CHAPTER IV

INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES TO
U.S. IMPOSED ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

The use of economic instruments to achieve foreign policy goals runs the gamut from consultation with other countries to persuasion, negotiation, pressure and coercion. The cessation of military aid to Turkey over its behaviour in Cyprus was clearly coercive in intent. Iranian nationalists seized hostages in the U.S. Embassy in Teheran, a form of non-economic coercion and the United States responded economically by cutting off trade, curtailed oil imports from Iran and seizing Iranian assets under U.S. control. The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, again a form of non-economic coercion and the United States responded both symbolically by not participating in the Olympics in Moscow and economically by limiting grain exports to the Soviet Union. The United States suspended aid to Nicaragua to coerce the government of that country, to cease being a transshipment point for arms, for rebels in El Salvador.

The Soviet action in Afghanistan was instructive. When economic coercion fails, force can be used. There must have been deep frustration in the Carter Administration over what
to do about the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and when hostages were seized in Iran, the administration surveyed every conceivable form of coercion that might be used. Military invasion was rejected as being overaction.

This is frustrating but it is reality. It was easier in Nicaragua. That country was getting aid and wanted more and this was an appropriate measure for coercing the government, to cease its involvement in favour of the rebels in El Salvador.

But this is not the sole reason for frustration. The most important factor is that, a country is vulnerable to economic coercion when what is being withheld is of vital importance and is not available from other sources or can be obtained only at great cost. Here lies the importance of international responses to any economic sanctions imposed either unilaterally or multilaterally on the target by the protagonist country.

This chapter attempts to deal with international responses to some specific economic sanctions imposed by the United States.
4.1 Suez, 1956

In 1956, following the nationalization of Suez Canal by Egypt, the United States imposed economic sanctions on Egypt to ensure free passage through Suez Canal and to compensate for nationalization. The U.S. Secretary of State John Dulles on his visit to London said "no arrangements for the Suez Canal's future would be acceptable which would leave it in the unfettered control of a single power which would exploit it for purposes purely of national policy".¹

On 26 July 1956, Egypt proclaimed the nationalization of Suez Canal Company and placed it in the hands of an Egyptian operating authority management of the Canal traffic. After eventually successful efforts by the United Nations, to obtain the withdrawal of those forces involving the creation of the United Nations Emergency Force and clearance of the blocked Suez Canal under the United Nations auspices, there came renewed negotiations concerning the Canal and renewed efforts to promote peaceful conditions in the area by reestablishing full compliance with the Armistice Agreement.

After the nationalization of the Canal in July 1956, France, United Kingdom and United States agreed in talks at London between 29 July and 2 August, 1956, that the Egyptian action threatened the freedom and security of the Canal as guaranteed by the Convention of 1888. The announced purpose was to consider steps to establish operating arrangements, consistent with legitimate Egyptian interests, under an international system designed to assure operation of the Canal as guaranteed by the Convention. Egypt, meanwhile had seized the Canal. Together with the United States, United Kingdom and France blocked all Egyptian accounts, including those of the Canal Company.

At the London Conference, India offered a compromise solution between the position of the majority and that of the exclusive control and management of the operation and development of the Canal by Egypt. It proposed a consultative body, which would advise Egypt in accordance with the interests of the users of the Canal and would maintain contacts with the United Nations. This proposal was supported by Ceylon, Indonesia and the USSR.

At the meeting of the Security Council on 13 October, United Kingdom and France submitted another draft
resolution. By this, as amended on the suggestion of Iran, the Council noting the account of the Secretary General on these explanatory conversations would: (1) agree that any settlement of the Suez question should meet the following six requirements: (i) there should be free and open transit through the Canal without discrimination, overt or covert - this covered both political and technical aspects; (ii) the sovereignty of Egypt should be respected; (iii) the operation of the Canal should be insulated from the politics of any country; (iv) the manner of fixing tolls and charge should be decided by agreement between Egypt and the users; (v) a fair proportion of the dues should be allotted to development; and (iv) in case of disputes unresolved affairs between Suez Canal Company and the Egyptian government, should be settled by arbitration with suitable terms of reference and suitable provisions for the payment of sums found to be due; (2) consider that the 18-power proposals corresponded to those requirements while recognizing that other proposals corresponding to the same requirements might be submitted by the Egyptian government; (3) note that government, while declaring its readiness to accept the principle of organized collaboration between an Egyptian Authority and the users, had not yet formulated sufficient-
ly, precise proposals to meet those requirements; (4) invite the Governments of Egypt, France and United Kingdom to make known promptly its proposals for a system of meeting those requirements; and (5) consider that meanwhile the Suez Canal Users' Association, which had been qualified to receive the dues, payable by ships belonging to its members and the competent Egyptian authorities should cooperate to ensure the satisfactory operation of the Canal and free and open transit through the canal in accordance with the Convention of 1888.

On 13 October, the Council voted on the amended Anglo-French draft resolution in two parts. The first part, outlining the six requirements was adopted unanimously. The second, which received nine votes to two against (USSR and Yugoslavia) was not adopted since one of the negative votes was that of a permanent council members. The representative of Yugoslavia did not press for a vote on this draft resolution.

It received great support from the international community. For the United Kingdom's Prime Minister Eden said that "this (nationalization) was, of course, the challenge for which he had been waiting. Now, at last he had found a
pretext, to launch an all-out campaign of political, economic and military pressures on Egypt and to destroy forever Nasser's image as the leader of Arab nationalism". 2

The French Foreign Minister Christian Pinean, stated that France would not accept the unilateral action of Colonel Nasser. Prime Minister Guy Mollet went even further in the days ahead and called "Nasser an apprentice dictator" whose methods were similar to (Adolph) Hitler's... (Mollet) announced that France had decided upon an energetic and severe counterstroke." 3

"The Iraqis were not surprisingly settled that Nasser should have failed to consult any fellow Arab State, even any of the oil-producing States, before embarking on a course of action that was bound to have serious political and economic repercussions on the whole Arab world. Inevitably, therefore, their reaction was more angry than cautious and Nuri es - Said, Prime Minister in particular, expressed the hope that Britain would respond resolutely to

2. Supra note 1, p.47.
Nasser's act of defiance.\(^4\)

Given Egypt's refusal to allow ships bound for Israeli ports through Canal "Israel's obvious interests lay in control of the Canal and of the terminal ports of Suez and Port said being taken out of Nasser's hands."\(^5\)

As for the Arab nations, all of them, even pro-British Iraq, in the end officially "endorsed Nasser's nationalization".\(^6\)

At the London Conference, India's V.K. Krishna Menon (acting Foreign Minister) was the main combatant for Egypt, with the Soviet Union acting as his second."\(^7\)

The voting (Appendix-III) reveals that the countries of Western Europe and Far East along with India supported the imposition of sanctions on Egypt by the western powers.

4.2 Cuba, 1960

On July 11, 1960, Cuba requested the United Nations

\(^4\) Supra note 1, p.47.
\(^5\) Supra note 1, p.49.
\(^6\) Supra note 3, p.297.
\(^7\) Ibid.
Security Council, to meet immediately to consider a grave situation endangering international peace and security that had arisen as a result of repeated threats, reprisals and aggressive acts by the United States against Cuba.

The Security Council met on 18 July 1960, to consider the Cuban complaint and invited the representative of Cuba to participate in the discussion. The representative charged that the United States was interfering in the internal affairs of Cuba through acts which included: aid to counter-revolutionary elements conspiring against Cuba, violations of Cuba's air space, verbal attacks, diplomatic pressure and acts of economic aggression. The policy of the United States had been shorned in allegations that under the revolutionary government, Cuba was falling under the influence of international communism and represented a threat to the security of the United States and the Western hemisphere.

The representative of the United States stated, that his government had no aggressive purposes against Cuba. It had taken steps to prevent unauthorized flights in the Caribbean area and to enforce domestic laws concerning traffic in munitions and implements of war, which might be
used in revolutionary activities.

The majority of the members of the Security Council supported that the situation be dealt with by Organization of American States (OAS) particularly, in view of the fact that OAS had already been seized of the problem.

The representative of the USSR and Poland supported the charges made by Cuba, maintained that aggressive acts of United States against Cuba constituted a threat to international peace and security.

The Cuban complaint was discussed by the Security Council on 4th and 5th January, 1961.

The Cuban representative also said that, the United States diplomatic manoeuvres to isolate Cuba from the other Latin American countries had resulted in the governments of Guatemala, Dominican Republic, Paraguay and Peru, obediently following, instructions from Washington to severe diplomatic relations with Cuba.

The United States representative charged that, Cuban officials had supported invasion attempts beginning in 1959, made against Panama, Nicaragua, Dominican Republic and
The representatives of Chile and Equador stressed the importance of the principles of non-intervention and peaceful settlement of disputes in the inter-American system and believe, that the dispute could be resolved through the application of these principles.

Other members of the Council, France, United Kingdom and China thought, that the Cuban representative had not produced any evidence to substantiate the charges of imminent aggression and indicated that they would not favour the adoption of any resolution implying recognition of the charges.

The First Committee considered the Cuban complaint during the second part of General Assembly's fifteenth session at meetings held between 15th and 21st April, 1961.

On April 18, Mexico submitted a draft resolution by invoking Article 33 of the UN Charter. On the same day, a 7-power text was submitted by Argentina, Chile, Columbia, Honduras, Panama, Uruguay and Venezuela. The clauses were: (1) exhort those members states which belonged to OAS to lend their assistance with a view to a settlement by peace-
ful means in accordance with the Charter principles of the United Nations and Organization of American States; (2) exhort all member-states to abstain from any action which might aggravate existing tensions.

On 19, USSR submitted a draft resolution condemning the aggressive actions of the United States and other countries on whose territories counter-revolutionary bands were being found. Secondly, demanded immediate disarming of all counter-revolutionary bands, thirdly, that all United Nations member-state cease to give assistance of any kind to such bands and last, call the United Nations, to render all necessary assistance to the government of Cuba to repel aggression.

Several amendments to the seven-power draft resolution were submitted on 20th and 21st April, and thus, Resolution 1616(XV) as recommended by Ist Committee, A/4744 and as amended in plenary, adopted by the Assembly on 21 April 1961, meeting 995 by roll call vote of 59 to 13 with 24 abstentions. The voting pattern showed that generally the pro-Soviet East European bloc was against the resolution for the obvious reason. The Soviet allies as India, Yugoslavia and many others did not take a clear stand, abstained to
prove their neutrality in the situation (see Appendix III).

4.3 Libya, 1978

In 1978, U.S. banned military equipment sales to Libya in retaliation for Libyan support of theorist groups in Arab countries, Italy, Ireland. In May 1981, U.S. closed Libyan diplomatic mission and in October of the same year imposed controls on exports of small aircraft, helicopters, aircraft parts avionics to Libya, to limit Libyan capacity to support military adventures in neighbouring countries. On December 6, the U.S. defense attache was murdered in Paris some observers suspected Libyan involvement. On December 11, Deputy Secretary of State, William P. Clark stated that, administration had acted in response to Qaddafi's "well known efforts over the course of many years to undermine U.S. interests and those of our friends, as well as Libya's support for international terrorism." Anti-Qaddafi strategy involved many potential options, including oil embargo, other trade restrictions, military contingency plans."

American policy for Libya was to get out of Chad. On December 11, Libyan oil minister Akdessalem Mohammed Zagaar

labelled Reagan administration's measures as 'act of aggression' and called upon the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) for assistance. On December 12, 1981, ministers of OPEC, rejected Libyan appeal for 'joint action' against U.S.

On December 12, 1981, West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson, among other Europeans, urged Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr. to treat Libya in a more friendly fashion. According to one French diplomat, Haig in appeal for NATO support against Libya only convinced himself. 9

But although France had reacted with concern to Libyan moves in Africa, it has refused in part for economic reasons to treat Colonel Qaddafi as a pariah. It buys oil from Libya and argued that it is important to keep lines of communication open with the Libyans. In addition to this specific difference, President Francois Mitterrand of France had sought to distance his policy towards Chad from Washington's. But American officials in the White House, Pentagon and State Departments, all said that American and French

policy has been closely coordinated.\textsuperscript{10} The voting on the issue was not available.

4.4 Nicaragua, 1978

As the insurrection against Samoza gathered momentum in 1978 and early 1979, the clear objective of the U.S. policy was to prevent the FSLN from gaining a pre-dominant position in a post-Samoza regime.

When the dynasty collapsed on July 17, 1979, the United States shifted from outright hostility to one of cautious cordiality, as political change did not endanger the vital interests of the United States.

In Washington, policy-makers could not ignore the Marxist origin of many of the Sandanista leaders. Nicaragua was in desperate need of foreign assistance to rebuild an economy shattered by war. A deterioration of U.S.-Nicaraguan relation would have economic ramifications far beyond the aid dollars from Washington alone. U.S. policymakers set out consciously, to avoid repeating the errors of 1959-60, when U.S. hostility drove the Cuban Revolution, into

alliance with the Soviet Union.

But the architecture of President Carter's whole Central American policy began to collapse as soon as Ronald Reagan was elected president. The Republican Party platform called for halting U.S. aid to Marxist Nicaragua and helping the Nicaraguan people "restore democracy".

The Reagan administration launched a public relations campaign, to portray Nicaragua as a Marxist-Leninist dictatorship, guilty of gross rights abuses, a pawn of Cuba and the Soviet Union and the primary source of external support for the Salvadoran insurgency. The thrust was that, Nicaragua had undertaken a major military buildup with Cuban and Soviet assistance intended for aggressive use against Nicaragua's neighbours. The administration was fully aware that the Sandanistas had neither the capability nor the intention of invading their neighbours and that their military buildup was defensive in nature.

On the diplomatic front, the administration sought to isolate Nicaragua from its Central American neighbours and to reduce West European support for the Sandanistas. France delayed shipment of the military supplies and agreed not to
make any additional sales. Similar pressure was brought to bear on the West European countries, not only to prevent arms shipments to Nicaragua but to reduce economic support for the Sandanistas. This effort was partially successful. Therefore though all the West European countries, as Hungary, U.K., Canada, USSR, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Germany (East & West), Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Sweden, Yugoslavia favoured the sanctions (refer Appendix III), they maintained their relations with Nicaragua by giving donations, economic-technical cooperation and trade.

But most of the Afro-Asian countries abstained from voting and none other than Nicaragua was against the sanctions decision.

The primary mission of the U.S. was to attack Nicaragua's economic infrastructure in the hope that the resulting economic hardship would produce political destabilization. The United States policy was disliked by the developing countries which showed their fellow-feeling toward Nicaragua. They considered the act as intervention but to protect their own interests refrained from taking sides and adopted the policy of abstention on the question.
4.5 Afghanistan, 1979

On 26 December 1979, following Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, President Carter announced actions against USSR. He stopped licenses of high technology, strategic goods exports to USSR, pending review of licensing procedures, embargoed grain exports of 17 mmt that exceed 8 mmt already committed under 1975 agreement, curtailed USSR fishing rights in U.S. 200-mile zone, hinted at later Olympic boycott, deferred cultural scientific exchanges, delayed openings of consular facilities in Kiev, New York, restricted Aeroflot service, requested Senate to defer consideration of SALT II.

On January 12, 1980 the conference of grain exporting nations, approved the following statement, "There is a general agreement among the export representatives here that their governments would not directly or indirectly replace the grain that would have been shipped to the Soviet Union prior to the actions announced by President Carter." In later interpretations, officials of Canada, Australia, European Union (EC) said, statement "was viewed as a commitment not to allow sales to the USSR to exceed 'normal' or
traditional levels." Subsequently, export levels of sales exceed "normal" levels for previous several years. Thus, "during the last months of 1980 Allied support for the continuation of restrictions on grain sales to the Soviet Union appeared to be crumbling."  

Argentina said, it has no legal means to control activities of its private traders and refused to participate in economic sanctions or to control its sales by destination. Preembargo Argentine grain shipment to USSR averaged to 1.5 mmt sales for 1979-80 reached 7.6 mmt. In July 1980, Argentina signed pact with USSR guaranteeing 4.5 mmt annually for five years.

Brazil too increased grain sales to USSR in 1979-80, in 1981, signed five-year agreement for exchange of Soviet oil for Brazilian soyabean, soya oil, corn.

Unlike President Carter, Prime Minister Joseph Clark of


12. CRS 43.

13. CRS 43.

14. CRS 47.
Canada saw sanctions, as means of persuading USSR to leave Afghanistan. He expected that this joint action and more particularly, the actions of a number of countries acting together may persuade the Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan. That is the point of the exercise."^{15}

In November 1980, Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudean lifted partial embargo, imposed by former Prime Minister Joseph Clark. Partial embargo had limited grain sales to 3.8 mmt during 1979-80 crop year. Timing of Trudean’s decision seemingly was influenced by US-China grain agreement of October, 1980 which 'eroded' traditional Canadian market. In December 1980, Canada agreed to sell 4.7 mmt the next year, removed all quantitative restrictions on future sales to the USSR. In May 1981, Canada signed five-year agreement with USSR providing up to 5 mmt annually.^{16}

Australia agreed to limit 1980-81 sales to 1979-80 level of 4.2 mmt but insisted on an early talk with Reagan


administration on lifting embargo. 17

France sought to end sanctions on ground that other countries are violating them but EC agreed to limit 1980-81 sales to previous years level of 1.7 mmt. 18

On 22 January, 1980, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher requested British Olympic Committee (BOC) not to participate in games; in early March, Parliament endorsed this position, on 25 March 1980, BOC voted to attend.

On 26 January 1980, Prime Minister Clark supported boycott, position endorsed by Canadian Olympic Committee.

Australia, New Zealand, Italy took position similar to U.S., Canada but like Britain, their Olympic Committees had voted to attend.

As for China, Zaire, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Israel, Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Norway, Monaco, Liechtenstein Olympic Committees, at the urging of their government, voted not to attend.

18. Supra note 16 at 6-7.
The effectiveness of the U.S. policy thus depended on the other nations. The Europeans did not respond enthusiastically to America's call for sanctions against the Soviets. Washington's failure to consult its European allies on a number of important policy decisions, which required their cooperation for successful implementation has alienated many allies. Europeans favoured political and economic measures over a military response. They felt that Eastern Europe would eventually pay the price for Soviet actions and that complete endorsement of American initiatives would lead to further strains in East-West relations. Furthermore, European officials generally believed that since each European nation is unique in its economic ties with Moscow, the adoption of a uniform policy toward Soviet intervention is extremely unlikely. West Germany, for example, reacted calmly to the invasion because it wanted to maintain communication with the Soviet Union as it improves relations with East Germany to reduce the number of nuclear weapons through negotiations with the Soviets, to receive about 40% of its natural gas supplies from the Soviet Union and to continue other trade with Eastern Europe and Moscow.

India's public action did not demonstrate a serious,
concerted effort to persuade the Soviets to leave Afghanistan. India perceived Pakistan and China as the primary threats to its security and cannot risk jeopardizing its friendship with Moscow.

China's response to the Soviet invasion was predictably strongly negative as the presence of the Soviet troops along China's very narrow border with Afghanistan, was not reassuring. So the Chinese responded by terminating talks with Moscow, demanding the withdrawal of Soviet troops as a precondition for restoring detente.

A clear picture of international responses to U.S. imposed sanctions on Afghanistan can be seen from the voting in the United Nations General Assembly (Appendix IV). The Soviet Union and East European countries were against the resolution for obvious reasons. The Western countries and mainly their allies were for as they considered that the situation was a threat to international peace and security (see Appendix III).

4.6 Poland, 1981

A serious international controversy arose during late 1981 and early 1982 following the declaration on December
13, 1981, of a state of martial law in Poland and the associated military council for National Salvation led by Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski (the Prime Minister, Minister of Defence and the First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party or PUWP) as well as the internment of several thousand persons and the suspension of numerous civil liberties.

During the period immediately after the declaration of martial law in Poland, the Reagan administration expressed the view that the United States as the largest of the NATO member countries, should lead its Western allies in reacting to the Polish crisis and adopted economic sanctions against both Poland and the Soviet Union. While these sanctions were widely supported in the U.S., the American Federation of Labour and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL/CIO) pressed for even more far reaching measures. The U.S. sanctions were regarded with considerable caution in the West European countries whose economic dealings with the Soviet Union and with other European countries were far more extensive than those of the United States.

On 13th December 1981, following the declaration of martial law in Poland and consequent arrest of the solidarity leader, Lech Walesa, President Ronald Reagan announced
sanctions against Poland which included ending U.S. Export Import Bank credit insurance, suspension of Polish airline (LOT) landing rights, suspension of Polish fishing rights in U.S. waters, request to the allies to restrict high tech sales to Poland. Reagan said that if authorities ease repression, U.S. would help rebuild Polish economy.

On 4th January 1982, NATO foreign minister met in Brussels, condemned the violation of human rights in Poland, called for Jaruzelski to take steps outlined by Reagan as conditions for lifting sanctions, also decided to suspend future commercial credits except for food delayed negotiations for rescheduling Poland's debt to NATO governments, to study possible long-term sanctions. 19

As a reaction to Reagan's suspension of Poland's Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status "Irritation was reported from several European capitals that President Ronald Reagan had once taken unilateral action without prior consultation with U.S. allies." 20

The West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in a meeting

19. CRS 79-93.
with Reagan on 5 January, 1982, "gave some support to the American moves in the Polish crisis but held out little hope that he would follow the U.S. in imposing economic sanctions against the Soviet Union." 21

Senior West German politician commenting in September 1983: "The American approach to Poland still emphasizes punishment. Our approach is broader. We are neighbours. We must show the Polish people that we care for them but must also do what we can do to prevent the awful day when Soviet tanks move in." 22

In late February 1982, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher announced movements of Polish and Soviet diplomats would be restricted, no new financial credits would be granted to Poland. The British official stated that "They are not really sanctions as such but a signal to the Polish and Soviet authorities of allied disapproval. We believe that this is just as strong a signal as the U.S. measures." 23

Japan banned new government sponsored credits, suspend-

ed negotiations on rescheduling debt; imposed travel restrictions on Polish diplomats. As Chief Cabinet Secretary Kuchi Miyazawa said, actions were taken because "unity and cooperation among Western countries are of utmost importance in coping with the Polish question." 24.

Belgium suspended negotiations on rescheduling of Polish debt and scientific and technical accord with Poland. 25

On 6 January 1982, USSR extended $3.4 billion credit to Poland to cover part of 1981 trade deficit, anticipated 1982 deficit, continued to supply Poles with Soviet energy, raw materials. 26

In late October 1982, Western sources predicted Soviet shipment of goods, raw materials to Poland would reach record levels in 1982 - 18% higher than 1981. Wharton Econometrics report said, USSR had reduced aid, exports to Poland (latter by some 10% 1981). 27 The voting on the issue

was not available.

4.7 Grenada, 1983

On 19-20 October 1983, following the murder of Bishop, the Members of Caribbean Common Market (CARICON) expressed revulsion of bloodshed and scheduled an emergency meeting to consider proposals for economic and political sanctions against the island's Marxist-oriented leadership. Over the weekend, the members of Organization of Eastern Caribbean States had publicly announced economic and diplomatic sanctions against Grenada while privately requesting U.S. to intervene militarily.

Since Bishop took power in 1979, Cuba had provided $10 million in aid, several hundred workers and technical advisers to assist in construction of Grenada's airport. At times of invasion, many Cubans on island resisted marine operation.

Nicaraguan officials condemned invasion and said, that it was intended to intimidate Nicaragua, was prelude to U.S. invasion of their own country.

Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher said, that she had
expressed doubts to Reagan about invasion, had refused to endorse it. One reason for misgivings was that British government had approved an airport in Grenada, guaranteed $9.75 million of funds required for the purpose.

Soviet Union said, U.S. aggression against Grenada was a challenge to the entire world community. All responsibility for the consequences of this criminal act rested with the Washington administration and personally with President Reagan... demanded the immediate withdrawal of the invading forces. Tass characterized the invasion, as an act of open international bandity of international terrorism against a UN member-state.

The responses of the other countries can be seen from the adoption of the General Assembly Resolution 38/7 on 2 November, 1983.

The General Assembly Resolution 38/7 calling for the withdrawal of foreign troops, one can seek that along with the United States, the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States of Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados Dominica, El Salvador opposed the resolution as they thought the stationing of troops is necessary; for the situation in Grenada was a threat to peace in Eastern Caribbean. But it was accepted
with a huge majority vote of 106 in favour, 9 against, 26 abstention (Appendix III).

### 4.8 USSR (KAL), 1983

Korean Airline (KAL) flight 007 travelling from New York to Seoul disappeared from the radar screens Anchorage, Alaska and Tokyo on 30 August, 1983. It was reported initially as having landed safely in Soviet territory of Sakhalin islands. On 1 September, U.S. Secretary of State, George Shultz accused Soviets of having shot down the airliner after it strayed off course into Soviet airspace over sensitive military facilities. On the following day, the UN Security Council, at the request of U.S. and Korea, opened debate on shooting. USSR admitted only that its fighters fired warning shots and the plane flew out of its airspace. Soviets contended that the plane was on deliberate spying mission sent by U.S., was flying without navigation lights, and did not respond to signals. Shultz accused the Soviet Union of covering up truth and U.S. called on the allies to halt air traffic to and from USSR for at least 60 to 90 days.

On the KAL incident, the Korean Foreign Minister
stressed that, the Soviets should comply with their justified demand and which he pointed out, had been backed by majority of votes at the United Nations. He also said that his primary mission would be to meet as much foreign ministers of the Non-Aligned countries as possible, in order to sound their opinion on the incident.

India behaved indifferently as few days afterwards, the Indian External Affairs Minister, Mr. P.V. Narsimha Rao met his Soviet counterpart A. Gromyko and they were to sign, in the next few days, a new trade agreement. In addition to this, for the United Nations summit on the 20th of the same month, the NAM members told Mrs. Gandhi, "You, as the Chairperson represent all of us. You alone need to be there." Moreover, countries like Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Zambia along with several other non-aligned countries informed their inability to attend because of unavoidable circumstances. This reveals that on the KAL issue, the non-aligned countries were divided within the set framework.

In reality the KAL incident revealed very clearly the fact that, the protection of one's national interest comes first, for which we see generally the countries which were friendlier to Soviet Union generally showed reluctance to
take a stand by behaving indifferently. As the majority of members of the international community were indifferent, a few allies of the United States as Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Zambia refrained from attending the meeting to avoid taking a stand. Actually, the non-aligned countries generally steered-clear of being caught between superpowers' rivalry. The voting on the issue was not available.

4.9 South Africa, 1986

International efforts to effect South Africa's internal situation and international concern with the distribution of power within that country, began almost literally with the birth of the United Nations. Racial policies and practices of South Africa, have engaged the attention of the international community. The notion that South Africa's internal situation was of international concern was voiced as early as 1946 when the Indian delegation at the General Assembly charged, that the Indian settlers in South Africa were suffering progressively for this policy of discrimination. In September 1952, thirteen countries requested the inclusion of an item in the agenda of the General Assembly entitled "...the question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of apartheid of the Government of the
Union of South Africa" and these countries alleged that the policies and practices of the Government were creating a dangerous and explosive situation which constitutes both a threat to international peace and a flagrant violation of the basic principles of human rights and fundamental freedom which are enshrined in the Charter.

The international community had unanimously felt the need to impose economic sanctions (although in varying degrees) in order to compel the Pretoria regime to abandon its policy of apartheid.

Consequently, South Africa had been subjected to a wide range of international sanctions which are diverse in nature - economic, communications, cultural and sporting, imposed by United Nations, individual states, regional and specialized agencies.

The United Nations General Assembly had adopted three resolutions, one 43/13C (in 1988 entitled "Comprehensive Mandatory sanctions against the racist regime of South Africa" retained all the essential elements of the 1986 Resolution No.41/35B and 42/23C of 1987 Resolution such as, urgently requesting the Security Council to take immediate action under Chapter VII with a view to applying sanctions.
Also urged that the Government of United Kingdom and United States to reassess their policies in this regard. Along with this, the Resolution of 42/23 G which called for "concerted international action for the elimination of apartheid" urged the Security Council, to consider without delay, the adoption of effective mandatory sanctions to pressurize Pretoria regime.

Most of the Western Countries were opposed to the idea of imposition of comprehensive mandatory economic sanctions because its impact on the Western economies would be sustained, by creating unemployment in certain sectors of the industry, by denial of critical minerals to the West, compelling them to look for an alternative source, i.e., Soviet Union, endangering not only their economies but security structures too.

Despite the Western reluctance, the active enthusiasm and continuous endeavour of the non-aligned countries have achieved an attitudinal change in the Western policies. They too have favoured the imposition of sanctions on some selected items against South Africa, such as, arms embargo, oil embargo, ban on new investment, ban on bank loans except for black upliftment, ban on nuclear collaboration.
Thus the UN Security Council on 13 December 1988, reaffirmed 1977 embargo of arms report to South Africa and voted unanimously to request that, "all the States refrain from importing arms/ammunitions of all types and military vehicles produced in South Africa.\(^{28}\)

The three consecutive years UN General Assembly Resolutions: 41/35B of 1986, 42/23C of 1987 and 42/23G of 1988 shows an interesting fact, in 1986 and 1987 the Western Countries which either abstained from voting. Under the non-aligned countries constant endeavour voted in favour of sanctions. The non-aligned countries played an important role in gathering consensus on the apartheid issue and imposition of comprehensive mandatory sanctions on South Africa that ultimately led to the removal of apartheid in South Africa, giving tremendous efficacy to this non-coercive instrument, i.e, economic sanctions (refer Appendix III).

4.10 Iraq, 1990

In many ways, the international reaction to the inva-

sion of Kuwait has been remarkable. Within the days of invasion, the United Nations Security Council imposed the most comprehensive economic sanctions that the United Nations has ever employed and a multinational force deployed to the region for a massive counter-attack upon Iraq. Economic sanctions were undeniably collective action and the United Nations Security Council Resolution 661 was a rare example of the imposition by the Council of enforcement action under Article 41 of the UN Charter. Switzerland, the most important non-member state imposed sanctions based upon the terms of Resolution 661 of 6 August 1990. The United States and Britain announced that their warships operating in the region would intercept ships suspected of violating the sanctions.

The situation was not that of a dispute between states but one of action by the international community as a whole against a state which the Security Council had identified as a law breaker.

The United States saw in the confrontation with Iraq, an opportunity to establish a military presence in the Gulf region to enhance its bargaining power vis-a-vis European and Japanese economic power. In a real way, economic weak-
ness threatened to undermine a historic opportunity for strategic primacy. The emergence of the United States as the undisputed superpower, after the dissolution of the Eastern bloc, was threatened by the relative economic weakness and its increasing influence in important OPEC countries, would balance the emergence of a United Europe and the increased economic pressure it would entail.

Anyway, if one observes the voting pattern, it is clear that the international community for once had shown a willingness to jointly or collectively impose economic sanctions, although the stand of the countries like Dohomy, South Africa, Sudan, Democratic Kampuchea, Zaire Democratic Yemen, Haiti, Solomon Islands were not known (Appendix III).

Thus it may be concluded that nations of the world would react and respond to situations of crisis if they are convinced that it is in their own national interest. In democracies such as the United States Great Britain and France, support for peace making operations may be 'political suicide' for politicians depending on continued political support.\textsuperscript{29} If voters do not identify conflicts in other

\textsuperscript{29} Michael W. Reisman, 'Peace-making', \textit{18 Yale Journal of International Law}, 419, 1993.
parts of the world with urgent national interests, politicians will resist being drawn into risky, drawn-out peace-making operations. Thus for the United Nations to be able to confront conflicts more effectively, states must "identify the protection of individual political and civil rights with their basic national interests in a secure, peaceful and humane world."\textsuperscript{30}

As has been mentioned in the previous chapter that economic sanctions are imposed to achieve different objectives as for example, some to improve and protect human rights, some to destabilize the existing government, some for expropriation and so forth. In this connection not only the international responses but the responses of domestic interest groups are of equal importance accounting for efficacy of sanctions which is the subject matter of the next chapter.