CONCLUSION
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Let us sum up by drawing the main lines of the thesis. In Chapter I it is shown that, with the introduction of the self-grounding notion of subjectivity instituted by Descartes and elaborated on in the thought of Kant, there has been a constant tension between the idea of subjectivity as self-positing and the givenness of the objects of experience as an index of the finitude of the subject. In our reflection on the *Critique of Pure Reason*, we have seen that the philosophy of Kant as a delicate balance between the self-positing activity of the subject and its receptivity, its finitude. This balance was shattered by the movement of German thought from critical philosophy to absolute idealism. The philosophy of Hegel can be viewed as the resolution of this tension. Hegel's most extravagant claim is that his philosophy is the completion of metaphysics. For us, following, Heidegger's completion means having "gone through the spheres of prefigured possibilities." It is also meant in the sense of running out of steam what Nietzsche evokes in his history of philosophy - How the true world became a myth.

Heidegger's work is crucial to understand this debate. As we have seen his relationship to the question of Otherness and Finitude is complex. The attempt was to show how Heidegger helps illuminate both the problems and the prospects. Now we can say...
that this dispute is best interpreted as one between who emphasises a responsibility to act and who emphasises a responsibility to otherness. The responsibility to act always requires at some point to fix or close down parameters of thought and to ignore particularity and differences among actors. With the notion of responsibility to Otherness, I mean to refer to a moral aesthetic sense that is tapped by Heideggerian philosophy. It refers to a need to be attentive to that which lies beyond the margins of our identity, our concepts and our projects. Especially important here is the appreciation of how the very processes of constructing identity, developing concepts and conceiving projects necessarily generate "Others". This distinction between two senses of responsibility can be seen most clearly in the controversies surrounding the work of Habermas on the one hand and Foucault on the other. But this attractiveness of Heidegger's thinking about responsibility to otherness is marred only by his failure to consider its implications. The two faces of everyday life are never articulated convincingly by Heidegger.

While Kant had attempted a fundamental thinking in terms of a Philosophy of limits, he had actually opened the way for a dialectics in which contradiction and totality came to be substituted for an interrogation of limits. But as we have seen, it is the questioning of limits that identifies what fundamental thinking for Foucault is. Thought finds itself within the space of a reality that is constituted for it in language and perceptual codes. Nevertheless, thought is precisely the power
to transgress these limits, to reflect outside of the structure within which a convergence of historical developments has placed it. At the same time, such thought is not autonomous, because it depends upon operating within a period in which a new structure of experience is beginning to emerge. Moreover, thinking as a thinking from without, as a Power of transgression has itself only been revealed in the wake of the event – the "death of God". This is the project of Nietzsche. In the excessive act of killing God, it is not God nor religion that is transgressed but the "limited and positivistic world", the world inscribed by discourse. This event has eliminated that "limit of the Limitless", within which western thought has been confined for centuries. In Chapter II we have seen for Foucault, the significance of this elimination is not to be understood as restoration, "but to world exposed by the experience of its limits, made and unmade by that excess which transgress it."

As we have seen in the Chapter III, this is the reason why Archaeology is conceived as the type of thinking that moves in the realm of exteriority and reveals historically constituted limits for thought. Since it inhabits a world that is linguistic, human reality is rooted in an "I speak" rather than in an "I think". This transition reflects a displacement of reality from an interiority that had been considered sovereign for the experience of thought to an exterior realm of language within which man and his thought are now dispersed. This realm of exteriority represents the necessity for thought to operate outside of a strictly Kantian framework. The strangeness of Foucault's
works on both madness and the clinic reflects the fundamental level of experience that his thinking is an attempt to reach.

In the chapter IV in our discussion of Raymond Roussel we have observed this possibility. The most fundamental discovery Foucault made in his reflection on literature was the autonomy that language possessed as the experience of the real. It is in the element of language that experience occurs and that speaking within language, it is always of language that we speak. In attributing this necessarily linguistic character to experience Foucault echoes the views of much twentieth century French literature. Raymond Roussel was among the first to recognise this autonomy of language. He developed techniques for communicating its ontological power. Foucault draws from it the essential implication it possesses for an understanding of the character of thought itself. Language lives by its death is excessive so that to contemplate or contesting its infinitude is impossible. Yet an escape route from such deliverance is continually present in the ongoing displacement of meaning. It signals the appearance of tropes and those constitutive gaps within which "all the forms of rhetoric come to life - the twists and turns ... Catachresis, metonymy, metaphor, hypallage and many other heiroglyphs drawn by the rotation of words into the voluminous mass of language" (PA: 15-16). Foucault has further elaborated this theme in a contemporary context in a discussion of paintings of Rene Magritte. The birth of this new space for thought makes its appearance only after a double death, that of God and of his
executioner, Man. As we have seen in the second chapter, Foucault’s Archaeology is an element of this culture and renewal of thinking.

What his theatre proposes is the dispersion of the subject (Chapter II). His Archaeology attempts to thematise, (a) the articulation of discontinuities and the differentiation of differences, (b) the analysis of transformations rather than the simple indication of changes, and (c) the description of the dispersion of the discontinuities themselves rather than their reduction to transcendental, unifying origin. Foucault’s rejection of consciousness as a transcendental origin of expressive speech allows him to treat every discourse as a purely material practice grounded in a historical a priori that forms its conditions of reality. Philosophy has consistently tried to elide the reality of discourse as a material event through the themes of the founding subject, an originating experience and universal mediation. Foucault’s Archaeology poses this problem by both criticising humanist intellectual history and at the same time distancing itself from the structuralist approaches. In short, the goal of the Archealogy is to establish a domain of investigation for the history of knowledges which Foucault calls discursive formations and practices. What relationship is presumed to obtain between discourse and language?

The discussion of third chapter was an attempt to map Foucault’s genealogies. Foucault’s genealogy or the history of the present owes much to his interpretation of Nietzsche.
Foucault's genealogy is interested in the generative process of modern forms of power, because it is situated in the present. It is neither a history of progress nor decay. The politically engaged nature of Foucaultian discourse does not answer the question why bio-power is uniquely dangerous, nor does it appear to provide a philosophical basis for political action and resistance.

Though we have seen that the Genealogy of power (Chapter III) is politically engaged this should not lead to the conclusion that it is aimed at revealing a "deep truth" about the operations of bio-power. Though Foucault occasionally lapses into the vocabulary of unmasking, he is explicit in his rejection of hermeneutics of suspicion. When hermeneutic interpretation seeks the truth of the operations of Power beneath surface practices, genealogy seeks in the surface practice themselves as the actual ways of power operates and affects us. For genealogy there is no appearance-reality distinction. The operations of bio-power are hidden in the transparency of surface practices themselves. Because the point genealogy asserts that there are no essences; one can look at how power actually functions in modern Carceral societies. This I take it as the thrust of Foucault's description of the genealogical mood as a "felicitous positivism".

The above description must be taken as a double protest: first, against the hermeneutics of suspicious and second against the idea that one can provide both an account of the actual
operations of Power and criteria for judging their legitimacy. Viewed in this purely "reactive" way, there is no consistency between genealogy as a "felicitous positivism" and genealogy as a politically engaged critique. The realisation that interpretation is an ungrounded act, does not mean that genealogical interpretation of power is arbitrary.

When in *Discipline and Punish* Foucault joined power and knowledge as "Power-Knowledge", his genealogy had clearly revealed a different set of relations between power and knowledge than our conventional understanding. Since the seventeenth century, power has been thought to figure its relation to knowledge in two ways: First, for Bacon, Power was the result of knowledge rightly conducted. This Baconian pragmatism became in the Enlightenment the defense of the idea of progress (the claim that the growth of scientific knowledge would yield the improvement of society). In post-seventeenth century epistemology and in political theory, analysis of power centered on the problem of legitimacy, grounding the exercise of power in theories of sovereignty, rights and law. Power-knowledge is a field of struggle which structures possible actions. It is this idea of power-knowledge as a field of struggle that is problematised in Foucault's reversal of the slogan that war is politics by other means. At this level, power-knowledge as a field of struggle is not offered as a theory of Power. Rather, it provides a "grid of analysis" through which the actual mechanisms, strategies and relations of power can be seen.
Foucault's account resists the idea that he is offering a general theory of power, if by that one means a unitary account.

By understanding power-knowledge as a field of struggles providing a grid of analysis for the actual ways power is deployed in our practices, the genealogy resists the imperialist temptation to re-colonise local and fragmentary knowledges into a theory of power. This grid of analysis can be constituted, however, only if it is first freed from the traditional notion that knowledge can exist only when the effects of power are suspended.

Power and knowledge are co-constituting. Knowledge cannot exist except through relations of power and power makes possible and produces regimes of truth. Power structures a domain of knowledge, at the same time the genealogical inquiry isolates areas as objects of knowledge, making them targets for the deployment of strategies of power. At the most general level, it demands a rejection of our conventional separation of the epistemological and political.

The result of conceiving power-knowledge as productive field of struggles that makes possible our actions and social relations and of collapsing the division between knowledge and power, is Foucault's greatest achievement.

In chapter IV we have seen that Foucault’s ethic proposes the wisdom of a disposition not only of certain systems of thought and action, but also of a muteness before our age's
indigenous suffering. If Archaeology became a provocative image for thought it was in part because there was the feeling that such a vision at least attempted to deal with the subterranean forces that erupted in our time. The practices of this ethic dispute the solidity of our neostalgia. Perhaps one of the greatest contributions of Foucault's work to contemporary culture is its encouragement to doubt the dramatic, comprehensive scenarios upon which we have been nurtured: history and politics as a contest between life and death, the appeal of revolutionary program for human liberation, the birth of scientific projects for human reform. In those intense pages of Discipline and Punish where he discusses plagues as both real and imaginary forms which give rise to dream of purification and the disciplinary programs which make them reality. There he again creates doubt regarding the naturalness of our intellectual and moral aspirations (DP: 197-200). We have seen that his quest entailed no search for a pure reason. There is neither stability nor purity in the emergence and activity of the thought which interested him. In this sense we can say that Foucault's work may be thought of as a reversal of Kant's great questions. His excursion into the putrid history of thought however did not lead him to a despair of philosophical thought.

His political dissent and his fabrication of instruments for others to speak was aimed at a culture that had been so deafened by its humanistic discourses.
The energy of his work reminds me far more of Alyosha’s reaction to the unexpected shocking purification of Father Zossima’s corpse in *The Brothers Karamazov*:

Alyosha stood, gazed out before him and then suddenly threw himself down on the earth. He did not know why he embraced it. He could not have told why he longed so irresistibly to kiss it, to kiss it. But he kissed it weeping and watering it with his tears and vowed passionately to love it, to love it forever and ever.²

Notes

1. Magritte’s painting is a depiction of a smoking pipe which bears at its base the legend “This is Not a Pipe”. The painted image of the pipe is not really a pipe. The demonstrative “This” in “This is Not a Pipe” is truncated in its syntactic-semantic failure. There can be no simple homology between painting and being. See TP, p. 20.