CHAPTER IV

DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES TOWARD APARTHEID

At the heart of the difficulties between the United States and South Africa and the world is the racial policy relentlessly pursued by the Republic. While the practice of racial discrimination goes back almost to the first years of the planting of the colony at the Cape, it has become a philosophy of life, thoroughly rationalised and elevated to a moral principle and sometimes to a religious dogma. During the Nationalist rule, a mass of repressive and discriminatory legislation was enacted. The philosophy of apartheid was applied with a rigid consistency to every phase of life. Everything is in a logical pattern with rarely a deviation from principle. The Nationalist government had enacted a broad and intensive programme of racial legislation.

While it is not possible to mention all the racial laws only the most important racial laws put on the statute books since 1948, can be mentioned here, as the amount of such legislation is massive. Obviously, a first require


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ment of a system of racial segregation as all-embracing as that practised in South Africa, is a registration of the population by race. This was provided for by an Act of 1950 in accordance with which persons were classified as white, native, coloured or Asian. Great difficulty has been experienced in arriving at an exact definition of a coloured person. Appearance and acceptance by the community are the tests applied to determine any body's racial position.

The racial classification required by the Population Registration Act has caused many persons hardship and humiliation. Their racial status is sometimes uncertain for a long period. In some cases families were broken up because of diverse classification of members. An Immorality Act of 1927 penalised extra-marital relations between Europeans and Africans. In 1949 the National government passed a law prohibiting mixed marriages and in 1950 amended the Immorality Act to extend its provisions to relations between Europeans and coloureds.

Parliament in 1950 enacted the Group Areas Act which authorized the government to proclaim an area reserved for occupation or ownership by members of a specified racial group. Under this law families that had lived in the area for decades could be ejected from their old

3. John Dugard, op. cit. no. 2 p. 62.
4. Ibid. p. 60
homes. Whole community might be uprooted and relocated. Elementary education had always been on a segregated basis in South Africa, but when Africans became ready for higher education they were admitted to some of the established universities. But by an act of 1959 the government adopted the policy of complete segregation also in higher education, and separate universities for nonwhites were established.

Under the Nationalists, the non-whites political participation has declined. Until 1936, the Bantu and the coloureds in Cape Colony had the right to vote for Members of Parliament. In that year the Bantu were taken off the common voters roll and placed on the separate roll with the right to elect three white members of the House of Assembly and four Senators. In 1960 that indirect native representation was abolished. The coloureds of the Cape were represented in the Cape Provincial Council and in parliament by four whites. However, even this token representation was abolished in 1968. This deprivation of political representation was justified on the ground of the new policy of separate development. The Bantu ultimately would have citizenship in one or other of the Bantustans.

5. Ibid.

South Africa also had a network of drastic repressive laws which are not only racially discriminatory but which evidently are thought necessary to enforce the policy of apartheid. In 1950 suppression of Communism Act was enacted under which persons and organisations may be banned for furthering the aims of communism. Under the Terrorism Act of 1967 the government was granted the power to detain persons indefinitely for interrogation.

Although Reagan Administration described South Africa as "a country that is strategically essential to the free world", it had no compunction about criticising apartheid in most unequivocal terms. Mrs Kirkpatric's deputy Kenneth Adelman described South Africa as "pursuing the only system in the world of denying its citizens natural rights which is openly and legally based on racism, a fact which is bestowed upon apartheid special distinction as the world's most condemned system". Crocker's own outspoken criticism of apartheid earned him the abiding dislike of Senator Jesse Helms who succeeded in blocking his nomination as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs for nine months.

Crocker was especially anxious to make clear that

there could be no question of a close working relationship between the two countries, until South Africa had moved much farther along the road to political reform. As the newly appointed U.S. Ambassador told a Senate Committee, the future relation between the two states would depend largely "on the extent to which the policy of constructive engagement produces positive measurable results". South African government was made aware of these conditions during a series of meetings between Pik Botha and Secretary of State Alexander Haig which took place in May 1981.

However, the Reagan Administration was not in favour of punitive measures like sanctions or disengagement. It was made clear in one of the most important paper written by Chester Crocker himself. He wrote "although we may continue to differ on Apartheid and can not condone a system of institutionalised racial differentiation, we can cooperate with a society undergoing constructive change".

Crocker’s view of South African domestic political development was optimistic and this provided the basic thrust of Reagan Administrations "constructive engagement". He presented an image of South Africa under P.W. Botha where grand apartheid and its architects were being reject-

9. Scope Paper: U.S.-South Africa Relations, Memorandum from Chester Crocker to Secretary of State, State Department, 14th May 1981.
ed by many Afrikaners where Botha was committed to controlled socio-political change.

Reagan Administration seemed to believe that National Party had finally ceased to be led by the conservative elements. It is now being led by an uncompromising advocate of change. The greater fluidity and pragmatism which Crocker saw in domestic white politics were a product both of growing international, regional pressures and forces within South Africa.

In 1981 no less a scholar than Samuel P. Huntington who had done much to shape American attitudes to Third World Political Development in 1960s, was arguing in the same spirit. He argued that it was likely that 'a minority dominated hierarchical ethnic system in South Africa will become increasingly difficult to maintain', because of increasing external opposition, the need for skilled black workers and the social and economic mobilisation of blacks who will become increasingly opposed to a system which effectively excludes them from political power'. He emphasised that in a multiethnic society it was not "inconceivable that narrowing the scope of political participation may be indispensable to eventually broadening that participation. The route from a limited universal democracy to a broader multiracial democracy could run through some form

10. Ibid,
of autocracy''. He concluded that reforms conceded under pressure would only weaken the government, reduce its authority and give rise to more extreme demands for power sharing. If conceded too early, they might provoke a white counter revolutionary backlash that might, only with difficulty, be contained.

Reagan Administration took the position that white South Africans were reforming their system of racial domination, and if just given some more time, free from outside pressure, everything would work out for the better.

However, it is questionable that P.W. Botha's conception of reform ever amounted to fundamental change rather than an adaptation of the existing political system as indicated by his oft quoted phrase 'adapt or die'. Critics charged that he viewed reform as part of the national strategy to counter the 'total onslaught'. For it became apparent quite early that it involved really little more than the modernisation of the existing apartheid system.

**The Wiehahn Reforms**

In May 1979 a government-appointed study group,

the Wiehahn Commission, began issuing a series of six reports regarding legislation affecting African workers. Since that time Botha government had enacted into law some of the recommendations of Wiehahn Commission. Training and employment opportunities for some Africans were expanded. The government relaxed its enforcement of laws requiring segregation in workplace cafeterias and restrooms. The government created two new institutions, the National Manpower Commission, which was to research labour issues and to advise the Minister of Manpower Utilisation, and the Industrial Court, designed to speed up the resolution of labour disputes by taking them away the civil courts.

However, the most important change based on the Wiehahn proposals was the legalisation of African Trade Unions. Prior to 1979 Africans were permitted to form unions but these were not officially recognised by the government. This eliminated Africans from participation in the industrial councils that established working conditions and minimum wages in each industry. Africans were also barred from joining white coloured or Indian unions that were already registered with the government. Hence African workers, despite their numerical superiority had a very


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weak bargaining position. It was illegal for Africans to go out on strike, Employers could simply refuse to arbitrate with African workers and seek help from the government to suppress any worker militancy. Hence very few employers had bothered to negotiate with African Unions.

Responding to the mass upheavals of the mid 1970s and the growing dependence of the economy on skilled black labour, the Wiehahn Commission reasoned that it was time to bestow legal recognition on African Unions. This would give unionised Africans greater bargaining power with their employers. In theory, adopting major recommendations proposed by the Wiehahn Commission, the government agreed to give black Unions the same rights and privileges that it had extended traditionally to white unions. However it was done in such a way that their activities were highly circumscribed.

Under the Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act 1979 and the Labour Relations Amendment Act (1981), there were numerous provisions that allowed the government to circumscribe the behaviour of unions. For example, decision to grant registration to African union was dependent solely on the government. Registered status could be withdrawn at any time by Administrative decisions. And perhaps most

importantly, the new legislation prohibited a registered union from engaging in political activity as defined by the government.

In addition to these restrictions contained in the new labour laws, the government was using its broad police powers to harass militant unions with arrests, detentions and bannings.

The Riekert Reforms

Another set of changes were based on the one-member Riekert Commission which issued its report in 1979. Under the general rubric of improving "manpower utilisation", the Riekert report examined influx control (the system of state controls on the movement of African workers from rural to urban areas) and made suggestions for upgrading the effectiveness of this system. Although the reforms eventually implemented by the government were not as broad as those suggested by the Riekert report, the contents of the report itself were well within the bounds of apartheid as envisioned by its founders. Riekert had made this explicit at the outset.

The basic goal of Riekert reforms was to strengthen government control over African migration to urban areas by means of more systematic manipulation of two factors: housing and job. As the report stated, the goal was "more effective control over migration than in the past, and the
avoidance of much of the friction that accompanied such control in the past in that, emphasis will be placed mainly on the control of employment and control of accommodation."

Botha's commitment to reform was more apparent than real. Pass laws were more strictly enforced in order to separate the one-fourth of African workers who qualified for urban residential rights, from those who did not. Arrests under the pass laws had risen dramatically. In June 1983, The Economist reported that "arrests for pass laws offences have almost doubled in the past three years, and government plans to tighten influx controls, imposing much heavier fines on employers of illegal blacks'.

The privileged African workers with urban residential privileges under section 10 of the Bantu Consolidation Act were no longer required to register with a labour bureau when taking a new job. Moreover they were allowed to move from one area to another if they had a job and housing in the new location. Section 10 Africans were also given preference in employment. However by linking the right to accommodation with legal job status the government gained greater control over African migration to the

cities. Only by being registered with and channelled through the labour bureau system could a rural African gain legal housing in urban areas. At the same time, Botha's government was cracking down on so-called squatters: those coming to the urban areas illegally and setting up make-shift dwellings. The government policy was to demolish the squatter camps and forcefully remove the residents to their assigned bantustans.

Residential conditions for Section 10 Africans were improved. The government for the first time allowed private contractors to build homes in African township, and expanded the number of state-built homes. However there was a dire shortage of housing and most urban Africans were living in overcrowded conditions. Basic services such as electricity, indoor plumbing, and schools were being expanded for the one-fourth of African workers who qualified to live in the white areas. These privileged Africans could now apply for ninety-nine year leases on residential property. However so few had the money and could meet the legal requirements that only a tiny percentage had been able to benefit from this provision.

As part of the Riekert strategy to control urban


influx via control of housing and jobs, the government had implemented broad measures to raise the cost of living for urban Africans. This had a planned effect of making it more difficult for rural Africans to live in urban areas illegally while searching for a job. A detailed post-Riekert study of the labour control system found that it "helps foster a hierarchy of living standards, market opportunities and rights within the African population".

The government lifted some restrictions on the African business class. They could now run more than one business, employ people of other races and were not limited to business sites under 350 square meters, as was previously the case. White and black businessmen could now do joint ventures in the African townships on 51-percent-black/49 percent-white, basis. Although, African business had grown in recent years, thus cultivating an elite group who would supposedly had a greater stake in the system, the government still kept a tight control on black "free" enterprise. Blacks could not do business in the white cities, suburbs and industrial parks.

Another Riekert proposal - one that had got much propaganda mileage - involved a limited form of self-government for urban blacks. The Black Local Authorities Act 1982 provided for local self-government through the election of

community councils in the African townships. However, in reality these councils were restricted to dealing with mundane infrastructural problems and could not affect broad policy questions. They could be dissolved any time by the white government.

But perhaps the most telling of all was the fact that the overwhelming majority of Africans rejected this government-sponsored institutions. In council elections held in late 1983, less than one of every five Africans eligible to vote bothered to do so. In Soweto, the largest and most politically significant African township voter turnout in thirty administrative wards ranged from 1.6 percent to a high of 13 percent.

Thus on every front it was clear that apartheid had been modernised not abandoned. New legislation was passed that enabled the government - in principle at least less often in practice-to co-opt a small skilled section of the black work force, while denying, the majority economic parity and social equity. By conceding economic privileges and security of residence to a minority, the government hoped to adapt and survive without having to abandon any of the central tenets of separate development. It appears that the white government had no intention whatsoever of altering the fundamental aspects of apartheid. The reforms

of Botha were designed to provide a more well-controlled African work force for white industry, create class cleavages in the black community and placate foreign criticism.

The central premise of the Reagan Administration's "constructive engagement" policy was that being nice to Pretoria the U.S. could strengthen reform minded elements of the white elite and thus facilitate gradual movement away from apartheid. But the experience of Botha's reforms showed that neither the intent nor effect of recent reforms had been to democratise and liberalise South African society. The government initiated changes were designed to further entrench minority rule and more effectively control the black majority.

Not only had the National Party intensified the repression of its own population it had also mounted a systematic campaign of terror against its regional neighbours. By carrying out economic, political and military destabilisation against neighbouring black-ruled states, South Africa had sought to reduce or eliminate regional support for the African National Congress.

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As with the labour reforms, the constitutional reform process had started under Premier Vorster. His 1977 proposals were presented in the form of a draft Bill in 1979. Still lacking agreement with Coloured and Indian leaders, the government referred the Bill to a Commission headed by Mr. Alwyn Schiebusch, Minister of the Interior. In 1980, the Commission recommended and parliament approved the abolition of the Senate and the creation of a President's Council of sixty members drawn from the white, Coloured, and Asian communities but excluding blacks.

The Council duly established at the end of 1980, was to advise the government on draft legislation and other matters of public interest but its main purpose was to propose new constitutional dispensation. It was also intended to consult a separate council of black South Africans. However, the black themselves, including even homeland leaders, refused to participate in such an arrangement. A constitutional committee was formed under the chairmanship of a former political scientist, Dr. Denis Worrall. It presented a report with new constitutional proposals in 1982.

The Worrall Report kept within the parameters of

government policy on group differentiation but based its arguments on models applicable to plural societies such as Arend Lijpharts. He had introduced the concept of 'conso-
ociational democracy' by which identifiable groups could reach decisions on the basis of consensus rather than confrontation while having control over their own affairs i.e. 'segmental autonomy'. This meant a departure from the Westminster system. However, the Worrall Report, deviated significantly from Lijphart's prescription, particularly in the exclusion of the majority from representation. In Lijphart's view this was its 'gravest weaknes' and not only unconsociational but also undemocratic'.

While the Worrall Report advocated a confederal relationship with the black 'states' (homelands), it asserted that 'a single political system in South Africa which includes blacks on an unqualified majoritarian or consociational basis could not function as a successful democracy in current or foreseeable circumstances'. This was infact never an option for a committee seeking acceptance from National Party (NP) government, but the result


was to make its proposals unacceptable to the vast majority of South Africans except the whites. After the constitution Bill had passed through parliament, it was submitted to a referendum of white voters in November 1983.

The proposed new constitution provided, firstly, for one parliament with three legislative chambers (instead of three separate parliaments as in the 1977 plan): a House of Assembly for whites, a House of Representatives for Coloureds and a House of Delegates for Indians elected on separate ethnic rolls.

Second, there would be an Executive State President (combining the two existing offices of non-executive State President and Prime Minister) indirectly elected by a college of Member of Parliaments (MPs) from the three Houses in a ratio of 4:2:1. As the majority party in each House would elect all the representatives from that House, the majority party in the white House would have a majority in the electoral college.

Third, each House would be responsible for 'own affairs', legislation of its community, for example culture, education and hospitals, while 'general affairs' legislation would pass through all three Houses. This distinction between 'own' and 'general' affairs was central to the new constitutional concept.

25. This text has been taken from James Barber and John Barratt, op. cit. no. 21, p. 289.
Fourth the President would appoint a Cabinet drawn from MPs. He would have to consult the Cabinet but not necessarily follow its recommendations. For each House, there would be a Ministers' Council to deal with 'own' affairs.

Fifth, a system of joint committees of the three Houses was established, to which draft legislation on 'general' matters would be referred and where it was intended that consensus should be reached.

Sixth, the President's Council, with members elected by the three Houses and a minority appointed by the State President, would continue to be advisory, but its role would have particular importance in resolving a deadlock between the three Houses.

The draft constitution was approved by a two thirds majority in the white parliament in September 1983 and endorsed by white voters in a referendum on 2 November: Yes 66 percent and No vote 33.5 percent. Botha government claimed that with the introduction of new constitution South African society had moved closer to democracy:

The year 1983 marks a departure from the present white-only Westminster-oriented parliament which is basically a conflict style government with a winner-takes-all approach that amounts to a dictatorship of the majority in a multi-ethnic society, in favour of a more democratic dispensation, in which everyone both individually and
within his community, will have an effective say in decisions affecting his own interests.

Not surprisingly, Washington reacted positively to the referendum programme result. It pronounced it a mandate for the government to move "decisively" along the road it was travelling. Crocker himself, welcomed the vote as a "new milestone in the modern history of South Africa". It has revealed that "a clear majority of South African voters has decided to take step which opens the way for constructive evolutionary change". Later after admitting that it was impossible to predict where the government's policies might lead, he continued to insist that the referendum result had clearly revealed a new consensus in South Africa, a new understanding that it was no longer possible to "just toughen it out" with traditional apartheid policies.

The referendum was taken to be final confirmation that the government could still lead the country out of the political impasse and for that reason alone deserved some political support. It was also taken to illustrate that


28. Ibid.

South Africa was "moving again" at a time when constructive engagement had begun to come under increasing criticism at home.

However, situation in domestic politics of South Africa was not as conducive for Botha's reform policy as Reagan Administration had thought of it to be. Before the proposed constitution was submitted to Parliament, the National Party had split. The growing resistance to Botha's reforms and his leadership came to a head early in 1982. Botha had used the term 'healthy power-sharing with particular reference to the coloured people. His words had been carefully chosen: For us the concept of consultation and co-responsibility is a healthy form of power-sharing, without undermining the principle of self-determination.

Therefore we prefer the term co-responsibility".

Nevertheless, Treurnicht objected to this concept as being utterly foreign to Nationalist philosophy. With twenty-one other members of the NP caucus, he refused to support a motion expressing full confidence in the Prime Minister and his interpretation of Party policy. However, Treurnicht was expelled by the Party's executive in the Transvaal.

On the left of the government the Progressive Federal Party (PFP) had also attacked the new constitution.

31. Ibid.
It was objecting to entrenchment of ethnic divisions, the exclusion of blacks and the great powers of the Executive President. Black leaders including the moderate Buthelezi and his Inkatha movement reacted bitterly to the referendum results. This black reaction was more serious than the reaction from the right. They warned that constitution would entrench white power, in particular the power of the NP which would be strengthened by its co-opted allies and that moves towards participation of blacks would become more difficult.

Many Indian and coloured leaders were opposed to power sharing scheme not because the blacks were excluded from it but because they saw no sign that it would bring about any fundamental change in their own situation. They were criticising "new constitution" on another count. That was with regard to group rights clause. A central distinction made in the constitution was that of "own affairs and general affairs".

Two matters were of crucial importance in this regard. One was residential segregation, governed by the Group Areas Act of 1950. Historically, the implementation of this legislation had resulted in the dislocation of coloured and Indian communities, shunted out of so-called white areas and hoarded into "coloured" and "Indian" areas,
after at considerable financial loss. The memory of this dispossession was deeply inscribed in the collective consciousness, especially those who lost their property and businesses. The continuation of Groups Areas Under Act the new system brought no relief to that memory, nor did it provide opportunities for growth in wealth for those middle class coloureds and Indians who sought it.

The other issue of central importance was segregated education, which was defined as "own affairs". Coloured and Indian teachers had long argued that segregated schools were inferior schools. Making up the bulk of the professional middle class, these teachers wanted a desegregated school system administered by a single department of education and supported by non-discriminatory state spending. Group areas and segregated education retained what was central to apartheid-that Group rights preside over individual rights.

There was therefore, little point to participating in election held under the auspices of such a restrictive arrangement. To them the whole affair amounted to apartheid under a new name-as the United Democratic Front (UDF)

32. Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley, South Africa After Apartheid (Los Angeles, University of California, 1986).

pointed out to coloured and Indian voters. Moreover the constitution failed to address the central dilemma of South African politics: African citizenship rights.

In practice even the power given to the three parliaments was so limited that the two non-white chambers were not able to repeal or amend two simple laws that the non-white communities most abominated: Race Classification Act which denied them the right to own and occupy property in white areas and the Separate Amenities Act which provided for the continued segregation of certain public facilities.

The Reagan Administration, by comparison justified its support by claiming that there was a "hidden agenda" which when the time was right would include the 10 million urban blacks in the same way. Despite the fact that the government's plans made no overt provision for black representation, Crocker insisted that it would be foolish to expect South Africa's would be reformers to announce their bottom line to the world at large. 34

What Botha Government had in mind was not a fourth chamber for the blacks but an increase in local authority for townships such as Soweto and a stronger role for black

local officials. However any upgrading of black powers in the localities represented not a move towards direct representation but a move away from it. Here too new constitution was an adaptation of the existing system not a radical break with the past. Therefore, the United States found itself committed to supporting a highly questionable programme. Despite the need for a forward-looking debate in South Africa, the attitude of the Botha Government had continued to be forged in the context of white supremacy. Botha's mind was not open to new possibilities, only tactical compromises.

In these circumstances the new constitution came into effect at the beginning of September 1984. The tricameral parliament was launched and P.W. Botha was duly elected the first Executive State President. However, the growth of United Democratic Front (UDF) plus the opposition of Azanian Peoples Organisation (AZAPO) and Inkatha, clearly demonstrated that the constitution was unacceptable to black political opinion. They saw it as an attempt to exclude black Africans from power for all time and leave the white groups dominant. The impending implementation of the new constitution, mobilised opposition and the low polls indicated that its credibility and legitimacy were challenged even before it had come into effect.
The Upsurge of Violence and The Black Movements

For years the vast and expanding black townships had been relatively quiet. However sporadic disturbances and school boycotts had continued. By 1984, the UDF was mobilising support as grievances built up into an eruption which was greater even than Soweto of 1976. Along with the persistent problem of apartheid, an underlying cause was economic decline and increasing unemployment.

For two years there had been no growth and although a mini boom early in 1984 had produced a growth rate of 4.5 per cent for the year as a whole, it was not sustained. Inflation was 13 per cent. There was no prospect that the economy would grow at the steady 5 per cent required to absorb new black job-seekers including an increasing number who had enjoyed better educational facilities. The Department of Manpower warned that 2.4-million people would be unemployed by 1987. There was rise in the cost of living also. Although average black earnings doubled between 1979 and 1983, inflation had eroded them and they were still substantially lower than average white earnings (R 310 as against R 1,210). Moreover increases in the price of maize in 1984, 'the most essential food stuff for people in the lower bracket, has also made African poverty unbearable'.

Within this context of economic hardship and opposition to constitutional change, the spark which set off serious disturbances was rent increases by the new local councils in the Vaal Triangle (Southern Transvaal and northern Free State). Against the rent increase protest meetings were held and an estimated 60 per cent of workers and most school children in Vaal Triangle stayed at home. Violent clashes followed during which sixty people were killed, thousands were arrested and detained and property damage amounted to about R 30 m. The protest and violence spread to East Rand, Soweto townships near Pretoria, the Eastern Cape and finally the Western Cape. They became so serious that by the end of 1984 unrest had become an euphemism for South Africa and violence continued to escalate throughout 1985.

**Challenge to Constructive Engagement**

In November 1984 the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Bishop Desmond Tutu, an outspoken critic of apartheid, drew world wide attention to the Bishop himself and the unrest within South Africa. Tutu's vigorous criticisms of apartheid made the greatest impression in the U.S. where ironically Reagan's overwhelming re-election in November had provoked the anti-apartheid lobbies into renewed activity.

36. Ibid.
South Africa had not been a significant issue in the election, but constructive engagement had been opposed by the Democratic candidate, Walter Mondale. It was an issue on which Democrats felt that public opinion could be mobilised against the Administration. The campaign was spearheaded by the black American organisation Trans Africa led by Randall Robinson. Who argued that the "long-range interests of the United States lie in accommodation and identification with the black majority that will inevitably inherit South African society".

Trans Africa concentrated on universities, state and city government, churches and companies. It became an active and vocal lobby for disinvestment and sanctions legislation by the Congress. Lowell Weicar, a Senator, commented "It was not a Congressman, a Senator or a President who brought the matter of South Africa to the attention of the American people. It was a citizen Randall Robinson".

A longer established organisation, the African American Institute based in New York, with strong links to the corporate sector, major foundations and universities, was trying to organise opinion against white regime of South Africa.


Against that background, the television pictures of violence in South Africa and Tutu's Nobel award sparked across America, a prairie fire of anti-apartheid protest. The most dramatic protests were daily demonstrations outside the South African Embassy in Washington. By March 1985, 2000 people, Democrat and Republicans, many of them prominent and newsworthy, had been arrested but charges were not pursued against them. Robinson called his campaign the "Free South Africa Movement". It was directed primarily against the Reagan Administration focused on Congress, where support for sanction legislation was growing under the leadership of black caucus. Robinson did not conceal the resentment that the Reagan Administration had 'almost entirely shut out Blacks'.

Perhaps the most significant indication that Reagan's "constructive engagement", policy was in crisis was the unprecedented action of Republican legislators apparently swept up in the wave of anti-South Africa activity. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman, Richard Lugar wrote a letter to Reagan in early December 1984 signed by Republican Chairman of the Senate Africa Committee, Nancy Kassebaum, expressing concern over the

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ambiguities in U.S. foreign policy. The letter asked Regan to speak out more forcefully against Pretoria's racial policies and repression.

Even more remarkable was a letter sent to South Africa's Ambassador to the United States, Fourie on 4th December 1984 by 35 conservative Republican Congressmen. The letter warned white regime that if" an immediate end to the violence in South Africa" is not brought about, Americans would be prepared to recommend that the administration take two major steps. These were to "curtail new American investment in South Africa," and to organise international diplomatic and economic sanctions against South Africa".

Reagan and the State Department remained firmly opposed to sanctions and disinvestment, but they could not ignore the vociferous campaign. The President spoke out publicly saying that there were occasions when quiet diplomacy was not enough. He called on Pretoria to reach out to its black majority by ending the forced removal of blacks from their communities and the detention without trial as well as lengthy imprisonment of black leaders. He also included South Africa in the list of countries where human rights were violated.

Botha responded by accusing the U.S. of interfering in their domestic affairs. However there was serious

42. Ibid.
concern about the polarisation of opinion in U.S. Congress on South Africa's domestic policies. When Botha opened the first full session of the new tri-cameral Parliament in January 1985, he promised further reforms, including: an informal non-statutory forum in which the government would discuss constitutional issues with black leaders, and possible freehold rights for blacks in urban areas to replace the existing ninetynine year old leasehold scheme. Clarification of the issue of black citizenship; steps to eliminate negative and discriminatory aspects of influx control were also promised.

White House spokesman called it a clear statement of intent to address the major outstanding issues of constructive change affecting the black majority. However within South Africa, there was no such appreciation from the militant black organisations. The UDF and AZAPO saw Botha's promises as falling far short of their aims and as an attempt to divide urban blacks from those in the homelands. A UDF spokesman said, "only a constitution based on the will and full participation of all South Africans can be the basis for a lasting peace". And AZAPO maintained that it would be satisfied with nothing less than "repossession of the land".

In the final analysis too, Botha's January speech

was long on references to the problems but short on the specifics of how to deal with them. As Dr. Motlana commented, "he did not commit himself to anything 'and there was still no real declaration of intent,' on which black leaders would be willing to negotiate".

Fear of right-wing reaction and black unwillingness to consider negotiations on Botha's terms had inhibited reform steps. By the end of the parliamentary session in June 1985, little had been done to give effect to Botha's promises of January 1985. For example, although Minister Gerrit Viljoen announced a suspension of forced removals, partly because of international pressure, however no guarantee was given to consolidate homelands or to deal with squatter problems. A concrete reform step, which it was hoped would make an impression abroad, was the repeal of the legislation, prohibiting mixed racial marriages and sexual intercourse across the colour line. The repeal of these notorious racial laws made little impression among blacks. As Dr. Motlana said, "we are not interested in the repeal of these laws; we want effective participation in the running of our country.

The new parliament's first working session did not therefore inspire confidence that the participation of

44. IRR, 1985 op. cit, no.35. pp. 328 & 330.
45. Ibid. pp. 4-5.

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coloureds and Indians would satisfy the demands for change. Moreover the two new Houses had not achieved legitimacy in their respective communities. The white community with its (National Party) majority, still dictated the substance and pace of reform. And other two Houses had little to show for their efforts except the repeal of the mixed marriage and immorality (section 16) Acts. Moreover the inclusion of coloured and Indian majority leaders. Mr. Revd Alan Hendrickse and Mr. Amichand Rajbansi in Botha's cabinet (but without portfolios) exposed them to accusation of complicity in government security measures.

Meanwhile conflict continued inside South Africa. By the end of June 1985, there had been over 400 deaths since the start of the disturbances in September 1984. On 20 July, 1985 Botha declared a state of emergency because ordinary law of the land was inadequate to maintain public order. Botha argued that it was essential that the situation normalised in such a way that the climate for continued dialogue in the interest of all people in constitutional, economic and social fields was ensured. But it was probably intended more as a show of strength to counter the widespread impression at home and abroad that the government was critically threatened by black resistance and that the collapse of white power was within sight. It

was also needed to counter the accusation from the right in white politics that the government was too weak in its response to black militancy.

Thus in mid 1985, there were strong international criticism of domestic and regional policy of South Africa. Security Council approved a resolution recommending sanctions by all U.N. members (non-mandatory) with only the U.S. and U.K. abstaining. In the U.S. confrontation developed between the Congress and the President over South Africa's domestic policies. Apartheid was seen as a moral issue and repugnant to American values. Most Senators seemed frustrated by the called negligible results of constructive engagement and the failure of the white minority regime to seek more than token gestures. Many Republicans and Democrats asked the President to support a foreign policy consistent with the views of the Republican President Abraham Lincoln. Gray argued that now the choice was between "standing with the victims or standing with the oppressors".

In a stunning defeat for Reagan the Republican controlled Senate Foreign Relations Committee vote 16-1 for the sanctions approved by the House and the full senate ap

47. See Anti- Apartheid Act, 1985, hearing before the Committee on Banking, Urban Affairs and the Subcommittee on International Finance and Monetary Policy, 99th Congress, 1st Session April 18, May 24, June 13, 1985, (Washington GPO), 1985 p. 6, 33, 55 and 57.
proved the legislation by a vote of 80 to 12. Thus it was apparent that unprecedented popular Congressional initiatives and events within South Africa had altered the dynamics of American diplomacy.

But the Reagan Administration, although it stepped up its verbal criticism of South Africa, continued to insist on the correctness of its policy. In early August 1985 when asked if he would continue with "constructive engagement", President Reagan said, "I believe that the results that we have had on this constructive engagement with South Africa justify our continuing on this score".

This optimism of Reagan was based on P.W. Botha's forthcoming address to the annual National Party provincial Congresses in Durban on 15 August 1985. Early in August in a meeting between South Africa's Foreign Minister Pik Botha and a top level U.S. delegation led by National Security Council Adviser Robert C. McFarlane, the Administration was given the impression that more fundamental reforms would be forthcoming. Robert McFarlane and Crocker were encouraged by what they heard. The White House spokesman said that the South Africans' "are taking into consideration the views of the U.S. government and of other


49. Robert A. Manning, "Toward Constructive Disengagement" op.cit no.41.
50 countries.

Such was the unprecedented interest in the Durban speech that it was transmitted live by major T.V. networks in the U.S., Britain, and Germany, giving P. W. Botha a vast international audience. However, given this high expectation, the speech was an anti-climax. Rather it was worse than that. There was deep international disillusionment and disbelief. Botha promised no significant new initiatives. His tone was defensive, his style defiant. He acted as a party leader speaking to the faithful, not a statesman, struggling with the problems of a complex society. Botha called the speech his 'manifesto for the future of our country'. He said, "I feel that we are today crossing the Rubicon in South Africa, "there can be no turning back". In effect the speech set out the parameters of the reform policy developed in the Botha years. The starting point was a country of minorities'. "We are not prepared to accept the antiquated, minority and a black majority'. 'The nature of the population is multicultural and poly-ethnic' and NP rejects any system of horizontal differentiation which amounts to one nation or group...dominating another or others'. Between these groups there should be economic

50. Ibid.

interdependence and the properly planned utilisation of manpower. Within this context of interdependence, the government has accepted 'the principle of ownership rights for blacks in urban areas', and the need to consider 'improvements' in the 'outdated and costly' system of influx control and it has modernised labour laws.

On the constitutional front, Botha simply reiterated that a constitutional dispensation providing for participation by all South African citizens should be negotiated. He firmly rejected the concept of "one man, one vote in a unitary system, contending that it would lead to domination" of one race over another and through that to chaos. He also rejected the idea of a fourth chamber of parliament to represent black groups. Botha took the hardest of line on the possible release of Mr. Nelson Mandela.

Hence Botha's policy statements failed to meet the expectations of the international community. It had been hoping for at least some gesture in the way of concrete reforms from Botha regime. Thus it had become increasingly clear that U.S. influence on Pretoria was at best marginal and judging from the defiant posture of the Botha government diminishing still further. The assumption of Reagan Administration that persuasive diplomacy on Pretoria would produce dialogue and negotiated solution—appeared flawed. None of the reforms that had been offered or appeared in
the horizon could alter the basic structures of apartheid and they fell far short of "one man one vote".

However, Congressional resolve was not weakened by Botha's speech. Nancy Kassebaum, Chairman of the Senate Africa Sub-Committee, said "Botha presented, virtually important issues in a very unclear manner....I fear it will only add fuel to the fire". On the eve of its August recess the House and Senate worked out the differences between their respective versions of anti-apartheid legislation, reaching a compromise on modest programme of sanctions.

The package of antiapartheid measures included: a ban on new bank loans to the South African government and government owned or controlled corporations; a ban on the import of krugerrands; a ban of goods or technology used in nuclear production facilities; mandatory compliance with the Sullivan Principles on fair employment practices. Further, it asked the President to submit an annual report to Congress on progress toward ending apartheid. The conditions for progress were defined in the bill as: eliminating restrictions based on race, eliminating forced removal of the black population, entering meaningful negotiations with representative leaders of the black population and freeing all political prisoners. thus the final bill put the Con-

gress on record in opposition to apartheid.

The bipartisan Congressional mood on this issue was reflected in the 380-48 vote. Many House Republicans who had opposed the original House bill supported the final compromise. Thus a new U.S. policy on South Africa appeared to be emerging on the horizon. Representative Stephen Solarz described the legislation as representing "a new congressional consensus that the only way to bring about change in South Africa is through the application of pressure".

Reagan vetoed the bill. But at the same time he issued an Executive Order placing sanctions on South Africa. It was in order to placate growing public reaction against South Africa's domestic policies. An Executive Order issued in September 1985 imposed ban on loans to the government of South Africa; export of computers to government agencies, nuclear exports, imports of South African produced arms; and export marketing support for U.S. companies not adhering to the Sullivan code. In addition there was provision for prohibiting the import of krugerrands (later implemented). It also provided for increasing educational assistance to blacks.

Although these measures were widely regarded as

53. Ibid.

mainly symbolic, they were enough to prevent Reagan's veto from being overridden by the Congress. The Executive Order was intended to demonstrate the seriousness of American concern. However, critics charged that Reagan's imposition of limited economic sanctions against the South African regime was a tacit admission that his diplomacy of "constructive engagement", had failed.

The Reagan sanctions, however limited, were an important symbol. It demonstrated to the ruling white regime nationalists that even an American President whom they had come to regard as their virtual saviour, could turn against them. But the sanctions, applied with fanfare did not represent a fundamental change in American diplomacy towards South Africa. Nor did they portend or promote a meaningful evolution in the South African political and social system. On the contrary, Reagan Administration continued the American practice of attempting to reform the South African system by working entirely within it and honouring its rules. It was relying almost entirely on white led change.

Thus, American policy makers had ignored the needs, the politics and the passions of the black majority

in South Africa. The resulting scenario for the near future was one of increased violent confrontation in South Africa—both white-black and black-black.

Demise of Constructive Engagement

When the new session of Congress opened in 1986, the Congressional black caucus immediately resumed its efforts to go beyond the Executive Order of the President and impose stringent economic sanctions against South Africa by legislation. While Senate's initial reaction was to pressure the President to move aggressively against Apartheid in order to avoid harsh sanctions. Senator Kassebaum urged Reagan to personally intervene and push for immediate negotiations between Botha Administration and black South African nationalists. Senator Lugar wanting to avoid another confrontation between Congress and the White House over foreign policy, stated that "The President and the Secretary of State ought to be responding on behalf of the country.

Mounting pressure from both the Congress and the Senate and the Botha regime's growing defiance, forced the Reagan Administration to begin a policy review. It reached some tentative conclusions in Reagan's address on South Africa on 22 July 1986.

For the first time, Reagan outlined what the U.S. felt, were necessary steps for progress. These included: a time table for the elimination of apartheid laws, the release of political prisoners including Nelson Mandela, unbanning black political movement and the beginning of a dialogue about constructing a political system based on the consent of the governed. Appearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Shultz reiterated the same basic arguments.

However, the heart of the Reagan's speech was an effort to make the case against sanctions which he claimed would be an "historic act of folly. Instead he argued that the U.S. should stay and work, not cut and run". Reagan delineated the arguments that Black South Africans and neighbouring black states would be the ones hurt by sanctions. If there was anything new with regard to U.S. policy in Reagan's speech, it was one element—one important for its absence. In his speech, the term "constructive engagement" was conspicuously avoided. The Administration appeared to have dropped the term even as it claimed to be clinging to the policy.

Disappointed with Reagan's speech on South Africa, the Senate approved its own somewhat milder bill by an


58. Ibid.
overwhelming majority of 84 to 14 on 17 August 1986. It put the Senate on a course of defiant collision with the Administration. The margin was well over the two-thirds needed to override any Presidential veto of a sanctions bill. Senator Lowell Weicker, a Republican from Connecticut said after the vote: "To night—the United States of America chose sides. We stand with our black brethren in South Africa".

Defying the strength of feeling in Congress, Reagan vetoed the legislation that had imposed new economic sanctions against Pretoria. Reagan in his veto message on 26 September 1986 said", The sweeping punitive sanctions adopted by the congress are targeted directly at the labour-intensive industries upon which the victimised peoples of South Africa depend for their very survival. Black-workers—the first victims of apartheid—would become the first victims of American sanctions.

Mr. Reagan asked: "Are we truly helping the black people of South Africa—the lifelong victims of apartheid—when we throw them out of work and leave them and their families jobless and hungry in those segregated townships? Or are we simply assuming a moral posture at the expense of the people in whose name we presume to act.

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60. Ibid.
61. Ibid.
In a sharp repudiation of Reagan's policy towards South Africa, the Senate on 2nd October 1986 overrode the veto on the Congressional Sanctions Bill.

The passing of the Comprehensive Anti-apartheid Act restricted various financial activities of American nationals doing business in South Africa. First the Act prohibited United States nationals from working or approving any extension of credit to the South African government or any organisation controlled by the South African government. Second the Act prohibited new investment in South Africa by United States nationals. Third the Act forbade any United States depository institution from accepting or holding any deposits from the South African government or any agency controlled by the South African government. Fourth, the Act prohibited United States Export-Import Bank both to encourage South African blacks to use its facilities and to guarantee credit to businesses that were majority-owned by either black South Africans or other non-white South Africans.

tation of petroleum goods produced in the United States. Additionally the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission was precluded from issuing a license for the exportation of nuclear materials to South Africa.

The Act also prohibited the importation into the United States of a number of South African goods. Those goods whose importation was prohibited included coal, uranium textiles, steel, iron and agricultural products.

The Act also barred the importation of South African arms, ammunition and military vehicles in addition to the importation of gold krugerrands. It also prohibited the importation of any gold coin minted in South Africa.

Finally the Act provided funds to support black South African students. The Act established a scholarship fund for black South Africans attending universities, colleges and secondary schools in South Africa.

The Act permitted the ending of sanctions if President of the United States determined that the South African government had released Nelson Mandela from prison; had made substantial progress towards dismantling the system of apartheid and establishing a non-racial democracy. The President was also to determine that South Africa

63. Ibid.
64. The Observer (London), October 3, 1986.
had taken three of the following four steps: repeal of the state of emergency and release of detainees held under the state of emergency; unbanning the democratic political parties; repeal of the Group Areas and Population Registration Acts; and public commitment to good faith negotiations with truly representative members of the black majority without preconditions.

This Act was a significant step forward in terms of diminishing U.S. support for the South African government. It marked a radical departure from President Reagan's policy of 'constructive engagement' and demonstrated the extent of Congress' dissatisfaction with the policy. Congress was so dissatisfied with the policy that for the first time since the enactment of the War Power Act in 1973, it voted to override President's veto on major foreign policy issue. The Act was able to send a message that the passive diplomacy of 'constructive engagement' was no longer acceptable and that the United States must and would act affirmatively to end apartheid in South Africa.

Unlike the Reagan Administration's emphasis on associating and working with South Africa's white regime, the 1986 law involved a clear distancing of the United States government from white regime of South Africa, and

stronger identification with the victims of apartheid system. Clearly the strategy of the legislation was to build bridges with the black majority while at the same time to use United States economic and political muscle as a lever for change.

However, the Act failed to address what really mattered to African states, the OAU and most importantly the blacks in South Africa. First the Act did not make it illegal for American companies in South Africa to continue to operate there. Many companies still operated in South Africa unperturbed by the sanction debate. Besides, the few companies that were reportedly pulling out of South Africa were doing so not because they had a legal duty to divest their business but rather doing business in South Africa had become unsafe.

Second the Act did not authorize the United States government to provide military assistance to the liberation movements in South Africa fighting to dislodge apartheid. It is not that United States had an obligation to grant military aid to liberation movements in South Africa or anywhere else. However, critics pointed out to the fact that the United States had provided military aid to some terrorist groups whose aim was to destabilise the legitimate governments in such countries like Nicaragua, Afghani-

stan, Angola etc. They argued that since the United States was not favourably disposed to arming liberation movements fighting a just war against the racist regime, then the friendly pursuasion it wanted to employ to encourage change in South Africa and the so called assistance it claimed to have given to the blacks were meaningless.

Thus, the refusal of the Reagan Administration to make the economy of South Africa scream, together with the refusal of the United States Congress to order the Executive to grant military aid to the liberation movement to complement Congress-imposed economic sanctions, evidently showed lack of serious commitment on the part of the United States to end apartheid. It also portrayed the "United States as a supporter of South Africa and a major hinderance to the liberation efforts".

The Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 which purportedly imposed some sanctions on South Africa, therefore was not meant to be effective, given the attitude of the Executive which was expected to implement it. Banks in the United States still granted loans to South Africa. By late 1988, the United States Congress was informed that despite the provision of the Act which prohibited any new loans from the United States, American banks provided loans totalling

68. Ibid., p. 104.

$2.95 billion as at September 1987. That was one year after the Act.

In essence, the anti-sanctions stance of the United States in the United Nations and the half-hearted measures of the Administration strengthened South Africa's government's determination not to be bothered by any threat of sanctions, or "be pressured into making major changes".

The State Department told Congress on 17 January, 1987:

"The U.S. economy and military remain too much dependent on South Africa for 10 minerals and other raw materials that the officials think it is difficult to find other sources for the key items like chromium, cobalt, manganise and platinum groups metals.

The sincerity of the U.S. Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 in the light of this statement sounded skeptical. Prohibition on new loans to the South African government was not likely to have much impact. Apart from this, U.S. companies then had already begun to withdraw existing investments from South Africa at a rapid pace. Given this trend toward voluntary divestment, the prohibition on new investments appeared to be superfluous.

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The Reagan Administration continued to send out mixed signals about Southern Africa in 1987. This was a reflection of a policy in disarray and of continuing conflict between the President and Congress. In February 1987, the President's own Advisory committee on South Africa issued a devastating report. It judged the Reagan Administration's diplomacy of "constructive engagement" a failure. Despite the advice of the President's own committee, and against the will of the Congress and the overwhelming international public opinion, the Administration remained committed to friendly persuasion as the means to end apartheid. An article in the Washington-Post, commented "in South Africa Reagan has been so out of touch with reality that he has lost even his own party".

Within the context of Africa, as a policy area of peripheral concern, United States diplomacy continued to concentrate on gains and losses. With few remaining months in power and a preoccupation with other world areas, Reagan Administration was not ready to make any significant changes in its policy toward South Africa.

Encouraged by U.S. government's attitude towards pressure tactics, South Africa's white regimes response was predictable - the laager mentality. It led to renewed


obstinacy in the face of international pressure. The State President Botha declared that the Republic would go it alone, rather than be manipulated by outsiders. It moved aggressively against the insurrection and organisational infrastructure of domestic opposition. This involved attempts to limit the degree to which domestic events catalysed international actions.

Aware that anti-apartheid politics in U.S. and Western Europe was fueled by media images of revolt and repression with in South Africa, Pretoria sought to prevent these image from being transmitted. In this way the connection between domestic unrest and international reaction could be short-circuited. Before the state of emergency went into effect, restrictions on the press were extensive. But as one legal expert on South African censorship put it, "The rules were harsh but the Press could work within them, and often get the story out".

The issuance of Emergency Media Regulations (EMR) after June 1986, altered this situation fundamentally, making getting the story out difficult and dangerous, if not impossible. Under the EMR media was legally barred from covering the mass political movement and the actions of the

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security forces in response to it. South Africa government also refused to issue visas and work permits to foreign journalists whose coverage it deemed threatening to its interests.

Stripped of doctrinal rhetoric, South African government was trying to eliminate the black opposition. It was attacking the black opposition at the mobilisational, organisational and psychological levels. This meant not just preventing mass political meetings and funerals, as had been the focus of the 1985 emergency, but eliminating workers stayaways, consumer boycotts, school boycotts and rent strikes etc. Hence in December 1986 Pretoria introduced emergency regulations that made it illegal to “encourage members of the public.......to take part in boycott actions against any firm... (or) any particular product (or) against any particular educational institutions”. In the same emergency regulation, encouraging people to refuse to pay rent or to participate in political stayaway was declared a subversive act.

To choke off any communication that might spread or facilitate mobilisational activities, South Africa

75. Ibid.,

declared it illegal to publish, new or comment on...any restricted gathering.

In cracking down on the mobilisational aspects of black opposition, however, Botha government was striking at the symptoms of the insurrection. What the government really desired was to crush the uprising's organisational base. Consequently the security apparatus zeroed in on the structures of "people's power". Adriaan Vlok, Minister of Law and Order said, "the government will pay particular attention to dismantling the alternative governmental structures including people's courts, protest education, street committees and para-police groups. He added, these "governments within the government" posed the most serious threat to law and order". In the words of P.W. Botha, "it is subversive to create alternative organisations in South Africa for the education of people, for local government, for proper economic development". In keeping with Botha's view, the state sought to have participation in alternative structures punished as the ultimate political crime. UDF community leaders from the Transvaal township of Alexandra were charged with treason for their roles in organising and operating organs of "people's power."

77. Ibid.


Under its emergency regulations, state was able to subject those organising and participating in alternative structures to sever criminal charges. Under emergency regulations adopted in December 1986, it became an act of subversion to, among other things, “exert power and authority in specific areas by way of structures purporting to be structures of local government...or to establish such structures”. It was also deemed subversive to subject (oneself) to the authority of (alternative) structures, or to make payments due to local authorities to such structures.

Under the new security order, established under the legal umbrella of emergency, South African government was intending to lower the expectations of the black majority. The lesson it hoped to teach was that South Africa was not on the verge of majority rule or “liberation”, and therefore, a less complete form of political inclusion should be accepted. According to Sotoffel Van Der Merwe, Minister of Constitutional Planning, the state's security actions under the state of emergency "are meant to send out signals to show that we are prepared to go (upto) a certain point in the move towards power sharing and no further....We are saying to those who now refuse to negotiate that if they want to have a part of the power, they are

80. Robert M. Price, "The Apartheid State in Crisis" op. cit. no.72 p. 255.
It was obvious that Botha government was less inclined to take initiatives for political reform. Instead emphasis was being placed on security needs of the white regime. The state of emergency was reimposed in June 1987, severely restricted personal freedom of great majority of South African population. Racist South Africa had indeed become an evil empire. The International Commission of Jurists was therefore correct when it condemned the racist regime for "using torture and violence even against children as a part of repressive strategy under white minority rule".

The situation in South Africa was one of conflict between the ANC and the White regime. The ANC was reluctant to make a firm commitment to abandon armed struggle which was a precondition on the part of the white regime to start negotiations. On the other hand, white regime's accusation was that the ANC did not represent a majority of blacks, but only a small group of communist controlled agitators. On its part South Africa's white regime had not taken any substantive step which could demonstrate that it was sincere in holding negotiations with the black majority or bring about reforms.


Four of the five conditions, established by the U.S. Congress had not been met by the white regime. It had not legalised the ANC and other "democratic political parties", it had not lifted the state of emergency which had been in force since June 1986; it had not released important black political prisoners including Nelson Mandela who could create conditions for negotiated solutions for South African domestic problems. Moreover, notorious Population Registration Acts were still intact.

The Regan Administration could hardly claim that diplomacy of constructive engagement had brought about genuine improvements in the lives of great majority of South Africans. There had not been found any concrete solution to the basic issue of apartheid. Group Areas Act and Population Registration Act which had provided the basis for segregation were still laws of the land. Blacks had not got their genuine rights to participate in democratic processes on equal footings. Thus the Reagan Administration's much orchestrated "goal" to end apartheid through friendly pursuits had remained elusive.