CHAPTER IV

The Indo-Iraqi Relations from the British Occupation of Iraq to Independence of India 1914-1947.

In the preceding three chapters the development of relationship between India and Iraq from the earliest times to the recent past was historically briefly surveyed. During the period covered in this work India was politically known as British India. But who was the first to term India as such, and when? Nothing of exactness in this regard can be traced, to the best of my findings. Before imposing their hegemony on the country, the British came to India as traders, chiefly, by means of their East India Company. In 1875, Queen Victoria took the title of "Kaiser-i-Hind" or "Empress of India". In 1877, Lord Lytton held a magnificent Durbar at Delhi and Queen Victoria was proclaimed the Empress of India. The Governor-General retained his legal title, but added the honorific of Viceroy as the personal representative of the British Crown. Now, it may be presumed, without much risk, that India came to be known as British India under such circumstances as mentioned above, though


the practice of Colonialism of the day was, in general, that the conquering European country was adding its name to the conquered land in order to distinguish it from other European countries' possessions in the Orient, hence, for example, Portuguese India (Daman, Diu, and Goa). But the fact that the British Empire in India was recognised in the Treaty of Paris 1763 may also be taken into consideration.

It was this very British India that her forces attacked Iraq in the First World War, but not India herself. In the words of Bal Gangadhar Tilak, in a letter addressed to the president of the peace Conference of 1919, "India is self-contained, harbours no design upon the integrity of other states and has no ambition outside."

During the same period, which is covered in this work, Iraq was first a target to be reached by the Britishers as soon as possible, and ultimately militarily attacked by Anglo-Indian forces and occupied in the First World War.

"The cynical Russian proverb, "Eternal peace lasts only until the next year," unfortunately capsules the long and bloody record of man's inhumanity to man. In some 3,457 years of recorded history, there have been more than 3,230 years of war, only 227 years of peace.

5. Ibid., p.1013.
The Great War from 1914 to 1918 was not, therefore, a historical abnormality; it represented, rather, an anticipated and recurrent norm. But in its scope, its violence, and above all, in its totality, it established a precedent. World War I ushered in the century of Total War, of—in the first full sense of the term—global war...

But never before 1914–1918 had a war absorbed so much of the total resources of so many combatants and covered so large a part of the earth. Never had so many nations been involved. Never had the slaughter been so comprehensive and indiscriminate. And never had the participants staked so much for so little... The causes of World War I, in Woodrow Wilson's phrase, " run deep into all the obscure soils of history ". They stemmed, too, as all wars do, from the nature of man, and the weakness, pride, venality, (7) and indecisiveness of his leaders. '

Even if one may take the above-mentioned statement of Woodrow Wilson at its face value, one has to take into consideration that what happened prior to the First World War has actually happened in the full light of modern history. The immediate and underlying causes of the war were the system of secret alliances, militarism, nationalism, nationalism,

economic imperialism, struggle for power, balance of power ... etc. In fact there was nothing hidden deep in the obscure soils of history. It was a European war; it began in Europe in 1914, developing out of quarrels of the Europeans, and remained predominantly European. It was the result of acts deliberately committed to make it unavoidable. Germany, in agreement with Austria-Hungary, deliberately worked to defeat all the conciliatory proposals offered to them by their rivals. Throughout the world Germany was pressing hard the hitherto invulnerable commercial and banking supremacy of London. A new, vigorous and ambitious great power grew to strength in the heart of Europe after 1870, and its challenge to "Britain's supremacy as the world's leading trading and maritime nation and the reaction of Britain and other powers to this economic-military-psychological threat were among the major causes of the First World War". In pre-1914 Britain, slums and widespread poverty had existed alongside apparent national prosperity, and it was only natural that Britain was determined to resist any rising power that threatens her progress towards more wealth and general prosperity.

11. Watson : op. cit., p.5
The European powers were divided into two groups: the Central Powers and the Entente Powers. The former group was composed of Germany and Austria-Hungary, together with their allies Turkey and Bulgaria in addition to Italy as a somewhat doubtful ally; and the latter was constituted of France, Russia and Great Britain. The two groups were roughly equal in military strength.

In July-August 1914 the political situation in Europe dangerously developed towards a general war. All the great powers Great Britain had taken their decisions by August I. At 7.10 P.M. on the evening of August 1st, Germany declared war on Russia. The German declaration of war on France was delayed (in the hope that France would declare war on Germany) until 6.15 P.M. on August 3. At daybreak on August 2 German troops entered Luxembourg. In the evening of August 2 a German ultimatum was presented to Belgium. On August 4 it was announced to the British parliament that the Germans had invaded Belgium. The British government sent to Germany an ultimatum expiring at midnight. The conflagration of the First World War started.

Turkey was most important to Germany as an ally in the Near East. As early as 1903, Germany had obtained a concession permitting a German railway company to extend its line to

13. ibid., p.22
15. Woodward: op. cit., pp.22, 24
Baghdad. The Berlin-to-Baghdad Railway was regarded by the British as an overland arrow directed at the heart of their empire in India. On August 2, 1914, at the height of the diplomatic crisis, Germany and Turkey signed the secret treaty that was designed to become effective in the case of war between Russia and Germany. On 30th October, 1914, the British, French and Russian ambassadors in the capital of the Ottoman empire asked for their passports. On November 3, 1914, Russia declared war on Turkey and two days later Great Britain and France followed suit.

By 1914, Iraq had a greater international interest than at any time since the collapse of the Abbasid caliphate. It lay notoriously on the land route to India, was important in Islam and in the realms of history and archaeology, and is believed to be rich in natural resources. The first British travellers visited the country in 1583, and since then it had been visited by scores of Europeans. Goods and pilgrims came in quantity from British India. The Russians were active in penetrating the north of Iraq. The French were successful in spreading French and Catholic culture. The Americans carried out some educational and missionary work. The Germans cherished since 1900 wide schemes of eastern penetration and expansion (Drang nach Osten: advance toward East), and planned and partly completed the

16. Snyder: op. cit., pp. 86 f
17. Barber: op. cit., p. 206
Iraqi sections of the Baghdad Railway (Bagdadbahn). Up to August 1911, the Russians were planning to construct a Russian railway in Persia from Tehran to link this by a German line to Baghdad Railway. England was given two seats on the board of directors of the Baghdad Railway Company, assured a dominant position in the navigation rights and oil resources of southern Iraq, and relieved of her fears that the Baghdad Railway would be a German menace to the safety of India. But ultimately Baghdad Railway was one of the many causes of the international rivalry that gave rise to the First World War.

Great Britain has decided to invade Iraq from her basis in India. Hostilities with Turkey had always been feared in India as likely to produce dismay among the Indian Muslims. These fears were ill-founded, and the proclamation of (Jihad : Holy War) by the Sultan in November 1914 failed to rally the Muslims of Asia and Africa against Britain and France. The deposed Sultan Abdul Hamid II was alleged to have criticized the proclamation of Jihad saying that his brother - the ruling Sultan - has done a mistake: he had to only threaten the Entente powers with this weapon to frighten them, but not to proclaim it; because the Muslims outside the Empire won't respond to it.

21. Longrigg and Stoakes : op.cit., p. 78
23. Penrose : op.cit., p. 30
Turkey or no Turkey, Jihad or no Jihad, the fate of Iraq was sealed and the occupation of the country by the British was a foregone conclusion. One of the foremost strategic aims of imperial Britain had long been, and at the end of the First World War continued to be, that of safeguarding the route to India. Before the Suez Canal was built, the isthmus of Suez, and after it the Canal itself, were the leading routes apart from the long journey around the Cape of Good Hope. Whatever the difficulties of navigation on the Euphrates, the importance of Mesopotamia from the point of view of India continued to be rated high in both London and Delhi. Commerce was not the only consideration: the danger that the route might be dominated by rival powers, particularly from Baghdad to Basra and the Red Sea, was always in the minds of officials in the two capitals.

The concern over the route to India began to find expression well over a century before the First World War. The imperialist rival or rivals which might seek to use or dominate this route changed from time to time, but the possibility was by no means fanciful. During the Napoleonic wars four different projects were prepared for an invasion of India overland through the Near or Middle East. Three of them would have passed through some part of Mesopotamia. That of Bonaparte would have followed the Euphrates to near Basra, then crossed the river and entered Persia, thereafter following a line near the coast to the border of India.
On the eve of the First World War, the source of British fears over the route to India was all to be found in Germany. Although the newer and growing rivalries of great powers within Europe were centred more and more on European questions, and Germany was comparatively indifferent to overseas empire, fears concerning the route to India, south-east Asia, and the Far East had by no means diminished, and Mesopotamia came most prominently into the overseas picture through German economic and commercial enterprise directed towards Anatolia and beyond it into Mesopotamia towards Basra and the Arab / Persian Gulf. The British attempt to develope a through water route using the Euphrates had failed. The obvious alternative was to construct a railway route. Here British initiative and British enterprise were lacking and late in the century German financial and business interests took the lead.

For some years the phrase ' Berlin to Baghdad ' became almost a slogan. It coincided with a period of Anglo-German naval rivalry and aroused strong feelings in some circles in London. Germany was also regarded as a rival in international trade, at a time when British was losing some of her initially long lead in the Industrial Revolution in the face of the rise of Germany and the United States as industrial powers.
As with the Suez Canal so with the Baghdad railway, Britain opposed initiatives and projects, accomplished later by others, to which she had been invited to contribute and which offered greatly improved communication with India and with the British colonies in Southern and South-East Asia and with the Far East. The motive behind this policy was a desire to obtain or retain as high a degree of monopoly as possible, in both a political and an economic sense. In Britain there were men who were opposed to such attitudes, but their influence was smothered by imperialists who desired British domination of all routes to India and the suppression if possible of any initiatives Britain could not dominate, even when they would have shortened the time and reduced the expenditure required to convey goods and passengers between Britain and India. The development of the areas along these new routes, one of which was to pass through Iraq, while the other greatly shortened the journey from Basra to Europe and beyond it, was hindered by the delays created through Britain's failure to co-operate.

Although the maintenance of a paramount position in Mesopotamia was for Britain central to strategic needs of the empire, and commercial interests, including oil, were of secondary moment, nevertheless as time went on the two imperial motives—strategy and commerce—increasingly reinforced each other, particularly as far as oil was
concerned. As the first decade of the century draw to a close, the future importance of oil, especially as fuel for the navy, was increasingly appreciated and fears were rising that a great imperial power would be extremely vulnerable if it did not control its own supplies of oil.

To be sure, British interests had discovered and controlled the Persian oil, but Britain still depended for over four-fifths of her oil on the United States. What if at some time that country became unfriendly? Of the British government departments, the Admiralty took the closest interest in such questions. For the Foreign Office, oil was not the central issue affecting British Mesopotamian strategy, but nevertheless its policy was to support British groups in the search for concessions.

It cannot be said that the dispute over rights in the territory of Iraq played a leading role in the genesis of the First World War. The position of Iraq as part of a route between Europe and Asia certainly draw the country into a clash of imperialistic policies. In any case the future territory of Iraq, whether independent or part of a wider unity, would have been drawn into the conflict among the great powers: its one very short coastline stood at the head of the Gulf and was of commercial and strategic importance to the Indian peninsula and to Britain's maritime interests in Southern and Eastern Asia. India, even if it had been independent, would have been actively interested in questions relating to control of the area: the historical circumstances which had placed Britain in a
dominating role in the Indian peninsula had given a special importance to the geographical position and resources of Mesopotamia.

On 5th November, 1914, the war was declared, and in the first half of the month British and Indian troops appeared in transports at the mouth of Shatt-al-Arab. Even before Turkey had declared war, the British Government took the precaution of sending a strong force of Indian troops to Bahrain. The British policy in the Middle East was to control the Arab / Persian Gulf and its natural extensions: the Tigris and Euphrates valleys as the outposts of India. The occupation of Basra from India was not a new project. In 1911, the Commander-in-Chief in India, General Sir Douglas Haig, anticipated the possibility of war in the middle East with Turkey and proposed in a memorandum the reorganization of the Indian Army to meet such a eventuality. The occupation of Basra was also recommended on January 15th 1912 by a special committee composed of Admiral Sir E. Slade, Naval Commander-in-Chief, East Indies; Lieut - General Sir Percy Lake, Chief of Staff, India; Lieut, Colonel Sir H. McMahon, Foreign Secretary, India; and Sir Percy Cox, Political Resident in the Gulf. This project was revived again in January, 1914, and referred to the Government of India whose reply could not be obtained till July 1914. As it was mentioned above, the Indian Government feared, among other
things, the disastrous effects which the initiation of hostilities against Turkey and the "Commander of the Faithful" might have on the Indian Muslims.

By the middle of September, 1914, a detachment of the 16th Indian Infantry Brigade under the command of Brigadier-General W.S. Delamain disembarked at Faw. The secret instruction was that the whole of the 6th Indian Division would follow as soon as possible in case of hostilities with Turkey. Later on the destination of the expedition was changed to Bahrain where it was to wait for further orders. The Viceroy and the Government of India were, initially, not in favour of this campaign.

To the India Office oil was not the chief objective. General Barrow placed oil as the last of five objectives to be gained. The Secretary of State for India wrote to the Viceroy when the expedition was ordered to proceed that 'Of the various objects to be attained by sending a force up the Gulf, I have always regarded the moral effect on the Arab chiefs as the primary and the protection of the oil stores as the secondary'. The Government of India also held that oil was not so valuable as to outweigh the consequences of an attack on Persia.

In a memorandum of September 2nd, 1914, Sir Arthur Hirtzel, Political Secretary to the Secretary of State for India, wrote: "The Political effect in the Persian Gulf and in India of leaving the head of the Gulf derelict will
be disastrous, and we cannot afford, politically, to acquiesce in such a thing for an indefinite period while the main issues are being settled elsewhere. From the military point of view a Turkish diversion in that region is doubtless negligible, though under German officers it may not be wholly ineffective; but it will be worked for all it is worth for the sake of the political effect which the Turks and Germans hope to produce through it on Moslem feelings on India.

Moreover... we cannot begin by sacrificing the Shaikh of Kuwait.

General Barrow stated that British interests at Baghdad and Basra will be swept out of existence. Our allies the Shaikhs of Mohammerah and Kuwait will be threatened and may consequently be attacked or seduced, in which case all our prestige and all our labours of years will vanish into air and our position in the Gulf will become precarious. Any other consideration aside, Great Britain wanted to maintain her policy of keeping guard over India through her supremacy in the Gulf and its extensions; the Tigris and Euphrates, and utilize these same regions as links in speedier communications with India.

The German-Turkish plans, formed by the German General Staff, were designed to seize the oil of lower Mesopotamia, block the Suez Canal and the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb, and prevent the dispatch of Indian forces to Europe. The

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Government of India pressed early for the occupation of Basra and the head of the Gulf. This operation was approved by London when it became clear that Turkey was entering the war, and was accomplished by a mixed naval and military force. Thus the territory of the future state of Iraq began early to be drawn into the war, confirming what appeared to be its future strategic importance to British and the British Empire, from the point of view both of the British Navy's fuel supplies and the Empire's network of communication. (27)

On 21st of November, 1914, Basra was captured. The occupation was bloodless. A Turkish counter-attack was unsuccessful, and the spread of the Anglo-Indian forces in lower Iraq to Qurna, Nasiriya and Amara; though costly and arduous, was complete in mid-summer 1915. (29)

Mesopotamia had been regarded as an Indian responsibility and at the outbreak of the war the Imperial General Staff were completely out of touch with conditions in Iraq but so far as the use of the British Army was concerned the War Office in London was consulted. Therefore, the Indian Army was under loose directions from London and a tighter rein from Delhi. (31)

The British Navy drew most of its oil from the Abadan refinery and it was only natural that the Admiralty pressed

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29. Longrigg and Stoakes, op.cit., p. 78
for a landing to secure the refinery, pipe-lines and oil-fields. It was for this purpose that a single brigade of the 6th Indian Division was, as mentioned above, to sail for the Arab/Persian Gulf.

The invading force was originally known as the 'Indian Expeditionary Force D,' but, later on, was renamed as the 'Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force,' to which the Indian Government was compelled, due to the Turkish reinforcements, to add a second division. The Indian Army was under General John Nixon, with General Charles Townshend in command of the Sixth Indian Division, Poona.

The military political officials of the campaign considered from the early days of it that the occupation of Baghdad should be the objective of the Expeditionary Force. On 23rd November, 1914, Sir Percy Cox, the Chief Political Officer to the Force, telegraphed to the Viceroy that the General Officer Commanding had been considering the question of the advance to Baghdad and that he (Cox) did not see how "We can well avoid taking over Baghdad." Officials on the spot, in Delhi and London, and representatives of commercial interests had the same views. But both the governments of Britain and India were not ready to support this idea. The Government of India changed its

33. Longrigg and Stoakes: op. cit., p. 78
34. Liddle Hart: History of the First World War, op. cit., p. 154
36. Longrigg: Iraq, 1900 to 1950, op. cit., p. 78
attitude when General Sir John Nixon was appointed on 9th April, 1915, as Commander-in-Chief in Mesopotamia. It was thought that India's permanent interests would be best served by the inclusion of Baghdad and Basra under the direct control of India. At the end of Autumn, 1915, the Government of India clearly stated that it expected to annex at least Baghdad and Basra. General Nixon ordered Major General Charles Townshend to Advance from Kut on Baghdad, and in this attempt the Anglo-Indian forces were faced with the famous disaster of Kut.

When General Nixon decided to occupy Kut-al-Amara, he entrusted the task to Major General Townshend whose Division was now to consist of the 16th, 17th, 18th and 30th Brigades; about 11000 men in all, with thirty guns. On 27th of July, 1915, the Poona Division advanced up the Tigris. On the afternoon of the 29th of September, the 16th Brigade marched into Kut. From here he marched on Baghdad.

It will always remain debatable as to why the Anglo-Indian forces advanced at that time beyond Kut-al-Amara. As a matter of fact the strategic aim had been achieved with the occupation of Kut. The obvious policy should have been to fortify Kut and Nasiriya, and to allow the Turks to take what action they liked. The Anglo-Indian troops were completely

37. Ireland : op.cit., pp. 63 - 66
exhausted by continuous fighting and the lines of communications had been stretched far too much. Even if Baghdad was captured it was impossible to retain it by a single depleted division. Above all, the Turkish Army was neither annihilated at Es-Sinn nor very badly routed. These facts were presented by Sir Charles Townshend to his superiors. The lure of Baghdad was irresistible. The planners thought that the capture of Baghdad would set off the failure at Gallipoli and would materially assist Russia. It would put an end to German intrigues in Persia and Afghanistan. It would have an excellent moral effect upon the Punjab and the North West Frontier. The entry into Baghdad would echo through the Bazaars of the East. And so Sir John Nixon was ordered to resume the advance and General Townshend, though much against his will, prepared himself to carry out his orders.

On the night 21st/22nd November the Poona Division advanced on Baghdad and was defeated at Ctesiphon losing 4511 men, killed and wounded. The Anglo-Indian forces retreated to Kut-al-Amra where they were besieged.

In the first week of January 1916, the garrison of Kut-al-Amara heard the guns of General Aylmer's relieving force which had attacked the Turks at Shaikh Sa'ad. Hopes were now raised that the siege would be ended very soon. On 16th
January torrential rains broke out making a sea of mud which
checked the advance of General Aylmer's troops. The trenches
and dugouts were filled with water due to the floods on
21st January. The first line trenches had to be abandoned
and the troops were withdrawn to the middle line. The Turks
too had been flooded out of their trenches and had to withdraw
about a mile. The situation within the garrison started
becoming acute from now onwards. The issue of tea and sugar
had to be stopped completely. Wood for cooking finished and
fuel oil was issued instead. The daily digging was replaced
by more unpleasant task of throwing out muddy water. The main
consideration was to keep out two things: the water and
the Turks. In the first week of February, 16 ounces of barley
meal was substituted for the flour ration. The officers had
to supplement their meat ration by shooting sparrows and
starlings.

On 13 February a Turkish aircraft flew over for the
first time and dropped two bombs. In the absence of anti-
aircraft fire the plane could fly quite low with safety.
On 10th March, the Turkish Commander Khalil Pasha sent a
letter to General Townshend demanding the surrender of the
Kut garrison. As the sounds of the intense bombardment by
the guns of the relieving force were heard in the vicinity
of Kut-al-Amara, Townshend decided to hold on and refused to
surrender. In the last week of March the ration had to be
reduced to 8 ounces of barley and 4 ounces of parched barley.
A great effort was made to induce the men to eat the flesh of horses and mules. The town and the defences were now constantly bombarded. The Turkish planes flew over, every day and night, dropping bombs. Water was seeping into the trenches from below and parties had to work round the clock to throw it out. The men were loosing strength and could not do more than one hour’s work a day. On the 20th April, the bread and barley meal ration came to an end and the situation of the garrison became very desperate. Though the flood showed signs of recession there seemed to be no hope of relief. On 26th April, General Townshend agreed to meet Khalil Pasha, the Turkish Commander-in-Chief, to discuss the terms of surrender. On 29th April 1916, a regiment of Turkish Infantry marched into the town and the garrison became prisoners-of-war.

Townshend surrendered after the Turks had rejected an offer of £2,000,000 and forty guns if the force was allowed to be relieved on parole. After the fall of Kut there were no repercussions in India, and neither the British nor the Turks were capable of large-scale action. General Nixon had resigned in January 1916 and was succeeded by Lt.-General Sir Percy Lake, Chief of Staff in India. General Lake for health reasons was succeeded in August by Major-General Sir F. S. Maude who captured Baghdad on March II, 1917, and died of cholera in the city of the Arabian Nights on November 18. The whole of Iraq was in the British occupation before the

close of the year 1918.

In the period after the unsuccessful attempt to relieve Kut the ultimate desirability of extending British influence to Baghdad was not entirely forgotten. Not until February 3rd, 1917, when the Russians were expected to advance on Mosul and perhaps Baghdad, did Sir William Robertson ask General Maude for his views regarding another advance towards Baghdad. It was considered desirable for political reasons that British forces should occupy the city before the Russians. Now one wonders if these 'political reasons' were real, because General N. N. Baratov, with a Russian army of about 20,000 men, advanced via Persia on Baghdad from the north and east in January 1915. The Turkish Sixth Army withdrew a corps from Kut, facing the Anglo-Indian forces, to hold the Russians in check at Khaniqin on June 1, and this was the virtual end of the Russians operations in the area.

After the British occupation, Iraq started embarking on a period of economic expansion and political progress. The Indian Rupee was introduced in Iraq as a legal tender to supplant the Turkish currency. The Indian currency (Bank Notes and Coins) remained in circulation in Iraq from 1916

40. Ireland : op. cit., p. 66
41. Longrigg and Stoakes : op. cit. P. 78
till the issue of the Iraqi currency in April 1932. The British wanted to Indianize Iraq, and the Iraqis saw in using the Indian currency an attempt to attach Iraq to the Indian Administration, and, therefore, they insisted on establishing an Iraqi national system of currency as a sign of rejecting the idea of attachment of Iraq to India. Naturally the introduction of the Indian Currency followed on the coming of the Expeditionary Force whose needs were paid for in Rupees. A proclamation forbade the use of depreciated Turkish paper money, and the inadequate supply of small Turkish coins was driven from the bazaars. The Turkish gold (Liras) continued to circulate but their import and export were regulated.

The Turkish officialdom was supplanted by Anglo-Indian officials and the administration of the governmental machinery was rearranged after the fashion of the Indian administration. The primary question with which the British were faced from the outset of the occupation of Basra was whether the existing Turkish system of civil administration should wholly or partly be adopted and utilized, or whether new systems based on Indian methods should be set up. Although the Hague Conventions

44. Samarie (Samarra'i), Sa'id Aboud al-, : Monetary and Banking System in Iraq, in Arabic, Baghdad, 1969, p.23.
46. Samarie : loc. cit.
47. Ireland : op.cit., p.82
of 1899 and of 1907, of which Great Britain was a signatory, stated that the occupant of a country "... shall take all the measures in his power to restore, as far as possible, public order and safety while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the law in the country", the choice between the two alternatives was not difficult. The situation demanded an immediate return to the initiation of the civil administration. From the British point of view the Indian systems were preferable because the confident expectations within inner circles that the Government of India would assume the future permanent control of Basra and its hinterland, at least, stimulated the adoption of the Indian methods and practices which would aid in the assimilation of the occupied territories. Within a week from the occupation of Basra a Civil Police service, modelled on Indian lines, under the supervision of E.G. Gregson of the Indian Police Service replaced the Military Police. This man was supposed to have wide experience on the North West Frontier and in the Persian Gulf. Employment of ex-Turkish police was not desirable, and, therefore, Constables were brought from India and Aden.

When Baghdad became in the British hands and its future had been considered by a Committee of the War Cabinet, it was apparent that the British Government intends to follow a line of policy differing in many ways from the expected policy of the political control and administration of Baghdad and Basra.
The Government of India had declared in late 1915 that, "... the minimum of annexation contemplated by us has always been the wilayets of Basra and Baghdad ", and it was still generally believed that the whole of the Occupied Territories, if not actually annexed, would be controlled from India.

The British believed that by occupying Mesopotamia they drove a wedge into the Muhammadan World, thereby preventing the possibility of a combination against them in the Middle East. They thought that it should be their policy under peace conditions to keep Mesopotamia as a wedge of British Controlled Territories, and that the country should not be assimilated politically to the rest of the Arab and Muhammadan World but it should remain insulated as far as may be, presenting a model to the rest ...

In addition to that they believed that if Baghdad is strongly held, and ample reserves of war materials and means of transportation be kept on the spot, military requirements for the frontier on India will be correspondingly reduced; the Middle East would be dominated, in a military sense, from Baghdad and their political influence would be proportionate to their potential military strength. On the basis of these considerations Mr. Asquith declared in the House of Commons, " ... Iraq as a province or district which is going to be governed in the Anglo-Indian fashion ... ".

Therefore, the British established in Iraq Secretariats, Departments, directorates, Bureaus, Circles and varieties of forms, reports, files and procedures in the best Indian administrative tradition.

As on March 29th, 1917, the Civil Administration employed comparatively few Arabs in responsible administrative positions. Arabs drawing Rs. 600 or more per month on August 1st, 1920, numbered 20 and formed 3.74 per cent of the 534 officers in the same category. The remaining 514 officers were British or Indian officials. By training and education the British and Indian officials were better than the Iraqis, but, in addition to this reason, the British local policy was that direct British control must be maintained by having a large proportion of British personnel in all branches of the Administration. It was from India that both administrative methods and officials were drawn. In 1917, 29 of the 59 officers serving in the Civil Administration of Baghdad, came from services in India either directly or on loan from the military authorities. In Basra the same proportion was held. In 1920, although only 79 of the 507 British Officers drawing over Rs. 600 per month were on the active lists of the Indian Government services, a much greater proportion of these as well as of the 515 British Officers drawing less than Rs. 600 had Indian training and experience. No less than 1280 of the Indian and British officials in the latter category came from
the Civil Service of India. A total of 2216 Indians employed plus 1022 British officials composed 50.5 per cent of the total administrative personnel, excluding the railroad staff and the non-administrative ranks of the Police and the Levies. On April 1st, 1920, the Indians composed 80 per cent of the railway personnel and the rest of 3 per cent were British and 17 per cent Iraqis (Arabs, Kurds and Jews).

The Acting Civil Commissioner disclaimed all intention on his part for thus organizing Mesopotamia along Anglo-Indian lines, but the fact remains that the great strides toward creating a bureaucracy, staffed and administered on Indian lines, took place during his period of office. The early division of the country into political districts as in British India with a British officer at each key position, responsible to the central administration, to which voluminous reports and statistics were dispatched in accordance with Indian practice for every aspect of life within the division, was extended and the hierarchy of officials increased from 1918 to 1920. The very titles borne in India—Civil Commissioner, Political Officer, Assistant Political Officer, Revenue Officer, Judicial Officer and others, were reproduced in the Iraq's Administration.

Whether or not the Acting Civil Commissioner desired to extend the Indian system or not, the shadow of India was over him at all times. Such administrative practices as
he had learned by 1914 had been learned in India. His early assistants, with a few notable exceptions, had been trained in Indian methods. Officers came from other parts of the Empire but the Indian tradition remained.

Much of the Indian influence on the character of the administration in Iraq was due to the fact that India had provided both the motive and the personnel for the Expeditionary Force. The original intention of making Mesopotamia a dependency of India had been given up but the rumour persisted and had to be officially denied. The early suggestion that Iraq might provide an outlet for India's surplus population had subsided but not entirely died out even in official circles. The strongest claim which India and Indian methods had in Iraq lay in the interests of the (Indian Empire) in the future of the country to which it had been bound so long by political and economic ties.

In August, 1920, the total number of the officials whose salaries were more than Rs.600 per month was 534, out of which there were 507 British, 7 Indians and 20 Iraqis, and the total number of those whose salaries were less than Rs.600 was 2209 Indians and 8546 Iraqis. Between the two World Wars, 49.

49. Ireland: op.cit., pp. 80 ff., 96, 139 f., 144 ff.

50. Kotlov, L.N.: National and Liberal Revolution of the Twentieth in Iraq, The -, Moscow, Tr. from Russian into Arabic by Dr. Abdul-Wahid Karam, College of Law and Politics, University of Baghdad, Baghdad, 1971, pp. 115 f.
many Indians were employed in various Departments of the Iraqi Government. After Independence of Iraq in 1932, contracts of Indians employed by the Iraqi Government had to be terminated.

In 1936, a Bill to prevent the non-Iraqis from practising professions in the territory of Iraq was introduced to the Iraqi Parliament. The Bill threatened the interests of a large number of Indians residing in Iraq. The Indian Press attacked the Bill which was modified as a result of interference of the British Embassy in Baghdad.

The British thought that Iraq for the time being is incapable of self-government and therefore the Mandate was imposed. It was decided that Britain should assume the Mesopotamian Mandate on account of Iraq's nearness to India and her close connections with Arabia, and because of work already done by the Britishers in the area.

During the first part of the War the Government of India had been responsible for dealing with Arab questions. At the end of March, 1915, responsibility for Arab Affairs down to a point eighty miles south of Mecca was transferred to the High Commissioner in Egypt. On 18th July, 1916,

the war Office in London assumed complete control of the Mesopotamian campaign.

For generations past the Government of India had assumed sole charge of Great Britain's relations with the Arabs. On March 31st, the High Commissioner for Egypt assumed charge of all Arab affairs, save those of the south and east coasts of Arabia. There were two "schools" of thought on Arab politics: (1) The Anglo-Indian or Eastern Arabia school which viewed Arab politics from the standpoint of the immediate needs of India; and (2) The Anglo-Egyptian or Western Arabia school, no less concerned for the welfare of India, which adopted the line of action that would place friendly Arabs in Damascus to bar a possible French expansion towards India and in Western Arabia; and to facilitate the protection of both the Suez Canal and the land routes to India. The shift of control of the Mesopotamian affairs from Delhi to London was considered to be a success for the Anglo-Egyptian school.

Although the Mesopotamian responsibility was shifted from Delhi to London, the Indian Laws were applied to Iraq; because the British found that many of the country's problems —

55. Birdwood: op. cit., p. 26
56. Ireland: op. cit., p. 101
social, agricultural, Industrial and educational - are similar to those of India. Since August 1st, 1915, the substitution of the Anglo-Indian Judicial system for the Turkish system was started, and the "Iraq Occupied Territories Code" was applied to the conquered parts of the country for the administration of civil and criminal justice. This code was largely created from 'Laws' in force in India. The Courts, functioning under the authority of the General Officer commanding, were supervised by Lieu.-Colonel S. G. Knox, Senior Judicial Officer, and by Captain C. F. Mackenzie, Junior Judicial Officer, both of whom were members of the Indian Political Department.

Under this Code, the Senior Judicial Officer exercised the civil and criminal powers normally assigned in India to the District and the Sessions Judges, respectively. The Junior Judicial Officer possessed the powers of an Assistant Judge and a District Magistrate. In addition, the Junior and the Assistant Judicial Officers were invested, as in India, with powers of small Cause Judges.

Powers were given under the Code to enforce any Indian Law, which might be amended to meet local conditions. The abovementioned Code seems to have made little distinction between India and Iraq. Section 8 of it explicitly stated,

58. Lloyd, Seton: Iraq, op. cit., p.2
"the Code of Criminal Procedure and other enactments for administration of criminal justice in British India shall have effect as if the Occupied Territories were a district in the Presidency of Bombay ". This section, as well as the Code as a whole, confirms the impression that it will pave the way for the smooth annexation of lower Iraq to India. The Indian Laws were not available in Arabic. At the end 1917, only four of the several score of Indian Laws were translated into Arabic.

At the beginning the British policy was to divide Iraq into small entities, and therefore Great Britain wanted to establish an Arab administration in Baghdad. In accordance with this policy the British Government made it clear that the "Occupied Territories Code" was not to be introduced in Baghdad Wilayet. When this policy was changed and the integration of the country was secured, the political and administrative considerations which motivated the amalgamation of the administration of Basra and Baghdad in September, 1918, were applied to the Judicial systems also. On January 1st, 1919, the two systems; the Turkish system of Baghdad and the Anglo-Indian system of Basra, were finally consolidated and the Iraq Occupied Territories Code and all Indian and British Acts operative under it were repealed with the exception of nine Indian Laws and one English Law.

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59. Ireland: op. cit., pp. 82 ff., 133
Before Independence of India there had been an Indian Consul at the British Embassy in Baghdad to handle the Indian affairs. Besides, there had also been an Indian Consul in Basra for the same purpose. The first Iraqi Ministry for Foreign Affairs was established on 21st November, 1926 (the Second J'afar al-Askari Ministry) and thereafter the Iraqi Consulates-General were established in Delhi, Bombay and Karachi. After Independence of India the Indian Embassy was established in Baghdad and the Iraqi Embassy in Delhi.

After the British occupation of Iraq, Trade with India increased to the extent that India was second only to Britain (both in Export and import), especially till 1932, and during the Second World War India occupied the First place in trading with Iraq. Oil aside, Iraq's main customers other than Britain before the Second World War were the United States and India. The United State bought dates, intestines and liquorice; and India dates, grains, animal fat and horses. After the Second World War India remained for several years the largest importer from Iraq, especially of grains and dates.

Iraq's railway system was established with the help of the Indians. Before the First World War, Iraq was closely

60. Iraq Directory 1936, Published by Dangoor's Printing and Publishing House, in Arabic, Baghdad, p.90.
62. Longrigg and Stoakes: op.cit., p.129.
connected in the western mind with railways; for she was to provide the terminus of the Bagdadbahm, but only eighty miles of that line were completed before the British occupation, and it was very important to the British that the nucleus of the railway system has already existed in the country. The Iraqi Railways were developed later on to the extent that Baghdad, Basra and Kirkuk were connected by lines. In 1939, the old (German Bagdadbahm) was completed by carrying the Baghdad-Baiji line through Mosul to Tall Kochek on the Syrian frontier which had been joined by rail to Istanbul and Western Europe. In 1936, there was an agreement between Iraq and Britain to transfer the ownership of the railways to the Government of Iraq.

River steamers have been in use since the middle of the nineteenth century. But as early as the occupation of Basra the British were profoundly concerned with river transport in Mesopotamia. They established with the help of the Indians dockyards (with slipways), constructed headquarters buildings in Basra, brought ships from India and regulated river transport from Basra to Baghdad.

63. Ibid., pp. 132 ff.
64. Rawi, Fu'ad al- : Indexed Dictionary of Treaties...etc. into which Iraq entered with Countries...etc. since 1921, The --, in Arabic, Ministry of Planning, Iraq, Book 4, Vol. 3, Baghdad, 1975, pp. 337 ff.
The Iraqi prisoners of war were brought to India. In addition to that the majority of the rebels of the 1920th Revolution were imprisoned in India too. The shrewd and dreaded Iraqi Politician General Nuri as-Sa'id was brought to India where he was trained to rule Iraq on behalf of the British in accordance with the basic principles of the British Raj in India. General Nury, a Baghdadi, was an officer in the Ottoman Army. At the beginning of the war he was captured by the British in Basra, and found to be a suitable man. The Britishers themselves cherished the idea that "Britain could serve the Arab world in general, and Iraq in particular, in a practical way more effective than others". After the establishment of the Iraqi Kingdom, he had been continuously in and out of the political leadership of Iraq for thirty-five years, and became Prime Minister of the country fourteen times. After the Revolution of 1958, the people killed him in a street in Baghdad. During the First World War General Nuri was brought to India and for ten days held in Bombay until a Bungalow was found for him at Darwar outside Ahmednagar, where he stayed for eleven months. The General made a start with the English language in Ahmednagar. According to him, "India was out of touch with Political realities in the Middle East".

66. Birdwood, op. cit., p.3
67. Ibid., pp. I, 298
68. Ibid., p. 27
From among the prisoners of war who were brought to India and destined to play a crucial role in Iraq's politics later on was Naji Shawkat. This man studied at the College of Law in Istanbul 1909-1913, and was commissioned as a military deputy-officer during the War. In June 1928, he became Minister of Interior for the first time. On 3rd November, 1932, he became the Prime Minister; and in 1941 Minister of Defence when Iraq declared war on Britain.

On 9th December, 1922, there was in Bushihr (Iran) an agreement between British India and Iraq on the one side, and Iran on the other to close down the foreign (Indian; as was mentioned in the previous chapter of this dissertation) Post Offices in Iran on the basis that the operations of these offices will be the responsibility of Iran herself. In 1932, Iraq concluded with Britain an agreement to include India in the Treaty of Repatriation of Criminals.

On September 1st, 1939, London received the news of German-Polish conflict gathering momentum in eastern Europe since 4.45 that morning. It took another 54½ hours to change the German-Polish War of 1939 into the Second World War. On 3rd September, Britain declared war on Germany.

69. Anees, Dr. Muhammad; Zubaidi, Dr. Muhammad Hurrain al-: Papers of Naji Shawkat, Letters and Documents, in Arabic, Baghdad, 1977, pp. 6 - 11
Iraq severed her relations with Germany, captured the German nationals residing in the country and handed them over to the British authority at the Habbaniya air base near Baghdad wherefrom they were deported to India as prisoners of War. The then Prime Minister Nuri as-Sa'id suggested that Iraq must offer the Allied Powers two Iraqi Divisions to fight against the Axis (Germany and Italy), and this caused a strong reaction amongst the Iraqis because they hated the imperialistic policies of Britain and France in the region.

In 1941, the British wanted from Iraq to allow British Battalions from India, North Africa and Trans-Jordan (now Jordan) to pass via the country to Palestine (now Israel) in accordance with the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930. The Government of the National Defence under the Premierships of Rashid Ali al-Gailani agreed to the request of the British Government provided that the number of troops must not exceed nine thousand soldiers at a time, and should not stay in the territory of Iraq more than three days; for taking rest only. On 17th and 18th April, 1941, an Indian Division arrived at Basra, and some days thereafter 350 men of King's Own arrived at Habbaniya by air from India. The later development of events showed that the British were unwilling to comply with the Iraqi stipulations regarding the period of stay of the British Forces in the country during the war. On the morning of April 30th, 1941, the British Garrison of Habbaniya was surrounded by the Iraqi Army. On 2nd May, 1941, the Anglo-Iraqi War started. Iraq had no intention
to declare war on Britain, but the British R.A.F. first attacked the Iraqi Army near Habbaniya.

Iraq requested Germany to help. Hitler was busy in preparing for the invasion of the Soviet Union, and therefore, the German military aid to Iraq was not sufficient. A squadron of the German Air Force with German pilots reached Iraq and participated in the war against the Anglo-Indian Forces. Hitler wanted to develop the situation in the Middle East hoping that in the final stage India will revolt against Britain but he postponed the active German participation until the fulfilment of the Barbarossa (the German military code-name of invasion of the USSR). By that time Hitler had already made up his mind: the destruction of the Soviet Union comes first. As for Iraq, he ordered that a few planes and some arms to be dispatched to Baghdad to help Iraq. He said, "I have decided to encourage developments in the Middle East by supporting Iraq." But he saw no further than this small and inadequate step. In 1940, Hitler projected a plan for peace with Great Britain which included a guarantee for the British Empire, but he intended to claim Iraq as a German sphere.

74. Schreuder, Dr.B.P.: War of Iraq 1941, Arabic translation, Baghdad, 1982, Passim.
According to classified papers of Hitler’s Foreign Office published in East Germany recently, he planned to send his army to the Arab States for economic and political exploitation. In February 1942, a Foreign Office staff headed by an envoy, Dr. Grobb, who had been the German Ambassador to Baghdad before the Anglo-Iraqi war of 1941, put forth a plan on a “German advance to the Arab region.” The plan envisaged German control of Government and State organisations in the occupied lands. According to this plan, the Armed Forces in the region would be ‘re-organized’ and the Arabs “ruthlessly subdued and exploited.” The paper stated that on entering the region an Iraqi – Arab army would be established; comprising three Iraqi, one Syrian and one Palestinian/trans-Jordanian divisions. The targets of the German advance were the Suez Canal and the Persian Gulf; and connections from Basra to Sri Lanka (Ceylon) were to be established.

A document released by the Soviet Foreign Ministry on end of June, 1984, shows that Hitler had planned to overrun India during the Second World War. Brought out in a brochure called “Operation Overland” the document says that Hitler wanted first to capture Afghanistan and later launch an offensive against India. The plan is contained in a diary dated January 17, 1941. In the autumn of that year, the

77. Indian Express, Bombay, May 9, 1985, p.7.
Nazi strategists had planned to begin operations for (78) conquering Iran, Iraq, Egypt, the Suez Canal and India.

At the end of May, 1941, the pro-German Government of Iraq collapsed and the anglo-Indian Forces entered Baghdad once again, and this was the last time in which the Indians have taken part in a military action against Iraq. The Indian troops remained in that country up to the end of the Second World War. When I came from Baghdad to Poona in 1975, I met some of the Indian Officers who had gone to Iraq during the Second World War with the Anglo-Indian Army of British India.

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78. Indian Express, Bombay, June 3, 1984, p.10