In the preceding chapters I have discussed critically the main doctrine of three well-known authors of speculative system: the German idealist philosopher, Hegel; the English historian, Toynbee; and the American theologian, Niebuhr. Such speculative accounts have generally claimed that there is in historical events a "significance" or "meaning" which goes beyond the understanding ordinarily sought by historians. In this concluding chapter I want to analyse critically 'the meaning of history'. The treatment I present requires the phrase 'the meaning, or meanings in history' for I am concerned with history as it is being lived. Any who maintain that there is something beyond it, as it were time-transcendent, should make clear what it is. A survey of history shows that mankind has not regarded history simply instrumental to any such goal.

To me the subject matter of history is the life of mankind in time. The historical world is made up of individual human beings, their actions and productions. These individuals have intrinsic value and experience things as valuable; they have purposes and perceive their lives as meaningful. Because this historical world is teleological, permeated with values and meaningful.
Let me analyse critically first such speculative philosophy of history in the following way.

It has been said that history 'is a tale told by an idiot ... signifying nothing'. The religions have views of the significance of history. But the independent inquirer cannot simply accept any such general conceptions. The phrase frequently used 'the meaning of history' may for some have an implication that history is instrumental for something beyond itself. Thus 'speculative systems' answers to the question, 'Has history any meaning'? In fact vary so widely that it has sometimes been doubted that they all interpret the question in the same way. 'In any critical examination of speculation, however, it is equally important to recognize that, even within a single system, this vague governing question breaks down into more determinate, component ones. And a philosopher's answer to one of these may often be deemed more satisfactory than the answer he gives to others.'

Let us first know in this connection how Prof. Vahiduddin analyses Hegel's concept of the cunning of the Idea. According to him, the historical consciousness has a decisive religious moment, and it is clearly indicated in the classical attitudes to history. History is taken as an unfoldment of a divine

1. Widsery, The Meanings in History, p. 34.
2. Dray, Philosophy of History, pp. 63-64.
plan, and the world history is considered a world tribunal. The most striking expression of this attitude is found in Hegel's concept of the cunning (List der Vernunft) of the Idea. The Absolute spirit cannot realise its ends without provoking passions in individuals and making them act in its own interests. What is however realized is something different from the ends which provoked passions. Individuals were just tricked to subserve the interests of the world spirit. "It is not the universal Idea that is involved in opposition and conflict and exposes itself to danger. It stands in the background unaffected and whole and pushes the particularity of the passions to fight for itself". But to all appearances the heroes of history, the so-called masters of decision, are as much subject to the cunning of Idea as the ordinary actors in the historical drama. No doubt the historical process gives the impression of teleology by the very frustration of national ends, by the futility of human planning and aspiration. However historical necessity cannot be imputed the power to override personal freedom and history cannot be equated with the decisions of any individual, however decisive his action might seem on the world historical platform.

What then is the place of historical decisions? Historical decisions are not by any means the expression of a mental act, a subjective resolve. When it is the question of a war which engulfs the whole world or a peace which
brings to end hostilities the decision of the individual is really epochal in the sense that it marks the end of an epoch and the beginning of another. Hence however fantastic it might seem on a purely empirical level it is impossible to witness the vast panorama of history without considering it in a super-individual perspective, without reference to super-individual ends. History is possible only through human actions taken not in isolation but in their inter-connection. Whatever man does can by itself constitute historical actions as little as it can constitute a moral action. The historical action has this much in common with the moral action that it is significant, that it is not reflex action but is carried by a voluntary impetus. It differs from the moral actions in so far as it is not just an individual performance but refers to a super-individual situation which we call history. Hence Hegel was perfectly right when he refused to consider history in a moral perspective.

Similarly, Prof. Carr criticizes Niebuhr's Christian view of history and Hegel's World Spirit. He says that "writers like Berdyaev, Niebuhr, and Maritain purport to maintain the autonomous status of history, but insist that the end or goal of history lies outside history. Personally, he finds it hard

to reconcile the integrity of history with belief in some super-historical force on which its meaning and significance depend — whether that force be the God of a Chosen People, a Christian God, the Hidden Hand of the deist, or Hegel's World Spirit. He further assumes that the historian must solve his problems without recourse to any such Deus ex Machina, that history is a game played, so to speak, without a joke in the pack.4

Similar criticism is that the relation of history to morality is more complicated, and discussions of it in the past have suffered from several ambiguities. It is scarcely necessary today to argue that the historian is not required to pass moral judgments on the private life of the characters in his story. The standpoints of the historian and the moralist are not identical. Henry VIII may have been a bad husband and a good king. But the historian is interested in him in the former capacity only in so far as it affected historical events. If his moral delinquencies had had as little apparent effect on public affairs as those of Henry II, the historian would not need to bother about them. This goes for virtues as well as vices. He also further says that "it was the Jews, and after them the Christians, who introduced an entirely new element by postulating a goal

towards which the historical process is moving — the teleological view of history. History thus acquired a meaning and purpose, but at the expense of losing its secular character. The attainment of the goal of history would automatically mean the end of history: history itself became a theodicy. This was the medieval view of history.\(^5\)

Let us know further clearly in this connection how Prof. Vahiduddin analyses the meaning of history. According to him, the historical process is taken as a guided and directed process to serve a divine telos. But it is one thing to say that it has a purpose and another to say that it has a meaning. Even if one fails to find a purpose which directs the historical process to a far-off divine event one may still detect intelligible patterns in the historical complex, discover some driving forces behind the historical phenomena, discern a dialectical movement which governs the march of history at least partially and in fragments and find unmistakably a value-orientation in history in so far as different periods of history seem receptive to different orders of values. A period of history may develop its own physiognomy and impart its character to the period in such a way as to make the man of the Renaissance so different from the man of the Victorian era or of our own technological age.

It is remarkable nonetheless that modern philosophers who have completely severed their links with the teleology of history still speak of a logic of history. The teleology of history is linked with the theology of history, with the view that historical events follow with an inevitability which has a definite direction. Nature is assimilated to history as a means. Thus both on the mechanical and teleological-cum-theological view historical events have an inevitability. But in spite of their essential inevitability the historical events may have unpredictability as their inherent character. This might be grounded not only in the limitations of the human knowledge but in their own character. In a non-theological context the historical process must retain incalculable and whatever is to happen remains often a surprise. This is implicit in the non-repetitive character of history where historical phase has its distinct character. The historical process has inevitability in retrospect and unpredictability in its contemporary reference. The emphasis on inevitability makes it appear as an expression of historical fatality and the stress on unpredictability imparts a character of freedom to the historical process. But as it was already hinted by Bergson with reference to the life processes, inevitability seems to attach to the historical process when it has shaped itself in a definite form as an expression of the past and
unpredictability to the event which has yet to form itself. In other words, the actual seems to be inevitable whereas the potential seems to be undetermined before its actualisation.

Again the relation of history to religious consciousness is far from ambiguous. It may easily challenge the religious relevance of the historical as such. One of the main patterns of religious consciousness is the denial of history, of change and time, and religion might appear as an attempted liberation from the historical flux. The Buddhist conception of Salvation involves liberation from history. The Christian and the Jewish pattern of the religious world-view are historical but involve nevertheless the concept of the end of historical process. History however is not an illusion. Where time is taken seriously history cannot become insignificant. While Bergson attaches great importance to time he does not assign any significance to history and this is a surprising omission in Bergson's concept of time. In his attempt to give a purer concept of time Bergson has neglected the historical time. Historical time presents its own problems. Though dates play a major role in historical consciousness the historical dates have not simply the mechanical determinations of spatialized time. Every historical date is not a temporal sign, a determination of

some event in the calendar or a determination of some physical event like the eclipse of the sun. It is much more. It refers to epochal decisions, sufferings and achievements of man, his frustration and realization. The date referring to an individual as a private unit has a limited reference and with the lapse of time this reference loses all its relevance and leaves no traces behind. The historical dates on the other hand have a collective or super-individual reference. Even the date pertaining to the historical individual has no private relevance. Its importance persists even when all private, domestic and personal relevance has been lost for good. The relation of man to man, be it that of friendship or hostility or that of blood relationship, assumes an extra-personal dimension in a historical context. Personal jealousies and feuds go beyond their limited relevance. Murders and loves in the historical arena even assume a character which is more than personal. Even if they are carried by personal motivation their significance assumes a historical dimension. The moment a person is involved in the flux of historical processes all his personal involvement and commitments disengage themselves from his private confines. The loss of privacy is the price an individual has to pay for his role in history. Personalities in history have a remarkable resemblance to the creations of artistic imagination. The figures even change their profile
in different historical perspectives. Like the figures of art
they develop a different character in the course of time, and
it is not only historic research, the coming to light of
hitherto unknown documents which changes the perspective but
the shift in the historical situation itself gives a new turn
to evaluation and appraisal. From the above discussion it
is well known that historical time presents its own problems
but the main pattern of religious consciousness is the denial
of history, of change and time. After this let us analyse the
meaning of history here.

Now we can ask question here, "Has history any meaning?
Is there a meaning in history"? I do not wish to enter here
into the problem of meaning of 'meaning'; I take it for granted
that most people know with sufficient clarity what they mean
when they speak of the 'meaning of history' or of the 'meaning
or purpose of life'. And in this sense, in the sense in which
the question of the meaning of history is asked, Karl Popper
answers: "History has no meaning".

In order to give reasons for this opinion, I must
first say something about that 'history' which people have in
mind when they ask whether it has meaning. I want to make it

p. 269.
clear that 'history' in the sense in which most people speak of it simply does not exist; and this is at least one reason why Popper says that it has no meaning.

Now one may ask another question here, 'How do most people come to use the term 'history'? Here the term 'history' is nothing to me but a book which is about the history of Europe -- not in the sense in which we say that it is a history of Europe. They learn about it in school and at the University. They read books about it. They see what is treated in the books under the name of 'history of the world' or 'the history of mankind', and they get used to looking upon it as a more or less definite series of facts. And these facts constitute, they believe, the history of mankind.

But we also know that the realm of facts is infinitely rich, and that there must be selection. According to our interests, we could, for instance, write about the history of art; or of language; or of feeding habits; or of typhus fever. Certainly, none of these is the history of mankind (nor all of them taken together). What people have in mind when they speak of the history of mankind is, rather, the history of the Egyptian, Babylonian, Persian, Macedonian, and Roman empires, and so on, down to our own day. In other words: They speak about the history of mankind, but what they mean,
and what they have learned about in school, is the history of political power.

Denying the meaning of history Popper further says that "there is no history of mankind, there is only an indefinite number of histories of all kinds of aspects of human life. And one of these is the history of political power. This is elevated into the history of the world. But this, Popper holds, is an offence against every decent conception of mankind. It is hardly better than to treat the history of embezzlement or of robbery or of poisoning as the history of mankind. For the history of power politics is nothing but the history of international crime and mass murder (including, it is true, some of the attempts to suppress them). This history is taught in schools, and some of the greatest criminals are extolled as its heroes.

But is there really no such thing as a universal history in the sense of a concrete history of mankind? There can be none. This must be the reply of every humanitarian and especially that of every Christian. A concrete history of mankind, if there were any, would have to be the history of all men. It would have to be the history of all human hopes, struggles, and sufferings. For there is no one man more important than any other. Clearly, this concrete history

cannot be written. We must make abstractions, we must neglect, select. But with this we arrive at the many histories, and among them, at that history of international crime and mass murder which has been advertised as the history of mankind.

One may ask a question here. Why has just the history of power been selected, and not, for example, that of religion, or of poetry? "There are several reasons. One is that power affects us all, and poetry only a few. Another is that men are inclined to worship power. But there can be no doubt that the worship of power is one of the worst kinds of human idolatries, a relic of the time of the cage, of human servitude. The worship of power is born of fear, an emotion which is rightly despised. A third reason why power politics has been made the core of 'history' is that those in power wanted to be worshipped and could enforce their wishes. Many historians wrote under the supervision of the emperors, the generals and the dictators.

Supporting his own argument Prof. Popper further says, "These views will meet with the strongest opposition from many sides, including some apologists for Christianity; for although there is hardly anything in the New Testament to support this doctrine, it is often considered a part of the Christian dogma that God reveals Himself in history; that history has meaning; and that its meaning is the purpose of God." Historicism is

11. Ibid., p. 271.
thus held to be a necessary element of religion. But I do not admit this. I affirm strongly that "this view is purely
idolatry and superstition, not only from the point of view of
a rationalist or humanist but from the Christian point of view
itself. ..."

I do not deny that it is as justifiable to interpret
history from a Christian point of view as it is to interpret
it from any other point of view; and it should certainly be
emphasized, for example, how much of our Western aims and ends,
humanitarianism, freedom, equality, we owe to the influence of
Christianity. But at the same time, the only rational as well
as the only Christian attitude even towards the history of
freedoms is that we are ourselves responsible for it, in the
same sense in which we are responsible for what we make of our
lives, and that only our conscience can judge us and not our
wordly success. The theory that God reveals Himself and His
judgement in history is indistinguishable from the theory that
wordly success is the ultimate judge and justification of our
actions; it comes to the same thing as the doctrine that
history will judge, that is to say, that future might is right;
it is the same as what Popper has called 'moral futurism'.
To maintain that God reveals Himself in what is usually called
'history', in the history of international crime and of mass
murder, is indeed blasphemy; for what really happens within
the realm of human lives is hardly ever touched upon by this cruel and at the same time childish affair. The life of the forgotten, of the unknown individual man; his sorrows and his joys, his suffering and death, this is the real content of human experience down the ages. If that could be told by history, then I should certainly not say that it is blasphemy to see the finger of God in it. Denying the meaning of history, Prof. Popper says "that such a history does not and cannot exist; and all the history which exists, our history of the Great and the Powerful, is at best a shallow comedy; it is the opera buffa played by the powers behind reality (comparable to Homer's opera buffa of the Olympian powers behind the scene of human struggles). It is what one of our worst instincts, the idolatrous worship of power, of success, has led us to believe to be real."

Lastly, I conclude from the above criticisms that history has no meaning. This contention does imply that all we can do about it is to look aghast at the history of political power, or that we must look on it as a cruel joke. For we can interpret it, with an eye to those problems of power politics whose solution we choose to attempt in our time. We can interpret the history of power politics from the point of view of our fight for the open society, for a rule of reason, for justice, freedom, equality, and for the control of

international crime. Thus denying the meaning of history
Prof. Popper says that "although history has no ends, we can
impose these ends of ours upon it; and although history has no
meaning, we can give it a meaning." 14.

Further I contend that it is the problem of nature and
convention which we meet here again. Neither nature nor history
can tell us what we ought to do. Facts, whether those of nature
or those of history, cannot make the decision for us, they
cannot determine the ends we are going to choose. It is we who
introduce purpose and meaning into nature and into history.
Men are not equal, but we can decide to fight for equal rights.
Human institutions such as the state are not rational, but we
can decide to fight to make them more rational. Thus history
itself — I mean the history of power politics, of course, not
the non-existent story of the development of mankind — has no
end or meaning, but we can decide to give it both. Ultimately,
we may say the same about the 'meaning of life'. It is up to
us to decide what shall be our purpose in life, to determine
our ends.

Admitting this dualism of facts and decision
Prof. Karl Popper says that "facts as such have no meaning;
they can gain it only through our decision" 15. Historicism
15. Ibid., p. 278.
is only one of many attempts to get over this dualism; it is born of fear, for it shrinks from realizing that we bear the ultimate responsibility even for the standards we choose. But such an attempt seems to me to represent precisely what is usually described as superstition. For it assumes that we can reap where we have not sown; it tries to persuade us that if we merely fall into step with history everything will and must go right, and that no fundamental decision on our part is required; it tries to shift our responsibility on to history, and thereby on to the play of demoniac powers beyond ourselves; it tries to base our actions upon the hidden intentions of these powers, which can be revealed to us only in mystical inspirations and intuitions, and it thus puts our actions and ourselves on the moral level of a man who, inspired by horoscopes and dreams, chooses his lucky number in a lottery. Like gambling, historicism is born of our despair in the rationality and responsibility of our actions. "It is a debased hope and a debased faith, an attempt to replace the hope and the faith that springs from our moral enthusiasm and the contempt for success by a certainty that springs from a pseudo-science; a pseudo-science of the stars, or of 'human nature', or of historical destiny."\(^{16}\).

"Historicism, Popper asserts, is not only rationally untenable, it is also in conflict with any religion that teaches

the importance of conscience. For such a religion must agree with the rationalist attitude towards history in its emphasis on our supreme responsibility for our actions, and for their repercussions upon the course of history. True, we need hope; to act, to live without hope goes beyond our strength. But we do not need more, and we must not be given more. We do not need certainty. Religion, in particular, should not be a substitute for dreams and wish-fulfilment; it should resemble neither the holding of a ticket in a lottery, nor the holding of a policy in an insurance company. The historicist element in religion is an element of idolatry, of superstition.

This emphasis upon the dualism of facts and decisions determines also our attitude towards such ideas as 'progress'. If we think that history progresses, or that we are bound to progress, then we commit the same mistake as those who believe that history has a meaning that can be discovered in it and need not be given to it. For to progress is to move toward some kind of end, towards an end which exists for us as human beings. 'History' cannot do that; only we, the human individuals, can do it; we can do it by defending and strengthening those democratic institutions upon which freedom, and with it progress, depends. And we shall do it much better as we become more fully aware of the fact that progress rests with us, with our watchfulness, with our efforts, with the
clarity of our conception of our ends, and with the realism of their choice.

Instead of posing as prophets we must become the makers of our fate. We must learn to do things as well as we can, and to look out for our mistakes. And when we have dropped the idea that the history of power will be our judge, when we have given up worrying whether or not history will justify us, then one day perhaps we may succeed in getting power under control. In this way we may even justify history, in our turn. It badly needs a justification.

From the analysed criticisms, it is clear that history has no meaning. Rejecting this meaning, Dilthey says that "there is no one 'meaning of life' but only the meaning which individuals have perceived in, or attributed to their own lives in terms of certain ideas and values"¹⁷.

Admitting the meanings in history and in religion, Prof. Widgery states that the main characteristics of religion may be described in terms of nine meanings.

The primary meaning in religion is the experience of God, communion with and love and praise of Him.

The second meaning in religion is man's experience of himself as a mind not to be identified with the body or any

portion of it. Some thinkers today either implicitly or explicitly present the view that the mental or psychical is nothing but a functioning of the physical organism. Philosophy of Religion affirms the reality of the individual self as mind, soul, or spirit is not on the basis of any rationalistic argument, or of any evidence (as though there could be any!) of empirical psychology supposed to be "scientific" because of its reliance on methods similar to those applied to the physical world. Its affirmation is on the basis of the whole experience of religion in which the mind is continuously present to itself. Without this meaning in religion, all its other meanings are unintelligible.

The third meaning in religion is in accepting and interpreting Nature as created by God, and responding to it as instrumental to the purposes of God for men in the ideal He reveals to them. God is not primarily approached from Nature, but Nature is regarded from the standpoint of the religious experience of God. Nature provides opportunities for enjoyments for which God has given men capacities. It contains manifestations of the beautiful, and gives means for human creation of the beautiful. It is an object of intellectual interest, and as such is instrumental for the development of the mind. It presents risks that are a challenge to man's moral nature. It is a source of sufferings that with the religious attitude may lead to spiritual refinement, to the cultivation of social
feelings, and to closer relations with God.

The fourth meaning in religion is the sharing in social life, not primarily as a result of biological processes or for secular benefits, but as a fundamental of the religious ideal. For religion society is a community of minds, and forms of external organization are secondary. That community of minds is in part developed through external organization for the attainment of physical and cultural constituents of the ideal. Nature forces men to such co-operation, and thus contributes to its cultivation. In the organization of religious groups, especially for the worship of God, it is experienced and enhanced.

The fifth meaning in religion is the experience of peace, joy, and bliss in the communion of men as minds with God as a mind. For the religious - though in their imperfection they may have it only intermittently — there is a felt presence of God. They would lead their lives with an awareness, even though in the "background of consciousness", that He is ever with them. The profound satisfaction of this relationship may be felt at any time by the individual in solitude or in fellowship with others. The joy of an exaltation of the mind is most often experienced in the worship and praise of God for which men come together in their religious edifices. This is the supreme meaning in religion.
The sixth meaning in religion is the acceptance of saintliness, moral goodness, truth, and beauty in all their forms, as divinely intended for men. The enjoyment of these is an obligation as well as a privilege. The realization of this meaning is possible only by the exercise of human freedom, by continuous striving, by the cooperation of others, and by the grace of God. Moral goodness is of inner personal character and of love for others. Saintliness is a likeness to the holiness of God.

The seventh meaning in religion is the individual's consciousness of defect, especially of sin, together with an awareness of the way of salvation, and — at least in part — an experience of salvation. Sin is felt inwardly and fundamentally as an alienation from God: in evil thoughts, and/or words, and/or deeds, or in neglect of the obligations of the sixth meaning. For religion sins of omission are no less serious than those of commission. But the mind has the capacity to "rise again" after falling into evil. Spiritual resurrection, regeneration, is a fundamental characteristic of life, on which human progress in any direction in part depends. In religion men do not experience themselves as inevitably determined and bound by the past, but as able to make "new beginnings". Religion is a challenge to the individual to repent of evil and to turn to good. Through the influence of individuals on each other a whole society may be regenerated. The attainment of
the benefits of social organization depends on the moral integrity of individuals in the performance of their social duties.

The eighth meaning in religion is the attitude toward suffering. Suffering due to one's own sin is accepted as a reaping of what one has sown. It is an instigation to the avoidance of sin and to striving for goodness. Suffering is a challenge to the human spirit by every intellectual and other effort to eradicate and prevent it. In that, it aids the development of spiritual character; it is often necessary for the eventual attainment of an enhanced enjoyment of life. Suffering leads to much benevolent activity, and cultivates and intensifies social feelings. Further, for religion, the attitude toward suffering is that of patient endurance, with trust in God, to whom suffering may make men turn. The failure to give adequate recognition to this spiritual significance of suffering is one of the greatest defects of those theories of life that are presented in contrast to that of religion. With this failure, they appear superficial, as never getting down to the deeper experiences of life. Religions have held the promise of salvation and redemption; but these are to be attained in part through suffering, and not merely from it. In this eighth meaning religion is contrasted with any superficially optimistic attitudes in life.

The ninth meaning in religion is the conviction of
spiritual continuity beyond death: the aspiration to, the hope for, the faith in the eventual attainment of spiritual perfection and happiness.

These meanings are described as "in" religion. Philosophy of Religion gets its data from history, and it is in history that these meanings are experienced — though not perfectly. Because God is ever-present, the religious relations with Him are always possible; and with them all the other meanings are involved. The meanings in religion are in part in terrestrial history, though the chief of them extend beyond it; religion is both "this-worldly" and "other-worldly". Much in the religions of history supports the view that the best preparation for the other world is the proper appreciation and adherence to the requirements of religion in this world.\(^1\)

This last meaning may be criticized in the following way. The ninth meaning in religion is the conviction of spiritual continuity beyond death. This meaning may be criticized as it is beyond life and this world. It is true that "every expression of life has a meaning insofar as it is a sign which expresses something that is part of life. Life does not mean anything other than itself. There is nothing in it which points to a meaning beyond it. The nature of the meaning relations lies in the pattern of a life formed in time by the

\(^1\) Widgery, What is Religion?, pp. 291-95.
interaction between a living structure and its environment.\textsuperscript{19} He further says that "awareness of meaning characterizes human life in general and provides the unifying framework of individual experiences. This meaning is not constituted by reference to something transcendental but by relations within life.\textsuperscript{20}

From the main characteristics of religion it is well-known that there are meanings in religion as well as in history except the last point which is not applicable to history.

In this connection I point out that an adequate view both of Christianity and of history requires the widest possible conception of the purposes of history.

Christianity is concerned with the purpose of history. If we use the single term, the purpose might be described as 'life abundant for all'. But it is better to talk of the purposes which are thus summed up. Intent on some of these, Christians have not infrequently adopted a narrow conception which has been called 'other-worldly'. But an adequate view both of Christianity and of history requires the widest possible conception of the purposes of history. This may be expressed in a formal way: "the purposes of history are the experiences of all the values possible through the relationship of Nature, the

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., p. 95.
self and other selves, including God. It may be described in the words of the New Testament: "Whatsoever things are true; whatsoever things are honest; whatsoever things are just; whatsoever things are pure; whatsoever things are lovely; whatsoever things are of good report: if there be any virtue, and if there be any praise, think on these things." Apart from the values specifically mentioned, the phrase 'things of good report' covers all else that should be included.

With his physical body the individual may enjoy physical goods and the Christian view of history may recognize them fully. With a knowable physical world and other minds, human beings created with the capacity to know, knowledge is justifiably included in the purposes of history. With appreciation of the beautiful and sometimes capacities to create it in works of art, human beings acknowledge the aesthetic as within the significance of history. Even the phrase 'the love of God' as used by Christians may be understood to involve the recognition of all economic and cultural values as made possible by His creation. Nevertheless that phrase means something more for religion as a specific form of experience. The love of God is an experience of personal relationship of worth in itself. It is an emotional attitude of devotion, awe, reverence, worship and praise. For Christianity this is the supreme purpose of

history. Admitting value-experiences Prof. Widgery further says that Christianity has continued, and will continue, in history not because of but despite the dogmas taught by its theologians. It has lived, and will live, in the religious experiences of particular individuals — human beings and God — in their relations with one another. The ideal of history, conceived as identical with the ideal of Christianity comprehensively understood, is the experience of the love of God, of others as ourselves, and of all values, physical and cultural which God in the creation of the physical world and of human minds with their varied capacities has made possible.

Thus from the above discussed facts, it is obvious that there are meanings in history as well as in religion. Not being aware of any 'significance of history' as a whole I interpret it in terms of 'meanings in history'. I want to discuss these meanings in brief as physical, intellectual, aesthetic, moral and religious value-experiences, and to give subsidiary recognition to enjoyments of sports and games. Before discussing these values, let us know first what value is.

**What is Value?**

Though the term 'value' is of very common use in recent philosophy no less than in other spheres of our everyday life,

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24. Ibid., p. 227.
yet it is one of those terms which have been the source of much misunderstanding. The reason is that value is of such a nature that any outlook on life and the universe involves some phase of it. "In philosophic literature we come across other terms like 'worth', 'good', 'excellence', 'perfection', but to avoid confusion we deem it wise to prefer the term 'value' to cover 'worth' and 'good', and reserve the term 'perfection' to mean consumption of all values"²⁵.

Let us know briefly here how Prof. Najder defines the term, value.

'Value' is a ambiguous term. However, both in everyday speech and in philosophical literature 'value' appears in three basic senses, which often overlap and are even more often confused. According to him, "the term value is used in at least three different senses, which are named attributive, quantitative, and axiological"²⁶.

(1) Value is what a thing is worth; something translatable into or expressible by some units of measurement or comparison, frequently definable numerically.
(2) Value is a valuable (a) thing or (b) property (quality); something to which valuableness is ascribed.

²⁶. Z. Najder, Values and Evaluations, p. 173.
(3) Value is an idea which makes us consider given objects, qualities, or events as valuable.

Let us look more closely at these three basic meanings.

(1) 'What is the value of this house'? 'Modigliani's canvases have greatly gained in value'. 'In this herd the black stallion has the highest value'. 'What is the value of Dubliners within Joyce's whole work'? These are obvious instances of using 'value' in the first of the senses, differentiated above. It is typical of economic contexts, but it appears in ethical and aesthetic contexts as well: 'Has the life of a genius greater value than the lives of ten average men'? 'Under the impact of Siegl's research the value of late Roman art has grown considerably'. Roman Ingarden, in discussing the second of the five senses he distinguishes uses the word 'value' in this way.

Prof. Najder proposes to call this sense of 'value' 'quantitative'. 'Value' in this sense is not bound to any particular theory but is a semantically independent unit. "Value in the quantitative sense is a measurable quantity of what determines value (two pence as the value of an egg)." He further says that "within the theoretical pattern the definition of quantitative value will be: Quantitative value is a quantity of substance, or a measurable degree of a property, to which substance or property the quality of

28. Ibid., p. 173.
valuableness is attributed within the given system of evaluation
W, on the basis of a value-principle.\textsuperscript{29}

Utilitarians are inclined to use 'value' in the
quantitative sense, although they frequently agglomerate all
three senses. In the Marxist concept of economic value the
quantitative meaning is obviously, though not solely, present.

The second meaning has a very wide range, as it may
apply both to (a) individual objects or facts (particular acts,
works of art), and to (b) certain properties of these (conscious
intention, artistic originality). For example, R. Frondizi
considers values to be qualities\textsuperscript{30}. R. Ingarden, in the study
mentioned above, uses the term 'value' mostly in this sense ...
when we say that somebody's actions possess a great social value,
or a given sculpture a high artistic value, or that the value of
somebody's behaviour consists in his altruism, or that the value
of a novel lies in the wealth of its language -- we use the
term 'value' in the second sense, which Prof. Najder proposes
to call attributive. "Value in the attributive sense is a
thing or property, to which valuableness is ascribed". There
are different meanings of value. It is possible for the same
statement to be interpreted as applying to value in different
senses. To make the distinction clearer let us compare: 'The

\textsuperscript{29} Najder, Op.Cit., p. 64.

\textsuperscript{30} R. Frondizi, *What is Value?,* pp. 5-7. Also Najder,
*Values and Evaluations*, p. 44.
value of this house is £40,000' and 'The value of this house consists in its being the classical example of Kentish Gothic'; 'The social value of his actions is zero', and 'His actions have great social value because they show that self-discipline and perseverance can overcome the handicaps of severe illness'.

Why are these two senses of 'value', (a) as object or fact and (b) as property or quality, banded here together as two species of the same basic meaning(2)? Because with regard to actions and personalities the scope of the concept of a property (or quality, or attribute) is unclear and the distinction between attributes and attitudes can be drawn only conventionally.

In everyday speech, as well as in specialized literature—although not too often in philosophy—a third meaning of 'value' is distinguishable. When somebody says that the value of life consists in preserving human dignity, or that the value of lyrical poetry lies in the fact that we experience in reading it a peculiar kind of emotion, he is using the term 'value' of a certain idea, principle, or criterion, which allows us to evaluate particular occurrences, objects, and properties—and, consequently, to ascribe to them value, positive or negative, in sense (2). For instance, if we wish to maintain that the value of a work of art consists in its originality (i.e., that being original is a valuable property), we have to assume that
originality is a value. To recognize as valuable acts of charity, we have to consider charity a value; regarding honour as a value makes honourable behaviour valuable.

When Taine describes art's value in human life, he uses the word 'value' in this way. Marx applies it when he declares that work is the source of all economic value, as do the biologist B. Glass, who writes about values as principles of biological selection, and the economist K. J. Arrow, who speaks of individual values as determining the issuing of judgements. Ingarden probably has this third meaning in mind, when he writes on 'cognitive values', or when he lists 'positive qualities of values'. Of the same kind are the examples of values given by Nicholas Rescher in his Introduction to Value Theory: economic justice, loyalty, patriotism; and his concept of 'underlying values' or 'values proper' also belongs to this category.

This last meaning of 'values' Prof. Hajder calls axiological, a conscious pleonasm to stress that this is the most important and essential sense for the philosophy of value. This meaning is going to remain at the centre of our attention. Axiological values usually concern states of affairs, such as happiness, honour, equality, but also types of behaviour such as impartiality, honesty, fidelity; formal relations, such as


32. N. Rescher, Introduction to Value Theory, pp. 4-6, 7, 8.
coherence, harmony, and so on. These states of affairs, types of behaviour, attitudes, and formal patterns are frequently called 'ideal', or 'ideals'. Value-principles can contain either names of these ideals, or their descriptions (indefinite descriptions).

Can values be only positive? The proposed definitions do not prejudge the matter, since they allow axiological value-judgements concerning such states of affairs as adversity, shame, harm, such kinds of behaviour as cruelty, egoism, cheating, such formal relations as chaos or disharmony, and so on. Value-principles may occur in both positive or negative forms: 'honesty is good', 'avarice is bad'. Thus value in the axiological sense is an idea which ascribes value to certain objects, properties, or events. Thus I have discussed, so far the term value which is used in at least three different senses. Let us know its relation to history, which is very important for understanding the meanings in history. 'History being constituted of the related histories of individuals, it is maintained that it was meanings in the value-experiences of individuals. A distinction has been made between what is of extrinsic and what is of intrinsic value'. 'Values are called extrinsic in so far as they are pursued not for their own sake but only as means to an end. Under these extrinsic values we may distinguish the physical and economic values. The things
and events of the world are valued by us not for their own sake, nor are the values in exchange, such as goods and money, regarded as having values in themselves. We attribute values to them in so far as they contribute in their own ways to our realization of individuality. Values are called intrinsic when they do not borrow their significance from anything extraneous to themselves. Under intrinsic values we may enumerate truth, goodness, beauty, individuality, and the like, which are ends in themselves, but never means to anything else. They are pursued for their own sake. It may be suggested, however, that the terms 'extrinsic' and 'intrinsic' are relative, their relative character being due to the fact that sometimes what is intrinsic from one level of our life becomes extrinsic when that level is transcended. Supporting this close relation between extrinsic and intrinsic values, Udgery says that "a distinction has been made between what is of extrinsic and what is of intrinsic value. As the former is instrumental to the latter — what is of worth in itself — it should be clear that we are primarily concerned with intrinsic values. It may be recognized that some extrinsic conditions of value are also sometimes of intrinsic worth. These intrinsic value-experiences have been acknowledged in the past, as they are in the past, as they are in the present, and may be in the future."

Admitting the intimate relation between history and intrinsic value, Rickman says that "the historical world is made up of individual human beings, their actions and productions. These individuals have intrinsic value and experience things as valuable; they have purposes and perceive their lives as meaningful. Because of this the historical world is teleological, permeated with values and meaningful." Let us clarify first the word 'meaning' which is ambiguously used.

The term 'meaning' may be employed in two ways. The first is with reference to the implications of words, sentences, paragraphs, books. The meanings of words are sometimes given in definitions — but that is only in other words. Eventually one reaches words that are indefinable. Their meaning is known only in some form of awareness, experience. That is also finally true of sentences, paragraphs, and so on. This may be illustrated by two examples. 'A line is length without breadth'. No one ever experiences such a line. The idea implied by the word is reacted by the abstraction by thought of the breadth of some surface (generally very narrow) that we experience. 'A point is position without magnitude'. The idea implied by the word is arrived at by abstraction of the magnitude of a surface (or surfaces) experienced. All words connoting significant ideas have some reference to experience.

That is true also of those concerning meanings in the second sense of values.

Admitting the importance of value-experiences in history, Prof. Widgery says that "a defect of many interpretations of history has been the failure to investigate adequately the nature of value-experiences in it"\(^\text{36}\). Partly due to this there has been wide use of the phrase the meaning of history. That suggests: (1) that there is one meaning, and (2) that the meaning is of history as a whole. I am not aware of one meaning of history, and I doubt whether any one has been or is. We do not know history as a whole, and have no justification for applying the idea of one meaning to it. Sometimes it seems as though it is supposed that history must have one meaning that might be capable of expression in one concept. One considering the nature of history should consider the empirical facts and see if he can discover one or more meanings. It should, therefore, be noted as fundamental in my treatment that I write not of 'the meaning of history' but of 'the meanings in history'. "The main meanings in history are basically the same for all mankind. That is involved in their being all of the same genus: and living in essentially similar terrestrial conditions"\(^\text{37}\).

The meanings in history are made possible by the nature of the physical world, the constitution of human beings and 36. Widgery, Op.Cit., p. 114.
37. Ibid., p. 114.
possibly the relation of God to these. The significance of history is in the strivings for and the enjoyments of values. The value-experiences constituting the meanings in the individual histories have been in them as they have gone along and are in them as they go along. Values are experienced as particulars in their own times and places and only by individuals. The history of any individual involves a scale of values whether explicitly recognized by him or not, with an order of lower and higher.

Different individuals, and the same individual at different times, may have different systems and scales of values. There are grounds for maintaining that there has been and is a tendency in history to a general acknowledgement of a scale valid for all—from lowest to highest—physical, intellectual, aesthetic, moral and religious. So there are five basic value-experiences in history: physical, intellectual, aesthetic, moral and religious that may be had by all individuals.

Let us discuss first the physical value. The satisfaction of the needs of the body is required for its survival. On its survival the attainment of any and every kind of value-experience in life on earth depends. But that satisfaction is not merely extrinsic—a means to an end or ends—but also intrinsic—of worth in itself. It is not necessary to give a long list of physical values; a few main kinds are considered as illustrative, they have duration, but often brief. It is true that the amount of time, thought and energy given to efforts for and the
enjoyment of physical value-experiences in history has been very great. They must be acknowledged as some of the meanings in history.

Food has not been — and is not merely instrumental to bodily health and the building up of bodily strength: it has been — and is — a source of enjoyment. It would be impossible to overestimate, the amount of time and energy devoted in history to the production and enjoyment of food. In later periods much time has been given to the discovery and provision of varieties not merely — and sometimes not chiefly — for their nutritive value as for their giving enjoyment. For the understanding of history it is necessary to recognize that not only do we 'eat to live', but that we also 'live to eat'.

Physical sexual-intercourse is obviously instrumental in the production of other beings. Even if performed with that aim, it may also be for physical enjoyment. Resort to prostitutes has been and is for this kind of satisfaction, and prostitution has been called the world's 'oldest profession'. Whether in or outside of marriage, when satisfactorily performed, it has been enjoyed by one or both concerned. Much in the histories of many individuals has been in efforts to obtain it and the enjoyment of it. Throughout history methods have been used to try to prevent the production of children while still indulging in sexual-intercourse for its own value-experiences. Today much time is spent on research as to artificial contraceptives and on
labour for their manufacture and distribution. That involves recognition of this value-experience. Considering the attention paid to it, it may be said to be one of the meanings in history.

There are, of course many other kinds of physical value-experiences concern with which plays a part — though not often an important part — in individuals' histories, and they are meanings in them. Bathing the body may help to preserve physical health, but in the course of history luxurious conditions have been contrived for the enjoyment of it. Kinds of clothes and dwellings have been used not merely as protection from inclemencies of the weather but also as giving physical comfort. Much furniture has been designed for a similar purpose. Much of the expansion of commerce has been and is for the distribution of the means for physical nourishment and physical enjoyment. "To leave physical value-experience out of consideration is to ignore much that has constituted a very large part of history."\(^{38}\)

Besides this physical value, there is another kind of value called intellectual value. For the physical survival and for physical value-experiences men have had to use their intelligence as well as their physical activity. It would be impossible to overestimate the amount of intellectual activity of individuals directed to practical aims. A merely cursory survey of history would have revealed that men have tried to know in order to do but they have also done in order to know.\(^{38}\)

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The term 'curiosity' has come into use, and it is reasonably maintained that it is to imply men's desire to know just for the sake of knowing.

There has been — and is — much striving for knowledge for its own sake. After it has been attained some of it has been found to be of practical use, but very much of it has not. It has been — and is nevertheless regarded as of worth. Intellectual activity and the knowledge acquired by it give a specific kind of satisfaction. What would an individual's history be without some intellectual value-experiences, however rudimentary?

Many throughout history have asked 'what is truth'? and have had no satisfactory answer. The reason is that knowledge is constituted of truths. "Any talk of the true in all truths, the good in all moral experiences, the beautiful in all the aesthetic ones, has no relevance for the meanings in history". Intellectual values are particulars. They are a plurality. It is with particular truths that the sciences of nature and history have been built up. To say 'I know the truth' is meaningless. To say 'I know the truth about the assassination of President John Kennedy' has significance. The knowledge of truths is a value for an individual only when he consciously apprehends them.

Similarly, throughout history interest in it has
developed to the vast scope of modern natural sciences. One main motive of the research for and the practical preparations for attempts of men to land on the moon is the desire for knowledge. Those who make the flights to the moon may contemplate the possibility that they will not return, that they will die in the venture. In the search for knowledge many have 'scorned delights and lived laborious days'.

Men as we know them do not seem to be predominantly intellectual. Conditions in the past have given, and in the present give, few opportunities to the majority of persons for intellectual interests. Technical advances in the future may relieve many of physical work and provide time for more cultural activities and enjoyments. But whatever the level of education of any individual, he certainly has some satisfaction in knowledge and the exercise of his intellect. Knowledge has played -- and plays -- a great part in history and "the efforts for and the enjoyments of it are intellectual value-experiences. They are some of the meanings in history."

In addition to this value, there is another kind of value known as aesthetic value. Let us know clearly it how Prof. Bhattacharyya explains it in the following way.

Just as the intellect and the will of man aspire after and realise their ideals of truth and goodness by a

process of development, resolving conflicts and contradictions as they present themselves in their cognitions and emotions, even so the feeling aspect of man has an inherent tendency to seek after its satisfaction in the ideal of Beauty. Feeling in its lower form is confined to the particular and the present, and is guided by interest which is local, private and personal. To rise from the lower forms of feeling demands on the part of man education and culture of his imagination which discovers a meaning and significance extending far beyond the objects of sense perception. When we say so, we seem to think as if aesthetic feeling is an acquired one and is to be met with only in a cultured society, and is never an innate function of the mind. But we know even among savages there is the sense of beauty, and they express it in decoration, dance and music. The question arises therefore that beauty is not entirely dependent upon subjective training but has something in itself which compels appreciation. Thus the problem of beauty has divided thinkers into two camps, one regarding beauty as existing purely in a peculiar feeling of man moulded by tradition and training, and the other holding the view that beauty is wholly objective depending on an inherent quality of objects, no matter whether there is or is not mind, trained or untrained, to appreciate it.

There is, however, a third possible view of the
nature of beauty which combines the above two and makes beauty depend partly on subjective and partly on objective conditions. An object of beauty must have certain inherent qualities which invoke the feeling of beauty, and at the same time the mind must be trained in a particular manner so as to appreciate the object of beauty and entertain an aesthetic feeling with regard to it. If beauty consisted entirely in the inherent quality of the object then there would have been no variation in aesthetic judgements, and apart from minor differences it is generally true that "the radical difference in the judgements as to Beauty is between those adopted by the savage and the civilized, not between those which are entertained by the latter. Further, we can only explain artistic progress in a nation if there be a standard towards which that progress normally tends." And the subjective-objective view of beauty also seems consistent with facts and also with principles involved in perceptual judgement. All such judgements imply joint contribution of the environment and of the mind, and similarly our aesthetic judgements, too, are results of the joint contribution from the objects of beauty experienced by us and from associations and imaginations of the mind. We can remain satisfied for all practical purposes with this combined subjective-objective view of beauty.

the nature of beauty, though there are extreme cases which may incline the more inquisitive mind to have recourse either to the subjective or to the objective account to explain them. After having considered the views about the nature of beauty, I propose now to consider how aesthetic value-experiences are possible. Aesthetic value-experiences are possible by inherent capacities of the individual mind. However much physical objects and instruments may be involved, it cannot be shown that those experiences are merely forms of sense perception. It could be assumed that all individuals have such capacities, as it is impossible to prove that any of them have not. Their apparent absence may be due to some lack of the kind of attention required, or of a necessary external stimulus. Aesthetic capacities can be — and require to be — cultivated. Children — and, of course, adults — can be taught to appreciate the beautiful. Artists of all kinds in painting, sculpture, architecture, music, dancing, and so on generally have training in their arts, often prolonged and arduous. With individuals created as distinctive some have outstanding artistic capacities.

We cannot say whether primitive mankind enjoyed the contemplation of the beauties of Nature, but from early

times there are literary expressions of it. In modern times people have travelled — and travel — to enjoy them. History shows the part that many forms of art have taken in human lives. Those of ancient China, India, Egypt, Persia and Greece still arouse our admiration. The cult of the beautiful has gone on through history and was perhaps never so widespread and intense as at the present time. Nature has provided all sorts of things, wood, stone, metals, fibres etc. with which men have 'created' objects of beauty — but that by their inherent aesthetic capacities. Men have invented many instruments of great variety for the production of music, manufactured almost incalculable colours for painting and dying. By colour printing and colour photography millions are able to have aesthetic enjoyment otherwise impossible for them. By the phonograph and the radio they are able to enjoy music at times and in places where it is otherwise unavailable. History has had the establishment of great galleries of art and the organization of magnificent musical orchestras. Thousands of individuals give time, thought and energy to training in the various arts.

Aesthetic value-experiences are of individuals. We know of no social consciousness of them. We know of no cosmic significance of them. They come and they go as time goes along. They may be of different periods of duration, some short, some of medium length, some long. Each
value-experience is in some way unique — and by a particular individual in a specific place and for its own time. Intellectual and aesthetic values draw men together into closer mental relationships. "It would be impossible to overestimate the importance of the aesthetic. Aesthetic value-experiences are some of the meanings in history."

Literature is a form of art, and brief reference may be made to it here. But its appeal is not merely aesthetic: its range covers the whole of human life. It has been said that 'the pen is mightier than the sword' — sometime it is. Individuals may be restricted through the narrowness of their own particular experiences; literature opens their minds to thoughts of manifold diversities, to a great wealth of human longings and strivings, of human disillusionments, of human achievements. In literature we get nearer to the problems of human life than through any of the sciences of Nature. The history of literature in many ways reveals an onward march of the spirit of man.

Besides these values, there are moral value-experiences which have been significant in the lives of individuals constituting history. Moral values always have some relations to the inner life. Let me explain this value in brief in the following way.

There is ample evidence in history that human beings have moral needs. These go beyond what may be involved in the individual's physical survival, for in accord with inner moral challenges men have sacrificed their physical bodies for benefits to others. Some thinkers, mostly Naturalistic sociologists, have maintained that morality is solely instrumental. According to them it is nothing more than rules and customs found to be beneficial for social co-operation. It is implied that there is nothing universal or permanent in morality, for the rules and customs of different peoples have varied and have changed in the course of history.

However, it is true that variations of customs and rules have been due to the efforts to realize moral values in diverse conditions. Human history may be viewed from the standpoint of ethical co-ordination. In the space here available only a small fraction of evidence can be referred to, but it is sufficient to show that fundamental principles and qualities, as veracity, benevolence, courage, purity, self-control, self-respect, love and friendship have been universally recognized and sought for, and the corresponding evils condemned and striven against lying, dishonesty, theft, cowardice, impurity and murder.

With their attention given to metaphysical aspects of Hindu thought many occidental scholars have failed to recognize the wealth of ethical ideas in India. Hinduism
does not advocate apathy, as it has so often been misrepresented to do. "It is often said that the Hindu ideal is inactivity, but in fact a considerable part of Hindu scriptures discusses the value of an active life. 'Do you perform prescribed action, for action is better than inaction, and the support of your body, too, cannot be accomplished with inaction' (Bhagavad-Gītā, Third Lesson, Verse 8). Krishna points out to Arjun that one must be active and discharge one's duty -- but the work must be selfless, that is, not for reward or even for the supreme goal of Paradise. The Rigveda says: 'God hath sent us forth to labour'. Nothing is placed higher than veracity: 'Let him speak only what is true: for this vow the gods do keep, that they speak the truth'. 'That wealth that is earned by righteous ways is true wealth'. Let a man 'nourish a clean spirit in a clean body'. 'Purify your heart'. 'Harbour only friendly feelings for all'. 'Righteous character is essential to a man: he that loseth it gaineth nothing by life, wealth, or friends'. Men of intelligence and purity should always behave towards others in the same way as they would other should behave towards them'. Courage, reverence to parents, honesty, charity and compassion, temperance and the social duties of the individual in his position in the group, friendship and 44. K.N. Sen, Hinduism, p. 23.
other virtues are repeatedly lauded in Hindu literature and the corresponding vices condemned.45.

Let us discuss the cardinal virtues as explained by Prof. Mahadevan. The Hindu Scriptures give several lists of virtues. The Gita enumerates these as godly virtues: fearlessness, purity of thought steadfastness in knowledge and devotion, alms-giving, self-control and sacrifices, study of the Scriptures, austerities and uprightness, non-violence, truth and freedom from anger, renunciation, tranquillity, aversion to slander, compassion to living beings, freedom from covetousness, gentleness, modesty and steadiness, courage, patience, fortitude, purity and freedom from malice and overweening conceit. All these virtues, however, may be regarded as manifestations of the five cardinal virtues: (1) purity, (2) self-control, (3) detachment, (4) truth, and (5) non-violence.

Purity of body and mind is the first rung in the moral ladder. The restrictions in diet and dress and in daily habits are all designed to make the mind pure. The body is to be regarded as the temple of God and the mind its inner sanctuary. The door of heaven is barred to those who are unclean in heart. Cleanliness is part of godliness.

Purity (Sauca) implies cleanliness in thought, word and deed.

and comprises such virtues as straightforwardness, frankness, innocence and absence of sinful thoughts. He who has cultivated these qualities will find the practice of the next cardinal virtue, self-control, easy and smooth.

Self-control again implies both the control of the flesh and control of the mind. The senses must be first restrained. If the reins are not firm, then the senses, like wicked horses, will become unmanageable; and if the individuals has no control over his senses and mind, he will come to ruin. Self-control, however, does not mean self-torture. It only implies moderation and self-mastery.

The third cardinal virtue is detachment — detachment from the sense-objects. The Gita regards attachment to objects of sense as the root of all evil.

Non-violence, the last of the cardinal virtues, is the expression of Truth. The Hindu sages, from the Vedic seers and the Buddha to Mahatma Gandhi have laid the greatest stress on the practice of this virtue. If Truth is the all, then nothing should be injured. The Vedic command runs: 'Do not injure any being'. The Buddha was the incarnation of compassion. He taught: 'Let a man overcome anger by love; Let him overcome evil by good; Let him overcome the greedy by liberality, the liar by truth!' 46.

Similarly, the literature of the Zoroastrians is full of exhortations to 'good thoughts, good words, good deeds'. 'Tell not lies to anybody'. 'Poverty which is through honesty is better than opulence from the treasure of others'. 'Be always charitable'. 'The two most excellent qualities of an intelligence of higher order are liberality and love'. 'To make an enemy a friend, to make a wicked man good, to make an ill-informed man wise, are among the higher functions of man'. 'That nature only is good when it shall not do unto another whatever is not good for its own self'. Gratitude, temperance, justice, self-control, cheerfulness are all insisted on.

In history it has been insisted that the moral is apprehended by individuals with its own kind of inner awareness. For this the term 'conscience' has come into use. The authority of conscience has been felt to be so definite that some have called it 'the voice of God'. It is an interesting and important fact that throughout history some of the most influential moral teachers have been religious leaders.

Moral values are experiences of individuals and all could be called 'personal', but for the consideration of history it is useful to distinguish between what one may describe specifically as personal and what as social. The former are qualities of personality, connoted by what the
Individual calls his 'character'. However like others, an individual is aware of himself. Thus individuals accord a special value to themselves.

Similarly, liberty is an intrinsic moral value—experience. It is not a 'right' accorded to individuals by society but inherent in them as mental or spiritual beings. It is essentially related to their freedom of will; what is possible is the placing of restrictions on the scope of his exercise of it. It has been with the scope and restrictions of the scope of liberty that professional historians, political scientists and sociologists have been concerned.

There are more moral value—experiences than have been considered here. "Moral value—experiences have been significant in the lives of individuals constituting history: they are meanings in it"47.

In addition to these values, there are religious value—experiences which constitute some of the meanings in history. Religion has offered to men a peace which the world cannot give. Individuals have been able to attain some of the satisfaction of their religious needs through participation in religious communities formed by and perpetuating the influence of eminent religious personalities in history. As they owe such debts to the past, their forms of payment

of them is in efforts for those of the future. Such payment is a form of moral obligation. In their new insights and creations in all realms of life contributions may be made to the welfare of others coming in the future. Let us explain in brief the religious value-experiences in the following way.

In his essay on the immortality of the soul, David Hume wrote: 'It is an infinite advantage in every controversy to defend the negative'. Supporting religious experience Prof. Widgery says that 'those who today reject religion feel themselves in such a position. Nevertheless, the presentation of religion as of real significance and worth in history may be undertaken with confidence. That human beings have religious needs seems to be evidenced by what they have done in history to try to obtain some satisfaction of them.

The religious attitude is based on the apprehension of two fundamental realities: one of the spiritual nature of man, the other of a Spiritual Being beyond the world of Nature and men as we immediately experience them. Religious needs have been brought to light and some forms of their satisfaction indicated by religious saints and eminent religious persons in communities. However great the achievements and influence of leaders in political, military, scientific, literary and aesthetic realms none have had the persistent effects on human beings comparable with those of the chief personalities of religion: Zarathustra, the
Buddha, the Jain Tirthankaras, Moses, Jesus, Muhammad. The reason for this was that they were concerned with fundamental needs of human beings: the religious. In history men have persistently striven for some satisfaction of them. It is the saint more than any other who manifests the central essence of religion.

Religious men have a trust in God with which they go through life with its vicissitudes with confidence. Individually and in communities they pray for His grace. They give Him thanks. They worship and praise Him. In communion with Him some become convinced of their spiritual continuity beyond life on earth, and this conviction affects their modes of terrestrial life. It is the implication of many religions that it is 'the pure in heart who sees God'. Many feel that they should repent before God for their sins. Sinners have become saints, not always by slow progress, but sometimes suddenly. Religion has offered to men a peace which the world cannot give. Some with high moral character and no religion have had a profound feeling that they lacked something.

The insistence in the religions that religious values are the most important in history has not meant that they ruled out other kinds. It has been an error to represent Hinduism, Jainism and Buddhism as terrestrially pessimistic —
as sometimes has been done. For Hinduism the world is maya, illusory, if taken to be the sole reality and attention given entirely to it. But seen from the standpoint of religion it is also lila, joyous divine creation. The Hindu is taught to think of his history as in four stages. According to Hindu doctrines, the ideal life consists of four āśramas (life- stages): brahmacarya, the period of discipline and education; gṛhaṭha or the stage of a householder; vānaprastha or the stage of a forest-dweller and sannyāsa or the life of renunciation.

The first stage is the period of study and discipline. The student is required to stay in the house of his teacher, and learn the sciences and the arts. Under his guru (preceptor), he studies the sacred books and is at the service of the guru. Continence, frugality and discipline will make of the boy a study and energetic youth. Here is an extract from the programme to be followed:

"The Brahmācāri should abstain from wine, meat, perfumes, garlands, sweetmeats and women; he should not take acid food nor do harm to any living being. He must avoid lust, anger and greed. He should never strike anybody. Let him sleep alone in continence."48.

After completing the exposition of the Veda, the

teacher addresses the disciples thus: 'Speak the truth. Practise virtue. Do not neglect the Veda that has been studied. Let there be no neglect of welfare. Let there be no neglect of prosperity. Respect your mother, father, teacher and guest as god. Whatever deeds are blameless, be devoted to them; and not to others. Whatever good customs you find amongst us, they have to be adopted by you and not by others. Honour those who are great. Be charitable. If there be any doubt regarding rites or conduct, then look up to the lives of great men and follow their examples. This is the command. This is the teaching. This is the meaning of Veda.'

"The second stage is that of the grhastha (householder). Normally, when the period of studentship is over, one should marry and shoulder the responsibilities of life. Marriage is to be regarded as a sacrament and the wife as a life-mate in righteous living. The relation of Rāma and Sītā or Śāṅkī and Satyavān is to serve as the ideal for the householder. Hospitality, almsgiving, industry, truthfulness and fidelity to the ritual and social duties of the caste are the qualities of grhastha. In short, grhastha is the life of householder with the values of self-love, the care and love of children, work in the community, the enjoyment of cultural values and devotion to religion.

50. Ibid., p. 77.
The next stage is that of the vanaprastha (the stage of a forest-dweller). When parents grow old, when they are surrounded by grand-children, their normal duty is to retire from the world. Husband and wife together, or husband alone, leave the house and go to the forest where they spend their days in prayer, austerity and the performance of sacrifices. Henceforth he is to devote all his time to spiritual pursuits and undergo his second period of probation which prepares him for the final stage of sannyāsa.

The sannyāsin is the ideal man. He renounces all worldly cares in order that he may attain the supreme goal (mokṣa).

The four āśramas are intended for taking man to perfection by successive stages. In extraordinary cases, however, some of the stages may be omitted. Śuka was a born sannyāsin. Śāṅkara renounced from the stage of brahmacharya. When Buddha took to sannyāsa, he was a householder. Whether the progress be quick or slow, the goal should always be kept in view, viz., the attainment of spiritual perfection and freedom. Buddhists have devoted themselves to intellectual pursuits.

and to aesthetic achievements. There is a Buddhist saying that 'Samsara is nirvan' employing that the ideal of bliss and peace is to be sought within ordinary human activities and experiences.\(^{52}\)

Religious experience is an individual matter. Religious communities in which they may join in worship are composed of individuals. Such social groups come together at particular times and in particular places. Some individuals have religious experience in solitude, at any time and in any place. Religion has been — and is — significant in the histories of many individuals. Religious value-experiences constitute some of the meanings in history.\(^{53}\)

Thus from the above discussed values I conclude that there are five basic value-experiences in history: physical, intellectual, aesthetic, moral and religious that may be had by all individuals. There is a sixth class which many enjoy that we may describe as games and sports, using those terms in their most comprehensive sense. Sports and games of so many kinds have been — and are — parts of the lives of many individuals that they should be recognized as meanings in history.

The evils in history are just as real as the value-\(^{52}\) Widgery, Op.Cit., pp. 134-138.
\(^{53}\) Ibid., p. 137.
-experiences. Evils in history have all been particular, experienced by individuals singly or in association with others. They may be considered as of kinds similar to the basic value-experiences. Any attempt at an interpretation of history should give serious consideration to evils in it. Few theories of history do so. A general concept of evil is of no help in the consideration of history. Let me explain it in very brief in the following way.

Evils are experiences by individuals in their own times and places. They are not mere appearances. Some are privative — the lack of value-experiences, but not all. Some are due to the wrong use of freedom of the will; some to ignorance from neglect of the search for knowledge and some from happenings in Nature. The sufferings that come from these last may be regarded as means used by God to lead men to efforts towards a non-hedonist moral ideal of personal character and social affection. Any attempt at an interpretation of history should give serious consideration to evils in it. That we are primarily concerned with are the evils that affect the histories of individuals. A general concept of evil is of no help in the consideration of history. Corresponding with value-experiences — the main evils may be classed as physical, ignorance and errors, ugliness, immortality and irreligiosity. There are, of course, some
evils associated with the subsidiary class of humour, sports and games. There is the privative evil of a lack of a sense of humour. Evils in sports and games may sometimes be privative, but some are forms of immortality, as forms of cheating and gambling. Majority of mankind have been more concerned with the avoidance and the elimination of evils.

All evils with which we are concerned in history have been and are particular experiences of individual persons in specific times and places. Though many individuals in social groups may suffer similar ills, each has his own experience of them. Any statement as to a 'people' or a 'nation' suffering is only a facsimile of paragon. No sociological or cosmic ideas of evils can be rightly substituted for the evils of individuals.

Let us discuss first the evils caused by the Nature. There are evils that come from natural happenings, diseases, famines, tornadoes, typhoons, earthquakes which have caused deaths, pains, destructions of dwellings, libraries, art galleries, museums, schools, temples, churches and so on.

The theist accepts the view that the evils not caused by men may be caused by God in order to lead and educate them to values not merely hedonistic, but intellectual, aesthetic, moral and religious. Natural catastrophes on a large scale come as a shock to men.

Similarly, according to the oriental doctrine of karma, all the individual's sufferings, all the evils he experiences in his history depend on his own thoughts, feelings and conduct. As a man sows so shall he reap. There is no escape from the consequences of one's attitudes and acts. The doctrine of karma suggests a universal law of effects following causes in the histories of individuals similar that insisted on for Nature in much of modern natural science. The evils men experience are due to themselves; never fundamentally—however apparently—to others. But along with the doctrine of karma there is a belief in ways by which evils may be avoided. With the implication of the individual's free will, it is maintained that by changes in thoughts, feelings and acts, the individual may escape bad and achieve good consequences.

Fear has been an evil in history that has led to many other evils. It is a painful state of mind with thought of possible evil to come. It may be as bad or worse than evil if it comes. It is most often a sign of weakness of character or of mistaken ideas. Some maintain that it is basically due to lack of adequate trust in God, for it has been said that those who firmly trust God 'fear no man'. With that trust they are supposed to bear evils that come with fortitude.
The evils of robbery, rape and murder are too obvious to need any discussion.

In contemporary history divorce is definitely an evil, even if in some instances it is less than the evils there would be without it. The love between the sexes is not simply physical intercourse, it is an inner affection of person for person. That affection may be one of the very best of moral values. To find ways to lessen the evils of increasing divorce there must be reflection on its possible causes. One gets the impression that it is most frequent in the United States.

Slavery was an evil for long periods of history. In early times slaves were generally prisoners taken in war. During the feudal period in Europe many were in a condition of serfdom, analogous with slavery. Emancipated from slavery and serfdom, so many are today exploited in modern industry in a manner definitely restricting their opportunities for value-experiences which in other conditions they might enjoy. Automation may bring some relief to them if it is not used simply to enhance employers' gains.

Similarly, ignorance is a private evil in the realm of the intellect. Errors are positive evils. But recognizing errors as such as has been an initiation into efforts for truths. They are often caused because judgements are...
Loneliness is a privative evil, and it can be very distressing. It is caused by a lack of opportunities for the chief social moral value-experience, friendship and love. Though times of solitude are advantageous to all individuals, loneliness is definitely an evil.

Physical evils are those of the body whether from causes internal or external to it. Those individuals born deaf, dumb or blind may not fully appreciate their deprivations. Bodily defects acquired in life are privative but the sufferers are specifically aware of them as evils. Physical evils are experiences of individuals. They are all particulars with their own times and places. They may be of short, medium or long duration.

Some of the worst physical evils have been due to famines, which have been more devastating than war. Famines cannot be entirely eradicated, dependent as they are on natural factors beyond man's control. But in most countries their effects have been lessened by systems of irrigation and improved agriculture.

Another kind of evil is caused by war. Wars have been so distressing because they have caused so many evils of different kinds for so many individuals. There has been an almost inevitable tendency for people to think of all
the suffering and destruction of a war as appalling in its whole amount of evil. But no individual experiences such 'a whole amount of evil', and there is no 'social mind' to do so. Evils in wars are actually those experienced by individuals. Besides what comes specifically to themselves, individuals have sympathetic suffering with others, grief at the destruction of the means of intellectual and aesthetic enjoyment (as the devastation of art galleries and libraries). By wars many individuals suffer early death, others have to spend their later lives blind or with some other physical disability. By wars, wives have been deprived of their husbands and children of their fathers. By war, some peoples have been enslaved. Some aggressive wars have been due to a lust for power in a specific individuals, then shared by a minority of a people, and later by a majority with the idea of racial or nationalistic dominance. Thus we conclude that wars in general are evils. War robs many of value-experiences and leads many to suffer evils.

Similar kind of evil comes from the exercise of human freedom. Many exponents of what they call the orthodox Christian view of history have related it with a specific doctrine of evil: that of 'original sin', with the 'corrupt nature' of all human beings. "It is the

Christian claim that sin is an exercise of human freedom; it is not by nature but in freedom that men sin. The doctrine of evil is related with the idea that it was necessary for God to become incarnated in Jesus to save men from their corruption, which they cannot do for themselves.

From the above discussion I conclude that there are five basic value-experiences in history: physical, intellectual, aesthetic, moral and religious, that may be had by all individuals. There is a sixth class which many enjoy that we may describe as games and sports, using those terms in their most comprehensive sense.

Events in history have all been particulars, experienced by individuals singly or in association with others. They may be considered as of kinds similar to these five basic value-experiences. History being constituted of the related histories of individuals, it is maintained that it has meanings in the value-experiences of individuals. Admitting these value-experiences of individuals, Dilthey says that "these individuals have intrinsic value and experience things as valuable; they have purposes and perceive their lives as meaningful". Let us discuss here how awareness of meaning characterizes human life in general and provides the unifying framework of individual experience.

The historian must tell a meaningful story and the meaning with which he imbues his account is already present in human life. How does it arise and how can we know it? Dilthey planned his work as a continuation of the Kantian Critiques, a Critique of Historical Reason. He therefore formulated a question analogous to those at the beginning of each Kant’s Critiques and asked: How is meaningful experience possible? Dilthey’s epistemological position depends on the answer to this question.

Awareness of meaning characterizes human life in general and provides the unifying framework of individual experiences. This meaning is not constituted by reference to something transcendental but by relations within life. We can grasp these by unbiased attention to the concrete reality of our lives. There is, to start with, the temporal structure of our lives. What we experience is not time by the clock, not the succession of tiny unconnected units of time. Every moment carries with it some awareness of the past and an anticipation of the future. What we call the present is always something with a temporal structure of its own and filled with some content of thought, feeling, or desire. Thus lived time has already a distinctive quality. Mental life has also some inherent structures through which different types of mental operations are linked together;
sense impressions stir memories, memories awaken feelings, feelings arouse desires, desires may issue in actions. Acquired structures overlay the inherent one. When we talk about a person's love of music we are referring to moments of his life, to experiences and actions, which are singled out and linked to each other in some pattern. Thus, every experience contains a complex pattern. Take the example of listening to a piece of music. At any moment there must be awareness of the notes which have gone before and anticipation of those to come. There is enrichment of experience derived from previous hearings of the piece. There is an interlocking of sense experiences, thoughts, feelings, memories and, perhaps, desires. All this makes up the meaning of the experience.

We approach this meaning through what Dilthey calls the categories of life. By categories he means, by and large, the same as Kant did. They are the general forms of predications about life which, on the other hand, refer to what constitutes it as what it is and, on the other, provide the means of comprehending it. They are, though, and here Dilthey diverges from Kant, derived from experience itself and cannot therefore, be wholly formalized, nor exhaustively listed.

At times Dilthey talks of meaning as one of the
categories, namely the one through which the pattern of the past is reconstituted in memory. He then places this category of the past beside 'value' as the category of the present and 'purpose' as the category of the future and assumes that each of these categories, from a different point of view, organizes the whole of experience. I believe that it is a more consistent interpretation of Dilthey's final view to consider meaning as the master category which characterizes all human life and all the other categories as different ways in which this meaning is constituted. Meaning, value, purpose, development, ideal, are such categories. Meaning is the comprehensive category through which life becomes comprehensible.

To illustrate this point and to explain some of the terms which Dilthey uses I shall list some of these categories. Value — something is meaningful insofar as it is valued, that is, appreciated, loved, hated, resented, by a person. Purpose — something is meaningful insofar as it forms a person's goal or serves as a means to that goal. Part and whole — something is meaningful insofar as it is part of a pattern or a link in a chain. A whole, in turn, is meaningful in terms of the meaning of the parts. Inner and outer — something is meaningful insofar as it is the outer expression of some inner process, a thought, a feeling, or an act of will.
Formation — something is meaningful insofar as it embodies a shape, pattern or configuration.

Development — a course of events is meaningful insofar as the successive changes are cumulatively influenced by the previous ones.

Power — a situation is meaningful insofar as we affect it by our decisions and actions, or insofar as we are affected by forces outside us. In the studies of man this category is the equivalent of the category of causality, but the latter is, psychologically speaking, a derivation from, or abstraction of, the category of power.

Human experiences and, indeed, human lives, have concrete meaning in terms of these categories and, by means of them, this meaning can be recaptured.

Human life and history are meaningful. There is, indeed, nothing like the meaning of life or of history and, if there were it would not concern the historian in his research. But, on the other hand, there is — in a quite unmistakable way — meaning everywhere in life and it is with this kind of meaning that the historian, too, is concerned.

It is a matter of empirical fact and not of metaphysical speculation that we experience life in terms of

of patterns, connections and relationships which constitute
for us the meaning of our experiences and indeed of our lives.
Let us give a trivial example of how a human being always
finds himself in interpreted and meaningful situations. Take
a man sitting by the window of his drawing-room. The scent
of roses coming from the garden gives him a pleasure and thus
means something to him. It also means something to him
because of the effort he has put into buying and planting
these roses over the years. The size of the window which lets
in sufficient light has always irritated him and is, therefore,
significant to him. One of these days he will do something
about it. The day means something to him because it is his
wife’s birthday. As he thinks of her days of his life stand
out as meaningful turning points: the day they first met or
the day of their engagement and their wedding day. He sees
his brother entering the room and from his pinched appearance
concludes that he has a headache. He interprets it as the
after effects of influenza. He watches him opening the
sideboard and understands that he is looking for aspirins.
That his brother has a headache also means something to him;
it causes him anxiety and this anxiety prompts him to action,
perhaps to calling the doctor.

In this example we can distinguish different ways
in which our experience is organized. Firstly, we note
structural relations between our mental acts. Thoughts, for
instance, arouse feelings and feelings prompt resolutions. Secondly, we see ourselves in dynamic interaction with an environment which pleases or frustrates us and affects us, not only as detached observers, but as creatures who feel, evaluate, hope and strive. We, in turn, affect this environment in accordance with our plans and purposes. Thirdly, we perceive significant relationships within our experience. We recognize physical manifestations — pinched features and the opening of drawers as well as spoken or written words — as signs of mental states. We see things as parts of a whole or as means to an end. There are, of course, important differences between the different senses of 'meaning', between, for instance, 'what something means' and 'what something means to somebody'. These have to be analysed and discussed. But, together, they constitute the ways in which we experience the world as meaningful.

We have emphasized, to start with, the meaning things have for an individual and the way he appreciates meaning around him. But, of course, human beings are not just lonely Robinson Crusoes in the centre of worlds of their own. Human beings live in communities. On the basis of their capacity — for interpreting physical manifestations as signs men establish communication and, hence, a sphere of common meaning; language, religion, conventions, art and law. They
join in common actions and create institutions to serve common purposes. This organized and meaningful way of life is based on the individual's primary experience of meaning and, in turn, permeates and makes possible the meaning which his own experience has for him. Thus, from the life of an individual — indeed from anyone of his experiences — to the life of mankind there stretches a world of meaning.

This human world permeated with meaning is the subject matter of the human studies. In its temporal extension it is the subject of history. The special importance and unique position of history lies in the fact that this temporal extension is not an external and incidental feature super-added to the meaningful structure of life. All the meaning in human life is linked to its temporal structure. To a momentary consciousness unaware of past and future the world would not be meaningful at all. Man's past, present and future interlock at every moment of his life and every experience is meaningful to him in terms of these temporal dimensions. It is understood in terms of the past, the cumulative effects of which he selectively remembers. I would not recognize a rose if I had not encountered it before. I might not appreciate it if I had not become accustomed to its scent and the quality of my appreciation would not be what it is, if I did not recall episodes of my life associated with roses. It is enjoyed or suffered at the
moment and seen as helping or hindering plans or purposes projected into the future. These temporal structures of human life are essentially the same as those of the life of mankind in time with which history proper has to deal. For communities, too, experience their present in terms of the past, the recollection of which is preserved for them in tradition, and the future, in which collective purposes are to be realized. We may, therefore, say that human life, as such, has a historical character.

But they further restates eloquently his whole conception of history and takes issue with the problem of historical relativity. The subject matter of history is the life of mankind in time. The historical world is made up of individual human beings, their actions and productions. These individuals have intrinsic value and experience things as valuable; they have purposes and perceive their lives as meaningful. Because of this the historical world is teleological, permeated with values and meaningful. It is meaningful and, therefore, intelligible not because specific historical laws of change, development or progress can be detected in it, but because, throughout, the general laws of human nature apply and provide some principles of order and predictability. Nor does this present an absolute, unhistorical starting point. The epistemological circle which we have encountered before in the human studies.

applies here, too, for we know human nature from its historical manifestations.

Though concerned with the thoughts, feelings and purposes of human beings the historian need not rely on the uncertain tracing of hidden motives. These are often inaccessible to objective scrutiny and reliance on them would lead to historical scepticism. The historian can understand how human beings judged circumstances and interpreted their meaning and can appreciate — with a detachment gained from historical distance — what they valued because they have expressed themselves in scientific works, philosophic systems, literary productions and in the creation or maintenance of institutions. In their actions, too, their purposes are transparently clear. Finally, as the historian observes the unfolding of the consequences of an action beyond those intended by the actor, the action acquires new meaning for him. (His interpretation of the meaning of an action, though it may contain truth, cannot, therefore, at any point of time, be final and complete).

It was Dilthey's general philosophic conviction that we cannot go behind life but can only try to understand it from within. Consequently with this view he rejected the application of any metaphysical scaffolding to history. History, too, must be understood from within. All meaning,
all value, all purpose, in the historical world, is rooted in
the experience of individual human beings who lived at a
particular time and in particular circumstances. Admitting
value-experiences, Prof. Barlingay says, "We have forgotten
that man is the source and the measure of all values." This
raises the spectre of the historical relativity of all values
and beliefs. The very consciousness of the historical
relativity of all values represents the ultimate liberation of
the human mind from all dogmatic narrowness. Awareness of
different points of view widens our vision and the very fact
that every position taken up by man is conditioned by time
and place enables us to face new situations with free and
creative action. In fact, historical relativity is merely
the corollary of human freedom and creativeness. The
historian notes, as a fact, that, in all ages, human beings
have held some values to be absolute and considered some
religious or philosophic beliefs to be unconditionally true;
but he is not concerned with the validity of these claims.
He is aware of the variety of standards for which absolute
validity has been claimed in different ages and places,
observes the irreconcilable conflict between unconditionally
held beliefs even within one age and nation and has no
historical means of deciding between them. Even if he

CO, F.S. Barlingay, Experience and Reflection, the
Presidential Address delivered at the 54th Session
of All Indian Philosophical Congress held in Madras,
1979.
believes himself to be in possession of some absolute standard by means of which he could decide between all these conflicting claims, this would not help him as a historian. His task is to show how points of view, whether unconditionally valid or not, arose in particular historical circumstances and influenced the actions of those who accepted them.61

Thus from the above discussed facts it is well-known that all meaning, all value, in the historical world, is rooted in the experience of individual human beings. Thus life is the fullness, variety and interaction — within something continuous — experienced by individuals. Its subject matter is identical with history. At every point of history there is life. And history consists of life of every every kind in the most varied circumstances. History is merely life viewed in terms of the continuity of mankind as a whole.

Those individuals with their purposes and meaning, who, as intrinsic values, form life and history, are, above all, effective forces consciously animated by values, and relate themselves to the pragmatic value of things; they are, in fact, purposive. Thus the historical world is full of purposes, is seen purely as a manifold of forces — a purpose — filled world.62

62. Ibid., p. 163.