Conclusion

The Cold War ended in 1989 in Germany when the Berlin Wall fell on 9 November. Two years later the Soviet Union collapsed, and the hammer and sickle flying atop the Kremlin walls in Moscow was replaced with the tricolour of the Russian Federation on 25 December 1991. The challenges of transition from communism to democracy are truly enormous, and have been researched in the context of a number of cases in Eastern Europe and former Soviet states. These challenges would have been daunting tasks even for a robust and invigorated system. But for Russia in the 1990s, many of the obstacles to democratisation were so great that there was doubt whether or not the task was achievable.

Absent practical evidence of any of the critical institutions of government that are common to liberal democracies, Russia had neither a market-based private property economy, a polity that was internally and externally sovereign, citizens’ judicial rights, nor representative’s government. As if this were not enough, Russia was also faced with the question of how to shape civil-military relations to secure democratic control of its vast armed forces, or, at the very least, to obtain the acquiescence of the military to democratic transition.

Military intervention in domestic politics and the degree of political independence and influence of the military are generally seen as one of the key problems often the central challenges of civil-military relations. Many of the academic works on civil-military literature has devoted to explore the circumstances that give to rise and the factors that explain military intervention in politics. Much attention is also paid to explore the circumstances and factors that facilitate civilian political control of the military and the establishment of democratic civil-military relations. The communist system as it developed in the Soviet Union resulted in the emergence of a very particular relationship between the military and politics. The military was generally under the strict political, but of course not democratic, control of the civilian communist leadership and had quite limited room for independent political action. At the same time, the military was politicised in the sense that it was one of the vehicles for society-wide inculcation of communist values. In most cases it was intertwined with the communist party through the establishment of party cells and
the oversight of party education officers throughout the armed forces. Finally, although the military’s political independence was limited, the military high command retained substantial control over defence policy, military strategy and force structure. As communism crumbled in the late 1980s and early 1990s this civil-military context raised major questions about the role of the military. To what extent was the military loyal to communism and to what extent would it, either independently or at the behest of or in conjunction with civilian communist leaders, act to defend the old regime? Once the communist regimes fell, the question shifted: to what extent would the armed forces support or resist a transition to democratic civilian political control and the broader de-communisation of the military?

Facing with these dilemmas, the military high command in Soviet Union were wary of the reforms introduced by President Gorbachev in the late 1980s and played a central role in the August 1991 coup against Gorbachev-indicating the greater loyalty of at least some parts of the Soviet military to communism. The priorities of perestroika amounted to an attack on the military’s claims to the lion’s share of state resources and a rejection of the sorts of foreign policy positions which relied heavily on the threat or use of force. At the same time, glasnost exposed the most unpleasant aspects of military life to public view, casting doubt on the army’s right to the privileges and respect it had claimed for years and acting as the catalyst for a crisis of morale and recruitment within the armed forces (Mathers 2003: 23-24). Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s success in opposing the coup and the subsequent disintegration of the Soviet Union, however, suggested that the military was both divided and ill prepared to actually implement a coup.

In August 1991, the military was complicit in a coup attempt that, although ultimately unsuccessful, did brief wrest power from legitimate authorities and place it into the hands of the coup-plotters. Yazov, as a uniformed defence minister, was complicit in the coup, while many in the military, Gromov, Lebed, Shaposhnikov, and Grachev, argued the opposite and managed to keep the “military” out of the operation. The coup attempt reflected the polarisation between the reformist and conservatives wings of the army’s elite. Ironically, as Dale Herspring has noted, “it was the Soviet Army that saved the reform process, and it was the Soviet Army that in the end was destroyed by the events of August 1991”. (Herspring 1996 (4): 153-154). What it
might take to precipitate a similar reaction in the longer term approaches to
democratic transition was a question that brought civil-military relations in post-soviet
Russia into focus during the 1990s.

In the Soviet era, the military was an integral component of the ruling elite. Under
the communist rule, the military’s loyalty was guaranteed by a threefold effort: penetration
of the military by the communist party, political education, and the provision of substantial
resources to support the needs and requirements of the armed forces. During the communist
times, civil-military relations were marked by civilian efforts to ensure military loyalty to the
system’s values and institutions. As was the case for every branch of the state, the military was
entirely subordinate to communist control. In communist systems, in return for subservience and
loyalty, the military was given a substantial amount of independence in the area of defining
defence policy and military doctrine.

After the December 1991, dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation
became its largest successor state. Boris Yeltsin was elected President of Russia by popular vote
in June 1991. By the fall of 1993, politics in Russia reached a stalemate between President
Yeltsin and the parliament. In a dramatic speech in September 1993, President Yeltsin
dissolved the Russian parliament and called for a new national elections and a new constitution.
The standoff between the executive branch and opponents in the legislature turned violent
in October after supporters of the parliament tried to instigate an armed insurrection. Yeltsin
ordered the army to respond with force to capture the parliament building (known as the
White House). In December 1993, voters elected a new parliament and approved a new constitution
that had been drafted by the Yeltsin government.

While the new democratic regimes faced the challenges of establishing
democratic civilian political control of the military and reforming the institutions for
management of the armed forces in the 1990s. In Russia faced more difficult political
transitions, with elected president and parliament in place, a variety of political forces
operating but political power increasingly concentrated in the hands of the president
and their supporters and weak counterbalancing institutions. As critics, comment on
this development in Russia as semi-or ‘soft’ authoritarian states in which the
concentration of power in the hands of the president and their circle fundamentally undermines democracy. In this context, the military and other security forces such as the interior ministry and intelligence services are some of the key instruments of presidential power.

The earliest part of the decade was characterised by a state of near political anarchy. Because it took several years to move from split division of authority between the executive and the legislature branches, the military, like all other elements of government, suffered from indecision and stagnation. The test came in October 1993 when civilian control called up upon the military to “restore order” but which civilian controllers were really in charge was a question that was not easily answered. Despite appeals for military forces to come to the aid of the “opposition,” the military remained loyal to the president and eventually the White House, ousting the rebels forthwith (ibid). The outcome of this confrontation has been the evolution of dramatically increased presidential powers- in effect, a form of super-presidentialism\(^1\). President Yeltsin’s growing prerogatives were exemplifies by his gradual acquisition of ever more civilian authority pertaining to military matters. Although his approach toward the military may be different, President Vladimir Putin “possesses few of Yeltsin’s inhibitions against the unbridled use of executive power”\(^2\). Thus under Yeltsin’s watch the army had emerged as a “presidential institution” (Baev 2002: 133). Putin had further cemented the institutional identity. Alexei Arbatov argued in a 2004 interview, given that the “president’s power is unmatched,” it was “entirely up to (him) whether true military reform takes place, or whether the military bureaucracy continues pretending that reforms are under way.” (Barany 2007: 163).

While much of the literature on civil-military relations focuses on the issue of military intervention in domestic politics. One of the main challenges facing the countries of post-communist Europe including Russia was the problem of establishing effective control over defence policy. When the communism collapsed almost no structures existed for civilian democratic control of defence policy. The new governments in Central and Eastern Europe faced a daunting array of challenges in this area: appointing civilian defence ministers and civilian staff to previously military dominated defence ministries; separating military generals staffs from defence
ministries and subordinating the former to the latter; putting in place institutions for
the management of defence policy, budgets and procurement; and establishing
parliamentary committees and procedures for the oversight of defence policy.

In Russia there have been civilian defence ministers, however the boundaries
between defence ministry and general staff remain a blurred, their defence ministries
remain predominantly military-staff organisations, defence policy-making, budgeting
and procurement are deeply opaque and parliamentary oversight is limited at best
(Cottey, Timothy & Anthony 2005). Moreover, the framework regulating relationship
between the civilian authority and military forces is based on the loyalty of the armed
forces to the state which is embodied in its subordination to the president as
Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, as set out in the 1993 constitution and the
1996 law “on defence”, but in practice this loyalty has been based on personal
relations between the head of the state and the head of the armed forces (Betz 2002)
On the parliamentary oversight, Brain Taylor comment, to achieve real parliamentary
control would be difficult since the Russia Constitution does not grant the Duma
oversight authority over executive branch structures (Taylor 2000: 45-47). In the
words of Marybeth Ulrich, parliamentary oversight is weak for several reasons. First,
there is the lack of civilian expertise in military matters although it has improved as
result of glasnost. Secondly, the military tends to forces through budget requests
worth millions without adequate scrutiny. Third, the president has more information
and clout on how much is to spend on national defence (Ulrich 1999: 74) In effect, the
military has become a de facto presidential institution, a status cultivated by the top
brass because it inherently denies any legislative interference into its affairs. The
absence of democratic civil-military relations, on the one hand, poses a serious
obstacle to the realization of democratic transition because it is a major component of
the process while, on the other hand, it reflects the power relations that have doomed
Russia’s democratization prospects (Barany 2007).

With the disintegration of the USSR and the end of the Cold War, it has been
felt that there is a need for radical military reforms and the evolution of a new
doctrine and strategy in keeping pace with the changing times. Alexei G. Arbatov has
rightly remarked: “the success of a radical and authentic military programme of
military reform is the key component for the survival of the complete package of
democratic and market regulations with Russia has embarked upon since 1992; in simple terms, if military reform is a failure then the whole Russian transition project is in jeopardy” (Arbatov 1998). However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the new Russia was faced with many obstacles. Conditions in the military were very poor in the decade of the 1990s, especially at the outset and during the early stages of transition, when the economy was particularly weak and resource allocation was ill-defined. The defence budget was declined by about 40 percent from 1989 to 1994. The standard of living for military personnel fell at a staggering rate. Research estimates indicate that in 1992, the standard of living was only about 25 percent of what it was in 1986, a troubling development for senior offices and others accustomed to the perks and privileges of the past. There was a particularly acute housing shortage, exacerbated by the repatriation of personnel from Russian military bases in newly independent states that were formerly part of the Soviet Union. Even worse, a system of hazing called (dedovshchina) plagued the enlisted ranks so badly that suicide rates began to rise dramatically (Moran 2002: 2). These conditions bred bad morale and eventually led to widespread corruption, especially in the most senior ranks. Accordingly, concerns about the military’s propensity for adventurous mischief supported all the more efforts aimed at proceeding with haste toward reforms and new military doctrine based on a more relevant and realistic national security policy (Brannon 2009: 8)

Boris Yeltsin demanded two things from the armed forces - manpower reduction and the speedy withdrawal of troops from Eastern and Central Europe and the former Soviet republics. In return, he permitted army leaders to run the army as they saw fit (and to get away with corruption and criminal behaviour on a shocking scale) (Barany 2008 (3)). The sinking of the submarine Kursk in August 2000 and the elusiveness of victory in the second military campaign in Chechnya only added a few more pixels of resolution to an already clear picture: after nine years of President Boris Yeltsin as Commander-in-Chief the army was a shambles; efforts at its reform had been ill conceived, inadequately supported financially and politically and, ultimately, fruitless (Betz and Valeriy 2005: 41). Vladimir Putin astounded by the military’s appalling performance in Chechnya came to power determined to radically transform the armed forces. Already as acting president in 2000, he identified defence
reform as a top priority. As time went by, however, his resolve diminished, for numerous perfectly sensible reasons, the absence of real reformers on his team and his disinclination to enforce unpopular decisions on a key institutional support base, to mention just two. The most important factor delaying substantial reform, however, has been the generals' steadfast opposition to it. In March 2001, Putin appointed his friend and political ally, Sergey Ivanov, to head the defence ministry and the effort to transform the military into a modern, effective fighting force. Nearly six years later, Ivanov left his post having failed in his task. This is not to say that nothing has been done or even that what has been accomplished is unimportant; rather, the point is that the post-Soviet armed forces desperately needed to undergo a comprehensive reform that, 16 years on, has yet to be implemented.

The bottom line, however, is that Putin has brought a new and welcome style to the role of commander-in-chief without addressing the inherent dysfunctionalism of the system of civil-military relations that militates against real military reform. The MoD still lacks accountability and transparency at nearly all levels. The government itself possesses no clear understanding of how much is spent on defence, for what purpose or why, while the strong- but highly personalised and opaque system of vertical control over the military centred on the presidency allows for corruption, bureaucratic game-playing in the corridors of power and shirking in the General Staff on implementation of unwanted reforms. Moreover, the critical problem of defence policy is that the failure of political and military elites to sort out what type of conflicts the country should prepare for inevitably prevents the formulation of a consistent grand strategy and doctrine. In other words, politicians and generals seem not to have reached a solid consensus on who their enemies are and how to fight them in a potential future war.  

It has been said that “harmonious civil-military relations reflect stable social conditions, while social crisis gives rise to tension” (Sakwa 2002: 409). Samuel Huntington wrote about the politicisation of societies and militaries in his seminal work about political order in societies that are in transition from one kind of political system to another. Huntington suggested that a “praetorian society might reflect the political participation not only of the military, but of other social forces as well (Huntington 1968: 195). In Russia there was tension between the military and civilian
authorities as the military tried to find the right balance between participation and
politicisation. Richard Sakwa writes, “Under Yeltsin the role of the military, despite
occasional flashes of military adventurism, remained mostly marginal. Under Putin,
however, there was clear pattern to rely on the security establishment, marginalising
career military officers”. Under both the presidential administration, the military
perceived behaviour, and mistakes were made. Sakwa concludes, “The fact that the
military could sustain a policy of their own suggests that Russia still has long way to
go before the military can be considered under complete civilian control” (Sakwa:
2002: 413)

Civil-military relations have many dimensions and can be viewed from
different perspectives, and though out the centuries political scientist, sociologists,
physiologists, and economist attempt to study the relationship between the military
and the society with theoretical and empirical tools of social sciences and arrived at
results which were more precise and accurate then accumulated wisdom of ages. In
the Chapter one show what is the relationship between civilians (people without
arms), the society at large, and the military (people with arms) established as a
separate armed body in order to protect a society? This question has a long history
that goes back to antiquity, to the very beginning of military organisation in civilian
societies. In each country the answer to this question is deeply influenced or rooted by
national history, sentiments, and traditions. It depends on the role of the army as a
state institution in the given country, subordination of the military to political
authorities as defined in laws and constitutional arrangements, and so on. Public
perceptions of military personnel, the prestige of the military officer’s profession,
public opinion towards defence and foreign policy of the regime and certain actions of
the army, and so on, determine it. The very nature of the problem is permanently
changing because of both society and the military are constantly changing as well.

The chapter deals with theoretical approaches to the civil-military relations in
western and socialist countries as put by various scholars. Samuel P. Huntington⁵ and
Morris Janowitz⁶ suggested specific aspects of professionalism, defining the civil-
military relationship in terms of objective or subjective control. One of the basic
methodological assumptions of Huntington is that it is possible to define an
equilibrium called “objective civilian control” that ensures civilian control and
maximise security at the same time. He argues that, "In practice, officership is strongest and most effective when it most closely approaches the professional ideal; it is weakest and most defective when it falls short of that ideal" (Huntington 1957: 11).

Janowitz in his argument has a similar concern with both civilian control and the military's ability to fulfil its responsibilities in meeting the security needs of the state (Janowitz 1960: lviii). However, in contrast to Huntington, Janowitz argues that relying on the creation of an apolitical military in order to ensure civilian control is an unrealistic approach. Janowitz advocates other measures for enhancing civilian control, such as legislative oversight, extending civilian control, such as increasing legislative organisations, and increasing civilian control into lower levels of military organisations, and increasing civilian involvement in officer professional education (Janowitz 1960: 439). One strong guarantee of the maintenance of civilian control according to Janowitz is the military's "meaningful integration with civilian values" (Janowitz 1960: 420). Yet, as Feaver points out in the end Janowitz is similar to Huntington in relying on the professional military ethic as the fundamental means for ensuring control (Feaver 1996: 166).

Dale Hersping and Ivan Volgyes considered models suggested by Roman Kolkowicz, William Odom and Timothy. Amos Perlmutter and William LeoGrande wrote about the extent to which militaries in communist societies were politicised through infiltration and penetration by the party, resulting in shared ideology and values. Pavel Baev and Marybeth Ulrich addressed the impact of anarchic political decision-making and severe economic conditions on the military. Peter Feaver, departing significantly from tradition, suggest that "principal-agent" relationship, based on the degree and intrusiveness of civilian monitoring, lead to military "working" or "shirking". Simply stated, working is doing things the way civilian want, while shirking id doing things the way the military wants. One of the limitations of Feaver's research is that it does not specifically address the problems of post-communism. Several factors unique to post-communist system point to variations from traditional theories. Professional military education in communist systems was based on military doctrine that was tied ideologically to politics. Professional behaviour of the military resulted from and was measured by its adherence to doctrine. Michael Desch's structural theory approaches the essential civil-military
problem from the comparative perspective of the state, attempting to make
generalizations about the power of civilian control over the military. The central
argument of his structural theory of civil-military relations is that the particular
combination of internal and external threats faced by a state (independent variables)
determines the quality of civilian control (the dependent variable). Civilian control
should be best in times of high external threat and low internal threat, worst in times
of low external threat and high internal threat, and indeterminate in the other two
cases. Though Desch’s argument may be useful in comparative perspective, its utility
in the case of the Russia is rather limited. The defect in his theory becomes evident
when applied to Russia, the opposition of Russian generals to defence reform. It is
precisely the divergent threat assessments of Russian political and military elites that
make this case so compelling; for the past decade, the high command had tried and
failed to fully convince state leaders that the United States and NATO pose a serious
threat to the nation (Barany 2006: 601).

However, it is not possible to settle on a single model, as there is no single
model appropriate for all nations. Forcseeing a future convergence among models of
civil-military relations is to remember that states are approaching it from very
different starting points, reflecting different national histories. Change in the pattern
of civil-military relations in each country is part of the further democratization of
society. Democracy is an ideal toward which human societies work; it is process, not
an existential state. At the theoretical levels, efforts to democratise civil-military
relations in the former Eastern bloc and Soviet Union expose the limitations of
applying Western frameworks to transition cases, raising more questions for civil-
military relations theory rather than confirming its core tenets. This difficulty suggests
the need for an alternative framework for examining and measuring the evolution of
democratic civil-military relations in transition countries.

Since the fall of the communism what conclusions can be drawn about the
state of civil-military relations in postcommunist Europe and the nature of the regions
in civil-military relations? The relative homogeneity of communist civil-military
relations has been replaced by significant diversity across the region. In Russia the
military has become part of the nexus of semi- or outright authoritarian presidential
rule, while severe economic and social problems are resulting in a dramatic
downgrading of the military's professional and operational competence and severely inhibiting the prospects for meaningful defence reform. The presidential (semi) authoritarianism that has emerged in Russia represents a very different pattern with its own distinctive civil-military dynamics. The extent to which this pattern is stable is a matter for debate. Presidential elections, the death of old rulers and or the handover of power to new ones are, however, likely to present periodic challenges to the status quo. In these circumstances, control of military power may play an important role and the military may be drawn into domestic politics (as occurred in the 1993 Russian parliamentary coup). The post-communist era is more than a decade old, yet the transformation of civil-military relations to democratic norms is still at a nascent stage or a difficult political issue in many ex-socialist countries as well as Russia.

In the chapter II, I examined the unique features of the Soviet political system which fostered a distinct form of military professionalism resulting from its tsarist legacy, the socialisation processes of the Soviet era, and the constraints of Party control. Where there is an authoritarian model of officership and leadership, the harsh discipline of military life, an intense aversion to reveal its internal operations to public, and the corruption of bureaucratic and personal ethics the characteristic Soviet military professionalism. The chapter also examined the degree of military intervention in the internal level affairs during the Soviet era and post-communist period which it did increased, and what seems to tracked in the internal was mainly because of the politicised of the military or lack of professionalism and the instability of legitimate authority, which was largely because of the role play by the civilian authority over the military for gaining political means.

The Soviet military was a key player in the August coup 1991, so as the Russian military in 1993 October event and the Chechen crisis, breaking a long tradition on non-intervention in domestic politics. The military at both these events show their ambivalent character or its reluctance to involve in internal politics. However, at the end of the day, the military end up in supporting the civilian leadership in the power struggle. Moreover, the military became highly politicised, with political differences between military officers and other actors, and splits within the officer corps itself, quickly, became apparent, unfortunately, no step were taken to prevent the officers from becoming members of parliament and political
organisations, or from expressing their personnel political opinions in the press. These processes weakened military professionalism, based on the principle of civilian supremacy and the concentration of the armed forces on its narrow professional tasks and at the same time, civilian decision to use the military internally undermine professionalism and contribute to the politicisation of the officer corps. As a ‘military intervention’ is an independent military decision to take a stance against the legitimate political leadership, but this was not the case in Soviet era and Russia, the army was used on the orders of the political leadership as evidently discussed in the chapter.

In the chapter two, section V and section VI; I assess the civil-military relations during the Gorbachev and Yeltsin period. They are the Gorbachev’s invitation to officers to actively participate in politics and Yeltsin’s acquiescence to a new institutional environment that did not deny the military an active political presence. The chapter highlights the struggle facing post-communist militaries as they adapt to the presence of democratic values in their society at large. In the process, I analyse military professionalism that has been made along the dimension of democratic military professionalism developed in the framework presented in the section II: recruitment and retention, promotion and advancement, Norms of officership and leadership, military budget, and the limited role of Duma over the military. The evidence presented highlighted the difficulty of adapting inherited forms of military professionalism to the norms of democratic accountability found in the military of developed democracies.

In the chapter II section VIII, I examine the Russian military doctrine and the recent trend in military doctrine basing on policy and doctrine. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, military doctrine has been in a nearly constant state of change. The first post-communist effort merely sought to revise the Soviet era thinking slightly, eliminating discussion of class struggle in its design, remaining essentially defensive in nature (Appendix A). The focus of attention was still aimed at coping with threats from states (the U.S.), or coalitions (N.A.T.O), bent on seeking world domination. Sakwa mentions that an early draft of this document, a version that ultimately was not adopted, provided for direct military intervention on behalf of Russian-speaking populations in places where Soviet interests had previously been preeminent (Sakwa 2002: 413). This military doctrine was updated in 1997, with few changes, at about
the same time as publication of Russia’s first post-Soviet national security policy (Brannon 2009)

As the decade of the 1990s began to end, new policy and doctrine were under development for implementation in 2000. Although the new military doctrine was drafted by the general staff, Putin’s influence need not beunderestimating. Sakwa suggest, that the inconsistencies failed to adequately address the issue of military reform in its most fundamental sense. Specifically, “It was this gap that allowed the very public clash between Defence Minister Sergeyev and Chief of the General Staff Kvashnin in July 2000 over the relative priority of strategic forces (defended by Sergeyev), or whether they should be cut to provide extra resources for conventional forces (Kvashnin’s view) (Sakwa 2002: 413)

In sum, the military doctrine, rather than assisting, guiding, and directing national defence were instead battlegrounds for civil-military relations in Russia in the 1990s. Rather than providing the basis for reform, as they should have done, these documents reflected their authorship: defending an outdated concept of national interest that was preoccupied with a western threat forces that no longer existed. The question of balance between conventional and nuclear forces, as well as other difficult issues such as personnel and infrastructure reform, were left mostly untouched.

Another objective in the chapter is assessing the Chechen war from the perspective of civil-military relations that revealed some valuable insights on the military performance in Chechnya and the relationship between the civilian and the military during the time of President Boris Yeltsin.

The objective of the chapter III was to analyse the military politics and the two crucial institutions, the presidency and the legislature. A short time after the collapse of the Soviet Union the presidency had emerged as the pivotal political institution in Russia with the incumbent acquiring “superpresidential” powers. For the most part, Yeltsin obtained this power at the expense of the legislature, the elected representatives of the Russian people. What powers does the president enjoy vis-a-vis the legislature in terms of the armed forces’ civilian oversight? To what extent has the Duma been successful in asserting its prerogatives regarding the military and its budget? One of the tasks of this chapter is to find answers to queries such as these.
Another objective of the chapter was a brief examine on the Chechnya crisis.

In the section II, chapter III it outlines the legislature function in civilian control in Russia. Until 1993 Russia did have a relatively independent legislature that could have filled a significant role in the establishment of institutionally balanced civilian oversight of the military. The country’s presidents, however, were interested neither in sharing their authority with parliament in general nor in jointly controlling the armed forces in particular. In the past years the executive powers has grown as the political influence of the legislature has diminished. The legislature’s very limited role in overseeing defence –security affairs, then, is directly attributable to “superpresidentialism” and may be the greatest failure of Russian civil-military relations.

Under the constitution (adopted after the elections of 1993), the president is the supreme command-in-chief of Russia’s armed forces. His power is to be executed through the general staff. The national Security Council is supposed to be the heart of the political-military relationship, blending the requirements of both and matching means to ends in support of the president’s policies and vision for the country. Although the constitution does not address who will craft national security strategy, it is implied that this would be one of the duties of the council. The ministry of defence is charged with the largely administrative burdens of developing and implementing military, technical, and personnel policies. Finally, the last element of the defence establishment in Russia is political. Sakwa wrote that “the prime minister and the parliament can exert considerable practical influence over defence policy through control of budgets and the Duma’s defence committee” (Sakwa 2002: 409). Military issues were debated at length, especially on the Duma’s defence committee. Drafts of national security policy and military doctrine that would be considered by the president’s Security Council were also reviewed by the state Duma. Collectively, these are the principal actors in the civil-military relationship.

The armed forces as an institution are administered by the Law on Defence of 24 September 1992 (amended in 1996). It is possible that the law may have contributed to uncertainties, or at least the perception of uncertainties, associated with the question of who had direct access to the president. While the law defines the
responsibilities of both the general staff and ministry of defence in terms of requirements and capabilities, it falls short of specifics about who trumps whom in the pecking order. The question of whether the chief of the general staff may approach the president directly, or whether he is required to conduct liaison via the defence minister, is not addressed in detail. Instead, the law leaves the issue somewhat open to interpretation, thus affording an opportunity for misunderstanding and exploitation. Two articles in the Law on Defence that is particularly relevant in this context:

Articles 4 outline the powers of the president with regard to defence. Section 14 of the article gives the president the power to appoint (and to dismiss) both the minister of defence and the chief of the general staff directly. Sections 14-17 further specify presidential authority to include subordinate elements of all of Russia’s armed forces, including unit commanders. Because the president has a direct relationship with each of the officers appointed by him as defence minister and general staff chief, this article also gives the president the right to go directly to each as he chooses, without first consulting the other. The article does not, however, grant reciprocal authority to each of these positions: neither one has direct access to the president at the expense of the other, at least not by virtue of this article of the law.

Article 13 addresses the administration of Russia’s armed forces. Consisting entirely of just four sections, the article specifies that the responsibility for administration lies with both the defence ministry and with the general staff. Despite vague generalities about the defence ministry acting in a primarily managerial role, while the general staff would occupy itself with operational matters, the article falls short of answering the question of access to the president. In this article, both officers have roughly equal rights in that regard.

Because legislation, constitutional and subsequent, did not settle the question of primacy between the defence minister and the chief of the general staff, especially regarding the all-important question of presidential access, there were gaps in authority to the extent that both were able to practice somewhat independently of each other. The result was a perception that the only credible civilian authority was the president. Yeltsin encouraged individual relationships between the officers in these positions and himself. Putin did not.
In the section IV of the chapter III I focus on the armed forces’ political participation since 1991 and the reasons for the absence of overt military interference in politics. They are the Gorbachev’s invitation to officers to actively participate in politics, which I have already discussed in chapter II; under Yeltsin the military’s independent political presence became not only acceptable but endorsed by the president, the legislature and the political parties. Because of the diminished success of military candidates at the polls and, more generally, the decreasing importance of elections in an increasing authoritarian polity, this electoral role declined during the 1990s\textsuperscript{14}. For this reason, during the Putin era, the most important locus of the military’s political presence shifted from the legislature to governorship and appointed political offices. In other words, they were no longer “independents” they were “appointees”.

In the section V of the chapter III I address the issue of superpresidentialism in Russia, which has become a usage among the scholars. During the past decade, Russia’s polity has been depicted as "managed democracy," "presidential democracy," "controlled democracy," and so on. Pinning different modifying labels onto "democracy," however, only obfuscates the reality of the Russian state’s fundamental authoritarian nature (Collier and Levitsky 1997). Russia is not a full-fledged dictatorship, however, given that local elections is still contested, opposition groups though harassed still exist, and a few media outlets do remain that provide critical commentary on public affairs. Russia has gradually become what many scholars called it as a superpresidential authoritarian polity, that is, a fundamentally authoritarian state in which the president has managed to concentrate extraordinary powers in his hands. Two political events may be considered as the defining milestones of this process. First, following the September-October 1993 conflict between the legislature and President Boris Yeltsin, Moscow’s political trajectory has been characterized by increasing centralization, the growth of executive power, the corresponding decline in the legislature’s influence, and the steady erosion of human and civic rights and freedoms. After the collapse of the Soviet Union presidential authority emerged as the pivotal political institution in Russia with the incumbent acquiring extraordinary powers. Second, the 1996 presidential elections demonstrated the already existing limitations on political competition and restrictions on the print
Chapter V Conclusion

and especially broadcast media and, following the contest, the further rise of the presidential administration and the growing influence of *silovoki* in it (Huskey 1999: 82-86; Nichols 1999: 144-53). Yeltsin and Putin used their authority, among other things, to increase the role of the executive branch particularly of the presidential administration in overseeing the armed forces. In addressing the issue, I assess President Yeltsin's and Putin polices toward the military and the changing character of the Security Council and Power Ministries in contemporary Russian Politics.

In the section VI, I analyses on the Chechnya crisis in Russia\(^{15}\). Over the past decade Chechnya has become a great defining issue of Russia statehood and the test of Russian military power. Conflict there did much to undermine the tenure of one president and became the distinguish element in another president's march to office. Since 2001, President Vladimir Putin has linked the endgame of the conflict in Chechnya with Russian participation in a board, antiterrorist coalition. In the wake of the events of September 11, Putin chose to refine the former conflict to fit within the latter.

The Yeltsin administration, having invoked Russian nationalism to bring about the end of the Soviet Union, found its sovereignty challenged by a nation of less than a million people and sought to thwart Chechen self-determination by force in 1994. After a year and a half of inconclusive warfare and fragile cease-fire, the Yeltsin government waited until after the second round of the presidential election to renew fighting, only to be embarrassed by the Chechen recapture of Grozny on the same day as Yeltsin's inauguration. An infirm president was forced to accept a cease-fire and the withdrawal of Russian forces from Chechnya in August 1996 (Lieven 1998: 142-143). In September 1999, in response to Chechen armed incursions into Dagestan, Moscow renewed hostilities. By the time Vladimir Putin took charge of the Russo-Chechen War there was a long legacy that shaped the parameters of the conflict. In September 24, 2001, Putin announced his support for the war against terrorism. Labelling the attacks as barbaric (September 11), Putin offered Russia's support for the antiterrorist struggle. As he pledged support for the antiterrorism coalition, Putin also addressed Chechnya in a manner that tied the two topics directly to one another. "As we see it, Chechen developments ought not to be regarded outside the context of efforts against international terrorism." (Kipp 2005: 206). Putin noted

242
the historical peculiarities of the Chechen conflict that made it a distinct part of the struggle against terrorism and then appealed for the misguided and or misinformed to lay down their arms.

That is why I call all paramilitaries and self-styled political activists urgently to sever whatever contacts with international terrorists and the organisation; and to contact official spokesmen of federal ruling bodies within 72 hours to debate the following: the disarmament procedure of the paramilitary groups and formations, and arrangements to involve them in peacetime developments in Chechnya. On behalf of federal of authority, Victor Kazantsev, envoy plenipotentiary of the president of the RF of federal district south, which incorporates Chechnya, has been authorised to affect such contacts.

Putin’s challenge was to make peace with those Chechens who were willing to seek a political arrangement within the RF as opposed to the creation of an Islamic state or a Jihad against Russia. Since then, the fighting has continued and evolved. Terrorism and repression within Chechnya continue. In the section VI of the chapter III I address the implication of the Chechen war on the Russian military, seeking to find an explanation for the lack of interest among both the top brass and the ruling clique in learning its lessons and translating these into new guidelines for modernisation. It starts with a brief examination of the pattern of combat operations in Chechnya that seeks to identify the key impacts on various elements of the armed forces. There follows an assessment of the overall impact of the war on the integrity of the military structures and on the transformation of military culture. Finally, the influence of the prolonged hostilities on the relations between the military leadership and Putin’s court is examined, with particular focus on decision-making related to exploiting the Chechen War. Chechnya also shows that Russia’s defence policy could not balance ends and means, or rhetoric and reality. Chechnya connects Russian defence policy with Russia’s vexed relations between the centre and the periphery.

The main purpose of the chapter IV is to analyse Putin’s defence policy in regard to armed forces reforms, defence industry and his close control over the military. In military reform the key problems are substantial re-equipment, modernisation of the principles for manning the armed forces and improvement of
their very structure with a strong, professional and well-equipped army for the successful and peaceful development of the country. In the chapter IV, section II to section III deal with brief analysed on how Putin had deal with the military and implemented reforms to bring changes in the military. When Putin came on the scene, he proved to be a much different man than Yeltsin. He cared about the military and it showed. He told them he would increase their funding and he did. Morale began to improve a bit, and the government made good on the back pay it owed. The armed forces, while far from perfect, organized and waged a much better campaign at the start of the second war in Chechnya. Then came a key turning point, the Kursk disaster.

Putin has a vision for his country as a revitalized great power. That vision mandates a powerful, but not excessively large military to complement a thriving economy and an active foreign policy in Russia’s sphere of interest (and at times, globally). The loss of the Kursk led Putin to quickly realize that the military was still in poor shape. He also began to understand that in the preceding decade, the only reforms that the military actually implemented were the massive reductions; the rest were mostly a lot of talk and little action. Therefore, Putin fired Yeltsin’s Minister of Defence and brought in his own guy, Sergei Ivanov. Then he pushed the generals to get serious about reform. The first efforts were much better thought out than previous attempts, but still of the same pattern: the generals wanted a better funded and better equipped mass conscript military. Putin, knowing Russia’s spending limits and staying true to his vision, persisted in his views, and finally several of his generals took notice of the changing world. Moreover, more than a decade after the breakup of the Soviet Union, some of them began to realize that Russia and her military had to move on. The empire was not coming back, but they could regain great power status if they did the right things. The generals finally began to understand that, despite decades of inculcated distrust, the West was not their biggest threat; the threat lay to the south and if they did not reshape Russia’s armed forces to deal with that threat, Russia would eventually be in jeopardy. That is where the Russian military is today: no longer looking back, but only now starting to move forward.

However, the critical problem of defence policy is that the failure of political and military elites to sort out what type of conflicts the country should prepare for
inevitably prevents the formulation of a consistent grand strategy and doctrine. In other words, politicians and generals seem not to have reached a solid consensus on who their enemies are and how to fight them in a potential future war. Consequently, the generals oppose the abolition of conscription because they want to retain the capability of raising large armies with a deep pool of reservists. They have, time and again, rejected the idea of creating a relatively small (600,000- to 800,000-strong), mobile, well-trained and appropriately equipped force to fight in local and regional conflicts while countering others with nuclear deterrence\textsuperscript{17}.

Another prominent argument as mention in the chapter IV section IV is that, can Russia afford a professional military. Two inextricably linked sets of questions. First, how large do Russian armed forces need to be? Is it necessary to preserve the enormous inherited force posture and associated mobilisation potential or not? Second, how should Russia’s military manpower be recruited? Is it desirable to retain the traditional conscript system, or should Russia move in the direction of an all-volunteer professional force (known in the Russian context as the contract manpower system). Such linked questions have been analysis on the chapter IV. For Russia’s military reformers, the answer to these questions is vitally important. As in Russia military context shifting from the draft to voluntary contract would create a modernised, effective, affordable military suitable to its needs. But the abandonment of the conscript system to all volunteer system is still not materialised and it has created a center of public debates, has gained both political prominence and symbolic importance.

In addition with the issue on professional, I examined on the conscription of the armed forces and its problems in drafting young Russian soldiers and within the military faced by the draftees and also examined on the draft reforms as formulate by the MoD. In Russia thought the term of conscription into the armed forces has been reduced from two years to one in 2008, while retaining the overall size of the forces, this implies doubling the number of conscripts drafted each year, but scholars and experts argue that the demographic change in Russia it would not be enough healthy 18-year-olds to do this. Secondly, recruitment and retention on contract service appear insufficient to fill the gap. Thirdly, quality and training of the soldiers is still inferior
and finally the NCOs are not fully equipped with modern facilities.

The bottom line is that as long as the armed forces are not held accountable by civilian authority, the prospects of substantial defence reform will remained minimal. One of the defining aspects of superpresidentialism is the restriction of legislative authority without which there can be no institutionally balanced control over the armed forces. This sort of executive role, in turn, has fostered the institutional crisis and led to gradual erosion of civil-military relations in Russia.

In the chapter IV, I examined on the Putin's handling of the defence industry during his tenure as Russia President and how under President Vladimir Putin, the Russian defence industry has been restructured and centrally controlled and in an effort to reform the defence sector. Moreover, in the procurement sphere the Russian government and presidential administration brought changes in the procurement mechanism on monitoring the defence and divisions of functions and responsibilities, which in turn was only to strengthen the central control over the defence industry, thereby the idea behinds was to remove any kind of governmental or parliamentary oversight and are a part of what might be called the president's personal government.

In the section I discussed on the impact on the Military Industrial Complex (MIC) due to the collapse of Soviet Union and the factors contributed to the decline of the MIC. In addition to section V, I gave a brief analysis on the post-soviet inheritance of the defence industry in relation to three important features that was driving during the 1990s, that is - contraction, Privatisation and conversion which the Russian defence industry experienced during that period. It was very important to note that the character of Russian economy was different from the centralistic and bureaucratic Soviet economy. Russian economy was on a transitional phase moving towards competitive market economy. Russian leadership however has no definite guidelines for the defence industry. Yeltsin in his major reform and simple and direct: the problem was that defence industry needed to be drastically reduced. Lack of a clear military doctrine (Including principles of force structure and weapons requirement and weapons development and procurement programmes) halted the prospect of quick action towards conversion and ownership issues (state versus private)
In the section VI of chapter IV, I focus on Putin’s programme on the defence in dealing with two important programmes—Putin’s armament Program 2002-2010 and the armament program 2007-2015. The former was that the state intends to reassert control over the defence industrial complex (OPK) by converting its intellectual property rights into majority stock holdings. The ambiguous program of the Defence Industrial Sector (2002-2006) seeks to reduce the 1700 firms that make up the OPK by some two thirds, and consolidate the remainder into what was called “system-building integrated structures” headed by design bureaus. However this program was doomed of poor planning, unrealistic budgets and a lack of consistent support within the government. On the State Program 2007-15, it is yet to say whether this program will succeed or not but if these program undergo well, it if bring an improvement in the Russian defence industry and the Russian could able to acquire numbers of advanced weaponry in the coming years.

On the section VII in the chapter IV, I focus on the relationship between executive and the military, that is, how Putin has able to strengthening the control of the political authorities. The end result is that institutional changes have been that civilian control over the Russian armed forces has become, in effect, presidential control. After the collapse of the Soviet Union civilian oversight of the armed forces has deteriorated to the point that it is synonymous with presidential control. Since the 1993 conflict between the president and the legislature, the Russian polity has been on a steady path toward increasingly authoritarian rule or “superpresidential” powers.

Another objective is that a brief examination of a group of non-civilian or paramilitary institutions. As these institutions were politically significant under Yeltsin who used them as counterweight to the regular armed forces. Once Vladimir Putin took office, power ministry personnel (militocracy or the siloviki) emerged as his most important support base. I therefore examined their political influence, especially in view of the regular armed forces’ role like the close control over the army and relationship with generals. In my research I concluded that the rise in the numbers of siloviki under Putin was mainly due to personal links and loyalty and not an individual institutional background in the force structure per se have been the central rationale for political appointments under Putin.
In sum, in a democracy, through the ballot box, citizens delegate to politicians the authority to control all the myriad activities of the state, including those of the military. The politicians' problem is to maintain and demonstrate the reality of that control, bearing in mind the vastness of the state bureaucracy, the multiplicity of its operations, and the necessity of “managing the expert problem”, as Huntington put it (Huntington 1957: 20). Control in this sense means making sure that the policies politicians have decided upon are faithfully executed. It also has the meaning of governing in a way that the decisions of policy-implementers can be overruled or re-examined if necessary. But theoretical debates aside, democratic civil-military relations boils down to two essential. First, civilians with legitimacy derived directly or indirectly from the electoral process make the big policy decisions. Second, civilian decision makers have the capacity to check whether their directives are actually implemented. In practice, this means that civilians decision makers play a major roles in an integrated military-civilian Ministry of Defence under the leadership of a civilian minister, while outside the Ministry of Defence there are effective, civilian-led bodies of oversight, and every one works in accordance with the law. It is also incumbent on civilians to exercise control not only in the literal sense, but also in the sense of management and direction of the armed forces.

The end result is that civilian control over the Russian armed forces has become, in effect, presidential control. When he chooses to, he can impose his policy preferences on the military, whose leadership is bound to him by a mixture of professional loyalty and personal self-interest. So, civilian control exists in a very narrow, literal sense. If strides are nit made in bringing civilians into the MoD, if the legislature continues to be shut out of any real oversight role, if the president continues to treat the security services as agents of his persona will, and if the military continues to be drawn deeper into the political life of the country, then it is unreasonable to expect much progress of democratisation and indeed it will led to more retrenchment and strengthen authoritarianism.

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End Notes

248


3 For a more detail discussion of the limitations of the legal and constitutional framework governing civil-military relations in Russia, see David Betz (2003), “No Place for a Civilian? Russian Defence Management from Yeltsin to Putin”, Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 23 (2): 175-504


13 The Russian armed forces consist of three armed services: army, air force and navy. The strategic rocket forces (SRF) have been downgraded below the status of a branch of armed forces. Many of the SRF assets have been transferred to the newly created space and space-defence forces, while around 35 percent of all nuclear launchers are controlled by the navy and the remaining to be pass to the air force. The air force and air defence have merged and the airborne forces is now a separate service directly responsible to the defence minister and the chief of the general staff; cited in Robert Brannon, Russian Civil-Military Relations, 2009.


Chapter V Conclusion


### Appendix 1: Military Doctrines of Soviet, Russian Federation Military Doctrine 1993 and RF Military Doctrine 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of pages</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definition of military doctrine</td>
<td>Represents a system of fundamental views officially accepted by the Soviet state concerning the prevention of war, force generation, preparation of the country and the Armed Forces for suppression of aggression and methods of warfare to defend the socialist Fatherland. The doctrine is derived from the foreign policy of state.</td>
<td>Russia’s military doctrine is a part of the concept of national security and represent a set of officially approved state views concerning war and its prevention, defensive force generation, preparation of the country and the armed forces for suppression of aggression and methods of warfare to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity</td>
<td>The main provisions of the military doctrine of the RF are a component part of the security concept and represent a system of officially approved state views on averting wars and Armed conflicts, force generation, preparation of the country of defence and using the Armed Forces and the other troops to protect the vital interests of the RF.</td>
<td>Represent a systemised aggregate of fundamentals official views (guidelines) on preventing wars and armed conflicts, on the nature and methods of waging them, and on organising the activities of the state, society and citizen to ensure military security of the RF and its allies.</td>
<td>Represent a systemised aggregate of fundamentals official views (guidelines) on military-political, military-strategic and military-economic fundamentals for ensuring the military security of the RF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preamble/Introduction</td>
<td>1. In the present international</td>
<td>1. The doctrine is a component part of the</td>
<td>1. The doctrine is a component part of the</td>
<td>1. The doctrine elaborates on</td>
<td>1. The doctrine elaborates on</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

251
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Military-Political Principles</th>
<th>Destabilising factors of the military-political situation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Situation</strong></td>
<td>The USSR believes that the immediate threat of a global war has been considerably reduced; however there are as yet no guarantees that the positive changes are irreversible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Concept of National Security</strong></td>
<td>1. The threat of a global nuclear or a large-scale conventional war has been considerably reduced. 2. Economic, political, territorial, ethnic, religious and other disputes might lead to local (civil) wars and military conflicts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security Concept</strong></td>
<td>1. The direct threat of open aggression against the RF has diminished considerably. 2. Social, political, economic, territorial, religious, national-ethnic and other disputes are the main reasons for armed conflicts and wars. 3. Aggressive nationalism and religious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Military Doctrine and Specifications of the Guidelines of the RF National Security Concept</strong></td>
<td>1. Extremist national-ethnic, religious separatist and terrorist movements, organisations and structures. 2. Diminished effectiveness of existing mechanism for ensuring international security, above all the United Nations and OSCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Clarity and military defensive doctrine</strong></td>
<td>1. Extremist national-ethnic, religious separatist and terrorist movements, organisations and structures. 2. Attempts to weaken (ignore) existing mechanism for ensuring international security above all the United Nations and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External threats</td>
<td>Main military threats:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The high level of military opposition especially in Europe and the Asian-Pacific region.</td>
<td>1. The presence of powerful troop concentrations near Russia’s borders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Politics ‘by force’ executed by the United States and other states dedicated to this principle.</td>
<td>2. The striving of states or coalitions to dominate the global community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The presence of an enormous number of foreign military bases on the borders of the USSR.</td>
<td>3. Attempts of political and economic pressure or military blackmail against Russia.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Interference in RF internal affairs.
- Attempts to ignore (or infringe on) RF interests in resolving international security problems.
- Attempts to oppose the increase of influence of the RF on a global level.
- Expansion of military blocs and alliances.
- The introduction of foreign troops.
| Internal threats | This paragraph is absent in this military doctrine | This paragraph is absent in this military doctrine | 1. The lawful activity of nationalist, secessionist and other organisations to destabilise the internal situation in Russia.  
2. Attempts to overthrow the constitutional regime.  
3. The creation of illegal armed formations. |
|------------------|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Principles for ensuring military security | 1. The USSR renounces the use of military means as a solution for contradictions.  
2. Conventiona l no-first use: | 1. The Military-political goal is to ensure the state’s security against external threat.  
2. Non-intervention in other states and nuclear no-first-use: first use of nuclear weapons is possible in | 1. No state is considered to be an opponent.  
2. Limited nuclear no-first-use: first use of nuclear weapons is possible in | 1. The RF adheres to the system of generally recognised principles and rules of international law (UN)  
2. The RF executes a |
the Soviet Union rejects the first initiation of military actions against any state.
4. No nation is considered to be an enemy.
5. Disbandment of both alliances, Warsaw Pact and NATO and their consequent reorganisation into instrument of political cooperation and systems of international security.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recognition of inviolability of existing borders</th>
<th>Conventional-no-first-use: rejection of first initiation of military actions against any state.</th>
<th>Strengthening of arms control regimes of weapons of mass destruction and of conventional weapons.</th>
<th>The RF and its conventional arms.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The first existing borders</td>
<td>3. Conventional-no-first-use: rejection of first initiation of military actions against any state.</td>
<td>3. The RF retains nuclear power status for deterring aggression against the RF or its allies.</td>
<td>The RF retains the right to use nuclear weapons in response to weapons of mass destruction and in response to wide scale aggression using conventional weapons against the RF and its allies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The first date of cooperation</td>
<td>4. To develop military cooperation with foreign states, especially with CIS member states and countries of Central and Eastern Europe.</td>
<td>4. The RF retains the right to use nuclear weapons in response to weapons of mass destruction and in response to wide scale aggression using conventional weapons against the RF and its allies.</td>
<td>The RF retains the right to use nuclear weapons in response to weapons of mass destruction and in response to wide scale aggression using conventional weapons in situations critical for the RF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The first mass hrst to bebegun</td>
<td>5. Nuclear weapons remain a realistic means for preventing nuclear attack.</td>
<td>5. Disbandment of nuclear states, especially the RF and its allies.</td>
<td>The RF retains the right to use nuclear weapons in response to weapons of mass destruction and in response to wide scale aggression using conventional weapons in situations critical for the RF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The first use of nuclear weapons</td>
<td>6. Unity and indivisibility of joint (CIS) defence: an attack on one CIS member is considered as an attack on all.</td>
<td>6. The RF retains the right to use nuclear weapons in response to weapons of mass destruction and in response to wide scale aggression using conventional weapons against the RF and its allies.</td>
<td>The RF retains the right to use nuclear weapons in response to weapons of mass destruction and in response to wide scale aggression using conventional weapons in situations critical for the RF.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| State military organisation | This paragraph is absent in this military doctrine | This paragraph is absent in this military doctrine | This paragraph is absent in this military doctrine | The RF Armed Forces are the nucleus of the military organisations of the state | The State’s military organisations includes the RF Armed Forces, which are its nucleus, and the Other |
| Command and control of the Armed Forces, the Other Troops, military units and entities | This paragraph is absent in this military doctrine | 1. The Security Council of the RF (SCRF), chaired by the President, is the principal agency, exercising over all direction of the security apparatus. 2. The RF President is the Supreme C-in-C of the Armed Forces. 3. The Ministry of Defence is assigned the development and immediate implementation of military policy. 4. The C-in-C Armed Forces exercises direction of the RF Armed Forces (n.b. other troops not mentioned) through the General Staff. 5. Coordination of the RF Ministry of Defence with the CIS United Forces Main Command is | 1. The RF President Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the RF Armed Forces, has the general guidance of the RF Armed Forces and the Other Troops. 2. The RF Council of Ministers- RF government is responsible for the state of the RF Armed Forces and the Other Troops. 3. The Minister of Defence directly controls the RF Armed Forces. 4. The General Staff of the RF Armed Forces has the operational control of the Armed Forces. 5. The Other Troops are directly controlled by the corresponding commanders (chiefs). 6. The Security | 1. The RF President Supreme Commander of the RF Armed Forces leads the activities of ensuring military security, provides the equipment of the Armed Forces and the Other Troops and directs the preparation of the RF for its defence. 2. The RF Ministry of Defence is in charge of the organisation, development and procurement of the state military organisation. 3. The General Staff is entity for operational command and control of the RF Armed Forces and accomplishes 1. The RF President Supreme Commander of the RF Armed Forces, directs the organisation, preparation and the use of the military organisation 2. The RF government provides the equipment of the Armed Forces and the Other Troops and directs the preparation of the RF for its defence. 3. The RF Ministry of Defence is in charge of the organisation and development of the Other Troops and procurement. 4. The Government Staff is the basic entity for |
### Appendix I

Council RF is responsible for drafting presidential decrees on security issues (n.b. the SCRF is not listed as a command & control level but as political fundamental) the strategic planning for the employment of the Armed Forces and the Other Troops.

|---|---|---|---|

### Objectives of deploying Armed Forces and the Other Troops


| 1. The prevention of war. 2. Suppression of aggression against the Soviet Union or an allied state. 3. Possible allocation of troops for UN peace support operations. | 1. Global war. 2. Regional war. 3. Local wars 4. Large-scale war |

257
### Ways of employing the Armed Forces and the Other Troops

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. Defensive strategy.</th>
<th>political missions.</th>
<th>armed conflicts.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. The strategic nuclear forces maintain military-strategic parity with US strategic strike forces.</td>
<td>1. Deterrence of potential aggressors.</td>
<td>1. Strategic operations, major operations, and combat operations in global war and regional wars.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The nuclear forces prevent a surprise nuclear attack and guarantee a counterattack.</td>
<td>2. Joint defence and strategic strike cooperation with other states in accordance with the UN charter and other treaties.</td>
<td>2. Operations and combat operations in local wars and armed conflicts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Protection of the rights and interest of Russian citizens and culturally likeminded persons abroad.</td>
<td>3. Peace support operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Disaster relief.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Missions of the Armed Forces and the Other Troops

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Guaranteeing the inviolability of the borders.</th>
<th>1. Defence of the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the RF and CIS.</th>
<th>1. Ensuring military security.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Defence of state sovereignty.</td>
<td>2. Joint defence based on treaties with other states (alliances).</td>
<td>2. Suppression of aggression towards the RF and its allies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4. Internal armed forces conflicts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5. Disaster relief.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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258
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deployment of Armed Forces and the Other Troops abroad</th>
<th>The removal of military bases on the territory of any other state and the deployment of troops explicitly within national boundaries.</th>
<th>This paragraph is absent in this military doctrine</th>
<th>1. The Security interest of the RF and other CIS states may require the deployment of forces outside the RF. 2. Russian forces may be deployed outside its territory in combined or Russian tasks forces and bases.</th>
<th>1. Limited contingents of the RF Armed Forces and Other Troops may be deployed in regions of strategic importance, outside RF territory, as combined or national tasks forces and bases.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3. Military—economic principles Main objectives of military-economic ensuring of military security</td>
<td>The chapter on 'Military-economic principles' is absent in this military doctrine.</td>
<td>The chapter on 'Military-economic principles' is absent in this military doctrine</td>
<td>Timely provide the Armed Forces and the Other Troops of the RF with effective weapons systems to an extent that the vital interest of society and state are ensured.</td>
<td>Financial and material guarantees for the state’s military organisation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International military cooperation</td>
<td>Contacts in the military filed are developed with all interested states by agreements on the prevention of conflicts situations</td>
<td>Russia will cooperate in strengthening (inter) national security and stability with: 1. CIS 2. OSCE 3. NATO 4. Other states and alliances in</td>
<td>To maintain international peace and security the RF cooperates with: 1. CIS 2. OSCE 3. Other states and alliances in neighbouring</td>
<td>The RF attaches priority importance to the development of military cooperation with member states of the CIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The RF attaches priority importance to the development of military cooperation with member states of the CIS</td>
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Appendix I
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<th>Appendix I</th>
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</table>
| neighbouring regions.  
5. On a global scale with all UN member states |
| regions.  
Military-technical cooperation is aimed at strengthening RF military-political positions across the world |
| Collective Security Treaty, to established a unified defence space ensure collective military security |
| Collective Security Treaty, because of the necessity to consolidate the forces towards the creation of a unified defence space and ensure collective military security. |
| Conclusion |
| The USSR strictly adheres to all international obligations that result from the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, the Stockholm Conference document, the Paris Charter for the new Europe and other agreements and universally recognised norms of international relations. |
| This paragraph is absent in this military doctrine |
| 1. The RF closely adheres to the norms and principles of international law.  
2. The doctrine determines strictly defensive nature of ensuring the military security of the RF and its allies. |
| 1. The RF guarantees compliance with the norms and principles of international law.  
2. The doctrine affirms the strictly defensive direction of its activities for ensuring military security. |
| The RF is dedicated to the deterrence of aggression, the prevention of wars and armed conflicts and fully supports international security and a general peace. |
## Appendix II: Russian Defence Industry

### Key Figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2008(USD)</th>
<th>2007(USD)</th>
<th>2006(USD)</th>
<th>2005(USD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total defence Expenditure</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>42,570</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>20,830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total procurement expenditure</td>
<td>14,900</td>
<td>12,040</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>4,270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total defence exports</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>7,300</td>
<td>6,500</td>
<td>6,126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total defence imports</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Key companies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Revenue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Aircraft Corporation (UAC)</td>
<td>Established as a vehicle to consolidate the RF’s key aerospace corporation such as Sukhoi, Irkut, MiG, and Tupolev. Ni total, it was to encompass approximately 20 existing companies (seven manufactures and five design bureaus)</td>
<td>Expected to reach USD 3.2 billion for 2007 USD 3.2 billion (2007) USD 4 billion (2008) USD 4.3 billion (2009) (All figures are estimated by Kapital Investment Group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gorky Automobile Plant (GAZ Joint Stock Company)</td>
<td>Design, development and production of wheeled light armoured vehicles. The company is also a significant manufactures of light vehicles for civilian markets</td>
<td>USD 4.5 billion (2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurgan Machine Building Plant (Kurganmashzavod)</td>
<td>Business consists of design development and production of tracked infantry carrier/fighting vehicles. This includes the manufacture and exports of BMP-2 and BMP-3 Infantry Fighting Vehicles; spares parts provision; post-sale service; crew and support personnel training; repair and modernisation of BMP-1, BMP-2 and BMP-3 vehicles.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. OPK Oboronprom

Activities
Oboronprom is a joint stock company which focuses on helicopter manufacture and associated, as well as defence systems and financing. It encompasses Kazan Helicopters, Ulan Ude Aviation Plant, Rostvertol, Vpered Moscow Machine Building Plant, and Stupino Machine-Building Production Enterprise.

Parent/major shareholders
Oboronprom, which was created in 2002, is owned by the Russian Federation (55-5 percent); Russian state defence export agency Rosoboronexport 928.3 percent); the Republic of Tatarstan (13.7 percent); and helicopter manufacture Rostvertol plc (2.5 percent)

Financial details

Financial performance (millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2007(USD)</th>
<th>2007 (RUR)</th>
<th>2006(USD)</th>
<th>2006(RUR)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revenue</td>
<td>1,638.3</td>
<td>38,000</td>
<td>1,214.7</td>
<td>33,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Structure
Oboronprom acts as a holding company for a range of business. It is divided into five areas: Helicopter Production (which accounts for the bulk of business); Engine Building; Air Defence and Radio Electronics; Electric machine Building; and Leasing

2. United Aircraft Corporation (UAC)

Activities
The UAC was established as an entity in mid 2006, having been launched by presidential decree in February 2006. Trading started formally around 1 April 2007. It was established as vehicle to consolidate the Russian Federation’s key aerospace corporations such as Sukhoi, Irkut, MiG, and Topolev. In total, it was to encompass approximately 20 companies (including seven manufactures and five design bureaus)
Parent/major shareholders

As of September 2008, the Russian state held 91.3 percent of UAC stock. Private investors held the remaining 8.7 percent. The stated aim of the Russian state is to float UAC through a partial Initial Public Offering which is expected between late 2009 and early 2010. It has been suggested that the state will retain a holding of at least 51 percent.

Financial details

Few financial details were available. It has been estimated by the Kapital Investment Group that the UAC sales exceeded USD 3.2 billion in 2007, and will reach more than USD 8 billion in 2017. Military aviation is expected to account for 84 percent of sales initially, dropping to 52 percent by 2017.

Financial performance (millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2009(USD)</th>
<th>2008(USD)</th>
<th>2007(USD)</th>
<th>2006(USD)</th>
<th>2005(USD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revenue</td>
<td>4,300</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>3,200</td>
<td>1,951</td>
<td>1,646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net profit</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>-28</td>
<td>-72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Estimated Figures- source: Kapital

Structure

Business units were to be created in UAC basing on the fourth stage of its planned development. Jane’s believes that the company will be divided into Combat Aircraft Production, Transport Aircraft Production, Civil Aviation Aircraft, and Spares and Components.

3. Gorky Automobile Plant (GAZ Joint Stock Company)

Activities

Design, development and production of wheeled light armoured vehicles. The company is also a significant manufacture of light commercial vehicles, civilian cars, and specialist vehicles such as goods wagons, ambulances and dump trucks.
Parent/major shareholders

GAZ Automobile Plant falls under the aegis of GAZ Group: the holding company created in 2005 to consolidate the production assets previously held by RusPromAuto. It is made up of Russia’s 18 primary automotive and machine building ventures.

Financial Overview

GAZ Group reported that sales reached USD 4.5 billion in 2006, with the Gorky Automobile Plant reported to have accounted for approximately USD 2 billion of this total. Net income of for 2006 was reported to have stood at approximately USD 181 million. As of 2007, annual output was said by the company to have reached 230,000 vehicles per annum. This figure was made up of trucks (52.4 percent)’ buses (17.2 percent); and cars (30.3 percent).

In the mid and late 1990s it was reported by western sources that the company was suffering from a shortage of working capital, and burdened by a combination of Tax arrears and an estimated USD 200 million accounts receivable arrears. Significantly, it emerged in December 2006 that GAZ had secured a credit facility valued at USD 100 million.

4. Kurgan Machine Building Plant (Kurganmashzavod)

Activities

The joint stock company Kurganmashzavod produces infantry fighting vehicles, including the BMP-2 and BMP-3 fighting vehicles and upgraded BMP-1, BMP-2 and BMP-3, BREM-L armoured recovery vehicles, as well as the BMP-3 based multipurpose chassis for mounting various weapons systems. Kurganmashzavod JSC is a large engineering complex, comprising auxiliary workshops and 11 “special” plants for complete production cycle. It is involved in developing technology, testing equipment and experimental development, pilot production and full-scale production of armoured vehicles.
In recent years Kurganmashzavod JSC has exported its products to the UAE, Kuwait, Finland, Angola, Egypt, Slovakia, India, Iran, Bangladesh, Cyprus and the Republic of Korea.

Financial Overview

In an interview on the company’s website, President Mikhail Bolotin said that the aggregate output grew from RUR 4.083 billion in 2005 to RUR 6.132 billion in 2007. No further financial details were released.

Sources: (a) Guy Anderson (eds), Jane’s World Defence Industry, Issue Twenty-three 2008, United Kingdom, Hobbs the Printers.
(b) Guy Anderson (eds), Jane’s World Defence Industry, Issue Twenty-four March 2009, United Kingdom, Hobbs the Printers.