CHAPTER 2

FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY
A. ARCHAEOLOGY AND THE DOUBLES

In the first chapter we saw the need to clear away a number of obstacles from the path of analysis. A major consequence which follows from this modern stress on finitude is that it attempts to reinforce a view of infinity that is metaphysical. It demands a series of suspensions in order to free analysis from the fold of categories which work to unify the history of knowledges in terms of the human subject and the march of Reason. There are several parts to the task of explicating this sort of critique. In order to see how this analysis goes, let us look in more detail at The Order of Things.

From 16th to the 19th century, Foucault analyses the discursive formations operative in the domains of natural history, wealth and language. In the 16th century, the discursive formation that generates and limits intelligibility is that of Resemblance. Foucault writes:

The universe was folded in upon itself: The earth echoing the sky, faces seeing themselves reflected in the stars and plants holding within their stems the secrets that were of use to man (OT: 17).

Here the form of knowledge consists of a series of cross references of things to other things and of all things to their creator. The explanatory strategies based on this discursive formation are the various ways in which things can resemble one
another. The world is a book that must be read and interpreted. Knowledge is exegesis, beneath the manifest text there is a latent text that must be discussed. Beneath the diversity of empirical language there is a natural language in which things have their names. In *The Oder of Things*, Foucault presents no theory of transition from one discursive formation to another. He writes: "Perhaps it is not yet the time to pose this problem (OT:50). The theory of transition presents a delicate problem for Foucault. Because a theory of transition easily becomes a theory of unification in which dispersion and discontinuity are rendered merely phenomenal. In *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel clarifies the role of the philosophical observer, the "We" of the phenomenology. The process which is for "Consciousness a bacchanalian revel" becomes from the vantage point of the "We" a systematic progression. For the "we", the successive shapes of consciousness are the determinate negation of prior shapes and their sublation. This theory of transition is also a theory of unification. But Foucault does not wish to undermine dispersion and difference to constitute them as merely the "for consciousness" of what is "for us" a unified and teleological process. A position analogous to the "we" of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* does not exist in Foucaultian theatre. Nevertheless, there are clues for a theory of transition within his text. But the attempt here is not extrapolate from them. Instead we will follow his practice of a successive presentation of structures of discursive practice.

According to Foucault, classical thought, - the period from the seventeenth to the eighteenth century - is engendered by
he rejection of resemblance into a place of madness. He writes:

Don Quixote is a negative of the Renaissance world; writing has ceased to be the prose of the world; resemblances and signs have dissolved their former alliances; similitudes have become deceptive and merge upon the visionary or Madness. (OT: 47).

The madman is one "alienated in analogy". Descartes begins his Regulae thus "In a frequent habit when we discover several resemblances between two things, to attribute to both equally, even on points in which they are in reality different, that which we have recognised to be true of only one of them". (OT: 51). Classical thought is organised in terms of Representation. To know is no longer to discern a latent text beneath a manifest one. It is to form a representation of the world. To know is not to discover a hidden secret, it is to produce a representation by which one knows Nature. The activity of knowing involves the act of analysis and the ordering of elements in terms of identity and difference. This discursive formulation is dominated by the idea of general science of order. Foucault writes:

The activity of the mind .... on the contrary in discriminating, that is, in establishing their identities, then the inevitability of the connections with all the successive degrees of a series. In this sense, discrimination imposes upon comparison the primary and fundamental investigation of difference: providing oneself by intuition with a distinct representation of things and apprehending clearly the inevitable connection between one.
There is an attempt made to establish an ordered succession between beings.

According to Foucault, the mathematisation of Nature is not at the heart of classical episteme. It is one discursive strategy based on the project of establishing a general science of order. This project was pursued in areas in which mathematisation was minimal (for example: general grammar, natural history and the analysis of wealth). The system of representation is the product of thought. It is not natural. It is an achievement of knowledge. In this sense it is "arbitrary". He writes:

But this arbitrariness is also the grid of analysis and the combinative space through which nature is to posit itself as that which it is — at the level of primal combination, it is an attempt to discover the arbitrary language that will authorise the deployment of nature within its space (OT: 62).

The concept of representation which dominates the classical episteme is that of a representation which contains within itself its own character of representing. He writes:

The signifying idea becomes double, since superimposed upon the idea that is replacing another there is also the idea of its representative Power. (OT: 64).

The point here being that the sign or representation is not a bit of the empirical world which must be animated by a sense - giving act of a subject. The representation finds its
intelligibility within a self-referential system of
representation. At the same time, it is not a "mark" whose
significance lies in the "meaning-bestowing" act of a
Transcendental subject. The sign does not refer to a centered
subject. For the classical episteme the sign refers us to a
system of signs and in fact prevents a theory of signification.

Foucault writes:

If the sign is the pure and simple connection between
what signifies and what is signified, then the relation can
be established only within the general element of
representation: the signifying element and the signified
element are linked only in so far as the one actually
represents the other (OT: 67).

Here there is no reference to a subject for whom the sign
exists. It is only a reference to the totality of signs in which
context marked out by identity and difference. It receives its
sense only in such a context. This discursive formation is
dominated by the idea of a table. Here the elements are laid out
in an order ranging from the most simple to the most complex. In
the table an element has its significance in terms of its
difference from all the other elements in the system. Table is
just like a dictionary. Foucault argues that the classical
discourse on language, natural history and wealth is structured
by this conception of a general science of order.

For the present purpose here, the discussion is limited to
the discourse on wealth and its transformation into political
economy. The discourse on wealth operates from the sixteenth to
the nineteenth century on three successive discursive formations:
each form is structured in terms of the epistememe in which it is located.

In the sixteenth century the discourse on wealth takes the form of a reflection on the relationship between money and prices. This discourse and the conceptual strategies immanent in it are structured by the epistemic configuration. Here money represents prices. In order to accomplish this money must be composed of metals which are themselves precious. The precious metals become money simply being measured. This concept of price is structured by a view of a universe folded over upon itself. Foucault writes:

Between all the things that man may need or desire, and the glittering hidden veins where those metals grow in darkness, there is an absolute correspondence (OT:172).

The coming of the classical age, and with it the discursive formation characterised by the notion of representation and order erodes the epistemic basis on money and prices. The reference of prices and money to a hidden text perceivable from heaven is displaced by the function of money in exchange. Goods have value only with reference to one another. The important point to note is that the locus of value is transposed from the precious metals to the possibility of exchange. There is another site of the transformation of the locus of value. The ontology which is posed and necessitated by the classical episteme is one in which being is posed as radically continuous. Foucault writes:

The ordering of empiricity is thus linked to the ontology that characterises classical thought; indeed, from
the very outset, this thought exists within an ontology rendered transparent by the fact that being is offered to representation without interruption (OT: 206).

It is an ontology defined by the absence of nothingness in which being is spread out as to give itself to representation in a table composed by identity and difference. The event that will displace the classical episteme and generate new areas in which discourse will be possible in the coming of discontinuity. Being will double over on itself generating a vertical opening. It will contest the power of representation. A fissure will be introduced between surface and depth. What one is able to represent is merely the surface. In this new order of discourse there is constituted a new space. Foucault writes:

>The condition of these links resides henceforth outside representation, beyond its immediate visibility, in a sort of behind the scenes world even deeper and more dense than representation itself. ... Instead of being no more than the constancy that distributes their representations always in accordance with the same forms, they turn in upon themselves, posit their own volumes, and define for themselves an internal space which, to our representation, is on the exterior (OT: 239).

As intelligibility withdraws into an interior, a discourse is generated on the relationship between essence and appearance.

For Foucault, the erosion of the classical episteme within the discourse on wealth begins (but only begins) with Adam Smith. Smith introduces into the classical discourse the concept of
labour. In his work, this concept of labour operates within a representative discourse on wealth, and at the same time generates the beginning of a fissure which will collapse the classical discourse. "Labour", writes Smith, "is the real measure of the exchangeable value of commodities." (QT: 222-223). Wealth continues to be thought of as a representation. But what is represented is no longer other objects of desire but labour. Labour is an absolute or irreducible unity, for the measurement of wealth. However, this labour is conceived of as the hours spent, "the toil and trouble". Apart from the factors which determine the price of labour - the market, productivity of labour etc. "equal quantities of labour at all times and places may be said to be of equal value to the labourer" (QT: 223).

Foucault writes:

It is not because men have comparable desires, it is not because they experience the same hunger in their bodies, or because their hearts are all swayed by the same passions; it is because they are all subject to time, to toil, to weariness and in the last resort to death itself (QT: 225).

Beneath the domains in which labour can be represented as the source of value, there begins to emerge a figure: Man. Anthropology begins to constitute itself as the foundation of political economy. It is Ricardo who did this job. He radicalised Smith's displacement of the concept of labour. Foucault writes:

Value has ceased to be a sign; it has become a product. ... It is because any value, whatever it may be,
has its origin in labour (QT: 254).

Value is definitely removed from the realm of exchange and installed in the domains of production. Ricardo further deepens the founding relationship of economics on an historical anthropology of finitude. Labour is necessary because of the confrontation between biological need. Foucault writes:

Homo œconomicus is not the human being who represents his own needs to himself and the objects capable of satisfying them, he is the human being who spends, wears out and wastes his life in evading the imminence of death (QT: 257).

In Ricardo's theory of ground rent, we can observe one of the structures that for Foucault is constitutive of the modern episteme: the interrelationship between anthropology and history.

Man as finite being is menaced from the beginning with the possibility of not finding in his environment his means of subsistence. This threat generates labour. As the population increases the less fertile land must be put under cultivation. The difference between the productivity of the most fertile and the least fertile tracks of land constitutes ground rent. This ground rent continues to rise as the population grows. The result is increase in the price of food. Since wages are always held at subsistence level, industrial profits are decreased. This process continues until industrial profits are so low that wages begin to fall below subsistence level. At this point the population stops growing. As soon as more arid land is not put under cultivation, ground rent got stabilised. It ceases to force down industrial profits. Then the period of indefinite
stability started. Thus the original finitude of man in relation to Nature comes to its clear expression. Foucault writes:

We see what roles History and Anthropology are playing in relation to one another. History exists only in so far as man as a natural being is finite: a finitude that is prolonged far beyond the original limits of the species and its immediate bodily needs but that never ceases to accompany, at least in secret, the whole development of civilisations (OT: 259).

The anthropological conception of man dramatises and orchestrates history. The truth of History is anthropology. History unfolds itself to be annulled the emergence of an anthropological idea which originally constituted the conditions of its possibility. Foucault writes: "History will have led man to the truth that brings him to a halt, face to face with himself" (OT: 260). For the Foucault of The Order of Things, Marxism is but another variant generated from this discursive formation. He writes: "At the deepest level of western knowledge, Marxism introduced no real discontinuity" (OT : 281).

For Marx, History leads to the formation of the proletariat. However, the proletariat is not just a "limited class" with "limited interests", its interests are "human interests". The proletarian revolution is not simply an historical event. It is the dissolution of alienation and the appropriation of humanity by itself. It is the reemerging and restoration of the human essence. It is the end of history. Here as with Ricardo, anthropology is the truth of History. The position of Foucault with regard to Marx radically alters between the writing of The
Order of Things and The Archaeology of knowledge. In the Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault speaks of a "decentering operated by Marx." (AK: 13). In this later work, Foucault conceives of Marxism as a contestation of this discursive formation. Foucault writes:

What I desire - and it is here that my formulation has changed in the relation to the one you cited (i.e. AK) - is not so much the defalsification and restriction of a true Marx, but the unburdening and liberation of Marx in relation to party dogma which has constrained it, touched it and brandished it for so long (PPC: 45).

Foucault's claim is that each age has a distinctive sense of order that characterises how it investigates these areas. What Foucault wants to emphasise is that the emergence of the human sciences requires the particular constellation that makes up the empirical sciences. This constellation came into existence only during the 19th century.

According to Foucault, the undermining of difference and the search for historical continuity is the reverse side of a historical ontology based on the centrality of a subject. He writes:

Continuous history is the indispensable correlative of the founding function of the subject: the guarantee that every thing that has eluded him may be restored to him; the certainty that time will disperse nothing without restoring it in a reconstituted unity, the promise that one day the subject - in the form of historical consciousness - will
once again be able to appropriate, to bring back under his way, all those things that are kept at a distance by difference and find in them what might be called his abode. (AK: 12).

For Husserl, the continuity of history is based on the teleology of Reason and the movement of spirit as a process of "discovery and concealment." The moment of a "restoration" is a return to the life-world - the "things themselves" as a lost foundation. Foucault explicitly rejects this strategy. For him, an intelligible world is the product of an order that is generated by the practice of a discourse governed by laws. A return to the things in their "silence" prior to and founding discourse is impossible. Foucault writes:

What in short we wish to do is to dispense with things. To substitute for the enigmatic treasure of things anterior to discourse, the regular formation of objects that emerge only in discourse. (AK: 47).

Husserl's imperative return to the "things themselves" is of course not an invitation to simply gank at the things which happen to be around us. His attempt is to discover in their organisation the achievement of Transcendental subjectivity prior to mathematical or scientific calculation.

The decisive difference between the two philosophies is that for Foucault the "order of things" emerges from a discourse specific to a given historical epoch and not from the activity of a Transcendental subject.
Foucault begins *The Order of Things* with the impossible classification of animals from a piece by Jorge Luis Borges. The classification is impossible to think because a common site, an underlying principle of order is not discernible. He tells us that the uneasiness that the Borges piece provoked in him was the idea that these are orders of things which are radically irreducible. Foucault writes:

Things are laid, placed, arranged in sites so very different from one another that it is impossible to find a place of residence for them, to define a common locus beneath them all (OT: xvii - xviii).

For Foucault it is this impossibility which precludes a "primary of perception" or a return to the Lebenswelt.

Foucault's rejection of a philosophy of historical totality does not lead him to an empiricist historiography in which all intelligibility other than simple narration would be abandoned. Foucault tells us that he wishes to write a history of things said, an analysis of discourse. He proposed to analyse discourse in exteriority. He conceives discourse as an event, a movement and not as a trace. This discourse is irreducible. It is not a translation of an exterior trace of "operations or processes that take place elsewhere". Discourse is not exteriorization of an "internal" process. Foucault writes:

It refers neither to an individual subject nor to some kind of collective consciousness, nor to a transcendental subjectivity, but it is described as an anonymous field whose configuration defines the possible position of speaking subjects (AK : 122).
The unities through which Foucault's philosophy of history works are not the traces of syntehetic acts of a transcendental subject. It is the unities of discourse itself what Foucault calls discursive formations. The discursive formation is a positivity in the sense that it is not a trace or an expression. Foucault thus calls himself a positivist. For various types of reflective or transcendental philosophy positivism is a residual category for any form of thought not committed to the resolution of history into expression. Foucault writes:

We must grasp the statement in the exact specificity of its occurrence, determine its conditions of existence, fix at least its limits, establish its correlations with other statements that may be connected with it, and show what other forms of statements it excludes (AK: 28).

The discursive formation determines the conditions of existence for a particular discourse. It is not an "idea" in the Hegelian sense, an idea that expresses itself in all the different registers of a culture in a particular epoch. It is rather a space of discourse that permits certain things to be said: it defines the limits of the intelligible. He writes:

Whenever one can describe, between a number of statements, such a system of dispersion, whenever between objects, types of statements, concepts or thematic choices one can define a regularity (an order, correlations, positions and functioning, transformations), we will say, for the sake of convenience, that we are dealing with a discursive formation (AK: 30).
The discursive formation is not defined by the identity of an object spoken about. It is the very condition for the formulation of objects. The discursive formation is a space of discourse in which objects can be spoken of and in which this speech makes sense. It is organised in terms of the rules of discourse, rules which operate in the discourse itself. A discursive formation defines strategies - the possible modes of explanation that can operate within a discourse. He writes:

This dispersion can be described in its uniqueness if one is able to determine the specific rules in accordance with which its objects, statements, concepts and theoretical options have been formed if there really is a unity, it does not lie in the visible, horizontal coherence of the elements formed; it resides, well anterior to their formation in the system that makes possible and governs that formation (AK: 72).

The discursive formation is an historical a priori. It is not founded in the unity of a subject. It is an event of discourse itself.

Now let us turn to Foucault’s analysis of the emergence of man, the event that constitutes the threshold of our modernity. He writes: “Man appears in his ambiguous position as object of knowledge and as a subject that knows” (OT: 312). As we have seen in the case of political economy, the modern discursive formation withdraws intelligibility from the universal space of representation into a dimension of depth. What is given to representation is the surface and it is given for a subject, Man.

The representation is depicted as having within itself its own
power to represent. It precludes a theory of signification. It
does not refer us to a subject for whom this panorama unfolds.
Representation is transparent. It exists in the act of
constituting a picture or a table and not as an object for
itself. It is "the darkness of the theatre necessary for the
illumination of the stage."

B. ARCHAEOLOGY AND THE TRANSCENDENTAL PROBLEMATIC

Let us now reflect on Foucault's conception of this modern
discursive formation and its relation to phenomenology. We will
begin by briefly outlining the basic features of Husserl's
philosophy of History as it is found in Crisis. History as a
motif for philosophical reflection concerns Husserl only in his
later works. In his earlier works, history is not only absent
but appears to be in principle excluded. In his previous works,
Husserl in opposition to psychologism and historicism radically
distinguishes the "irreal" object of thought from the real act of
thinking. The ideal entity which is the object of thought is
distinguished from the real act of thinking. This is achieved
through its repeatability as opposed to the inherence of the real
act in an irrevocable temporal flow. The ideal object is not a
real part of the temporal acts that intend it. Hence the
impossibility of the reduction of logic to psychology. This is
the movement of the conflation of philosophy as a rigorous
science into philosophy as an expression of the "Zietgeist".

If in his early works a rejection of various forms of
objectivism (the reduction of the ideal to the real) leads Husserl
to the rejection of history, in his later works it is the
hegemony of objectivism which turns Husserl's thought in the
direction of history. Husserl perceives a crisis in the European
sciences and more generally in European humanity. The crisis is
not internal to the sciences. It concerns the exclusive
incarnation of rationality in the objective sciences. Moreover
it conceives the inability of these sciences to serve as the
foundation of a "philosophical culture". The crisis concerns
'what science in general had meant and could mean for human
existence".

Objectivism encloses the impulse, the telos of rationality
within the domain of the factual sciences. This presents two
dangers from Husserl's perspective. On the other hand, the
limiting of the domain of rationality to the field of objective
science. Its relevance for human existence is questionable.
Hence Husserl wishes to establish that the destiny of western man
is finalised in terms of a telos of rationality and to understand
the objective sciences as an achievement of subjectivity
elaborated on the basis of our experience of the "Lebenswelt".

In his writing on the origin of Greek Philosophy, Husserl
seeks the advent of a subjectivity which constitutes the
"eternal ideas". He seeks the origin of this subjective
achievement in a radically altered form of cultural life. He
writes:

Naturally the outbreak of the theoretical attitude like
everything that develops historically, has its factual
motivation in the concrete framework of historical
occurrence.
The "eternal ideas" are the corollary of a subjectivity which in Greece for the first time is liberated from practical, limited self-interests in the world characteristic of all natural world views. These limited, practical life interests are replaced by a will to Truth, an infinite and universal task to know the world as it is. Husserl writes:

Man becomes a non-participating spectator, surveyor of the world; he becomes a philosopher, or rather, from this point on his life becomes receptive to motivations which are possible only in this attitude, motivations for new sorts of goals for thought and methods through which, finally, philosophy comes to be and he becomes a philosopher. This task which organises the horizons of the theoretical attitude is infinite. It is that of a rational knowledge of the world as it is. The subjective attitude and the infinite task which is its corollary are for Husserl the telos of Western humanity. This theoretical attitude becomes the foundation of a culture which he argues, "henceforth must receive its norms not from the naive experience and tradition of everyday life but from objective truth."

The constitution of truth as universality necessarily implies this idealisation of experience. Because what is true is not this particular experience or its object but the ideal object intended by this experience. It is the subjective achievement of idealisation that makes possible the transition from measurement to mathematics in Greece. Geometry, as well as being the achievement of a subjective act is also a sedimentation of this
achievement. Later when Galileo proposes the mathe̊matisation of Nature he has no need to inquire into the origins of geometry. Nature itself being extended can be made intelligible by the acquired science of mathematics. However, not only Nature as extended but its qualitative aspects as well can be made intelligible through the same mathematical concepts. The sensible qualities (secondary qualities) are the subjective effects of the interaction of extended bodies in space. This causal relation can be expressed by the functional dependence of numbers. According to Husserl, Galileo's mathe̊matisation of Nature is not achieved without a price. He writes:

The surreptitious substitution of the mathematically substracted world of idealities for the only real world, the one that is actually given through perception, that is ever experienced and experiencable - our every day life-world. This substitution was promptly passed on to his successors, the physicists of all the succeeding centuries. According to Husserl, Galileo's failure to trace back geometry to the life-world, makes his work a "discovering and a concealing". This failure renders Galileo incapable of recognising the "objectively true nature" as a "well-fitted garb of ideas " fitted over the life-world. This objective nature comes to be regarded as True Being. In contrast the experienced life-world is seen as an effect of True Nature. It is the merely subjective appearance of True Being. For Husserl, this disjunction between the Lebenswelt and the world of scientific rationality and the disappearance of the life-world as a theme for systematic rational investigation sets the problem for all subsequent
philosophical investigation. It is the underlying problematic for modern philosophy.

The themes that dominate Husserl's philosophy of history are those of a return to origins and the reassertion of a teleology become obscure to itself. His goal is a reconciliation between man as transcendental subject and man as the object of empirical science. For Husserl, it is their disjunction which ultimately constitute the "Crisis".

Against the themes of teleology and a return to lost origins, Foucault's theatre proposes an intelligibility of history which is radically irreducible to a form of reflection. For the history of ideas, dispersion, difference and discontinuity appear as phenomenal expressions of a subject alienated from itself. Moreover, intelligibility is presented as the constitution of a secret and hidden continuity. For Foucault, difference and discontinuity are radically irreducible. Differences cannot be annulled merely phenomenal by discovering their hidden continuity through reference to an absolute centre. Foucault is attempting "to operate a decentering that leaves no privilege to any centre". (AK: 205). Representation exhausts and effaces itself in its production. Husserl, Heidegger and Sartre all have criticised Descartes for not having interrogated the mode of being of the cogito. Foucault argues that this interrogation is precluded by the classical episteme. Man is known through his life, his labour and his language. Nevertheless at the same time he is the condition of the possibility of that knowledge. The advent of man is co-extensive
with what Foucault calls an analytic of finitude. Man as subject, as point of convergence of all life, language and labour as the expressive subject that externalises himself in his labour and language. Foucault writes:

As soon as he thinks, merely unveils himself to his own eyes in the form of a being who is already in a necessarily subjacent density, in an irreducible continuity a living being, an instrument of production, a vehicle for words which exist before him (OT: 313).

This is not a finitude that is imposed from without a simple imitation. It is an essential finitude, in as much as the being who lives, speaks and labours is in principle only accessible through his expressions which necessarily transcend him and are intelligible only through him. Man is thus both the unconditional and the conditional. He is what Foucault calls an empirico-transcendental doublet. Man lends him to two types of analysis which Foucault calls quasi-analytic and quasi-dialectic. The analysis of analytic operates within the space of the body and discovers that knowledge has anatomo-physiological conditions. It discovers that there is a "nature of human knowledge" (OT: 319). The dialectic analysis discovers the historical conditions of knowledge, "that knowledge had historical, social or economic conditions and that it was not independent of the particular form they might take here or there" (OT: 319). This historical reflection functions as a critique, its role is to demystify the pretensions of the discourse to universality and to truth. According to Foucault, it is the status of this critical discourse which generated a
persistent contradiction within modern thought. How can one establish the truth of this critical discourse? He writes:

Either this true discourse finds its foundation and model in the empirical truth whose genesis in nature and in history it retraces, so that one has an analysis of the positive type (the truth of the object determines the truth of the discourse that describes its formation), or the true discourse anticipates the truth whose nature and history it defines, it sketches it out in advance and forments it from a distance, so that one has a discourse of the eschatological type (the truth of the philosophical discourse constitutes the truth in formation) (QT: 320).

Man, whose image dominates modern thought gives rise to a thought which is either of the order of reduction or of the order of promise. The modern discursive formation generates either a positivism which in principle stays on the "surface of things" or an eschatological thought which gets beyond appearance by the anticipation of the essence. It is the emergence of the truth from the merely factual. Foucault notes that the history of Marxism has vacillated between these two poles. We began the second section by juxtaposing phenomenology to Foucault's archaeology. For Foucault phenomenology is called forth as a contestation of the two poles of modern thought. Phenomenology would be a thought which is neither of the order of reduction nor of the order of promise. Its pivotal point is the analysis of actual experience. Foucault writes:

Nevertheless the analysis of actual experience is a discourse of mixed nature, it is directed to a specific yet
ambiguous stratum, concrete enough for it to be possible to apply to it a meticulous and descriptive language, yet sufficiently removed from the positivity of things for it to be possible, from the starting point, to escape from that naivete, to contest it and seek foundations for it (OT: 321).

According to Foucault, the modern episteme is defined by the relationship between the empirical and the transcendental, the cogito and the unthought, the origin and the return. For Foucault the most important concept in these themes is that of the "and". It is in the "and" that the modern episteme resides. He writes:

> Identity separated from itself by a distance which in one sense is interior to it, but in another, constitutes it, and repetition which posits identity as a datum, but in the form of distance are without doubt at the heart of modern thought ... (OT: 340).

Modern thought is a thought of the Same revealing itself across Distance. For Foucault it is man, composed of the empirical and the transcendental who introduces this distance across which the Same reveals itself. According to Foucault phenomenology vacillates between the poles united in this "and" of modern thought: the formal and the material, the original and the teleological. For him the true contestation would be to pose the question: Does man exist?

C. THE DEATH OF GOD AND NIETZSCHE'S PHILOSOPHY

It is Nietzsche who did this work. Nietzsche's philosophy posits both the promise and task of a post anthropological future. What Nietzsche attacks is what these philosophers
believe in. Posed in this way, the problem becomes one of tactics. It can be said that Nietzsche's thought of the Eternal Return is a tactical as well as descriptive mechanism. His ultimate goal was of course the "revaluation of all value". In the Will to Power and the Eternal Return he had "found" the way to achieve this. They can provide the basis for a rigorous discursive system. It is analytic as well as speculative, theoretical as well as practical set one without an a priori dependence on presupposed identities. Hence it is possible to effect a critique of traditional metaphysics from a position that is neither inside nor outside that neither accepts the presuppositions passed on to it nor posits itself as Negative. Then the task is to "break dangerous alliances".

Through deletion, misconstruction and faulty analysis Nietzsche's writings have been used to support numerous positions with which they have no affinity. In Nietzsche's estimation, philosophy ought not be the dogmatic application of immutable concepts ("concept mummies"). Rather the philosophical act can be compared to dancing. Then it needs "pliable concepts" that permit this mobility. By assuming this perspective we could never construe will as having anything at all to do with the "free will" that philosophers talk about. We could never consider Superman as something which would evolve from the "progress" of society. But in a larger sense we are able to develop and project Nietzsche's philosophy into new ways of thinking. For Nietzsche, philosophy is indeed the creation of new values but more than that it is never complete. It is a philology which would never be absolutely fixed. By projecting
Nietzsche's philosophy we can enter this interpretive process. Philosophy and thought must be aggressive, dramatically and forcefully opposed to the "other" philosophy.

Nietzsche's philosophy is both critical and genealogical. These aspects are interwined in both terminology and evaluation. The Will to Power is the basis upon which Nietzsche's critique of values is built. "This world is Will to Power - and nothing besides". The will to power is the mode of being of the Eternal Return, the means by which all previous identities are abolished and dissolved. Functioning through the Will to Power, the Eternal Return produces Superman, "The supreme type of all beings". To grasp the idea of the Eternal Return, we must initially take into consideration two basic facets of Nietzsche's thought. They are what may be called Nietzsche's world-view and his method of "dramatisation". In the final apprehension of The Will to Power, Nietzsche tells what he thinks of the world, he shows it to us in his "Mirror". We see a "monster of energy", "enclosed by nothingness" as a boundary, composed of forces "through out as a play of forces and waves of forces at the same time one and many". It is "eternally changing" and eternally recurring, " a sea of forces". But most important is his "Dionusion world of the eternally self-creating", a world with the "joy of the circle as its only goal". To Nietzsche, "you yourselves are also this will to Power - and nothing more ".

Two words may be used to describe this world : Chaos and multiplicity, ideas whose origin can be seen in the pre-Socratic Greeks 18. As Deleuze points out for Nietzsche Heraclitus is the
tragic thinker. The relationship between Anaximander and Heraclitus represents a determining experience for Nietzsche. Anaximander begins with the infinite or indefinite and encounters a world of chaos of becoming and of injustice. For him, the mere life of any organism is a crime that has to be atoned for. The existence of this plurality becomes a moral phenomenon for Anaximander. He remained within the deep shadows like a giant spectre were lying on the mountain range of such a world perception. Anaximander's problem of plurality and becoming needed to be illuminated by the "divine flash of lightning" of Heraclitus. Nietzsche says that Heraclitus teaches the eternal and exclusive Becoming, the total instability of all reality and actuality which continually works and becomes neueris. Heraclitus does not seek a world of unity as Anaximander sought behind "the fluttering veil of plurality." He conceived "a world of eternal and essential pluralities". For Heraclitus as for Nietzsche, as Deleuze points out: "Multiplicity is the affirmation of unity; becoming is the affirmation of being. The affirmation of becoming is itself being, the affirmation of multiplicity is itself one. Multiple affirmation is the way in which the one affirms itself. The one is the many, unity is multiplicity."  

The Eternal Return then grows out of Nietzsche's consideration of all life as will to Power and multiplicity. Nietzsche writes:

"My hypothesis: the subject as multiplicity."

But within the limits of multiplicity, life has another aspect
that is essential to philosophy. It is the unity of thought and life. Nietzsche's idea is to affirm becoming and multiplicity. And it is the implications of multiplicity that constitute the basis of Nietzsche's method of dramatisation. Nietzsche writes:

The evolution of a thing, a custom, an organ is thus not by no means its progression towards a goal, even less a logical profession by the shortest route and with the smallest expenditure of force - but a succession of more or less profound, more or less mutually independent process of subduing, plus the resistances they encounter, the attempts at transformation for the purpose of defense and reaction and the results of successful counteractions. 15

Meaning is fluid because a thing or its evolution does not have one meaning. It has as many as there are forces capable of affecting and controlling it. Deleuze comments:

A phenomenon is not an appearance or even an apparition but a sign, a symptom which finds its meaning in an existing force. 16

In history, it is not great events which demand investigation but the silent workings of forces which by their very nature exist in multiplicity. Nietzsche writes:

Freedom, you all most like to bellow, but I have unlearned belief in great events whenever there is much bellowing and smoke about them. And believe me, friend infernal racket! The great events - they are not our noisiest but our stillest hours. The world revolves, not around the inventors of new noises, but around the inventors of new values, it revolves inaudibly. 17
Dealing with multiplicity, force and the relationship between forces is precisely Nietzsche's method of dramatisation. This is why the notions of struggle, war, rivalry or comparison are foreign to Nietzsche and to his conception of the Will to Power. The evidence of this can be seen in an aphorism in *The Twilight of the Idols*: "The real world - an idea no longer of any use, not even a duty any longer - an idea grown useless, superfluous, consequently a refuted idea: let us abolish it!"

The world becomes a "fable". "Fable" signifies something which is told and which only exists in the telling. The world is something which tells itself, an event told as a story and thus an interpretation. For Nietzsche, religion, art, science and history are many variants of the fable. We cannot hope to relate forces to an external ordering process, such as Evolution, History or God. It is not possible to establish their correct place in such an order, for the world is chaos. Order is established through the creative will. But it is a fluid, plastic order, the order of the Will to Power.

Nietzsche's method of dramatisation is at the root of much of the contradiction that so many commentators find in his writings. If we read Nietzsche's texts in terms of truth, they will be misinterpreted. For Nietzsche, the philosopher is someone who determines and formalises values and the "workers in philosophy" must not be mistaken for philosophers. True philosophers are "commanders and law givers" (legislators) and "they grasp at the future with a creative hand, and whatever is and was, becomes for them thereby a means, an instrument and a hammer."
As stated above, the Will to Power is the mode of being of the Eternal Return. Will to Power does not and cannot mean wanting Power or desiring to dominate. The desire to dominate, according to Nietzsche, is "the wicked fly seated upon the vainest peoples; the mocker of all uncertain virtue, which rides upon every horse and every pride." If Zarathustra were to heal the cripples and the blind as the hunchback requests, they would be like all other men. For Zarathustra, "The present and the past upon the earth - alas! my friends - that is my most intolerable burden; and I should not know how to live, if I were not a seer of that which must come."

In order for Power to be something desired or pursued it must be represented and representable. It must be what society considers Power to be and defined in society's terms. But the "masters of the present" are what the Superman must overcome, including the values that society has created for itself.

The conception of Power as represented by Society is unacceptable. Because it is society that represents it and because of the fact that it is represented at all. In a world of chaos where "I" is only an artifice and a grammatical necessity, it is impossible to conceive of a One. Because any "thing" or "event" presents a multiplicity of meanings. To reduce it to a representable One is an artifice. This results from our desire to establish order in the world. As Zarathustra says: "I call it evil and misanthropic, all this teaching about the One and the perfect and the unmoved and the sufficient and the intransitory. All that is intransitory - that is but an image! And the poets lie too much."
In addition to avoiding misconceptions about Power, we must also avoid those that concern Will. The concept must be freed from any relationship to a unitary, causal X Schopenhauerian Will. Nietzsche chastises his "educator" for doing what other philosophers had done: "he seems to have adopted a popular prejudice and exaggerated it." And the popular prejudice is to assume the unity of will and the parallel assumption of a causal relationship between willing and acting. According to Nietzsche, the fault in this reasoning is that will can only act on will not "matter" Deleuze writes:

Nietzsche's break with Schopenhauer rests on one precise point; it is a matter of knowing whether the will is unitary or multiple... Nietzsche discovers what seems to him the authentically Schopenhauerian mystification; when we posit the unity, the identity, of the Will we must necessarily repudiate the Will itself.23

To arrive at a conception of Will and therefore of Will to Power, we must begin with force. Force is only exerted on another force and it is called Will. Then the real problem is not in the relationship between willing and the involunatry but in that of a Will that commands and a will that obeys. At the same time, we cannot reduce a situation to the original will. To do so means to exclude the other Will, the one that obeys. Nietzsche writes:

The question 'what is that'? is an imposition of meaning from some other viewpoint. "Essence", the essential nature, is something perspective and already presupposes a multiplicity. At the bottom of it there At
the bottom of it there always lies what is that for me? (for us, for all that lives, etc.).

What results is something indeterminate. What results is two quantities acting on one another. To move from the hypothetical into reality, we need only to remember what Zarathustra says about force, "wherever there is force number will become mistress: she has more force". It is the multiplicity of force in its relationships that permits the investigation of the quality in a relationship and thereby the establishment of value. Deleuze writes:

The sense of something in its relation to the force which takes possession of it, the value of something is the hierarchy of forces which are expressed in it as a complex phenomenon.

At the origin, then, force is difference: difference from itself. It is becoming but not becoming something. They are different from other forces. As distinct entities within the multiple they cannot be identical. Nietzsche writes:

Duration, identity with itself, being are inherent neither in that which is called subject nor in that which is called object: they are complexes of events apparently durable in comparison with other complexes.

Force can only act on force and to desire to impose the categories of subject and object is a regression to the conception of a unitary efficient Will and its implicit moral indegement. To move 'beyond good and evil", we must consider force in its essential relationships, in its difference. It is the difference in force at the origin that permits the assignment
of value generated by the hierarchy of forces. And this comes from the most basic observation that can be made about force: that "force either commands or obeys". According to Nietzsche, force that commands is active and force that obeys is reactive. What is more important for the Eternal Return is the effect of active and reactive forces. What they become is more significant. The indeterminate relationship between active and reactive forces produces either a dangerous or a joyous situation. The nature of active force is to affirm difference and distance. Reactive force begins by denying that which it is not. Nietzsche writes:

While every noble morality from the outset says No to what is outside, what is different, what is not itself; and this No is its creative deed.  

The interplay between active/reactive, affirmation/negation forms the basis for the Will to Power. Just as active and reactive designate the original qualities of force, affirmation/negation designate the primordial qualities of the Will to Power.

Force is "victorious" for it is what can be analysed and what will permit the revaluation of all values. Its "essence" is acting on other forces: as such it is called Will. At the same time, force is not identical to Will. In its essential relationships, force is indeterminate and needs completion by an inner Will. Moreover, Will does not desire any represented power of the "now". What it desires "insatiably" is to manifest its own Power. Therefore, Power must be one that is internally generated and externally conquering. Nietzsche writes:

The victorious concept of "force" by means of which
our physicists have created God and the world still needs to be completed: an inner Will must be ascribed to it, which I designate as Will to Power i.e. an unsatiable desire to manifest Power.  

In this conception of Will to Power is related to the passage of time, then it is the principle of a synthesis. The principle has two aspects which relate to the nature of "force-in-relationships". Force is essentially a difference in quantity with other forces and the relative difference expresses itself as the quality of force. Thus the principle must generate the difference in the quantity of "force-in-relationships" as well as the manifested quality of each force. The Will to Power must be both "differential and genetic."

The Will does not desire Power. Power is what wills in the Will. The Will to Power is to use Deleuze's words, the genetic and differential principle by which the world functions. It exists as the internal element which makes the concept of force "victorious". Nietzsche compares it to the driving principle behind evolution:

One cannot discover the cause of there being any evolution at all by studying evolution, one should not wish to think of it as becoming, even less as having become - the Will to Power cannot have become. Nietzsche's philosophy of Will overcomes and destroys earlier metaphysics. The major difference between previous conceptions of Will and Nietzsche's is that the former thought of assuming established values while Nietzsche conceives that Willing is
producing new values. The Will to Power desires only forces in
relationship which it determines and by which at the same time it
is itself determined. In the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche
writes:

We need a critique of moral values the value of
these values themselves must first be called in question. The masks that morality has assumed must be torn away in order to
get at the value of values. For Nietzsche, the only way to
uncover the value of values is by a pluralistic typology. It is a
way of an analysis and classification of forces into the types of
active and reactive and of Wills to Power into the types of
affirmative and negative. It is precisely the question why
affirmation is better and more valuable that relates Will to
Power to the Eternal Return.

As with the Will to Power it must be stated initially what
the Eternal Return is not. It is not the eternal return of the
same. It is not mechanistic and circular. The Eternal Return
does not imply identity or unity as would the return of the same.
The mechanistic interpretation conditions only a final state.
Nietzsche writes:

This conception is not simply a mechanistic
conception, for if it were that, it would not condition an
infinite recurrence of identical cases, but a final state.
Because the world has not reached this, mechanistic theory
must be considered an imperfect and merely provisional
hypothesis.

Moreover, considering the eternity of time past, if a state of
equilibrium, a final state or a state of identity could have been
reached it would have long since been achieved. The problem of Eternal Return has nothing to do with being and nothingness. It is a function of becoming and multiplicity. The Eternal Return must be thought of as a synthesis. The Will to Power is the principle of a synthesis and that synthesis is the Eternal Return.

In the consideration of the Eternal Return, the impossibility of conceiving of any one moment of being is multiplied by the passage of time. If there ever were such a thing as pure present without its synthetic relationship with both past and future, time would stop. But time does not stop. No more can we think a moment of pure present than a moment of pure being. For Nietzsche, the question of how becoming could have started and what it is becoming are false problems. Thus in the Eternal Return, there can be no return of Being, Identity and One. Just as the Will to Power produces it, the Eternal Return is an affirmation. Nietzsche writes:

One cannot explain pressure and stress themselves, one cannot get free of "actio in distans" (action at a distance): - one has lost the belief in being able to explain at all, and admits with a wry expressions that description and not explanation is all that is possible.

According to Nietzsche, what is designated by the Eternal Return is the fact of returning of the dynamic differing of forces.

The Eternal Return as a physical doctrine can be seen in the Will to Power. It is based on Nietzsche's consideration of the world as a finite quantity of force: "We forbid ourselves the
concept of an infinite force as incompatible with the concept of force. Remaining within the limits of the physical world, we do not know of any infinite. We cannot conceive of one too. Thus in an infinite amount of time, a finite number of finite forces will and must return to the same configuration. Moreover, they must return an infinite number of times also. For Nietzsche, at any moment there is a finite number of configurations of force. They cannot be destroyed, only altered. In an infinite time, they must return to the same configurations.

It is important to note that the Eternal Return has not been completely elaborated by Nietzsche when his work was abruptly stopped in Jurin. Zarathustra contains Nietzsche's exposition of the idea generally.

It is in the Third Book that the Eternal Return is first seen, "Of the Vision and the Riddle". It is presented as a dream and a riddle of "the bold ventures and adventurers" of "dreadful seas", those who have no wish to "feel for a rope with cowardly hand ", those who prefer guessing to calculate. The Eternal Return then is immediately concerned with the problems of creation. Its interpretation is to be created by explorers by those who will not seek any thread out of the Labyrinth.

The confrontation between Zarathustra and the dwarf culminates at the gate of "Moment", where two eternal paths of past and future meet. For the dwarf, time itself is a circle and therefore his eternal return is a circle as well. At the Gate of Moment, Zarathustra realises the necessity of the Eternal Return. The spider crawling slowly in the moonlight. Then suddenly the
Just as the howling of a dog arouses pity in Zarathustra. But two things have happened that radically alter the situation. First, at the Gate of Moment, the dwarf and spider have all disappeared. Time has passed but there is no distinction between past, present and future. The three flow together to return and to return as the black snake in the mouth of the young Shepherd. Secondly, the howling of the dog does not merely return as howling but as crying. It is a difference in quality, not type. When Zarathustra sees the Shepherd lying in the moonlight with the snake in his mouth, he sees more “disgust and pallid horror”. But the sight inspires disgust and pallid horror in Zarathustra as well. He attempts to save the Shepherd. Nietzsche writes:

My hands tugged and tugged at the Snake—in vain! They could not tug the Snake out of the Shepherd’s throat. Then a voice cried from me: Bite! Bite! Its head off! Bite!—thus a voice cried from me, my horror, my hate, my disgust, my pity, all my good and evil cried out of me with a single cry.

This first encounter with the Eternal Return evidences an aspect of the idea that is absolutely essential. The direct Willed action by Zarathustra has no effect on the Snake. This can be seen as a subtle refutation of the idea that “willing suffices for action” and of the belief in a unitary causal will. This attempt to tear the Snake from the Shepherd’s throat is also the only action that can be seen to originate in a “person” called Zarathustra. What cries out is a fragmentation of Zarathustra that is affirmed in a single cry. Zarathustra literally goes “Beyond good and evil” in the experience of the
Eternal Return. Moreover, this one cry which affirms the multiple is effective in the production of someone that is "no longer Shepherd, no longer human—one changed, radiant, laughing: Ubermenseh). The only way to pass beyond good and evil, the only one which is an affirmation of the multiple and only production of superman are within the terrifying ordeal of the Eternal Return. The most terrifying aspect is that the artificial concepts of "Ego" and "I" cannot survive the ordeal.

Here we can see the close and important relationship between the experience of the Eternal Return and the death of God. The death of God makes the Eternal Return possible by freeing man from the hold of "Ich", be it the conscious "Ego" or a grammatical "I". Then there is a God which guarantees the identity of the responsible self. According to Nietzsche, man was made responsible for "himself". Nietzsche writes:

They wanted to create for themselves a right to take revenge - they wanted to create a right for God to take revenge. To this end man was conceived of as free, to this end, every action had to be conceived of as willed, the origin of every action as conscious.

Even when God is removed, man is made responsible to society, to himself. Nietzsche writes:

That no one has given man his qualities, neither God nor Society, nor his parents and ancestors nor he himself—that no one is to blame for him.

But keeping God's place after He is gone can even be seen in "atheistic " existentialist thought. But what is more important for the Eternal Return is that "Ich " cannot survive. The
question arises then is that whether there is an identification of self within the circle of the Eternal Return? In as much as the Eternal Return must be willed, it demands a subject. But it is a subject that wills all previous possibilities. Nietzsche himself addresses this question in a later chapter. He writes:

The man of whom you are weary, the little man, recurs eternally—thus my sadness yawned and dragged its feet and could not fall asleep. It was the return of everyone that caused Zarathustra's disgust. But Zarathustra is recovering from the damage caused by that Return. Something has happened which permits his convalescence something with far greater implications than a mere resignation to the return of "All". But something happens which permits him to become a convalescent. In creating the progression, Nietzsche dramatises Zarathustra's learning that the Eternal Return is selection. In the selectivity of the Eternal Return, Being is no longer equated with identity. Because "forces exist in more or less durable complexes". Then they have a certain affinity with one another.

But in returning, complexes attain an affinity which is difference. This difference affirms both distance and becoming. This affinity overflows the traditional concept of Being. But the Returning is the only being of that which is becoming.

The problem lies in the fact that we are no longer at the origin. It is no longer simply a question of revealing active and reactive forces. The task is that we are confronted with the development of the inversion of values. This is what we call
history. Nietzsche's revaluation of all values is not merely a "change in values but a change in the element from which the value of values is derived" with the inversion at the origin, the alliance between negative forces and reaction produces a negating, nihilistic Will to Power. This Will to Power is the target of transmutation. It cannot be destroyed by a half-hearted effort analogous to "half-hearted willing". It is more than a quality of the will to Power. And the thought of the Eternal Return makes us aware of an unknown face of the Will to Power. The Eternal Return is a mode of thought for a world where 'Ich' does not exist. Multiplicity is a rule and force is the measurable quantity. With no God to guarantee the unity, coherence and responsibility of Self another basis is needed in the search for truth. Nietzsche writes:

Truth is therefore not something there, that might be found or discovered—but something that must be created and that gives a name to a process or rather to a will to overcome that has in itself no end—introducing truth as a processes in infinitness, an active determining—not a becoming conscious of something that is in itself firm and determined. It is a word for the Will to Power. 

The new "truth", the truth of the Will to Power will be created through the Eternal Return. In its more intense form, the Eternal Return operates as a selective being, creating a being that is a complex of forces. It expels from itself all that cannot be affirmed. It is a mode of thought that does not think Image but rather thinks Difference. It marks a revolution in thought. This fiction is dynamic. Fiction, says Foucault, does
not exist as a description of things from a distance. The
distance and presence appear in the simulacrum of language.
Language can then pass indifferently through any prose, poetry,
new and "reflection".

D. FOUCAL'T'S ARCHAEOLOGY

It is in this context that Michel Foucault's theatre of
thought occupies a unique position. In his theatre of thought an
analytic of finitude is articulated coextensively with an
archaeology of difference. The result is that thought and action
are deracinated from their binary parameters to make way for a
very different sense of epistemological practice.

By interrogating the very logic of naming and representation,
the archaeological event inaugurates reality as maverick, local,
regional and discontinuous. By insisting that perspectivity is
reality / language it scorns philosophic language that operates
in the name of identity, generality, theory and theological
model of history. The radicality of archaeological event cannot
be accounted from the point of view of structure conceived as
plenitude. Foucault writes:

I would really like to have slipped imperceptibly into
this lecture, as into all others I shall be delivering,
perhaps over the years ahead. I would have preferred to be
enveloped in words, borne way beyond all possible
beginnings. At the moment of speaking, I would like to have
perceived a nameless voice, long preceding me, leaving me
merely to enmesh myself, when no one was looking, in its
interstices as if it has paused an instant, in suspense, to
beckon to me. There would have been no beginnings: instead, speech would proceed from me, while I stood in its path—a slender gap—the point of its possible disappearance.

(AK: 215).

Both Foucault and Beckett problematise the nexus that holds language and identity together. Foucault’s theatrical disclaimer of his self and Molloy’s obsessive pathological preoccupation with then embodiment of the self in language are indications in this direction. They attempted to show the failure of ontology that relies on the one hand on the “numinousness of Being” and the sheer transparency of language as the signifier. Both are aware of the autonomous materiality of discourse and its “refractoriness” to predetermined notions of “meaning and design”.

Foucault writes:

Behind me, I should like to have heard the voice of Molloy, beginning to speak thus: I must go on; I can’t go on; I must go on; I must say words as long as there are words, I must say them until they find me, until they say me, heavy burden, heavy sin, I must go on; may be it’s been done already; may be they have already said to me, may be they have already borne to me to the threshold of my story, right to the door opening on to my story; I did be surprised if it opened (AK: 215).

In the very process of abandonment, Foucaultian discourse revitalises language and its capacity for a differential proliferation. In this context, the loss of the Self is in fact a celebration. It is a daring invitation to give up the
Foucault's most telling invention is that there is no self without language. The Self exists only as a creation and function of language. The traditional speaker expresses his/her self through language only because his/her self exists above and before language. In his/her perspective, language is that docile servant who can always be relied upon to effect the identity of the Self with the very being of language. Language cannot turn against or destroy the self. Because the self as identity is a first principle whose legitimacy may not be questioned. In contrast to this notion of the Self, the self in Foucault's address is: "Shy, Self-effacing and inordinately available" to the open endedness of discourse. What happens in Foucault's context is the reverse of the traditional domination of speech by Speaker. According to Foucault, a Philosophy that celebrates the Self and a thinking that enables the free disposition of discourse are mutually exclusive. It is intrinsic to the self to want control over the operations of language. According to this representational definition of language an immutable "being" is attributed to language. The being of language and the identity of the Self are co-axial. Hence, the former cannot isolate the latter. It is no wonder then that Foucault prefers the term "discourse" to the conventional term "language".

Discourses are active and diachronic formations within specific conjectures. They are susceptible to institutionalisation and ideologisation. In contrast language is
a metaphysical construct that is ontologically and transcendentally oriented. The main thrust of Foucault's discourse is to elucidate and elaborate the political connection between the users and the constraints of discourse.

Foucault's reference to Molloy is not a dramatic utterance. In the context of Foucault's Archaeology Molloy's disappointment with language takes on a radical significance. Molloy's sorrowful self-derogation is not an invitation to an absolute escapist absurdism. It inverts reality with a perceptible aura. Molloy's problem is more serious and more practical. He is burdened with a self that "can't go on". In stylistic terms, he is burdened with the pronoun "I" that has lost its nominal backing. In Beckett's fiction, the first person pronoun is exhausted. It does not have a Self, Subject or being to express. At best, it is a shifting focus deracinated from its epistemological moorings. The "I" in the statement "I can't go on; but I must go on" expresses a non-identity, a differential that has no linguistic being. It in fact announces the death of not any individual unsuccessful self, but the obsolescence of the very idea of the Self. It also announces the closure of what Althusser would call a specific epistemological continent. Because what follows the closure of a continent is a break or a gap. Molloy and all Beckettian protagonists are dramatic philosophic expressions of the reality of the break. The "I" that has to go on is an "I" under erasure a "process without or goals ". The obstacle to Molloy's use of language is the carry over of the past Self into the present Self-less syntax. Molloy is looking for a specific practice that will critically remember
the past and thus lead to a creative forgetting. Molloy's expression of his fear that perhaps he has already been expressed is the fear of pre-emption by the past and by tradition. Molloy is made to feel sterile and choiceless. The surprising feature of Molloy's situation is that he is constrained to feel tired and exhausted. The very fact that he is compelled to honour with past is the real burden that he is unable to shackle.

Molloy is held prisoner by the sanctity of first principles. One such principle is the "Self" or the very concept of "Man". This is the context of Foucault's reference to Molloy. Foucault's theatre of thought is one such an attempt to trace the genealogy of these reputed first principles. His theatre attempts to discover their vulnerability and dispensability. As we have seen in the beginning of this chapter, here again, Foucault has provided us with the possibilities of a different analytic—the analytic of finitude described in The Order of Things. This text begins with a brilliant interpretation of the concept of representation as exemplified in "Las Meninas". The analytic of finitude in many ways is a radical projection of the notion of the "enclosing-enclosed" interaction that receives no textual resolution in the painting by Valasquez. In "Las Meninas", the painter attempted to adequately portray the scene that he was painting as it was painted, a reflectonal totality. This was accomplished among other things by Velasquez painting himself into the painting. Consequently, where we should see ourselves, we see the constructed image of those patrons figured as they should see him. But it is just this attempt to encompass the unencompassable constituted the failure of classicism. The
final contradiction occurs when we come upon our own vision in
the looking glass provided for the patrons. We do not in any
straight forward sense meet ourselves in this canvas. And
neither did Velasquez confronting his own image. All the jumps
made betwen the regard of the painter and his construction of a
system which would render them all homogeneous. Foucault writes:

As if, in that vacant space towards which Velazquez's
whole painting was directed, but which it was nevertheless
reflecting only in the chance presence of a mirror and as
though by stealth, all the figures whose alteration,
reciprocal exclusion, interweaving and fluttering one
imagined (the model, the painter, the king, the spectator)
suddenly stopped their imperceptible dance, unmobilised
into one substantial figure and demanded that the entire
space of the representation should at last be related to one
corporeal (CT: 312).

Foucault points out that in classical picture there is never any
representation of the act of painting. There is no attempt at
self-representation. But without this self-consciousness there
is no sovereign subject. because sovereignty requires
self-mastery and self-control. It is a pre-condition for the
sovereign domination of the visible world by means of a panoramic
vision. Deleuze remarks:

The path of light forms a "spiral shell" that makes
the particular features visible and turns them into a series
of flashes and reflections of light within a complete cycle
of representation. Just as statements are curves before
they are phrases and propositions, so scenes are lines of
light before they become contours and colours. And what the scene brings about in this poem of receptivity are the particular features of a relation between forces, which in this case is the relation between the painter and the sovereign such that they alternate in a never ending flicker. The diagram of forces is realised both the description-scenes and statement curves. 30

The constitution of man as a field and object of study can only be at the expense of his hitherto undivided non-perspectival “being”. The primordiality of his Cartesian cogito has to undergo the humiliation of being a latecomer in the domain of the theory of knowledge. Foucault writes:

All these contents that his knowledge reveals to him as exterior to himself, and older than his own birth anticipate him, over hang him with all their solidity, and traverse him as though he were merely an object of nature, a face doomed to be erased in the course of history (OT: 306).

From such a situation Foucault derives the analytic of finitude:

Man’s finitude is heralded—and imperiously so—in the positivity of knowledge; we know that man is finite, as we know the anatomy of the brain, the mechanics of production costs, or the system of Indo-European conjugation; or rather, like a watermark running through all these solid, positive, and full forms, we perceive the finitude and limits they impose, we sense, as though on the blank reverse sides, all that they make impossible. (OT: 313-14).

The theme here is decidedly Nietzschean: the death of man and the founding of process as a drive that pays little attention to
authropocentric conveniences. Man creates, sanctions and pursues knowledge and thereby endorses knowability. But he does so only by withdrawing himself from the domain of "Knowables". The conclusion then is that knowledge requires the reality of the hidden meaning for its own viability. But the emergence of the study of man by Man shatters this availability of man to himself. It is Foucault's thesis that although the study of man has emerged as a field, the implication of such an emergence "have not yet been felt". The reason for this lack of critical development is simply the fierce intrusion from earlier forms of knowledge that have not been interrogated.

The radicality of Foucault's thought consists not in the mere thematisation of the constitution of man by man. It lies in its insistence that revolutions in epistemology need to be unravelled completely and exhaustively. As a genealogist, Foucault is prepared within the analytic of finitude to describe it endlessly. The question he raises is: why should the proliferation of man in discourse be viewed as a tragedy? Molloy's awareness that there are only signifiers and no signified by way of a self is an example. This loss of Self is in fact a liberation. The namelessness implicit in the loss of the "Self" is very much like the "determinate indeterminacy" that informs Foucault's analytic. Foucault's initial remarks in his Discourse on Language and the analytic of finitude enable such an opening.

In the next chapter, I intend to develop this argument through a detailed analysis of Foucault's Power and Knowledge. The goal of an archaeological analysis of history is to effect a
catharsis of those intellectual and political assumptions which predetermined our analysis of contemporary experience. Foucault's archaeologies/genealogies are directed at this concern. Man his prisons, that is, the way in which the figure of man has been fabricated as knowable and governable reality for the modern period. It is possible to read the work of Michel Foucault as a concerted attempt to understand the diagonal line that Power and knowledge take as they proceed through such figures.

NOTES
2. According to Hegel, for consciousness what has emerged exists only as an object "For us it exists at once as movement and becoming".
3. Althusser has shown that the problematic of Marx's mature work is not that of an historicism clandestinely operated by an anthropology. See Louis Althusser and Etienne Balibar, Reading Capital, trans. Ben Browster (London: Verso, 1979), pp. 139-40.
7. Ibid, pp. 287
8. Ibid, p. 48-49.

11. Nietzsche writes: "Will to truth is a making firm, a making true and durable, an abolition of the false character of things, a reinterpretation of it into beings. Truth is therefore, not something there, that might be found or discovered - but something that must be created and that gives a name to a process ..." Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Holingdale (New York: Vintage, 1968), p. 298, section 592.

12. The obvious case is the editing of his works by his sister and her interpretation of his intentions. More damaging are interpretations by Walter Kaufmann, if we remember what Nietzsche thinks of those who are "objective" and disinterested". Gilles Deleuze presents the example of Kant, whose total and positive critique never questioned the values of knowledge, truth and morality, see Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, trans. Hugh Tomilinson (London: The Athalone Press, 1983), p. 98-100. This book was certainly an important factor in effecting a reconsideration of Nietzsche free from any external system of categorisation.


20. Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, p. 207.


22. Ibid, p. 110.


27. Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, p. 36, sec. 1:10


32. Ibid, p. 332, sec. 518.


35. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, p. 402, sec. 765


37. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, p. 238.

38. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, p. 298, sec. 552.