In the following pages, I propose to undertake a selective review of Kant's biography. I say 'selective' because after a detailed study of Kant's critical philosophy and a perusal of his biography, I have a feeling that there are certain things in his life that have a definite relation with his thoughts. It may perhaps be too presumptuous on my part to assert that the relation is causal. That would imply a pre-determination. Perhaps the way Kant lived and the way he thought are both manifestations of the same character that Kant was in himself. There seems to be a certain unity in his ordinary, extra academic actions and his academic utterances. So, in the present context, this review will be 'selective' in the sense that only those aspect which are philosophically significant will be taken into account.

This account will again be divided into two parts, one dealing with Kant's upbringing as a person and the other with his nurture as an academic par excellence. In both these respects I have relied mainly the 'Memoir of Kant' in Kant's Critique of Practical Reason & c. translated by T.K. Abbott and in some cases on the biographico-philosophical supplement to Kant's Prolegomena edited by Paul Carus.

Two prominent forces are found to have a serious and permanent effect on young Kant: his own parents. Economically, they were not well-off, but by their voluntary simplicity and sincere
piety they influenced him to a great extent through their actual conduct. To both of them Kant owed his almost religious allegiance to morality. In his later life, Kant nostalgically recounted how his father spoke of his opponents in a quarrel with forebearance and love and how his mother planted and fostered the germ of good in him and even sacrificed her own life while nursing her friend. I think, the awe with which Kant beheld moral law within and his insistence on duty for duty's sake, irrespective of consequences can be traced to these early days. The impact is so overwhelming that, in spite of the pledge to institute a critique based on the eternal principles of reason alone, Kant is found 'to deny knowledge to make room of faith.  

Kant's parents influenced him in one more way. The way they practiced religion left a profound impact on Kant's mind with respect to the heart of religion, so much so that his initial intention while entering the university was that of studying theology, but being dissatisfied with the religious ideas and practises of that time he gave up the course. It seems that of the two—morality and religion, morality appealed to his reason more and religion only so far as it fostered this moral core and gave morality an ontological foundation in the form of God. This is also reflected in his attempt to reduce religion to morality in "Religion within the Bounds of Reason Alone."

For Kant morality was not a matter of paying lip-service but of active, constant and conscientious practice. Though poor, he earned his livelihood, whether as a student or as a grown-up person, doing the unpalatable job of tutoring in well-to-do families.
and, above all, ensured that he lived within his means alone and took pride in not having any debt. He aspired to be a professor and, when there wasn't a chance, worked as a Privat-Docent for a long period. Yet when a Professorship was offered to him, he declined the offer because he believed himself to be unfit for it since it was a post of professor of poetry. This consistent and rigorous emphasis on doing, using or claiming only that which is his rightful (desert) confined itself no longer to Kant's moral life but also influenced his academic or theoretical thinking and was definitely one force that enabled him to interpret Humean challenge in a proper perspective as a demand for justification and consequently led him to the discovery of a new method in philosophy. Not only this, even the reasons for which his philosophy is criticized—noumena, denying knowledge to make room for faith, the discrepancy in the solutions of the antinomies his criticism of proofs for the existence of God etc.—can be traced back to his anxiety to defend religion and morality. (I indeed felt elated when I discovered later on that this hypothesis which long lingered in my mind is confirmed by Kant himself remarking that "the origin of the Critical Philosophy is in Morality-responsibility for actions."

In the academic sphere, Kant was indeed very fortunate in having exposure to a variety of disciplines and of schools of thought alike. His schooling was in the study of classics and Latin as a classical language. In the university, as per his original intentions he studied theology, but natural science and mathematics interested him more; and, though parental influence had created in him a deep respect for the heart of religion, the actual practice of the
organized church of his time did not suit his temperament. Consequently, he gave up the theological line and got involved in the study of physics and philosophy. It must be remembered here that, in those days, the distinction between these two subjects was not as hard and fast as it is now-a-days. In fact, one of the teachers who influenced Kant most and developed his interest in physics, Martin Kuntzen, was a professor of both physics and philosophy. That is how, Kant had an in-depth study of physics, so much so that ten out of his first eleven articles are on physical problems.3

Thus all this undoubtedly goes to show that Kant did not have an empty fascination or curiosity about a newly established discipline with a Newtonian aura around it but a serious interest and a genuine insight into it, accompanied by some concrete output of conclusions. This has led to speculation over the primacy of his interests as to whether they were physical or philosophical. As we shall see very soon, what really appealed to Kant was the method of natural science, but what bothered him were certain problems concerning metaphysics, morality and religion. From this point of view, it was indeed a happy coincidence that Kant studied under Kuntzen. Thereby, Kant was brought up not only in the Leibnizian-

The most unmistakable marks of his scientifically working mind are his conjectures regarding existence of planets beyond Saturn and of a planet between Mars and Jupiter—both verified later on. On his own understanding of the force of gravitation, he believed that the other stars must have an orbital motion in a vast system called the Milky Way, to prevent them from falling together and that the distant nebulae may be nothing else but other galaxies. In due course, all this order may collapse into chaos and again be born like a phoenix. The problem of extra-terrestrial beings that haunts us even now has not escaped Kant’s attention. It is true that he has not written anything specifically on mathematics, but his mastery over contemporary physics, for which a genuine understanding of mathematics is a sine qua non and also the fact that he lectured on mathematics are sure indications of his mastery over mathematics also. And there is plenty of evidence for this in the Critique of Pure Reason too.
Wolffian tradition of philosophy - about which he was soon to develop disregard, but also was exposed to the Newtonian way of knowledge of nature, in contrast to the Cartesian or Leibnizean models. But what seems to have appealed to Kant as regards Newtonian physics was not the concrete output of particular and certain conclusions but the method due to which such 'sure march of science' is possible. It was rather because of this methodological issue that Kant wanted himself to be recognized as a teacher of philosophy and hence defended a thesis concerning the first principles of metaphysical knowledge in addition to his physical thesis De Igne. 6

If we see the later developments in Kant's philosophy on this background, the importance of the novelty of the method that he adopted becomes all the more clear. As is normally thought, the critical turn or the 'Copernican Revolution' in philosophy as Kant himself called it was not a sudden or unexpected event, in fact no revolution is and can be. The tension was slowly building up, not just in Kant's mind but in the minds of his predecessors and contemporaries also. Kant's own statement that Hume first interrupted his dogmatic slumber should be taken only as a half-truth. In fact, Kant was having a terrible nightmare of being pushed to and fro between the dogmatic metaphysics and his own doubts concerning it. Had it not been for Hume's biting attack, one wonders what the fate of philosophy in the following years would have been. There is a profound sense in Riehl's comment: "Without Hume no Kant, without the Enquiry Concerning Human understanding no Critique of Pure Reason." 17
In the following pages, therefore, I will attempt a sketch of how the crisis built-up in philosophy, making a critique imperative.

As said earlier, the critical turn or the Copernican revolution in philosophy was not a sudden result of a simple event—Kant exposure to Hume's criticism concerning causality. At the most it may be regarded as the climax of a situation slowly building up its tension on various factors. Similarly, it will also be too presumptuous to claim that all these tensions built up in the mind of Kant alone. Many of the weaknesses and inconsistencies in the traditional systems had struck others as well, but for lack of proper diagnosis no further progress could take place. So it will be proper to begin with the academic environment in which Kant was brought up, to understand where his predecessors of contemporaries left the issues and where he took them up.

The years immediately before and after Kant's entry on the academic scene may be truly characterized as dominated by the methodological issues. So long as the proclamations of metaphysicians did not have a challenging rival, the debate was not over the method of metaphysics; the choice between rival systems was mainly based on the logical criteria of absence of contradiction and degrees of consistency. But all the rivals held beyond doubt that metaphysics was a matter of a priori, analytic thinking about a transcendent reality, a discipline modelled on mathematics and geometry—both erroneously thought to be purely analytic in character and hence deductive, formal in method and consequently wholly accessible to reason. But now, with the rise of Newton who
represented through 'Principia' the sure march of science, the very foundations of metaphysics were shaken. To save the situation, a fierce battle between the two factions was fought over the issue of applicability of their respective methods.

The rationalist side in this debate was represented by Leibniz and his followers the most prominent among them being Christian Wolff who with his own version of Leibnizian philosophy made Leibniz the national philosopher of Germany. For Leibniz reality is rational and the truths discovered by natural sciences correspond exactly to the truths about transendent reality discovered by reason alone. As such, for him, reason and sensibility are not generically different but differ only in degrees. So in principle, all truths of fact that are normally known through experience are also knowable analytically with the help of reason alone. But a full proof of this merger of the realms of sense and understanding required that the principle of sufficient reason that governs the matters of fact should be derived from the principle of contradiction that rules the relations of ideas. We have seen earlier that Leibniz himself could not do it. But now Wolff attempted to do it in a pseudo-logical way and was vehemently opposed by the scientists. Even prior to Kant, Crusius had refused to identify logical reason with real reason. Yet a decisive solution of this puzzle was not found by him; rather Hume's criticism with respect to causality, namely, that it belongs neither to experience not to reason further added chaos to confusion.

On this background, Kant's penetrating mind naturally delved behind the glaring contrast between the exact sciences

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which demonstrated the possibility, nay, actuality of certain, uncontroverted knowledge and metaphysics which made still loftier promises and yet had to retrace the steps. From as early as 1765, he had a sure feeling that something was wrong with the method of metaphysics. As marked earlier he was interested in physics and mathematics due to their successful modus cognoscendi. In a letter dated 31-12-1765 to J.K. Lambert, Kant expresses his conviction that he has reached "...the method that has to be followed..." to escape the enchantment of dogmatic metaphysics. He even declares "What I am working on is mainly a book on the proper method of metaphysics." This of course seems to be the announcement of his Inaugural Dissertation (1770). Though it contains many important distinctions such as those between senses and reason or noumena and phenomena which Kant used is the Critique of Pure Reason, we can't say that he had given up the idea of a possible transcendent metaphysics. It was only that Wolff and other dogmatists had used wrong methods. Here again we find him fascinated with the methods of mathematics and natural science but warning that there, since these sciences rest on perception "practice gives rise to method....In metaphysics, however, the method must precede all science." He seems to be imagining a science of the transcendent noumenal reality quite analogous to the a priori science of mathematics which deals with the forms of sensibility and is applicable to the phenomenal. It must be remembered, however, that Kant in not advocating the application of mathematical methods in metaphysics. He is fascinated by mathematics only so far as its a priorily, apodeictic certainty and
applicability to reality are concerned. But even in his earlier works such as the essay on Negative Magnitudes (1763) he insists on keeping away from the method of mathematics. And in the Prize Essay (1762), he deals at length with the radical differences between the methods of mathematics and philosophy. Mathematics starts with definitions that are precise, simple and complete and proceeds by synthetic method directly from axioms and rules to deduction of consequences. Secondly, the universals of mathematics are presented in concrete, by figures and symbols, and are governed by strict rules. They are also unanalyzable and demonstrable. On the other hand the philosopher has to start with concepts not framed by himself but with those which are given in experience. These concepts are complex, confused and inadequately determined. Unlike mathematics, these concepts can be expressed only in words which are not their exact equivalents and hence they require analysis, explication and yet can't be demonstrated in the sense in which the truths of mathematics can be demonstrated. "The overall tone of the essay is that because of the differences between Mathematics and Metaphysics, the quest of the latter will never end."

Even later in the Critique of Pure Reason we, find a detailed and scathing analysis the failure of all previous metaphysics as the result of a wrong analogical application of the method of mathematics to metaphysics ignoring the essential basic differences between them and hence resulting in a corresponding difference between their fortunes.

So it can be said on the basis of these observations that
the first factor that was responsible for inducing Kant to take a critical
look at our very knowing apparatus was the dismal failure of the
prevalent metaphysics, heightened by contrast with the sure and
certain achievements of the exact sciences, and pointing to meth-
odological malady as its root cause.

Counterpositioned to the certain and secure knowledge
of mathematics and natural science however were morality and
religion, both of which claimed equal, if not more, respect in Kant's
mind. In the introductory part of this chapter we have seen how his
upbringing had inculcated in Kant's mind a profound and everlasting
respect for morality and religion. But a fully deterministic
Newtonian picture of the universe and the human realm of morality
that made sense only on the indispensable presupposition of
freedom of will were apparently in conflict with each other. Right
from the early days, this peculiarity of human reason had puzzled
Kant viz two different results of rational inquiry, each one
individually acceptable yet taken together standing in apparently
irreconcilable opposition to each other. He seems to be having an
unfailing faith in the powers of reason so that it won't allow anyone
to fall into complete error. In his first essay 'On Living Forces',
speaking about Descartes and Leibniz he comments: 'We can now
accuse neither of the two great sages of a complete error...We
defend the honour of reason if we reconcile it with itself in the
persons of those two sagacious men.' In the same spirit he sought
to reconcile Leibniz and Newton in Physical Monadology (1756) by
bringing in for the first time the distinction between noumena and
phenomena with the hope of avoiding the head on collision of the
giants by shifting them to two different levels. And though he slowly realized that metaphysics in the sense of a pure rationalistic doctrine of noumenal reality is impossible, he nonetheless retained the noumena-phenomena distinction as it served not merely an epistemological but also a moral function in his philosophy.

It was in this situation that Hume's critical examination of the metaphysical concepts of self, cause and God added chaos to confusion. Even of the three concepts the one of causality bothered Kant more because on its validity hung the fate of both natural science and morality. If we can't maintain that objective events are causally governed, the very basis for all certain generalizations and inferences based on them is uprooted; while to talk of morality which necessarily involves "responsibility for actions," in Kant's own words, will be redundant if we are not the controllers of our actions.

In none of the writings of Kant that are available to me is there any evidence that he had acquaintance with Hume's Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. Yet the very insightful way in which Kant unfolded the implications of Hume's criticism in the Treatise enabled him to see the moral implications of the same. As Paul Carus has aptly pointed out, "morality becomes possible only by man's ability to make general principles the basis of his action. Reason makes action according to maxims or principles possible, and all those maxims are moral which can become universally established." So the cause of Reason must be upheld not just for sake of knowledge but also for vindicating morality. Not only that, we can also say that even the former was regarded as a particular
special case of morality. This is very clear in Prolegomena where Kant explicitly states his understanding of Hume’s criticism of causality. Hence he (Hume) inferred, that reason was altogether deluded with reference to this concept, which she erroneously considered as one of her children whereas in reality it was nothing but a bastard of imagination, impregnated by experience. ....the question was not whether the concept of cause was right, useful and even indispensable for our knowledge of nature....but whether that concept could be thought by reason a priori.... implying a wider application than merely to objects of experience. This was Hume’s problem. It was a question concerning the origin, not concerning the indispensable need of the concept.”

The moral overtones of all this presentation are quite obvious. It was precisely because Kant took it to be a moral issue in epistemology that he took the further step of generalizing the problem. - “I, therefore first tried whether Hume’s objection could not be put into a general form, and soon found that the concept of the connexion of cause and effect was by no means the only idea..., but rather that metaphysics consists altogether of such connexions.”

Here I want to contend that, even though Kant was primarily concerned with an epistemological problem and there too, especially with the problem of method, this interpretation of Hume’s criticism in terms of morality, as a problem concerning our epistemic right, demanding justification played a crucial role in Kant’s thinking. In support of this contention I want to forward two things that indicate the influence of moral considerations on Kant’s thinking. We have seen that he was from the very early days deeply
struck by the relation between knowledge in various disciplines and the methods adopted by them. Though initially he entertained the possibility of a transcendent metaphysics, he soon gave it up. Yet, what he did not give up was the idea of a possible metaphysics. The disillusionment with the dogmatic, rationalistic metaphysics attracted him towards the method of Newtonian physics which, as he understood it, gave a priori knowledge of reality. Thus in the Prize Essay (1764) he expressed his belief that “the true (achte) method of metaphysics in essentially the same as the method introduced by Newton into the science of nature.” 28 Still, he doesn’t seem to have hit upon what precisely the nature of this method would be. But this moral slant to the whole issue must have made one thing very clear - the method must be one providing ‘justification’ for the possession of a priori concepts of our understanding. And as certainty of the conclusion was important the choice was that of deductive reasoning which Kant takes in both the senses - logical and legal.

But the moral consideration is operative in one more way. Justification of our knowledge is necessary, but if this knowledge were the knowledge of all that there is, the categories or pure concepts would be appliable to everything; particularly such universal application of the concept of cause will result in a deterministic picture of the world including the actions of moral agents. Therefore, ironically, at the same time when Kant wants to justify knowledge, he is also required to limit it to the realm of appearances. Because freedom of will is so much necessarily a postulate of morality that it must be admissible at least as not logically contradictory and hence ‘thinkable’ if not as something knowable. 21
And if these moral considerations didn’t weigh on Kant’s mind so heavily, he would not have treated this limiting function of the critique as inevitable and held that such a limitation makes a positive contribution of the critique possible, namely, the ‘practical employment of pure reason - the moral - in which it inevitably goes beyond the limits of sensibility.’ Such an understanding of the nature of critique also further clarifies why Kant had to ‘deny knowledge in order to make room for faith.’ Even much later, in a letter to Christian Garve (1798) Kant specifically states that it was not from the investigation of existence of God or immortality etc. that he started but from the antinomy of pure reason, particularly the third one: ‘Man has freedom’ ‘There is no freedom; everything belongs to natural necessity.’ ‘These were what first awoke me from my dogmatic slumbers and drove me to the critique of reason itself.’

And if all this is not enough, let us turn to the end portion of the Critique, the Doctrine of Method, which, by Kant’s own reckoning, must precede science. After the inability of our reason to pass any judgment about transcendent reality is clearly demonstrated, Kant wonders over ‘the inextinguishable desire of our reason to find firm footing beyond the limits of experience.’ and asks whether it is merely out of speculative interests that reason struggles. His

Incidentally, this ‘awakening from the dogmatic slumbers’ seems to be Kant’s favourite cliche. ‘Alongwith its occurrence with reference to Hume which is well-known (Prolegomena, Introduction, P.7), it also occurs again in the same work “This product of pure reason in its transcendent use is its most remarkable curiosity. It (The Cosmological Idea) serves as a very powerful agent to rouse philosophy from its dogmatic slumbers and to stimulate it to the arduous task of undertaking a Critique of Reason itself.” (Prolegomena 50, p.104)

In addition, a slightly changed version of the phrase to the same effect is used with reference to scepticism towards the end of the first critique. “At the best it is merely a means of awakening it [reason] from its sweet dogmatic dreams.” But, setting aside these remarks as idiosyncratic, Hume’s criticism certainly seems to have given Kant’s investigation ‘quite a new direction in the sense of search for a totally new method of doing philosophy.’
answer is that the ultimate end of all our speculative endeavours is practical, i.e. concerning the questions - What ought I to do? What may I hope for?

and, therefore, concerning freedom of will, immortality of soul and the existence of God. It is needless to remind it here that, for Kant, all these three are the necessary postulates of morality.

The above quoted observations of Kant also bring to light a remarkable feature of his thought namely, the ultimate continuity and unity of human interests. The abovementioned two questions along with the third one - ‘What can I know?’ are not questions about three separate entities but about the same one, the ‘I’ and thus must inevitably lead to the fourth question “What am I?” “What is Man?” - a perennial problem in philosophy, echoed in ‘Know thyself,’ and “अद्वैत (who am I?)” in Indian philosophy.

To understand the full significance of almost all ideas that are typically Kantian, one must constantly bear Kant’s conception of man in one’s mind. Only then can we hope to understand why he adopted ‘noumena’ in a peculiarly different sense, why he formulated the concept of critique so rigidly or why he ‘denied knowledge.’ This is not to say that Kant’s arguments and his conclusions are impeccable, but if seen in the light of his conception of man, they will at least appear to be unified in a certain way and not as haphazard or convenient concoctions.

All the thinkers that were studied in the last chapter had one thing in common. All of them agreed that, so far as our contact with the external world is concerned, our senses are, by their very nature, confined to the phenomena or sense-data. We have seen
that, in order to account satisfactorily for illusions, this position is a must. But if, by sensibility we are finite, how come we can ever know that there are things out and that they are so-and-so? To answer this problem all these thinkers tried to open the doors to external world in different ways. These can be broadly grouped into five classes.

I) Denying that external things are the proper objects of knowledge and replacing them by unchangeable, eternal Ideas by definition accessible to reason. (Plato)

II) Positing a teleological cosmic order in which it is the function or purpose of reason to know and that of things to be known (Aristotle)

III) Reaching the world through God (Descartes, Spinoza, Berkeley)

IV) Reaching the world through causality (Locke and even, Hume though implicitly)

V) Justifying the possibility of knowledge through unification of the realms of sense and understanding by reducing the principles governing the relations of ideas. (Leibniz)

We have seen how each one of these attempts to justify the possibility of knowledge was itself based on assumed, unwarranted entities and/or principles and thus itself subject to similar sceptical objections. But, oblivious of these lacunae, they stuck to their positions and in the end, gave rise to a multiplicity of systems of ‘knowledge.’ The general trend of all these thoughts seems to be that since we undeniably have knowledge, it must be defended against the sceptical attack by whatever means available. Since as precious a thing as knowledge is at stake,
a real, in depth investigation of its foundations or of the means of vindicating it is not as important as silencing the sceptic. Some sort of 'ends and means' controversy in epistemology!

On this background, the stand taken by Kant is remarkable. Perhaps due to his moral predispositions he would rather accept defeat than use unfair or improper means. Talking about the discipline of reason he has said:

"Allow.....your opponent to speak in the name of reason, and combat him only with weapons of reason. For the rest, have no anxiety as to the outcome...Reason is benefitted by the consideration of both sides, and its judgment is corrected in thus being limited....For although we have to surrender the language of knowledge, we still have...the quite legitimate language of a firm faith."^20^\(^{\text{122}}\) (emphasis added)

No wonder then that Kant showed the desperately needed courage to admit the complete finitness of man-in rationality as well as in sensibility. The limits of our reason are, according to Kant, twofold. The first is that it is only discursive; it can’t intuit. Thus the possibility of reaching the world through an intuited God is foreclosed. Secondly, the principle of sufficient reason is irreducible to the principle of contradiction. Hence, ontological proof as a way of proceeding from idea to existence, too is out of question. Thus we have a concept of man as a totally finite being, condemned to his 'self-centred predicament.' Nonetheless, Kant is far from subscribing to solipsism. But how, beginning with our sense-data and thoughts alone, are we to build up the picture of the world around us on safe foundations? This problem plagued
him from very early days. In a letter to Marcus Herz (dated 21-2-1772) he says “I asked myself: ‘What is the ground of the relation of that in us which we call “representation” to the object? ...Our understanding...is not the cause of the object, nor is the object the cause of the intellectual representations.”^30

Similarly, about the same time, a ‘reflexion’ expresses the problem still more clearly: “How does it come about that objects correspond to what is simply a product of our mind itself alone? ...To say that some superior being had already wisely implanted within us such concepts and principles means subverting philosophy altogether. [To ascertain] how a reference and connexion is possible, although only one (term) of the relation is given, we must inquire into the nature of knowledge as a whole.”^31 (emphasis added) Especially the later (underlined) part of the second quotation shows beyond doubt that Kant had felt the problem which nobody till then had and had a clear formulation of the same. As the origin of the concepts was not in the experience it was vain to derive them from it. So the only course open was that of investigating reason itself.

What we have to see now is how Kant formulates his idea of critique and how this idea is influenced by the factors aforementioned. It must also be remembered that the Kantian undertaking of critique as a ‘tribunal’ for all disputes of pure reason is itself not a system of philosophy and as such is not against this or that system but is concerned with doing justice to all the systems on their merits. That in why the whole tone of the arguments in the Critique is not that of a lawyer engaged in polemics but of a judge administering justice to parties in a dispute. Hence we find Kant
agreeing partially with all the parties and simultaneously differing with them when their claims are extravagant, and sternly setting the limits.

Thus, we find him agreeing with the rationalists so far as the a priori origin of the concepts of understanding and the pure forms of intuition is concerned, but he emphatically denies that they can be applied to the realm of noumena. So ‘curbing the pretensions’ of reason becomes necessary. He agrees with the empiricists in that senses alone can provide the content or matter of experience and therefore are a necessary condition of experience. But the forms of our experience are not derived from them, they are applied therein. Hence, he regards the empirical derivation of the concepts as amounting to begging the question and hence insists that the only proof can be transcendental. But what is surprising is that he agrees even with Hume in admitting that metaphysics in the sense of knowledge of supra-sensible reality is impossible (no wonder, he was branded Prussian Hume.), but his way of establishing that a priori, universal, certain and necessary (though not in the logical sense) knowledge about our experience is legitimately possible seems to be his way of disposing of the very sceptical challenge as a pseudo-problem, though whether this satisfies sceptics and dogmatists alike is a problem. But that will be dealt with later on.

I will first of all begin with a brief but essential statement of what Kant himself has said about the concept of critique in the Critique of Pure reason. This is essential for two purposes. For one thing it will help in estimating the gap, if any, between Kant’s claims and goals and his actual performance. Secondly, when we have
such a clear picture of what Kant has said and the arguments he has made for the same, it will be easier to evaluate the criticisms levelled against him.

It is indeed, very difficult to cull out some part of the first Critique as pertaining to the concept of critique, because the whole of this work purports to be 'a treatise on the method' i.e. critique as reason's self-examination. Nonetheless, for a proper understanding of the concept, the introductions, the Analytic and the second part - Transcendental Doctrine of Method will be more important.

Need of Critique:- Earlier we have seen how as a result of several factors to enumerate them briefly again-

1) Dismal performance of dogmatic metaphysics
2) Demonstration of certain a priori knowledge by mathematics and physics.
3) Humean scepticism
4) Kant's anxiety to defend morality and religion.

Kant thought it imperative to undertake a critical examination of reason. He is averse to take sides either with dogmatists or sceptics or least of all with indifferentists.

But though needed and hence desirable, is such a project possible and moreover flawless? Because the very question that he is asking about metaphysics or maths and physics may be raised against the very concept of critique.

Possibility of critique - In the preface to the first edition, Kant emphatically claims that such a critique is very much possible because 'I have to deal with nothing save reason itself and its pure
thinking; and to obtain complete knowledge of these, there is no need to go far afield, since I come upon them in my own self. Similarly, in the preface to the second edition he puts this point in a different way saying '...Pure speculative reason has this peculiarity, that it can measure its powers according to the different ways in which it chooses the objects of its thinking,...nothing in a priori knowledge can be ascribed to objects save what the thinking subject derives from itself.'

Again in presenting the plan of the critique, he remarks, 'That such a system is possible...may be gathered from the fact that..our subject matter is not the nature of things, which is inexhaustible, but understanding...only in respect of its a priori knowledge. These a priori possessions of the understanding, since they have not to be sought from without, cannot remain hidden from us, and in all probability are sufficiently small in extent' (emphasis added) It is worth considering why Kant should use a probabilistic language in the same sentence where he is arguing for the possibility and completeness of a critique. Perhaps he must have felt that the grounds for completeness are inadequate.

But the possibility of a critique can be jeopardized in one more way. One may claim that though conceptually possible, such a procedure is objectionable because, thereby, we are instituting a judge who is also a disputant. Kant answers this objection by distinguishing between two modes in which our reason operates—the first is dogmatic where reason thinks it possible to make progress 'without previous criticism of its own powers.' while the other is critical, impartial like a judge. It is like reason in its sober
moments reflecting upon its own excesses in a drunken state. Here the inherent capacity of reason to act as a judge is not something imposed on it for the first time. During the days of Reformation when there was a problem of proper interpretation of the holy books, both the parties resorted to an independent court of appeal - Reason which thereafter came to be established as an independent authority. What Kant did was a step ahead - making reason critical of itself.

To deserve the title of a critique in its true sense, Kant believes that such an inquiry must be complete and its results certain and clear. He claims that his critique will have all these qualities.

Completeness, Certainty and Clarity - In addition to the ready accessibility of our reason to itself, what guarantees the completeness and exhaustiveness of our inquiry, according to Kant, is the well-knit, unitary character of our reason. In support, he gives the illustration of logic which studies all the simple acts of our reason completely and systematically.

With regard to certainty he holds that whatever is a priori is absolutely necessary and therefore apodeictically certain and since space, time and the categories of understanding are, one and all a priori, that guarantees their certainty.

About clarity, however, Kant takes a double stand. He distinguishes between logical and aesthetic clarity, i.e., one through examples and illustrations. He seems to believe that it is necessary, but excuses himself for lacking it by claiming that examples would have added to the magnitude of the work and that they are really
necessary from popular consumption. A better excuse is that the aids to clearness, though they may be of assistance in regard to details, often interfere with our grasp of the whole.

Priority of the Critique - This is a very important aspect of the critique and Kant is never tired of mentioning it repeatedly. However, it has been grossly misunderstood, especially by Hegel, who accuses him of expecting to learn to swim before entering the water, to know before we know. At present, it is sufficient to point out that Kant is expecting priority of the critique only with respect to knowledge independent of all experience. And he specifies this repeatedly. Nowhere has he claimed that the critique should be prior to all knowledge as such or that we should suspend our belief in all the so-called knowledge and first undertake a critique. On the contrary, the very title of the section II of introduction of the Critique clearly states his belief in the existence of certain modes of a priori knowledge. The very way he proceeds by taking natural science and mathematics as the paradigms of synthetic a priori knowledge is sufficient to prove my contention. 'Whether they are possible?' is not the question. It is 'How they are?'

Kant has traced the failure of all previous metaphysics to its dogmatic procedure based on a false analogy that since reason succeeds in mathematics attaining a priori, certain & complete knowledge so will it in the realm of transcendent, by following the same methods. This misunderstanding is the cause of the transcendental illusion that can't be obliterated. But our reason can be armed against it, if it alserdy has a realistic grasp of its powers and limits. Hence, critique as a preventive measure or as a propaedeutic must
precede all its application to a priori modes of knowing.

Of course, it may be questioned whether a critique should be prior even to its restricted application, but that will be a different issue.

The term ‘priority’ can be taken not only in a temporal but also in the epistemological sense. Because just as Kant admits that in physics and maths we have paradigms of the a priori ability of human reason, he also has to admit that metaphysics as a natural disposition and as a result of the tendency of our reason to go beyond the field of its empirical employment is very much there. The priority of the critique is rather in the sense of reflection by reason on its own acts to understand their true nature and thereby ‘to deprive metaphysics, once and for all, of its injurious influence.’

And if we look at the procedure of proving the existence and validity of the categories of pure understanding with the help of transcendental proof, we can very well say that the critique is not supposed to be chronologically prior even to the a priori employment of the reason. The critique proceeds from the very fact of experience - the result of the actual application of the categories of pure understanding to their proof.

Such a critique simultaneously performs several functions. Kant himself has characterized these functions in the critique variously.

Function of the critique: One way of putting these functions is to look at them as positive and negative. Because of its attack on dogmatism, the negative function is highlighted very much. Indeed, curbing the pretensions of human reason, or showing it its proper
place, i.e. the sphere of possible experience is not only a necessary consequence of denying intellectual intuition to human beings. In a way this is not a real loss to reason but a loss only of its undue or illegitimate claims.

But in the very act of setting limits to reason, the critique paves the way for its positive gains which were endangered by the sceptical challenge and to defend which the dogmatic methods of traditional metaphysics were powerless. These positive functions of the critique are two. The first is to defend the legitimacy of the concepts within the sphere of possible experience by showing that this experience itself is possible due to them. Thus the just claims of reason are vindicated against the attack of scepticism. Secondly, the former limiting function also opens up the scope for the possibility of morality and religion. Within the frame of experience these will conflict with the categories of understanding. The realm of the transcendent can't be known but it can be thought. And 'thinking' freedom is 'not at least self-contradictory' and therefore can be taken as possible. This is a rather weak way of contending for these precious, cherished possessions of mankind, nevertheless Kant regards this as the best achievement 'the inestimable benefit, that all objections to morality and religion will be forever silenced.'

Another way of understanding the functions of the critique is, so to say, pathological. Here, critique is seen as working in a diagnostic, curative and even preventive capacity. Human reason by its very nature is prone to overstepping the limits of experience and hence metaphysics is forever, but a critique will 'deprive metaphysics of its injurious influence by attacking the errors at their very
source,\textsuperscript{51}

In the introduction to the Critique, Kant thinks that the function of the critique is properly only negative 'not to extend but to clarify our reason and to keep it away from errors.' \textsuperscript{52} Here, if the critique is regarded as prior to the actual application of reason, we may say that it will work in a preventive manner.

On the whole, I think that Kant's arguments for the negative and preventive or curative functions are stronger and therefore should carry greater weight, but personally Kant himself seems to be admiring the positive functions which have got a weaker case.

\textbf{Intrinsicality of Method} : In the introductory portion of this chapter, I had drawn attention to Kant's preoccupation with method of knowing and the resultant conviction that something is wrong with the method of metaphysics. While he firmly spurns the idea of an empirical investigation of reason as it is never capable of yielding certainty and necessity which are the sine qua non of the propositions of metaphysics, he is also cautious not to imitate the method of mathematics. Yet as both the fields are concerned with the applications of reason and are similar also in result (synthetica a priori judgments) he insists, on the grounds of unity and self-sufficiency\textsuperscript{53} of reason that the principle according to which a critique of reason should be undertaken must be found in the reason only. 'This examination is to be conducted not with reference to experience but in accordance with reason's own eternal and unalterable laws.'\textsuperscript{54}

\textbf{Finality and Incorrigibility of the results} : One of the most
important consequences of the aforementioned characteristics of the critique, especially its completeness and procedure according to inherent principles, both of which are based on the assumptions of unity and self-sufficiency of reason, is the finality and incorrigibility of the results of the critique. Kant asserts it in no ambiguous terms that the critique determines not the present but determinate and necessary limits or reason. The same sense is echoed when Kant speaks about objections to morality and religion being silenced 'for ever' or when he emphasizes the need of deprince metaphysics 'once and for all' its injurious influence.

While talking about the derivation of categories according to a principle - the faculty of judgment - Kant remarks that this procedure will enable us to explain 'way just these concepts and no others.'

The joint result of all these remarks certain, complete and final - requiring neither addition or omission nor substitution of old ones by new.

The claim is very attractive and reassuring and, to speak in Kantian fashion (if the will be taken for the deed), if the claim be taken for the fact that is what, not Kant, but every philosopher is hankering for, but the problem is, is the claim valid even on Kant's own terms?. When we investigate this we will find the claim a vacuous one and paving the way for further developments in the history of the concept of critique.

Kant himself has claimed to have brought about a Copernican revolution in philosophy. To see how much of the revolution owes itself to the concept of critique or to the altogether novel method it will be better if we juxtapose the pre-Kantian version
of knowledge (with all important variations) and the model of knowledge proposed by Kant. The emphasis, naturally, will be on or the common features and assumptions in the former case and corresponding elements in the latter.

Pre-Kantian Concept of Knowledge:

1) Model of Knowledge: The certainty and necessity of the propositions in mathematics and geometry had made these disciplines the indisputable models of knowledge. Not only that, their method-deductive, analytical, a priori-was regarded as the method of knowledge.

2) Possibility of metaphysics: Reason as the source of formal truths also came to be regarded, of course by a false analogy, to be capable of yielding metaphysical truths. Thus, the possibility of having metaphysical knowledge was never questioned.

3) Possibility of ordinary Knowledge: Same was the case with the knowledge of particular things existing outside and general laws governing them.

4) Possibility of Error: This had to be accepted not as a theoretical necessity or an assumption but as a stark fact staring in the face and forcing its acceptance either due to inconsistency or a failure in action based on it. It won't be an exaggeration to point out that but for this possibility of error scepticism could not have wedged in its upsetting challenge, nor would there have been a need of any serious epistemology.

5) Empiricist Claim for Credit: The situation till now was relatively simple. Complications developed by the claim of the empiricists that knowledge worth the name is derived from sense-
experience. With this began a fight over which one is the source of knowledge. Both the parties agreed over one point—the source is only one—Reason OR senses.

6) Objects of Knowledge: This controversy over the source of knowledge to the problem concerning the objects of knowledge. The rationalists held that the universals alone are the proper objects and condemned the sensible particulars to the realm of opinions. The empiricists, on the other hand, took sides with the particulars and tried to explain the universals in terms of them. A reconciliatory or softer position was that of knowing particulars through universals.

7) Admission of Sense-data: The fact of error could be explained only by accepting sense-data as the agency mediating between the thing and our senses. But precisely because of this the distinction between 'thing-as-it-appears-to-us' and 'thing-as-it-is-in-itself' became inevitable—even to those who tried to regard the thing as only a collection of properties. Hence, the nature of things as they are in themselves and the ways of knowing it became problematic. An implicit presupposition here is that the awareness things as we know them in experience is only appearance in the sense of illusion. Thus, true knowledge came to be equated with knowledge of the things as they are out there. But as our senses are incapable of reaching out, the only other possible candidate for the job was reason.

8) Infinitization of Man: On this background, all the efforts were naturally concentrated on showing how reason by itself is capable of knowing the real nature of the world. This was done
either by denying the radical dichotomy between senses and reason, thus fusing the two realms or by bringing in God and so on. These alternatives already discussed earlier.

9) **Passivity of mind**: Last but not the least is the common presupposition of the passivity of the mind. For an empiricist, the mind is only a blank sheet receiving impressions; for the rationalists all that is to be known is already there, experience only makes us aware of our possessions by producing the illustrations.

**Kantian Concept of Knowledge**:

For sake of brevity as also for clarity by comparison and contrast, I will deal with Kant's concept of knowledge with reference to the points that we have characterized pre-Kantian concept of knowledge.

Seen in this way, we find that Kant agrees fully with his predecessors only with respect to points 3, 4, 7, i.e., possibility of ordinary knowledge, possibility of error and, naturally, admission of sense-data. Of course, with respect to the last point, it must be remembered that Kant does not equate the phenomenal world with illusion but insists that it is a necessary and the only possible way of knowing the world because of the way we are made up.

With respect to three other points viz. 1, 2 & 5 Kant agrees with the pre-Kantian concept of knowledge only partially.

Thus, he treats maths and geometry as the paradigms of knowledge only in so far as their a priori, apodeictic certainty and universality is concerned. But, as we have seen earlier, he detects certain important differences and hence claims that their methods can't be the same. It was rather the failure to detect the
differences that metaphysics was treated as analogous to maths and it was this misplaced unity of method that led to chaos in metaphysics.

The second point on which he is partially with and partially against the predecessors is the problem of possibility of metaphysics. While earlier the possibility of metaphysics was never questioned, Kant does not react by denying it altogether but questions it, examines it and passes a judgment that is totally against the dogmatists, in that the possibility of a transcendent metaphysics is closed for ever, but not against metaphysics as such. Because now, metaphysics, as the indispensable, inextinguishable tendency of our understanding, is given a new lease of life in the form of an immanent metaphysics, a metaphysics of experience. Of course, this idea is not found in the Critique for the first time; it is as old as the Prize Essay where Kant proclaims "Metaphysics is nothing else than a philosophy concerning the ultimate grounds of our knowledge." 50

Thirdly, he concurs partially with the empiricists in admitting that sense-experience is a necessary ingredient of our knowledge but refuses to treat it as the sole source of knowledge.

The most important points, however, are those where Kant differs radically with the predecessors. These are points no. 6, 8 and 9. But I prefer to deal with them in order of their importance as well as their logical priority. Hence, I will tackle them in the order, 8, 9 and 6.

The first and fundamental aspect that sets Kant apart from the rest is his emphatic denial of human infinitude in any sense and
a courageous acceptance of his radical finitude, in reason as well as in sensibility. I say 'courageous' because all the earlier philosophers had 'seen' or 'fabricated' 'a way out' to overcome the unpleasantness that loss of knowledge implied. And by positing a God as the medium of transcending the finitude they hit two birds with the same stone - a place for God in their philosophy and getting rid of the problem of transcending their subjectivity.

Remembering that Kant, too, was a devoutly religious person and deeply concerned about the existence of God as a postulate of morality, it is all the more significant that Kant refused to take recourse to such a philosophically cheap though orthodoxy-
respectable way of solving the problem. One reason is that this either meant a blind acceptance of the existence of God which was out of question for Kant. But nor were any proofs for the existence of God or the intuition of his existence completely satisfactory for him. The cosmological proof blended with the ontological one is what comes closest to proving God's existence. And even the Divine mind can help us transcend our subjectivity provided it can be shown that for the Divine mind all truths are analytic. But this can't be done logically. Kant's courage lies in accepting this quietly and then senting out again from the ego-centric predicament to see whether 'just on the basis of what is given we are entitled to make judgments capable of objectivity. As T.K. Swing has suggested, Hume's criticism with respect to causality was chiefly instrumental in bringing out the inadequacy of both the abovementioned ways, i.e. cosmo-ontological argument and the derivation of causal principle from the analytical principle of contradiction. It is indeed
a frustrating situation forcing one to admit that one is totally cornered
(or, should we say besieged?), but Kant would rather admit it
realistically and try to give a solution overcoming it than wishfully
deny the situation altogether and 'fabricate' a solution giving false
consolation. We find a very beautiful expression of this Kantian spirit
in the Doctrine of Method where Kant advocates meeting the oppo­
nent on the battlefield if reason and fighting with the help of reason
alone, even though this may imply a possible loss of knowledge. On this background, it becomes clear why he proposed an
altogether novel conception of knowledge as confined only to the
realm of appearances. Prima facie it was not palatable to his
contemporaries, and successors, Hegel being the most caustic
among them; but as we shall see, none of them has succeeded in
forwarding a better, if not the best alternative to it. Kant's methodol­
ogy and his results are in no way beyond criticism, but the credit of
formulation of this problem of finiteness of human beings and of
insisting on a radically new method to solve it must be unquestiona­
bly given to Kant and Kant alone.

The second feature that distinguishes Kant from his
predecessors is his view of mind as an active agent in the process
of generation of knowledge. By advocating this view he simultane­
ously achieves many things. First of all, the claim of empiricists is
acknowledged in a restricted sense, i.e., as to the content of
particular experiences. But a differentiation between a purely
subjective awareness of sense-data and an experience of an
objective reality can't be made on the basis of sensations alone. As
Kant has pointed out, illusion consists not in sensation but in a
they can’t. This leads to our mind or understanding as the faculty of judgment actively engaged in synthesizing ‘the given’ in accordance with certain principles. This step has two advantages. Now we are concerned with ourselves and, at least so Kant claims, this makes a complete, certain and final exploration of this realm of the a priori contribution of reason very much possible. It also explains how we can legitimately claim that all our experience must necessarily have certain features for they are the very preconditions of the possibility of such experience. Last of all, as these principles of synthesis are the built-in, necessary ingredients of human understanding in general and, therefore, common to all human beings, we can also understand how an intersubjective dialogue is possible. Such a dialogue is necessary because in the absence of the so called real transcendence, the only thing that can distinguish objectively from subjectivity is intersubjectivity and, in fact, we find in Kant the two terms used synonymously. In contemporary terminology we may say that just as there can be no private language, these can be no private knowledge as both presuppose a common or intersubjectively available world.

As a consequence of the two points discussed above, i.e. radical finitude of human mind and mind’s active participation in the genesis of knowledge, we get a peculiarly different answer to the problem of objects of knowledge. (Point no.6 above) In the new scheme of knowledge as a joint product of two factors—understanding operating on the given data of sensations—we have a new type of objects of knowledge. They are neither particulars as existing independently of our minds nor universals in the Platonic
upper world. They are now phenomenal objects, objects as they appear to us. But even within the phenomenal realm the same problem may be raised - Is our phenomenal knowledge concerned with phenomenal particulars or phenomenal universals? I think, the way Kant is concerned with the problem of knowledge - a priori, necessary element in our knowledge. Kant's answer would be that metaphysics as such is concerned with the necessary or a priori (the two terms are for him equivalent) and have universal features of our experience. Knowledge of the specific sensible properties of particular as well as that of the rules governing such particular objects or events would be, according to him, the concern of a science of a restricted scope. Metaphysics is concerned with the general precondition of the possibility of our ordinary experience as well as scientific investigation of the world. But this should not be taken as a deliberate narrowing down of the problem of knowledge for sake of convenience in answering it. Rather, the problem with which Kant is dealing is the foundational one - establishing the secure and solid foundations of human knowledge. If that is done the rest of the edifice is only a matter of time.

The brief characterization of the nature of human knowledge according to Kant is an important step in his theory of knowledge. Its importance consists in highlighting the fact that both - the understanding of the nature of knowledge, and, therefore, the problem of explaining its possibility, and the methods adopted by all his predecessors were wrong. Using the jargon of modern analytical philosophy, we can restate this by saying that - 1) The very concept of metaphysical knowledge as knowledge of reality as it is
in itself was wrongly formulated. 2) Consequently, the problem as to how we can have such a knowledge was a pseudo-problem and was, therefore, incapable of a satisfactory solution. 3) Kant re-examined the concept of human knowledge and held that it consists in the synthesis of the data received by the passive sensibility in accordance with the a priori principles of our understanding. As such we can never know what the things in themselves are, but we can definitely say a priori what the necessary and general features of any human experience will be, because they are our contribution. Hence, metaphysics as an exposition of the necessary a priori features of our experience is possible. 4) But, due to the unique feature of this knowledge - neither purely formal, analytic like maths, nor grossly empirical, synthetic like empirical sciences - metaphysics in the new sense requires a totally new method.

Earlier, we saw how the admission of total finitude of human beings has led to the situation like a siege. Remembering our initial formulation of a critique as necessitated by a crisis, let us now try to delineate the present context. The crisis has posed itself in the form of a dilemma. On the one hand we have to admit that in both the aspects - sensibility and understanding, we are finite while on the other hand we do possess some certain and necessary knowledge such as physics and maths and we also are convinced that we are capable of behaving morally. The problem is, is it possible to refute scepticism in such a way that we can assign a legitimate place to both physics and morality. One very very important precondition - This is to be done only without doing violence to human finitude.
It is this crisis that made a critique imperative, but now the object of critique is reason itself, because now in this besieged condition nothing else can come to its rescue. Of the two sources of knowledge - sensibility and understanding - the former can't be of any help as it is passive and depends on 'something else' for its material. Hence, like a valiant but composed general, reason is forced to take a stock of its own possessions, their strength and limit. The question is 'how can this be done?' It won't be in the least sense any exaggeration to say that this is the central problem to the Critique of pure Reason as a 'treatise on method' and not itself a system of philosophy. And from the point of view of the present thesis, I will be chiefly concerned with this problem and Kant's proposed solution to it.

Before turning to the concept of critique and its method, it will be very useful to remember that, carrying our analogy of siege further, Kant has to hold the fort against not one but three antagonists divided into two camps. In the first are the dogmatists - rationalists and empiricists. Apparently, they seem to be struggling for the cause of knowledge but due to their misconceptions about goals and methods are actually endangering it. In the second camp are the sceptics who are out and out against the possibility of knowledge. The reason why both these camps have joined hands is that they share certain common misconceptions about the nature of knowledge and the methods that are necessary to attain it, if possible.

Accordingly, the strategy that Kant the challenges of all these three. Thus, as against should adopt should be capable of meeting the sceptic it must be shown that a priori knowledge about
the world of experience is not only possible but also necessary to make that very world possible and that it is legitimate to claim such an a priori knowledge can't be said to be derivable from experience. And it must be shown to the rationalists that these a priori possessions are meant only for application to experience and hence are confined to it. In short, we may say that with regard to the a priori contribution of our reason to our knowledge the following things must be established:

1) Possibility and legitimacy/validity as against the sceptic.

2) A priority as against the empiricists.

3) Limits to application as against the rationalist.

The last point, i.e., limits of application is important from a different point of view also. On the face of it, it is taken as a stab in the back of reason or as a harness that curbs the unrestricted exploits of reason. That is why Kant's contemporaries and successors, including his own pupils raised a cry against it. But Kant himself seems to have given a realistically rationalized scope for reason. These limits are set down by the noumena and they eke out a sphere which legitimately belongs to our reason. No doubt it is limited; but if such a barricading with noumena were not done, even this limited sphere would not have remained available to reason.

But from the point of view of critique itself, this limit set down by noumena is important because it defines the limit of the operation of the critique as well. A critique can explore reason only in so far as it is concerned with experience.
in so far as it is concerned with experience.

It is rather unfortunate that Kant should have come in for such a heavy criticism for accepting noumena. The criticisms range from branding him "Prussian Hume" to the suggestion that the noumena should be purged out of the critical philosophy. Even the assertion that 'there are noumena' is taken as conflicting with the very spirit of Kantian philosophy as reflected in Jacobi's comment—that without the thing in itself he could find no way into the system, and with it, found it impossible to stay there. But if we see how and why Kant admits phenomena in his system, the idea won't appear at least as abominable as it is made out to be.

Most of the arguments and reasons that Kant has forwarded for phenomena are logical or explaining the peculiarities of our experience.

The very first argument for entertaining the phenomena is made in the very preface to the second edition. There Kant insists that 'though we cannot know these objects as things in themselves, we must yet be in a position to think them as things in themselves; otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be appearance without anything that appears.' Here the argument seems to be based on the need to make full sense of the term appearance.

But a more detailed and very clear treatment of the concept of noumena is available in a separate chapter on the distinction between phenomena and noumena (Critique of Pure Reason p. 257 ff). The arguments as I present them are not in the same order in this chapter.
The first and a very basic argument for noumena or rather for their possibility is that the very concept is not contradictory because we can't say that sensibility 'is the sole possible kind of intuition.' Logically speaking this is a very weak argument because the possibility (in the sense of absence conflict with another idea) of noumena is based on a similar possibility of a non-sensible intuition. The same question may be raised against the later. The only way this regress can be stopped by showing that the last idea in this chain is not logically self-contradictory. But will even this be adequate? For earlier, Kant himself argues that the absence of self-contradiction is not sufficient to prove the possibility of a thing.

Another argument is a better version of the one in the second preface, quoted above. It proceeds from the concept of phenomena to the noumena. "If we entitle certain objects, as appearanecs, sensible entities (phenomena) then ... we distinguish the mode in which we intuit them from the nature that belongs to them in themselves... it is implied that we place the latter ... in opposition to the former and... in so doing we entitle them intelligible entities (noumena)" (emphasis added.) The world 'implies' may suggest that Kant is merely using analysis of the concept 'phenomena' to deduce the concept of 'noumena' as its necessary correlate. But that can't be so, because even Kant won't accept that there is a 'concept' of phenomena in the strict formal sense. Secondly, deriving from the 'concept' of phenomena the 'existence' of noumena also will be questionable because that would amount to some form of ontological argument. But, these are really superficial considerations about the argument which
rests on a deep-lying assumption of a corresponding relation between sensibility and understanding. To make the problem more clear - Must we admit that a thing is also intelligible because we experience that it is sensible? An affirmative answer can be given only if a strong link between sensibility and understanding is established. But, at least for the purposes of the critique, Kant claims that the two sources are heterogeneous. Otherwise why would schematism be necessary. Instead, a better reformulation of this argument is possible on the level of the usage of the term 'appearance'. We may say that the very term 'appearance' has a denotation beyond the appearance itself, to the 'apparent' (in the sense of 'that which appears') and hence we can sensibly talk of 'appearance' only if we admit something that appears.

The root of all this confusion over the existence and knowability of noumena arises, I think, due to Kant's twofold mistakes. The first is his loose usage of the term 'intelligible'. There is every chance that on a close analogy it may be taken to mean 'accessible to, understanding or thought' in the same sense as 'sensibility' means 'accessible to senses'. But while Kant emphatically denies that the categories of understanding are not applicable to noumena and, even if applied, that is not a real application, he also keeps on talking time and again of a different mode of intellectual intuition, that is conceivable available to other beings, for example God, and to which the noumena may be accessible. It is doubtful whether he really entertained the idea of such an intuition with any seriousness because as he says 'we can't comprehend even the possibility' of such an intuition. This doubt is further
supported by Kant's unambiguous assertion that 'there are intelligible entities... but our concepts... could not in the least apply to them. That, therefore, which we entitle 'noumena' must be understood as being such only in a negative sense. (emphasis added) So finally what the term intelligible turns out to mean is not 'that to which intellect is applicable' but only 'that which has to be accepted by our reason in order to account for the limits of our knowledge.' This indeed is the sense in which Kant regards noumena to be necessary - 'a limiting concept...to cart the pretensions of sensibility...it is no arbitrary invention, it is bounded up with the limitation of sensibility.' again, on the same page he makes it clear that if taken in a problematic sense, 'the concept not only admissible but as setting limits to sensibility is likewise indispensable.' As is usual with Kant, the 'necessity or indispensability' is not absolute but but 'in a sense' or in the context of human knowledge.

In this chapter on phenomena and noumena, we find a brief but precise, almost mathematical expression of the relation between sensibility understanding and our knowledge (or a ghost of knowledge). The categories are properly meant for application to sensibility only, but 'are not, as regards their origin, grounded in sensibility and...seem to allow of an application... beyond all objects of senses.' Now, the argument proceeds, 'If I remove from empirical knowledge all thought no knowledge...remains...But if...I leave aside all intuition, the form of thought still remains... The categories accordingly extend further than intuition, since they think objects in general.' In the manner in which the argument is presented it may be represented as:
Experience Understanding = No knowledge.
Experience Sensibility = Ghost of knowledge.

One thing is at once clear - though the language is of 'removing' or 'leaving aside', we can't express the hypothetical process in terms of subtraction. For Kant, understanding seems to have some sort of superiority or primacy over sensibility, because it can act, albeit illegitimately in absence of the latter. If so, the famous Kantian maxim will have to be modified partially - 'Thoughts without content are lame but they can mimic a walk 'By contrast 'intuitions without concepts are blind ' and that is the end of it. They are not capable of having even illusions. So, in the last analysis, the problem of metaphysics boils down to drawing the demarcating line between the proper and improper fields of application of our understanding. Kant himself seems to be of the conviction that such a demarcation is once and for all, unchangeable. Consequently, there will be a fixed division between phenomena and noumena - which are not two 'sets' of objects but two 'aspects' of them.

Thus the Copernican turn in the sense of a realization of a new method can be seen as a necessary result of the realization and confession of the radical finitude of man coupled with the determination not to use 'unfair' means to escape or to redefine escape if a real escape can not be available. Thus the only alternative available for Kant is to begin from 'inside' with what is 'given' - data, principles and methods alike and start going ahead. It is this turn from 'metaphysics as ontology' to 'metaphysics as epistemology' that is called the Copernican Turn. James Ward has remarked that there is nothing common in the revolution except a commutation of
relation, i.e., replacement of \( aRb \) by \( bRa \). But considering that the relation between the two relata—knowledge & known—was that of ‘founding’ and that the earlier relation led to a superfluous abundance of systems and the latter to their paring down to reasonable limits, even such a trivial change must be regarded as very important.

As a revolution, Kant’s Copernican Revolution has also been compared with French Revolution by Heinrich Heine—“On each side of Rhine we see the same breach with the past, all respect for tradition withdrawn. As here, in France, every privilege so there, in Germany, every thought, must justify itself, as here, the monarchy, the keystone of the old social edifice, so there, deism, the keystone of the old intellectual regime falls from its place.”

We are here indeed at the threshold of the concept of the critique proper. Because it is here that Kant’s methodological deliberations show a radical point of departure from the established modes of philosophizing. A proper grasp of the philosophical scepticism has convinced him that a sceptic can never be silenced by an ‘internal’ response, i.e., by instances of empirical knowledge however vivid, certain or indubitable they might be. All such arguments take for granted precisely that which the sceptic is challenging—that there is an independently existing world, that we exist, that we actually can have knowledge of things. More importantly, what Kant is concerned with is not particular instances of knowledge, but certain a priori modes of knowledge that make the former possible and therefore are necessary. The elements of necessity or certainty or universality (all of which are to be taken not in the logical but epistemological, more specifically ‘human’
epistemological sense) can never be expected from experience which can give only matters of fact. For these reasons, Kant explicitly rejects the empirical or psychophysiological method.

There is also one more reason for such a rejection. One of the aims of Kant’s investigation is the thoroughness or completeness. One can’t be sure of this characteristic if the investigation is merely empirical, because whatever is empirical is ‘therefore’ contingent.

But, above all, the supreme reason for rejection of empirical modes of inquiry is that the present inquiry is aimed at not only discovery of a priori possessions of human reason but also, and mainly, at their justification, quid juris. Let us remind ourselves again that according to Kant, what Hume questioned was not the need or utility but the ‘origin’ of the a priori concepts and had claimed to have demonstrated that they have none of the only two-reason and experience. So a proper reply to Hume must include not only the fact that there are certain a priori concepts belonging to our reason but also a convincing demonstration of our right to possess them. On this second count also, empirical methods fail miserably.

What then would be a proper method? In the present situation, when all genuine access to the so-called external world is impossible and therefore any methods presupposing the existence of the external world also are precluded, the only thing one can genuinely do is to examine one’s own consciousness or awareness. Apparently, it may seem that one is forced to do this out of sheer desperation or helplessness. But it should be remembered that, if so, this situation has not been forced on Kant by someone else. He
has deliberately burnt all the boats to the promised land in the piper's song and has decided to turn inwards to the deep recesses within himself to find a way out. The very paradoxical appearance of this move had perhaps kept all the thinkers till then from even exploring it. If actual discoveries or profits out of them are not be confused with the courageous spirit of a pioneer, the credit for blazing this new trail must be unquestionably given to Kant.

Kant's strategy seems to be that of beginning from the fact of experience, which even a sceptic can't deny, and then trying to show that this very experience offers ample evidence for admitting the existence of an external world which can be known with certainty and objectivity. As a result there is a shift from the objects of knowledge to the very mode of knowledge in which we can say something definite about these objects a priori. This is what is meant by the adjective 'transcendental' attached to Kant's method of inquiry. Far from being something high-flown or esoteric or mysterious this mode of inquiry is concerned with something within the reach of each one of us, with our own consciousness- 'what here constitutes our subject-matter is not the nature of things, which is inexhaustible, but the understanding which passes judgment upon the nature of things...only in respect of its a priori knowledge.' This clearly implies that the critique that Kant intends to undertake is a turning of oneself on oneself. In another place, Kant has characterized transcendental method as concerned with grounds or foundations of our beliefs. So a transcendental inquiry seeks to establish 'within ourselves' the grounds of a priori knowledge that we claim to possess.
Now, this proposal of a critical self-inquiry seems to be confusing. To a lay-person it may even appear to be superfluous. If what we want to know is ourselves, he may argue, are we going to gain anything new out of it; because this seems to be an attempt to know what we know. On a higher level, this exercise may seem to be problem-ridden. The basic assumption behind the attempt is that one can know oneself or one's own consciousness. In logical jargon, we may say that in case of self-knowledge the relation of knowing is reflexive. Using the function Kxy to stand for 'x knows y'-this will be expressed as (x) (Kxx). But even then the problems don't cease. How do we know that we 'can' know ourselves? And, further, how will we be able to say that we 'do' know ourselves? It seems that these and related problems must have plagued Kant. He has not discussed them explicitly in the Critique itself, but we find him pondering over them and simply claiming that 'reason must know itself,' But, as Heidegger has pointed out, it is only as a result of the Critique that reason comes to know itself. But this is not surprising. Kant himself has shown that our knowledge is the result of synthesis of intuition and understanding. This synthesis is the result of the function of imagination and of this function we are scarcely aware. In simple terms, what is implied is that normally we know that we know but we do not know how we know. Thus, when as a result of critique we turn upon ourselves, we reach a new level of self-consciousness. On this level the consciousness is not of ourselves as aware of objects but of ourselves as capable of this awareness.

Now, what is Kant's own idea of such a critique? One naturally feels like turning to the final section of the introduction
to the Critique of Pure Reason which explicitly claims to expound the idea and division of a special science called the critique of pure reason. But what Kant actually delivers in the following pages is somewhat disappointing.

To be brief, I will merely enumerate the points which Kant mentions as the salient features of the critique:

1. The purpose: Not to extend but to clarify knowledge.
2. Limit: The critique is concerned only with the principles of a priori synthesis.
3. Nature: It is a critique of reason itself and therefore we have sure criterion for the reliability of the conclusions. The critique must supply complete and systematic enumeration of all principles of pure reason, but it is not supposed to provide an analysis of the concepts.

At the end of this section also, explaining the systematic division of this science, Kant mentions only two sections - doctrine of the elements and the doctrine of the method - and nothing more on the ground that the reasons for further subdivision can’t be explained at the moment.  

In the preface to the first edition of the Critique also Kant equates critique with a mere listing of the concepts - “it is nothing but an inventory of all our possessions through pure reason, systematically arranged.”

What is strikingly astonishing is that nowhere in the introduction, or even in the prefaces, does Kant make a merest mention of the transcendental deduction, the essentially new and very important contribution of Kant to the world of philosophy.
Surely, a critique must enumerate concepts and principles and do this exhaustively but will that be enough to satisfy a sceptic or even to us in the heart of hearts? From the repeated referenes to Kant’s train ofthoughts - in his earlier writings, his letters, his 'reflections' - which I have quoted earlier, it is very clear that one of the very important issues before Kant is the justification or legitimization of a priori possessions of our reason. And another, equally important, issue is that of setting limits to it. Kant is not at all oblivious of these problems-as the judicial jargon such as tribunal, quid juris, quid facti, deduction (in the legal sense), rights, claims of reason etc. in his writings will testify. One can just try to visualize the first Critique containing only expositions of space and time and metaphysical deduction of the categories but no transcendental deduction and transcendental dialectic. So even by way of a verbal mention, these important sections of the Critique deserved a place. This is all the more significant in the light of the fact that Kant distinguished his own work from that of Locke in giving an account of the right and not only of possession of pure knowledge and hence advocated the superiority transcendental method over the empirical.

Even in the brief characterization of the Critique quoted above there is one point that is upsetting. Is Kant right in abstaining from the analysis of the concepts? Elsewhere also he elaborate on the reason for avoiding definitions of categories. In other words, can anyone claim to make a critical and complete inquiry without explaining the nature of the components of a system. But this is problem which should more properly be dealt with in the examination of the metaphysical deduction to which I will come
soon.

The plan of the Critique can be understood in a better way by the detailed table of contents of the 'B' edition. The first part—Transcendental Doctrine of Elements, consists of two section—one devoted to aesthetic—conditions of sensibility, and the other to concepts—conditions of understanding. This second part will be more important from the point of view of the present study because it contains the most important methodological contributions of Kant to the concept of critique.

The Method in Transcendental Aesthetic

The overall nature of the first stage of the critique is to lay bare what the a priori constituents of our knowledge are. But in the treatment of the two elements there is an important difference. In case of understanding, aiming at completeness, Kant insists on proceeding according to principle which will guarantee this completeness. Whether he actually does so and is right in doing so is an issue that we will take up later. But in the case of the Aesthetic he doesn’t seem to need that procedure. Going a step backward, we may note here that even sensibility and understanding as the only two sources of understanding are accepted without any procedure to prove that they are jointly exhaustive.

The method that Kant follows in the Aesthetic may be said to be that of abstraction:

"if I take away from the represenation of a body that which understanding thinks in regard to it... and likewise - what belongs to sensation... something still remains...namely, extension and figure."
The same procedure is again stated in slightly different way on the following page. What remains behind after this procedure is the pure forms of intuition—space and time.

Right in the beginning of the ‘exposition’ of the concept of space there is a comment that evokes many a hopes in spite of its ambiguity—"By means of outer sense, a property of our mind, we represent to ourselves objects as outside us." But then, without explaining what this outer sense is or what type of property of our mind it is, Kant proceeds ahead. Whether Kant intended to say that this very idea of ‘outside’ is a product or a projection of our mind, we merely have to guess.

Amongst the other characteristics enumerated, of space and time, the most important is that they are the necessary ingredients of our experience and a token of this is that we can’t think of the absence of these two although we can think of them as empty. But Kant is against treating them as absolute existents.

Derivation of the Concepts/Categories.

From the point of view of methodological considerations as well as from the point of view of importance which Kant himself attaches to it, the second part of the Transcendental Doctrine of Elements, i.e., Transcendental Logic is the most significant part of the Critique. This importance can be gleaned from the superficial quantitative span that it occupies in the work as well as from the need that Kant felt for making maximum revisions in this part. Ironically this is also the part where Kant has made the maximum blunders—qualitatively & quantitatively—and has, therefore, received a huge amount of criticism, some of it, of course, unjustly. But, the impor-
tance of this section becomes all the more vivid when it is found that in spite of all the blunders, criticisms and measures suggested to overcome the limits of the Kantian critique, there still remain certain insights which can't be denied and certain points beyond which we could not at least till now progress.

The treatment of human understanding begins very properly with a differentiation of Formal Logic and Material or Transcendental Logic. Kant has very rightly separated the former as concerned with itself or its own forms from the latter as concerned with the object of thought. This realization that our thought possesses a priori certain ideas that have reference beyond thought is a very important step in the direction of justifying the phenomenon of transcendence. This insight is preserved even upto the point where Kant points out to 'judging' as the key function of our understanding. The act of judging doesn't describe what our sensations, experiences are like, it has an external 'reference'. The common form of all judgments is 'such and such is the case'. In this they differ from the propositions of formal logic, which too are called judgments, such as 'All cats have whiskers', 'All fairies have wings', or even 'No yoyos are momos' because what matters is not their meaning and even their material truth but only the relations between the terms. It is, therefore, its agonizing to find Kant skidding across to formal logic for the derivation or metaphysical deduction of categories of pure understanding.

In 'Kant's Transcendental Logic' T.K. Swing has quite elaborately proved how Kant has actually not derived the table of categories from the table of judgments and how we can't base a
category on a form of formal judgment. Apart from the logical questionability of this procedure, the reason why this illicit jump from formal to applied sphere of reason should be examined is, that on the basis of it Kant claims two important characteristics of the critique - its completeness and irrevisibility. 92

Here I want to put forward a conjecture as to why Kant was lured into such a deceptive exercise of deriving categories from formal logical judgments. This conjecture is based on the internal evidence from the first Critique.

Earlier we have noted that completeness is the chief aim of the Critique. But in addition to being complete, Kant also wants that such a completeness must be assured. That is why he finds fault with Locke and Aristotle for not following the proper method or for picking up the categories 'as they came his way.' As regards the possibility of such completeness in the field of metaphysics he again refers to common logic as an actual example where such a completeness has actually been achieved. Now in logic this is possible because reason is concerned with itself. 93 This explanation of the sure completeness of Logic implies that according to Kant reason is a finite and static entity. This suspicion is confirmed when we find Kant explicitly describing reason as 'a unity self-subsistent, self-sufficient, and not to be increased by any additions from without.' 94

But how is the completeness guaranteed? Kant replies by drawing attention to the functions of understanding manifested through the judgments. On a supposed close parallel between the formal and real use of reason Kant used the same 'clue' of 'judging' to bring out all the categories of understanding claiming that there are 'the
same number of pure concepts of the understanding...as...there...(are)...logical functions in all possible judgments.'

One very simple way in which this could have been avoided is by comparing the meanings of different types of judgments in the Aristotelian table with the meanings of corresponding categories. But as noted earlier this option was foreclosed for Kant when he declined to explain the nature or give definitions of categories. It is difficult to say whether this omission was made on a purpose.

The preface to the second edition of the Critique also opens up again with the problem of possibility of a complete Critique not requiring a second glance for revision and assures us that this is indeed possible as amply supported by the example of logic. Kant draws our attention to the fact that since the days of Aristotle, Logic was neither required to advance nor to retrace a single step and hence concludes that it is a closed and completed body of doctrine. It can be questioned whether the fact that a field has not been altered or modified in any way for a very long period (in this case, about two thousand years) can be regarded as a ‘proof’ that the field is completely covered. Kant seems to have taken this for granted. But in a different sense he can be excused for regarding Aristotelian Logic as the paradigm of reason’s self-examination. For one, that was the only example before him. The very idea of ‘formal/deductive systems’ as the result of our reason’s creations based on an almost free choice of axioms and rules is a much later development. We can now look at logic as 'one of the
formal systems' that can have parallels. Same is the case with geometry and, in a weaker or loose sense, is also true about such apparently unrelated fields such as music or language or games. Looked from this angle, we come upon two important aspects about the construction of such systems. One is the element of convention as regards the choice of the 'basics'. What is more important from the point of 'systems' is the logical character of internal consistency of these axioms and not their truth or 'applicability' to something beyond the system. Another, and more important, feature for the present study is the ability of our reason as the source of 'formality' that is displayed through all such successful attempts at systems-building. So far as the formal character of the systems is concerned, they depend on this innovative capacity of our mind and not on experience of reality. On the contrary, we can cite in the history of science at least a few instances where an independent development in the field of maths or geometry was subsequently found to have application in certain fields of reality.

The Kantian contention of reason's complete self-examination in the form of Aristotelian logic has been shown to have limits by the developments in later logic. No doubt, it is true that Aristotle led the study of propositions of the subject predicate type (and categorical) and syllogisms containing them to its ultimate perfection. On this count he does justifiably deserves Kant's, or for that matter, anybody else's admiration. But from this complete or exhaustive exploration of a particular type of thinking, the conclusion that Kant draws, namely, that reason's entire sphere is exhausted, does not follow. As we have witnessed, later logicians have
successfully dealt with other types of arguments that required considerations of different properties such as truth functions, properties of relations, enthymemes, modalities, characteristics of relations between moral concepts (in deontic logic). I have referred to these developments in logic just to make the point that completeness is the characteristic of a formal system and from it we can't conclude that the entire sphere of reason's possible operations is exhausted.

But, as we have seen, since all these observations are possible only after the post-Kantian developments, we can't expect Kant to be aware of them. Consequently, we find him regarding reason and understanding as co-extensive.

To my mind there occurs one more possibility as to why such a co-extension of reason and understanding was beyond doubt for Kant. In the pure formal sphere of logic as well as while talking about 'objects', we use the same verb 'to judge' to describe the activity of our mind. But, if seen carefully, we can easily notice that it is used in different senses. When we are dealing with a categorical proposition per se, e.g., 'All dodos are tame' what matters is not whether the proposition applies to reality, whether the terms are meaningful etc. but only the form of the proposition-the way in which the two terms are related with each other. Such propositions are called judgements. But the term judgment is also used when we claim 'something to be the case/the state of affairs' 'when we base this claim on experience. In such situations what we intend to communicate is not the state of our consciousness but something supposedly beyond it, that of which we are conscious. As
such our activity is not just the same as that of the formal utterance. I think that the equation of the formal and real spheres of reason by Kant was perhaps the result of ignorance of this distinction between the two senses of 'judgments'. Even by Kant's own token the purely formal judgements of logic won't require the element of pure sensibility whereas 'judgements' in the second sense being synthetic a priori are necessarily dependent on pure sensibility and require 'synthesis' as an act of imagination for their possibility. But this vital point is ignored and the result is acceptance of isomorphism between reason and understanding and admission of the latter's finitude on the grounds of finitude of the former. Hence the belief that a complete exploration, not requiring revision or extension, of our understanding is possible, nay certain. The only logical conclusion into which this process can culminate is the idea of nature as a static entity completely and certainly knowable by us so far as its necessary a priori features are concerned.

One wonders whether Kant could have made these claims of completeness, finality and certainty if, instead of proceeding on the model of formal logic, he had tried to discover the forms of various types of 'real' judgments by analysing different types of experiences. But then, we know that Kant was so much fascinated by the formal characteristic of completeness that he ended up forcibly achieving it at the cost of proper conclusions about the nature of our understanding, or even proper method for deriving those conclusions.

Apart from the impropriety of drawing a parallel between table of judgments and categories of understanding, in the
light of later developments in logic, for which Kant can't certainly be held responsible, it is possible to question, even within the epistemological environment in which Kant worked, the very propriety of the acceptance of completeness as a goal of inquiry prior to the proper acquaintance with the field itself. On the basis of the foregoing analysis, it can be reasonably concluded that such a prior acceptance of the goal of completeness was one of the factors that was responsible for the weaknesses of Kantian critique. In short we can say that it was completeness that set undue limits to Kant's concept of understanding by requiring him to model it on Aristotelian logic. In 'Kant's Transcendental logic' T.K.Swing has tried to save the situation by regarding the table of judgments as content based so that the passage from purely formal to the 'real' use of reason is no longer there. But that scarcely helps because it presupposes completeness so dear to Kant. In any way Kant faces a dilemma. Either he has to insist on completeness and, for its sake, base the categories on the formal judgments and then face the problem of how this can be done, or derive the categories from the table of judgments as content based at the cost of completeness. Besides this, the second procedure doesn't require much ingenuity, as Swing has pointed out.

Earlier, I have claimed that Kant's upbringing in a pietic and morally puritan tradition was an important factor behind his interpretation of Humean criticism of dogmatic metaphysics as one aimed at the origin and hence at the validity or legitimacy of metaphysical knowledge. This was responsible for his search for the proper method that would establish metaphysics. The essence
of the novel method - transcendental method - consists in beginning with our experience which is an undeniable fact even for a sceptic and then showing that there is an a priori element in it. But, along with the sceptic, Kant is equally concerned with refuting the dogmatic claim that the reality in itself is knowable. Hence another important task is that of limitation.

So, against the sceptic, two things must be done: 1) To show that there are certain categories which we actually use (Derivation) and 2) To show that we have the right to use them (Justification).

It has been a practice to call both these procedures 'deductions'- metaphysical and transcendental respectively. But Kant himself does not use the term 'metaphysical deduction' anywhere in the plan of the Critique (p. 100) or in the first chapter of the Transcendental Analytic where the so-called 'metaphysical deduction', is carried out (p. 104-119) His own term is 'discovery'. In the introductory remarks explaining the nature of 'analytic' he describes it as 'dissection of the faculty of understanding'. And certainly at the beginning of the 'Transcendental Deduction', the term deduction is defined as proof of the question of right (quid juris). No one can say that metaphysical deduction is 'deduction' in Kant's sense. It will be interesting to see how and by whom the term came to be coined and circulated.

Later on Kant remarks very emphatically that 'transcendental deduction' is the 'only deduction' that can be given of such a priori knowledge.

Thus, at this stage, what Kant has succeeded in showing is that 1) Our experience is (in C.D.Broad's terms)
epistemological objective or, in other words, it has a 'referent'. 2) This fact is reflected in our act of judging. 3) Elimination of the contingent, sensible matter from these judgments reveals their pure form and 4) As these are (supposed to be) similar to the Aristotelian table of judgments, we should be certain that we have derived all the categories of pure understanding.

I personally believe that Kant is right in trying to derive the formal features of our understanding by eliminating the contingent sensible matter from our experience. If he had stopped at this he would have been much more respectable. But the lure of completeness made him present a show of deriving them from the table of judgments and one can't help exclaiming - "You too, Kant?"

Nonetheless, the subsequent portion of the Critique presupposes these results of the 'metaphysical deduction.'

By way of conclusion of this part, we can say that a good starting impression made by the transcendental method has been off-set by an undue attempt to assure that this investigation is 'complete.' A more cautious conclusion would have been: 'From the dissection of our experience, as we have it at present, such and such are the a priori contribution of our understanding to our experience; but there is no indication to conclude that there can be and must be only these and no others.' But under the pre-set goals of completeness, certainty and finality this conclusion was 'as it were, precluded.'

Transcendental Deduction

The 'metaphysical deduction' or derivation of the categories leaves us in a peculiar state. While we won't be in a mind
to reject the claim that there are the given number of categories (or, at least, most of them) and that they are a priori in the sense that they aren't derivable from experience, the manner in which Kant has derived them leaves a pinch of doubt about the whole affair. In such a state of affairs, one can ask, what is the propriety of forging our way ahead to the process of validation of these categories? Because, as we shall see, what we want to justify is not merely a formal truth which is justified if it is shown to be following logically from certain similar formal truths. So, along with the issue of formal validity, the question of the truth of the premisses also is equally important. And if regarding even a single of these premisses we are doubtful, deduction will fail.

Nonetheless, if we keep aside these issues and look at transcendental deduction per se as a methodological exercise, we will be immensely benefitted. The reason is that in this section we find a very novel strategy of refuting a sceptic. But to appreciate it, what is needed is an effort not to allow the shortcomings of the previous sections of the Critique to overshadow the insights of this section.

While trying to understand the philosophical significance of scepticism we have seen that where experience as a whole is challenged, no amount of illustrations from 'within' experience will suffice to refute a sceptic. Kant's decisive edge over his predecessors consisted in his perception of Hume's challenge as a demand for justification of our right to use the categories by asking for their origin and rejecting them by claiming (according to his own understanding of human nature) that they had none genuine. This
realization led Kant to seek for a new and proper method to validate the metaphysical claims. And if 'critique' is to be taken as the method that Kant proposed, transcendental deduction using transcendental arguments as the tool occupy the most important position in the concept of Critique. On their nature and value hangs the fate of critique of Kant and of sceptics.

Hence, just as the topic of transcendental deduction occupies the central place in the Critique, it should also be given a meticulous attention in this study of the concept of critique, where it is regarded as the tool of this self-examination of reason by reason.

This idea of giving transcendental deduction (proof of right) of the categories of understanding with the help of transcendental arguments gives rise to a host of problems. This is because they are not just purely formal, deductive arguments. Of course, for the acceptability of their conclusion the problem of formal validity will be an important one. But more important problems are raised by the fact that the arguments are intended to establish the epistemie rights of human beings. First of all this raises the question of the nature of the premisses - both as regards their truth and logical structure. This leads to the problem of the nature and truth of the conclusion or, in other words the nature of the result of transcendental arguments. For both these points the situation has been further complicated by later developments in our understanding of the nature of different types of propositions. And before we would conclude anything about the achievements of the transcendental arguments, we will also have to face the unpleasant but undeniable
fact that these arguments work only within a certain context of presuppositions and hence don't have the efficacy Kant attributes to them. Only then will we be in position to look at the implications of this whole exercise.

Therefore, in the following pages, I will attempt to go through these problems in roughly the same order. Where necessary, the corollary problems also will be explored.

The need of giving justification for the pure concepts of understanding arises due to the apparently heterogeneous origin of these concepts. They arise in our understanding which is not related to the objects in the way our senses are. Hence, it seems that we can have experience solely on the basis of sensibility. But this is precisely what Kant denies. For him 'having experience implies 'being aware of something as an object of experience, something as distinct from oneself-the subject of this experience.' There is nothing in our pure sense-data to give rise to this concept of object. Kant assigns the genesis of this concept to the synthesizing function of the pure concepts of understanding. Thus, though of different origin, the categories are necessary for the very possibility of our experience. The task of transcendental arguments is to bring to light this link between categories and experience and on that strength make their use legitimate.

As Dr. Sundara Rajan has pointed out, transcendental arguments are intended to meet the sceptic on his own grounds by posing a dilemma before him. If the sceptic doubts a proposition P, and a transcendental argument shows that P is necessary for any intelligible discourse, the sceptic must either accept that P is true or
(that P is false and) admit the impossibility of intelligible discourse of which his own doubt is a part. But to translate this noble intention into reality, the arguments must be sound in all respects - formal and material.

Logical Structure of Transcendental Arguments

This point has become problematic because Kant himself does not discuss it anywhere explicitly. But in order to understand the nature of the conclusion as well as of the premisses and the relation between them, it is necessary to articulate it. The strange thing is that, consistent with the understanding of the constituent propositions, these arguments can be taken to be deductive as well as inductive. Yet neither classification is completely satisfactory. This has led either to the proposal of a third type of arguments or regarding transcendental arguments impossible (Korner). After exploring all these alternatives, Wilkerson is at pains to accept such conclusions.

But in the light of circumstantial evidence from the Critique itself, I think, it is better to regard transcendental arguments as deductive. There are at least four factors in the Critique that point in this direction. The first and a rather trivial one is the term 'deduction' itself. Though Kant specifies that he uses it in the jurisprudential sense, it is equally deductive in the formal sense as the context of justification suggests. Secondly, even in the legal sense, an argument meant for the establishment of right has to be deductive as it has to proceed on the basis of established premisses in accordance with principles. Thirdly, and most importantly, Kant himself never uses the term 'argument' but keeps on using the
terms' deduction' and 'proof'. Even in 'Transcendental Doctrine of Method' where he separately and explicitly discusses the nature of transcendental proofs, the models before him are of formal arguments and the types he discusses, such as modus ponens and modus tollens, clearly indicate that he has only deductive arguments in mind. Lastly, these arguments are regressive as they aim at going backward from the fact of experience to the necessary conditions of its possibility. This process can be more properly presented in the form of a deductive argument with one implicative premiss.

Now, what is the structure of such a transcendental argument? As Kant himself puts it, the argument shows that 'experience, would be impossible without a connection of this kind.' This negative way of putting things is a clear indication that he regards the categories as the necessary conditions of experience.

On this background we can present Kant's transcendental argument as follows:

Premiss 1 - We have experience.
premiss 2 - P is a necessary condition of experience.

Conclusion  P
- symbolically- E

E ⊃ P
  ∴ P

Taken in this way, we can say that at least the formal validity of a transcendental argument is established.
But a transcendental argument is not just a formal argument. In addition it seeks to establish something real—namely our right to use a category or the objective 'validity' (in the legal sense) of the category. Hence to ensure that we aren't having a true conclusion from false premisses, as is possible in a formally valid argument, it is necessary to study the status of the premisses. This will also have a backlash on the validity of the argument because according to rules of logic, the conclusion should not contain anything that is not in the premisses and Kant claims that the conclusion is synthetic a priori.

Let us take the first premiss first - 'We have experience.' This is certainly not an analytic proposition as its negation is not contradictory nor is it necessary in the sense that its falsehood is conceivable. But the claim is so comprehensive that though synthetic it can't be called a posteriori. We don't experience that we have experience. The latter, substantive occurrence of 'experience' stands for a totality which is not and can't be an object of experience. Secondly, 'experience' in Kant's sense is a correlate of 'object' which is the product of the application of the a priori categories. Hence, the first premiss is synthetic a priori in the negative sense, i.e., it is neither classifiable as analytic a priori, nor as synthetic a posteriori as well as in the positive sense that it makes sense only in relation to the term 'object' which is an a priori concept.

The second premiss is more troublesome. If the conclusion 'P' is to follow it must be a proposition expressed in an implicative form. However, its analyticity is not an obvious one. There can of course be non-obvious analytic propositions, but there
too the analyticity is accepted only after demonstration. The proposition ‘E P’ is of such a nature that such a demonstration from some obvious and foundational analytic proposition is not possible. Kant himself doesn’t even attempt such a demonstration but simply takes it to be analytic. Kant’s remarks elsewhere concerning the genesis of experience can be taken to suggest that a demonstration of analyticity of the second premiss is impossible. Experience is possible due to synthesis of representations. ‘Synthesis...is the result of the power of imagination, a blind but indispensable function of the soul... of which we are scarcely ever conscious.’ Now, while dealing with schematism he attributes the origin of schema to imagination and comments that ‘This schematism...is an art conceded in the depths of the human soul, whose real modes of activity nature is hardly likely ever to allow us to discover.’ Here is one of the several blind-spots in the Critique due to which it can’t gain the credibility it promises. We are simply left with two unpleasant alternatives to choose from - Either accept the analyticity of the second premiss dogmatically on Kant’s word, or accept it as a result of some mysterious process that is unknowable but from which it is supposed to follow.

Putting together these observations regarding the logical structure of the argument and the nature of the premisses, what is the outcome? What we can say is that the arguments are logically valid but with regard to the acceptability of the conclusion we are in a fix. While Kant is definitely miles ahead of his predecessors in refusing to accept a single source of knowledge, the synthetic nature of it is far from obvious and not even provable.
Hence, when the premisses themselves are not indubitably true, the conclusion can’t be accepted whole heartedly.

Thus, once again, in an enterprise begun with lofty intentions, we have to accept a compromised result.

Before proceeding further, it necessary to pause here and consider what exactly has been achieved by the transcendental deduction, because along with the metaphysical deduction, it is supposed to have given a list of complete, irrevocable (why just these concepts, and no other —Critique p.114) and legitimate possessions of our understanding which are necessarily true of the world of our experience.

Even on the suppositions that the transcendental deduction is concerned with the necessary conditions of our experience, can it establish the conclusion that they are the only necessary conditions? The illusion that they are has arisen due to Kant’s earlier ‘derivation’ of these categories from a table of judgments of a ‘complete’ sphere that Aristotelian logic is. We have already examined even this procedure. But, along with transcendental deduction, there seems to be a certain awkwardness in this procedure. First of all Kant accepts logic as co-extensive with the sphere of operation (real use) of reason and concludes that it is complete. Now, transcendental arguments are as it were constrained to move-about only in this pre-defined arena and ‘justify’ the status-quo. But if we understand transcendental arguments as a regressive procedure that aims at dissecting the a priori features of our experience then it is really meant not for justifying a pre-established frame but for discovering the a priori
structure of our experience by continually examining them. There is nothing in our experience to indicate that it must be of the type we are having. And if the very direction of the transcendental arguments is to discover the a priori features of the experience, by its very nature, this method can't be applied a priori, i.e., in isolation from experience or without considering the concrete nature of experience. Kant's derivation of categories from the table of proposing first a ill-conceived frame and then forcibly confining all possible experience within it. But the 'projective' movement of the metaphysical deduction and the regressive movement of the transcendental deduction can't match each other and hence the discord within the Critique.

An important corollary of the claim to completeness is the finality and hence incorrigibility of the critique. But as the former fails to realize itself, the latter is bound to follow the suit. Stephen Korner has brought out this point in a convincing manner in his book 'Fundamental Questions in Philosophy.'

Korner suggests two ways in which transcendental arguments may fail to prove the uniqueness of their conclusions i.e., categorial frameworks. The first way is more fundamental in the sense that the very logic on which such a system is based may conflict with an area of thought or experience. But in addition to this, he also points to a vital deficiency in the very structure of transcendental arguments that incapacitate them to make such a claim. Though 'some' categorical framework is necessary for everybody's objective thinking, this does not imply that the present framework is the only possible one. To prove this, Korner holds, the argument must fulfill
two conditions. The first is the derivation or construction of such a system. In this respect, the categories of Kant are close to common-sense or scientific thought of his day, though the way of deriving them is dubious. The second condition is that the uniqueness of such a categorial system must be proved. But, Korner goes on, this can’t be done because we can never be sure that there can be no possible rivals.

Korner also rightly analyses Kant’s faith in the uniqueness of his categorial framework as a result of mistaking internal incorrigibility, i.e., incorrigibility within an accepted logical framework for incorrigibility as such. But I don’t agree with the conclusion that he draws on the basis of this discussion namely, ‘transcendental deduction is impossible because it can’t demonstrate uniqueness.’ In spite of this major lacuna, I think transcendental arguments must be preserved as an important addition to philosophical method. To reject them altogether is like rejecting scientific method because it can yield only probable conclusions.

In that direction, many philosophers have attempted to reconstruct or reinterpret transcendental arguments. A brief survey of these is, therefore, in order. One central question with which they all are concerned is the nature of the conclusion of the transcendental arguments. What is it that they establish? A fact, a convention, a choice?

Kant’s own understanding of course is that the conclusions are about the phenomenal world and can’t be about noumenal reality. If we remember that a phenomenal object lies in between the personal, transient sensations and the unknowable
noumena, we can say that, for Kant, the phenomenal object is the object and the only possible object of our experience and the categories are 'about' it. But as the noumena nonetheless looms large behind the experience, none of the later philosopher accepts this interpretation. As 'knowledge' is equated with 'knowing a thing as it is', the Hegelian view that 'to know something as it is not is not to know it at all' is influential here. But before considering the alternative interpretations of the outcome of the Critique, I want to raise a pertinent question which to my knowledge has not been raised before. It is this. In rejecting the Kantian model of knowing as conditioned by our in-built nature are we not clinging to an impossible model of 'knowing-something-as it is'? Though deficient in other respects, Kantian critique no doubt has brought home the fact that 'knowing' or at least 'human-knowing' is not a matter of just passive reception. If so, in the jargon of analytical philosophy can't we say that 'knowing-something-as it is' is a pseudo-concept, however attractive it may sound? I think, Kant is trying to point out the meaninglessness of this concept and to accept propose the more sensible, realistic concept of an object partially but necessarily determined by human nature. Now if this is to be taken as 'not-knowing' it can be nothing short of sounding the death-knell of epistemology as the theory of a unique knowledge.

But perhaps that is the inevitable conclusion that later studies have pointed to. Ironically, the Critique which began with an intention of asserting what we can know a priori about the objects of our experience is seen to result in conclusions not about the world but about ourselves. Thus, Barry Stroud holds that
transcendental arguments can establish how we must think things to be. How they really are can be proved only with the help of a verification principle. \(^{112}\) I personally wonder whether such a verification will be ever possible, not only in Kantian but also in the positivistic sense.

A different line of thought is proposed by Carnap who claims that the so called a priori propositions are about a convention that we have adopted to use language, and thus the question about their truth does not arise. \(^{113}\) This conventionalism fails to account for the necessity (though not logical) that we attribute to the categories. It also can’t explain the uniformity that is there for all human beings. At least to explain it, Carnap must probe deeper beyond the element of random choice to find out what governs this choice.

What the above two interpretations viz. of Korner and Carnap, have in common is that they tend to relativize our idea to our scientific knowledge of an epoch and thus are centered around the cognitive interests. However, philosophers like Strawson prefer to make a distinction between human experience and scientific knowledge of the world and regard that a critique results in a ‘descriptive metaphysics’ that is concerned with the broad general features of our experience and hence is not subject to change with development of science.

Schematism and Imagination

The last problem that Kant has to tackle in the positive part of the critique in that of application of the purely formal categories to sensibility. There are only two sources: \(^{114}\), sensibility and
understanding and knowledge can arise only through the union. Nonetheless, explaining this union is a problem because the two are heterogeneous. Hence, Kant brings in imagination as a faculty that as it were translates the formal concepts into principles that prescribe the pure form of our experience in terms of the pure form of our sensibility, i.e., time. Put in this way, it seems that such a schematization is a necessary part of the Critique.

But Martin Heidegger has pointed out to Kant's wavering position in this book 'Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics.' He points out that Kant begins dogmatically with the assumption of two and only two sources of our knowledge (as pointed above). But his contention that they are heterogenous and, therefore, a schematization necessary for their synthesis is a must is not tenable. This is because, at places he also entertains the idea that the two sources, sensibility and understanding might be springing or do spring from a common but unknown root. If so, the two sources won't be heterogenous. Such a common-root hypothesis is also consistent with Kantian contention of the essential unity of knowledge in the sense that in the very nature of these sources themselves there is the possibility of the synthesis. Kant himself, however, just treats the common root as unknowable. But this way of ignoring is not really paying as he soon has to give up the language of two sources and accept imagination as a fundamental and third source of knowledge. Heidegger proposes a restructuring of the whole of Critique as it were and claims that, instead of understanding, transcendental imagination should be regarded as the source of the categories as this explains the unity of our knowledge and the possibility of the
synthesis of the two apparently heterogeneous sources in a better manner. 118

I think, the foregoing survey of the various investigations and interpretations of the Critique is more than enough to convince one that the Kantian claim of a presuppositionless, systematic and complete inquiry of what we can claim about the world has definitely not succeeded wholly to realize. The major drawback is that it results not in knowledge but, as Hartnack holds, in rules or prohibitive imperatives not to conceive the regulative use of ideas as if they were constitutive and hence assumes the form of therapy. 119

So far as the achievements of the critique are concerned, two more things must be considered, because it is for them that the Critique came into being. The first is refutation of scepticism and the second, defense of the possibility of morality.

With regard to scepticism, we must say both 'yes' and 'no' to the question as to whether scepticism is refuted. To the extent to which Kant has demonstrated the necessity of a common conceptual scheme for an intersubjective world of experience within which alone even the sceptics claims make sense, he has refuted Hume by showing that we do possess a priori knowledge. But, as C.D. Broad has pointed out the term 'a priori' is used in a changed sense—transcendental.120 But that is a typical Kantian way of using terms in transcendental sense as is the case with 'necessity', 'object', 'truth' & so on. Hence, Broad's charge that Kant answered the original problem of the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments by changing its meaning.121 But, I think, this change was not just a gimmick by Kant.
to mould the question to suit his answer but a re-formulation of a question couched in logical terms to meet the epistemological needs of the context.

But when Hume's question is taken on his own terms, Kant replies in very clear terms that there can be no transcendent employment of our reason and hence metaphysics in the transcendent sense is impossible. 122

Now, this is a conclusion in which Kant is in agreement with sceptics as against the dogmatists. But in another sense he can also be said to be against both, because both of them agree with regard to the existence of a mind-independent reality and the model of knowledge as 'knowing - something-as- it is.' The essential outcome of the Critique is the meaninglessness of this model of knowledge. So if we can't know something as it is, the sceptical demand to prove that we can need not trouble us. To this extent scepticism is refuted.

But unfortunately, though necessarily, Kant agrees with the opponents with respect to the existence of mind-independent reality and this has caused a lot of consternation in Kantian scholars as this amounts to a paradoxical 'knowing that there is an unknowable.' However, as we shall see later on, the noumenal element is a necessary evil in our cognitive structure and the efforts to get rid of it have not so far succeeded. And as long as it is there the 'noumena' will be the last bastion of scepticism from where it will continue to upset non-sceptics-dogmatists and Kantians alike.

As regards morality, Kant's original intention was to make a 'scope' for it by showing that the very idea is not impossible.
For this it was necessary to carve out a niche for morality without coming into clash with universality of causality within our experience. This he achieved by assigning necessity and freedom to two different levels - phenomena and noumena. But his 'solution' of the third antinomy, based on the classification of antinomies as mathematical and dynamical, has come in for severe criticism because of a different strategy he adopts for it. Moreover, this sort of defense of morality by merely making allowance for the possibility is a rather weak and insufficient even by Kant's own account.

It seems that Kant himself was aware of many of the flaws that are discussed here in the body of the Critique. Hence, in spite of the claims of completeness and finality of the critique, he seems to admit towards the end of the Critique that in the ultimate sense a 'proof' of our ideas is not possible and the whole field of metaphysics may have opened due to not cognitive but practical requirements. 123

As regards finality the realization appears to have dawned a bit later. This is at the end of the Introduction to the 'Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics' where Kant insists that 'he who undertakes to judge or...to construct, a system of metaphysics, must satisfy the demands here made, either by adopting my solution, or by thoroughly refuting it, and substituting another. To evade it is impossible. (emphasis added) 124 These remarks are a clear confession of the lack of finality of Kantian critique and herald the further developments.

The Final Outcome
Here at the end of this chapter it is necessary to look back
and take stock of the positive contributions that Kant made to the world of philosophy in particular, and to the world of knowledge at large, in spite of the forgoing critical evaluation of different stages in his idea of 'Critique'.

The most important and valuable contribution can be no other that the very idea of Critique as reason's self-examination. We have seen that Critique was Kant's response to Hume's questioning of our very right to use certain ideas. Kant's ingenuity lies in taking a different - methodological approach. By turning upon itself, he claims, reason can assert, its own rights and realize its limits. 'Man is the measure of all things' was an old maxim, but it was Kant who for the first time proposed a programme of bringing out the full implications of the maxim.

A necessary corollary that follows from the Kantian concept of human knowledge is the idea of the world as the product of our constitution. Knowledge in this sense is no longer a passive reception but an active modification, a construction or constitution. This idea has caused Kant's critics to charge him with subscribing to philosophical anthropomorphism or subjective idealism or even to the impossibility of knowledge (of things as they are) but true to his position, Kant would respond: 'Well, this is the way we do know and we can know. If this is taken as a denial of knowledge under the unrealistic ideal of knowledge, so much the worse for the fate of philosophy.'

Another equally important relief that Kant provides to the philosopher is through overcoming solipsism. His very concept of experience implies a distantiating of the knower and the known,
the latter constituted by an intersubjectively valid and common conceptual framework. While we can't say anything about the reality as it is, the very fact that we have objective experience, that we can communicate with each other meaningfully or even raise doubts about the veracity of our experience are all indications that there is a common, epistemologically objective world of experience available to many persons. It is in this manner that we can achieve 'transcendence' of our finitude although in a new sense.

Methodologically, the use of transcendental arguments as the tool of laying bare and validating our conceptual make-up also is an important one. True, with their help we can't claim completeness of our inquiry, but they can definitely expose the necessary presuppositions of our thinking though they can't show that they are 'true'. Thus it has been a very effective tool in the hands of scientists, particular social scientists, for understanding the behaviour of different social groups by exposing the common intersubjective conceptual framework within which the people think and with reference to which they decide the propriety / legitimacy or otherwise of particular actions.

But such an effective tool was forcibly confined to a rigid and static concept of experience as it was at Kant's time and under the influence of logic the investigation was regarded as complete. As we will see soon, the most urgent need felt by Kant's critics is to free this concept of critique from this strangling confinement and to let it breathe the free air of a really 'possible' experience.
Chapter II

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