CHAPTER - IV

NIGERIA AND APARTHEID IN SOUTH AFRICA

Introduction 1-

The main focus of this Chapter has been on Nigeria's role in eradicating the obnoxious apartheid system in South Africa. In this connection the evolution of Nigerian foreign policy dating from the time of independence to the present has been traced. Besides certain factors, such as the aspects of national security, economic, humanitarian, as well as other aspects of socio cultural implications of the apartheid system which impinges on Nigeria's national interests as the emerging leader in Africa South of the Sahara has been extensively discussed. The linkage of the country's foreign policy with the federal system, economy, socioculture of the country has been of primary importance in this Chapter. This is in view of the fact that, any scientific approach to the study of foreign policy without a consideration of these factors is unthinkable.
SECTION - A
FOREIGN POLICY DURING SIR ABUBAKAR TAFWA BALEWA
REGIME : (1960 - 1966)

The South African Government has persistently and stubbornly maintained that apartheid is an internal problem of South Africa. In the first place, it is worth while to ask a question as to what apartheid connotes and how it came about? As often said, there is no smoke without fire and naturally there are bound to be certain reasons for establishing this obnoxious apartheid policy. In any case, South African claim that apartheid is exclusively an internal problem does not hold water, since the situation has gone to the extent of posing a threat to international peace and concord. Thus the concern of the international community over this issue is not out of place.

Understandably, Britain after colonising the whole of present day South Africa following the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902 promulgated the Union of South Africa Act with the aim of uniting the two white communities i.e. the Boers and the English speaking white communities. This was preceded by the independence of South Africa in 1910. Under this Act, political, economic and military powers were transferred to the white community
which comprises only one fifth of the total population. The indigenous majority were totally excluded from any organ of the Government. It was this total exclusion that formed the basis of the present conflict in South Africa. The first Act of the all white Government installed by the British Government passed the land Act in 1913 which set aside 87.3 percent of the land for exclusive white occupation. The indigenous majority comprising four fifth of the total population were herded into the remaining 12.76 percent of the land.

In the light of this situation what is expected from Britain is to do something realistic to eliminate the apartheid system it has helped to build up. Why in the light of the prevailing circumstances should Britain alone be expected to bring about the demise of apartheid. That is the responsibility of the oppressed peoples of South Africa themselves through their National Liberation Movement. But where the freedom fighters are unable to fight against the oppressive forces in South Africa on their own, it is the responsibility of independent Africa to come to their aid.

In a purely geopolitical point of view it might be contended that Nigeria has no justifiable reason for concerning herself with the apartheid issue in South Africa. That it should be better for Nigeria
to concern herself with the affairs of her immediate sub-region i.e. West Africa. But a closer look on the objectives of Nigeria's foreign policy would make us to understand that, the existence of white minority rule in South Africa based on apartheid is in fact a potential threat to Nigeria in terms of her Security Considerations, economic, socio cultural as well as humanitarian considerations. Besides, it impinges on the overall regional consideration of Nigeria as stated in the OAU charter. The following are the original principles of Nigerian foreign policy:

1) Respect for the independence and territorial integrity of all states;
2) Sovereign equality of all states;
3) Non-interference in the internal affairs of other states and,
4) Non-alignment with any geopolitical power bloc.

These principles have been reflected and strengthened by the objectives of the nation's foreign policy which are the following:

a) To achieve the total liberation of Africa;
b) To eradicate the inhuman system of apartheid and to ensure the social and economic well being of the African people;
c) To defend the independence and territorial integrity of African States and,
d) To put Nigeria's national interest above everything else while pursuing these objectives.

Nigeria achieved her independence at a time when the international community was up in arms against colonialism, racial discrimination and apartheid. The Sharpeville massacres of March 1960 provided ammunition for action against the apartheid system of the South African minority regime. Accounting for 20 percent of Africa's total population, Nigeria also has the distinction of providing one out of every six persons in the entire black diaspora. Therefore, making Africa the pivot from which the wheel of her foreign policy turns is only but natural. That is why the eradication of apartheid in South Africa under which the majority black population is suffering untold hardship is of primary importance to Nigeria in her foreign relations.

The initial seeds of this stand of the Nigerian foreign policy were sown at the time of independence. Right from this embryonic stage of Nigeria's involvement in the committee of nations, she took a stand against the Pretoria regime shortly after the Sharpeville massacres to adopt the special UN resolution on
decolonization. Nigeria's stand on this issue was
clarified by Jaja Wachuku the then External Affairs
Minister when he identified that, 'the total eradi-
cation of all forms of racial discrimination as one of
the pillars of Nigerian foreign policy' and went on to
declare that, 'our second objective in Africa is the
total liberation of the whole of the African continent
from foreign domination. There can be no going back on
that, colonialism in all its manifestations anywhere in
Africa must be ended. We would be
failing in our duty if we did not use our full resources,
mental, moral and material in the struggle for the
emancipation of the rest of the continent.'

This assertion of the External Affairs Minister
was strengthened when the Prime Minister Sir Abuakar
Tafawa Balewa declared at the African Summit that
founded the OAU that, "On the question of colonialism
and racial discrimination ..... we in Nigeria will
never compromise". In view of the wide spread
condemnation of the white minority Government's action
following the sharpeville shootings of March 1960, the
reaction of the Balewa administration regarding the
apartheid issue was not impressive. Independent
Nigeria response though clear was not sufficiently
forceful, a fact indicative of the still lingering
influence of the erstwhile imperialist power and other outside forces. For instance a statement made by prime Minister Balewa rightly attests to this external influence on Nigeria’s foreign policy within this period, "the unity of Africa presupposes the independence of all African States. Nigeria’s position born out of her experience has been that peaceful and constitutional methods must first be exhausted in the struggle for freedom. In accordance with this belief, we have given and will continue to give, moral and material support to the freedom fighters as we are opposed to a system which gives political power and authority to a minority solely on account of assumed racial superiority. We shall therefore continue to use all the means at our disposal, especially in the OAU and the United Nations to ensure that the last vestiges of colonialism and apartheid are wiped off the face of Africa.

In another statement he said that, "we know fully well from our own experience that the preparation of a people for freedom and nationhood in the modern world require some effort and sense of purpose among those on whom the freedom is to be conferred. We realise also that some planning and training are always necessary for the establishment of a successful independent state. In many cases the governing powers of these dependent territories have not accepted the principle of the right of self determination for these peoples."
There was overwhelming pressure from many members of the federal House of Representatives and demand from the National Congress of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) the Western and Northern Houses of Assembly for a ban on the importation of South African goods and the expulsion of South Africa from the Commonwealth of Nations. Instead of taking measures to implement the ban, Nigeria actually increased the volume of its imports from South Africa which stood at £ 1,006936 in 1959 rose to £ 1,018550 in 1960. Besides, Nigeria invited South Africa to take part in her independence celebration.

The problem with the foreign policy of Nigeria within this period was that it tried to eschew radicalism and run counter to the revolutionary spirit within the continent at the time. But above anything else, Nigeria's contribution in establishing the Organization of African Unity (OAU) is an indication of its stand for the unity of the continent giving room and strengthening inter-African solidarity. This was to a great extent a psychological boost to the freedom fighters in South Africa.

This posture of Nigerian foreign policy towards the eradication of apartheid in South Africa was due to certain factors. Nigeria attained her independence
on a platter of gold. The road to independence was gradual since Nigeria adopted the evolutionary path to sovereignty. The transfer of sovereign authority from the colonial power to the Nigerian leadership did not entail any violence. Indeed, Nigeria’s transition from the colonial status to national self rule took the form of constructive bargaining between the colonial interest and nationalist parties.

Besides, this was a time when the cold war between the Superpowers and their satellites was at its zenith. Obviously the establishment of its position in the international environment was one of the tasks before the leaders. This is by no means an easy task to undertake by an infant republic that had just gained independence from colonial rule. Thus the non-align­ment stand of the Government was a very wise and correct decision.

But why was it that, this foreign policy stand of the Government was not reflected on the issue of apartheid in South Africa? The fact is that, in formulating foreign policy the leadership elite was faced with the dilemma of internal disunity and a patently contrived and unstable federal political balance. Therefore, bridging the cleavages between internal divisiveness and the wider notion of Nigerianism was the main pre-occupation of the Government...
At this time, a pattern for giving and receiving aid had already been set up when Nigeria achieved independence. This pattern had been built on the promise that an important role would be allocated to foreign aid in the economic development of the newly independent less developed countries (LDCs). It was felt that since inadequate investment resulting from insufficient savings was the major constraint on economic development, the less developed countries had to supplement their savings and investment with foreign aid. Besides, even if they had enough domestic savings, they might not invest these savings for want of the foreign exchange component.

Like any other African Country Nigeria's foreign policy was shaped by many factors, including the colonial heritage, the nature and structure of government and the state of the economy. Between 1960 and 1965 the newly independent country was interested mainly in consolidating its independence in achieving Unity and Stability and developing its economy. For instance, the country had inherited a Westminster type of parliamentary Government, English as the lingua franca and an educational, legal and administrative system patterned on the British model. Furthermore, most of the country's leaders were trained in Britain and America.
The most problematic aspect of huge population, size and its heterogeneity is that it is bitterly divided as already indicated along ethnic, religious and class lines and that political behaviour and foreign policy tend to be structured in strict conformity to this situation. Herein lies the dissociation between heterogeneous population, size and foreign policy. Where ethnic, religious and class interests are diametrically at variance with national interests, national security is continually threatened and what Dr. Gambari aptly characterise as "Conflict of allegiance" becomes a rule rather than an exception. This was reflected in the foreign policy of the Government at the time of independence.

Moreover, a country which in 1960 had an income per head of £ 29 and a foreign reserve of only £ 1,45 million could not understandably afford to concern itself much with global or continental issues. The Government was not prepared to allow its commitment to eradicate colonialism to damage its relation with the Western powers. The structural integration of the Nigerian economy and its national bourgeoisie into an international capitalist order constitutes a major constraint on the ability of the bourgeoisie even if it were willing to change radically the structure of dependence.
Since the necessary resources, especially machinery and technological skills which were not adequately available locally would have to be imported, the foreign aid which would come in the form of foreign exchange would then pay for these necessary imports. Nigeria therefore looked forward to securing as much foreign aid as possible for her development programmes in consonance with the recommendation of an International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which postulated that, "without foreign investment neither public nor private endeavour can achieve the rate of economic growth the Nigerian people desire". During this period, the Western Countries took about 90% of Nigeria's exports and supplied about 70% of her imports, while the Soviet Union took roughly 1% of Nigeria's exports. Besides, the West ensured that investment flowed in massively as Nigeria appeared to be a model country for stability, moderation and liberal democracy. During the first year of Nigeria's independence nine of the ten nations that gave aid to Nigeria were from Western democratic countries. The Government therefore, became virtually dependent on the Western countries whom they considered as their traditional allies and friends.
This was the reason why the Nigerian leaders in the First Republic approached the apartheid issue in South Africa with care and moderation. This was ostensibly to enable them secure more aid from the Western countries with whom they have had long-standing relationship. However, as time went on there appeared a dramatic change in the country's foreign policy stand particularly with regard to the apartheid problem in South Africa. In part it was apparent that, Ghana's preponderant influence in West Africa and the entire continent was anathema to the overall interest of Nigeria. The leaders were apprehensive of the influence of this traditional rival and consequently decided to change their policy stand with a view to checkmate Ghana and to increase its own influence.

In consonance with this new stand the Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa went to the March 1961 Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference, "determined to oppose South Africa's apartheid policy". Consequently Nigeria spearheaded the move that led to the withdrawal of South Africa from the Commonwealth. As a follow up Nigeria terminated all the privileges of Commonwealth membership which South Africans enjoyed in Nigeria before South Africa's forced withdrawal from the Commonwealth. A trade ban was also imposed on South Africa. A few months later Nigeria moved a resolution at
the International Labour Organization to expel South Africa on the ground that apartheid was a flagrant violation of both letter and spirit of the ILO Constitution.

Moreover, ever since the OAU was set up Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa who played a major role in its establishment became an ardent supporter of the OAU Liberation Fund. Nigeria's financial assistance to the special fund of the OAU Liberation Committee progressively increased from £10,000 in 1963/1964 to £84,000 in 1965/1966. Nigeria's deep concern over the apartheid issue in South Africa could be easily seen when Nigeria convened a Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference in Lagos to discuss the rebellion of the minority regime in South Africa. Admittedly, under Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa Nigeria did not undertake to train South African nationalists for subversion and liberation independently of the OAU as was the case in Nkrumah's Ghana, but merely declared a readiness to help the freedom fighters with arms and ammunition if that is the decision of the OAU. Within this period freedom fighters were not allowed to enter Nigeria illegally and in most cases were sent out of the country. The most astonishing part of it was the announcement by the Foreign Minister Mr. Jaja Wachuku that the colonial territories should be given independence by 1970. This stand of Nigerian Government runs
counter to the thinking of a majority of African Countries who preferred 1963 as the dateline for the eradication of all vestiges of colonialism in South Africa thus making the continent free from the pangs of racial discrimination and the depredations of empire builders. Besides, in 1963 Nigeria embarrassed African freedom figures when its External Affairs Minister Jaja Wachuku proposed at the United Nations that a federation of separate white and black states be created in South Africa. However, protests by some progressive elements within the country forced the Government to withdraw the proposal.

The official verdict was that under Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, there was a general tendency on the part of Nigeria to view the conduct of external policy rather narrowly in terms of the projection of an image of international good behaviour and diplomatic correctness. The underlying principle of nonalignment to which Nigerian leaders committed themselves at the time of independence in 1960 often lacked, in practice, a dynamic personality and suffered from excessive caution in making new friends and pursuing national interests that may offend old friends. This foreign policy posture does not signify a genuine non-alignment but an economic alignment with the West. For the fact
that the economic relations have their own political undertones. Balewa's regime could be said to have been both economically and politically aligned with the West. This alignment with the West either overtly or covertly was a major inhibitive factor in the country's foreign policy regarding the issue of apartheid in South Africa.

Quite below the expectations, Nigeria did not follow a vigorous and assertive foreign policy with a view to dismantle apartheid in South Africa commensurate with her size and economic power. Rather, Nigeria was dubbed by the Western powers, when they often call Balewa as the golden voice of Africa. Thus, Nigeria was contented to maintain a low profile in her external relations within this period of the First Republic after independence. But to some extent it could be said that, this low profile was not without justification. It was due to the circumstances of the time. As Guy Arnold has pointed out in his book Modern Nigeria, "part of Nigeria's problem in international relations...... is ironically its great size in comparison with other African Countries particularly her immediate neighbours." In terms of population one out of every six Africans is a Nigerian which fact alone as Guy Arnold says gives her status of a giant in Africa. 16.
Unfortunately, this status was not made good use of by the leaders to help strengthen Nigeria's position in the world with a view to help the blacks suffering at the hands of the racists in South Africa. What in actual sense should have been a blessing in disguise was misused. That the pursuance of a vigorous and assertive foreign policy might frighten other African Countries of Nigeria's domination over them has no basis. At best what was really expected was to use these manifold blessings at the disposal of the country in dismantling apartheid by way of making proper use of the internal environments, of the vast resources and the large population. This could have been possible if proper use were made of these vast resources in the implementation of her development plans. Instead of doing this, the leaders resorted to mere rhetorics based on western democratic leanings that has no bearing with her traditional set up.

Was it not necessary for the leaders to understand that in international politics there are no permanent friends or enemies but permanent interests? Does it mean the non-alignment stand of the Government was a mere cover-up? In fact, Nigerian leaders after independence participated actively in the nationalist movement that led to the attainment of independence. What was therefore, expected of the leaders was to evolve an idea
system an ideology based on the Nigerian national interest. This could have been in turn inculcated in the youths and in all strands of the Nigerian society. The ultimate result of this would have been a patriotic feeling in all facets of national life which could in turn have been reflected on the country’s external behaviour more so towards racist South Africa. Thus, the tenuous - situation of a lack of common front, separatist tendencies that culminated into the attainment of independent statehood was reflected in the country’s political process both internally and externally.
SECTION - B

FOREIGN POLICY DURING GENERAL YAKUBU GOWON REGIME
(1966-1975)

General Yakubu Gowon came to power in a counter coup d'état in 1966 that ousted General Aguiyi Ironsi's military government which lasted for a period of six months. At this time there was widespread violence and political disorder resulting into instability and incohesiveness. This situation served as a prelude to the civil war that broke up in 1967.

The fragility of Nigeria's First Republic had the effect of weakening the vigour of Nigeria's policy during this time. However, the civil war provided an opportunity to make up for this weakness. The question of territorial integrity which had been a central element of Nigeria's African Policy was put to the test during the civil war. The eventual failure of the secessionist attempt and the support Nigeria got from Africa and the OAU was an indication of Nigeria's commitment to that principle.

The civil war has been described as a factor that has had the most profound influence on the country's foreign policy particularly with regard to the apartheid issue in South Africa. The danger which the existence of
the apartheid regime constituted to the security of the country came to the open. According to Chief Anthony Enahoro Nigeria’s war time Information Commissioner that, ‘South Africa provided the secessionist Biafra with mercenaries and mounted heavy propaganda to support the secessionist regime’. All these tended to make the Nigerian leaders to realise that the racist regime in South Africa posed a threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Nigeria.

Besides, Nigerian leaders had to learn many lessons from the international politics for which they were quite inexperienced at the time of independence. The first was that their so called western allies and friends refused to sell them the necessary hardware to prosecute the civil war. These gave the leaders a rude shock and made them to realise that in international relations there are no permanent friends or enemies, but only national interests.

After the civil war, in order to consolidate the tenacious national unity and to regenerate the credibility and cohesiveness of the OAU Gowon had to visit 20 African States between 1970 and 1973 including the four deviants. In a reconciliatory gesture to Zambia which had led the bid in the OAU to recognise the Biafran
The primary objective behind this policy stand was because of the leaders perceived threat to African unity which damages Africa's credibility in international affairs and Nigeria's role as the leader of the continent. Thus the Nigerian leaders indulged in forceful rhetoric the perennial substance of which was apartheid in South Africa. The post civil war leaders became more conscious of the African centredness of the country's foreign policy. As a matter of fact, they welcomed this preoccupation with Africa and urged that in the 1970s Africa should continue to receive Nigeria's foremost attention. Accordingly, the need to relate Nigeria's national interest to the demands of continental unity and development was given great prominence. It was always considered essential that Nigeria should always be conscious of its responsibility to all its citizens and the people of Africa.

This was started at the regional level particularly in the field of economic co-operation, it was envisaged that West Africa would be the domain of immediate policy...
relevance. This has resulted into Nigeria's participation in the River Niger Basin Commission, the Lake Chad Basin Commission and some other West African regional specialised agencies. Within this period, it became generally accepted that an objectively executed cognitive mapping of the 'health and wealth', the problems and difficulties as well as the self-reliance potential of the domestic environment could in fact provide the policy makers some broad indications of the 'power' and influence their country is capable of wielding in international affairs as a participant in the processes of shaping decisions in the image of its national aspirations and preferences.

Nigeria has since 1970 been adopting policies designed to strengthen the OAU and in particular to make it achieve its objective of bringing an end to apartheid. The Government became more militant and more vocal in denouncing these acts and contributed more to the efforts to bring about the collapse of the minority regime. In 1972 the country increased its contribution to the OAU Liberation Fund by 50 percent and in the following year made a further contribution of US $180,000. Leading members of Gowon's post war cabinet made it clear that Nigeria's attitude to the Western powers would be largely influenced by their relations with South Africa.
The importance of the OAU in the overall African centredness of Nigeria's foreign policy can hardly be overemphasised. In December, 1970 at the initiative of Nigeria, the OAU council of Ministers was convened at Lagos. Simultaneously the Defence Commission convened in Addis Ababa and Lagos renowned the call for the establishment of an African high command to defend African States in the frontline of the liberation offensive. Similarly in 1971 Nigeria determined to secure from the OAU council of Ministers a declaration condemning South Africa's dialogue policy and forbidding OAU member states from taking up the South African dialogue initiative so as to present a United OAU opposition.

The Gowon regime actually committed Nigeria to support the freedom fighters in their struggle to rid their land of racism and apartheid. The main reason for the assertiveness in Nigeria's foreign policy on the apartheid problem during the Gowon era was because of the buoyant economy that resulted after the end of the civil war. Nigeria took the lead in ensuring that the issue of dialogue with South Africa does not materialise. Though Ivory coast and few other OAU member states supported it, the Council of Ministers rejected it. Further more, Nigeria led an OAU protest against
the British sale of seven *Wasp* Helicopters to South Africa in 1971.

Though the efforts of the Gowon regime on this issue were laudable they fell far below the expectations. At a time when Nigeria had emerged as the undisputed leader of Africa with a buoyant economy she was expected to perform by far more than this. This stems from the fact that the Government wanted some assistance from the West on the rehabilitation programme of the country after the civil war. As a result the Government felt being tough on the apartheid issue might drive away the needed assistance which could only come from the Western countries. A clear indication of this fact is that although Nigeria increased her contributions to the OAU Liberation Fund and mounted more diplomatic support for the liberation movements, they were not allowed to open offices in Lagos.

While Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa with some validity could justifiably claim that the financial weakness of the economy which Nigeria inherited at independence imposed severe constraints on the options open to him for the implementation of the foreign policy principles, Yakubu Gowon could not plead the same constraints. By 1973, it was obvious that Nigeria did not need any more foreign financial assistance. Equally obvious was the
fact that foreign contractors were falling on each other to do business in Nigeria since they did not have to invest one Kobo to win multimillion naira contract. In other words, Nigeria was in a happy financial situation of absolute freedom to choose with whom she could do business. Unlike her situation in the early 1960s, when Nigeria had to conduct herself in such a way as to be acceptable to the Western countries whose finances she needed, Nigeria is now able to demand acceptable conduct from countries whose citizens wanted to bid for contracts in Nigeria. In spite of the damage and disruption of the war, the economy showed a remarkable resilience which surprised even the country's leaders. The war was financed at a huge cost of US $675 million without resorting to external borrowing.

Oil was discovered in large quantities and the country became one of the ten largest oil producing countries in the World.

Unlike during the first national development plan (1962-68) when the country depended on massive external aid the second (1970-74) and the third (1975-80) plans dispensed with aid altogether. Nigeria, says Moyall, "is thus one of the very few developing countries which can contemplate an ambitious development programme irrespective of aid climate and without needing to feel
vulnerable to possible pressures from outside. On the basis of US dependence on Nigeria's oil, Boltz concludes that "South Africa's influence on US policy ought to have declined substantially during the early 1970s in favour of Nigeria."

The feeling of confidence arising from the favourable turn of the economy made Nigerian leaders to criticise any country that seemed to pursue policies opposed to Nigeria's interests. Although President Nixon was among the first set of world leaders to congratulate Nigeria on the successful outcome of the civil war, Nigerian leaders found it hard to forget that the United States refused to embrace the federal course during the civil war. Besides, Gowon's chairmanship of the OAU was made good use of within this period in criticising the Western attitude towards apartheid in South Africa. But one realisable fact was that it was not sufficient when weighed against the background of Nigeria's resurgence after the civil war with a lot of petro-naira in her coffers. It was not surprising of this luckwarming or rather halfhearted support of the Gowon regime towards apartheid as Gowon decided to take political asylum in Britain after his overthrow to pursue a degree course in political science.
Nigeria's lukewarm attitude and half-heartedness in assisting the freedom fighters such as the ANC and the PAC within this period notwithstanding her greatest moment of triumph came when as a result of her patient diplomacy spread over several years, she succeeded in 1975 in establishing the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)\(^23\). This was based on the realization that, a credible foreign policy abroad must of necessity start with security and stability at home. The best way to achieve this is a skillful cultivation of the neighbour's friendship in a cordial manner. Nothing threatens the stability and well being of a nation that is cloistered around with hostile neighbours.

This was the reason behind Nigeria's pioneering efforts for the establishment of the ECOWAS to enable a greater economic co-operation among African states both regionally and at sub-regional level. As Omolodun said, "We cannot remain an island of prosperity in a turbulent sea of economic development"\(^24\). The ECOWAS treaty provides for free movement of goods and people, abolition of visas, the right to reside anywhere in the community and to work or undertake commercial or industrial activities anywhere without residence permits. As Prof. Okon Udung of Ibadan University stated, 'Nigeria's decision to throw her full weight behind the new effort was partly because of the intractable
difficulties involved in the success of similar move­ments and partly in response to her changing economic status among the countries of the region. At the same time we must concede that the economic power of Nigeria places her in a somewhat embarrassing situation and also makes it difficult for her to play the role expec­ted of her. Besides, she has to share the burden of paying more that is equal to her size and status. This is in addition to political responsibilities that is placed on her shoulder. By and large, the successful implementation of this policy would be of an added advantage in strengthening Nigeria to achieve her foreign policy objectives.

Nigeria emerged from the civil war militarily and economically preponderant, but still vulnerable to regional antagonism and potentials of neighbouring states to undermine Nigeria national unity, together with the linkage between national unity and aspired continental leadership. The consolidation of the Nigerian regional constituency became imperative both for the security of the Nigerian territorial integrity as sequel to 1978 ECOMAS adoption of a protocol on "Non-Aggression ", recognising inter-alia, the inviolability of national borders and guaranteeing the non-aggression intentions of member states and the maintenance of national unity and as a base from which
to project Nigerian continental leadership ambitions. In aspiring to the role of continental leader, the Nigerian leadership has perceived the need for the country to be seen to represent a wider constituency and support base within the continent.

The perception of Nigeria as the leader of the largest African sub-regional organization is of self-evident significance to Nigerian continental leadership credentials. Herein lies the primary significance of ECOWAS, namely that, the Nigerian leadership perceives in ECOWAS a base for the projection of continental role objectives. It is possible to envisage ECOWAS forming a cohesive political bloc within the OAU in time and the pragmatism of the gradualist approach lies herein. Since it is evident that the socialization of member states for a common political purpose is a long term and subtle process. Similarly, it is conceivable that the Nigerian leadership has perceived the possibility of the emergence of a powerful economic and political subregional bloc in the Southern African subcontinent once the remaining Namibia and apartheid issues are resolved.

From an economic point of view, the development of the smaller and poorer states as well as the larger states within the West African sub region can best be
facilitated within such a co-operative economic union. The immediate advantages are (a) the larger market for the products of member states (b) the extended infrastructural facilities (c) complimentary raw material access, (d) the stimulation of regional economic activity, (e) the increase in investment potential (f) an increase in industrial processing and capacity (g) the raising of levels of national income. Nigeria as the predominant economic power in the region stands to benefit more from the increased markets and stimulated economic activity than the other member states.

However, in terms of Nigerian role perception it can be argued that ECOWAS is primarily of political significance and that the Nigerian leadership perceives ECOWAS in the longer term as a potential continental and international economic organization. Dr. Okoi Arikpo the then Nigerian External Affairs Commissioner while speaking of Nigeria's wealth and size said that, "Nigeria felt she was in a frightening position in relation to other smaller African countries implying thereby that a big and powerful country had to tread carefully in foreign policy matters less it should cause unnecessary alarm and suspicion among the comparatively weaker neighbours."
Although the basic purpose of ECOWAS serves to promote collective self-reliance within the community, the real significance of Nigeria's relations with West African nation states must be understood in the broader context of Nigeria's security interests and unacknowledged competition with France for influence in the sub-region. Charles de Gaulle was once quoted to have said some time in 1944, that, "French civilization would prevail in Africa because it brought with it, two precious boons, respect for the human personality and material welfare." Seen from the African perspective it is more pertinent to refer to the institutional modes of French penetration and control, that is the numerous bilateral economic, financial, cultural and military arrangements undertaken with the local political elites.

In 1959-60 as part of the material foundation of decolonization arrangements in the financial sphere, France for example considered it still in its overall national interest to subsidize the budgetary and trade deficits of an impoverished client state such as Upper Volta (Bokina Faso) to the tune of 900 million CFA Franc in 1962, 1,000 million in 1963, 573 million in 1964 and 500 million in 1965.
Economically, another indicator of continuity is the extent of trade relations sustained by the advantage of the Franc zone between France and French speaking Africa. In 1978, for example, Francophone Africa supplied 67.9 per cent of total French imports from the continent, while 69 per cent of French exports to Africa went to this area. Yet France remains economically the prime source of foreign capital utilised by the ruling regimes of Francophone states for their domestic investment needs with the attendant result of further integrating Francophone African economies. As General Leclerc, a close associate of Gen. de Gaulle, stated, 'I dream of France radiating overseas bringing civilization and progress. Since 1940, the world has been surprised to watch our Empire fighting for the defence of the mother country. The first victories of our reborn forces were won in the Empire... the loyalty of the colonies should now be fully rewarded. It is our duty that the close union of all French territories is a fact by the fusion of the nation and the Empire which shared its woes so loyally.'

It is often the argument of French authorities that it is a different matter for them to terminate their historic mission in the evolution of black Africa. Thus, the range of practical Franco African accords
operational since independence in the security, political economic and cultural spheres becomes readily justifiable on the basis of this historic obligation. When for example France intervened militarily in shaba in the spring of 1977 President Giscard d'Estaing justified that action among other reasons as a gesture of Europe's solidarity with Africa. "I don't want African states to feel abandoned where their security is threatened... it is to show the close ties that exists between Europe and Africa.... Europe cannot disregard what happens on the African continent."^29^.

The case can be made that although France fundamentally pursues an independent policy in Africa the results of such policy are to a significant extent supportive of larger NATO interests, and therefore French involvement in the region tacit if not the explicit support of the United States as the leader of NATO. It is for example no secret that the United States, France and West Germany, engaged in extensive military cooperation including collaboration in the nuclear field with the Republic of South Africa^30^. This no doubt contributes immensely to consolidate the military power of the apartheid regime, South Africa, according to the thinking within NATO, ensures the security of the Western position in the South Atlantic area.
The pervasive and tenacious involvement of France in West-Central Africa constitutes a direct threat to Nigeria's national security and also impinges the natural growth of the country’s political and cultural interests in the region as well as its efforts at eradicating apartheid in South Africa. One evidence of this involvement and potential interests in the subregion is the mineral resources of Niger (uranium oil), Gabon (uranium, oil) Cameroon (oil) and Chad (oil, uranium). Another prominent evidence is military which consists in the large presence of French troops on French controlled military bases and the deployment of these forces for interventionist purposes in the region.

Another indication is the extensive net-work of financial, technical and cultural penetration of the relevant countries by French functionaries. Certainly, these are all critical prerequisites, indeed manifestations of the extreme political leverage that France wields in these countries. That it can make and unmake regimes from Libreville to Naukchott without suffering serious prohibitive costs exposes dramatically the truth about its actual political clout in the subregion.
It is to be noted that most of these countries in the orbit of French dominance are also located within Nigeria's sub-regional environment, where its leadership expectation is strongest as demonstrated for example, with regards to ECOWAS and the Lake Chad Basin Commission. As Prof. Ali Mazrui puts it "The natural rival to Nigeria is France". True, Nigeria took the lead in breaking off diplomatic relations with France in 1962 in protest over the French tests of atomic bomb in Sahara. Also in 1967-1970 Nigerian-French relations were severely strained as a result of French support for Biafra during the Nigerian civil war. Beyond this however, there is no evidence that Nigerian policy makers since the Balewa administration have been keenly conscious of the strategic essence of their country's interaction with France in Africa. Such an awareness would necessitate a clear and coordinated policy that places France within the context of an overall African strategy more particularly with regard to the issue of apartheid in South Africa.

Since the end of the civil war, France, with apparent encouragement from various Nigerian Governments, has been pursuing a different option of this strategy. Early that year Minister delegate for Foreign Affairs M Andre Betten Court visited Lagos and
held talks with Gowon's Government about normalization of relations. Following this visits Nigerian Airways inaugurated its joint venture arrangements with the French Airlines (UTA). In March 1975, the Peugeot car assembly plant in Kaduna was commissioned. Since 1973, direct Nigerian Franco business transactions had grown to such an extent that by March 1976, some 20 French companies were engaged on projects in public building road construction, the oil industry and telecommunications, worth about N26 million that Nigeria has emerged as France's leading market in Africa, succeeding South Africa and Ivory Coast.

In 1973, the then Nigerian Commissioner for External Affairs Dr. Okoi Arikpo, made a limp attempt to articulate such a relationship. In an interview with Agence France press he said that it would be unwise for Nigeria and France to ignore each other the reason being that, "apart from trading links, there is also the fact that we (Nigeria) are literally surrounded by French speaking African countries in which French commercial economic and technical activities are still going on. We realize it will certainly help our relations with these countries if we bring our relations to an even keel."
Nigeria's dominant economic and political status within the region as compared to the other primary states is one major bulwark against France. For Nigeria's population of approximately 100 million is nearly twice the combined total of about 51 million for the 14 former French colonies in West and Central Africa and it is still slightly more than that of the 19 primary states of the region of about 73 million excluding Zaire. Furthermore, Nigeria's GDP of US $34.2 million taking a base year 1977 was by far greater than the total for all the 14 primary states in the region estimated at US $21.55 billion larger also than that for all the 20 primary states in the region estimated at US $29.19 million including Zaire. Taken together, these factors alone point to the truth that Nigeria is the single largest economic entity in the sub-Saharan Africa apart from South Africa.

One crucial implication is that no regional economic arrangement could become viable without central participation by Nigeria. And one French observer has noted that, "underdevelopment and dependence must be viewed side by side with important countervailing features of the African environment in order to appreciate the prospects of an expansive
regional leadership by Nigeria. On the one hand the efforts in the eradication of apartheid has in the last 25 years pushed both the United States and the Soviet Union along with their inter imperial rivalry into the fore of political development on the continent. The significance of this post colonial phenomenon is largely two fold. It signifies a corresponding decline in the dominant power position of the ex-colonial nations on the continent, and it creates fluid circumstances for a realignment of political forces, thereby making it possible for a few well endowed indigenous states to play a relatively dominant role in the regional system less encumbered by neocolonial trappings.

One must agree, therefore, with Timothy Shaw that, "there has been emerging since 1975 a certain hierarchy and inequality of power attributes among African States. Nigeria belongs to that group of evolving middle powers in the global system which as Shaw puts it possess a range of national attributes which distinguish them from the majority of states in their region of location others are India, Brazil, Indonesia and Iran. For black Africa the development of regionalism is both a normative as well as historical imperative. There is an urgent need for the emergence of a regional power centre around which indigenous interests of the
continent like the eradication of apartheid can coalesce in relative security and autonomy.

Thus, balkanization of the Nigerian territorial entity dramatized by the Gaullists policy of inciting the secession of Biafra during the Nigerian Civil War has been one typical example. The role played by some neighbouring Francophone States most prominently Ivory Coast and Gabon in the civil war illustrates the immediate danger that French domination of these territories poses a threat for Nigerian security, and the overall interests of the African continent such as the eradication of apartheid would be in jeopardy. Added to this, the entrenchment of French military personnel installations and surveillance system in these and other local African territories makes the potential critical nature of the threat to unveil itself.

The most enduring feature of the French problem is obviously the cultural linkage between France and Francophone Africa. "Apartheid explains Prof. Ali Mazrui is anachronism and hated by all blacks in South Africa and indeed the whole black diaspora. French is loved by its victims in West Central Africa. South Africans are seeking to be redeemed from white racial hegemony many West Africans are contented to bask in French cultural hegemony.\textsuperscript{35}"
Thus a strategy of re-Africanization is indeed the motive of ECOWAS. Ultimately of course what is needed is to effectively challenge French hegemony in West Central Africa in the progressive development of a technological base of power by Nigeria. This is a sine qua non for a strong military force and a self-reliant economy, which will in reality confirm Nigeria's credentials as an alternative regional power to France. Allied to this is the imperative of consolidating the new democratic federal structure by the Nigerian political leadership as well as the intensification of conditions that will ensure greater social and regional cohesion. The effective implementation of these strategies would naturally boost Nigeria's efforts on issues bordering overall African interest particularly the eradication of apartheid in South Africa.
The Coup of 1975 brought into power a regime whose foreign policy has been out of context of the oil induced foreign policy enhancing international status. This has continued to be sustained by her potentials which include a large population, vast resources rich and varied climate etc. There had been no change in the original stand of Nigeria's foreign policy being centred on Africa. However, the need for the reinforcement of Continental co-operation and Solidarity through a determined invigoration of regional and Continental institutions, such as ECOMAS, the OAU and the ADB became highly imperative. This was with a view to harmonising the efforts among African states to strengthen their stability, Security and self reliance seeking the economic growth of the African Community through co-operation with the advanced nations without compromising their sense of self dignity, sovereignty and territorial integrity, unshakable adherence to the principle of the OAU Charter.

Thus, the need arose for harnessing Nigerian influence and power to the on going international crusade for the total eradication of mankind's only
surviving institutionalised slavery, the apartheid system. Nigeria's contribution to the OAU Liberation Fund has since 1975 been increased to about US $5 million every year. While at the same time, South Africa Relief Fund (SARF) takes care of providing medical and some necessary materials to the liberation movement. The Government continued to make donation to them as and when the need be. Having taken such a stand on the apartheid problem Nigeria embarked upon frantic efforts to convince the liberation movements in South Africa of the need for forming united fronts with a view to jointly face their enemy instead of dissipating their energies. When attempts to bring ANC and PAC close together failed Nigeria decided to sponsor the South African Youth Revolution Council (SAYRCO) some of whose members took part in the "SOWETO" uprising of 1976. This new body has been provided with military aid while its members also enjoy scholarship awards to study in Nigeria.

Why do Nigeria along with other African countries decided to keep South Africa out of the Commonwealth and the OAU? If we strip our answer of all rhetoric we find that she do so because they are a minority Government lording it unjustly over unwilling majorities, they practice Laws and policies which deny most citizens
their basic human rights, they do not enforce the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights, they obstruct press freedom and they gag the judiciary and compel judges to dispense a pattern of justice based on immoral laws. Because of these factors, Nigeria justified intervention in South Africa by the OAU. Nigeria has been attacking South Africa, pass resolutions against them and finance movements for their overthrow, impose sanctions on them and hope one day, unless they change voluntarily to be involved in a military effort to overthrow them.

One significant aspect of Nigeria's involvement in the apartheid problem in South Africa is the diplomatic offensive launched by Nigeria against the white minority regime in various international fora especially at the UN. It was specifically designed to shape and influence world opinion on the evils of apartheid. From the platform of the UN Committee, Nigeria has also specifically sought to exert pressure on prominent third world groups in the UN such as the non-aligned and the Afro-Asian groups to effectively isolate South Africa and support the liberation movement in more tangible terms. Even more significant is the Nigerian effort to bring pressure to bear on the great powers that have sustained the minority regime with massive infusion of
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armaments and development Capital. Nigeria employed
the use of threat during Murtala/Obasanjo adminis-
tration to pressurise Britain into reconsidering its
role in South Africa, it nationalised Barclays Bank
for doing business with South Africa and British
Petroleum Company in Nigeria (Shell B P ) for
Selling Nigeria's Oil illegally to South Africa.

Nigeria is happy to have had the privilege of
presiding for several years over the United Nation's
Special Committee Against Apartheid, and keep the
progress made in this direction under constant
review. Nigeria has faithfully adhered to the United
Nation's mandatory economic sanctions against the
racist regime and maintained no relations whatsoever
political, economic with the racist regime. There is
a complete ban on trade and communications by air,
land and Sea with the Republic of South Africa.
Apostles of apartheid and representatives of that
regime are not allowed to set foot on Nigerian Soil.
Nigeria, there are all indications, will continue as
she has always done, to seek to promote in the world
forum of the United Nations and other international
gatherings measures aimed at ridding Africa of the
aberration of apartheid.
It is also noteworthy that Nigeria identified the United States's Corporate interest as one of the most important sources of support for South Africa's prosperity and sought to apply political pressure on the United State's administration. By 1976 Nigeria's bilateral relations with the United States had faded and waned to the point where the military Government of General Obasanjo could refuse US secretary of state Dr. Henry Kissinger to undertake an official state visit to Nigeria during his African tour. The Carter administration took the cue on assuming office in January 1977 and set the pace for a thaw in US/Nigeria relations. Carter's Human Rights Crusade, his visit to Nigeria and his subsequent major foreign policy declaration supporting one man one vote in South Africa were illustrations of the twist in US policy towards South Africa in keeping with Nigeria's on the apartheid issue.

The Transnational corporation's deep involvement in the Nigerian economy has contributed to a great extent the Government's inability to deal harshly with them. Compounded with that is the fact that most of the (TNCs) spring from the Western Countries who have tremendous and uppermost interest in the Survival of the apartheid regime in South Africa. Any miscalculated
treatment on the (TNCs) might have a serious impact on the Nigerian economy because of the (TNCs) deep involvement in the Nigerian economy.

The Southern African factors reinforced by economic realities largely accounts for the cordial relations between Nigeria and the United States between 1975 and 1980. Although the rigours of World Politics and domestic constraints made Carter renge on some of his promises, his initial policies and actions endeared him so much to Nigeria that the leaders of the two countries exchanged the first official visits. Besides, in contrast to Nixon's regime which had refused to participate on the conference on apartheid jointly sponsored by the OAU and the UN, Carter administration sent a high powered team led by Andrew Young to participate in the same conference held in Lagos in 1977.

Nigeria's persistent assistance of the freedom movements such as ANC and PAC in South Africa stem from their racial affinity with the suffering blacks. As General Obasanjo once declared, "We in Nigeria believe that so long as one inch of African territory is occupied territory we remain in bondage and... where any black or African is oppressed, we share the indignity." He further said that, "Moral support for the liberation movement is a duty in the interest of the black man all over the World." It seems
therefore that there is no alternative to this policy as long as Nigeria continues to expose the linkage between black oppression and Nigeria's national interest of self preservation. As a result of this Nigeria has continued to sustain its commitment to the liberation struggle and the eradication of apartheid. Nigeria had since devised strategies to enhance the strength of ANC and PAC to give them more effective and substantial military, material and economic support. This support has been extended not only to the liberation movements but also to the frontline states who bore the strains of the problem. Conventional military arms and units have been mobilised and stationed in the frontline states.

The total identification with anti-apartheid front has been of prime importance to Nigeria's African policy. This involves a moral and political commitment to the restoration of human dignity particularly black man's dignity in South Africa. Under the Bantustan policy of the Pretoria Government 13% of South African territory has been allocated to the people constituting about 70% of the country's population. The Bantu homelands are characterised by inadequate economic base large population densities and increasing impoverishment, while the population is politically and economically strangulated. On the other hand, the white South
Africans who constitutes only 19% of the total population receive 75% of the total national income.

So actively and totally committed to the cause of liberation in South Africa she is that in 1976, the Nigerian Government decided to bring the evils of apartheid to the ordinary stay at home Nigerians by launching a voluntary appeal fund in aid of the victims of apartheid. A sum of 15 million dollars was collected for humanitarian purposes. Today every ordinary Nigerian is aware of what apartheid and its evils are.

The criminal policy of apartheid involving the promotion of the ideology of separate development of the races and the provision of legal structures and support for racial discrimination has been found to be morally indefensible and politically unacceptable to most members of the international community. Nigeria's antiapartheid posture cannot ignore the fact well stated by General Gowon that, "peoples of African descent throughout the world see in a strong Nigeria a banner of hope and an instrument for achieving self respect for the black man so long disregarded every where."
Within six weeks of the Murtala/Obasanjo regime coming into power South Africa featured prominently as the cause of Nigeria's riprend on the West German Government. A report came that West Germany entered into an agreement with South Africa for the sale of a nuclear reactor. In a statement the Government said that West Germany went into the agreement in utter disregard of her association with the African countries whose stand was that any country engaged in any form of association with South Africa was not advancing African interests. The statement continued that if West Germany decided to associate with South Africa it only showed how little premium she placed in her friendship with other African Countries. The Government's statement ended by asking the West German Government to explain for more details before alternative measures could be taken.

Nigerian policy makers saw the invasion of Angola by South African forces as an attempt by South Africa to install cliental states in Africa and thus push the confrontation line between herself and free Africa as far as possible. To that extent it was an even more unacceptable face of South Africa's brand of detente. For the fact that Nigeria is one of the two or three African states with the potential
"Military Might" to take on South Africa militarily, it was felt that any South African success in Angola would only have spurred her on in Africa. In other words, it was not just the credibility of Nigerian anti-apartheid policy is at stake but prevention of South Africa from acquiring a taste for destabilization of African Governments through military or other means became vital. As Prof. Bolaji Akinyemi said, "It is the duty of not only the Government but of all the people of Nigeria as indeed that of every blackman the world over to continue to support the diplomatic, economic and cultural isolation of South Africa until that country abandons racial discrimination and until that Government treats the black man in South Africa as a full citizen of the country of his birth."

Nigeria's commitment to armed struggle in South Africa perhaps provide the main focus for assessing the degree of tension between Nigeria and the racist regime of South Africa. It can be presumed then, that Nigeria and South Africa are mutually antagonistic. Indeed the hardline approach rest on the mutual perception of Nigeria and South Africa as common enemies, therefore, relations between the two countries have been tense and hostile. There is
every possibility of South Africa infiltration in attempt to thwart Nigeria's efforts and weaken its domestic political machinery with a view to distracting it from its external commitments. According to Clause Witz, "war ... is a Continuation of political intercourse, a Conduct of political intercourse by other means. Foreign and defence policies are closely linked and should therefore, be made to mutually reinforce each other, especially as the capacity of a state to pursue a dynamic and influential foreign policy and to, if need be impose her will ultimately depends not merely upon the soundness of its military capability of internal domestic order but, perhaps more importantly on its military capability profile and defence preparedness." The issue of the debate on whether Nigeria should go nuclear in her armament and defence policy underscores and reflects the perceived linkage which Nigerian foreign policy elites see between the country's defence policy and foreign policy in Africa particularly in relation to South Africa which has acquired nuclear capability.

Some have argued that in the event if South African policy of containment shows any sign of failure, the Pretoria regime, in desperation could launch a nuclear attack on Nigeria and other black
states giving assistance to the liberation movements. The threat seems even more ominous when one is confronted by the grim fact that South Africa may have already acquired an effective delivery system putting Nigerian targets within easy reach. It is of course possible that South African nuclear facilities can become the target of attacks by the liberation movements inside that country.

The need therefore, for a regional collective defence arrangement became highly imperative. For South Africa is a relatively credible military power in the African context. In addition to its own technology and armaments industry it has guaranteed access to arms and other material assistance from its Western supporters. To confront and compel South Africa to free the sovereignty of the frontline states, African Countries, especially those in the fore of the liberation efforts must possess an equivalent or greater military capability to back up their policies.

But the problem is that African Countries are unarmed. The possible threat from South Africa highlights the urgency of a collective defence system, and the need to take a longer perspective at the security interests of the African continent. The principal challenge to Nigeria would be to champion a revitalization of the African common defence system which
Kwameh Nkrumah desperately advocated in the early 1960s that Nigeria has vigorously encouraged all African states to eschew narrow parochial interests and to conceive of their political future and independence as being predicated on the security interests of the African continent as a whole.

A necessary first step to close the gap between putative economic power and military strength will be to disengage from the present development model based on dependent capitalism. Thus an alternative strategy of collective self reliance with emphasis on political education, science and technology and industrialization of the production is a much more viable model for Nigeria. Quite arguably, one such restraining factor could be linked to the dependent development pattern of Nigeria's national economy. Another could be the weight of international opinion against the evolution of what certain observers regard as sub-imperialism in the developing regions.

Prof. Aluko is probably correct in arguing that, the cost of a nuclear plant enrichment and reprocessing facilities and of the acquisition of the necessary expertise and uranium to produce nuclear weapons would be so prohibitive as to make nuclear development an unthinkable option. However, his policy prescription
would appear to be an even more unattainable alternative strategy than the nuclear option per se. For while it may be a most difficult endeavour for Nigeria to mobilise the economic political and social resources for nuclear weapon’s acquisition and development, especially in the light of the present economic depression it will certainly be well nigh impossible, in order to ensure security for Nigeria to try to persuade neighbouring states to observe the same democratic values that she does.

Against the background of this generally perceived linkage between foreign and defence policies, it is however, difficult to understand why for instance membership of the National Defence Council created as a statutory body under the 1979 presidential constitution to advise the president on matters relating to the defence of the sovereign and territorial integrity of Nigeria, should have excluded the Minister of External Affairs. It is a known fact that, no credible defence plan and strategy can be properly developed without a consideration of its external implications. That notwithstanding, the credibility of Murtala/Obasanjo regime’s foreign policy is clearly amplified in a statement made by Oye Ogunbadejo that, "clearly, the record of the military in the field of the country’s foreign relations in varying degrees is much better than
that of the Balewa regime. But then this could be explained to some extent by the way of Lago's increased capability for influence in its oil wealth particularly in the years after the civil war, provided Nigeria with the economic base and thus the confidence to give more substance to its foreign policy of non-alignment.

Thus if the sixties were symbolised by passivity, the seventies were characterised by activity especially within Africa. This new tempo in Nigeria's external affairs was the result of a conjecture at the beginning of the new decade constituting on the one hand, the ending of domestic hostilities and internal crisis from 1970-71 and on the other hand, the beginning of international energy and economic crisis during 1973-74. In the second half of the seventies in particular Lagos emerged as a diplomatic centre by contrast to the inheritance of the First Civilian Republic. According to Ogunbadejo: "When the military intervened in January, 1966, Nigeria's foreign policy remained what it had been when the Country attained its independence from Britain in 1960, it was openly pro... West and lacked any initiative, creativity or leadership of any consequence in African affairs."

Nigeria's new Afro centric activism which for a while came to shape its attitude towards other
African interests and issues was revealed most dramatically in its surprising recognition of the MPLA regime in Angola in 1976 in addition to its continuous advocacy of regional co-operation in West Africa after 1975. Policy namely liberation in South Africa and integration in West Africa Continued.

The Nigerian Federal Government succeeded to galvanise public opinion in Nigeria on the basic principle of its opposition to the apartheid system by setting up a National Committee on the Dissemination of Information on the Evils of Apartheid. The activities of this Committee helped to keep the people informed and alive to the issue. It also generated support and sympathy for the Government's position among the people. At the same time Multinational corporations operating in Nigeria were told that for any Government contracts to be awarded to them they have to reappraise their operation in South Africa.

In 1978 a United Nation's Conference on the evils of apartheid was held in Lagos, Capital of Nigeria under the auspices of the Nigerian Government. This was in addition to the military, financial and diplomatic support that was stepped up. The Government increased its contribution to the OAU Liberation Committee Fund and also embarked on direct material aid to the
liberation movements. In his address at Howard University Washington D.C. the Nigerian Head of state made the following statement in October 1977: "Your great country is a world power and its position and posture on many issues can be and most often is critical to the nature and speed of solution in world affairs. Your political process is oiled by an efficient system of lobbies. The greatest weakness in the foreign policy of the African countries is that, although the USA has one of the largest concentration of blacks in the world, this political power has not before now been used to influence its African policy. Increasingly there is an awareness of this possibility, in all black intellectuals, scholars and researchers in their work. The politicians of the black caucus have become a greater force to reckon with, the black vote too has become decisive factor. These new points must facilitate the achievement of the objective of black and African peoples wherever they may be. There is no greater area of action for this lobby than the explosive situation in South Africa."

What is understandable from the statement of the Head of state is to enable America to change her stand and attitude over the issue of apartheid in South Africa. Notably that it would help to solve the
apartheid problem. Therefore, there arose an imperative need to galvanise the American blacks to influence and lobby for a change in South Africa in favour of the blacks overthere. This was a step in the right direction, because inspite of what the huge American black population can do in this regard, Africans have to show them how serious they are over this issue. The days when the interests of the black Americans can be overlooked are gone. In fact, today most of the black leaders are a power to reckon with in the American political process.
SECTION - D

FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE REGIME OF THE FIRST
EXECUTIVE PRESIDENT ALHAJI SHEHU SHAGARI (1979-1983)

This administration’s stand over the apartheid problem in South Africa is clearly amplified in President Shagari’s foreign policy statement immediately he assumed office. “Africa remains the cornerstone of Nigeria’s foreign policy. My administration is committed to the cause of the total liberation of Africa and the abolition of racism in all its manifestations. We shall neither relax nor relent until all African men are free. It should be understood that especially South Africa where the entire world is convinced that problems created by racial injustices are fast threatening the peace and shared good will of the human race... the style of Nigerian foreign policy today is therefore, determined largely by these two unambiguously articulated factors, African solidarity and an unflinching adherence has emerged as a realistic approach to the prevailing structure, and condition of the international community. Nigeria has an inter African consensus without which Africa would not overcome its numerous post colonial and economic viability will continue to elude a greater part of the continent.”
President Shagari's initiative in proposing and hosting the first OAU economic summit in Lagos in April 1980 further underscores the high position which interstate economic Co-operation and economic development of Africa have come to occupy on Nigeria's foreign policy agenda particularly since the mid 1970s. The Lagos plan of Action approved at the end of the summit of all African States to sectored functional Co-operation, Nigeria's renewed caution and conservatism is due then not only to its continued dependence on an outward oriented petroleum industry but also to an interrelated set of complex changes as the 1980s began in contrast to the relatively favourable situation of the early 1970s. Together these factors constituted new challenges and constraints first at the national level, the revival of democratic forms and the instability of revenues inhibited dramatic initiatives. Secondly at the regional level ECOWAS was marked by interstate wrangles and interstate conflicts. Thirdly at the continental level OAU affairs entered a period of intense controversy particularly over the apartheid issue in South Africa did not proceed at the same pace following the independence of Zimbabwe.

Besides, at the global level the cold war returned and the global economy failed to expand. The distinction
among such levels of interaction Constitutes one type of explanation for the Contradictions and set backs to Nigeria's foreign policy towards the apartheid problem in South Africa. At the level of apartheid in South Africa Nigeria's Support for anti racist African nationalism has put it more directly in opposition to various Western countries and Corporations, although once again shared Commercial interests moderate antagonisms. Inspite of these aforementioned Constraints, Nigeria's support to the liberation movements have been quite impressive in Shagari's administration. The Government became a helpful fixer between the Western and the frontline States over a series of multilateral negotiations. Yet the combined insensitivities of the Reagan and Thatcher's administrations further helped to strain Nigeria's tolerance of Western perfidy not withstanding their common Conservative inclinations.

What she fail to understand or perhaps ignore is that American or Western policies and aspirations are not in congruence with hers. This has clearly been shown to be so in Southern Africa. She must clearly move towards checking American preponderance in any of these areas but without exposing the region to the overriding concerns of East - West geostrategic
calculations. Any appeal to the loftier values of international equity, justice and morality will go unheard since we do not command the international superstructure of control which enforces them.

At this time petroleum production dropped significantly from 2 million barrels per day in the first third of 1981 and January 1987. But the "roller coaster" continued when the 1982 production further declined to 0.7 million barrels per day and foreign exchange reserves dropped even more precipitously, leading to emergency economic decision and legislation. Yet by early June of 1982 liftings were back to 13 million barrels per day despite Nigeria's perpetuating its premium price of US $35.50 per barrel. The same mini cycle was repeated in the first half of 1983 when the Nigerian OPEC stand led to the cartels' apparent demise. These volatile oil cycles really affected Nigeria's industrialization process which was reflected on the country's foreign policy.

These rather calamitous set of political and economic circumstances had foreign policy repercussions in the expulsion in January 1983 of an estimated two million aliens illegally resident and employed in Nigeria. Significantly the attention which underscores the intimate linkage between domestic stability and
foreign policy action. There is no comfort to be drawn from the current political and economic disarray in Nigeria, or Africa at large. Economic collapse and concomitant political instability provide the opportunities for the foreign meddling and exploitation which impinges upon the hard won national sovereignty closely guarded by African States. The consequence will be an intensification of Nigerian paranoia and the butt of increasing political frustration will be apartheid South Africa.

In a world economy that is basically reliant on oil, Nigeria's economic and strategic importance is enormous. The increase in Nigeria's wealth and position, has immensely enhanced her political and strategic importance in African and world politics. A strong member of nonaligned movement, a cofounder of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Nigeria is slowly but assuredly emerging as a major factor in global power calculus particularly on African affairs. But when nemesis caught the economy, oil induced foreign policy died a natural death. As Prof. Claude Ake laments, "Nigeria's economy is still oriented outwards and hooked into dependence on the West. Our problems are rooted in our history and in the concrete economic and social structures which has evolved. By
the very nature of the problems they can not be solved without at the very best breaking our exploitative dependence on the West and doing away with the existing relations of production ... the contradictions of the present system are creating the conditions that will change it.

There is no doubt that this situation during the Shagari administration was a major lacuna in the conduct of Nigerian foreign policy toward apartheid in South Africa. But still the Shagari Government was able to show a stern measure in criticising the apartheid South African Government in its nefarious activities in oppressing the black people of South Africa. This could be seen when Shagari unleashed a diplomatic offensive on the South African Government when he said that, "the current policies of South Africa of increasing oppression and repression at home, of unprovoked aggression on the neighbouring states and an arrogant defiance of the entire international Community and the United Nations may well lead to tragedy of monumental proportions. We can not leave matters in the hands of the racists in South Africa even if we were to believe that they hold the key to settlement. Even their best friends do not trust South Africa to voluntarily change their racist ways. We must therefore mobilise interna-
tional opinion to keep on the pressure including the imposition of sanctions against South Africa.\footnote{51}

The president in a further statement said "We believe the recently concluded Rugby Tour of New Zealand by the Springboks must have given some comfort to the South African racists regime as it threatened the unity and Solidarity of the Commonwealth. Nigeria, he continued deeply deplored the fact that the Government of New Zealand was unable to utilise the provisions of the Gleneagles agreements to the full and in a more effective manner to have stopped the tour. It was most unfortunate that the Commonwealth by an overwhelming consensus found itself as a very last resort with no other option but to shift the venue of the important annual Commonwealth finance Minister's meeting away from New Zealand. The Commonwealth was obliged to do this simply to show displeasure and disapproval or avoid embarrassment, but to prevent the development of a most serious rift among its members. Nigeria is particularly gratified by the show of total commitment to this noble, moral and humanitarian struggle by the people of New Zealand. Nigeria fully supports and reaffirms its faith in the Gleneagles agreement."\footnote{52}
Nigeria's smooth journey towards independence, as often said, led to the belief during the Balewa era that moral persuasion could help in the liberation struggle in apartheid South Africa. The realization of the falsity of this view has led to more trenchant criticism of the apartheid system beginning from 1970s. As a result of this, Nigeria has been very active in providing materials, fund and aid to ANC and PAC which are the recognised freedom movements in South Africa. Nigeria is constantly being consulted by the UN and the European Contact Group on the apartheid issue. She has for some years and up till the present day been the chairman of the UN special Committee against apartheid.

In continuation of Nigeria's activist role in the liberation struggle, Alhaji Shehu Shagari, the then executive president of Nigeria, had once called for the imposition of an oil embargo against South Africa. Nigeria's declared policy motivation as a result, was scarcely distinguishable from that of Africa as a whole. He said, "Nigeria is an African nation; it is part and parcel of that continent of Africa and therefore, it is but natural for anything that pertains to that continent to be of utmost concern to Nigeria. Nigeria cannot and has not been neutral and must never be considered as a neutralist country ... We are independent in every
thing but neutral in nothing that affects the destiny of Africa.\textsuperscript{53} Through the process of cumulative diplomacy the precepts of Nigerian external policy particularly on apartheid in South Africa have evolved from the abstract and vague to the assertive and specific. Thus over the 25 years since independence there have been only but peripheral changes most noticeably in terms of economic and military capability the basic imperative remain unchanged. That is to say (a) the need to manifest and maintain domestic political stability and national unity which most forcibly underscored the experience of the civil war and (b) the need to exert its "predestined" leadership role in Africa in accordance with Pan African sentiments and objectives. \textsuperscript{54}

In 1983 president Shagari in an annual foreign policy speech at the Institute of International Affairs Lagos as its patron made a foreign policy speech which showed the high tempo of Nigerian concern over the issue of apartheid, "the situation in South Africa then as was a reflection of making the Bantustan a separate state, thus bringing into reality Pretoria's dream of separate development. Sham constitutional changes in South Africa under which sections of the South African population were to be associated with the exploitative and racial
system to the exclusion of the majority black African population has been consumated. There is no doubt that the struggle in South Africa has entered a new and decisive stage. We will therefore, continue to provide all possible assistance to ANC and PAC as they embark on their new strategies in the liberation struggle. We will closely once again join hands with the frontline states in order to ensure the victory of ANC and PAC in the efforts at eradicating apartheid in South Africa.
FOREIGN POLICY DURING MAJOR GENERAL
MUHAMMADU Buhari Regime
(1983 - 1985)

There is actually nothing much to take home about the Buhari administration with regard to foreign policy projection and execution. As could be seen this administration came to power when the nation’s economy was in complete shambles resulting into uncertainties about the future of the country as an active participant in the committee of nations. This situation led to the overthrow of President Shagari’s administration by Major General Buhari in December, 1983.

Thus within this period the paramount concern of the Government was to create in the masses a sense of discipline and patriotism the absence of which has been the cause of perennial problems of political instability and incohesiveness. Equally of much concern to the Government was to revamp the debtridden economy of the nation as creditors no longer have faith to do any transaction with the nation. At this time particular attention was paid on events happening mainly on her neighbouring countries. This was because of the realization that, the spillover effects of instability in
these countries would inevitably have a tremendous effect on her political stability and economic well being.

Nonetheless, the commitment of this administration to the total liberation of Africa can be hardly over emphasised within the short span of its stay in power. At the epicentre of the Government's priorities were the national economic and security interests of the Federal Republic of Nigeria which were inextricably tied up with the security, the stability and the economic and social well being of her immediate neighbours. Efforts were made by the Government for the realization of these objectives.

A four nation mini-summit was held in Lagos embracing Nigeria, Benin, Togo and Ghana with a view to ensure their collective and individual security and prosperity. On the apartheid issue the Head of state Major General Muhammadu Buhari attacked the South African Government in a foreign policy speech he delivered at the Institute of International Affairs in December 1984 that, "South Africa today remains the greatest threat to our national interest. The major thrust of our policy in South Africa is therefore directed against the obnoxious system of apartheid. We believe that the despicable system of
apartheid must be eliminated within the shortest time limit, in order to avoid any further encroachment on the inalienable rights of all blacks and African people throughout the world.

The assertion is an indication that the Government was highly committed to see that the apartheid system is brought to an end within the shortest possible time. But unfortunately this regime was overthrown in January, 1985 in counter coup staged by Major General Ibrahim Babangida.
FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE REGIME OF

MAJOR GENERAL IBRAHIM BABANGIDA

(1985 to the present)

Babangida's Government on coming to power had to face similar problems that confronted Buhari's regime i.e. tenuous internal situation and a debtridden economy. However, there is a lot to take home about the performance of Babangida's administration on Nigerian foreign policy towards the issue of apartheid. This new assertiveness in Nigerian foreign policy on the apartheid issue was not the original thinking or expectation of most observers and scholars of Nigerian foreign policy. Perhaps, what was the thinking of most scholars was that Nigerian foreign policy would take a similar direction of low tone as was the case in Buhari's administration.

More than anything else, the democratic posture and less authoritativeness exemplified in the abrogation of Buhari's obnoxious decree 4 is an enough signal of the possible toughness of the Babangida administration within the shortest time limit, on the apartheid issue. Within this time, at the heart of the country's foreign policy was undoubtedly the conception, definition and
promotion of its national interests the selection of instruments and strategies for policy implementation, the perception of the international environment in which the country operates and the self of the country's capability profile in relation to that of other states. Owing to certain predicaments which tend to befall successive regimes in asserting Nigerian policy for over a quarter of a century the need for seriousness in foreign policy execution was realised by this administration. These factors have been ignored in most cases and prices paid where necessary. The military Government of President Babangida more than any other in the history of Nigeria's political process tend to realise these factors and faired well where others failed. The objectives of Nigerian policy as redefined and delineated now comprise;

i) The defence and promotion of Nigerian Sovereignty, territorial integrity and national independence,

ii) The creation of the necessary political and economic conditions in Africa which shall secure the sovereignty and territorial integrity and national independence of all African countries and their total liberation from imperialism and all forms of foreign domination,
iii) The creation of the necessary political and economic conditions in Africa for the rapid, self reliant and integrated ecological, economic, social, cultural and political development of all its people.

iv) The building of United Africa.

v) The creation of the necessary political and economic conditions in the rest of the world, which shall ensure the independence, dignity and self reliant development of Nigeria, Africa all black peoples and other oppressed peoples elsewhere and.

vi) The defence and promotion of world peace built on freedom, equality, mutual respect and justice for all the people of the world.

One outstanding feature of these objectives is the African centredness of Nigerian foreign policy, which stressed on the emancipation development and unity of Africans through out the world. The tradition of regarding Africa as the centre piece of Nigeria's foreign policy has come to be confirmed, established and received unconditional endorsement. Though it has in most cases been advocated that Nigeria should be the centre piece of her foreign policy. But still it could be said that there is absolutely nothing wrong with the African Centredness of her
foreign policy because her national interest is inextricably linked to the conduct of the nation's external relations, which is in any case believed to be inseparable from the destiny and interest of Africa.

A comparative examination and analysis of the capability profile of the States in Africa particularly in black Africa presently concede a balance of advantage and superiority for Nigeria. Existing evidence suggests a determination on the part of the Nigerian leaders to restructure the domestic economy beginning with a structural adjustment programme in the hope to expand and improve the product of the economy all of which are absolutely necessary for sustaining a leadership role when it comes to taking initiatives and decision's concerning Africa.

In consonance with this stand a high level Nigerian delegation visited the frontline states led by Minister for special duties, Air vice Marshal Ishaya Shekari. The aim of the mission among other things was to assess the damage done by the racist troops of South Africa and make recommendations on what contributions Nigeria could make. Nigeria and other African members of the Commonwealth were responsible for changing the attitude of some reluctant white members of the Commonwealth towards apartheid. It was chiefly due to their efforts that both
Australia and New Zealand have in recent times adopted an anti-apartheid stand. There is hardly any surprise in this policy stand of the Nigerian Government. Africa has always been regarded as the cornerstone of Nigeria's foreign policy that is, it is Nigeria's wish that Africa be free of racial bigotry and oppression.

The operationalization of Nigerian foreign policy towards the eradication of apartheid in South Africa have been hampered by circumstances of the various periods in question. In the period between independence to 1966 Nigeria could not project its image forcefully outside of its borders due essentially to the rather fragile domestic political base. In the period from 1967 to 1970 Nigeria was engulfed in a civil war and then economic rehabilitation and reconstruction. However, it was in this period that Nigeria's foreign policy became truely non-aligned when it moved out to embrace eastern bloc countries due to the uncompromising attitude of Britain, France and the United States during the civil war.

The period between 1975 and 1979 have been referred to as the golden period of Nigeria's foreign policy. Increased revenue and a more stable domestic political base gave Nigeria the confidence with which to operate.
The effects of the decline in oil prices affects Nigerian foreign policy adversely. For instance, the proposal of President Shagari for a Pan African Peacekeeping force to replace the Cubans in Angola is a clear testimony of the state of affairs. During an interview with the international herald tribune why Nigeria took such a position that is closer to the American stand and totally against that of the OAU and the frontline states. The President, Alhaji Shehu Shagari, who was said to have made the proposal denied flatly arguing that he was misquoted by the press. On the other hand, though the period from 1983 till date has witnessed a further decline in Nigeria's oil fortunes with the economic position getting worse. But still Nigeria has shown more guts in dealing with the apartheid issue. Its stand on the IMF loan was enough signal of its intention to adopt an independent economic recovery plan. This is based on the realization that the excessive external orientation of the Nigerian economy was the reason for the inability of previous Governments to face and tackle the apartheid problem Commensurate with the Nigerian potentialities.

The central bone of contention has been that, the relations between France and Nigeria have been based on unprofitable unfriendliness and suspicion and unless a new frontier
is constructed Nigeria's strategies in Africa particularly the elimination of apartheid may become mere rhetoric. The deep rooted causes lie in Nigeria's quest for relative security in her sub-region and her aspiration for a leadership though not a hegemonic role in West Africa. The realization of this would naturally give room and strengthen Nigeria in its bid to free Africa from racial bigotry and segregation. Naturally this aim of Nigeria is based on the realization that it could not be fruitful without the backing of francophone West African Countries.

It is an obvious fact that, a consolidated African front based on unity would pose a common affront to apartheid South Africa. How could that be possible when for example, in the West African sub-region there could be no African unity when francophones lend support to French military intervention and some others notably Angolophones oppose them. Unity in Africa as well as peace and security in Nigeria's neighbourhood is a precondition for a radical step towards apartheid South Africa.

If such a good relationship between Nigeria and France exists it would help to foster good relationship between the countries. It would further help to allay the fears of the Francophone countries of any possible
dominance of Nigeria over them. This understanding and cooperation would naturally foster good will among the countries. Nigeria on her part would use this atmosphere to convince Ivory Coast of the anachronism and naivete of a peaceful dialogue with Pretoria as a means of putting an end to apartheid.

It is heartening to note that Nigeria has already invested US $125 million in SADCC projects. Besides, the participation of Nigeria in the Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons on South Africa which was endorsed by Nigeria after promptings from the frontline states showed that there was lack of consultations and communication with them before Nigeria made her position known. Therefore, there is need sometime for displaying leadership ability, but Nigeria should be careful not to give the impression that she is capable of single handedly solving the problem. The feelings and sentiments of other states particularly the frontline states should not be disregarded when major policy decision are being made on the apartheid problem.

Anti-apartheid feeling in Nigeria is a mass movement with the Government in the forefront and the entire population behind it. Nigerians believe that Mrs. Thatcher's Government is the only foreign power now propping up the apartheid regime in a flagrant, arrogant manner. Admittedly Mrs. Thatcher's concern to save over 100,000 British jobs and investments in South Africa
is patriotic but how politically expedient her opposition to sanctions are remains to be seen.

Some of the reasons in support of Mrs. Thatcher's opposition to sanctions are that sanctions have no basis in international law, that sanctions would hurt the black South Africans more than the whites, that sanctions have previously not been known to be effective without enforcement through blockades and blockades are known in the realms of arm conflict and the use of force, that sanctions would make Botha regime more intransigent and repressive, that apartheid is an internal affair which is not the concern of other Governments, that the African National Congress (ANC) regards sanctions as complementary to armed struggle and has refused to endorse it.

She further said that independent African countries are plagued by mismanagement and corruption and that South Africa in the hands of black Africans would go the way of all other African Governments, that the leaders of ANC are communists and would declare South Africa a socialist state if they gained political power, and that sanctions are ineffective when applied to Southern Rhodesia.

On the other hand, Nigeria and other advocates of sanctions agree that sanctions have no basis under
international law except the mandatory sanctions applied by the UN security council under Article 41 and 42. They nevertheless assert that sanctions constitute a clear signal of a country's disapproval of apartheid and victory for conscience and morality. Furthermore, Nigeria and other protagonists of sanctions assert that, the apartheid regime must surely crumble and that African rule in South Africa can be delayed but cannot be stopped, that it is the long term economic interests of Europe and America to be in the vanguard of the crusade for the dismantling of apartheid, since apartheid would surely crumble with or without them, that it is morally reprehensible to allow four million whites to suppress, oppress and destroy twenty million native blacks, that sanctions which included cessation of flights into South Africa would surely succeed.

It is the understanding of this contention that Botha is willing to make changes in South Africa. But the problem is that he is afraid of the extreme right wing members of his party. His contention is that apartheid which had been debated in the United Nations times without number could no longer be regarded as an internal affair of South Africa. Besides, South African exports include primary products such as fruits which could easily perish if not quickly evacuated on export to Europe.
That many European business men in South Africa were in favour of eventual majority African rule in South Africa.

Recent events generated by the apartheid regime in South Africa has drawn comments from the Nigerian Government, Nigerian leaders of thought, that is, elder statesmen political leaders, religious leaders, Obas, Obis, Emires, Ejes, Chiefs and other eminent citizens, pressure groups such as the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) and the Nigerian students Union and individual social reformers and conscientious observers.

In the same vein the current issues of sanction on South Africa by the Commonwealth had been amply debated in the Nigerian media very extensively. A look on the Nigerian news media indicates constant coverage of news items pertaining to the on going situation in South Africa. This has been on an increasing tempo. For example the Guardian Newspapers on 4th June, 1986 carried news of the visit of Nigeria's External Affairs Minister Prof. Bolaji Akinyemi to the frontline states capitals raided by South African forces to express Nigerian solidarity and sympathy with them.
As succinctly delineated by the Nigerian weekly magazine "News Watch" 4th August 1986 in its leading article, "Grabbing the initiative" the magazine recounted the events leading to Nigeria's boycott of the Edinburgh games and praised the Nigerian Government for its initiative and decisive action which led to the boycott of the games by as many as 30 Commonwealth countries. The Guardian of 13th June stated that the Nigerian National Committee Against Apartheid (NACAP) in conjunction with the United Nations Information Centre (UNIC) and the South African Relief Fund (SARF) has commemorated the tenth anniversary of Soweto Day in Nigeria.

According to the Guardian with the leakage of the EPG report the cochairman of the EPG retired General Obasanjo of Nigeria gave a crowded press conference on the EPG mission to South Africa which was reported on the front page of the Daily Times of 14 June 1986. General Obasanjo was so disappointed by the South African Government and Mrs. Thatcher that he advocated the use of African wizards to bring down Botha's regime as reported in the Daily Times. The Guardian of 17 June reported on its front page that Nigeria had pledged US $50 million to the frontline states 10 million of which had already been delivered.
The whole purpose of Nigeria's attack on Mrs. Thatcher, her boycott of the Commonwealth Games in Edinburgh and her relentless opposition to apartheid is to bring about majority black rule in South Africa. Many Britons in and around Nigeria dissociated themselves from Mrs. Thatcher's stand as reported in the Daily Times of 2 July, 1986. Consequently the British High Commission fearing that Nigeria might sever relations with the Commonwealth and on 1st August 1986 the British High Commissioner to Nigeria Mr. M.K. Evans gave a list of 10 sanctions imposed on South Africa by Britain as reported in the Guardian 1st August 1986 which include the following:

1. No trade in armaments with South Africa,
2. No military co-operations,
3. No export of oil,
4. No export of sensitive equipment to South Africa,
5. No collaboration in nuclear development,
6. Britain has observed the Gleneagles Agreement discouraging sporting contact with South Africa,
7. Britain withdraw its military Attaches from South Africa,
8. Britain has banned all new Government loans to the South African Government and agencies. However, Archbishop Trevor Huddleston, veteran campaigner in the Anti Apartheid Movement (AAM) said, "the British action was a breakthrough but warned that Mrs. Thatcher's Government was threatening the future
of the Commonwealth by failing to take tougher economic sanctions.\textsuperscript{60} Mike Terry, executive secretary on his part said, that, "The British Government is putting the narrowest interpretation on the scope of its already minimal decisions".\textsuperscript{61}

Under the prevailing circumstances, the OAU had to set up a committee of which Nigeria is a member to monitor the implementation of the resolutions adopted by the Heads of Government at the 22nd summit. The resolution among other things was to teach the evils of apartheid as a first lesson in all primary schools of African countries. The committee is also charged to monitor the ongoing situation in South Africa and make necessary recommendations to the OAU for implementation\textsuperscript{62}.

As President Babangida rightly said, "in fact, even if we have had to take steps to guard our interests as in recent times, Nigeria remain the strongest force in the West African subregion and the greatest hope of black Africa. Indeed peace or war in the African continent without consideration of Nigerian position has become inconceivable. It is important to note that inspite of the dark clouds surrounding the country, Nigeria is still one of the few nations in the world and Africa in particular where there exists most of the necessary conditions and means on the basis of which the greatest and the most spectacular achievements in human development and growth can be realised". He further said that, "on the
realization of these potentialities. Nigeria's resolve on the issue of apartheid in South Africa is absolutely nonnegotiable and unbending. We have said it before and must continue to say it again that to us apartheid is morally wrong, politically unacceptable and philosophically unjustifiable.

It is therefore apparent from the President's statement that Nigeria's involvement in a manner of high commitment towards the eradication of apartheid in South Africa is worth it. It further shows that Nigeria inspite of her original contributions as already stated will continue to pursue this issue untill apartheid is finally abrogated within the shortest time limit.

Concluding Observations

From the foregoing discussion the prime importance attached to the eradication of apartheid in Nigerian foreign policy is easily discernible. Right from the beginning of independence to the present day Nigeria has been making efforts in different ways both within the nation and externally in other to abrogate the only surviving institutionalised racism called apartheid. There is no doubt that, being the largest country in Africa endowed with a lot of resources it would be out of place for Nigeria to play a low profile kind of role in this regard as was shown in the foreign policy
activities of the first civilian Government after independence. Though certain reason such as the economic position of the country at the time has been given as the main course of this low profile, but still they do not seem to have any substance.

Take for instance Ghana which played a dominant role on the issue of apartheid was not wealthier than Nigeria at the time. Moreover, it was because of Ghana’s preponderant influence that made the Federal Government to change its stand on this issue. However, the periods within the late sixties and the seventies immediately after the civil war have seen Nigeria involved in the efforts at eradicating the apartheid system in South Africa. It is often said that the economic buoyancy after the civil war contributed to this dynamism in Nigeria’s foreign policy towards apartheid South Africa. The internal situation, the tribal and regional misgivings the Nigerian and the people after the civil war helped to strengthen the Government in pursuing a dynamic foreign policy. With unity and stability at home there was no major inhibitive factor besides the economy was also in good condition.
This very atmosphere contributed to the activeness in the successive regimes. For the fact that the lessons of the civil war were not learnt properly certain vital and key aspects such as the economic, as well as sociocultural aspects were not taken good care of and when nemesis caught up with the economy the oil induced foreign policy has to die a natural death. The situation started backfiring. No doubt, if this situation has not contributed to a low profile or less assertiveness in Nigeria's foreign policy toward apartheid South Africa, it would have done by far more than what it is doing at present.

In sum it can be said that, though apartheid has become the concern of the international community, that it is in Nigeria's national interest for the abrogation of this obnoxious system. Though laudable the efforts of Nigeria in this regard are she could perform better if she keeps her house in good order. The inability of Nigeria to play a role commensurate with her leadership potentials is because of certain internal constraints. As often said, her problems stem from her internal situation and an outward oriented economy that is under the influence of outside forces.
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