In the preceding discussion we noticed the zamindars of various descriptions, having many features in common as also definite signs of differentiation, within the broad category of Superior zamindars. It has also been observed that the empire made elaborate arrangements for adjusting, preserving and maintaining the often discordant interests of the zamindars and its own through various devices but mainly by maintaining constant vigil and continual pressure, the degree of which varied from place to place. It is further noticed that during the course of the seventeenth century some of the zamindars successfully repelled the imperial pressure and effected a favourable change in their position leading to gradual erosion of the inter-strata distinguishing features and the emergence of intra-stratum variations. Having been in nascent stage and confined to select zamindaris, the process found its way into the eighteenth century and, within a few years of its opening, gained momentum and went on unabated, acquiring unmanageable dimensions. Gradually the zamindars greatly disturbed the entire system of balancing interests. There was a progressive decline in the degree of imperial control. Much before the Mughal rule had physically become extinct from Ahmadabad (1753) the Moghul authority ceased to exert any pressure on them. A drastic change in the conditions of holding zamindaris and the imperial attitude towards the zamindars becomes manifest. Without losing their positions, the various sections of Superior zamindars mingled with each other.
and formed a single bloc. These zamindars were locked in contest with the empire, even though they fought among themselves and remained disunited. Under the emerging pattern of relationship, exacting peshkash by force survived as the only point of contact between them and the Mughul state. In this Chapter an attempt is made to discuss the elements of continuity and change in the position and role of the Superior zamindars in their relationship particularly to the Mughul state and in relationship with their own. In view of the emergence of almost uniform conditions of holding zamindaris resulting from the prevalence of similar circumstances, these processes are studied at one and the same place since they relate to all sections of the Superior zamindars.

Following the example of the relatively stronger and the more privileged of them, the rest of the Superior zamindars too ceased to serve the empire. To begin with, the mansabdar-zamindar of Dungarpur withdrew his troops (1701) from the provincial capital in the wake of subedar Shuja't Khan's death (1701) in office.1 With the withdrawal of his troops the last of the zamindaran-i sarkarat-i peshkashi who had continued to furnish

specified contingents ceased to serve the empire for good. Thus, with the turn of the century even a mansabdardar-zamindar could not be forced to serve in contrast to the situation during the seventeenth century when the same and the other zamindars regardless of the award of mansab, had rendered service obediently.

The zamindaran-i ismi followed the example set by the zamindaran-i sarkarat-i peskhashi. Of the ismis those who were still in imperial service withdrew their troops (1701) which were stationed at Ahmadabad. With this, all the ismis ceased to serve the empire for good.

1. Subsequent upon his withdrawal of troops Prince Mohd. Azam, the next subedar summoned the zamindar. But he did not show up. Later on subedar Firozjang and Shahamat khan led expedition into the territory. The zamindar, however, refused to call on the subedars. Account ff. 79ab, 126b, please see also Ibid, f. 105 b and Mirat-i Ahmadi, Supplement p.225.

2. Account ff. 79b, 112a; Mirat-i Ahmadi, Supplement p.229. Similar inference may be drawn from the detailed description of contemporary events given in our sources. During the course of the seventeenth century the Mirat, on a number of occasions as noted earlier, specifies the zamindars who served the nazims. In subsequent years (1702-50) such references in regard to the above mentioned zamindars disappear altogether. But the Mirat-i Ahmadi, at another place (Ibid, 1 pp 173-4; Ibid, Supplement, pp. 224-5, 228-9 and following him the other works of later date trace the development to the year of Aurangazeb's death (1707). See, for example, Treaties, VI, pp. 93, 96, 203, 210, 229; Rasmala, pp. 556-67. Bombay Gazetteer, II pp. 119, 213, 219. From the evidence cited in the previous and the present Chapter, it would appear that the process was a gradual one and did not emerge and develop all of a sudden in 1707.

3. Account ff 79b, 112a
The tendency to abstain from rendering military service is likewise well evident in the case of zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin also, a number of whom had already ceased to serve, as noted in the preceding Chapter. But unlike the above mentioned zamindars this stratum continued to serve for a little longer and withdrew only gradually. Leading ones among them withdrew their troops from the place of postings along with the zamindars of the other sections. But some of them whose zamindaris were located in the areas adjoining the provincial seat of power, responded to the subedar's call (1707) and furnished troops to fight the invading Maratha forces soon after emperor Aurangazeb's death. A little later (1714) one Jassa zamindar is noticed in the company of subedar Daoood Khan, informing him of the high handedness of the zamindar of Navanagar. Later on (1724-25), subedar Mubariz-ul mulk is reported to have summoned the zamindars to join his standards for pushing the Marthas out of the subah. Momin Khan the subedar (1737-43) had also asked Jatta, zamindar of Antrasma and the Kolis of Mandwa to present themselves for defending the ford and passage of Kholwad. It was apparently a call for duty but no zamindar is mentioned as having responded to it.

1. Account f. 112a.
4. Mirat-i Ahmadi, II. p. 86.
No evidence suggesting any actual attempt by the provincial authorities to enforce the military obligation is available in the pages of contemporary, near-contemporary and later works. Instead, the provincial authorities resorted to the collection of peshkash through expeditionary forces specifically led for that purpose. Such expeditions were led by the Nazims, or sometimes by an equally strong commander. Gradually it became a norm. As a corollary to the development which indicates a definite change in the zamindars' attitude, the nature of economic claim, mode and method of its assessment and collection, as would be examined below, underwent a drastic change.

It seems worthwhile to examine the observation of the Mirat-i Ahmadi that "whenever the Nazim-i subah leads an expedition the zamindars pay peshkash. Presumably no tributs was paid without this coercion and this point itself indicates the process and pattern of the emerging mode of Mughal-zamindar relationship in the context of time and space.

Collection of peshkash through expeditionary forces led by the Nazims as a matter of routine is in direct contrast to the ways and means of collecting it during the seventeenth century when such a course of action was adopted under extraordinary


2. That was why, it seems that all the zamindari makans came to be designated mehwas. Account, ff. 74b, 107a, 112b-13b.

circumstances and against the strong recalcitrants in particular. As the situation, according to the Mirat necessitated the presence of nazims in "each pargana" at the head of a strong force, it emphatically reveals the defunct state of pargana and sarkar level administration with regard to its dealing with the Superior zamindars who had turned bold and strong enough to successfully defy the faujdars and other local officials. The continued necessity of leading expeditions each year for the collection of peshkash is also indicative of the absence of a permanent solution at the local level.

Some information which casts light on the changing attitude of the Superior zamindars and, by implication, on the ineffectiveness of the routine administration, is also available.

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1. Beside the expeditions mentioned in the text, the Nazims were also required to undertake such expeditions for reinforcing local administration Account, ff. 106 b-7a.


3. According to a regional work (Mirat-i Mustafabad, pp. 150, 156) the faujdars and the thanedars waited for the arrival of watangiri forces in the areas of their respective jurisdiction. At the arrival of such forces they merely assisted the Nazim. The work also reports that from the fourth decade of the eighteenth century active support of the locally influential nobles had become a necessity for the nazims for collecting peshkash from the zamindars of sarkar Soreth. The Mirat also indicates that the local nobles accompanied these forces and mediated between them and the zamindars. Mirat-i Ahmadi II. pp. 93-4, 244.

4. Combining more than one official positions into one hand (i.e. executive and revenue) may, in the present context, be seen as an attempt apparently made for strengthening officials' hand who, on their part, might have clamoured for acquiring such a privileged status. The attempted solution instead of providing a respite to the administration, proved harmful for the state as well as the riaja. For references, please see Political Milieu under Introduction to this work and Chapter VII below.
The situation necessitating the leading of expeditions seems to have partly arisen as early as the period of the subedar of Prince Mohd. Azam (1701-1704) and subsequently it came to stay for the rest of the period. The Prince had been able to ensure remittances of peshkash, presumably through routine administrative channel from two of the zamindaran-i ismi and a number of zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin, even though expeditions are not reported to have been led during his period of administration. But the fact that all the zamindaran-i sarkarat-i peshkash (100%), 13 of the zamindaran-i ismi (87%) and a considerably large number of the zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin (74%) evaded payment, speaks of the emerging ineffectiveness areas of the routine administrative channel, demanding intervention of the higher authority. Hence the Nazims had to step in.

During the period of administration of Prince Bedar Bakht, the next (interim) subedar "no expedition - no peshkash".

1. Mirat-i Ahmadi, I. pp. 346-57. The prince had only reluctantly accepted the subedar of Gujarat and shown his unwillingness to continue there, for he had found the subah "not congenial" for himself. Ibid. Also, the prince had to deny the Marathas an entry into South Gujarat, in which parts they roamed all through his period of subedar. Ibid For the remittance of peshkash, please see Account, ff. 126b, 127a; Haqiqat-i naziman-i Gujarat, pp. 53-4; Peshkash docs, P.C. Nos. p8-p19, p25-26, p37.

2. The peshkash documents contain detailed information about peshkash for the years 1701-24 concerning 160 zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin. Taking the giure (160) as 100 for calculation purposes, it would appear that of them only 42 zamindars i.e. 26% remitted the peshkash. Ibid, P.C. Nos. p8-p19, p25-26, p37; Account, ff. 126b-27a.
situation comprehending almost all the Superior zamindars seems to have emerged, and, come to stay. The Peshkash documents and other works of the period do not mention any amount of peshkash having been exacted from any of the zamindars of peshkhashi sarkars, the ismis and 160 of the 518 zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin details of whose offering are available for the period covering the subedaris of Prince Bedar Bakht and his successor, Ibrahim Khan (1707).\(^1\) The Mirat too does not mention any watangiri expedition as having been led during their days of administration\(^2\). It may be pointed out in brief that any amount of peshkash exacted from the zamindaran-i sarkarat-i peshkashi and the zamindaran-i ismi is invariably associated with the watangiri expeditions led

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2. Mirat-i Ahmadi; 1, pp. 367-74, 374-81, To reinforce the argument it may further be pointed out that the zamindars of Soreth-region are not recorded to have offered peshkash during the periods of subedari of Ghaziud-din Khan (1708-10), Asad Khan (1712), Dawood Khan (1713-15), Maharaja Ajit Singh (1719-21 i.e. second tenure) and Nizam-ul mulk (1723-24) who are also not mentioned to have led expeditions into the region. Peshkash docs, P.C. Nos. p 9, p 14, p 20, p 30, p 39, read with Mirat-i Ahmadi, 1. pp 382-400, 401-13 Ibid II. pp 21-38 47-54, and 58-82; But Ghazi-ud din Khan, Shahamat Khan (1713), the Maharaja (2nd tenure) are mentioned to have led expeditions into Ahmadnagar and Jhalawar (sarkar Ahmadabad); Daood Khan into sarkar Pattan and Nizam-ul Mulk's naib Hamid Khan into Jhalawar, Mirat-i Ahmadi I. pp 382-89, 398-400, Ibid II, pp 21-38, 58-82. The zamindars of the same areas are accordingly reflected to have paid peshkash to the same subedars Peshkash Docs, P.C. Nos. p 8, p10, p12, p25-6, p28, p31.
into their respective territories for the purpose. Likewise the peshkash documents reflect the peshkash as having been exact-
ed only from those zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin whose areas had been visited by the watangiri forces. As such it may be main-
tained that a no expedition - no peshkash' situation had, by and large, emerged from the period of Prince Bedar Bakht's subedari.

The peshkash-i nizamat, an annual claim (peshkash-i harsala) came to be collected irregularly. A careful examination of the recorded expeditions led in prevailing circumstances of no expedition-no peshkash reveals that the expeditionary forces lacked comprehension of the time and space. To beginwith, the

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But the point in case of zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin may not be pressed too far. Some of them, particularly the ones whose possessions being situated in the area adjoining Ahma-
dabad were within easy reach, remitted the peshkash regularly, as late as, if not later than 1721-22 without having been forced by the expeditionary forces. Hawazna-i dehsala, dehat pangana haveli Ahmadabad 1127 to 1139 fasli, P.C.

3. An identical situation though on a limited scale, as seen earlier, had started emerging during Prince Mohd Azam's period of subedari.
expeditionary forces could not be led each year¹ to realise the peshkash which, otherwise, was to be exacted every year. For instance, Prince Mohd. Bedar Bakht and Ibrahim Khan are neither reported to have led any watangiri expeditions nor shown to have levied peshkash during the periods (1705-9) of their subedaris.² Among the zamindaran-i sarkarat-i peshkashi the zamindar of Dungarpur faced the expeditionary forces thrice in 1709, 1711 and 1722; that of Bhuj only twice in 1720-21 and 1730-31; and the zamindars of Sirohi, Banswara, Ramnagar and Sunt each faced it only once sometime before 1721-22 during the course of 48 years (1702-50).³ They did not pay any amount during the rest

¹ Thus during the times of uncertainties at the imperial centre, wars of succession, internal strifes, transfer and forcible eviction of subedars from the office, mounting Maratha pressure, other internal engagements such expeditions were not led. Mirat-i Ahmadi, I. pp. 365-77; Ibid, II pp. 13-20, 23-4, 27-8, 37-9, 42, 103-6, 155-8, 164, 177-80 etc. Please see particularly, Ibid, II pp. 51-3, 58-64, 195-238, 269, 275-6, 397-8, when the expeditions could not be led due to the reasons stated above. The striking capacity of the watangiri expeditions might have been conditioned by the resistance put up by the zamindars and the presence and activities of the Marathas in and around the subah. The Marathas who had been making inroads into the subah since 1701, had become quite active, particularly in Southern Gujarat from 1715 onward. Excepting Shahamat Khan, Mubariz-ul mulk and Maharaja Abhay Singh no other subedar could lead expeditions into these parts of the subah.

² Mirat-i Ahmadi, I. pp 346-82.

³ Ibid, II, pp. 41, 112-3; Account ff. 105b, 11b, 126b; Mirat-i Ahmadi, Supplement pp. 226, 232, 234, 238, 266. Though the matalba-i sarkar-i wala in regards to Dungarpur and Banswada was assigned (1717) in the tankhwah gagar of a member of the house of Udaipur, but the peshkash-i Nizamat stood due and could not be realized. Later on, Sarbuland Khan (1722-23) forced the zamindar of Dungarpur to accept the payment of the peshkash. But in view of the intervention of Rana of Udaipur the zamindar was absolved of the responsibility. The exemption thus granted in the Rana's favour, was never revoked. Account, ff. 110a, 118b; Mukhtasar Tarikh-i Gujarat. ff. 60-61; Mirat-i Ahmadi II pp. 45-6.
of the period when expeditions were not led into their lands. As such the zamindaran-i sarkarat-i peshkashi ceased to be an effective part of the empire before the close of the first quarter of the eighteenth century, particularly so far as the sharing of their revenues is concerned.¹

¹ Thus zamindar of Dungarpur paid peshkash for the last time in 1711. Subsequently the zamindar was forced in 1722 but, as pointed out in the preceding note, the amount was not realized. Sirohi paid it for the last time sometime between the years 1713 and 1716. Ramnagar, Sunt and Banswara made their last offerings sometime before 1721-22. Account. ff. 105b, 110b, 122a, 126b-7a.

The zamindar of Bhuj made his last offering in 1720-21. In the year 1730-31, the territory was invaded again and the zamindar had also agreed to pay 10,00,000 mehmudis. But the nazim demanded more. After a long battle the subedar was forced to beat the treat empty handed. It happened to be the last attempt for realizing peshkash. Later he enjoyed virtual exemption.

It seems to be worth pointing out that the zamindar of Bhuj did not break off his relation with and continued to accept the suzerainty of Mughal empire. The zamindar of Bhuj is reported to have submitted arz-i ali alongwith 100 asharfis sometime between 1730-1733 during the subedar of Maharaja Abhay Singh (1730-1737). Raja Lakhpat, the next zamindar sent offerings which consisted of local specialities. He was favoured with the grant of a farman, a khilat and the title of Mirza-Raja. He had also hoped to get the subedar of Thatta which he was not favoured with. Account 1056, 11a; Mirat-i Ahmadi, II p.245. The said zamindar and his successors retained the title even during the British days as is evident from the documents carrying the epithet Mirza Raja Maharao Shri..... available in the personal archives of the present descendent of the house. Please see also Sorabji Jahangir, Representative Men of India, London. 1887, p 29; For the similar offerings made on earlier occasion Murad's hasb-ul Hukm, May, 1657 op cit; Emperor Murad's farman, 20 Dec, 1658 Op cit; for the occasions when such offerings were to be made, Account, f. 856.
In the same way the *watangiri* expeditions could not be led into the territories of the *zamindaran-i ismi* on regular basis and, therefore, the *peshkash* could not be realized annually. Thus our sources do not mention any such expedition to have been led into their lands during the periods of *subedari* from Prince Mohd. Azam to that of Asad Khan (1702-12) and later on during the tenures of Maharaja Ajit Singh (1719-21, 2nd tenure), Nizam-ul mulk (1723-24), Maharaja Abhay Singh (1730-37) and during the post-Momin Khan period (1743-50). The other *subedars* who had actually led expeditions, could not manage it on a regular (annual) basis. Also, the *watangiri* forces, as and when led, could not march into the territory of each of the *ismis*. Putting the information zamindar-wise it would be seen.


that the zamindar of Navanagar faced the *watangiri* expeditions on six occasions, that of Rajpipla on four occasions and the ones of Porbandar, Kesoj and Pharkar faced them twice each during the year 1702-50. There were still others who seem to have escaped attention of the *watangiri* forces all through the period.

The *ismis* seem to have ceased to share their revenues with the empire from 1725-26, excepting Navanagar who made its last offering to the *watangiri* forces in 1742. In this way they happened to be next only to the *zamindaran-i sarkarat-i peshkashi*.

The position of the *zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin* with regard to the offering of *peshkash-i nizamat* was not much different from the above discussed constituents of the Superior zamindars. An analysis of the information concerning the *watangiri* expeditions undertaken by the provincial authorities available in the pages of the *Mirat-i Ahmadi* and the details of zamindar wise *peshkash* exacted by subedars from the times of prince Mohd. Azam (1701-4) to those of Nizam-ul Mulk (1723-24) reflected in the *peshkash* papers strongly suggests that the tribute was collected only irregularly. Thus, for instance, the zamindars of Sabarkantha region (*sarkar* Ahmadabad) are shown not to have paid the tribute


2. The zamindars of Fatehpur, Pol and Kukramunda are shown to have paid no *peshkash* during the period. *Account*. f. 113b.

3. For details please see the preceding and the following discussion.
peshkash during the periods of administration of Sarbuland khan (1712), Daood Khan (1713-15) and Maharaja Ajit Singh (1715-17) in the peshkash papers. Likewise these subedars are not mentioned to have led watangiri expeditions into the region. Similarly the zamindars of Pattanddeo (sarkar Soreth) did not pay peshkash to Ghazi-ud-din Khan (1709-10), Shahamat Khan (1711) Sarbuland Khan (1713) and Maharaja Ajit Singh's naib Mehar Ali Khan (1719-20, second tenure). The Mirat too does not mention any expedition to have been led into the area held by them. To put the information briefly, it may be seen that none of the subedars from Prince Mohd. Azam to Nizam-ul mulk (1701-24) could exact peshkash-i nizamat from all of the 160 zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin details of whose offerings are available.

Statistical analysis of the subedar-zamindar-wise information contained in the peshkash papers further clarifies the point under review. None of the 160 zamindars (taken as 100) paid peshkash to Prince Bedar Bakht, Ibrahim Khan and Asaf-ud-dawla; whereas Shahamat Khan, Dawood Khan, Maharaja Ajit Singh, Khan-i-dawran, Maharaja Ajit Singh (Second tenure),

Muizuddawla and Nizam-ul mulk could exact it respectively from 11 (7%), 5 (3%), 18 (11%), 91 (57%), 75 (47%), 3 (2%), 102 (64%) and 2 (less than 2%) of the 160 zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin.\(^1\)

Moreover the subedars as pointed out earlier, could not lead expeditions every year and cover the whole of the subah even during the entire duration of their respective tenures.\(^2\)

The watangiri forces, as and when led, did not cover the entire subah and, as mentioned earlier, all the zamindars could not be forced to offer peshkash on every occasion. According to the information contained in the Mirat-i Ahmadi Ghaziuddin Khan led expedition into Sabar Kantha and some other parts of sarkar Ahmadabad; naib-subedar Sarbuland Khan and his naib could cover Chunwal, Sagwara, and Chorasi areas; Dawood Khan visited Sabarkantha, Kathiawar, Halar, and parts of Patnan; Maharaja Ajit Singh covered the zamindaris situated in some parts of sarkar Ahmadabad, Sabarkantha region, Soreth and Halar areas; Khan-i Dawran's naib could not go beyond Baroda, Sabarkantha and

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2. For more information about the areas covered by the expeditionary forces please see discussion in the following pages.
parts of Soreth. As such all the areas thus covered by expeditionary forces put together, any of the Nazim could not cover whole of subah even during his entire tenure, much less every year.

From the evidence cited above it must, not however, be concluded that the watangiri forces would have succeeded in exacting peshkash from each zamindar of the parts of subah thus visited by them. For instance, Maharaja Ajit Singh led expeditions into Soreth region. But he could not levy peshksh on the zamindars of Dharai, Dhak and Junagadh parganas of the sarkar. Similarly, Khan-i Dawran's naib visited the same sarkar for collecting peshkash. But he failed to capture it from the zamindars of pargana Amreli, Bhimrad, Rajkot etc situated within the same sarkar. Likewise Muizuddawla had not been able to exact peshkash from the zamindars of pargana Ghoga, Baxra, Medra etc. situated within the region visited by him. Also the watangiri forces could not necessarily exact peshkash from all zamindars of a pargana, much less of a sarkar, actually visited by them. For

instance, out of 14 zamindars of pargana Banswara (sarkar Soreth) Maharaja Ajit Singh and Khan-i Dawran exacted peshkash from seven zamindars each but Muizuddawla could succeed in capturing it from six only. 1

Out of the eleven zamindars of pargana Ranpur (sarkar Soreth) the above mentioned three subedars could levy peshkash from three, two and nine zamindars respectively. 2 Likewise out of the 15 zamindars of pargana Pattan, Dawood Khan, the Maharaja, khan-i Dawran naib and Muizuddawla could exact peshkash respectively from 11, 13, 12 and 6 zamindars. 3 Evidently coverage of watangiri forces was neither comprehensive and nor even intensive, a situation which must have provided the zamindars an opportunity to evade payment of otherwise a regular claim of Mugal State.

Instances of evading payment of peshkash and offering it only irregularly may further be highlighted by citing a few examples of representative nature for the years 1701-24. Holders of relatively large sized zamindaris in favourable geo-social setting far off the provincial seat of power, like those of Bhimrad, Palitana, Jagat and others (sarkar Soreth) could be forced to pay peshkash only once. 4 Similarly the zamindars of Sonkhera and Sankhani holding lands in the hilly tract on the outskirts of

4. Ibid P.C. Nos p17- p20. Please see also the zamindars of pargana Laathi, Morwada, Santalpur, Chorwar bandar etc. for the same type of instances. Account. ff. 120b, 123a, 124a.
Charnpaner could be oblized to pay it only once during the period. But the zamindars of mawza Limbda of pagana Chhad (sarkar Soreth) holding a small sized zamindari though in a far off area, was forced to surrender tribute four times during the same period. On the other hand, the zamindar of Lakhtar who held his lands in Jhalawad (pagana Viramgaon) in close proximity to Ahmadabad but noted for its recalcitrant Jhala Rajputs, surrendered peshkash only once. But the zamindars who held their zamindaris in pagana Ahmadnagar, an area by and large plain and relatively within easy reach from Ahmadabad, paid it from there to five times. More particularly mention may be made of the petty zamindars of pagana haveli Ahmadabad who offered peshkash regularly as late as 1723–24, subsequently surrendering it only irregularly under the pressure of arms. It was, evidently, not merely the element of irregularity in leading military expedition that counted but also, and quite prominently the zamindars' own resourcefulness that went a long way in deciding the chances of evading payment of peshkash.

4. For instance see Bhimji and Ajab Singh, the zamindars of mawza Kaher; Dayal and Ajab Singh of mawza Karaadi; Jassa and Jiwaji etc. holding zamindaris in the pagana. P.C. No. p8.
5. For example, the zamindar of mawza Anwarsej and that of Muzaffarpur paid it the same way. Mawazna-i dehsala dehat pagana haveli Ahmadabad, 1127 to 1139 fasli, P.C.
It may, therefore, be concluded that the collection of *peshkash* depended on leading military expeditions and the zamindars' capacity to resist and evade its imposition. The expeditions, moreover, were led only irregularly. Consequently, the *peshkash* could be exacted only irregularly. It follows that long before the Marathas' emergence as a serious contestant for power on the provincial political scene from 1722-23, the *peshkash-i nizamat* (or, *peshkash-i harsala* as it was termed) which had been a duly established 'annual claim' of empire, acquired the form of a 'casual claim'.

During the post-Muizuddawla period, or for that matter after the Marathas' appearance as serious contender for power (1723-50), the capacity of administration for effecting assessment and collection of *peshkash* deteriorated further. Thus from the table given below it would appear that
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period of Subedar</th>
<th>Number of the expeditions led into the parts of .......... led during the tenure</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nizam-ul Mulk¹ (1723-24)</td>
<td>Jhalawar (sarkar Ahmabad) one</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarbuland Khan² (1724-30)</td>
<td>Sarkar Ahmadabad six</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Sarkar Bharauch three</td>
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<td>Sarkar Pattan three</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Sarkar Baroda one</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maharaja Abhay Singh³ (1730-37)</td>
<td>Sarkar Ahmadabad one</td>
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<tr>
<td>Momin Khan⁴ (1737-43)</td>
<td>Sarkar Ahmadabad five</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Sarkar Pattan two</td>
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<td>Sarkar Bharauch two</td>
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<td>Sarkar Soreth one</td>
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<td>Muftakhar Khan⁵ (1743)</td>
<td>Pargana haveli Ahmadabad one</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Pargana haveli Bharauch one</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jawanmard Khan⁶ (1743-53)</td>
<td>Sarkar Ahmadabad four</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Sarkar Pattan two</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sarkar Soreth one</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


3. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 143-4, 183, 192-93. Even these expeditions were led to chastise the Marathas and a rebellious noble. The Subedar failed miserably against the Marathas and withdrew from the subah, leaving the affairs in the hands of his naib. During this period the task of collecting peshkash was assigned to leading nobles on *ijara*. They too could not make a headway. For references, please see discussion in Chapter IV below.


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The *watangiri* forces could cover much less parts of the areas thus visited by them. Also the *watangiri* expeditions could be led much less frequently during the period (1723-50) as compared to the earlier period (1701-22), presumably due to the internal strifes, activities and presence of Maratha forces that kept the Mughals on a tight rope and the increasing resistance put up by the zamindars.

As compared to the other two constituents of the category of the Superior zamindars, the *zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin* continued to surrender *peshkash* more often and even after the others had ceased doing it. But more resourceful amongst them could not be forced after the close of the third decade of the century. Withdrawal of this section from the imperial net was a bit slow and gradual.

That the capacity of the provincial authorities to effect collection of *peshkash* from the Superior zamindars had considerably eroded even before the appearance of Marathas as a worth reckoning political power in the *subah* may further be highlighted by examining another piece of information --- zamindar wise amount of *peshkash* which was actually paid. A study of the amount may possibly clarify whether the irregularly levied exactions were inclusive of the dues of the period when the collection had not been effected. It may also be of some use for ascertaining the pattern of ongoing change concerning the magnitude of state demand on zamindars.
On the basis of statistics available for the zamindaris of Durgarpur and Kutch it may be inferred that the zamindaran-i sarkarat-i peshkashi paid the peshkash which, in comparison to the others happens to be minimal. The zamindar of Dungarpur who had not paid matalba-i sarkar-i wala calculated against the jama (1,60,00,000 dam) at least during the years 1702-17, paid a total of Rs.200,000 as peshkash-i nizamat during 1702-50 i.e. for a period of 48 years. The annual average (200,000/48) comes to Rs.4166/- as against the required minimum of Rs1,00,000/- per annum i.e. he paid 4.02% of what he was under the obligation to pay. The zamindar of Bhuj surrendered 600,000 jami (1702-50) which comes to 12500 jami per annum as against the required minimum of 6,79,440 jami per annum, he thus paid less than 2% of what was due.

1. Account, ff. 79b, 105b, 126b; Peshkash Docs, P.C. Nos. 8, 10-12, 14, 16, 10-9, 20, 25, 33-4, 37; Mirat-i Ahmadi, II pp 45-6, Ibid, Supplement pp 226, 234, 238, 266. Even if we donot take into account the period (1722 onward) when (1722) the claim was written off in favour of Rana of Chittor, the zamindar paid Rs. 2 lacs for a period of 20 years i.e. @ Rs1,0,000/- per annum which comes to 10 % i.e., less by 90% of the amount due for the period.

Collectively both the zamindars paid 800,000 i.e. 8 1607 (21.13%) as against the required sum of 7,77,440 per annum, paid 21.3% of what was due.

A similar position emerges in regard to the zamindaran-i ismi also. Of the 15 ismis of whom detailed data are available for five\(^1\) thus:

| Zamindari | Peshkash Amount Average per Percent |
|-----------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------|
|           | muqarriri- (1701-50) paid harsala | payment |  |
| Navanagar | 1,50,000 6,77,000 | 13540 | 9 |
| Pol       | 2,500 7,500 | 150 | 6 |
| Lunawara  | 80,000 1,67,000 | 3540 | 4.4 |
| Kesoj     | 30,000 13,400 | 268 | 0.9 |
| Pharkar   | 15,000 2,000 | 40 | 0.26 |
| Grand Total | 2,77,800 | 8,66,900/50 | 17336 | 6% |

As compared to the zamindaran-i sarkarat-i peshkashi who paid 21.3%, the ismis paid 6% Though both the sections paid much

\(^{1}\) Account ff. 113a-15b; Peshkash Docs 16, 23, 25, 33; Mirat-i Ahmadi, I, pp 409, Ibid II pp 11, 44, 94, 98, 276.

It must be kept in mind that Navanagar and Lunawara had also captured mal-i wajib paying lands (references follow), and the lands of Pol were located not far off the provincial seat of power.
less than they were under the obligation to pay, the *ismis* bore
a little more burden in comparison to the zamindars of *peshkash*
sarkars.

From the data of *peshkash* which is available for 160
out of 518 *zamindaran-i mha'in-o kahin* it would appear that they
too bore much less burden during the years 1704-22 as compared to
the first few years (1701-4) of the century. But they bore a
greater burden as compared to the other two sections of the
category of Superior zamindars.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sarker</th>
<th>Base =100</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ahmadabad</td>
<td>Pargana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmadnagar</td>
<td>1. Denwal 900 1 x x x x 500 2000 3500 194.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Kaloti 4500 1 x x 6000 x x 9500 12000 27500 1528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Jarkal 500 500 1450 x x x 3200 3750 208.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Bansa 500 500 400 x 900 x x 2800 156</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. It may be pointed out in particular that among the representa-
tive cases cited in the text we have included only those
zamindars who, on their own volition, had remitted *peshkash*
during 1701-4. Such zamindars who did not pay *peshkash*
either during 1701-4, or else during 1708-10 are not includ-
ed, as this period is taken as the one when *peshkash* was
fixed in accordance with the set procedure. Secondly the
zamindars who did not pay at all during 1701-22 are also not
included. Explanation follows.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>1701-4</th>
<th>1708-10</th>
<th>1713-5</th>
<th>1715-7</th>
<th>1719-21</th>
<th>1705-22</th>
<th>Total/18</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>11. Azam</td>
<td>Jhang</td>
<td>mat.</td>
<td>Khan</td>
<td>Ajit</td>
<td>Dawran</td>
<td>Ajit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12AMINDARI</td>
<td>1713</td>
<td>1715-7</td>
<td>1719-21</td>
<td>1705-22</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>45000</td>
<td>120990</td>
<td>6722</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pargana(s)</td>
<td>11. Chhad</td>
<td>+5620</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>562-8</td>
<td>562-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
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<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Sultanpur</td>
<td>+3000</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Ranpur</td>
<td>+937</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Hastni</td>
<td>+938</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chowk</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>106%</td>
<td>159%</td>
<td>170%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mangrole</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>540-9</td>
<td>129%</td>
<td>148%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Sangrasai</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Ghoga</td>
<td>1875</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>1875</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>18413</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total | 38501 | | | | | | | 13,900 | 36% |

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Above are tabulated representative instances of *peshkash* exacted during 1701-22 from the *zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin* whose possessions were located in central (*sarkar* Ahmadabad), northern (*sarkar* Pattan), southern (*sarkar* Bharuch), eastern (*sarkar* Champaner) and western Gujarat (*sarkar* Soreth).¹ From the data tabulated above it may be inferred that:

Prince Mohd. Azam and Firuzjung apparently exacted the same amount² as *peshkash*, but in reality the latter's exactions constituted only a fifth of the former's, for the *peshkash* was not exacted during 1705-7 and, therefore, under Firozjung the exaction was to be levied for a period of five years (1705-7 and 1708-10). Also Firozjung could exact *peshkash* from a much lesser number (eight) of the zamindars in comparison to the number (13) of them under the prince.

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¹ *Peshkash Docs, P.C. Nos. 8, 10-12, 14, 16, 18, 19, 25-6, 32-4.*

² It must be clarified here that the prince had managed exaction on annual basis whereas under Firozjung and his successors the exactions by and large happened to be a one time affair regardless of the duration of tenure of a given *subedar.*
Secondly, it would also appear that after Firozjung almost every subedar, barring a few exceptions, realized more amount than their immediate predecessors. As compared to the first recorded (as also the duly fixed) exaction of the century, the hike in subsequent years ranged between 0.7 and 544 percent. Amongst the different subedars Muizuddawla whose tenure extended to almost a year, exacted the maximum of amount, viz. 0.7% to 544% more (serial no. 5)¹.

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1. As compared to the first exaction, Muizuddawla levied more from 12 (serial Nos. 1-3, 5-9, 14-17), less from one (serial no. 13) and equal from two (serial no. 10-11) of the zamindars. Though some of his predecessors also exacted more than what had been exacted earlier, the hike under Muizuddawla in the context of duration of his tenure, was much more than under others. Also, Muizuddawla exacted peshkash relatively from a larger number of zamindars than any of his predecessors. The Mirat also speaks of the stiff attitude with which Muizuddawla had dealt with the zamindars. (Ibid II pp 43-5), the hike in the amount appears to denominate the same. Muizuddawla's tenure was followed by large scale Maratha penetration into the subah having paralysing effects on the working of the provincial administration. These developments, to a great extent explain the cause for acceleration in the recalcitrance and the armed resistance put up by the zamindars during the post-Muizuddawla period which witnessed withdrawal of imperial control from rural Gujarat. For references see discussion in the following pages.
But the hike noted above is more deceptive than real. A closer view of the evidence suggests that the net burden of peshkash on the zamindars had rather declined during 1705-22. A comparison of the amount of peshkash for the period 1701-4 (column no1.) with the average per annum amount (column no1.0) paid during 1705-22 clearly suggests that each of the zamindar paid less during the later years. Thus the zamindars of Maqbulabad (serial no.5) and Ghoga (Serial no1.7) proportionately paid the largest sums. But these zamindars too paid less, Maqbulabad paid less by 4% and Ghoga paid less by 59% i.e. they respectively paid 96% and 41% during 1705-22 of what they had paid earlier (1701-4). The rest of the zamindars paid much less, viz., 11% to 58% of the amount paid earlier.

A sarkar-wise analysis of the peshkash figures suggests that the highest amount was exacted from sarkar Bharuch (63.6%) followed by sarkar of Ahmadabad (32.6%) Pattan (28.25%), Soreth (21.8%) and Champaner (13%). But if we exclude the peshkash exacted from the highly vulnerable towns of Maqbulabad and Ghoga, then Ahmadabad (32.6%) replaces Bharuch as the highest paying sarkar and Soreth takes the position of the lowest paying. In other words, the nearer the area to Ahmadabad, the higher the amount of peshkash, and the further off the area, the less this amount.

1. Maqbulabad, a town and trading centre was located in plain area and had no fortification. It was within easy reach from Ahmadabad. Ghoga happened to be a port town, situated in a highly vulnerable position.

2. Thus zamindars of Bharauch sarkar paid only 27% and those of Soreth 9.3% if the peshkash levied from the towns is excluded.
A comparison of the amount levied from the zamindars of sarkar Soreth (21.8%) a difficult region, with the one levied from the zamindars of mainland (40%) also suggests that the zamindars of the former region paid less by 78.2% and those of the latter by 60%. Elements of proximity to the provincial seat of power and accessibility of the area presumably constitute the reason for the difference.

On the whole the zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin could be forced to pay 36% during 1705-22 which is less by 64% in comparison to the preceding years of the century. Thus this section of the Superior zamindars paid more than the zamindaran-i sarkarat-i peshkashi and the zamindaran-i ismi. The burden of peshkash came to be associated in reverse order—higher the status and more the resources of a zamindar the lighter the burden of peshkash actually borne and vice versa. True, the data on which this general statement is based pertains only to about a third of the total strength of the class of Superior zamindars, one might yet tentatively, and perhaps speculatively, extend it to the entire class.

Some idea of the way the amount of peshkash came to be determined, may also be formed from the available information.

During the closing years of Mughal rule the amount came to be

1. Please also see the zamindars of sarkar Champaner paying only 13%. Reason is not far to seek—it was difficult from the point of view of access and located in a distant part, holding a position identical to that of Soreth in this regard.
fixed in accordance with the exigency of time and the nazim's own strength (b'mutaqaza-i waqt w quwwat-i nazim) as different from the zamindar's capacity. ¹ For instance, the zamindar of Bhuj who was required to pay 6,79,440 jami annually, agreed to pay only 600,000 jami when pressed in 1720-21. ² Later on (1730-31) the zamindar agreed to surrender 10,00,000 jami, if the subedar was agreeable not to march on Bhuj. But the subedar demanded more. The zamindar, then, resisted the very imposition of any amount, successfully forcing the subedar to return empty handed.³

From amongst the ismi zamindars Dawood Khan could persuade the Jam of Navargar (1714) to offer a meagre sum of Rs.77,000/- as against Rs.1,50,000 which had been fixed during former days.⁴ The zamindar fought Maharaja Ajit Singh (1717) for several days with guns and cannons "due to the demand of a large sum of money", finally agreeing to pay Rs.90,000/- only.⁵ Five year later (1722) the amount was fixed

1. Account, ff. 15a, 74b; Mirat-i Ahmadi l.p 174, ibid, Supplement, pp 225, 229; Mukhtasar Tarikh-i Gujarat f 69
2. Account ff 110b-11a
3. Mirat-i Ahmadi, ll, pp 112-3. According to a local legend which is still current in the region, the Bhuj Army captured the mahi-o maratib and the Nazim's drum during the fight. These are preserved at district museum Bhuj. Similarly the zamindars of Ramnagar and Sunt paid a reduced amount which was settled on the spot. Account, ff 110a,127a.
4. Mirat-i Ahmadi, I, pp 409-10; Akhbarat. No. 2489, 7th Shaban, 3rd R.Y Farrukhsiyar ibid. No. 2519, 5th Shawwal, 3rd R.Y. Farrukhsiyar. The Subedar had also helped the zamindar against a family member contesting for the gaddi.
5. Mirat-i Ahmadi, ll, p 11; Account, f. 105b; Peshkash Docs P.C., No. 39 b.
at Rs. 60,000/- which the subedar collected peacefully.\(^1\) Later in the year 1724 the Jam who could reoccupy gaddi with the help of subedar volunteered Rs. 300,000/-, the highest sum ever paid by the zamindar during 1700-50.\(^2\) During the year, it may be seen, the subedar commanded a large army which was specially financed by the imperial centre, and therefore could collect peshkash to his "heart's content".\(^3\) The following year (1725) the same subedar who had, in the meantime, suffered considerably in strength could exact Rs. 1,00,000 from the same Jam.\(^4\) On the last occasion (1742) the zamindar resisted impositions of peshkash and after giving a battle for 20 days agreed to surrender Rs. 50,000/- only which amount the subedar willingly accepted due to "exigency of time".\(^5\)

Some information on the ways of determining the peshkash exacted from the zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin is also available. From the extant evidence it would appear that the

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1. Mirat-i Ahmadi, I, p. 44; Peshkash Docs, P.C. No. 39 b.
3. Ibid, II pp. 54, 79-80, 94.
4. Ibid, II p. 98.
5. Ibid II p. 276. Likewise, the Subedars had to be contented with a meagre of Rs. 500(1716) and Rs. 1500/- (1721) which the zamindar of Phakar agreed to pay as against the previously assessed amount of Rs. 15,000/-. Also, the zamindar of Porbandar who had captured mal-i wajib paying lands paid, on different occasions @ Rs. 2,500/- mehumudis which amount he was required to pay in addition to rendering military service. The position in regards to other ismis was almost the same. Account, f 113a; Peshkash Docs, P.C. 16, p 19, p 25, p 33; Mirat-i Ahmadi, I, p 248; Ibid, II pp. 11, 98-9.

\[-----------------------------\]
assessment of tribute involved hardly any calculation based on
the paying capacity of the zamindars; the amount in their case
also, was often the outcome of the Nazim's and the zamindars'
evaluation of each other's strength.

During the first few years of the century, necessary
exercise in calculation seems to have been undertaken for deter-
mining the amount of peshkash. The zamindars had remitted the
duly assessed amount through routine administrative channel
during prince Mohd. Azam's period of subedar-i (1701-4). Khan
Firozjang, the next subedar (1708-10) to levy exactions, collect-
ed almost the same amount which was fixed under the prince.1
Also, there are a few instances showing some of the succeeding
subedars as collecting the amount which had been fixed during
the preceding years.2 The observation of the Mirat-i Ahmadi
that the nazims extorted "befitting" and "suitable" peshkash in
'accordance with the capacity of each (zamindari) unit (farakhor
halat-i har makan)3 presumably relates to the seventeenth and
the early years of the eighteenth century.

But the position concerning the mode and method of
assessment gradually showed signs of deterioration. Dawood
Khan's laxity allowed the rebels to go unpunished, and the zamin-

1. Please see serial no. 3-4 and 7-9 in the table above, and

2. For instance, please see serial no 8-13 and 17 in the table
above beside Peshkash Docs, F.C. Nos. p9-p10, p12, p14-p16,
p18-p19.

dars to pay less than they had volunteered under the preceding nazims.\(^1\) Under the Khan and his successors the amount came to be increasingly fixed and realized in round figures:\(^2\) Muizuddaw-la (1721-22) who had earned the reputation of a tough man during his tenure as diwan-i subah (1715-17) and naib-subedar (1717-19) fixed and collected peshkash, particularly on the mainland, with a stiff attitude. He seems to have applied the sword and fire recklessly, if and when a zamindar ventured to resist.\(^3\) It was under him that the administration, as noted earlier, fixed and exacted the largest amounts which are, by and large in round figures.\(^4\) But the amount fixed as peshkash-i muqarrari-i harsala (i.e. peshkash-i nizamat) under him, could not be realized under his immediate successor and when it was realized it was much less.\(^5\) Sarbuland Khan the next subedar, settled and realized peshkash 'according to his heart's content' during the first two

1. *Ibid* I pp 412-3; for a comparative position of the amount, please see table above and the references concerning Navanagar cited in the preceding discussion. See also Peshkash Docs, P.C. Nos. p12 and p30.

2. See the table above and for further references, *Peshkash Docs, P.C.* Nos. p10-p12, p15, p18, p28-9 etc.

3. For instance, see *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp 9(Palitana), 10(Munjpur), 17(Antrasma), 41(Pethapur), 43-9(Dabhali), 51(Petlad and Dhawan) etc.

4. See the table above and the discussion based on it in the preceding pages. For more references, please see also *Peshkash Docs, P.C.* Nos. p8-10, p12, p14, p20, p25-38.


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years (1724-6) of his administration. But later (1726-30) the subedar had to face stiff opposition put up by the zamindars. During the subedari of Maharaja Abhay Singh (1730-37) rebellious elements could gather enough courage to attack sebedar's army, and sneak into the provincial capital. During his administration the state officials who had contracted peshkash on ijara failed to effect assessment and collection of peshkash and consequently suffered losses. Momin Khan, the next subedar (1737-43) had to lean heavily on the support of the Marathas and some locally

1. Some idea as to how the subedar dealt with a defiant zamindar (1725) for settling the amount may be formed from the incident of Wadhawan (sarkar Ahmadabad). Zamindar of the place put up armed resistance with the help of his tribesmen and the Kolis. Having not been able to dissuade the determined Nazim, he negotiated peace. The Nazim decided to charge not less than rupees three lakhs as penalty for he had stood on the trench for three days. The zamindar helpless as he stood, agreed to surrender the dictated sum in addition to the unspecified amount of peshkash. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp. 93-4. The author of *Mirat-i Mustafabad* (p. 151) adds that the zamindar had already expelled thanedar and occupied the thana for himself. It may here be clarified that the authorities were empowered to collect whatever booty may be collected from the recalcitrant zamindars. Q. Ahmed, "dastur-ul amal-i salatin", *Proc. I.H.C*, XXI, p. 353. Despite his efforts to exact more from the zamindars, and encroachments upon the paibagi khalsa and jagir lands, the subedar could hardly collect sufficient funds. He found it hard to pay salaries to his soldiers, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, p. 113.


4. *Ibid*, II, pp. 172-73; the subedar continued to retain the Khalsa, paibagi and jagir lands which had already been encroached upon. Still he complained of sharp decline in the income of the subah B N Reu, "Some more farmans of Maharaja Abhay singh of Marwar regarding his Gujarat campaign," *Proc. I.H.C*, 1948, p.12. The *Mirat-iAhmadi* also states (1737) that most of the paraganas had turned zortalab, *Ibid*, II, p.64.
influential nobles for effecting assessment and collection of *peshkash*. The zamindars appeared to be all the more determined to fight before agreeing to pay.\(^1\) The *subedar*, therefore, could assess *peshkash* "according to exigency of time" and collect only "more or less" (*kam-o besh*) amount.\(^2\) Then, during the *subedari* of the last Mughal Governor, Jawanmard Khan Babi (1743-53), in particular and the post-Muizuddawla period (1723-50) in general exactions were commonly determined and levied in accordance with the "exigency of time", "exigency of situation" and the "Na-zim's own strength" as distinct from the zamindar's capacity to pay.\(^3\)

As such the *peshkash* was more a matter of bargain than one of conformity with the established rules. The mode of collecting it is reminiscent of the one adopted for *zortalab* zamindars. Also the line of distinction based on service and *peshkash*, the basis and mode of its calculation and collection that had existed during the heyday of Mughal rule, had almost become extinct. The shade of distinction based, particularly, on the varying degree of autonomy seems to have vanished.\(^4\) Moreover, the

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4. Later, the British found that the (superior) zamindars enjoyed complete autonomy, independent of outside interference and the possessions were subject to the payment of a nominal quit rent.
zamindars, whether ismis or the mahin-o kahin, endeavoured to transform the nature of imperial claim from mal-i wajib to peshkash, for a considerably large number of them surrendered a single amount which was reflected as peshkash. As such the ismis and many mahin-o kahin zamindars acquired the status which otherwise was enjoyed by the zamindars of peshkashi sarkars.

The next step of the Superior zamindars was to seek to destroy the symbols of Mughal administrative machinery; the thanas, the head quarters of the faujdars and the check-points. As these symbols of imperial control were gradually erased, the zamindars felt ever more free to choose their path of action.

The zamindars of peshkashi sarkars were spared even this effort for no faujdar was maintained in these zamindaris.

1. The exacted amount from all the ismis is reflected either as peshkash and penalty, or simply peshkash in direct contrast to the earlier practice of reflecting the same as hasil and peshkash. Similarly the levies exacted from the mahin-o kahin zamindars in considerably a large number of cases, are shown as peshkash only, or else peshkash and khichri i.e., amount levied from the raiyati portions which were otherwise subject to the payment of hasil but had been encroached upon by the zamindars. Account, ff. 109a-11b; 126b, 127b; 241a, 275a, 277a, 300a, 304a, 367a; Mukhtasar Tarikh-i Gujarat. ff. 60-1, 69-80; Mirat-i Ahmadi, II, pp 41, 45-6, 98-9, 112-13, 258 Ibid, Supplement pp 205-6, 227, 230-33; Peshkash Docs, P.C. Nos.p 28-30, p33,p36. As such the distinction based on mal-i wajib and the peshkash got blurred and in a number of cases vanished completely.

2. The empire made an unsuccessful attempt to appoint a qiledar at Ramnagar Mirat-i Ahmadi, II, p.41. The waqai-nigar could not be maintained at Dungarpur after 1701. Account, f 26a. But the land revenue grants made in favour of a Jain trader at Mt. Abu (sarkar Sirohi) by Aurangzeb survived the fall of Mughal empire. For references, please see Revenue Grantees, Chapter V below.
Their refusal to render military service followed by their successful endeavour to evade payment put them on an almost equal footing with the provincial authorities. No reference is available to suggest any effective link between them and the provincial authorities during the second quarter of the eighteenth century, except an unsuccessful attempt to levy peshkash from the zamindar of Kutch in 1730-1.

The Zamindaran-i ismi also appear to have endeavoured to overthrow the symbols of imperial control. The zamindar of Navanagar sought to retrieve to his earlier status of a peshkashi sarkar. Soon after the death of Aurangzeb the zamindar reoccupied Navanagar, the headquarter of faujdar and, formerly, the seat of gaddi and raised strong fortifications around it. He is reported to have expelled the faujdar, Qazi, muhtasib, amil, amin and other officials like tehsildar, darogha of mandis; the officials posted at the mint and the pearl fisheries. 1 Sometime after 1716-17 the zamindar encroached upon jagir lands of imperial mansabdars and the paibaqi lands situated within the sarkar. 2 But the zamindar did not deem it either necessary or...

1. Ibid, 1, p. 285; Ibid Supplement, pp. 219-20; Account, ff. 17, 46a.

2. The document entitled yad dasht: Jama pargana haveli Islamnagar waghaira, fasli-i kharif, 1128 fasli/P.C. Nos. 33 and 39a) specifies the mehsul from the paibaqi and the jagir lands for the year 1128 fasli/1716-17 AD. Therefore the observation of the Mirat-i Ahmad that the Jam occupied the lands soon after Aurangzeb's death may not be taken literally. Ibid, 1, p. 285; Ibid, Supplement, p220.
possible to overthrow all symbols of subordination. According to the *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, what is left of the former regulations is this: that a permit of goods despatched to Islamnagar (Navanagar) is accepted in its *mandis*. The traders are not molested for taxes*. The *Nazims* who led *watangiri* expeditions into Navanagar donot seem to have pressed for his eviction from his unauthorised acquisitions. Similarly the *ismi* zamindars of Rajpipla, Mohan, Lunawara, Atlesar and other places expelled the *faujdars* and either occupied the *faujdari* head-quarters or razed them to the ground. Also the zamindar of Porbandar expelled Mughal officials from the port and the fort and occupied them for himself sometime before 1724-25. The zamindar of the place (Rana of Porbandar) also acquired the *thanasi* of Ranavao, Adwana, Miani, Navi (a port), Gariadhar and Madhopur. 

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1. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, I, p.286; *ibid*, *Supplement*, p.220. Moreover the zamindar doesnot appear to have succeeded in re-establishing his control over all the members of his family who in thier capacity as *zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin* paid *peshkash* directly to the *watangiri* forces as late as, if not later than 1721-22 *Haqiqat-i nazari peshkash waghaira*, *zamindaran-i subah* Gujarat, P.C. Nos. 39-40.


Vikramjit who succeeded to the gaddi of Porbandar after his father's death in 1728, conquered the isolated thanas of Kutiyana and annexed to his principality. ¹

Like the ismis, the zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin also sought to destroy the symbols of Mughal administrative machinery. Attributing the cause of this development to the weakness of nazims and want of military discipline the Mirat observes that the zamindars gradually demolished the thana-fortresses, or else they captured the places and settled down as residents there. ²

According to the detailed information available in the same work zamindars of Prantij, Bhel, Harsol, Aseelnagar, Palitana and some other places destroyed thanas and strongholds of faujdars. ³

The thanas of Pethapur, Piplapur and Sadra were occupied and converted into shops by the zamindars. ⁴ The zamindars of Kathiawad, Jhalawad, Ahmadnagar, Jagat, Talaja, Chorwarbandar (Port), Tarkeshar, etc. pulled down, or else occupied the administrative fortresses located within their respective zamindaris. ⁵


other hand, the zamindars of Gariadhar, Chhad, Talaja (a port) and Oplota instead raised fortifications. The zamindar of Sehore founded (1717) and developed a new fortified port town, Bhaonagar, occupied Lollyana - the most important Mughal outpost of the region, called doorway of Soreth. Some of the faujdars and thanedars are also reported to have left the places, other failed to reach the place of their charge and some of them were bullied down by the zamindars and still other assumed independence. As a result most of the thana - fortresses passed into the zamindars' hands.

Some of the zamindars raised fortresses and fortified their watan towns and villages on the pretence of defence.


1. Ibid, Supplement, p. 218; Account, ff 124b, 126a; Bombay Gazetteer, VIII, pp 296, 301.

3. Bombay Gazetteer, VIII, p 302. Mirat-i Mustafabad, pp. 152-58. The latter work notes that Asad Ali Khan (d. 1726), faujdar of Soreth, had lost control over the outlying thanas - Mangrole, Kutiyana, Una, Deluda, Solapara and Samna. They had become independent. The more distant thanas of Mahua, Doretha, and some others in the central peninsula had long been independent of the faujdar. The work further remarks that the thanedars not merely disobeyed the faujdars but also opposed them and even fought against them.

against the Marathas. Still others entrenched themselves behind strong fortifications even without such a pretence. Baha-
dur Khan (d. 1728), faujdar of Soreth is reported to have permit-
ted the Kathis to build a fortress at Jaitpur. Evidently the imperial policy of demolishing and occupying the zamindars' forts and fortresses and instead raising its own strongholds to keep them within bounds, was virtually reversed and its achievements were accordingly undone.

Besides, the empire seems to have been wanting in pro-
viding necessary security to the zamindars. Simultaneously it

1. Khawfi Khan, Muntakhab-ul Lubab, IV, pp. 194-5; Ghulam
Husain Khan Tabatabai Syar-ul Mutakhirin, II (tr) Yunus
Ahmad, Karachi, 1962, pp 203, 293; Mirat-i Mustafabad, p. 154.
2. Mirat-i Mustafabad, p. 154; Mirat-i Ahmadi, Supplement, pp
214-15, 217.
3. Tarikh-i Soreth, p. 82.
4. The principality of Ramnagar was attacked twice in the year
1672 by the Marathas who succeeded in capturing it in the second attempt. Ramdeo II, the son and successor of the exiled zamindar Raja Somdeo (also known as Somshah), managed its recovery with the Kolis' help in 1679-80, after he had failed to seek help from the Mughals. J. N. Sarkar, Shivaji and his times, pp. 186, 219; G.S. Sardesai, New History of Marathas (1600-1707), I, 2nd print, 1957, pp '103, 208, 226,
229. Occupation of Ramnagar by Marathas gave Shivaji a safe and easy route from Kalian to Surat and laid that part helplessly open to invasions from the South. Please see also, History of Administration of Dharampur State (prant
Dharampur), From 1262 to 1937, pp. 15-17. Sometime before
the year 1745 the zamindari was again occupied by the Mar-
athas and only its part was restored to the zamindar in 1758-
59. R. Bahadur Ganesh, Chimanji Vaid, (ed.) Selection from
the Satara Raja and the Peshwa Diaries, III, Balaji Baji Rao
Similarly, Marathas attacked Dungarpur and Banswara in 1728-
could not effectively govern inter-zamindar relationship and apply
a restraining hand. Therefore, the extent of sway of zamindars' rights came to depend on the ability of the zamindar himself.

A change in the ways and means of acquiring and extending sway of rights thus becomes increasingly evident during the first quarter of the eighteenth century. With no effective power to keep them within bounds the zamindars turned against their brethren. Consequently the zamindaris of some of them were eliminated and some of them came to acquire a sub-ordinate position thus giving rise to sub-infeudation. But before analysing the process of relegation of some of the zamindars to a sub-ordinate position in a free for all situation it seems worthwhile to ascertain its existence during the days of relative stability.

Evidence suggests the presence of a zamindar as an independent holder of makan-i zamindari and of a dependent zamindar belonging to another caste within the same makan even during the opening years of the eighteenth century. The zamindari-makan of Roopram of mawza Amod (pargana Kadi) consisted of

...Continued...

29 forcing them to pay Rs. 113000 and 50,000 respectively. RBG, Chimanji Ved, & DB ' Paranvis (ed.) Selection from the Satara Raja And the Peshwa Diaries I, Shahu Chhatrapati, Poona; 1907, Doc No. 219 (1728-29), pp. 101-2. The zamindar of Banswara was again humbled to surrender khandni (security money) in 1748. Selection from the Peshwa Raja and the Peshwa Diaries-III op. cit, p. 26. For further references see discussion in the following pages.
six villages which are specified in the document.¹ Une Akraj (Koli) held mawza Santhanl in the same makan.² However, Roopram was treated as the zamindar of the makan while Akraj held only a dependent position within the zamindari, presumably under the zamindar.³ Similarly, one mawza Lakhpai out of 34 villages forming one makan-i zamindari of Amar Singh zamindar, was held by Abdul Khan the same way as described above.⁴ The mawza Kel too is shown as the talluqa-i Musalmanan within the zamindari of Ajab Singh.⁵ The three subordinate holders of the villages within the zamindari makans (also called talluqa-i zamindar) held by "zamindars" were not recognized as zamindaran-i mhin-o

1. P.C. (Kadi) No. 4.

2. Ibid. The entry is made as under:
   Taalluqa-i Roopram Mawza Amod
   6 villages
   Amod, Palaj, Kankadan, Mankaj, Sathal, Manknos, Akraj.

3. The document entitled yad-dasht: Peshkash-zamindaran (R. No. 66, Pune) dated 1705-6 records the remittance of peshkash in the following way: Roopram, zamindar mawza Amod, Six villages : Rs. 2750/-, -az mawza Santhal Rs. 390/-. Apparently, Roopram remitted the total sum of peshkash (2750/-) due from his zamindari. He paid Rs. 2360/- on (6-1) 5 of his villages while the rest (Rs. 390/-) was contributed by dependent Koli, holding the 6th village.


5. Ibid.
kahin nor their possessions counted as separate makan.¹

How and when did the above mentioned developments take place? Our sources are completely silent on the matter. However, from prince Murad's Nishan and emperor Shah Jahan's farman concerning the zamindari of Dantiwara it would appear that the imperial government could place the zamindar of one makan under the zamindar of the other. The zamindari of Dantiwara (one makan) was granted to the zamindar of Sirohi on condition of ensuring safety of passengers and traders passing through the former territory.² Likewise, emperor Aurangzeb had granted 12 zamindari villages of pargana Kutyana (sarkar Soreth) as "ina'm b' tariq-i zamindari" to the brother of one Sheikh Md. Hafiz for suppressing a rebel (mutamarrid...mufsid) perhaps the rebellious zamindar, and maintaining specified contingents to serve the faujdar-i sarkar.³

Some of the zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin could be placed under some noble favoured with the position of watandari (?). Masum Quli Khan, naib-faujdar of pargana Rajkot was granted watandari

1. Ibid. Nos. 1 to 7; Account ff 121a, 309b. The two sources do not count the holdings of sub-ordinate zamindars as separate makan, particularly the latter work which lists all the makan of pargana Kadi, does not mention the these sub-zamindars at all.

2. See texts of the Nishan and farman in Vir Vinod III pp. 1102-4.

of the same pargana in recognition of his appreciable act of
eliminating the leading zamindar of the place during emperor
Shahjahan's reign. Likewise, Jawanmand Khan Babi (senior) was
granted watandari of (pargana) Radhanpur during Emperor Far-
rukh's reign. Later on Jawanmand Khan Babi, (the Jun-
ior) was favoured (1731) with the watandari of pargana Badnagar
by maharaja Abhay Singh, the subedar designate, for assisting
him against Mubariz-ul mulk, the dismissed defiant Governor.
What kind of rights did the watandar enjoy is not known. However
they seem to have been placed over and above the zamindars of
the concerned area, and were themselves required to pay pesh-
kash.

But the mode of extending the area of influence and
acquiring additional rights is distinct during the eighteenth from
that of the seventeenth century. Thus the zamindar of Bhuj en-
croached upon the Waghela's possessions in the adjoining sarkar
Pattan, occupying pargana Tharad, some villages in parganas of

4. At the time the Babi chief was granted watandari of Radhan-
pur some reduction(tatkfil)was made in the jama of the
pargana, presumably to adjust the watandars rights. Ibid,
Supplement. Pp. 202-3. The Babis continued to hold the
watandari possessions for the rest of the period. For the
watandar paying peshkash, Ibid, II, P. 144.
Santalpur and Morwara beside the lands in the adjoining subah Thatta sometime before 1720-21. The subedar who visited the zamindari (1720-21) at the head of a strong wathangiri force, did not bother the zamindar to vacate the un-authorised possessions which he continued to hold.¹ Similarly the zamindar of Sirohi continued to hold 60 villages in pargana Deesa which he had occupied in a likewise manner around the year 1717.² On the other, the zamindar lost part of his lands to the house of Jodhpur.³ In the same way zamindar of Sunt lost his valuable possessions i.e. plains to the ismi zamindar of Cheharmandvi. The territory of Sunt shrank to the immediate surroundings of the capital city.⁴

Likewise the ismi zamindars of Lunawara that of Porbandar extended their area of control. The Rana of Porbandar took Kutiyanā from the Qasbati zamindars of the place.⁵ He bribed the desai of Mangrole and took hold of Madhopur and its depend-

¹. Account, ff. 110a, 111a; Mirat-i Ahmadi, Supplement, pp 226-7; For a similar act on the part of zamindar but followed by quick action leading to his eviction from the unauthorised occupations during Akbar's reign, please see Akbarnamah, III, pp. 524, 530; Tabqat-i Akbari, II, pp. 386-7; Account f 110b.

². Account, f 110a.


⁵. Tarikh-i Soreth, P. 86.
ent villages in 1725. The Rana is reported to have acquired all the villages between Madhopur, Chhaiyan and Porbandar. The zamindar of Rajpipla expelled the imperial officials from Nadot (1729) and brought the area under his control.

The stronger ones among the zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin too did not lag behind in the ongoing process. Some stray pieces of information suggesting, though indirectly, the existence of a zamindar holding sub-ordinate positions under others, are available for the third decade of the eighteenth century. In contrast to the usual practice of reflecting a zamindar zamindari-wise amount of peshkash, the Account sometimes brackets a number of zamindari makans together as having been assessed on all the zamindaris thus bracketted together, but collected from a duly specified zamindar. The peshkash document, in a likewise manner, brackets eight maken-i zamindari together along with the peshkash noted separately against each of the makans but, then, the sum total of the peshkash is reflected against zamindar Dayal.

1. Ibid, pp. 84-86; Mirat-i Mustafabad, pp. 151-2.

2. Tarikh-i-Soreth, Pp. 52, 92; Bombay Gazetteer, VIII, pp. 115. Between the year 1723-33 the Jethwas, tribesman of the zamindar of Porbandar, are reported to have acquired territories adjacent to these zamindaris. Ibid, VIII, p. 298.


4. Account, ff 11b, 117b, 366a, 368a -69b.
and other who held zamindaris amongst them. According to another document the zamindar of Wadhawan, Arjun Singh, paid *peshkash* to Dawood Khan (1713-15) on his duly specified zamindari, i.e. Wadhawan. But during Muizauddawla's period the *peshkash* from the zamindaris of Karanpur (Rs.75/-) and Bans (Rs.225/-) along with from Wadhawan (Rs.9700/-) was collected through *ima'rfat* Arjun Singh only. It suggests that the zamindars who paid *peshkash* on behalf of other zamindars also, had acquired some authority over them and this seems to have carried the state's approval.

Some specific information showing the zamindaran-i mahin-o kahin turning against each other is available in the works of a little later date. Bhao Singh, the zamindar of Bhaonagar, is reported to have encroached upon the territory of parganas of Ghoga, Dholqa and Dhandoqa, forced the zamindars of the places to pay him tribute (1739) and, finally expelled them from their respective possessions.

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Ghoga became tributary to the Kathi zamindars of Kathiawad. 1 The Ahirs, Kolis and Bareas of Kathiawad are reported to have enlarged their possessions at the expense of their neighbouring zamindars during Farrukhsiyar's reign. 2 The zamindar of Bhaonagar did not spare even his own bhayads and occupied Tarpat, holder of which had been in direct relationship with the state. 3 He also took away zamindaris in pargana Santalpur from their Koli zamindars and harassed the zamindars of Laathi. 4 Likewise a brother of the zamindar of Halwad established his authority over the Khanwad (Kathi) zamindars of Saela. Subsequently he established himself at the place as a raja, independent of Halwad. Sometime during the fifth decade of the century he successfully brought his brother Gaj Singh of Halwad under his control. 5 During the same decade Nagar Brahmins of Mangrole were deprived of their possessions by Maliks and Rajputs; the Waghelas also

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1. Rasmala, p. 146; Tarikh-i Soreth, p. 82.
2. Tarikh-i Soreth, p. 82, Hamilton Walter (op. cit, i, pp. 644-5) states that they acquired Dhandopur, Sudama, Chhotola, Mawar, Bewar, Channora and Arunpur.
4. Tarikh-i Soreth, p. 96; Imperial Gazetteer (Bhavnagar), p. 119.
5. Tarikh-i Soreth, pp. 98-9; Mirat-i Mustafabad, p. 251. Jawanmard Khan Babi (Junior), the last Mughal Governor and founder of the Nawabi of Rahanpur, reportedly helped Gaj Singh regain Dharangdhara.
lost their zamindarish to the Kahtis around the same period.\(^1\) Bhagat Singh Waghela lost Kalor in 1728. In his turn he captured Lambodra from Arjun Singh, a Koli and occupied the place for himself.\(^2\)

Some idea of the process and causes of the passing of the weaker zamindars under the stronger ones may be formed with the help of contemporary and near-contemporary evidence.

The process of passing of Dungarpur and Banswada into the tutelage of the house of Chittor suggests that even the imperial authority could itself be instrumental in letting the stronger zamindar establish his sway over the weaker one. Pursuing a carrot and stick policy towards the house of Udaipur during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the empire had used Dungarpur and Banswara as pawns for regulating Agra-Udaipur relationship.\(^3\) But with the assigning of the two principalities

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3. Zamindars of Dungarpur, Banswada and Sirohi had, before their acceptance of the Mughal suzerainty, owed their allegiance to the house of Chittor, the relationship being based mainly on political affiliations and matrimony. Even after their submission to empre, their position was considerably influenced by the state of relationship subsisting between the Mughals and the house of Chittor. Thus in his apparent attempt at isolating Udaipur from its allies, Emperor Akbar singled out the three chiefs for doing homage (1576-77) and married the daughter of the zamindar of Dungarpur, the strongest of the three. (Akbarnamah, I, pp. 181-90, 195-96; Kr. R. A. Khan, \textit{op. cit}, pp. 32-6). Moreover, Rana pratap's brother Jagmal who had entered into imperial service was assigned jagir in the zamindari of Sirohi, a step

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In the tankhwah jagir of a cadet of Chittor in 1717 and subsequently (1730-31) the writing off peshkash-i nizamat in favour of the Rana, the two principalities could never return to the imperial fold. Likewise the zamindari of Sirohi which was assigned in the tankhwah jagir of the zamindar of Jodhpur by emperor Farrukhsiyar, passed out of the Mughal state for good.

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seemingly pregant with significan implications. (Tabqat-i-Akbari, II, p. 370; Akbarnamah, Ill, p. 413). Once Rana Amar Singh submitted, emperor Jahangir assigned (1615) Dungarpur and Banswada in the tankhwah Jagir of Kunwar Karan Singh. (Text of Jahangir's farman, dt. May 11, 1615, Vir Vinod, 11, pp. 239-49). But when a rift cropped up during Shah Jehan's reign, the emperor deprived the Kunwar of jagir of two principalities which, instead, were assigned in the tankhwah jagir of the respective zamindaris of the principalities who were ennobled with mansabs. The two zamindars along with the one of Sirohi were obliged to do homage; and one of them, the zamindar of Dungarpur also favoured with the thanedari of Azamabad (Sarkar Ahmadabad). Rawal punja of Dungarpur and Rawal Samsi of Banswada were respectively awarded mansabs of 1500/1500 and 1000/1000. Being thus encouraged by the emperor the zamindars 'began to throw off Chittor's yoke'. Amal-i Saleh, III, pp. 205-213; Abdul Hamid Lahori, Badshahnamah, Asiatic Society, 1867, 11 pp. 304, 307; Vir Vinod, Ill, pp. 319, 369, 425-8, 430; p. Saran, op. cit, pp. 128-30. Presumably in recognition of the neutrality observed by the Rana of Chittor during war of succession, emperor Aurangazeb restored the two principalities in the tankhwah jagir of Kunwar Jai Singh, terminating the mansab of the Rawals of Dungarpur and Banswara. (Text of Aurangazeb farman of 1068 AH, Vir Vinod, Ill, pp. 425-28; as also Ibid, p. 430). During the Rajput wars (1679-80) the Mughal-Chittor amity again suffered a set back and, consequently, the two principalities were again taken away and the zamindar of Dungarpur, as under Shah Jehan, was granted mansab. The zamindari of Banswarah was restored to khalsa. Mirat-i Ahmadi, 1, p. 305; Account, ff 108a-9b; Vir Vinod, Ill, p. 754.

1. Account, ff. 105b, 110b, 111b, 126b; Mirat-i Ahmadi, Supplement, pp. 226, 234, 238.

2. Account, ff. 111a, 126b.
This development may be attributed to the declining grip of the imperial centre which virtually helped a stronger zamindar-jagirdar to absorb zamindari-jagir. The Mirat, moreover, speaks of the use of force by the zamindars in their endeavours for extending the sway of their rights. The zamindar of Navanagar regained part of his possession under imperial control by applying force; the Rana of Porbandar made encroachments and re-occupied the directly administered portion of his zamindari while the faujdar had gone to southern Gujarat to resist Maratha pressure. The Rana bullied the local thanedars into vacating thanas in his favour. Also he bribed the desai of Mangrol so as to get the latter's consent for the occupation of Madhopur, a dependency of Mangrol.

Connivance of local nobles seems to have played its role. The zamindar of Sehore (and later Bhaonagar) had provided shelter to Sohrab Khan during the days of hardship. The Khan's

2. Tarikh-i Soreth, p. 256; Mirat-i Mustafabad, p. 158.
3. Bombay Gazetteer, IV, p. 301. The zamindar is also reported to have intrigued with the local officials.
4. Tarikh-i Soreth (Junagadh MS) f.54; Mirat-i Mustafabad, p.152; Bombay Gazetteer, VIII, p. 302; Wilberforce, op. cit p.152.
5. Mirat-i Ahmadi, II, pp. 155-6. The author of Bombay Gazetteer (ibid, p.303) incorrectly mentions Sohrab Khan instead of Behram Khan, who, according to the Mirat was the person so sheltered by the zamindar and later on appointed by the state.
appointment as amin-amil-faujdar of Ghoga and surrounding areas in the vicinity of Sehore might have come as a boon for the zamindar. During his tenure the zamindar is also reported to have entered into a secret treaty with the Abyssinean commander, in-charge of Mughal fleet, who helped him encourage the traders to use the newly founded port of Bhaonagar. The possibilities of the Abyssinea's connivance with the zamindar in the acquisition of lands under the port of Ghoga may not be ruled out. The zamindar of Cheharmandvi took part in the internal strife at Surat by siding with Teg Beg Khan, the port officer, against the merchant prince (umdat-ut tujjar). In the strife the former emerged victorious. The obliged mutasaddi presumably turned a cool eye towards the zamindar who absorbed the surrounding thanas and the lands of sarkar Sunt.

Some of the zamindars made direct use of the Mughal-Maratha struggle. Some of them acted as mediators between them and were rewarded by both. The zamindar of Rajpipla took advantage of his treaty of friendship with the Marathas. The Maratha pressure in this part kept the Mughals at bay and the zamindar fell upon

1. Gazetteer of Bhaonagar, pp.434, 477; For similar instances of the zamindars extending support to defiant Mughal nobles, Mirat-i Ahmadi; II, pp 17, 170-1.


Mughals' land, and the thanas. Besides, the overall prevailing political condition must have generated the requisite atmosphere conducive to such acts of self aggrandisement on the part of the zamindars.

As regards the specific causes other than the ones which are implied in the preceding discussion of the passing of the weaker zamindars under the stronger ones, contemporary works are almost silent. However the works of later date cast some light on the point. It is suggested that the adventurers and the 'stronger' zamindars harassed their neighbours and compelled them to purchase their protection and forbearance at the price of surrendering a part of their share. The qirasias and the free booters

1. The Mirat-i Ahmadi does not explicitly report about the treaty. It, however, specifies that the Marathas when pressed hard by subedar Sarbuland khan took shelter in Rajpipla. Ibid, II, pp.60-5, 143-4, 108-10; Rasmala, p.iii.

2. From the observations of the Mirat-i Ahmadi, (Ibid, i, pp.174-5) however it would appear that the helplessness of the weaker ones (i.e. inability to defend themselves in a situation when the Governors had themselves were too weak to extend protective hand) was the main cause.


According to the Bombay Gazetteer, (IV, pp.147) failure of the provincial authorities to shelter middle zamindars' from the raids of free booters and exactions of strong neighbours drove the "Owners", of many villages to seek protection of local 'chiefs'; the protection was sought in lieu of cession which was either in perpetuity (aghat) or for a number of years (avad). In almost all cases only a share of the produce and a subsistence was reserved for the original possessor.

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reportedly caused havoc. Harassed by them the zamindars sought protection of those stronger than themselves. 1

There were, then, some Superior zamindars who could not maintain the unity of their zamindaris, particularly due to the challenges that came from within. 2 The bhayads in particular appear to have been restive under the control of the head of the family. 3 Thus brothers of zamindar Arjun Singh who held mawza Barod within his zamindari makan, broke off their relationship

1. During 1770-90 the British noted that the villages in peninsular Gujarat were generally fortified. There they also noted the high towers which were used to notice the arrival of kathis and their ilk and warn the inhabitants. Hamilton Walter, op cit. 1, p.653. The Mirat also speaks of particular arrangements made for controlling the Kathis and their ilk who used to create disturbance if they noticed a slight slackness' in the administrative control Mirat-i Ahmadi, l, pp. 174-5, 211. The gradual decline of garrisons in the interior and on the important points might have encouraged such element to go about their job with impunity. For the presence of such element in the subah, please see Mirat-i Ahmadi, l, pp 173-75; Ibid, ii, pp. 244, 247, 249, 253, 266, 276, 500; B N Reu, Some Imperial farmans addressed to the rulers of Jodhpur, Proc. I.H.C.; 1952, p.353.

2. It may be recalled that the empire had sought to dismember and weaken some of the stronger zamindari, like the one of Nawanagar, by entering into direct relationship with the vassals and the junior members of the family of ruling zamindars. Later (1721) subedar Muizuddawla also entered into direct dealing with the bhayads and other vassals of the Chief of Bhuj. But the two zamindars, strong as they were, succeeded in putting their respective houses in order again. Mirat-i Ahmadi, ii, pp 11, 98, 110-3; Tarikh-i So-reth, p 258; Account ff. 110a-11a, 122a. Obviously even the gains of the policy which was pursued within its logical limits, could not be preserved, if and when the zamindar happened to be strong enough.

3. It is worth pointing out that on the death of a junior member of the family, the grant reverted back ot the head of the family who, according to the rule of inheritance, was the sole successor to such lands.
with the head of the family by paying peshkash to the subedar (1721) directly.¹ Likewise one Gangadas broke off his relations with the head of his family by entering into direct transactions with subedar Ghazi-ud din Khan (1709) and, later on with Muizud-dawla (1721).² Moreover, sons of Veroji and Vesoji (Mahikantha) are reported to have enlarged their possessions at the expense of the head of family from whom they had broken off their relationship.³ Some of the Bhayads in northern and peninsular Gujarat who had severed their links with their families and assumed independence were later on found in possession of a few villages; one of the bhayads who held village Barkoora, had assumed the title of raja.⁴ Works of a later date observe that the bhayads pressed hard by the Kathi free booters, girasias and sometimes even by the heads of respective families sought protection of a stronger zamindar, of the one other than their immediate head.⁵ Some of them surrendered the main part of their possessions to

1. Peshkash Docs, P.C. No. 30 read with Account, f.116b.
2. Peshkash Docs, P.C. No. 10 read with Account, f. 115b.
4. Treaties, VI, pp. 9-10; Bombay Gazetteer, VIII, p.115.
5. Treaties, IV, p.59.
the protector and retained only a share as *jiwae*. The process might have created a new section of zamindars out of the existing zamindaris and enhanced the position of those who could extend protection by virtue of possession of a striking force.

It would appear, then, that some zamindaris changed hands and some new hands came to acquire the status of Superior zamindars whereas some of them lost their independent status. A drastic change in the caste composition of the category of Superior zamindars is not discernable. But the relative exclusiveness of the caste-blocks as noted in the preceding Chapter, might have been further affected, though only marginally, by the entry of a new group of people, viz; Mughal officials and *jagirdars* who could transform their official positions into hereditary ones.

Still the Rajputs and the Kolis seem to have continued to hold leading position, with their caste-bastions constituting as before, the main source of their power.

It would appear from the preceding discussion that the

2. For a detailed view of the representative cases transforming official positions into hereditary *nawabi*, please see Chapter VII. below.
Mughal - zamindar relationship underwent a drastic change during the period. A qualitative change in the Mughal attitude which is indicated in the preceding discussion may be summarised as under:—

Although in theory the very act of abstaining from service on the part of zamindars amounted to rebellion, the Mughals however made no serious attempt to enforce this rule. No action is reported to have been taken against any of the zamindars abstaining from service.

The virtual alternative to military service as we have noted above, came in the form of extorting peshkash. As the collection of peshkash also required actual use or show of force, it is evident that the tribute was not offered willingly and regularly. On many an occasion the zamindars put up resistance and refused to pay even under the pressure of arms. As per the available evidence only two of the defiant zamindars, viz; Dantiwara and Halwad were confiscated for a while.¹ No other example of confiscation is traceable in our sources, though in a few cases the authorities resorted to the extreme acts of massacring the zamindars' supporters, putting fire to their possessions and

exacting heavy amounts by way of penalty. ¹ Numerous incidents of withholding payments and putting up armed resistance are spread all through the pages of available sources.² But in all other incidents of the sort the zamindars either paid the tribute, offered securities or hostages, or agreed to pay the amount at the very arrival of watangiri forces; or they (particularly the more resourceful ones) resisted the imposition, put up armed opposition but agreed to pay the bargained amount before the final result of military action. More and more instances of military resistance are reported from the period of Dawood Khan's subedari (1713-15), though the tendency to evade payment considerably had emerged much earlier.³ Gradually rebelliousness came

1. Mīrāt-i Ahmādī, I, p.396; ibid, II, pp.10, 41, 43-4, 51, 102. Such immoderate actions were taken against relatively smaller and more vulnerable zamindars.

2. For instance, ibid, I, p. 392-4, 396; ibid, II pp. 9-11, 41, 43, 51, 89, 93-4, 107, 212, 244, 247, 257-8, 262-6, 276 etc. In all the struggles one common feature emerges, that in the end the amount of peshkash was bargained and settled. Zamindari of none of these zamindars where resistance has found mention, was confiscated. It makes clear that the zamindar first refused to accept any claim and when they saw that resistance was unavailing they purchased forebearance. See also Hamilton Walter, op cit. I, 642. But the zamindar of Bhuj, as noted earlier, had been able to resist its imposition successfully. Also a number of them evaded payments all through the period.

to be accepted as a *fait accompli* and all the zamindaris came to be designated as *mehwas* (refractory) and the zamindars as seditious (*mufsidan*) and leading ones among them as *Mehwas-i umdai* i.e. the recalcitrant and the excessively recalcitrant zamindaris. The blanket treatment thus given to them all and their categorisation based on the degree of recalcitrance not only speaks of the wholly changed attitude of the zamindars but also indicates the helplessness of the Mughal State which could not even react effectively, much less to take the initiative which had virtually been seized by the zamindars.

It would, therefore, appear that Mughals did not care much for the acquisition of military service, or were unable to do so. In case the zamindars paid *peshkash* peacefully to the *watangiri* expeditions they were not disturbed in their possessions. Some

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2. The Mughal's attitude in this regard becomes clear from the incident of Porbandar. On the arrival of the *subedar* near Porbandar, the zamindar abandoned the forcibly occupied fort and port and fled, obviously to avoid payment of tribute which had been due for a long time. The *subedar* captured the fort. In order to press the zamindar to come back and offer *peshkash*, the *Nazim* ordered the demolition of the fort. The action could not bring the desired results. In the end the *subedar* ordered repairing of the demolished parts of the fort and declared his intention of appointing a *faujdar* and retain the fort i.e. to restore status quo ante. The news brought the zamindar back to the place of action. As the zamindar paid *peshkash* and penalty, the order of appointing the *faujdar* was withdrawn and the zamindar was left in possession even of his unauthorised acquisition. The *Nazim's* action totally legitimatised the zamindar's action. *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, II, pp 98-9; *Tarikh-i Soreth* pp 84, 86; *Mirat-i-Mustafabad*, p.152.
of them who put up resistance were in some cases not so much opposed to the imposition of peshkash as to the amount dictated. However some of them first opposed the very imposition of peshkash and when they saw the futility of resistance they agreed to pay the dictated or the bargained amount. More commonly the resistance proved to be a tactic meant to put the zamindar in a bargaining position. Neither the Mughals nor the zamindars brought the matter to an extreme for, it seems, the latter were basically interested in retaining their possessions while the former's interest was mainly in obtaining the peshkash quickly and, preferably, peacefully. Under the circumstance the administration adopted a compromising attitude leading to a sharp fall in the amount collected and gradually in the very capacity to effect collections. The administration could not come out of the vicious circle.

It is possible that the negligence on the part of Mughal officials was due to their pre-occupation with safeguarding their interests vis a vis one another and the Marathas which also affected the efficiency and strength of the empire. The Mughals, for whatsoever reason, virtually had lost control over the Superior zamindars and punishing the rebels as they had done during the heyday of the empire. The Mughals had adopted virtually a non-punitive attitude towards the rebels. Hardly any of
the zamindars was forced to vacate his unauthorised acquisition of faujdarī-strongholds, the thanas, the raiyatī and the other zamindars' lands. 1 Exacting peshkash on irregular basis survived as the only interest as also the point of contact of the Mughals with the Superior zamindars. Moreover peshkash which was a well-established claim, duly calculated on the basis of paying capacity, came to denominate not so much the zamindars' subordination as much the price of forebearance determined on the basis of evaluation of each other's strength and surrendered only casually.

A change in the attitude of provincial authorities towards the matter of succession is evident from the evidence coming for Navanagar. Hardolji had killed his elder brother, Jam Rai Singh and usurped the qaddi. Son of Rai Singh left for his aunt, the Rani of Kutch - sister of Rao Pratap Singh of Halwad. The Rani is reported to have requested her brother to manage installation of the legitimate successor on the qaddi of Navanagar. The zamindar of Halwad entered into matrimonial alliance

1. Subedar Dawood Khan is, however, reported to have forced the Kolis of Baroda region to vacate the villages which they had captured by force and the fortress which they had raised was also pulled down. Akhbarat, 2505, 3rd Shohan, Farrukhsiyar's 3rd R.Y. For the Nazims not seeking eviction of zamindars from their unauthorised acquisitions, Mirat-i Ahmadi, II, pp. 11, 41-2, 45-6, 57, 93, 96, 98, 99; Tarikh-i Soreth, pp 84-6; Mirat-i Mustafabad, pp 152, 154; Bombay Gazetteer, VIII, pp. 296, 301. Also there is a solitary instance showing the subedar re-establishing a thana, Mirat-i Ahmadi, II p. 266.
with Sarbuland Khan, then subedar and Salbat Mohammed Khan, an influential Babi chief. The subedar along with the Rao of Halwad and the Babi chief attacked Navanagar, expelled Hardolji and restored the gaddi to Jam Rai Singh's son. The new Jam offered peshkash and three villages which the two Mughal officials sold to another zamindar. In order to finance the project, the Jam had taken loan from the zamindar of Kutch by mortgaging the mahals of Balambha and Amrah. At Balambha, the zamindar of Kutch built a fort (1736) and subsequently annexed the two mahals. 1 Again, the Jam was killed (1734) by the zamindar of Wadhawan, Karan Singh Jhala. But our sources are silent as to what happened subsequently. However members of the same ruling family continued to rule the zamindari. 2 It, thus, becomes clear that the intervention in the matter of succession does not appear to have been considered a matter of established state policy. It was rather a matter of personal interest of the provincial authorities if it suited their purpose. It may, thus, be seen that


2. Tarikh-i Soreth, pp. 256, 258; Mirat-i Mustafabad, p. 151. L.F. Pushbrook William (Jamnagar, Sketch of its rulers And its administration P.4) notes that struggle for succession was a 'rule' in the house of Navanagar until nineteenth century.
the Superior zamindars had successfully replaced the Mughal authority with the one of their own, emerged stronger out of the strife-ridden phase (1700-50) in the history of the region.