist societies.\(^3\) As a result of this kind of development, two camps have emerged: one called the 'divergent' school and the other, the 'unanimist' school.\(^4\) I would like to make it clear that I shall maintain throughout

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2. Frederick Engels, *Dialectics of Nature* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1954). Engels felt that it was his responsibility to offer the working class dialectics to nature. Along with Marx's contribution to the working class, Engels' work, *Dialectics of Nature*, would complete the application of dialectics to the world, both natural and social. The working class would then be armed with a complete science.


Ball observes that 'For in the end Engels, like Saint-Simon, cannot distinguish persons from things. Human beings are material things; the motions of both are governed by the same laws. Human thought and purposive activity, world-transforming labor and political praxis, are, for Engels, simply more complex forms of material motion'. (p.254).

3. Ibid., pp.254-259.

this work the latter position i.e. the 'unanimist' position. As I hold to this position, let it be also clear that there is substantial difference between Marx and Engels notion of Historical Materialism.

(ii) I would like to think of Marxism as a Tradition. Let me elaborate. Marxism can be thought of in a number of different ways:

(a) 'as a self-sufficient body of doctrine, complete, internally-consistent, and finally realized in a particular set of written texts...';
(b) as a 'method';
(c) as 'heritage'; and
(d) as 'tradition'.

I would like to associate myself with Marxism as a tradition. Marxism as a 'school' is problematic because of the 'plurality of conflicting voices'. This reality of Marxism is best captured by the concept of tradition. I am using it in the sense E.P. Thompson has used it.

6. Ibid., p.322.
7. Ibid., p.324.
8. Ibid., p.326.
I would like to add here a related observation which I hope is the justification of my accepting Marxism as a tradition. After the 1917 revolution, 'Bolshevik Marxism' emerged as the dominant school of Marxism. All other 'voices' were either peripheralized or accused of being 'infected' by bourgeois ideology. The success of the Bolsheviks in 1917 effectively transformed all other interpretations/voices present at that time into efforts at falsifying Marxism and it was argued that 'true Marxists' would keep away from such 'Marxisms', which, according to them, were distortions. In the words of Russell Jacoby:

Capitalism fabricated the myth of individual success; the Marxists marketed their own brand...Success confirms the truth of the theory; defeat is its own verdict. Failure bespeaks an erroneous theorizing. On the bottom line of the account book of Marxism, Leninism shows a net profit.9

This, I want to state explicitly, is not a criticism of Leninism or Bolshevik Marxism. The point I want to make is that many other voices within the tradition have been submerged. In effect, thinking about the nationality question, for instance, has been tagged on to Stalin as if he was its sole theorist.

Historically this is hardly true. In addition to these problems, the Comintern which came into being in the early part of this century, internationalized Bolshevik Marxism. English translations of the works of other Marxists were not taken up seriously, or if taken up, were stopped at the publishing end. What happens because of this is that we not only do not get a proper picture of the resources available within the Marxist tradition, but also we encourage unreasonable criticisms by non-Marxists.

I hope my case for taking Marxism as a tradition is reasonable. I shall now undertake a textual exposition on the questions of 'nation' and the 'nationality question'.

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10. Before writing on the 'nationality question', Lenin had sent Stalin on a 'study trip' to Europe to learn about the problem. Stalin in his travels had come across the works of the Austro-Marxist, Otto Bauer on the nationality question, a work that was rejected by the Bolshevik Marxists (though they were markedly influenced by it). See Otto Bauer, 'The Concept of "Nation"' in Austro-Marxism, translated and edited by Tom Bottomore and Patrick Goode (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), pp.102-109.


The final aim is to point out Marxism's inability to correctly understand it. An elaboration and reconstruction of the theory will be attempted after this textual exposition.

2.1. CLASS AND NATION

2.1.1. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels

On 5th March 1852, Marx, in a letter to Weydemeyer in New York, makes the following claims:

Long before me bourgeois historians had described the historical development of this class struggle and bourgeois economists the economic anatomy of the classes. What I did that was new was to demonstrate:

1) that the existence of classes is merely linked to particular historic phases in the development of production,

2) that the class struggle necessarily leads to the dictatorship of the proletariat,

3) that this dictatorship itself only constitutes the transition to the abolition of all classes and to a classless society.13

To present Marx's and Engels' claims in a more comprehensive way, let me enumerate the following:

(i) Classes are positions in the economic structure and all of us have position in the structure.

(ii) Classes are collectivities/agencies internal to the development of production.

(iii) Classes are not ahistorical. They are directly linked to the development of production.

(iv) The motor of history is the struggle between classes.

(v) The struggle reaches its culmination when the dominated class - the proletariat - establishes itself in society through its dictatorship.

(vi) This dictatorship, which is a transitory political phase, is necessary for the total destruction of the social bases of class formations. Only such an act in the midst of plenty will destroy class society, transforming it in that destruction into a classless society.

(vii) Classless society, which is a reality in a period of material abundance, sets the stage for the annihilation of all forms of domination and the overcoming of all differences as negativity.

The fact that relations of production defined total social space, that class was the motor of history, did not necessitate the need to look at other forms of collectivities/agencies. For they would, in the final analysis, be drastically overcome and made into moments of the 'concrete universal', the proletariat. This theoretical
and philosophical position did not present any effort to think about other collectivities. There was no explicit theorization about the 'nation' or 'gender' and their relationship with class.

However, it will not be true to say that Marx and Engels were not sensitive to these 'non-class' forms of collectivities. We will explore this sensitivity in relation to the question of 'nation' and 'nationality'. In Marx and Engels, the 'nationality question' figures in the following contexts:

(i) In the context of the historical development of the capitalist society out of feudal society, and from it, the communist society; and

(ii) In the context of the obstacles creating practical problems for workers pursuing a social revolution against their oppressors.

Let us take (i) and move in stages to capture what Marx and Engels meant. First, regarding the progressive role played by the bourgeoisie, one 'group' making up the relations of production:

So just fight bravely on, most gracious master of capital! We need you for the present; here and there you as rulers. You have to clear the vestiges of the Middle Ages and absolute monarchy out of our
path; you have to annihilate patriarchalism; you have to carry out centralization; you have to convert the more or less propertyless classes into genuine proletarians, into recruits for us; by your factories and your commercial relationships you must create for us the basis of the material means which the proletariat needs for attainment of freedom.14

The aggressive nature of the progressive role of bourgeoisie is put more sharply in the *The Communist Manifesto*. Marx and Engels write that the bourgeoisie has...

...pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his ‘natural superiors’, and has left remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous ‘cash payment’. It has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervour, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egoistical calculation...In a word, for exploitation, veiled by religious and political illusions, it has substituted naked, shameless, direct, brutal, exploitation.15

What has happened as a result of this aggressive role of the bourgeoisie? In what direction are we moving because of this modern mode of organizing production?


The further the separate spheres, which act on one another, extend in the course of this development and the more the original isolation of the separate nationalities is destroyed by the advanced mode of production, by intercourse and by the natural division of labour between various nations arising as a result, the more history becomes world history.16

The development of world history has resulted in the globalization of capital, of the productive forces. The universal development of productive forces

...is a universal intercourse between men established, which on the one side produces in all nations simultaneously the phenomenon of the 'propertyless' mass (universal competition), making each nation dependent on the revolutions of the others, and finally puts world-historical, empirically universal individuals in place of local ones.17

In the series of texts presented above one can notice a certain trend of argument following the observation made in the introductory chapter that relations of production constitute total social space. With the coming of the capitalist social order, with the globalization of capital, with the aggressive breaking down of every nook and cranny of the social world and with the integration of them into a 'vestiges of the middle ages' and 'patriarchalism', emerges


17. Ibid., p.54, 57.
a world order, with the consequent destruction of the 'world-historical, empirically universal individuals in place of local ones'. All other identities are destroyed in the coming-to-be of this world order. Thus when Engels was asked a question, 'Will nationalities continue to exist under Communism?', he answers it as follows:

The nationalities of the people who join together according to the principle of community will be just as much compelled by this union to merge with one another and thereby supersede themselves as the various differences between estates and classes disappear through the superseding of their basis - private property.18

If this is the general tendency of social development, i.e., the coming-to-be of a 'generic being' with the obliteration of the nationalities, how does Marxism come to terms with the living reality of nationality? How Marx thinks about this can be explored in his writings on the Polish Question. This brings us to (ii) i.e., 'the nationality question' in the context of the obstacles creating practical problems for workers pursuing a social revolution against their


This document is the draft programme discussed at the First Congress of the Communist League in London on June 2-9, 1847,
oppressors. Broadly, (ii) is discussed within two contexts:

(i) Practical problems faced by the workers' movement; and

(ii) The problem of ideology.

(i) On the Practical Problems faced by the Workers' Movement

In a letter to Engels on the Irish question, Marx writes that:

The question now is, what advice shall we give to the English workers? In my opinion they must make the repeal of the Union (in short, the affair of 1783, but in a more democratic form and adapted to the conditions of the present time)....This is the only legal and therefore only possible form of Irish emancipation which can be embodied in the programme of an English party. Experience must show later whether the merely personal union can continue to subsist between the two countries.19

Two years later, in November 1869, Marx writes to Kugelmann:

I have become more and more convinced --and it is only a question of driving this conviction home to the English working class - that it can never do anything decisive here in England until it separates its policy with regard to Ireland most definitely from the policy of ruling classes, until it not only makes common cause with the Irish but even takes the initiative in dissolving

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19. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Correspondence, p.184.

Marx to Engels in Manchester, London, 30th November 1867.
the Union established in 1801 and replacing it by a free federal relationship. And this must be done, not as a matter of sympathy with Ireland but as a demand made in the interests of the English proletariat (underscoring mine). If not, the English people will remain tied to the leading-strings of the ruling classes, because it will have to join with them in a common front against Ireland. Every one of its movements in England itself is crippled by the strife with the Irish, who form a very important section of the working class in England. The primary condition of emancipation here - the overthrow of the English landed oligarchy - remains impossible because its position here cannot be stormed so long as it maintains its strongly entrenched outposts in Ireland.

But, once affairs are in the hands of the Irish people itself, once it is made its own legislator and ruler, once it becomes autonomous, the abolition there of the landed aristocracy (to a large extent the same persons as the English landlords) will be infinitely easier than here, because in Ireland it is not merely a simple economic question but at the same time a national question, for the landlords there are not, like those in England, the traditional dignitaries and representatives of the nation, but its mortally-hated oppressors.... But since the English working class undoubtedly throws the decisive weight into the scale of social emancipation generally, the lever has to be applied here.20

In December of the same year, Marx changes his mind on the Irish issue. He writes to Engels:

For a long time I believed that it would be possible to overthrow the Irish regime by English working-class....Deeper study has now convinced me the opposite. The English working class will never accomplish anything until it has got rid of

20. Ibid., pp.216-217

Marx to Ludwig Kugelmann in Hanover, 29th November 1869.
Ireland. The lever must be applied in Ireland. That is why the Irish question is so important for the social movement is general.\textsuperscript{21}

A year later in a letter to Sigfrid Meyer and August Vogt in 1870, Marx explains:

Ireland is the bulwark of the English landed aristocracy. The exploitation of that country is one of the main sources of their material wealth; it is their greatest moral strength. They, in fact, represent the domination of England over Ireland. Ireland is therefore the cardinal means by which the English aristocracy maintain their domination in England itself.

If, on the other hand, the English army and police were to be withdrawn from Ireland tomorrow, you would at once have an agrarian revolution in Ireland. But the downfall of the English aristocracy in Ireland implies and has a necessary consequence on its downfall in England. And this would provide the preliminary condition for proletarian revolution in England. The destruction of the English landed aristocracy in Ireland is an infinitely easier operation than in England herself, because in Ireland the land question has been up to now the exclusive form of social question because it is a question of existence of life and death, for the immense majority of the Irish people, and because it is at the same time inseparable from the the national question.\textsuperscript{22}

The English bourgeoisie, Marx observes, benefits from this situation:

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., p.218.

Marx to Engels in Manchester, London, 10th December 1869.

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., pp.221-222.

Marx to Sigfrid Meyer and August Vogt in New York, 9th April 1870.
Owing to the constantly increasing concentration of leaseholds, Ireland constantly sends her own surplus to the English labour market, and thus forces down wages and lowers the material and moral positions of the English working class.\textsuperscript{23}

Marx continues:

Every industrial and commercial centre in England now possesses a working class divided into two hostile camps, English proletarians and Irish proletarians. The ordinary English worker hates the Irish worker as a competitor who lowers his standard of life. In relation to the Irish worker he regards himself as a member of the ruling nation and consequently he becomes a tool of the English aristocrats and capitalists against Ireland, thus strengthening their domination over himself. He cherishes religion, social, and national prejudices against the Irish worker...[The Irish] sees in the English worker both the accomplice and the stupid tool of the English rulers in Ireland...This antagonism is the secret of the impotence of the English working class....It is the secret by which the capitalist class maintains its power.\textsuperscript{24}

In the same letter, Marx observes that

It is the special task of the Central Council in London to make the English workers realize that for them the national emancipation of Ireland is not a question of abstract justice or humanitarian sentiment but the first condition of their own social emancipation.\textsuperscript{25}

I hope I have shown above how Marx came to terms with the nationality question, i.e., by considering it chiefly as an obstacle to workers' solidarity, an obstacle that the

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., p.222.

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., p.223.
bourgeoisie was using in their favour. This set of ideas must be kept in close association with another set of ideas if one wants to appreciate how the founding fathers of Historical Materialism came to resolve the problem of nation/nationality.

In his studies on European history, Marx tried to understand the Polish nationality question and he made the following observation:

The people of Southern France were, in the Middle Ages, no closer to the people in Northern France than the Poles are now to the Russians. In the Middle Ages, the Southern French, commonly called Provencals, achieved not only a 'remarkable development', they even led European development. They were the first modern nation to have a literary language. Their poetry was regarded by all Romance peoples, and even by the Germans and the English, as a model unequalled at the time... Nevertheless, like the Poles, they were first partitioned between Northern France and England and later completely subjugated by the Northern French... who were culturally just as inferior to their Southern neighbours as the Russians to the Poles -- [The Northern French] waged continuous wars of conquest against the Southern French and, finally, conquered the whole country... The Southern French fought against their oppressors for centuries -- but historical development was inexorable. After a struggle lasting three centuries, their beautiful language was reduced to a patois and they themselves were turned into Frenchmen. Northern French despotism ruled over Southern France for three hundred years...26

The above passage quite amply suggests that such historical passages of countries that today make up Europe had influenced Marx sufficiently to make both a historical and theoretical observation: Nation/nationality would disappear when classes disappear. There is nothing 'fixed' or 'specific' about nation or nationality.

In addition to this historical insight, Marx had other influences on him.

(a) Marx was a Jew by birth. He was not rooted in his native Germany. He was by the status quo 'transplanted abroad, to live a life spent largely in a cosmopolitan world of exiles and revolutionaries of various nationalities'.

(b) Marx was influenced theoretically by the Enlightenment thinkers who 'assumed that national loyalties and conflicts would inevitably disappear with the progress of rationalism, liberalism and free competition'.


28. Ibid., p.262.
There is a very strong Hegelian influence evident in Marx, an influence I shall take up for criticism later in this chapter. Of this influence, Pelczynski writes that

The conception of civil society is, as we have seen, grounded in a universalistic, cosmopolitan and rather abstract view of man and society; its basic categories, especially its narrow version as the 'the system of needs', such as need, labour, relations of production, classes and capital, may be discussed without reference to national factors.²⁹

Pelczynski continues and states that

For Marx and Engels civil society provides the arena of individual development only in the pathological form of general competition, egoism and privatization. The scope for the development of genuinely social, communal features of human nature they see partly in the class consciousness and solidarity of the proletariat, but mainly in the classless, stateless, nationless community of free cooperative producers of the future.³⁰

The above elaboration aims to show that Marx who had placed society on the ground of the relations of production actually encouraged the masking of certain aspects of

²⁹. Ibid., p.276.

A Hegelian theory of nationality was eventually developed in Poland after Hegel's death. I am here more interested in the trajectory Hegelian thought took in Marx.

³⁰. Ibid., pp.276-277.
reality that have since then come to play an important, dynamic role in the constitution and reconstruction of societies.

(ii) Nation/Nationality as a Problem of Ideology

This view comes out quite clearly in The Communist Manifesto.

Since the proletariat must first of all acquire political supremacy, must rise to be the leading class of the nation, must constitute itself the nation, it is, so far, itself national, though not in the bourgeois sense of the word.31

Before we make some important concluding remarks from this exposition, it would be a useful exercise to explore the contribution of the third generation Marxists.32

2.1.2. V.I. Lenin

I shall begin by looking at V.I. Lenin's contribution to the issue. A closer look at Lenin's writings would allow us, for


He names the following among others in the third generation: Lenin, Stalin, Rosa Luxemburg and Otto Bauer. Most of the Marxists in this generation were revolutionaries and theoreticians who had to deal with the nationality question while they were organizing the working class. It was a practical issue for them.
the sake of convenience, to place Lenin's writings on the nation/nationality question under the following headings:

(i) Right to Self-determination:
   (a) transition from feudalism to capitalism;
   (b) political right;
   (c) in the period of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat'; and
   (d) proletarian internationalism.

(ii) Two-nation theory (cultural aspects only).

(iii) Non-coercive Exchange Theory of Unity.

I shall present (i) in a number of stages, to capture one of Lenin's major contributions to the issue.

(i) (a) Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism

The emergence of the nationality question was an important aspect of the transition from feudalism to capitalism:

Throughout the world, the period of the final victory of capitalism over feudalism has been linked up with national movements. For the complete victory of commodity production, the bourgeoisie must capture the home market, and there must be politically united territories whose population speak a single language, with all obstacles to the development of that language and to its consolidation in literature eliminated. Therein is the economic foundation of national movements. 33

Lenin also observes that

...the growth of nationalist tendencies among the liberal bourgeoisie and the growth of nationalist tendencies among the upper classes of the oppressed nationalities, give prominence at the present time to the national question.  

(i) (b) Political Right

Lenin was the first Marxist theoretician to consistently put forward the argument that the nationality question is a question of collective political right.

From the standpoint of national relations, the best conditions for the development of capitalism are undoubtedly provided by the national state. This does not mean, of course, that such a state, which is based on bourgeois relations, can eliminate the exploitation and oppression of nations. It only means that Marxists cannot lose sight of the powerful economic factors that give rise to the

34. V.I. Lenin, ‘Resolution of the Summer, 1913, Joint Conference of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. and Party Officials’ Collected Works, vol.19: 1913 (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1963), p.427. The Conference was held from September 23 to October 1, 1913. Among the questions discussed at the Conference was the ‘national question’.

35. The idea of collective right has been dealt with quite clearly by Rajeev Bhargava. See Rajeev Bhargava, ‘The Right to Culture’ Social Scientist, vol.18, (10), October 1990, pp.53-54.

There is no notion of collective right in liberal political theory.
urge to create national states. It means that 'self-determination of nations' in the Marxist Programme cannot, from a historico-economic point-of-view, have any other meaning than political self-determination, state independence and the formation of a national state.36

Lenin goes on to make a further point:

The domination of finance capital and of capital in general is not to be abolished by any reforms in the sphere of political democracy; and self-determination belongs wholly and exclusively to this sphere.37 (underscoring mine.)

What is the implication of this right to self-determination?

Lenin observes that

...this demand for political democracy implies complete freedom to agitate for secession and from a referendum on secession by the seceding nation. This demand, therefore, is not the equivalent of a demand for separation, fragmentation and the formation of small states. It implies only a consistent expression of struggle against all national oppression.38

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38. Ibid., p.146.
In the Period of the 'Dictatorship of the Proletariat' (or the Transition from Capitalism to Socialism)

In 'The Discussion of Self-Determination Summed Up', Lenin answers an important question he himself asks: 'Is it to be supposed that victorious socialism, restoring and implementing full democracy all along the line, will refrain from democratically demarcating state frontiers and ignore the "sympathies" of the population?'

In actual fact its frontiers will be delineated democratically, i.e., in accordance with the will and 'sympathies' of the population. Capitalism rides roughshod over these sympathies, adding more obstacles to the rapprochements of nations. Socialism, by organizing production without class oppression, by ensuring the well-being of all members of the state, gives full play to the 'sympathies' of the population, thereby promoting and greatly accelerating the drawing together and fusion of the nations.39

Proletarian Internationalism/Democracy

Lenin had spent a lot of time thinking on the relationship between the nationality question and the proletarian internationalism. Lenin brings the nationality question within the sphere of proletarian democracy.

In our times the proletariat alone upholds the real freedom of nations and unity of workers of all nations.

For different nations to live together in peace and freedom or to separate and form different states (if that is more convenient for them), a full democracy, upheld by the working class, is essential. No privileges for any nation or any one language! Not even the slightest degree of oppression or the slightest injustice in respect of a national minority -- such are the principles of working-class democracy.40

Lenin further adds:

Working class democracy contraposes to the nationalist wrangling of the various bourgeois parties over questions of language, etc., the demand for the unconditional unity and complete amalgamation of workers of all nationalities in all working-class organizations ... in contradistinction to any kind of bourgeois nationalism.41

Lenin makes a further distinction between bourgeois and proletarian democracy and their implications for nationality questions.

A member of an oppressor nation must be Lenin makes a cautionary remark. The thrust of this caution immediately


'indifferent' to whether small nations belong to his state or to a neighbouring state, or to themselves, according to where their sympathies lie: without such 'indifference' he is not a Social-Democrat. To be an internationalist Social-Democrat one must not think only of one's own nation, but place above it the interests of all nations, their common liberty and equality.42

take us closer to the place of 'class' and 'nation' and their explanatory status.

The right of nations to self-determination (i.e., the constitutional guarantee of an absolutely free and democratic method of deciding the question of secession) must under no circumstances be confused with the expediency of a given nation's secession. The Social-Democratic Party must decide the latter question exclusively on its merits in each particular case in conformity with the interests of social development as a whole and with the interests of the proletarian class struggle for socialism.43

(ii) Two Nations (Culture) Theory

Lenin was convinced that there 'are two nations in every modern nation... two national cultures in every culture'.44

He observes that

42. V.I. Lenin, 'The Discussion of Self-Determination Summed Up', p.347.


44. V.I. Lenin, 'Critical Remarks on the National Question', p.32.
The elements of democratic and socialist culture are present, if only in rudimentary form, in every national culture, since in every nation there are toiling and exploited masses, whose conditions of life inevitably give rise to the ideology of democracy and socialism. But every nation also possesses a bourgeois culture.... Therefore, the general 'national culture' is the culture of the landlords, the clergy and the bourgeoisie.45

How will an 'international culture of proletarian democracy' be built? 'In advancing the slogan of "the international culture of democracy and of the world working-class movements" we take from each national culture only its democratic and socialist elements; we take them only and absolutely in opposition to the bourgeois culture and the bourgeois nationalism of each nation'.46

(iii) Exchange Relationship for the Development of Common Language (for Unity)

Lenin held the belief that economic exchange relationship will bring about close association of the nationalities.

...the requirement of economic exchange will always compel the nationalities living in one state (as long as they wish to live together) to study the language of the majority. The more democratic the political system in Russia becomes, the more powerfully, rapidly and extensively capitalism will develop, the more urgently will the

45. Ibid., p.24.
46. Ibid.
requirements of economic exchange impel various nationalities to study the language most convenient for general commercial relations.\textsuperscript{47}

Lenin's thinking about the nation and the nationality question allows us to make some preliminary observations.

(i) Lenin subordinated the right of a nation to self-determination to proletarian internationalism.

(ii) There are two nations in a 'national' formation, and this is predicated on the category of 'culture' (based on class practices). Lenin talks of a two (national) culture theory. The shared aspect is out of view and is, I believe, not logically possible within his interpretation of Marxism. Any sharedness would imply the envelopment of the proletarian class within the dominant culture.

(iii) Unity between nations is to be achieved 'voluntarily'. He suggests that economic exchange is the living context in which such a unity would emerge. He fails here to make a distinction between exchange within the capitalist formation and a socialist formation. Within the capitalist formation

a unity achieved through economic exchange can really be a violent process of the peripheralization or destruction of a language or culture. This could also happen in a living socialist society.

(iv) Lenin avoided defining a nation in a manner he has defined a class. Thus the non-definition of nation by Lenin could only indicate either a difficulty in defining nation or that ultimately there is no need to define something that is after all a particular specific substance of class struggle.


Thompson writes:

'Members of the bourgeois class had everything to gain from a policy of linguistic unification which accompanied the French Revolution. Promoting the official language to the status of the national language gave them a de facto monopoly of the political apparatus and a privileged path of communication with the central power. The subsequent normalization, inculcation and legitimation of the official language was effected primarily by the educational system and its relation to the labour market. With the establishment of a system of educational qualifications endowed with a standardized value independent of social and regional properties and with the unification of the labour market in which administrative positions depended upon educational qualifications, the schools came to be seen as a principal means to access to the labour market, especially in areas where industrialization was weak. Thus, by the combined effect of various institutions and institutional mechanisms, people speaking local dialects were encouraged, if not compelled "to collaborate in the destruction of their instruments of expression".'
The right to self-determination is political and cultural. This is because the economic foundation for the formation of nation-states becomes consciously expressed in the political terrain as a right, the right to self-determination. It is located within the political sphere because 'politics' in Marxist theory is secreted by class relations in civil society (in Marx's sense of the term). The disappearance of class would mean the disappearance indirectly of nationality.

2.1.3. Rosa Luxemburg

Rosa Luxemburg, throughout the period that the nationality question demanded her attention, was 'haunted' by the fact that the socialist proletariat of different countries was poised against each other ready to butcher themselves in the name of national survival and the defence of fatherland.

49. When World War 1 began Rosa Luxemburg had already been sentenced to a year in prison for an antiwar speech made in 1914. In October, her appeal was turned down, and although she was able on postpone serving the sentence for several months due to ill health, she was finally seized in February 1915. It was while serving this sentence that she wrote the Junius Pamphlet, as it came to be known. It contained her thoughts on the nationality question. It was finished by April 1915 and smuggled out of prison, but due to technical difficulties with finding a printer and other problems, it was not published until April 1916. The actual name of the Junius Pamphlet was 'The Crisis of the German Social Democracy'.
Today the nation is but a cloak that covers imperialistic desires, a battle cry for imperialistic rivalries, the last ideological measure with which the masses can be persuaded to play the role of cannon fodder in imperialistic wars.50

Rosa Luxemburg adds that

For the first time since the modern labor movement exists there yawns an abyss between the commandments of international solidarity of the proletariat of the world and the interests of freedom and nationalist existence of the people; for the first time we discover that the independence and liberty of the nations command that working men kill and destroy each other.51

As a sensitive proletarian leader, she was fighting a war within a war, fighting those who proposed the right of nations to self-determination in the capitalist era, to bring the socialist forces from different countries together before they end up slaughtering each other, which in the final analysis, benefited nobody but the bourgeoisie.

Thus, on a practical level what she argued for was quite logical. She did not want the working class to have anything to do with the nation. Whether it is politically


51. Ibid., p.271.
right or not, she had a *stage-theory* about the nationality question.

Up to this time we have cherished the belief that the interests of the peoples of all nations, that the class interests of the proletariat are a harmonious unit, that they are identical, that they cannot possibly come into conflict with one another. That was the basis of our theory and practice, the soul of our agitation.52

Later in the same pamphlet, Luxemburg notes that

International socialism recognizes the right of free independent nations, with equal rights. But socialism alone can create such nations, can bring self-determination of their peoples. This slogan of socialism is like all its others, not an apology for existing conditions, but a guidepost, a spur for the revolutionary, regenerative, active policy of the proletariat. So long as capitalist states exist, i.e., so long as imperialistic world policies determine and regulate the inner and outer life of a nation, there can be no 'national self-determination' either in war or in peace.53 (underscoring mine.)

This analysis of Rosa Luxemburg clearly reflects here a stage-theory i.e. the need to consider class struggle first and only then think about right to self-determination. That right, she believed, cannot be articulated without the resolution of class struggle, a position very close to what I shall develop later in this chapter.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid., p.305.

Putting it differently, I have argued that the resolution of class antagonism allows the development of 'dialogism'. (See chapter three and four.)
2.1.4. **Stalin**

Stalin gave a comprehensive definition of nation. He wrote:

*A nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture.*

Stalin adds that 'none of the above characteristics taken separately is sufficient to define a nation. More than that, it is sufficient for a single one of those characteristics to be lacking and the nation ceases to be a nation'.

Stalin like those earlier Marxists believed that a 'nation is not merely a historical category but a historical

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54. This 'comprehensive' definition had prefigured in Otto Bauer. '...a common history as the effective cause common culture and common descent as the means by which it produces its effect, a common language as the mediator of the common culture, both its product and producers'.

Otto Bauer, 'The Concept of the Nation', p.103. Otto Bauer understands the above definition as a 'systematic conception' of the nation.


56. Ibid.
category belonging to a definite epoch, the epoch of rising capitalism. The process of elimination of feudalism and development of capitalism is at the same time a process of the constitution of people into nations'. How does this happen? Stalin writes that the 'chief problem for the young bourgeoisie is the problem of the market. Its aim is to sell its goods and to emerge victorious from competition with the bourgeoisie of a different nationality. Hence its desire to secure its "own," its "home" market. The market is the first school in which the bourgeoisie learns its nationalism'.

Influenced by Lenin, Stalin observes that

The right to self-determination means that a nation may arrange its life in the way it wishes. It has the right to arrange its life on the basis of autonomy. It has the right to enter into federal relations with other nations. It has the right to complete secession. Nations are sovereign, and all nations have equal rights.

I shall now take up a more comprehensive criticism of the way 'class' and 'nation' have been handled conceptually and

57. Ibid., p.313.
58. Ibid., p.316.
59. Ibid., p.321.
find space for elaboration and incorporation of non-class practices.60

2.2. THE 'NATION' AS PART OF A THEORY OF PROLETARIAN PRACTICE

Since relations of production constitute total social space, and therefore, classes being the only governing collectivity or agency present in the Marxian social space, everything else is underplayed. As must be obvious from the various writings presented above, nationality has been treated as an obstacle to proletarian internationalism. It is an obstacle to be overcome in practice not theory. Therefore, in all the Marxist literature discussed above, nation is not a part of the Marxist theory of history but is part of a theory of practice. The distinction must be made clear. The Marxian 'social space' cannot accommodate any other agency except as a specific substance of class relations. Any

60. The idea of practices has been briefly introduced in the introductory chapter. It will become clearer in chapter three and four. In subsection 3.3 of chapter three, I have tried to make some clarifications of the use of the notion of structure in this work. In the sub-section I have discussed on 'structure' and 'agency'. The point of contact of structure and agency is understood as 'position-practice', following Roy Bhaskar. I have also presented four primary positions-practices. These consist of class and non-class practices. Among the non-class practices I have included gender and ethno-communal practices.
recognition of something called nation is circumscribed by the belief that it will disappear with the disappearance of class, though this belief seems not an altogether settled one.

In the Marxist theory of history, the agency that intervenes in history is class, not any other. It is also important to keep in mind that the inhabitants of the communist future—the 'concrete universal'is the 'end-product' of the process of overcoming all local identities. Concretely this is achieved through one of the important principles guiding proletarian practice i.e., the practice of proletarian internationalism. The overcoming of all local/segmentary perspectives is made possible when (instrumental) rationality is universalized, giving way to the generic and the universal. Thus, nation, or for that matter even gender, is part of the theory of proletarian practice. It is part of a strategy that seeks to overcome it. It was never conceived as a sub-theory of nation within the Marxist theory of history.

2.3. COMMONALITY

Another problem one confronts in reading the texts on nation is the question of commonality. Commonality is important to consider because it points to non-class realities. Inspite
of it being an important part of our everyday life experience, in all the Marxists (except for Stalin) we have considered to help us think about nation or the nationality question we encounter the inability to place commonality. Thinking about commonality can result in a claim and criticism that one does not have a clear picture of the nature of society i.e. class nature of society. The 'classness' of society makes thinking about commonality virtually impossible. This strand is reflected in the writing of many. Take for instance Marx and Engels:

Since the proletariat must first of all acquire political supremacy, must rise to be the leading class of the nation, must constitute itself the nation, it is, so far, itself national, though not in the bourgeois sense of the word.  

Lenin in his 'Critical Remarks on the National Question' writes that there 'are two nations in every modern nation - we say to all nationalist-socialists. There are two national cultures...' Thus, in 'advancing the slogan of "the international culture of democracy and of the world working-class", we take from each national culture only its democratic and socialist elements; we take them only and


absolutely in opposition to the bourgeois culture and the bourgeois nationalism of each nation'. 63

In the quotations given above, neither Marx nor Engels nor Lenin have made any attempt to think of the 'conditions' under which two cultures can operate within a single social formation. What are the implications of this fact? Almost as an answer to this dilemma i.e. living within a single formation and yet being hostile to the fact of commonality, Stalin in his writing on language observes that

Language is not a product of one or another base, old or new, within the given society, but of the whole course of the history of the society and of the history of the bases for many centuries. It was created not by some one class, but by the entire society, by all the classes of the society, by the efforts of hundreds of generations. It was created for the satisfaction of the needs not of one particular class, but of the entire society, of all the classes of the society. Precisely for this reason it was created as a single language for the society, common to all members of that society, as the common language of the whole region. 64

This exposition indicates among other things, a line of positive argument for commonality and a qualified consideration of plurality. Let me pursue this line of argument a little further by presenting the perceptive

63. Ibid., p.24.

observation made by a Puerto Rican Marxist, J.M. Blaut:

Commonality of culture between ruler and the ruled within - internal to - a society seems to manifest itself in two principal ways. The first is a matter of social interaction. In all class societies there is some degree of interaction between the two polar classes. In the most ancient form of class society, and particularly in the societies emerging from pre-class character, rulers and producers were joined in common kinships and at least a fictive relic of this survived for a long time thereafter. In all class modes of production, inter-class interaction remains important. It consists primarily of participation by all members of the society in smaller social networks, each of which embraces class fractions not too distant from one another (for instance as serf and free-tenant, soldier and knight, worker and foreman, petty bourgeois and middle bourgeois), all such networks being interlinked in an overall network extending throughout society, the point here being the continuity of a chain of interactions extending from the lowest producer to the highest ruler.65

Given this situation, there must be a sense in which commonality must be understood. Rejecting a notion of commonality, though understandable, actually submerges non-class realities and negates its contribution to societal movement. A completely bifurcated formation with no commonality on any level, in any form, is a non-existent reality. Thus, it would be important for us to have a notion of commonality. Otherwise, it would be difficult to sustain the notion of 'hegemony' or 'nation'.

Commonality can be thought about for our purpose in two ways. I shall for convenience mark them as C₁ and C₂. C₁ will be the 'strong' argument for commonality and C₂ will be the weak version.

C₁: A kind of commonality that seeks to downplay or erase any difference between the bourgeois and the proletariat. It is commonality of a homogeneous population.

C₂: A kind of commonality that is sensitive to the difference but is markedly sensitive to 'commonly participated' institutions.

A Marxian notion of commonality cannot appreciate C₁. C₂ will find some acceptance. This version is not hostile to Marxist theory. If we accept C₂, what does it really mean? We can think about this sense of the notion of commonality in two inter-related ways:

(i) commonality of property (not private property); and
(ii) commonality of use.

Language, for instance, is a shared common property between the bourgeois and the proletariat. That the members of the two classes are 'Tamil' or 'English' is governed by the fact that both posseses (or have) a common language. That both of them use the language too establishes commonality. There is a distinction to be made between both sub-senses of the use of the notion of commonality that we
are trying to clarify. The former make the claim of 'having' a language. People living in Tamil Nadu have Tamil language and we can believe that they are to a good extent Tamils. The use of the language is evidently different. Language is differentially appropriated by the two classes. Thus, in understanding commonality we have to distinguish between the possession of a property and its differential use and this distinction presents a possible Marxian understanding of the notion of commonality. The notion of commonality is important for our purpose because it directs attention to non-class practices and resources that are appropriated by class practices. This idea will figure as we proceed.

2.4. EXPLORING THE RELATION BETWEEN CLASS AND NATION

Having stated the above notion of commonality, let me go on a little further to explore an aspect of the relationship between class and nation. Let us assume there is a social formation SF1 with a certain population and a number of resources. I shall mark these resources as follows:

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66. There is a fairly well-established scholarly work on this fact. See for example Basil Bernstein, Class, Codes and Control, vol.1 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1971).
K : Capital
LP : Labour power
L : Language
T : Territory
C : Culture

The distribution of K and LP presents class formations—the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The distribution of L, T, and C creates the national community. L, T and C are common and are resources everyone in the social formation SF1 would have in contrast to some other formation, SF2. By such a possession, SF1 and SF2 would be marked off by a boundary. However, K and LP do not mark off this kind of boundary. They are generic and universal. In effect, we can if we treat the possession of resources as 'distinction creating', conceive of three potential groups, the bourgeoisie, the proletariat and the national community.

Let us explore this line of thinking a little more to come to terms with the relationship between class and nation and the problems emerging from this relationship. I shall propose the following to help us think about the problems at hand and to pursue them. A 'collectivity' can be analytically separated as follows:
Both the agents and resources make the collectivity. Let me make another move by naming two collectivities, class and nation.

\[ \text{AGENTS (here, individuals)} \]

\[ \text{COLLECTIVITY} \]

\[ \text{RESOURCES} \]

\[ \text{AGENT} \]

\[ \text{CLASS} \]

\[ \text{NATION} \]

\[ \text{R1 / R2} \]

\[ \text{R1 in the diagram represents capital and labour power. R2 represents language, territory and culture.} \]

\[ \text{Now, having conceived of the relationship in this way, let me mount my criticism at the way Marxists have dealt with the problem. Having given class the explanatory primacy (relations of production as total social space), they have made R2 as a 'secondary' resource available to class. This is shown below.} \]
The "error", as it were, committed by the Marxists we have been discussing will be evident if we see it from the following point of view. There is the conflation of two types of resources, one belonging to 'civil society', and the other which we shall for the moment leave un-named. Thus only by conflation of the two sets of resources could Marxists arrive at a situation when everything 'local' would disappear on the impact of a universalizing rationality and would be replaced by universals.

67. The way Marx understood it. This is markedly different from the way Antonio Gramsci understood it.
If we reconsider the problem, we can envisage it in the following manner:

As the capital or labour power become universal, and a transformative process destroys the social basis of capital and labour power, what would 'remain' would be:

Fig. 4 : CLASS AND NON-CLASS AGENTS AND RESOURCES
This is also to propose the fact that not everything can be universalized and there are limits to universalizability. A language or its meaning-structure or the structures of feeling emerging from it cannot be universalized.

We are confronted with a number of problems. This way of looking at the problems explodes into a number of trajectories, each, as it were, demanding attention and explanation. I shall try to look at this and then look for some answers in the next section.

(i) In arguing that there are a number of resources, I am actually trying to separate two levels of practices—one class practices, the other non-class practices. Both practices materialize in the materiality of resources. If we want to account for 'bourgeois nationalism' or 'proletarian nationalism' then it is important that we keep in mind the sense of commonality that I have tried to argue for in the

68. This will be taken up in greater detail in chapter four on power.


70. One can argue that today the Anglo-Saxon language English is universal. Progressively, however, this is being challenged. Other languages are slowly but surely asserting their presence.

143
last section. If the resources making up the nation are similar, then it is these resources that are differentially appropriated and used by the two classes. Thus, without losing sight of commonality, we are able to talk about bourgeois/proletariat nationalisms. We are also able to look at the reality of non-class practices on which we will concentrate in the next chapter.

(ii) In introducing the resources argument, I have also introduced three collectivities, the bourgeoisie, the proletariat and the national community. The implication of the introduction of the third collectivity is hardly accommodative of the primacy of class. The bringing forth of the third collectivity questions the primacy in the sense we have understood, a primacy with the effacement of local identities, giving way to a universal identity. It is a primacy that results in the complete dissolution of the Other, in this case nationality.

(iii) Class is taken as an 'empty' category that 'breathes' through 'ground level' relations and resources, physical, biological and social. This is why I am proposing a split of practices into two levels. One level has to survive as it were on the available
ground level relations. The class practices appropriate non-class practices. Marxism is constructed in a way in which the Self appropriates the Other by making it a moment of itself: class appropriates non-class practices and makes them moments of itself, and with the destruction of class practices and the consequent universalization of (instrumental) reason, all practices will become a distinction of the Universal, the Totality. All point of views will be rationalized into a whole.

As I have merely indicated, this cannot be sustained because the Self-Other relationship is problematic in Marxist theory. There is an unsustainable assumption of an aggressive Self and a passive Other. Self-bias in the construction of the relationship does not take into consideration the self-ness of Other. This relationship has to be reworked. I shall therefore develop this aspect later in this chapter. Suffice it here to say that the movement toward universalization will be marked by a plural condition not as distinction or duality but as a 'community' of differences. Such a move brings into question the primacy of the relations of production. The aggressive Self of the relations of production absorbing the passive Other in a formation is called into question. This way of thinking
about primacy needs to be abandoned. I shall therefore address this problem to begin with, before addressing the Self-Other relationship.

2.5. DISMANTLING THE PRIMACY OF THE RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION

In this section and the next I intend to establish the ontological category that will allow me to reconstruct the emancipatory subject. In order to achieve this, I will abandon the primacy of the relations of production. I will introduce another ontological category individual-in-relations. This category not only incorporates the relations of production but is also sensitive to non-class relations i.e., the relations between the male and the female, between different ethno-communities and between human beings and Nature. To argue my case, I will take an excursion into sociobiology to get acquainted first with the body in its interaction with culture. Of course, subsequently I offer a non-physical conception of the body.

The ontological category individual-in-relations demands a reconceptualization of the Self-Other relationship in Historical Materialism. In this section therefore the reconceptualization will be at a philosophical (both ontology and epistemology) level. The dialectical relationship between the Self and the Other is achieved.
through close self-mediation. This implies an aggressive, active Self and a passive Other. The Self completely overcomes the Other. I reconceptualize this with a notion of open self-mediation which recognizes the selfness of the Other i.e., a recalcitrant Other. This reconceptualization allows me to maintain the Self-and-the-Other-as-distinction (class reality) and the Self-and-the-Other-as-difference (non-class reality). Consequently, it allows me to locate both class and non-class subjects within the notion of the emancipatory subject. It allows me to link up the working class movement with the feminist, ethno-communal/national and ecological movements. In the next section, I pursue the argument further by proposing the notion of a multi-self, multi-identity emancipatory subject.

2.5.1. Individual-in-relations

Marx writes that 'To be a slave, to be a citizen, are social characteristics, relations between human beings A and B. Human being A, as such, is not a slave. He is a slave in and through society'.71 Marx's 'in-and-through'-ness is of

utmost importance. And it is this that I shall examine below.

The ontological category that Marx proposes is this -- *individual-in-and-through-social-relations-of-production*. This 'in-and-through'-ness indicates the primacy of relations i.e. the relations of production and it also indicates a 'wiping out' of the 'individual' except as dictated by social relations.

The individual-in-and-through-relations is in effect 'social relations' (of production). It is this relation that is the basis of historical society and its movement forward. Thus, the relations of production is a privileged relation. It is the ground relation.

I shall begin a critical examination of this position, which I shall label as *sociological determinism*. Thus, we can say that Marx's view is a sociological determinist point-of-view. To make it more specific, it is a sociological determinist view privileging social relations of production.

We can have the sociological determinist view in two parts:

(i) individuals who are formed in-and-through-social-relations-of-production; and

(ii) individuals who are formed in-and-through-social-relations, assuming here that there are multiple social relations in society.

148
The 'in-and-through'-ness privileges the social and submerges the biological (not in a physical sense) domain'.

This creates a problem. I shall present below a glimpse of arguments that have emerged from sociobiology. Trigg writes:

...if it is believed that society wholly makes the man, there is no way of validly criticizing a new form of society once it has come into being, whatever its effects on men. New desires and needs will have been created and there is no independent standard according to which they can be criticized.72

He goes to add that

The advocate of an exclusively sociological vision must refrain from theorizing about societies other than his own, and he must not (and cannot) use external criteria to criticize his own. He cannot produce general principles applicable to all societies. What then can he do? He is merely going to be the mouthpiece of the particular prejudices and obsessions of his own society for the benefit of those who already share them.73

Peter E.S. Freund in an article on the 'body' writes that

Social science, in this dualistic thinking so characteristic of Western thought, assigns mind priority over body, and severs it from its embodied form.... Social science eliminates any consideration of continuities between humans and the biological, natural world and of human beings


73. Ibid.

149
as biological entities in its emphasis on a socially constructed world and rejection of sociobiology and related approaches.74

Lumsden and Wilson, in a book on gene-culture coevolution, criticize Marxism for a strong version of sociological determinism:

In our opinion the key error of Marxism as scientific theory of history is its tendency to conceive of human nature as relatively unstructured and largely or wholly the product of external socio-cultural forces.75

Perhaps we can examine more elaborately the reasons for believing so. Lumsden and Wilson have proposed a 'theory of gene-culture coevolution'.76 The gene-culture coevolution


A 'warning' in this work is useful to keep in mind: 'Sociology should not, by default, allow sociobiology to produce the only social-scientific approach to the body'. (p.856)

My purpose of appropriating from sociobiology entails two objectives. There is something important and reasonable in sociobiology's efforts to understand the 'interface' between the biological (physical) and the cultural. I want to appropriate this contribution of sociobiology. At another level, I believe that sociology must actively engage with sociobiology to produce a distinctive approach to the study of the body. We need a sociology of the body.


76. Ibid., p.ix. (preface)
is achieved through a set of 'epigenetic rules'. There are according to Lumsden and Wilson, 'primary and secondary epigenetic rules'.

Primary epigenetic rules are the more automatic processes that lead from sensory filtering to perception. Their consequences are the least subject to variation due to learning and other higher cortical processes. For example, the cones of the retina and the internuncial neurons of the lateral geniculate nucleus are constructed so as to facilitate a perception of four basic colors. The secondary epigenetic rules act on color and all other information displayed in the perceptual fields. They include the evaluation of perception through the processes of memory, emotional response, and decision making through which individuals are predisposed to use certain culturgens in preference to others. Thus fear of strangers represents a form of prepared learning in which human infants from six or eight months to eighteenth months old display an aversion towards adults to whom they are not accustomed...  

What are 'culturgens' that are preferentially chosen?

...a culturgen is a relatively homogeneous set of artifacts, behaviours, or mentifacts (mental constructs having little or no direct correspondence with reality) that either share without exception one or more attribute states selected for their functional importance or at least share a consistently recurrent range of such attribute states within a given polythetic set. 

77. Ibid., p.7. 

'Epigenesis is defined as total process of interaction between genes and the environment during development, with the genes being expressed through epigenetic rules'. (p.36.)

78. Ibid., p.36.

79. Ibid., p.27.
Environmental modification by society

**FIG. - 5 GENE-CULTURE CO-EVOLUTION**
(SOURCE: LUMSDEN AND WILSON, GENE, MIND AND CULTURE, P-347)
A polythetic set is a set of entropy-reducing (disorder reducing) mechanisms that is taxonomic in nature.

The concept of the polythetic set is derived from numerical taxonomy, a methodology that attempts to quantify the degrees of relationship among organisms, species, and other conceivable objects for which classifications are needed. A polythetic group is any set of entities, such as an array of swords or marriage ceremonies, in which each entity possesses a large number of the attributes of the groups, where the attributes might be size, geometric shape, duration of a process, and so forth. Furthermore, each attribute is shared by large numbers of entities, while no single attribute is both sufficient and necessary for group membership.80

The culturgens according to Lumsden and Wilson 'are processed through a sequence of epigenetic rules, which are the genetically determined procedures that direct the assembly of the mind, including the screening of stimuli by periphery sensory filters, the internuncial cellular organizing processes, and the deeper processes of directed cognition. The rules comprise the restraints that genes place on development...’81

The complex relationship between gene and culture in their coevolution incorporating epigenetic rules is presented in figure 5. The force of Lumsden and Wilson’s argument

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80. Ibid.
81. Ibid., p.7.
lies in the fact that 'Nature' has been completely separated from culture by a self-conscious but 'non-self-sensuous' social theory. Having performed this separation, it proposed a study of the 'social' by an observer stripped of his/her 'bodily' nature. In effect, social theory encouraged the study of the social by disembodied beings.\(^{82}\) It encouraged the study of the social by non-existent observers. Because it was unable to carefully develop the idea of an 'embodied observer', it encouraged the theoretical extremities to develop. On the one hand we have the 'proponents of a sociological vision...' (who)...harbour the illusion that if man is a creature of society, you only have to change society to change the man'.\(^{83}\) On the other extreme you have the 'biological determinist'.\(^{84}\) In these extreme forms of looking at human society or understanding the actions of human beings, most of us have forgotten that 'man is more than his genes. He is more than his society'.\(^{85}\) This truth is neither captured by the 'behaviourists' nor the 'sociological determinists'.

\(^{82}\) Peter E.S. Freund, 'Bringing Society into the Body', p.839.  
\(^{83}\) Roger Trigg, The Shaping of Man, p.175.  
\(^{84}\) Biological in the sense of something physical.  
\(^{85}\) Roger Trigg, The Shaping of Man, p.176.
Marxists, belonging to the latter extreme 'seem' to have lost touch with the biological. I say 'seem' because the biological is not a total absence in Marx's writings. He was sensitive to fact of the biological body. In his first thesis on Feuerbach, Marx writes that

The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism (that of Feuerbach included) is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object or of contemplation, but not as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence, in contradiction to materialism, the active side was developed abstractly by idealism -- which, of course, does not know real, sensuous activity as such. Feuerbach wants sensuous objects, really distinct from the thought objects, but he does not conceive human activity itself as objective activity.86

Elsewhere Marx writes

The abolition of private property is therefore the complete emancipation of all human senses and qualities, but it is this emancipation precisely because these senses and attributes have become, subjectively and objectively, human. The eye has become a human eye, just as its object has become a social, human object -- an object made by man for man.87


This elaboration is to indicate that in the 'journey' Marx undertook in order to write his critique of the capitalist society and history, he was sensitive to the biological body. He was also sensitive to the fact that it was idealism that emphasized the active part of human sensuousness. This active aspect was appropriated by Marx in his construction of Historical Materialism. In the development of Marxism and in the forceful theoretical stance of the notion of (sociological determinist) primacy, the 'biological body'-- I am using biological here not exactly in the physical sense -- was submerged and lost to Marxist theory. It was replaced by the assumed plasticity of human nature, an understanding that led to sociological determinism. The plastic man was conceived and a conception of autonomous man was lost and not consonant with the theoretical interest of Marx. Marxism became as a result sociologically determinist. Like most social theories emerging at the turn of the century, Marxism became a social theory of disembodied human beings.

88. I have borrowed these two notions of man from Martin Hollis. They are however not used exactly the way Hollis has used them. See Martin Hollis, Models of Man: Philosophical Thoughts on Social Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p.5.

I say that Marx's notion of Man is 'plastic man' because he believed that human needs are so plastic that they can be completely subordinated to the social.
It is, therefore, particularly important to reconsider the ontological category 'individual-in-and-through-social-relations'. The 'in-and-through'-ness is sociological imperialism. Thus contrary to Marx's claim, there is a careless 'wiping out' of a level of human sensuousness and autonomy. It is therefore necessary for us to reconsider this individual-in-and-through-social-relations in order to remove the imperialist tendency. Of course, such a removal would require us to rework the notion of primacy in Marxist theory.

The recovery of (all the levels of) the biological body for the Marxian social theory is an important input into the reconsideration of individual-in-and-through-social-relations. It is therefore necessary that this be changed to a more sensitive ontological category, a category sensitive to the biological (not in the physical sense) and the sociological. Let me propose the category of individual-in-relations.

Individual-in-relations implies two kinds of relations -- individual in relation to Nature and individual in social relations. In the latter relationship, the 'in'-ness is used in a Janus-faced sense, that is, it has the following meaning:

(i) in-and-through-social-relations

(ii) in-and-of-social-relations
It is a category intended to capture what Trigg meant when he said 'Man is more than his genes [and] he is more than his society'. The space between the 'more'-ness is the terrain of the biological body.

First, we have to be clear that the biological body is different from the physical body. The biological body of human beings is different from the animal body. It is special. Joseph Margolis, commenting on Merleau-Ponty's position, writes:

that the biological cannot be reduced to the physical; that 'body' in the sense of 'lived body' (le corps vecu) cannot have the sense it has in the expression 'physical body' as used in normal physics; that the Cartesian disjunction between the mental and the physical fatally equivocates and suppresses the distinction between the physical and the biological; that the psychological cannot be separated from the biological; and that, to put the point in its boldest and most provocative form, the intentional is already a feature of the bodily.89

The introduction of the 'individual' in the sense of a biological body establishes a region of specificity and autonomy in the ontological category of individual-in-relations. As Carol Gould says, the individual is social but

SOCIAL CLASS PRACTICES

UNIVERSAL ASPECTS

EXISTENTIAL AND CONTINGENT ASPECTS

NON-CLASS PRACTICES

FIG - 6 INDIVIDUAL-IN-RELATIONS
everything about the individual is not captured by the social.90 See figure 6.

There is a need to consider the body also for another very important reason. For Marx, one of the reasons why a sociological determinist position emerged is because there was a need to develop the universal as something purely social. That is, universalization of the capitalist relations of production would result in the emergence of the concrete, empirical universal. This is to erroneously assign only the 'social' as capable of becoming a universal, or as capable of offering the ground for universality. The body also creates the basis for imagination about universality. Processes of birth, death, sexuality and other needs direct universal symbolic activity. Thus, it is also important from this perspective to bring the body into social theory, into reconstructed Historical Materialism.

The introduction of individual-in-relations as an ontological category is the general 'social space'. It is the positing of an arena to allow the possibility of


The idea of 'individual-in-relations' is inspired by this work.
thinking about human society. It must be made categorically clear that there are many kinds/types of social relations and here we are not privileging social relations of production. Thus, what will happen as a result, the whole of the social space will at a more concrete level be 'crowded' by all kinds of relationships and, consequently, social practices. There will be multi-fractured space, multi-fractured by social relations of all kinds. This confusing pluralism provides the starting point for redefining primacy, since we have already dismantled it. But in order to do that, we need to make a further conception of the social space we have introduced. This would involve the development of the internal components of the individual-in-relations.

The individual-in-relations produces two internally linked relational spheres. They reflect, in the final analysis, the movement of labour that we have discussed in chapter one. These two relational spheres are:

(a) Self-and-the-Other-as-Difference; and

(b) Self-and-the-Other-as-Distinction.

The individual-in-relations is the individual as Self or Other in relations. This demands an understanding of the relationship between the Self and the Other. This I shall pursue in the next section.
2.5.2. Self and the Other

There are two relational contexts that are proposed as secreted by the ontological category individual-in-relations. The two relations contexts are:

(a) Self-and-the-Other-as-Difference; and
(b) Self-and-the-Other-as-Distinction.91

The relational context places before us the need to consider the relations between the Self and the Other. To help us think about this relationship, let us consider Hegel. I shall then look at Marx’s and Sartre’s approaches to Hegel’s notion of the Self and the Other. I shall conclude by looking at William Desmond’s elaboration of Otherness in order to arrive at an understanding of Otherness suitable to our needs.

91. The conception of these two relational spheres is inspired by: (a) Marx’s idea of ‘distinction without difference’. I am proposing here distinction with difference by proposing the two spheres, one to sustain the former, the other to sustain the latter; and (b) Mao’s notion of antagonistic and non-antagonistic contradictions. Again these different forms of contradiction can be linked to the two relational spheres.

In Hegel, the frontier between the Self and the Other is broken down by the 'absorption of the Other by Self'. As Hegel puts it, Self as

Determinate being as such is immediate, without relations to an other; or, it is in the determination of being; but as including within itself non-being, it is determinate being, being negated within itself, and then in the first instance an other -- but since at the same time it also preserves itself in its negation, it is only a being-for-other.92

Hegel goes on:

It preserves itself in the negative of its determinate being and is being, but not being in general, but as self-related in opposition to its relation to other, as self-equal in opposition to its inequality. Such a being is being-in-itself.93

Self which 'absorbs' the Other has within it two moments - being-for-other and being-in-itself. These are 'determinations posited as moments of one and the same something, as determinations which are relations and which remain in their unity, in the unity of determinate being. Each, therefore, at the same time, also contains within itself its other moment which is distinguished from it'.94

93. Ibid.
94. Ibid.
It is, therefore, important to understand that for Hegel the unity of Self and Other emerges from the absorption of the Other and the transformation of it into a distinguished moment of Self. Hegel's notion is therefore Self-biased with the Other lost in passivity in the 'being-for-other', which is a moment of Self. It is interesting here to point to the fact that this conception of Self had an aggressive male bias.95

The notion of the Self and the Other was preserved by Marx in his appropriation of Hegel. This is reflected in Marx's claim of a movement of society that would finally allow the proletariat to absorb the Other into distinction of the same determinate being, the concrete universal. Marx's attempt to create such a notion of future society is also to overcome the problem of the sociology of knowledge.

The way Jean-Paul Sartre responds to the Hegelian Self-Other relationship is drastically different from that of Marx. Though, here we will not go into his notion of Self and Other, a notion that is unfruitful for our purpose, it will be a worthwhile exercise to look at his criticism of the Hegelian notion. Sartre, to begin with, charges Hegel of

being guilty of twofold optimism - epistemological and ontological optimism.96

Sartre observes that Hegel seems to believe that 'the truth of self-consciousness can appear; that is, that an objective agreement can be realized between consciousnesses -- by authority of the Other's recognition of me and my recognition of the Other.'97 Sartre elaborates the point:

For Hegel indeed truth is truth of the Whole. And he places himself at the vantage point of truth -- i.e., of the Whole -- to consider the problem of the Other. Thus when Hegelian monism considers the relation of consciousness, it does not put itself in any particular consciousness. Although the Whole is to be realized, it is already there as the truth of all which is true. Thus when Hegel writes that every consciousness, since it is identical with itself, is other than the Other, he has established himself in the whole, outside consciousnesses, and he considers them from the point of view of the Absolute. For individual consciousnesses are moments in the whole, moments which by themselves are Unselbständig, and the whole is a mediator between consciousnesses.98


97. Ibid., p.324.

98. Ibid., p.328.
He concludes that

I can not know myself in the Other if the Other is first an object for me; neither can I apprehend the Other in his true being -- that is, in his subjectivity. No universal knowledge can be derived from the relation of consciousnesses. This is what we shall call their ontological separation.99

Having stated his criticism of epistemological optimism, Sartre next moves to a criticism of Hegel's ontological optimism which Sartre understands as 'plurality [that] can and must be surpassed toward the totality'.100 Hegel is insensitive to the ontological separation of the Self and the Other according to Sartre. This is because 'he [Hegel] has forgotten his own consciousness; he is the Whole, and consequently if he so easily resolves the problem of particular consciousnesses it is because for him there never has been any real problem in this connection. Actually he does not raise the question of the relation between his consciousness and that of the Other'.101

Sartre further adds that

In a word the sole point of departure is the interiority of the cogito. We must understand by this that each one must be able by starting out

99. Ibid.
100. Ibid.
101. Ibid.
from his own interiority, to reconsider the Other's being as a transcendence which conditions the very being of that interiority. This of necessity implies that the multiplicity of consciousnesses is on principle unsurpassable, for I can undoubtedly transcend myself toward a Whole, but I can not establish myself in this Whole so as to contemplate myself and to contemplate the Other. No logical or epistemological optimism can cover the scandal of the plurality of consciousnesses.102

With this exposition, it is clear that Sartre's criticism of Hegel's notion of Self and Other fleshed out in the criticism of epistemological and ontological optimism is distinctly different from that of Marx. In the rest of this section, we will take a look at the reality of a 'plural' condition (which Sartre is extremely conscious of) and the impossibility of the absorption of the Other by the Self. In (young) Sartre this sensitivity is articulated as unresolvable dualism, an unbearable conflict between Self and Other. To think about the Self and the Other not just in terms of dialectical transcendence or dualism, we need to turn elsewhere and look at the work of William Desmond and the notion of 'metaxological intermediation'.103 Let me briefly present the general drift of his argument.

102. Ibid., p.329.

Desmond is a contemporary American philosopher. I find his work particularly exciting. Desmond's book 'is a philosophical effort to deal with the problem of otherness'.

It is an extremely rich treatment of the problem of otherness. Desmond treats the problem of otherness through the pathway of Desire. 'Reflection on desire,' Desmond writes, 'may yield philosophy a pathway of thought in the middle between the extremes of abstract analysis and an immediacy that is totally inarticulate. Desire erupts in experience; it does so spontaneously and, to that extent, is immediate. But beyond its initial, spontaneous upsurge, it may unfold in an articulated, mediated way.'

Human desire is restless and is in a search for immanent wholeness. The 'restlessness [of human desire] reveals what we might call certain intentional infinitude marking the human self...'

Desmond is critical of the way this desire for wholeness is constructed in Hegel in which an aggressive Self 'absorbs' a passive Other. Replacing this form of 'closed wholeness', Desmond proposes 'an intermediate view of human wholeness that avoids a fixed closure on the one

104. Ibid., p.1.
105. Ibid., p.9.
106. Ibid., p.12.
hand and sheer indefinite openness on the other'. 107 By conceptualizing this, Desmond leads us to conceptualize a form of relationship and mediation between Self and the Other in which desire comes to terms with finitude as 'affirmative finitude'. The Other is irreducible to Self’s desire for infinite wholeness. There is 'a certain inviolable value in the being of the other, one that is especially acknowledged when desire takes the form of goodwill'. 108 This is one aspect of what Desmond calls the 'agapeic otherness'. 109 As a result the 'sense of finitude is not our passive lacking existing which, of course, is inevitably shaken up by desire’s infinite restlessness. It is emergent rather in recognition of the inexhaustibility of otherness, the suggestion of infinity in the agapeic other. Here is no degrading of finitude, but an open space eliciting the creative power of finitude, while curbing the individual’s pretension to be the sole original. The degrading of finitude occurs, rather, when desire deforms its own possibility and through the power of negation tries to diminish the other to a subordinate role in desire’s own self-aggrandizement.' 110 (underscoring mine)

107. Ibid., p.13.
108. Ibid., pp.163-164.
109. Ibid., p.163.
110. Ibid., pp.168-169.
Putting it differently, Desmond writes that 'Human desire unavoidably seeks its own wholeness, and, just as unavoidably, this search coexists in tension with its openness to otherness. This is just human doubleness. Or better, we are always a middle between these two exigencies of our being. The deformation of desire's doubleness emerges when we try to close dialectical desire into an absolutely self-sufficient self-mediation.'\textsuperscript{111} (underscoring mine.) Desire achieves a sense of infinite wholeness with agapeic goodwill, for it 'discloses what is beyond contestation and antagonism, what is beyond agonistic lack'.\textsuperscript{112} Desmond writes that 'we love what lets us be, what sets us free. The metaxological [discussed below; see footnote 120] community of being is exemplified in agapeic goodwill, because the difference it affirms is not a breach within one absorbing unit but a free expansion between original unities. Self and other cannot be reduced to objectifiable things, for they are worlds within themselves.'\textsuperscript{113} Desire ultimately achieves a sense of wholeness even while accepting affirmative finitude.

\textsuperscript{111} Ibid., p.167.
\textsuperscript{112} Ibid., p.174.
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid.
Desmond's philosophical point of view is very interesting. However, I do not agree with Desmond in every detail. I think the general drift of his argument is very useful to me, to my reconstructive effort. Through the concepts that he has developed in his book I have been able to conceptualize Self and Other as distinction and as difference, both of which are the internal components of the ontological category that I have introduced, individual-in-relations.

Before we elaborate the Self-Other relationship as understood by Desmond, it will be fruitful to consider some of the reasons for which these ideas were developed. On Hegel's position, Desmond writes:

The metaphysical coup de grace was rather to subsume otherness within dialectical Aufhebung, yielding diversity within unity, difference within identity, otherness within sameness. Otherness thus seems to be both saluted and domesticated within a larger, overarching totality.114

He goes on to add that

The problem of otherness in relation to man's finitude can be put in terms of what has been called Hegel's 'panlogism'. This is a reading of Hegel's thought as a philosophical system for which nothing but reason is actual; whatever is not rational is merely an evanescent, eventually self-cancelling existence.115

114. Ibid., p.1.
115. Ibid., p.2.
Desmond presents a long but very significant way of thinking about Self and the Other. I shall quote him in entirety before considering his specific contribution in greater detail.

Let me state the issue in terms of the notions of identity and difference. There is both a positive and a negative aspect to the matter. Negatively, one might assert one’s identity by withdrawing from the fullness of otherness in such a way that the difference between human beings and the rest of being becomes a dualistic opposition. Then one might be tempted to one of two alternatives: to will to appropriate what is other and incorporate it within a horizon that subordinates being in its difference to us, as, say, in the Cartesian project of the mastery and possession of nature; or to disperse one’s own difference in the manifoldness of the outer world in a manner that reduces one’s identity to one finite thing among other finite things. In connection with these alternatives, there are two extremes to be avoided: first, that of fixing difference in such a way that genuine mediation becomes impossible; second, that of allowing the notion of identity to dominate to such an extent that the mediation of difference becomes, instead, its reduction or disappearance. This allows us to state the problem positively. The question then is how, in avoiding these extremes, one can be affirmatively rooted in oneself, yet appropriately in relation to being other than oneself. The solution is not to disperse the centre of selfhood within or to absorb the outer without, but rather, to enter into a fitting relation within what is other to proper wholeness within oneself. The issue, that is, involves the possibility of a double attainment: internal wholeness of being and external harmony with being.116

116. Ibid., p.5.
Four relations -- 'fundamental relations' -- are proposed between Self and Other. These are

![Diagram of four fundamental self-other relationships: Univocal, Equivocal, Dialectical, Metaxological]

**FIG. 7: FOUR FUNDAMENTAL SELF-OTHER RELATIONSHIPS**

(i) **Univocal**

This is relationship of immediate identity. 'It stresses their sameness, excluding any difference between them and asserting that their oneness precludes their manyness. It also excludes any internal differentiation in either the self or the other.'\(^\text{117}\)

(ii) **Equivocal**

This is relationship of simple, unmediated difference. 'It puts the accent on sheer difference,

\(^\text{117}\) Ibid., p. 6.
barring the possibility of conjunction. It underscores manyness without the possibility of oneness and, like the difference of recent deconstructive thought, tends to undermine the possibility of a grounded immanent identity of the self'. 118 (underscoring mine.)

(iii) Dialectical

This is a relationship of neither sameness nor unmediated difference. 'First, by contrast with the univocal, the very notion of relation implies some difference, however slight. Second, by contrast with the equivocal, every relation entails some mediation of this difference, however minimal'. 119

(iv) Metaxological120

Like dialectical relation, 'the metaxological relation affirms that the self and the other are

118. Ibid.
119. Ibid.
120. Ibid., p.7.

'This neologism, despite its unpleasing sound, has a very specific significance for our purposes, for it is composed of the Greek words metaxu (in between, middle, intermediate) and logos (word, discourse, account,
neither absolutely the same nor absolutely different. But, unlike the dialectical, it does not confine the mediation of external difference to the side of the self. It asserts, rather, that external difference can be mediated from the side of the other, as well as from that of the self ...the metaxological relation allows the mediation of external difference from both sides, and because both sides are rich in their difference, not only in their mediation, it does not circumscribe their difference within an overarching monism....it grounds a positive plurality, each of whose members is rich in its distinctive identity, and whose mediation is not only self-mediation but also inter-mediation. In sum, the intermediation of metaxological relation grounds an open community of self and other. Beyond mere unity, beyond sheer manyness, beyond manyness within a single unity, it entails a community of full unities, each of which is inexhaustibly manifold within itself'.

121. Ibid., pp.7-8.
A deeper and more elaborate understanding of these relationships can be brought out in the context of the knowledge of Otherness. There are three key notions relevant to such knowledge: immediacy, self-mediation and intermediation.

What is immediate knowing? Crudely, this is the brute experience of the Other. This kind of knowing 'tends to diminish, if not eliminate, the complex, internal self-differentiation of the knower in a way that makes it difficult to distinguish knowing consciousness from an undifferentiated awareness'. Immediate knowing can be personified in two 'ideal-typical types' -- the narcissist and the naive realist. The narcissist says 'The world is an image of me, univocally the same as me'. The naive realist advances the counterclaim 'I am an image of the world, univocally the same as it'. Both these types produce two kinds of states:

... an exclusive subjectivism (the reflective counterpart of immediate narcissism) leads to a dominance of self and fails to do justice to the
Alternatively, an exclusive objectivism (reflecting naive realism's sense of minimally mediated difference) furthers a forgetfulness of the self and literally loses its mind while claiming to give itself over to external things. It petrifies a difference into an opposition. Both these positions forfeit something essential. If

122. Ibid., p.111.
we forsake the self, we also rid ourselves of the world, for we surrender any internal principle of recalcitrant difference of what is other. discrimination. If we take flight from the world, we relinquish articulate selfhood, for then we collapse into formlessness without some degree of external definition.123 (underscoring mine.)

Immediate knowing is, therefore, inadequate and needs to be transcended. The simple fact is that 'knowing is an act of relating, it unavoidably implies mediation...'.124 'We must grant the knower's active power, the knower's internal self-differentiation and efforts to differentiate the initially unappropriated tumult of existence in its otherness. Here our focus is on the second notion of self-mediation.... With this, we rescue the knower from an unduly passive receptivity and counter the opposing dominance of a merely confronting externality'.125 However, in this form of mediation 'the self tends to assert its dominance while the other is assigned a subordinate role in its self-activity, and self-mediation per se tends to become ruler of the total realm of mediation...'.126

123. Ibid., p.112.
124. Ibid.
125. Ibid.
126. Ibid., p.113.
Both these ways of knowing i.e., immediate and self-mediated, are limited. And they need to be transcended. Let us take up step by step Desmond's argument for 'metaxological intermediation'. First, in the conception of the Other and its overcoming by dialectical self-mediation, Hegel conceives the Other as negativity and passivity. He 'does not seem to entertain a radically affirmative sense of otherness. Consequently, the end he seeks is to subordinate otherness to a subsuming unity'.\(^{127}\) (underscoring mine.) For Hegel, all differences are 'ultimately self-differentiation'. He, therefore, has no notion of recalcitrant difference.

If a notion of affirmative otherness is accepted, then we need to reconsider the Self-Other relationship and the knowledge of otherness. Thus 'what is important here is not to repudiate self-mediation or the intention of its advocate -- namely, to preserve an appropriately rich sense of self-identity. The difficulty is that this preservation may sometimes come to lack proper discrimination. That is, the difficulty is not with self-mediation, but with closed self-mediation. The trouble with closed self-mediation is not unrelated to that with sheer immediacy: when self-mediation points to the need to complete the incomplete self-knowledge

\(^{127}\) Ibid., p.121.
of immediacy, it too is sometimes determined by the implicit assumptions of immediacy. These assumptions tend to be dualistic. Where immediacy is tied to an external dualism, mitigated by the dominance of the other and by the submission of the passive self, self-mediation (at least when it succumbs to the temptation of closure) becomes yoked to the same dualism; only in this case we have a reversed order of independence and subservience, which seems to allow for the subsumption of all external difference within the knower’s own active self-development. Neither of these dualisms is adequate, either to self-knowledge or to knowledge of otherness. The stress on immediacy tends to abridge self-knowledge and so inevitably mars knowledge of otherness. Closed self-mediation tends to reductionist outcome with respect to knowledge of the other, an outcome that eventually truncates even proper self-knowing'.

(underscoring mine.)

With an open self-mediation, we get a better picture of our intention of knowing. This ‘articulates itself in terms of a double directionality. The middle space of all mediation bears this twofold intention, which expresses itself, on the one hand, in the exigence for self-knowledge, and on the

128. Ibid., p.113.
other hand, in genuine openness to otherness'. This allows for a more positive notion of otherness. There is appropriation but one that 'involves openness, comprehension and further openness, and not, as in the first case, openness, comprehension and subsumption'. (underscoring mine.)

This sensitivity to the Other and the notion of an open self-mediation demands another notion of mediation. Hegel, to make another critical point, seemed to have believed that self-mediation exhausts all mediation. Is this so? 'Any adequate mediation between a plurality of individuals, each marked by the power of dialectical self-mediation, cannot be exhausted by dialectical self-mediation. For, with a plurality of such individuals, neither the externality of their rich singularity nor the association of their diverse manyness can be subsumed by any single absorbing unity'.

We need therefore another form of mediation. 'Immediacy rightly grasps the convergence of the other on this middle space, but by congealing this other and purifying the self, it goes against the grain of its own intent to affirm

129. Ibid., p.117.
130. Ibid., p.125.
131. Ibid., p.116.
otherness. Self-mediation correctly recognizes the activity of the self but, in pacifying the other, inflates the self in an exaggerated way. Immediacy and closed self-mediation fail to allow both sides of the intermediation to flower out of themselves and so to meet in a middle that neither defines completely by itself and in which neither is completely determinative of the other'.\textsuperscript{132} (underscoring mine.) Thus, intermediation acknowledges the essential recalcitrance of the Other and lets it be.

This acknowledgement does not however neglect self-mediation. 'Self-mediation is essential to intermediation, for without the former, the latter would collapse into inarticulate immediacy. The desire to know, when directed toward otherness, is thwarted if, at the same time, it fails to conserve self-consciousness, the concomitant of self-mediation. This requirement is intrinsic to any knowing, since it involves nothing other than the knower's articulateness concerning the fulfillment or frustration of his epistemic intention. Without it, knowledge of otherness would be a loss of self-consciousness in the other'.\textsuperscript{133} (underscoring mine.)

\textsuperscript{132} I{\textup{b}}id., p.115

\textsuperscript{133} I{\textup{b}}id., p.117.
Yet, self-mediation's perspective on difference 'regards it as ultimately a privation of identity. To remedy this privation, self-mediation is always exposed to the temptation [in its bond with otherness] to seek a culminating, monistic totality. The sense of difference acknowledged by intermediation is not a dispersed multiplicity to be annulled by such totality, however. Intermediation is grounded in the interplay of a positive plurality, and this interplay has the effect of constituting such plurality as a certain community of being. Each identity is greeted in its difference; nor is their meeting encased in some further incorporating identity'.

The difference required by metaxological relation produces a situation unlike that envisaged by post-structuralists/post-modernists. The 'sense of difference required by the metaxological relation is not dualistic opposition, but positive plurality. This, of course, is conditional upon difference of identity. But if different identities are already rich centres of originative existence (like participants in a Platonic dialogue), they are not, relative to themselves, catatonically alone; nor, relative to others, need they be estranged'. (underscoring mine.) Thus,

134. Ibid., pp.116-117.
135. Ibid., p.127.
'metaxological relation, by contrast, constitutes a community of being that is formed in the interstices and interplays between a plurality of originals. This community cannot be included within any final whole, because its composition is framed by the difference and identity of more than one whole. It is not defined by a dialectical self-mediation between one original and its images, but by the space between different dialectical originals...The balanced equilibrium here between identity and difference neither declines into the univocal or the equivocal, nor does it spiral into the dialectical, if this is taken to imply a circumscription of otherness'. 136 (underscoring mine.)

We began this exposition of Self and Other by proposing two basic relational contexts:

(a) Self-and-the-Other-as-Difference; and
(b) Self-and-the-Other-as-Distinction.

This was done by merely stating the two contexts. Now that we have worked out the relationship between Self and the Other, we can reconsider the basic relational contexts from the ground. We proposed the ontological category

136. Ibid.
individual-in-relations. The individual in individual-in-relations can either be a Self or an Other, existentially. Thus, we undertook to understand the relationship between the Self and the Other. We elaborated on four relationships to which we tied three approaches to knowing otherness. Of these aspects, dialectical open self-mediation and metaxological intermediation are of great importance.

Dialectical open self-mediation creates the following situation. Because it is self-mediation, the relational context (ii) tends towards a dialectical whole i.e. a 'manyness within a single unity'. But, because it is open self-mediation, this process is more complicated. The open self-mediation 'splits' the Other. Self-mediation creates a situation in which the Self is a 'manyness within a single unity'. It is confronted with a different Other. This requires another form of mediation i.e. metaxological intermediation. The self-and-the-other-as-difference is a relational context born out of the Self and the Other relating to each other as
different 'manyness within a single unity'. I have presented this in figure 8 below. It must be kept in mind that the relational contexts we have elaborated above with the two different forms of mediation are internal components of individual-in-relations.

Fig.8: THE INTERNAL COMPONENTS OF INDIVIDUAL-IN-RELATIONS

We need to make one 'corrective' to Desmond's fruitful philosophical analysis. We have discussed in chapter one the two internally related movements of labour. The generic nature of labour is captured by context (a), while the existentially contingent and difference-sensitive nature of
the other movement is captured by context (b). Now, unlike what Desmond constructs, not all selves as they totalize become sensitive to the recalcitrant difference of their Others. Class relations, for instance, are relations between capital and labour. Both of these, i.e. capital and labour (or labour-power) are fundamentally the same; they are mere distinctions of the Same. And so derivatively, the two dialectically related classes are really distinctions of the Same. Dialectical open self-mediation would really mean that classes are overcome but results in metaxological intermediation between two or more existentially different forms of living labour, which can never be equated. (I will take this issue up again chapter four.) The deconstitution of classes is fleshed out in the social as universalizing institutions. Other relational totalities can emerge given the fact that there are differences dictated by existential contingencies (and their derivatives) like sex and race. Metaxological intermediation seeks to pacify the sensitivity to the recalcitrant difference of the Other which is also dialectically open self-mediating.

It is also important here to undo the chaotic plurality that we had introduced in the act of dismantling primacy as understood in Marxist theory. The individual-in-relations is a condition of the individual being implicated in a number of relations (or relational totalities). This conception
results in a chaotic pluralism with no potential of redefining primacy. It is this kind of pluralism that we have undertaken to undo by developing a relationship between Self and the Other through metaxological intermediation. This kind of mediation, depending on dialectical open self-mediation, defines a sense of pluralism that is not drastically antagonistic to the critical intention of Historical Materialism. Thus individual-in-relations 'breathing' through the two relational contexts defines positive pluralism. We are now ready to move to the last section and to present a reconsidered notion of primacy.

2.6. PRIMACY AND POSITIVE PLURALISM

I have in the previous section made, I hope, a fairly consistent criticism of the notion of primacy as it is understood and developed in Marxist theory. This notion is too restrictive and it does not come to terms with many significant social realities in the contemporary social world. As such, there is a need to reconstruct primacy. Without a notion of primacy there will be a serious problem in terms of social analysis.

Given our notion of a plural reality, it is possible to conceive of three theoretical directions we can take and
these are already established traditions. I shall merely state them without elaborating then:

(i) Post-liberalism;
(ii) Non-foundational Nihilism; and
(iii) Non-foundational Universalism.

The directions assumed by (i) and (ii) are unfruitful for our purpose as they are 'blind' to the processes resources born out of modernism, particularly a structure of universality. In order that we may not lose this important historical resource through which human societies have moved or are moving, we shall pay particular attention to the third position. This position maintains a closer association to the themes developed by Marx's social theory.

2.6.1. Non-Foundational Universalism

By denying the conception of primacy of the social relations of production, we have effectively withdrawn the foundation or point-of-view that is privileged in Marxist theory. Such a denial would mean assuming the non-foundationalist position. Let us explore this notion.

Foundationalism is about the foundation of knowledge. 'The classical foundationalist divides our beliefs into two groups: those which need support from others and those
which can support others and need no support themselves. The latter constitute our epistemological foundations, the former the superstructure built on those foundations'. 137

Let us suppose we have a belief A. One may want to know what led to belief A. The answer could be B. And what led to B? C, and so on. But this does not lead to infinite regression. There is a belief Y where it stops and Y is the foundation that provides the basis for all other beliefs. Y is independent and foundational.

The non-foundationalist would seek no such foundation, or divide belief into two groups. Knowledge is constituted inter-subjectively and dialogically. The foundationalist would be comfortable with a correspondence theory of truth. That is to say the foundation is lodged 'out there' in reality that language is trying to faithfully 'map'. 138


Grace writes: 'The basic epistemological assumption of the mapping view might be stated as follows: there is a common world out there and our languages are analogous to maps of this world. Thus, this common world is represented or 'mapped' (with greater or lesser distortion) by all languages'. (p.6.)
Truth is the correspondence between the belief and its determinate, external constraint. The non-foundationalist would be comfortable with a coherence theory of truth. That is, "coherence" of beliefs is taken to be the criterion in the determination of truth. Coherence cannot be just construed to be a product of imagination. A good novel is a coherent piece of writing but is hardly a set of dependable beliefs about the world. Thus, "coherence" need not necessarily imply imaginative fabrication. It is possible to imagine the coherence principle being applied as a primary criterial condition for a set of beliefs to be determined as true but in such a way as to 'correspond' to the empirical actuality. It is important to keep in mind that coherence is brought about by constant dialogue in a social reality in which the Self and the Other relate in dialectical open self-mediation and metaxological intermediation.

The dialogical tension remains, 'erupting' here and there to establish a coherence of the different views of the social world. One can imagine this to be close to the notion of Mao's non-antagonistic contradiction. This dependence on coherence, and not correspondence, provides for a form of non-foundationalism which I can appropriate for the reconstruction of the notion of primacy.
I have briefly fleshed out non-foundationalism. What needs
to be done is understanding how it has a property of
universalism. We can think of coherency theory as having a
number of tendencies:

(i) sensitivity towards otherness;
(ii) maintenance of dialogical tension; and
(iii) universalism in a twofold sense.

Can coherency theory make a claim for universalism? The
plurality objection\textsuperscript{139} is critical of such a claim. Let us
follow the argument. The plurality objection claims that
for a set of facts, there can be multiple coherent theories.
So which is true? 'We should ask whether there is any other
theory of truth, any other account of what truth is, which
fares better. It emerges quickly that none of the standard
theories of truth have the desired consequence that there
can only be one set of truths. Certainly the traditional
opponent of the coherence theory, the correspondence theory,
faces the same difficulties. Correspondence theories try to
erect an account of truth upon the undeniable remark that
for a proposition to be true is for it to fit the facts.
But as long as facts and true

\textsuperscript{139}. Jonathan Dancy, An Introduction to Contemporary
Epistemology, p.113.
propositions are kept separate from each other, what is there to prevent there being two distinct sets of propositions which "fit the facts" equally well? We must either admit that the plurality objection is as effective against one theory as it is against another, and abandon the demand that 'the truth' be somehow unique, or admit that though the truth must be unique, it is somehow not part of the role of the theory of truth to show this'.

The plurality objection still has teeth to cause damage to coherency theory. 'After all, the coherentist must admit that the competing theories are all true (since they are all equally coherent), while the correspondence theorist can say that one is true and the others false. The correspondence theorist has this advantage because he says that there is something beyond and distinct from the competing theories, the world, which can make it the case that one is true and the rest false. So the coherentist cannot really give a good sense to the notion that the different theories compete or are incompatible, it seems'. This is weakness, it is claimed. This weakness is addressed in two ways. 'First, we can say that for the coherentist each theory is

140. Ibid., p.115.
141. Ibid.
incompatible with every other because one cannot embrace two theories at once, on pain of loss of coherence. So from the point of view of someone with a theory, every other theory is false because it cannot be added to the true theory. And second, it is only from the point of view of the world, a point of view external to any theory, that the correspondence theorist has an advantage. Only those people who hold no theory at all but view all theories from outside can give a sense to the notion of incompatibility between theories beyond that which the coherentist has already given. But there is no such thing as a theory-free, external, viewpoint. So the coherentist can give an account of what it is for two coherent theories to be incompatible, and there is no further account which only the correspondence theorist can give'\textsuperscript{142}

It seems that universalism can be thought of through coherency if we want to avoid a situation of unmanageable, chaotic pluralism. But let me approach the problem in another but related way. Metaxological intermediation is dependent on dialectical open self-mediation. This I have, following William Desmond, established above. A certain universality is an internal requirement for thinking about metaxological intermediation as I understand it. Thus,

\textsuperscript{142} Ibid., pp. 115-116.
coherency operates on the basis of a 'certain' universality i.e. a social context of institutionalized practices that provide dialogical tension between the Self and the Other to develop into a generalized capacity. That this generalization does not lead to a chaotic plural situation is constrained by the intersubjective need for some sort of coherency. This generalization based on the materiality of universalized (or universalizing) institutional practice provides for a double sense of universalism. Or to be more precise, non-foundational universalism.

Now that we have discussed to some extent non-foundational universalism, we can move towards redefining the notion of primacy which will take us away from the tyranny of the primacy of relations of production.

2.6.2. Primacy and the Emancipatory Subject

Let us examine the notion of primacy a little more closely as understood in Marxist theory. The relations of production is assigned primacy. The primacy thus allows us to determine the nature of the social formation. This privileging is important because it is directly linked to the agency of social trans-formation. Primacy is proposed, in the final analysis, to locate the 'ground' that would 'transport' society to an imagined (communist) future.
Thus, the notion of primacy has also another important aspect to it, this 'imagined future'.143 Let me tie up the idea that I am developing here: Primacy presupposes an agency of transformation that undergoes internal development in the movement towards an emancipated future.

In our attempt to reconsider the primacy of relations of production, I have, through some elaboration, pluralized social reality and with it I have made the proletariat, as it were, one among the four that go to make the agency of emancipation. This requires the reconsideration of the agency of transformation, or the emancipatory subject. Such a reconsideration will throw some light on the way that we will rework primacy.

2.6.3. Multi-Self, Multi-Identity Emancipatory Subject

The notion of an emancipatory subject is tied to the proletariat. Being a single, or in a sense 'pure' collective subject, it is conceived in an important sense as a single Self subject - the concrete universal. That is,

143. I use 'imaginary' here to mean a real structural possibility of the present. This possibility which is captured by theoretical imagination conceives of a future, born out of the present, in which the social, political and economic ills of today are overcome by active human intervention. I am not using 'imagine' to mean 'illusory'.
the subject can be thought of only within the 'confines' of an individual. It is necessary for us to reconsider this way of thinking about the emancipatory subject. Let me propose the notion of an emancipatory subject with multiple selves. And as a corollary, I wish to think about each Self as a composite of multiple identities.

What is this notion of a multi-self emancipatory subject?

(i) First, this notion of the subject is a notion that questions the idea of thinking about a person within the confines of an individual. The emancipatory subject is not identical with the individual organism. The 'person' is not confined to the consciousness of one's own body.144

(ii) This larger-than-the-individual organism points to the possibility of thinking of the emancipatory subject as a product of 'inter-corporeality'. How can we think of this? Let me present two examples. Though they are somewhat crude examples, they do,

to some extent, communicate what I mean. First, when we meet someone at a shop or a street junction we sometimes do not just greet her. We immediately ask her about her mother or her husband or her children or friends. Why do we do this? What we really encounter is not just an individual organism who is our friend but an 'intercorporeal' being, a person, as I like to understand. Another example of the 'family'. We cannot think of a family by merely thinking of a person. But our idea of a family really consists of a number of individual beings. The family is a mental creation of the experience of intercorporeality. The emancipatory subject I am here engaged in thinking about has this quality.

(iii) To get a deeper experience of the presence of such an intercorporeal being, we need to tie it up with ideas we have developed earlier. We have already questioned the virtues of closed self-mediation and replaced it with dialectical open self-mediation. This openness brings into being a sensitivity to the recalcitrant difference of the Other. The recalcitrance (of the Other) enlarges the notion of the emancipatory subject.
(iv) The process of open self-mediation is totalizing but because it is open, multiple totalities emerge resulting in a plural condition. This seemingly chaotic pluralism is overcome by metaxological intermediation. The fact is that metaxological intermediation is dependent on open self-mediation. Like the argument that we have put down in the subsection on non-foundational universalism this multi-self emancipatory subject possesses two senses of universalism. Thus, as a social context of institutionalized practices universalized at one level, the material possibility of dialogical tension/co-existence assumes a generalized capacity at another level. (There is another source of universal imagination that we will not consider here i.e. the biological body.) These internal movements in the subject removes the totalitarian tendency and self-closed inertia of the Marxian dialectic, with the coming of the communist society. The multi-self emancipatory subject therefore has the capacity not to lead to self-closure but to positive pluralism.

(v) Having elaborated on the multi-self emancipatory subject in rather abstract terms, it would be fruitful to think about it in more concrete, metaphorical terms. For this shall draw two ideas from Jon Elster.
Loosely Integrated Set of Selves

(I) A firm may serve as an analogy. 'Subunits within a firm may achieve considerable independence and autonomy. One subunit may proceed on the basis of information that another unit already knows to be outdated. In spite of the knowledge that this is liable to happen, the direction of the firm may still decide that the overall value of independent subunits outweighs the loss of efficiency'.145

(II) Another idea of organization can be thought of in terms of a central planning agency. Such an agency can delegate 'the less important tasks to habits and subroutines, knowing that this may occasionally lead one astray, but believing that on balance the outcome will be better than if the full power of the mind were brought to bear on every issue (since the full power would then at any given occasion be smaller)'.146

(III) Another way of thinking about it is to think of coordination, not rational direction. Thus 'there

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146. Ibid., pp.3-4.
may be no direction that bears responsibility for
the lack of coordination. There might be less, or
more, coordination than a rational direction would
have chosen'.147

(b) Hierarchical Selves

This is the second notion that I shall borrow from
Elster. 'The self that constitutes the person
[not used in the way I have used it in this
section] is not the stronger or more decisive
self, the self that gets its way: it is the self
that entertains higher order intentions about
other selves'.148

We can think of the emancipatory subject in terms
of (a) and (b). The more inclusive self, professing higher-order intentions (i.e., the
class self) is at the top of the hierarchy and the
more exclusive self professing difference is at
the lower part. However, the exclusive selves are
a plural reality and are therefore better thought
of as organized in terms of the ideas presented in
(a).

147. Ibid., p.4.
148. Ibid., p.11.
The selves that make up the multi-self of the emancipatory subject are a composite of multiple identities. Let us recall the ontological category individual-in-relations. The individual i.e., the 'constant' is implicated in a number of relations. Thus, it results in the individual 'possessing' a number of identities that may be held loosely together. It is also possible to think about these identities as resources available to the individual to be used at various crisis points. See Figure 9.

Let us consider individual-in-relations again. The individual is implicated in a number of relations. But these relations primarily belong to the two relational contexts i.e., self-and-the-other-as-difference and self-and-the-other-as-distinction. The material basis of these contexts goes back to the two movements of human labour. Thus, the individual is generic in one sense. In another sense, particularly when their existential contingencies are considered, they are different, separated from each other (as individuals or collectivities).

149. Jon Elster's ideas would be more applicable to this situation.
We have, therefore, a number of very basic relations in which the individual is implicated. These are relations between the sexes, the ethno-communities, between humanity and Nature (not in the sphere of production) and between classes. These relations are tied to sets of resources that mark them as what they are. These relations are also related very intimately to the existential condition of the biological body (not used in the physical sense). All other relations are derivative.

In the context of contemporary historical development, these relations have formed the basis of four global movements:

(i) the workers movement;
(ii) the feminist movement;
(iii) the ethno-communal/national movement; and
(iv) the ecological movement.

The four movements are the result of four spheres of struggle - the class struggle, the 'genderic' struggle, the cultural autonomy struggle and the struggle for civilizational survival. All these movements have globalized. Of these (i) belongs to relational context (a), and the rest to the relational context (b). For the moment,
(i) MULTI-IDENTITY

A : WORKING CLASS MOVEMENT
B : FEMINIST MOVEMENT
C : ETHNO-COMMUNAL / NATIONAL MOVEMENT
D : ECOLOGICAL MOVEMENT.

(ii) MULTI-SELF

FIG 9 : THE MULTI-SELF, MULTI-IDENTITY EMANCIPATORY SUBJECT
I shall not consider the ecological movement. Among the rest, there are three 'pure' collective subjects - the proletariat, women, and ethno-community. The multi-self emancipatory subject we are talking about consists of these selves. Whereas, the multiple identities lay the emphasis on the individual in individual-in-relations, the multiple self lays emphasis on the relations. I have tried to show this in figure 9.

The removal of the primacy of relations of production removes the assigning of the proletariat as the sole

150. Among the entities that have no 'voice' to speak out are 'Nature', 'future generations', 'species of plants and animals' and 'human-civilization-in-general'. Conditions now exist that can destroy all these entities. Such a destruction would also mean the extinction of Life. Homo Sapien's imperialist tendency today has put all life on Earth in danger. The quest for absolute abundance is destroying the natural support system. ' Humanity' cannot wait for a proletarian revolution to save itself of the dangers posed by the development that is being undertaken by nearly all the nations around the globe. Since the dominant form of socialism is also based on abundance, there is no natural ground within the proletarian movement for a consciousness and political practice to emerge whose central concern will be the protection of Nature, future generations, life of other species and 'humanity-in-general'. The ecological movement is the 'ground' in which such a consciousness and political practice are emerging. The ecological movement has given rise to what may be called the 'biosphere consciousness'. See for instance Raymond F. Dasmann, 'Toward A Biosphere-Consciousness' in Donald Worster (ed.), The Ends of Earth: Perspectives on Modern Environmental History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp.277-288.
emancipatory subject. However, without the class relation (and hence the proletariat) the material possibility for generalizing active dialogical tension/co-existence between Self and the Other would be inconsequential. If dialogical tension is not held within the emancipatory being we give way to totalitarian tendency. The multi-Self, multi-identity emancipatory subject is proposed to overcome this dilemma.

2.7. CONCLUSION

I started this chapter with the intention of thinking about the emancipatory subject. The reason was to counter an aggressive emancipatory Self which absorbed a passive Other. This kind of construction possesses a totalitarian tendency. A reconstruction of the emancipatory subject led us, after some changes, to a multi-self, multi-identity emancipatory subject. In working out this subject we had to set the ground to bring in class and non-class aspects (resources, relations, and practices). In the reconstruction of the multi-Self multi-identity emancipatory subject we have found space for non-class aspects.

The reconstruction of the emancipatory subject in this chapter allows me the possibility to develop my arguments further in a number of directions. One obvious direction I
may be expected to pursue is the further elaboration on the four movements which are the sources of the contemporary emancipatory experience. I think this exercise, though critically important, can be withheld for a more important exercise. Having developed the arguments for the multi-self, multi-identity emancipatory subject I shall attempt to locate it as a possibility in structural terms. What I mean here is that structures must contribute to the constitution of the emancipatory subject. This is my aim in the next chapter.