INTRODUCTION
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I, in the present study, shall attempt to analyse and examine 'Nature and Status of Appearance and Reality in Śaṅkarācārya and Immanuel Kant'. I shall discuss appearance and reality as developed in the ontology, metaphysics and epistemology of the philosophy of Śaṅkarācārya (788-820) and Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Śaṅkara and Kant are two most important philosophers of the east and west respectively. They have made certain contributions in shaping the philosophical quest. Appearance and reality are two but interrelated concepts in philosophy. These are not only the ontological issues but also their nature and status shape of epistemological quest. Śaṅkara, with reference to his own philosophical system, has developed the nature and status of appearance and reality which are near about close to the issues discussed by Kant, though, there are certain differences in detail. We, therefore in present work, propose to develop a comparative and critical study of the nature and status of appearance and reality in Śaṅkarācārya and Immanuel Kant.

1.1. PROBLEMATIC OF THE STUDY:

The problematic of the present study has two aspects, namely, there is long historical, geographical and cultural gap between Śaṅkara and Kant but there is a similarity between them. So far, the nature and status of appearance and reality are concerned. Whether Kant was really aware of the work of Śaṅkarācārya, we do not have enough evidence but there is enough evidence that an intellectual climate concerning Indian philosophy was available for Kant. One of the fundamental reason for comparing Śaṅkara and Kant is that during early 19th century Europe including Germany took to classical Indian
studies in a big way. “The ethnic Croat Ivan Filip Vesdin (1748-1806), better known under his monastic name Paulinus, a Sancro Bartholomaco, wrote the first Sanskrit grammar *Sidharubam Seu Grammitica Sanscridamica*, Rome 1790.”

Every major University in Europe started developing a deep interest in Indology. With the efforts of German thinkers like J.W.von Schlegel, W.von Humbolt, special Sanskrit chairs were established at German University- in 1818 in Bonn, 1821 in Berlin, 1826 in Koenigsberg (now Kaliningrad in Russia). Kant had died 1804 and by then all young scholars in Europe were doing Sanskrit. It is in this light that we propose compare and contrast Kant with Śaṅkara.

1.2. ON METHODOLOGY:

New construction in ontology and epistemology can be achieved only by a comparative study which consists in mutual supplementation of arguments and consequent clarification of issues. In this way, it helps to develop the intellectual atmosphere of philosophical heritage. A comparative study does not depend in tracing the similarities between two philosophical systems. It consists in tracing and clearing the way for more comprehensive grasp of the truth from the original sources. In other words, the comparative philosophy works on isolated topics, or with two or more philosophers, just for the sake of gaining clarity on some specific issue. I think that the above mentioned views about comparative study is sufficient to suggest the importance of the present work and in this way, it justifies to attempt of comparative study of two representative thinkers of Indian and western philosophy.

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1.3. DEFINITION OF APPEARANCE AND REALITY:

"Meta Encyclopedia of Philosophy"\textsuperscript{2} defines the terms 'appearance' and 'reality' as such. In epistemology, appearance is:

1. a sensuously observable state of affairs.
2. a sensuous object existent or possible, in space and time, related by the categories (Kant). It differs from illusion by its objectivity or logical validity.

In metaphysics, it is:

"A degree of truth or reality; a fragmentary and self-contradictory judgment about reality."

It defines 'reality' as such:

"The totality of what is, as opposed to what merely seems to be. Metaphysicians and ontologists differ widely in their convictions about what kind of entities are properly included."

Appearance/Reality is based on the distinction between the way things seem to be and the way they are. Here I would like to put an example: whenever we dip a pencil in a transparent glass of water, the pencil seems to be bent at one place inside water. But we know well that the pencil is straight and it is not bent anywhere. Here we can draw a distinction between appearance and reality. We can say that in reality, the pencil is straight. But in our perception, it appears to be bent. The straightness of the pencil is reality and the bentness is appearance. The distinction between appearance and reality is drawn and applied in ontology and epistemology by many thinkers of Indian and western philosophy but I, in the present work, shall be limited

to the philosophy of Śaṅkara and Kant and compare this distinction in the framework of their ontology and epistemology.

1.4. HISTORICAL SURVEY OF ŚAṅKARA AND KANT:

Now, I would like to discuss on Śaṅkara and Kant's conception of appearance and reality in their historical background. First of all, I shall take up this concept in Indian philosophical tradition.

1.4.1. Samvṛti and Paramārtha satya in Śūnyavāda:

In pre Śaṅkara philosophy, the concepts of appearance and reality have been analysed by Buddhist thinkers. The transition of the concept of appearance and reality, in Indian philosophy, takes place from Nāgārjuna to Gauḍapāda and from Gauḍapāda to Śaṅkara. I shall put my arguments about this issue later. First of all, I would like to clarify the nature and status of the concept of appearance and reality in Mahāyāna school of Buddhist philosophy.

1. There are two schools of Buddhist philosophy, namely, Hinayāna and Mahāyāna. Mahāyāna has two branches: Śūnyavāda or the Mādhyamika school which, as a full-fledged system, was established by Ācārya Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva in the 2nd century A.D. Śūnyavādins is known as the Mādhyamikas because they adhered to the middle path realized by Buddha.

2. Māla-vijñānavāda or Yogācāra school which, as a system, was established by Ācārya Maitreyanath, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu in the 4th century A.D. Vijñānavādins is known as the Yogācāras because they emphasized the importance of yoga in order to become Buddha.
However, the literal meaning of the word ‘Śunya’ is negation or void. But Madhyamikas do not use this word in this sense. They use this word as indescribable (Avācya or Anabhilāpya). It is beyond the four categories of intellect (Catuskoti-vinirmukta): existence, non-existence, both and neither. From empirical point of view, it is relativity (Pratātya-samutpāda) which is phenomena (samsāra) but absolutely, it is reality (Tattva) which is release from plurality (Nirvāṇa).

Nāgārjuna, who represents the philosophy of Śnyayāda, draws the distinction between empirical-truth (samvṛti-satya) and Absolute truth (Paramārtha-satya). Samvṛti-satya, from the Paramārtha-satya point of view, is appearance and Paramārtha-satya is reality. He declares that those who do not know the distinction between samvṛti-satya and Paramārtha-satya can not understand the teaching of the Buddha. Having focused on the importance of the distinction between these two truths, he states, “The teaching of the doctrine by the Buddhas is based upon two truths: truth relating to worldly convention and truth in terms of ultimate fruit. Those who do not understand the distinction between these two truths do not understand the profound truth embodied in the Buddha’s message.”

Let me elaborate the nature and status of these two truths of Śnyayāda.

Samvṛti literally means covering. It covers entirely the real nature of things and also makes them appear as something else. In this way, we can say that the covering and projection are two aspects of samvṛti-satya. Candrakīrti divides samvṛti into loka-samvṛti and mithyā-samvṛti (Madhyamakahāvala; 6.25). The former corresponds with empirical truth (vyāvahārika-satya) and the latter with imaginary truth (prātibhāṣika-satya) in Advaita Vedānta. Samvṛti is

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ignorance (avidyā or ajñāna) which is non-apprehension as well as mis-apprehension of the real. Samvṛti is of a covering nature which is expressed by the use of form or language. In other word, everything, that can be thought, experienced or given verbal expression by man, is of the nature of samvṛti. All man’s expressions, whether in philosophic views or common everydayness, are empirical or relative. Thus that which can be expressed by its very nature is samvṛti-satya. On contrary, Paramārtha-satya is Absolute truth and it is the knowledge of the real without any distortion which can be realized but not expressed in language. On the whole, we can say that Paramārtha-satya belongs to the realm of unutterable (Anabhiñāpya). It is the absence of the function of reason (buddhi) which is equated with samvṛti. Paramārtha-satya is beyond the scope of discursive thought, language and empirical activity but the object of these is samvṛti-satya. Thus, the Paramārtha is in fact the indescribable, the unthinkable, unteachable etc.

On the basis of above description, we can say that samvṛti-satya and Paramārtha-satya represent different perspectives of the real. However, these perspectives are merely perspectives and do not form a doctrine of one reality as against another. Epistemologically, these are the two levels of reality but ontologically, there is no difference between them. Whenever anything looked at through thought form (vikalpa), it is samvṛti and whenever it is freed from super-imposed thought form (nirvikalpa or Nīśprapañca), it is the Absolute. The difference between them is epistemic and not ontological. Nāgārjuna, therefore, declares that there is no difference between the world and the Absolute or sansāra and Nirvāṇa. He says, “The life-process (sансāra, i.e., the empirical life-death cycle) has no thing that distinguishes it from freedom (Nirvāṇa). Freedom (Nirvāṇa) has no thing that distinguishes it from the life-process (sansāra).”⁴ Here it should be noted that the identity of sansāra and Nirvāṇa does not constitute the identification on the worldly (samvṛti) level.

⁴ “Na sansārasya nirvānāt kimcidasti asti vīśeṣaṇam, na nirvāṇasya sansārāt kimcidasti asti vīśeṣaṇam.” Ibid., 25.19, p.365.
The differences and degrees, that are visible or created, are because of samvṛti whereas truth, from the standpoint of the Paramārtha, is one. “Whatever is of the nature of coming and going that occurs contingently or dependently. Freedom is, therefore, indicated as being non-contingent and independent.”

To realise the Paramārtha-satya, it is necessary to go through samvṛti-satya because the Paramārtha can only be realised negatively by the removal of samvṛti. This negation is the heart of the dialectic which gives rise to Śūnyatā. Śūnyatā is not only the negation of our views (drṣṭi), but is spiritual experience (Prajñā). It, in itself, is the non-relational knowledge of the Absolute and negative only for thought. It is not the denial of the reality but the freeing of the reality of artificial restriction. Śūnyatā is negation of negation. Thus, it is a reaffirmation of the positive character of the real. Finally, we would like to say that everything is Śūnya. At a one hand, samvṛti-satya, from the Paramārtha-satya point of view, is appearance and devoid of Ultimate Reality (Svabhāva-Śūnya). On the other hand, Paramārtha-satya is reality and devoid of plurality (Prapañca- Śūnya). Mādhyamikas used Śūnyatā in this double sense. Now we shall take up Vijñānavāda.

1.4.2. Parikalpita, Paratantra and Parinīpičana Svabhāva in Vijñānavāda:

Vijñānavādins declares that consciousness-only is established truth which is preached by Buddha. It is pure and Absolute. All external objects do not exist. Actually, they do not deny the existence of the objects but deny their externality. Vijñānavāda accepts the three levels of essence (svabhāva), namely,

1. Imaginary (parikalpita) nature: it is the object which is superimposed (adhyasta or āropita) and utterly unreal.

2. Relative or conditioned or dependent (paratantra) nature: it is the creative consciousness which assumes the form of the object

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5 “Ya ājavan-javi-bhāva upādāya pratitya vā, so’pratityānupādāya nirvāṇam upādiṣyate.” Ibid., 25.9, p.361.
(arthākāra vijñāna) and works as the basis (āśraya or ādhāra) of super-imposition.

3. Absolute (Pariniṣpanna) nature: it is the pure consciousness which is the transcendental ground (adhiṣṭhāna) and not involved in illusion.

The parikalpita is the object which is known as pure imagination (kalpanā-mātra). The word ‘object’ deals with the entire phenomenal world whether it is mental or material things from the lowest to the highest including the attributes of Buddha. In other words, the entire phenomenal world, which we normally experience in our day to day life, comes under this category. Sthiramati says, “...both the mental and the material things or even the ’Buddha-dharmas’ ...all these are parikalpita...they do not essentially exist...such a thing does not exist in-as-much as it has no essence of being. Because of this, this thing is parikalpita in essence.”

6 It is called the parikalpita because it is imagined to exist and it is called svabhāva because it is mistaken as real by the ignorant common folks. In this regard, he says, “...the state of entities, do not so exist as what the ignorant or the commoners hold to be.”

7 Actually, the parikalpita is non-essence by its characteristics of imagination. In favour of this, he states that the parikalpita- svabhāva “is a non-essence by its characteristics alone, because its characteristics are a matter of imagination- as ‘Rūpa’ is what is characterised by ‘rūpa’ (form) and ‘vedanā’ is what is characterised by ‘anubhava’ or feeling and so on. Thus because of having no essence in itself, it is (called) a non-essence by its own, like the sky-flower.”

After having explained the ‘parikalpita’, the ‘paratantra- svabhāva’ has to be discussed.

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7 “...subhute dharmiistathī vidyante yathā bālapṛthagganā abhīntoītā.” Ibid., 20, p.117.

The *paratantra* means what is governed by the causal law of conditioned origination (*Pratītya-Samutpāda*). Vasubandhu defines it as such, "The *paratantra* nature means the constructions born of cause and conditions."9 It means that it is no independent existence and arises depending on their cause and conditions. Sthiramati says, "That which is controlled... or originated (brought into existence) by other - the cause and conditioned - is called *paratantra*."10 It is called non-essence because its origination depends by cause and conditions. In this regard, he says, "It exists (but) not by itself, because it comes into being by cause and conditions other than itself as in the case of an illusion. Therefore, as its appearance does not conform to its origination, it is called a non-essence on the score of its origination."11 The *paratantra* is creative consciousness. It has lost its original purity because of its association with illusion. In fact, it is the *Pariniśpanna* but involved in subject-object duality. The *paratantra* is spoken of. What about the *Pariniśpanna*?

The *Pariniśpanna* means the unconditioned nature of the *paratantra* free from all imaginary instruction. In other words, it is the *Paratantra* free from the *Parikalpita*. Vasubandhu defines it as such, "The state of 'Paratantra' ever being free from the previous (*parikalpita-svabhāva*) is called 'Pariniśpanna'."12 It is the Absolute reality and free from the subject-object duality. In this regard, Sthiramati says, "The 'paratantra' ...if ever free from ...notion of the perceiver and the perceived becomes 'Pariniśpanna' by nature."13 It is called *Pariniśpanna* because it is absolutely unchanging and ever the same. He says, "It is 'Pariniśpanna' in-as-much-as it reveals the undistorted nature of

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9 "Paratantrasvabhāvaṃasti vikalpah pratayagodbhavah." Vasubandhu’s *Trimśikā-Kārikā*, 20, Ibid., p.117.
10 "...paraśheturpratyakṣastantraṃ vṛti paratantra utaṇḍhata ityarthah." Sthiramati’s commentary on *Trimśikā-Kārikā*, 20, Ibid., p.118.
11 "Na svayaṁbhāva māyāvai parapratyayenaḥpadat. Ataśca yathā prakhyati tatḥasyopatītaṁ nāstī atosayya utapattimhiṣvabhāvaḥapotetugacayet.

Sthiramati’s commentary on *Trimśikā-Kārikā*, 25, Ibid., p.124.
12 "Nispannastasya puroceta sadda rahitā tu yā." Vasubandhu’s *Trimśikā-Kārikā*, 21, Ibid., p.118
things."\textsuperscript{14} It is pure, eternal and uniform consciousness which is ever the same like space and in this way, it is called 'Paramārtha'. In his words, ‘...the 'Parinispanna- svabhāva' is called 'Paramārtha' because of its purity remaining ever impolluted and ever homogeneous or uniform like 'ākāśa'.\textsuperscript{15} As we stated above, the Parinispanna is eternal and always the same. Because of this, it is called 'Tathatā'. And it is Vijñapti-mātratā because it alone is pure-consciousness. Vasubandhu says, ‘...in all circumstances...it remains the same and not otherwise and therefore is called 'Tathatā'...(and) that alone is consciousness pure(Vijñapti-mātratā).\textsuperscript{16}

In my point of view, these three svabhāvas are neither three 'reals' nor three 'truths' nor even three degrees of reality. The Absolute is the only reality and the only truth. The parikalpita is utterly unreal and the paratantra belongs to samvṛti. They are called svabhāva only by courtesy. The distinction between Parinispanna, paratantra and parikalpita in Vijñānavāda differs from the distinction between Paramārtha, vyāvahāra and prātiṣhāṣa in Advaita Vedānta.

It should be noted that the distinction among Parinispanna, paratantra and parikalpita in Vijñānavāda differs from the distinction among Paramārtha, vyāvahāra and prātiṣhāṣa in Vedānta. The basis of this distinction is different in both these systems. Vijñānavāda distinguishes between two degrees of reality, reality in itself as it is in is inherent purity (Parinispanna) and reality as it appears defiled or conditioned by transcendental avidyā or vāsanā (paratantra). Vijñāna, whether pure or defiled, is the only reality. The third, the parikalpita is the imaginary object (which includes our entire empirical world) which is declared as utterly unreal like the sky flower and left undegreed. Vedānta, on the other hand, believes that the Paramārtha is not subject to degrees. It is Absolute reality. Vyāvahāra and prātiṣhāṣa are real in its own spheres but

\textsuperscript{14} "Avikārapariniśpatyā sa pariniśpannah." Ibid., 21, p.118.
\textsuperscript{15} "Dharmājaṃ paramārthasā ca yatatsthāpi sa..." Ibid., 25, p.124.
Please also see, " ...parinispannaśca akāśavo ekarasaṃt jñānam..." Ibid., 22, p.122.
ultimately, they are illusion. These illusions belong to two different orders and cannot be placed on the same level. The two factors in illusion, for vedānta, are the superimposed object (adhyāsta) and the ground of superimposition (adhisthāna). Thus, Buddhism and Vedānta, scratch two different philosophical conclusions.

Actually, “Śaṅkara criticizes Vijñānavādins view”\(^{17}\) who accept that external objects are not exist. According to him, if world can be proved by all pramāṇas, we cannot say it is not exist. “Knowledge arises from its valid means, (e.g. perception, inference etc.) and the valid means apprehend the things just as they are.”\(^{18}\) Criticizing Śūnayavādins view, he says, “As for the view of the Absolute nihilist, no attempt is made for its refutation since it is opposed to all means of valid knowledge.”\(^{19}\)

1.4.3. Are Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara crypto Buddhist?

As we know, the development of Buddhism and Vedānta is based on the same soil, same culture and same philosophical climate and Gauḍapāda is standing historically between Nāgārjuna and Śaṅkara. In this reference, some thinkers charge that Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara are crypto-Buddhist. As S.Dasgupta says, “Gauḍapāda thus flourished after all the great Buddhist teachers Āśvaghoṣa, Nāgārjuna, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu;...there is sufficient evidence in his kārikās for thinking that he was possible himself a Buddhist, and considered that the teaching of the Upaniṣads tallied with those of Buddha.”\(^{20}\) Having focused on the utilization of the logic of Mādhyamikas by

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17 For detail, please see, “Nāḥāvau upalabdheḥ”, 2.2.28; “Vaidhamyāccca na svapnādivat”, 2.2.29; “Na bhāvo anupalabdheḥ”, 2.2.30; “Kṣaṇikatvāccca”, 2.2.31; “Sarvāthā anuppatteśca”, 2.2.32 in Brahma-Sūtra-Bhaṣya of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya, trans.by swami Gambhirananda (Calcutta, Advaita Ashrama, 1965) pp.418-426.

18 “Jñānam tu pramāṇa janayam pramāṇāt ca yathābhūta vastu viṣayam.” Ibid., 1.1.4., p.34.

19 “Śūnyavādi-pakṣastu sarva-pramāṇa vipratissiddha iti tannirākārṇāgya nādaraḥ kriyate.” Ibid., 2.2.31., pp.425-426.

Gauḍapāda, S. Radhakrishnan observes, “Gauḍapāda’s work bears traces of Buddhist influence, especially of the Vijñānavāda and the Mādhyamika schools. Gauḍapāda’s uses the very same arguments as the Vijñānavāda do to prove the unreality of the external objects of perception ... In common with Nāgārjuna he denies the validity of causation and the possibility of change... The empirical world is traced to avidyā, or, in Nāgārjuna’s phrases, samvrti... The highest state beyond the distinction of knowledge cannot be characterised by the predicates of existence, non-existence, both or neither Gauḍapāda and Nāgārjuna regard it as something which transcends the phenomenal...”

Regarding the association of Gauḍapāda and Buddhism, Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya states, “It is, however, to be noted that Gauḍapāda, though much influenced by the Buddhist thought, maintains his position as a Vedāntist.”

Some thinkers argue that however, Gauḍapāda utilises some terminology of Buddhism but inspite of this, he is Vedāntin. As T.M.P. Mahadevan says, “Our object in criticizing the view of those who hold Gauḍapāda to be an advocate of Buddha doctrines in his kārikās is to expound the philosophy of the Upaniṣads, and that he does not deviate from his purpose even when he adopts the arguments of the Buddha Idealists and dresses his thought in Buddhist terminology. This is recognized by those teachers of Buddhism who came after Gauḍapāda and who, while referring to his kārikās do not regard him as a Buddha or as having been influenced by Buddhism... Gauḍapāda is faithful throughout to the Upaniṣads. Even in the Alātaśāntiprakarana where he employs Buddhist terminology to a great extent, he does not cut himself away (as we have seen) from the Upaniṣadic moorings.”

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22 Bhattacharya, V., The Āgamasāstra of Gauḍapāda (Calcutta, University of Calcutta, 1943) p.cxxxi. He sees Buddhist influence in the specific Kārikās in chapter II: 31, 32, 35, 38, 44, 46 and in most of the Kārikās in chapter IV.
Ajātivāda to Mādhyamika and concludes: “The Ātaman of the Advaitin is necessarily implied in the Ajātivāda of the Mādhyamika and the Asparśayoga of the Vijnānavāda, but neither the Mādhyamika nor the Vijnānavāda realized that the Ātaman of the Advaitin, which is a self-comprehending (Svaprakāśa) existence (sattī), alone contemplates in entirely, the truth only realized in a half-hearted manner by the Buddhist Absolutists.”

Further he says, “The use of a word, which has its origins in this or that school of thought, should not be restricted to those only who coined it and gave it currency...So the presence of the Buddhist philosophical terms in the Āgamaśāstra does not necessarily point to the conclusion that Gauḍapāda was a Buddhist. One has to make a deeper analysis of Gauḍapāda in order to consider the nature of the charge; and a deeper analysis of his philosophical doctrine only that Gauḍapāda was a Vedāntin who was making an extensive use of Buddhist terms and the Buddhist art of disputation.”

On the basis of above discussion, perhaps it is not premature to say that we would tend to agree with T.R.V. Murti’s appraisal of the situation when he states, “Gauḍapāda appears to us as the Brahmanical thinker boldly reformulating the Upaniṣadic idea in the light of the Mādhyamika and Vijnānavāda dialectic. But there was more borrowing of technique than of tenets. The Vedānta philosophers did not and could not accept the Buddhist metaphysics-its denial of the self, momentariness, etc.; but they press into service the Mādhyamika dialectic and the Vijnānavāda analysis of illusion. No absolutism could be established without the dialectic and a theory of illusion.”

Finally, I would like to conclude that Gauḍapāda comes to us as one of the first Vedānta thinker to seriously take account of the implication of

25 Ibid., p.60.
Buddhist thought. However, he used some philosophical terms which had been already adopted by Buddhist, but he can not be charged to be a crypto Buddhist only because of this. He is *Vedāntin* and his philosophical conclusions are different from Buddhism. However, its credit goes to Śaṅkara who for the first time systematically establishes *Advaita Vedānta* philosophy. But the transition of the concept of appearance and reality did not directly reach to him from Buddhism. Gauḍapāda is standing historically between Nāgārjuna and Śaṅkara and the transition of this concept comes in Gauḍapāda from Buddhism and from Gauḍapāda in Śaṅkara.

**1.4.4. Appearance and Reality in Ancient Greek Philosophy**

Now I would like to take up Kant's historical background regarding the distinction of the concept of appearance and reality. When we enquire about the historical background of the concept of appearance and reality in western philosophical thought, we find that the dichotomy of appearance and reality begins from the ancient Greek philosophy. The appearance/reality dichotomy is consists in the philosophy of Heraclitus (c.535-c.475BC), Parmenides (c.510-c.440BC) and Plato (c.428-c.348BC). First of all, I would like to begin our enquiry from Heraclitus.

**1.4.4.1. Heraclitus:**

Heraclitus, known as “The Obscure”, was a pre-Socratic Greek philosopher from Ephesus in Asia Minor. He is described as having a melancholy disposition, and is sometimes called as the “weeping philosopher” as contrary to Democritus, who is known as the “laughing philosopher”. Heraclitus wrote a book but unfortunately, (as with other pre-Socratics), his writings only survive in fragments quoted by other authors.

Heraclitus disagreed with Thales, Anaximander and Pythagoras about the nature of the ultimate substance, but instead claimed that the nature of
everything is change itself. He believes that the fire is the primary form of reality. He says, "The world is ‘an everliving fire’ and therefore there will be an unceasing process of ‘flux’ "27 and "All things are changed for fire and fire for all things."28

This led to the belief that change is real, and stability is illusory. For Heraclitus, everything is in flux, as exemplified in his famous aphorism, "'Panta Rhei', All things flow, nothing stands still."29 In his opinion, all things originate from fire and return to it again by a never-resting process of development. In other words, there is a cycle of transformation by which the exchange of fire and earth and water and air takes place, an ‘upward’ and ‘downward’ way. All thing, therefore, are in a perpetual flux. He is famous for expressing the notion that “You cannot step twice into the same river...”30 and “Into the same rivers we step and do not step; we are and we are not...” 31

However, this perpetual flux is structured by logos which most basically means ‘word’ but can also designate ‘argument’, ‘logic’ or ‘reason’ more generally. Logos structures the ever-changing process of the universe. The idea of the logos is credited to him, as he proclaims that everything originates out of the logos which “steers all and runs through all..."32

Thus, Heraclitus accepts the view that change is reality, and stability is appearance. Now I shall take up Parmenides.

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29 Ibid., p.46.
30 Burnet, John, Greek Philosopher: Thales to Plato, etc., p.48.
31 Brumbaugh, Robert S., The Philosopher of Greece, etc., p.46.
32 Ibid., p.45.
1.4.4.2. Parmenides:

Parmenides is counted as the one of the most significant thinker in Socratic philosopher. His only known work is conventionally titled ‘On Nature’. Actually, it is a poem, survived in fragmentary form and originally divided into three parts:

1. A poem
2. "The way of truth" (alethia), and
3. "The way of appearance/opinion" (doxa)

The poem opens with a prologue, in which Parmenides journey to the place of the sun where he receives a revelation from an unnamed goddess on the nature of reality. He says, "The goddess greeted me, taking my right hand in her, and spoke thus to me: Oh Youth! ...It is fitting that you shall learn all things, Both the constant heart of encircling Truth, And also mortals' thought, where not one true belief lies..."33

The central theme of Parmenides is that "only Being is; not being cannot be."34 He argued that the every-day perception of reality of the physical world (as described in doxa) is mistaken, and that the reality of the world is ‘One Being’ (as described in alethia). This is "single, ungenerated, undivided whole, throughout, one and unchanging."35 Actually, under ‘The Way of Opinion’, Parmenides set out a contrasting but more conventional view of the world, thereby becoming an early exponent of the duality of appearance and reality. For him, the phenomena of movement and change are simply appearance of a static, eternal reality.

33 Ibid., p.51.
34 Ibid., p.51.
35 Ibid., p.52.
'The Way of Truth' discusses that which is real, which contrasts in some way with the argument of the 'The Way of Opinion' which discusses that which is illusory. Under 'The Way of Truth', Parmenides stated that there are two ways of inquiry: "it is or is not." He said that the latter argument is never feasible because nothing can not be and be an object of speech and thought. Furthermore, he implied that "from nothing, nothing can arise; but if from being, then it did not come to be, but was already."

Moreover he argued that movement was impossible because it requires moving into 'the void' and Parmenides identified 'the void' without nothing, and therefore (by definition) it does not exist. that which does not exist is 'The Parmenidean One' which is timeless, uniform, unchanging, indivisible, eternal; this is the final truth about reality.

Parmenides claims that the truth (reality) can not be known through sensual perception. Only pure reason will result in the understanding of the truth of the world. He says, "For this view, that That Which Is Not exists, can never predominate. You must debar your thought from this way of search, nor let ordinary experience in its variety force you along this way, (namely, that of allowing) the eye, sightless as it is, and the ear, full of sound, and the tongue, to rule; but (you must) judge by means of the reason (Logos) the much-contested proof which is expounded by me." 

Thus, we find the dichotomy of Being and not-Being, is and is not, unchanging and motion, truth and opinion, pure reason and senses and finally reality and appearance in Parmenides. Being is reality and motion is appearance. Being is known through the pure reason and motion is known through the senses.

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36 Ibid., p.52.
37 Ibid., p.52.
"Parmenides considerable influence on the thinking of Plato is undeniable, and in this respect Parmenides has influenced the whole history of Western philosophy, and is often seen as its grandfather. Even Plato himself, in the *Sophist*, refers to the work of 'our Father Parmenides' as something to be taken very seriously and treated with respect."³⁹ Now I would like to analyse the dichotomy of appearance and reality in Plato.

1.4.4.3. Plato:

Plato, in his epistemology and ontology, adopted the dichotomy of appearance and reality. He, in his epistemology, draws a separation between 'knowledge' and 'belief' or 'opinion'.

According to Plato, knowledge is linked to truth, and opinions are untruth. Plato, in the *Republic* (circa 380 B.C.), expounds the distinction between knowledge and opinion as different 'powers' or 'faculties' from which he draws the conclusion that they must have different objects. Plato goes on to explain this alleged difference in the objects of knowledge and opinion by saying that knowledge relates to what is, while the opinion relates to what 'is and is not'. This inevitably leads to the distinction between reality and appearance. This also has paved the way for the introduction of the so-called 'Forms', the 'eternal, unchanging, absolute realities' which are the object of knowledge and these are different from the 'changing and perishing' appearances which are the objects of opinions. What is involved here is a fundamental contrast between the sensible world - the ordinary world revealed to us by the five senses - and a separate world of intelligence - a world whose objects must be apprehended by the intellect alone.

Adopting the method of abstraction, Plato further draws distinctions in the realms of sensible and intelligible worlds. The sensible world is divided

between the imagination consists of faint images of things and events in the memory or in the dream. In the sphere of perception, we come across things and events by means of our sense perceptions. Senses give us objects in terms of their coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be. The sphere of imagination and perception can never give us the 'knowledge' of objects, it is always an 'opinion or belief' about the objects.

Plato's rejection of the senses as a source of 'knowledge' comes out with particular clarity when we see the method of abstraction applied in it. The whole purpose of Plato's curriculum is to "draw the mind away from the senses" towards the pure exercise of apriori reasoning. For this purpose, the intelligible world is over-emphasized. The intelligible world is divided in to the realms of understanding and reason. The understanding consists of the knowledge of arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, physics, etc. This sphere draws the mind upward and forces it to argue with what is extremely abstract and unempirical kind like number, etc., and will not be put off by any attempt to confine the argument to collections of visible or tangible objects.

The highest abstraction, in Plato, consists in the sphere of reason which is the expression of wisdom. Wisdom is defined by Plato as the knowledge of Truth, Beauty and Goodness. This sphere is called by Plato as the sphere of eternal reality, the reality unaffected by change and decay. And this brings us to the decisive step in Plato's reasoning that makes it an example of the method of abstraction.

Thus, Plato divides the world into two distinct aspects: the intelligible world of forms and the perceptual world we see around us. The perceptual world consists of imperfect copies of the intelligible forms or ideas. These forms are unchangeable and perfect, and are only comprehensible by the use

of the intellect or understanding; i.e., a capacity of the mind that does not include sense-perception or imagination. So, in the sphere of epistemology and ontology, Plato adopts the dualism between intelligible and the perceptual world, between reality and appearance.

The above Greek philosophers agree on this point that the things, which we know through our senses, are appearance but which is grasped by reason, is reality. Thus, the concept of appearance and reality arise from ancient Greek philosophy which Kant received as historical heritage. Kant develops the appearance and reality in his ontology and epistemology. Kant draws the distinction between noumenon, thing-in-itself and phenomenon. The noumenon and thing-in-itself are synonymous term in Kant's philosophy. But there is a basic difference between them. Noumenon is the spiritualist aspect and thing-in-itself is materialist aspect of his ontology. Thing-in-itself is the ground and cause of appearances. Sensibility and understanding constitute the phenomenal knowledge. Appearance and reality are possible in the sphere of phenomenon. But noumenon and thing-in-itself are free from the applicability of the categories of understanding.

In order to organize my discussion, I have divided the present study into following three chapters besides the Preface, the Introduction and the Conclusion:

(i) Chapter 1: An Exposition of Appearance and Reality in Śaṅkara's Philosophy of Advaita Vedānta:

In this chapter, shall try to elaborate the nature and status of appearance and reality in Śaṅkara's philosophy of Advaita Vedānta into the framework of ontology, metaphysics, epistemology and psychology. In Śaṅkara's ontology, I would like to explain the ontological status of Reality in terms of Paśca Kośas (five sheaths), i.e., Annamaya Kośa, Prāṇamaya Kośa,
Manomaya Kośa, Vijnānamaya Kośa and finally Ānandamaya Kośa. Śaṅkara's metaphysics contains the nature and status of Reality as Brahman in terms of Sat, Cit, Ānanda and Satya, Jñāna and Ananta. In Śaṅkara's epistemological situation, we come across appearance and reality into his position on antahkaraṇa, pramāṇa-vicāra, anirvacaniya khyātivāda and vivartavāda. Śaṅkara explains the status of consciousness as reality in terms of avasthātraya, i.e., jāgrat, svapna and suṣupti. This could be regarded as psychological framework. Besides these doctrines, I would also like to discuss the doctrine of Jīvan-mukti which is also in term of Reality and three different levels of reality, i.e., prātibhāsika, vyāvahārīka and Paramārthika sat. Before go into the details of these doctrines, I, in this chapter, shall explicate Śaṅkara's methodological situation of his philosophy of Advaita Vedānta.

(ii) Chapter 2: An Exposition of Appearance and Reality with reference to Ontology and Epistemology of Immanuel Kant:

I, in this chapter, shall discuss the nature and status of appearance and reality in Kant's critical philosophy in the framework of ontology and epistemology. In ontology, I would like to examine Kant's distinction of noumenon, thing-in-itself and phenomenon. As a matter of fact, the epistemological problems can properly be examined only in the context of the general ontological framework of a particular philosophical system. Likewise, Kant's epistemology constitutes the most vital aspect of his ontology. So I shall take up Kant's epistemology with occasional references to its bearing on his ontology. In Kant's epistemological situation, I have to discuss how 'synthetic apriori' judgements are possible. I, in this field, shall attempt to explore and examine the nature and status of sensibility, understanding and reason. I would also like to take up Kant's transcendental deduction of categories, transcendental schema, transcendental synthesis of imagination and transcendental consciousness. Before go into the details of these issues, I,
in this chapter, shall attempt to identify Kant in terms of methods he has adopted to vindicate his ontology and epistemology.

(iii) Chapter 3: Śaṅkara and Kant on Appearance and Reality: A Comparison and Contrast:

I, in this chapter, shall propose to develop a comparative and critical study of the nature and status of appearance and reality in Śaṅkarācārya and Immanuel Kant. One of the most philosophic problem in epistemology is the distinction between appearance and reality. Philosophers from the East as well as from the West discuss the significance of this problem and have tried to resolve it. In the Indian tradition, Śaṅkara has made a distinction between vyāvahārika sat and Paramārthika sat whereas Kant has made a distinction between phenomenon and noumenon. I shall try to deal with the problem of the distinction between appearance and reality within these two traditions. I am not simply going to develop a comparison and contrast between Śaṅkara and Kant, but my attempt will be to show that the argument of Śaṅkara and Kant regarding appearance and reality are supplemented by each other. My comparative and critical study of appearance and reality shall be focused within the framework of ontology, metaphysics and epistemology of Śaṅkara and Kant. I propose to discuss it under the following heads:

1. Appearance with reference to Antahkarana in Śaṅkara and sensibility in Kant.
2. Reality with reference to the role of Pramāṇas in Śaṅkara and Categories in Kant.
3. Reality as Paramārthika and Vyāvahārika Sat vis-à-vis Noumenon and Phenomenon.
4. Reality as Anubhava in Śaṅkara and Noumenon as Intellectual Intuition in Kant.
5. Reality as Self or Sāksin in Śaṅkara and Self as a Paralogism in Kant.
(iv) Conclusion:

On the basis of the above arguments given in former chapters, I would like to conclude that Śaṅkara and Kant successfully removed the dualism of appearance and reality. However Kant creates dualism between phenomenon and noumenon, knowledge and faith, known and unknown. But Śaṅkara successfully removes all the distinction and duality and find the final destination of life as jīvan mukti. Kant failed to realise the noumenal entity which is called Ātman or Brahman in Advaita Vedānta. Kant proposes intellectual intuition as the means of achieving the noumenal or highest reality which man can never comprehend. So he draws his philosophical conclusion as unknown and unknowable. Here, we can suggest an Advaitic view for Kantian philosophy to remove these dualisms and in this way, we can give the perfection to Kant’s critical philosophy.