# CHAPTER 2:
CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SR NO.</th>
<th>CONTENTS</th>
<th>PG NO.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>MEANING OF THE TERM DIPLOMACY</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF DIPLOMACY</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF DIPLOMACY</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: AIMS, MERITS AND DEMERITS</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.1 INTRODUCTION

Missing from debates on the clash of civilizations and the post-Cold War evolution of foreign policy and international affairs has been a serious look at ‘diplomacy.’ As old ideologies disintegrate, the world has faced a rash of new difficulties as religious, ethnic and national antagonisms have flared concurrently with the emergence of transnational problems such as the world health crisis of AIDS, the spread of drug use, environmental degradation, and burgeoning refugee issues. Rapid communication and much faster transportation, plus the astounding increase in the number of nations from the 50 which founded the United Nations to over 180, has changed the nature of diplomacy, substantially increasing its importance as normative and scholarly concept, pattern of behavior and profession.

The dictionary definition of diplomacy is "the art and practice of conducting negotiations between nations," and "skill in handling affairs without arousing hostility." Reaching back into antiquity, diplomacy involved mediation, or managing an entity or an individual's relationships with an ‘other’ (sometimes defined as "enemy," sometimes not). It was only with the development of the modern state system, dating from the 16th century that diplomacy took on its more narrow current contemporary meaning: managing the foreign affairs of states at the governmental level. Today, both scholars and practitioners suggest this narrow interpretation has lost its utility.36

To ‘be diplomatic,’ however, has long involved astute skills of tactful conciliation and negotiation. Diplomacy has always included the notion of communication as well. Added to those meanings in recent decades have been persuasion, conflict resolution, and a whole host of managerial activities centered on economic development and nation-building, such as economic aid and Peace Corps activities. These tasks have required organizational structures that many nations are now being forced to adjust to

36http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/diplomacy
significantly changed circumstances (as the current American administration indicated at the end of January 1995 it is beginning to do).

Component elements necessary to create a broader holistic conception of diplomacy have been quietly emerging. Disparate developments in science, religion, and psychology have also potentially strengthened both the need for, and effectiveness of, diplomacy and diplomatic approaches to a whole range of political and social problems. These developments need to be assimilated into diplomacy.

On both normative and practical levels, the rise of religious fundamentalism as a political force and challenge to widely-accepted values has emphasized the need for intercultural diplomacy. At the same time, fundamentalism calls into question the post-World War II Western aspirations for a ‘universal’ culture based on what many emerging nations see as an unnecessarily narrow set of values.

The world political and social environment over the past five years has been gradually working free of many of the hierarchical constraints of bloc politics that bound it for 45 years. Values that were not open to question earlier are again on the table. Issues such as economic aid, market access, refugee flows and humanitarian intervention have risen in importance and taken on new dimensions. The breakdown of bipolarism opened the field for more active diplomacy, ending an era of containment which "allowed no role for diplomacy until the climactic final scene in which the men in the white hats accepted the conversion of the men in black hats."37

As the so-called "sole remaining superpower" in a period when superpower hood has lost most of its meaning, the United States and others face a world in which diplomacy is both less important for direct survival as draconian security threats recede, but even more vital to national well-being and long range prosperity than at any time since the American War of Independence. There is an urgent need to put the post-Cold War period in a historical perspective and deepen American understanding of its current historical situation.

Other changes in the world have also expanded the scope for diplomacy beyond the traditional western perspective which evolved over the past 300 years. The gradual metamorphosis and weakening of the concept of the state, political and economic

interdependence and interpenetration, the emergence of multinational (corporate, political and nongovernmental) and sub-national (cities, states and provinces) actors, and emergent cultural clashes have not only complicated analysis and removed old guideposts, but opened the way to expand our understanding of what diplomacy means and how it can be practiced.\(^{38}\) It is clear that the relationship between diplomacy and military force is changing as well. Despite the so-called end of the ‘balance of terror,’ conflict remains an important target of diplomatic effort. Australian Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans, notes that the conflict within states now supersedes the conflict between states (in 1992, 29 of 30 recognized conflicts were intrastate struggles); Leslie Gelb speaks of "quelling the teacup wars," and notes:

The increase of terrorism and the potential proliferation of nuclear weapons make diplomacy even more important in security terms. Moreover, the coordination of diplomacy and force in what are called "Operations Other than War" is becoming a more important issue as the mix of problems confronting world leader’s changes. Meanwhile, for less-than-great powers, traditional security concerns continue to require as much, if not more, diplomacy than before.

Ironically, the United States has a peculiarly unique view of diplomacy that complicates its task. America understands of, skill at, and respect for diplomacy has not reached the same level as its competence in defense and corporate finance, for example. David Newsom, three-time Ambassador, former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and now Acting Dean of the Georgetown School of Foreign Service, put it succinctly:

The American view of diplomacy is a mixture of ignorance of its details, suspicion of its objectives, contempt for its importance and fascination with its romance. This stems largely from historical accidents. The Golden Age of American diplomacy which flowered during the struggle for independence was followed by a century of isolationism in which suspicion of European diplomacy flowered in the new democracy. The end of isolation in 1917 was not fully accepted by the overwhelming majority of United States citizens until December 7, 1941, and not fully realized in practice until the United States' emergence as the leader of the anti-communist bloc in the 1950's. Today, many again yearn for a return to some form of disengagement. The

\(^{38}\)See Hamilton and Langhorne, pp. 71 – 75.
ensuing Cold War period left diplomacy relatively frozen vis-a-vis principal adversaries, yet the United States developed a large and active diplomatic/military establishment as a part of its hegemonic superpower responsibilities. America now is struggling with a redefinition of its role as well as decisions on how to adjust its organizational apparatus to current realities, including the increasing importance of value issues on which there is but a limited domestic consensus.\(^3\) Beginning in the final years of the Bush administration and continuing with a vengeance under Clinton, both criticism and analysis of U.S. foreign policy and operations have reached new heights even as overall intellectual coherence has disintegrated and clarity has been supplanted by controversy.

Ironically, though classical diplomacy was regarded as the province of elite specialists and the United States has remained wary of international diplomacy and diplomats, many of the techniques of diplomacy (stripped of their mystique) are the same that the democratic politicians, labor negotiators, and other communicators use as a matter of course. A paradigm shift which increased the consciousness of diplomatic behavior, particularly as a conflict resolution and a communications tool, would make ‘diplomacy’ both as a concept of management as well as a collection of skills more acceptable and valued and strengthen the hand of those seeking to make and keep peace.

2.2 MEANING OF THE TERM DIPLOMACY

Diplomacy has also spread to the sub-national level. In an era where city and state officials and private citizens increasingly and routinely negotiate with foreign governments and businesses, they use ‘diplomacy,’ much like the gentleman who did not realize he was speaking prose until one of his literary friends enlightened him. Many techniques of diplomacy are very familiar to experienced negotiators in many fields, and within the past few years a sizable literature on bargaining and negotiation, including cross-cultural elements, has evolved.\(^4\)

For diplomacy to remain an important and effective tool of statecraft and increase its potential for conflict reduction, it needs to be recast. It must be expanded


\(^4\)The classic statement of this is in Philip de Commynes, *Mémoires*, Paris (n.d.), VI, pp. 198 - 199,
intelligently and philosophically to take account of altered circumstance and related intellectual developments so that its practitioners can broaden the scope for diplomatic action. Consistent with current efforts in science to seek more holistic explanations and linkages that move away from the mechanistic models of the universe that began to lose their explanatory power around the end of the 19th century, diplomacy can more fruitfully be viewed in comprehensive terms that reach substantially beyond its classical dimensions. In short, if the ‘clockwork universe’ model has given way to the organic growth model, new scope for diplomacy has opened up.

Since diplomacy is both a functional concept and an activity, such a re-examination must draw in theoreticians as well as practitioners and organizational managers. Given the rising importance of ethics, religious issues and cultural differences as value questions, such a recasting should profitably expand to include theologians and cultural anthropologists. This would generate greater understanding of and insight into new varieties of diplomatic problems, value questions, and political challenges coming forward as a result of changing citizen perceptions as well as more pointed challenges: increased political activity by Islamic and Hindu fundamentalists and the emergence of variant economic and social approaches in Japan, the states of the ex-USSR, and elsewhere.

Diplomacy is been defined as the skill or arrangement for conduct in maintaining international relations, as in negotiating alliances, treaties and agreements. Diplomacy is a social practice of states; and secondly, that this practice consists of reconciling state behaviour to international law. The emphasis on negotiation is viewed by most people as the essence of diplomacy—negotiating a treaty, reaching an executive agreement, or bargaining with another state over the terms of proposed agreement. The emphasis on the states as key diplomatic actor is, of course, consistent with a realist perspective on diplomacy.
2.3 CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF DIPLOMACY

Diplomacy is normatively preferable to a confrontational approach, and is frequently more descriptively accurate. For example, Sam Huntington's thesis might have been more accurately titled "Interaction among Civilizations" than "Clash among Civilizations." The latter characterization automatically skews his predictions toward security issues; the former suggests a much broader approach which permits an easier approach into the realm of values and discussion of which human needs are bargain able interests and which are not.\footnote{See Richard Langhorne, "Current Developments in Diplomacy", Diplomacy and Statecraft, 8, 2, (1997), pp. 1 – 15.} Why take the narrow road? Few businessmen start out to arrange a deal on confrontational principles; most politicians have to build consensus.

Moving to more philosophical and theological grounds, it is time that international relations and diplomacy caught up with the revolution in science and philosophy underway for the past several decades. The emergence of more organic models emphasizing probability and chance has opened up the prospect of science and religion coming together in a new relationship. Templeton Prize winner Charles Birch's On Purpose and David Bohm's Wholeness and the Implicate Order set forth a new grounding for science. Such material has until now remained far from the diplomatic enterprise, but it has serious implications for it. Diplomatic scholars and practitioners do not necessarily need to get lost in scientific or religious thickets, but they should know that the relationship between the sacred and the secular is shifting significantly in ways which emphasize collaboration and understanding rather than hierarchy and confrontation, just as collegial decision-making is drawing more attention than top-down direction.

An excellent and provocative place to begin is A New Vision of Reality: Western Science, Eastern Mysticism, and Christian Faith, by Father Bede Griffiths, an Anglican Monk who ran an ashram in India for 30 years and was an intellectual soul-mate of American Catholic writer Thomas Merton.\footnote{See a newspaper article by Metternich justifying rather uncomfortably the summoning of the Congress of Vienna in d’Angeberg (L.J.B. Chodzko) Le Congrès de Vienne et les Traités de 1815, I, pp. 362 – 364.} Griffiths stresses the common
elements in Christian, Islamic, and Hindu theology, and links them to a reborn unity, inclusive of diversity, which he calls the "perennial philosophy." Griffiths offers theological, intellectual and practical reinforcement for the conception of a unity of mankind which could temper excesses of egoism, unbridled sovereignty and dehumanization of people.

Diplomacy, properly expanded and used, may even significantly help defuse the implacable hostility of the Khomeinis and others. Until now, most diplomatic studies have ignored the impact of religion (except for fundamentalism) on diplomacy. An excellent and balanced study of this phenomenon is now available, which emphasizes the more positive effect of mainstream religious involvement in contemporary diplomacy, such as the Catholic Church's role in the shift to democracy in Poland and Latin America. Theologians, led by Dr. Glenn Stassen of Louisville's Southern Baptist Theological Seminary and Peter Paris of Princeton Theological Seminary, have already begun work on a thoroughgoing review of 'Just War' and 'Just Peace' doctrines.

The expansion of national interaction, at least among the larger powers, set in the context of greater interdependence as well as independence, has also opened the way to redefine and question more secular values. The struggle going on within the United States to define what the country stands for -- and what resources it is willing to expend to accomplish which goals -- is being repeated elsewhere: in Europe over Bosnia, in East Asia over North Korean nuclear proliferation, and in Africa over myriad questions of public order.

The primary question regarding American behavior is becoming not how much attention the country will devote to 'foreign' affairs, but how it will manage the mix of 'intermestic' issues. Although many give lip service to this idea, it is not just the present administration that does not seem to understand that the dividing line between foreign and domestic politics has been dissolving for twenty years. Elitism in diplomacy is fading and public opinion is becoming critical to the value-sorting

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43 As early as 1805, William Pitt, Prime Minister of England spoke of "all the Calamities inflicted upon Europe since the disastrous era of the French Revolution". Memorandum on the Deliverance and Security of Europe, 19 January, 1805, printed in H.W.V.Temperley and L.M. Penson, The Foundation of British Foreign Policy, CUP, 1938, p. 18
process in ways it has not been since at least World War II, as a recent study by the American Assembly points out.\textsuperscript{44} This will inevitably require greater attention to normative questions as well as practical ones. Moreover, the American diplomatic establishment, never well-heeled, has over the past eight years, been put on starvation ranging from domestic relations to commercial disputes. If the entire political or social system would work smoothly, then people would be better in dealing with each other and resolving conflicts and the smoother entire political/social systems will work.

Beyond formal educational experiences, professionals in the press and elsewhere should be given incentives to do more work and research in this area. Any professional should be asking himself or herself "What am I doing to keep up with a changing world?" More journalism of a higher order, such as David D. Newsom's regular column on foreign affairs issues for the Christian Science Monitor, and Thomas Friedman's pieces for The New York Times, would significantly upgrade public understanding of diplomacy as well as the relationship of contemporary issues to each other. Such efforts need to be more closely keyed to popular, not elite, issues. Integration of government and business, Japanese-style, has more limitations than originally realized, but breaking down barriers and increasing understanding, in some fashion, between business, government and academia is essential for developing comprehensive understanding of the contemporary world.\textsuperscript{45}

On a more institutionalized basis, specific provision should be made for educating state and local officials in the realities of international negotiations and diplomacy. The increasing prevalence of former state officials in national office (Clinton, Reagan, and Carter) came in late September this year; other professional meetings have touched on these issues in the same way.

Accompanying the question of using force is the psychological component of both diplomacy and war, the issue of the ‘enemy.’ Much exceptional work has been done on this and other psychological aspects of diplomacy as well. Beginning with the idea that negotiation itself takes place with an ‘other’ who may be seen as a friend, neutral

\textsuperscript{44}See Rousseau’ s blistering description” quoted in E. Satow A Guide to Diplomatic Practice, London, 1922, p. 2 page.
\textsuperscript{45}Metternich, Mémoirs, Documents et Écrits Divers, I, Paris, 1879, pp. 175 – 176.
or enemy, the idea of Track II diplomacy (also called ‘citizen’ diplomacy) has been
developed and used effectively in a number of areas, including U.S.-Soviet relations
and the Middle East. It was particularly helpful over the past several years in shifting
both Palestinian and Israeli attitudes enough to permit the successful 1993 peace
accords. Such a focus reduces the tendency to instinctively portray all opposition evil,
pressing for both intellectual and practical balance. Too little of this approach has
been integrated with more traditional theory and practice, despite the fact that raging
ethnic and racial conflicts force this need upon our consciousness.

It is neither necessary nor desirable to enter the often-sterile debates among
behavioral and non-behavioral social scientists on empirical versus normative
dimensions to recognize that both are in play, and both are necessary for dealing
intelligently and wisely with today's world. There is room for everyone's contribution.
(From some of the acerbic and frenetic debates in academia, one senses a role for
diplomacy, at least diplomacy-as-civility, in this arena as well.) Theorists of all
schools have much to be modest about, as John Lewis Gaddis has pointed out in his
review of failures to predict the end of the Cold War and the collapse of Russia.\footnote{46}

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\footnote{46}{For the Vienna Congress, see C.K. Webster, \textit{The Congress of Vienna}, London, 1950.}
\footnote{47}{E. Hertslet, \textit{The Map of Europe by Treaty, 1814 - 1875}, London, 1875, p. 317}
increasing prevalence of former state officials in national office (Clinton, Reagan, and Carter come immediately to mind) suggests that it is clearly in their own as well as society's interest. Senior-level and middle-level professional seminars should be provided for such officials, perhaps by a consortium of universities and think tanks, including the Council of State Governments. Would the Clinton administration be coming under such fire if its key players, especially many of the neophytes in the White House, had received significant practical instruction in the interconnections between domestic and foreign policy?

Similarly, as so many scholars and practitioners have noted, each new American administration reinvents history. New political appointees certainly need instruction that goes well beyond the scope of this argument, but it should not be beyond the Foreign Service Institute's (FSI) capability to organize some mandatory organizational training for new assistant secretaries and other key political appointees. It would certainly be in the interest of an incoming president to see this done. Much the same thing has already been done for ambassadors and their deputies with very positive results.

In a holistic spirit, the FSI might also consider conducting familiarization courses for journalists and businessmen in the spirit of breaking down institutional barriers and stereotypes, specifically the view of diplomats as "weak-kneed cookie-pushers." The State Department ran a Scholar-Diplomat program for many years which facilitated exchanges and familiarization in that way. Such efforts have been shown to pay for themselves many times over.

A change of paradigm, even just a plain increased general realization that "foreign affairs" now involves substantial non-national and sub-national inputs, are both needed. At a minimum, nations and their component parts need to be aware of what each other are doing. Increased communication and better coordination would enhance effectiveness on both sides and expand the range of policy tools to advance national objectives with maximum consensus.

One good start would be a sustained effort to develop and discuss national goals. There have been several efforts to do this, most broadly with the Rockefeller Commission in the 1960's. None has been an unqualified success. Many believe Americans do not like this sort of thing well, but present circumstances suggest it is
worth another try, since the more amorphous value issues are back on the table. Perhaps this should involve not just one commission, but several, including a dialogue within and between Councils on Foreign Relations, foreign policy associations and other such groups. This could be continued over time, and include a broad-gauge effort to analyses the federal structure and federal-state (and local) interaction aimed at a more rational organizational restructuring. Absent such an effort, the body politic will be pushed this way and that by fanciful and unhelpful congressional efforts to abolish the CIA or cut the defense budget in half, and the country will again be left unaware of rising threats and unready to meet future challenges.

At the organizational level, it is again time for a serious comprehensive review of the foreign affairs function across the whole spectrum. Such reviews have been carried out in the defense sphere, beginning with the National Security Act of 1947, and most recently the Goldwater-Nichols reform of the mid-1980. The initial outputs of the Vice Presidential effort at governmental reorganization announced at the end of January 1995 suggest more a bureaucratic log-rolling, cut-and-paste process rather than a serious study/action mechanism focused on effective reform. Efforts in 1995 by Senator Jessie Helms to force the Clinton administration to accept a downsizing of AID, USIA, and ACDA and the merger of two of those organizations into the State Department is a classic example of how NOT to do an effective reorganization which also protects national interests.48

Such an effort on the civilian side should begin with, but not be limited to, how the government and other foreign affairs organizations function. The impressive State Department study, State 2000, was a good institutional effort, but limited to suggested organizational reforms within the State Department, NOT integrating the civilian foreign affairs community. Diplomacy, defense and intelligence have to be analyzed together. The increasing role of Congress must also be included, particularly the compartmentalizing effects of the committee system as it now exists.

The last 40 years have seen the growth of dozens of think tanks, as well as the development of state and city offices which handle international affairs. Institutional inputs from such institutions are sporadic and often personalized. Such individual

48The relevant text is in the renewal of the Quadruple Alliance which accompanied the Second Treaty of Paris of 20 November 1815
contacts are useful, but institutional links are critical. The State Department has one small three-person office to follow non-national governmental affairs, yet important issues, including foreign loans, are often decided at the state level with little or no national input or even awareness. Kentucky's 1989 billion-yen loan from Japan and Illinois' contemporary $100 million loan to Poland come to mind.

2.4 EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF DIPLOMACY

Diplomacy is an activity whose roots lie deep in remote history of humankind. Throughout centuries, it has gone several vicissitudes and the changes, the examination which allows us to distinguish with greater clarity its permanent and essential features from its fleeting and extrinsic aspect.

The use of representatives by holders of political power to establish contact of varied nature between two political units dates back to the primitive times, to the times when political organization appeared. Diplomacy is the process of formal and informal communication between and among states. While evidence of proto-diplomatic practices exists from the ancient Egyptian, Greek, and Roman worlds (especially through envoys), the antecedents of modern diplomatic practices can more properly be traced to medieval and early modern Europe? The emerging states of Europe slowly began to institutionalize formal diplomatic customs and conventions in the 14th, 15th and 16th centuries, forced as they were to engage with one another for political, geographic, economic, religious and strategic reasons. Traditionally (and especially since the Renaissance), diplomacy has been conducted by ambassadors and consuls, professional diplomats who function as resident agents of their respective governments in foreign states. Since the early 19th century, the leaders and foreign ministers of the major powers have increasingly opted to conduct direct diplomacy through congresses, conferences and summits, in addition to dispatching permanent representatives to act on their behalf. Diplomacy as practiced by foreign services and foreign ministries has seemed in recent years to be in decline. Governments in the post-collectivist age have wielded few economizing axes more deeply than in respect of the management of their overseas representation. The urge to save increasingly hard won tax revenue was backed up by the sense that foreign services needed modernizing - which tended also to mean minimizing. This notion had been present before the real force of the anti-collectivist gale had developed. One of the English
writers, Nancy Mitford’s Wittiest novels is called ‘Don’t tell Alfred’ and was written in the 1960s. The Alfred in question is the professor of Pastoral Theology in the University of Oxford and has been unexpectedly summoned to become the British Ambassador at Paris. Not all the family was impressed by the apparent honor: "Now listen, Mother dear", said Basil, "the Foreign Service has had its day - enjoyable while it lasted, no doubt, but over now. 49 The privileged being of the future is the travel agent". A genuine part of the atmosphere which this estimate catches was because of the regular increasing sense that the collection and evaluation of information about foreign societies and governments which had been the principal objective of diplomacy since the emergence of the Resident Ambassador had been overtaken by other and more adequate means of communication. During the course of time, the amendments have become more important than the reality that diplomacy had always had other functions and that the relative importance of the varied functions of diplomacy undergoes continuous changes, sometimes slowly, sometimes fast. Such explanation of previous ebbs and flows in these functions can be accurate.

It is not known as to when human societies have realized the need to communicate with one another but it is said that it had been felt in the very beginning of human civilization. We do not know when human societies first felt the need to communicate with each other, but it is safe to assume that they did so from the very earliest times. It was also realized that hearing of ideas and messages is better than eating it then there was need to have rules about who is authorized to transmit messages, and there have to be sanctions which will ensure his unreachability. The diplomats in earlier times were like a response to a felt need of a procedure to convey messages between societies safely and honestly. 50 It was suggested to note that diplomacy since beginning, in its crudest forms, came into being as a reaction to political needs reciprocally felt. This has been continuous up till now and we will also understand in the coming chapters with the help of unique and some interesting instances of the process in action. The period when diplomacy actually started and was conceded to be irreplaceably useful, it was possible to have a reverse safeguard. At any point of time, the nature and functioning of the diplomacy could frame the structure in which

principals - whoever they would be - provided their exchanges. However, there are instances where the emergence of the functions came with the concept diplomacy which came to be known as an international activity. We will look at one of the examples which will help us to understand the process as well.

It is very obvious sometimes what the machine could not do, or could not be seen to be doing without damaging its basic function, could be done by other means, for example, by Secret Services or by hired assassins. But it needs to be assumed that sometimes the opportunities created are lost and what could not be done was not done. For this purpose, perhaps one example will suffice. In the period just before 1914, when most foreign services were not equipped to handle commercial matters, the British Board of Trade - the then Ministry of Commerce - asked the Foreign Office to provide information about arms manufacture in Imperial Russia. The Ambassador, Sir George Buchanan, replied to this enquiry that he had not been sent as His Majesty’s Ambassador to the Russian Court to do arithmetical computations for the Board of Trade.

Let us begin by giving some outstanding examples of the process where an unfolding international and diplomatic need evoked a corresponding addition or development in the machinery of diplomacy. This has certainly been the more usual process of modification. The growth of very complete - perhaps too complete - systems for the giving and checking of full powers was an effect of the growing importance of diplomatic activity and the greater risk of serious harm flowing from embassies being disavowed. The habit of issuing minute instructions, and the consequential, almost hysterical, desire on the part of others to know what they contained in advance of negotiations, was evoked both by the emergence of greater central control of diplomatic activity and by the greater potential damage a careless or over confident ambassador could cause. And both of these again reflected a rising level of diplomatic traffic. The evolution of foreign ministries followed from the desire of rulers and their ministers to maintain a continuous flow of diplomatic business in which cross relationships between diplomatic partners, between internal sources of political influence and between differing issues could be carefully followed and controlled. To do this successfully and to have instantly available knowledge of current obligations

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and commitments required an institutional memory obtainable only through a properly managed single foreign ministry archive.

These kinds of development occasionally engendered reluctance from contemporary traditionalists. None, however, encountered the fierce opposition and disapproval from the principals themselves that accompanied the emergence of the resident ambassador. There could be no doubt that this was an inescapable response to particular circumstances, otherwise it could not have triumphed over the objections of the proprietors of the system itself. The origin of the problem lay in a change of emphasis in the purpose of diplomacy. Internal circumstances in northern Italy in the renaissance period had produced a highly competitive group of small city states, each directly bordering others, none able to triumph over the others either directly or in alliance groups. The most significant - Venice - was not concerned with territorial power so much as trading expansion. External circumstances for the time being provided no threat of intervention.

The Byzantine Empire came to an end, the Muslim advance had stopped short in the eastern Mediterranean and the establishment of centers of political power in northern Europe was still in gestation. The result locally was a stalemate: war, apart from being an undesirable way of extruding power for very small entities - mercenaries notwithstanding, had proved to be incapable of giving victory to any state or group of states. The effort to secure a sudden and ultimate benefit with the help of a great diplomatic coup became an obsessive preoccupation. It might be engaged by fabricating the so far tricky leading combination of states; but it might also be acquired by switching the balance of power by suppressing the regimes of neighboring states. Not only Popes but also secular rulers necessarily rejected to stoop even to poison in this regard, but more usually sought to operate by creating or supporting opposition groups in the desire of due reward when they had clawed their way to power. It was not a pretty picture nor did its pleader recommended otherwise.

The changed international situation had created a new diplomatic need. Over a long period of time, the purpose of previous diplomatic activity had been to convey messages and the answers to messages from one principal to another, but with the exception of the Byzantine Empire, now the importance was given to the collection of

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52 Hill. C (2003), The changing Politics of Foreign Policy, 1st edition, Palgrave Macmillan
information about the political and military situation of others, the information to be communicated with maximum speed and secrecy. It was a demand by both Domestic security and external advantage. Thus, the running of the system only reflected the previous demands. Embassies were created either by a particular issue about which information needed to be exchanged or by a ceremonial occasion - e.g. a funeral or an accession or a wedding. The stay in the host country was likely to be relatively short, if luxurious, and the opportunities for spying or interference were naturally very limited. The only justification was to keep a representative on the spot and have him report by courier - so secretly that a whole new range of possible ways of concealing documents came into vogue which make swallowing contraceptives full of drugs seem crude by comparison.53

However, the resident ambassador appeared. Martin Wight said that he represented the "master-institution" of western diplomatic development. Thus, the rulers of the period objected to his existence in the strongest terms and from time to time cleared them all out. But as much as they did not want them to report on their domestic situations or indeed to intervene in them, they wanted just as much to receive such information and have such opportunities in respect of others; and the stresses of the contemporary international environment enforced a reciprocal if unwilling tolerance of the existence of permanent representatives. Their usefulness entrenched them, although they did not immediately supplant the older temporary missions, which simply carried on, gradually losing business to the residents and becoming finally purely ceremonial.

It took a hundred years before the complete development and the slow pace was partly because of the patchy emergence of the fully sovereign and secularized state across the rest of Europe. It was this development which led to the gradual restriction of diplomatic representation to states and thus to the office of ambassador achieving greater importance as the sole international extrusion of his ruler’s power and policy. The conjunction of these two factors contributed to the growing demand of the vital role of the permanent resident embassy. The other delaying factor arose from the

53Nabil Ayad, (2006), the impact of Technology on Intelligence and Security, The Diplomatic Academy of London Press, United Kingdom Page667
intense diplomatic complications caused by the corrosive ideological split brought about by the Reformation. This produced sharply fought wars both general and civil and led to a kind of diplomatic ‘cold war’, where embassies of Protestant rulers at Roman Catholic courts and vice versa became the focal point for dissident groups within the host state, possibly sanctuaries for them, where they could attend religious services otherwise banned and develop plots for the future, perhaps to be aided and abetted by the forces of the resident’s principal. Not surprisingly, it was only when the full force of this struggle blew itself out after 1648 that the position of the resident ambassador became generally recognized de jure as well as de facto, as it had been in Italy a hundred years or more earlier.

Later periods produce further examples. Adjustment to the communications revolution of the 19th century and the creation of international organizations first in response to practical requirements and later answering to an overwhelming moral need to sustain peace when the contemporary conduct of war had produced unacceptable casualties. More recently, the diplomatic machine has needed to integrate the need for representation by a rising number of private international organizations concerned with humanitarian and environmental matters with the existing structure of states. In this case, the process is very difficult since the practical point of entry has been on the very edges of the machinery of diplomacy gained through a particular arm of the United Nations system. In this, there is more than a resonance of the other form of diplomatic development which was mentioned at the outset: developments defined by molding a response to a new need by reference to a pre-existing element in the machine. Recasting and improving diplomacy will have to be a multifaceted enterprise, but there are practical, intellectual, and normative reasons why it should be undertaken. Academics have a particular role to play in this enterprise, but practitioners are an indispensable component if professional skills are to be developed. A significant effort to look at and educate about foreign affairs must heighten both public and elite awareness of the changing international environment and the expanding importance of diplomacy not only for local, state, and national affairs, but for the international system as well. There is merit in the enterprise, not just the result. Such an attempt will fall short, however, if it is not cast across the

broadest possible spectrum and accompanied by an effective intellectual revitalization of diplomacy.

The techniques, skills, habits of understanding that make good diplomats need to be more widely spread in every society, particularly as a counter to religious and ideological zealotry which promotes violent solutions to significant public issues. This is probably the single most important thing that could be done to actively upgrade public participation in foreign policy across the board. Developing the proper organizational structure for this effort to flower is another critical task.55

"Diplomacy" as both a conceptual approach to issues and as a set of skills has much to recommend it to help ease chaos and manage the planet. Diplomacy needs to be de-mythologized from its post-Renaissance, state-cantered, classical status and given a new vigor. As the world deals with a more probabilistic environment shorn of past ideological rigidities, it is left with significantly fewer reliable anchors for value beliefs and tools for action. Diplomacy can provide some important and effective ones, including restraint on unbridled extremism at home and abroad, as well as some guidelines for shaping organizational and societal change along less violent lines the most interesting examples of this second process occurred at the end of the Napoleonic Wars and it repays examination.

The Congress of Vienna was a historically peculiar event in many ways, not least that it was technically at least, an illegitimate meeting, as Metternich typically grasped. The basic assumptions upon which it proceeded were, however, far more significantly odd. Unlike the practice at previous peace-making, the makers of the Vienna settlement were less concerned about punishing and disabling the vanquished - though quite clear about removing Napoleon himself from further active participation in international politics - than they were about protecting the world from the ravages of an ideology. The extraordinary trajectory of the Napoleonic imperia had left behind a strong sense that what had fuelled its course was not so much the intrinsic power of France, which was correctly sensed never to have been greater than that of the other great powers, but the positive effects of the ideology of the revolution on those who espoused it and the negative effects on the power and security of those who did not. The consequences of concluding that the long and - by contemporary standards -

55 Asian Affairs, Vol. 27, No. 1 : 56-71 , January-March, 2005
destructive war had in effect been caused by an ideology, rather than a state or a ruler, profoundly affected what the Congress tried to do. It meant that the usual behavior of states had changed and that jockeying for relative power via shifting alliances was in effect suspended. Indeed, a deliberate effort was made to maintain the wartime coalition, implicitly - explicitly after 1818 - including France, who signed the settlement, for the stated reason of defending the system against any resumption of revolution. The consequence of this sea change for diplomacy was to begin with at least, that there appeared to be no means for giving effect to the obvious wish of the powers to institute a kind of co-operative management of the international system. Diplomacy had steadily developed as the means by which sovereign rulers communicated with other sovereign rulers. It was the great assertion of sovereign individuality, functioning in a sometimes avowedly - or sometimes simply politely - adversarial mode, depending on circumstances. If it was asked to give expression to the wish that rulers co-operate on what was intended to be a permanent basis, it was not easy to see how that could be done. Two ideas were tried out, one very traditional, the other uniquely naive. The first was that an extra treaty should be signed in order to give a special force and legitimacy to the settlement as agreed. It was to have been called a Treaty of General Guarantee. For various reasons, though drafted and revised, it was never signed. The second was the Tsar of Russia’s notion that a highly simplified version of the tenets of Christianity - modern terminology would suggest ‘born again’ as the most accurate description - would serve as the basis for a new kind of international security. This was called the Holy alliance and, amidst a good deal of covert giggling, it was signed in 1815. The other parties did not believe in its likely efficacy, and felt right up to the end of the negotiations, resumed post-Waterloo, that something else was required. More or less in despair, the British delegate, Robert Stewart, Lord Castlereagh, drafted a clause which turned a piece of recently evolved diplomatic practice into the cornerstone of the international system, which, mutatis mutandis, it has remained.

This clause established the peacetime conference as the mechanism by which governments would give expression to their wish for permanent co-operation in the face of a revolutionary threat, or, as later became the case, against any threat of disruption. The idea that the most effective response to a crisis was to call a meeting

56 Asian Affairs, Vol. 27, No. 1 : 56-71 , January-March, 2005
in peacetime to discuss it before it got out of hand was new. Conferences or congresses had of course been well known devices, but always in the context of bringing an existing war to an end. Such a thicket of protocol had come to surround them, that by the mid-eighteenth century, powers were beginning to try to avoid formal meetings and resorting to informal ones, without traditional rules. But the main purpose was still the same. Towards the end of the war, there was a final example of this kind of meeting in its traditional form. Late in 1813, Napoleon had allowed his minister Coulaincourt to hint at a possible peace negotiation and the abortive Congress of Prague was the result. To achieve the abortion, the French side resorted to wonderfully old fashioned mechanisms, demanding formal proposals submitted through a mediator and denying the legitimacy of viva voce discussion. The allies drew the correct conclusion that the negotiations were not serious and withdrew.

The failure of the Congress of Prague was almost simultaneous with the events that were to provide the basis upon which the modern peacetime conference was later introduced. After the battle of Leipzig in 1813, which to most observers signaled the coming end of the Napoleonic imperia, there was a general belief that the Emperor must soon sue for peace in order to obtain the best possible terms, and that the sooner he initiated the process, the more of his Empire he would save. The likelihood that negotiations would soon start made it important that an allied response should be more or less immediately available, and for the British, who were the most geographically remote of the partners, there was an obvious risk that the first stages of a peace negotiation might take place without their participation.

To fend off that possibility, the British Cabinet took the hitherto unheard of step of sending the Foreign Secretary on a personal mission to the continent which began at the very beginning of 1814. From mid-January, Castlereagh joined up with Metternich, the Prussian, Hardenberg, and Czar Alexander I of Russia in Switzerland and the group remained together until the war ended and beyond. The ever extending length of the mission was caused by the refusal of Napoleon to see the apparent logic of his position. To him, anything other than victory in war was synonymous with losing his throne, for he understood that his domestic power was dependent on foreign domination. He thus fought on through appallingly wintry conditions and survived by some of the most remarkable generalship of his career, until the end came in May with the retreat to Paris and his abdication. The continuation of the coalition thus
became a more significant objective and achievement than preparing for peace, and it is clear from the course of events that the political direction which was provided by the foreign ministers and rulers was essential in protecting the coalition from breaking up, as all previous ones had done. What in effect had happened was that a de facto rolling conference of the allied powers was established, ready to deal on a daily basis with the thrills and spills of a major alliance at war à l’outrance.

The success of this operation caused its members to proceed in the same way with the making of the Treaty of Paris of May, 1814, and the preparations for the Congress of Vienna, originally scheduled to meet in August of 1814 but persistently postponed until November. The difficulties inherent in creating a major resettlement of Europe were in themselves immense, and the determination of the representatives of the Great Powers to do the job without the participation of others produced major tensions with smaller powers, notably the King of Sweden. But despite the great crisis of December/January over the future of Poland, the core group succeeded in constructing a new European order and did so by including France among the negotiating parties, thus completing the process by which affairs were being conducted essentially by a directorate of all five of the Great Powers.

Initially, nobody noticed that what had occurred constituted major revision of the machinery of diplomacy, except in so far as they objected to it as a new and excluding phenomenon. As the settlement proceeded, and particularly after the episode leading to the battle of Waterloo, the notion first adumbrated by Pitt the Younger in 1805 that the final agreement needed some exceptionally definitive and permanent expression grew in strength. As was noted earlier, two possible routes were discussed: the first was the drafting of a special Treaty of General Guarantee. This was redrafted several times, but it fell by the wayside and was never signed. As time passed, the Czar of Russia came to prefer the idea of encapsulating new rules for the international community in a specifically Christian - and, indeed, wholly naive - form; and successfully insisted on the institution of the Holy Alliance in September 1815. From a different point of view, Lord Castlereagh also became unenthusiastic, as each day that put distance between the British Parliament and a real military emergency, increased its reluctance to have anything further to do with obligations to intervene in defense of a general European agreement. He dared not risk what President Wilson was later to do, knowing more certainly what his fate would be. Since there was to be
no treaty of General Guarantee and no one really believed in the efficacy of the Holy Alliance, something else was required.

What eventually happened was the codification of the new piece of the diplomatic machine that we have seen coming into existence. The pre-existence of its development made possible the implementation of the wishes of the powers: the system became the message and the significance of an historical development became crucial. It was not called into being by the demands of the moment - that path had been attempted but failed - and the character of its origin shaped the nineteenth century international system in profound ways, most particularly by stressing the practical and consensual over the application of rigid principle.57

We may thus conclude that in at least two ways understanding the significance of historical development leads to a clearer vision of why we have what we have, and, perhaps, how it may be expected to evolve. Looking at the present and likely evolution in the immediate future, we can identify at least two significant developments. They both arise out of the changing nature and increasing numbers of principals in the global system. The complexities that these introduce can be listed: the spectrum of power, size and efficiency among states has widened sharply and produced a parallel widening in the range of the activities about which they may wish to be represented. In turn, this has affected the functioning of associations of states - the most usual form of international organizations - who have discovered limits to the effectiveness of bi-lateral relationships. The recent difficulties encountered by the IMF in dealing with the financial crisis in Asia are a clear example of this. If both states and associations of states have experienced baffling complications and loss of power in their global dealings, the role of private, usually humanitarian organizations has sharply increased in significance, chiefly because the major crises in global politics are being caused by semi- or complete collapse of weak state structures. The consequences are unlike the previous patterns of international politics and have not proved amenable to traditional systems of control. They have instead induced the participation of large numbers of private organizations, with no tradition of self-representation and little machinery for achieving it. Indeed, in so far as having to join the diplomatic nexus means joining the world of states, there can be an element of

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57The Pure concept of diplomacy by Jose Calvet de Megalheas, 1988
reluctance involved: fear of the ‘poacher turned gamekeeper’ syndrome. However, all the signs are that this reluctance is being overcome. Private organizations are developing their own diplomacy both between themselves and between actors in the state system; and the way they have been doing is remarkably reminiscent of the early days of state self-representation. The decisions of the UN to avoid bilateral compulsions by adopting coordinating status in humanitarian crises and to give recognition to greatly increased numbers of private organizations have provided another example of how existing parts of the diplomatic system can provide the means of responding to the needs of the current situation and, to some degree, actually shape them.

It is very different, however, in other areas of activity. Organizations, whether states or not, that have a vertical structure and relate to each other over geographically precise events and issues can in various ways inherit the machinery of diplomacy already constructed. The need to deal with other aspects of globalization seems likely to provoke much more radical change. The reason is that important developments in human behavior are no longer occurring in relation to the destruction, reform or establishment of human authorities, but in relation to burgeoning areas of new activity. These tend to be arranged horizontally across global geography, time zones and cultures. They are commercial, financial and intellectual. They represent new areas of power, speaking chiefly and dramatically to individuals and they are particularly capable of profoundly affecting the economic fate of individuals. Unlike previous centers of power, they have not yet developed either internal organization and control or the means of representing themselves, either to each other or to state or non-state structures. The limitations that this imposes on global relationships have recently been made sharply clear during the Asian economic crisis. This has proved to be alarmingly immune to treatment by the usual authorities, and those authorities have discovered no means of speaking to the real authorities - unsurprisingly, since there is, for example, no known means of finding representatives of global currency dealers, let alone negotiating with them. This amounts to a crisis of representation and there is nothing in the existing machine that is going to help. The problem will worsen until areas of activity have also become centers of organized power and have acquired the need to deal with others like them. History suggests that this transition always happens in the end, but offers no guidance as to how it will be done on this occasion.
or how long it will take or if violence will be tangled in the process, which it generally has been. It is only expedient to conclude that, in the contemporary world, this is certainly the most significant zone to watch.

International relations is the study of relationships among countries, the roles of sovereign states, inter-governmental organizations, international non-governmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, and multinationals. International relations is an academic and a public policy field, and so can be positive and normative, because it analyzes and formulates the foreign policy of a given State. As political activity, international relations date from the time of the Greek historian Thucydides, and, in the early 20th century, became a discreet academic field within political science. However, international relations is an interdisciplinary field of study.

Besides political science, the field of international relations draws intellectual materials from the fields of economics, history, international law, philosophy, society, culture, environment and technology. The scope of international relations comprehends globalization, international security, protection of environment, nuclear proliferation, Scientific and technological development and terrorism and human rights.

2.5 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: AIMS, MERITS AND DEMERITS

International relations have been gaining immense popularity since the early 20th century. The first chair of international relations, the Woodrow Wilson Chair, was established in 1919 at the University of Wales. This set the stage for the recognition of international relations as a valuable and important subject of study. Organized studies of International Relations began as a very popular academic exercise. The two world wars and the changes that came under their collective impact gave a big momentum to the study of relations among nations and foreign policies of major powers. The post-war period witnessed an academic revolution in the study of international relations. It entered the 21st century as a well-recognized, popular and autonomous discipline. In contemporary times, it continues to enjoy the patronage of a very large number of scholars.
International relations is a complex and dynamic system of relations among nations. It covers all sorts of relations among peoples and groups in the world society. The relations among nations are both political and non-political. These includes social, economic, cultural, legal, official and non-official relations. All international transactions-financial and commercial, international sports, technical co-operation, cultural visits and ceremonial visits, form part of international relations. War, international conferences, diplomacy, Olympic Games, espionage, trade, foreign aid, immigration, tourism, hijacking, worldwide epidemics and violent revolutions also fall in the same category.

Since relations among nations, i.e. relations involving all human behavior on one side of the national boundary affecting human behavior on the other side of the boundary form the core of the study, the term international relations is considered more appropriate than others.

Palmer and Perkins prefer to use the term international relations instead of international politics on the grounds that politics at international level is a product of relations of different types and it rightly suggests the study of all aspects of human relations at the international level. According to Schwarzenegger, the term ‘international relations’ is broader than the term ‘international politics’ and it puts a stronger emphasis on the interdependence of entities inside the international society. In his opinion, international politics precludes aspects of national affairs which lie outside the political sphere.